INTERVIEW II

DATE: December 20, 1988

INTERVIEWEE: WALTER JUDD

INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette

PLACE: Judd home, Mitchellville, MD

Tape 1 of 2, Side 1

J: --went up and worked on trying to get a piece of legislation through to clarify those witches, their names. Their names are--witches and a piece of legislation saying that modern science and discoveries have shown that was an error and declared their name. And I said to Chris[?], "Well, I don't care a hoot about this, but my cousins and my sister are all upset. They're going on this as a mission. They've got to get this clarified." "Well," he said, "Walter, I've got problems up here. I don't know that I can get--the problem is with the current things, and the witches of Salem aren't one that I need to tangle with." So I went around and worked with him and the chairman of the committee that would deal with the legislation--he saw the point, and he called and they asked Chris, and he said that he approved of it, but he wasn't going to take it as a major cause; he had other causes he had to crusade for. So they got a piece of legislation through clarifying these witches who were hanged at Salem, and they were given honorable names in history.

G: Now her married name again was--

J: Pudeator. P-U-D-E-A-T-O-R.

G: And what was her first name?

J: Ann. She was Ann Judd. Ann--I forget what her name was before she was--she wasn't Ann Judd. She was Ann Greenslade, and then it was Pudeator when she married him after Greenslade died leaving his four kids, then she married Pudeator and he died and left them with five pounds apiece and they changed their name to Greenslade.

G: Fascinating. How were you related to her?

J: Right down descended. My mother's, my grandmother was a Greenslade. Mother's mother was a Greenslade. No, beg your pardon. Mother's mother was a Fuller. Mother's father was a Greenslade. He was a direct descendent.

G: Did you know your grandfather who was the captain in the--

J: Oh, yes. In the back room there's a--this room. This table, or that chair with those dog-ears--that was his. And we--they lived in a little town called Surprise. In Nebraska it's flat, you know. You go along there mile after mile after mile and all of the sudden there's a gap where the Blue River--just a little wide spot in the--a little rivulet that comes down through there, and it's a surprise. They named it Surprise. And my father, that's where Grandfather Judd took his homestead and where my--when my father was about eighteen or twenty or so when they moved over into Nebraska from Missouri, and Mother got out there because her older brother had come out from Connecticut and taken a homestead across the road, catty-corner.

Well, you know what happened. The boy on one side of the road married the girl on the other side of the road. There wasn't much out there but my father and my mother. There wasn't much opportunity or much competition, I suppose you might say. And we

were born there and Dad ran a little--Grandfather was still living and rented the farm and my father ran a little grocery store. Well, Uncle Walter bought the local lumberyard and started it, and my father liked that so he bought--went up and got a little lumberyard seven miles away. A little town called Rising City. It never rose. It was named after a fellow named Albert Rising who had homesteaded there and there was a little railroad. They had an elevator. Every seven or eight or ten miles the railroad had to put in a little town where they could bring the grain in and the elevator and the sand and the cement and things and groceries, whatever it is, could be shipped out there. There's no excuse for those towns now, because they can go to the county seat in less time in an automobile on a good highway than they could get in a horse-and-buggy or a wagon into the town and do their shopping and get back out to home in time to milk the cows and feed the cattle and feed the horses and so on.

So, my father had that lumberyard, and every Sunday afternoon--just as regular--we went to church in the morning. We went after lunch--dinner, we called it--we got in a buggy, all of us, and drove down to Surprise. We went around one corner in that little town and to the Judd home, and here Grandpa Judd sat in that chair. And he would tell you--he was a handsome guy, impressive. He'd sit there and his hands would go up and down on those two dog heads. Are they dog heads? Yes. They're dog heads.

G: Heads of dogs.

J: He'd look up and he'd say, "I says to him, says I"--we kids imitated this, you know--and "says he to me says he," and then he'd tell us these stories about during the war and we would sit there. I was the fifth--sixth of seven kids that would sit in there. When the

oldest was eight--and the first eight and a half years my father and mother had six kids. I was the bottom one of the kids as I sat in there on Sunday. They always said that I was insistent on getting my nickel's worth in in the discussion. They were all--all at once, you know, right together. Argumentative. The Judds were darned argumentative, so I've been that way ever since. Grab ahold of something that's important. I'd stick my neck out, and they'd try to hush me, but they couldn't; my brothers and sisters couldn't knock me out entirely. So we had that kind of a close family. Therefore Grandma Judd had a little--she was a tiny little girl, and she would sit in a little rocking chair that had a platform. It rolled back and forth on the platform. My wife likes it. She uses it. Here they would sit, those two. And we kids were always intrigued by Grandpa Judd because he had these stories about the war, and they had some problems with the Indians in those days, you see, or maybe they--

G: The western part of the--?

J: No, just seventy-five miles right straight west of Omaha. Although the road follows the Platte River, but if there were a section line going through it would be on the main street of Omaha that goes across the river. Douglas Street would run right along the north highway of the section where my folks lived in Rising--

G: Where had he been in the Civil War, did he say?

J: Well, he did mostly fighting in the area. Guerrilla warfare, with the people from the South coming up there. There were some mostly within Missouri and over into Indiana. Illinois, southern Illinois and Indiana. He was born in Indianapolis.

There were six Judds. One Judd came over from England. He had six sons and all--most of the Judds in this country, if they know anything about their ancestry, come from one or the other of them. We're from the third son, John. And he had come out of--most of them stayed there--Connecticut. All over. Connecticut, Massachusetts. Judds all over the place still. But they had moved west step by step and they had moved into Indianapolis, and they had a place where the Union Station in Indianapolis is now. He's buried in a little . . . He died. He had three sons, of which my grandfather was the youngest, and he died when he was about twenty-eight years old. I expect from what they said he probably had typhoid fever. And his mother, who's buried in that little cemetery, my great grandmother was a tremendous woman, and she brought those three kids out there in the wilderness and brought them up, practically. So I don't know quite why they moved over into--but Grandma--Great-Grandma Judd, my father's grandmother, was with them in Missouri and moved out in Nebraska and her tombstone's right there alongside Grandpa's, her son's. On the other side is his wife, who's my grandmother. Well, I didn't intend to get into all that.

G: That's interesting genealogy, and perhaps nobody knows it better than you do.

I saw a mention, a reference in the *Congressional Record* to the fact that you had observed something in Chungking in October 1944. Did you go to China in 1944?

J: Yes. Went down, flew over the "Hump," went into--

G: Tell me about that trip.

J: Well, the Foreign Affairs Committee had to keep track. We had to go before the Congress and justify the expenditures for this, and for that, and the other, so when

Congress was not in session, there were always--this is where really a change in the pattern of behavior of Congressmen and the way in which the Congress operates today came during the war. I'll come back to your question in a moment to get in an important observation. Night before last a man asked me--he said, "Dr. Judd, do you think the Congress is better now than it used to be?" And I said, "No, I know it's a lot worse, but there are reasons for it," and the basic reason is the character. During the war, the whole character of--the work of the Congress had to be changed. Formerly we were down there from early--one year Congress is in session from the beginning of December to the fourth of March. The other year it began the first week in December but could go up beyond the first part--sometimes into April or May. That's all the time they were in Washington. The rest of the time they were at home, and they practiced medicine at home; their income was at home. They only got enough to go down there one round trip a year, and when I went down there it was $8,000 a year, plus one round-trip.

Now they have a free trip home to wherever they're from, Hawaii or Alaska, every two weeks, as well as at the beginning and the end of the session, and their income was made there. They lived there. They practiced medicine. They farmed. They were lawyers. They were grocers. They were house--no, there weren't any women in those early years. There were schoolteachers, whatever. They lived locally. They thought locally. They went down for a few weeks or months of the year like the board of directors of a corporation. The stockholders don't try to run a corporation. They choose people in whose basic judgment they have confidence, put them on the board of directors, and they work for the good of the corporation. Not to get more and more money out of

this, that and the other for the constituents. Their job is to build a good corporation. That's the main thing that the stockholders want. If it's a good, strong corporation, they'll get their dividends and so on. Now that's what Congress was supposed to be.

We're not a democracy; we're a republic. We're not direct government-by-the-people. There are three forms of government. There was government from the top down by dictators imposed or sometimes chosen, like the Germans really gave their allegiance to Hitler. And then there is the other kind, which is a pure democracy which has never lasted very long. And the prospects for our country are not too good. No. I'll tell you--I'll interrupt myself to put it in here now. There's a quote from a British scholar named [Sir Alex Fraser] Tytler, a Scotsman. Two hundred years ago he was a great scholar of Greece and Rome and the Mediterranean area. And he had a paragraph at the end of his major work, and this is the paragraph: "A democracy can never exist as a permanent form of government. It can exist only until people discover themselves--discover that they can vote themselves largesse"--which was their word for benefits--"out of the public treasury. From that moment on the majority always votes for the candidate who promises most, and the democracy goes down over a loose fiscal policy." They spend more money than they have. He goes down there. His job is to get some benefits for his customer. He's not going to do what's good for the United States, but, "What's good for my customers?" Well, he knows you've got to have as few wars as possible, but most of the amount Congressmen work now is taking care of the needs or the demands or the desires of the citizen.

Now here we were during the war with a guy who was at home. He made his living at home, on his practice, and he had to have the same interests that the neighbors had. He was a local person. But during the war, and I was a part of it, we had to be there to vote all the time, and so over a period of four years of the war, we had to be in Washington most all the time. We didn't run back and forth, because we didn't get our pay except at the beginning of the session and at the end of the session, and so you couldn't go home all the time, and so after a while you had to expand that and give more benefits, and more benefits. They vote themselves benefits out of the public treasury. And there was a reason for it, understandable.

But what have they done? Nowadays they don't even have homes. They don't have a residence back in their district, back in their hometown, farm, wherever it is. They go home, for a rally, and then come on back, and they live. They bring up their family. Their kids go to school. They're no longer by training background Nebraskans or Iowans or Virginians; they're Washingtonians. They vote then in terms of who can get the most benefits for their own jury. Here, you know, we have something like twelve hundred, I think it is, little military establishments and Congress can't get them closed down because every guy's got one or two in his district and he's going to defend that because the people who work for that want it. So, what's good for the defense of the United States? They're totally useless! They were put in to deal with Indians, or little rebellions here and there, and they had to have a little place where there's some officers and a few men, for aid and guard and so on, and they're on almost every sizable--almost every town. Almost every district's got one of them, and you can't get them closed, even

now! Well, the democracy's not going to last, because it will go down over a loose fiscal policy.

Our debt--we talk about cutting down the deficits. You can't cut it down, because whenever you do it--it's relatively easy to prevent the expansion of benefits, but once they've been gotten, then it's considered rights. You're depriving them of rights. One of my favorite speeches or arguments [is about the] Bill of Rights, and people think the Bill of Rights is a list of the things the government must do for the citizens. No. Every single one of them--except the tenth, which is broad--every single one of them is a guarantee that our government can *not* do this, that, or the other *to* the citizens. Rights are what your government can *not* do! Not what they must do *for* you. And we've changed it by pattern, especially with the Roosevelt years on--the Depression. In emergencies you have to go in and do things. In war, you have to do it. But then you should go back to the basic system. But you can't do it. These things were done during the war, and you can't take them away. Take them away, you're depriving people of their rights, and they're brought up to believe that they have a right.

Another illustration of it: the federal government was not supposed to have any relations to the citizen, except in few defined cases. If he went abroad, he had to get a federal passport. If he committed a crime and escaped into a neighboring state, the federal government would assist in getting him back into his own state. And only two or three things like that--the government had nothing to do with the citizens. The state government took care of the citizens. This is the United *States* of America, not the

United People of America. And see, little by little without realizing the whole thinking has changed completely. Not completely, but substantially.

G: Would you add the post office?

J: Yes, the post office--there are four or five. But they have nothing to do--and many people believe that the post office will be much better handled if it were handled privately. I'll give you a sample of it. What is the most--everything is more expensive now, and costlier than it was, but the one that's expanded more than anything else are the public values. For instance, in 1950--now that's less than forty years ago--it cost three cents to send a letter, and now it costs twenty-five. It's gone up eight times. Eight times! And the service [is] complained about all the time. Now they talk about business. AT&T--the cost of your telephone is less now than it was in 1950, and you can get somebody else almost instantaneously. Efficient, efficient, efficient. And so what does the government do? It breaks up AT&T. It's incredible! They've been successful. They got money. So break it up and pass it out among the rest of us. You see, this is why it will go down.

The thinking of the people has changed. Government is to take care of me, not to protect me against anybody's depriving me of my proper rights. This is a--some people say to me, "Walter, you're pessimistic." And I say, "No, but I'm realistic, and I'm anxious, because my country as a free society as we've known it--it'll be"--as I told you the last time, the thing I put on the blackboard when I go out to talk to students if they come into political science class or something like that, I say, well, after a few remarks,

"Let me put on the blackboard here for you to look at for the next forty minutes the story of history."

And I draw a line on the blackboard like this. The rise and fall of governments. That's the story of history. The rise and *fall*! There isn't a one that hasn't fallen, and ours is one of the longest already. We've got over two hundred years already. Only two or three others have gone that long. And why do they go down? Old Tytler puts it [that] they went down over loose fiscal policies. They spend money they haven't got. After a while, they can't do it, and then they get to thinking, the Socialists comes along and he cares. He wants level. But instead of leveling up, getting more and more people to get better incomes, the whole thing comes out to be leveled down, and you pull down the ones who have become rich, who generally are the most creative of the people. They got rich by inventing or risking, or starting something. And so after a while, you're going to have an equitable division of less and less and less. There won't be anything more to divide more equitably, because the creative, the big enterprises, the ones that raise the higher standards of living, they're the three or five per cent of the people, ten, fifteen at most.

And when people talk to me about, "You've got to think of the poor." All right. I've got an illustration there. How many are there? Well, one hundred years ago more than fifty per cent of them were considered poor. Everybody was poor. My little hometown. We didn't have anything. My father got the lumberyard and he had one hundred dollars a month to take care of seven kids and family, and we had to--all of us had to work, all of us. I'd peddle papers. We did this, that and the other. All of us

worked. My mother never washed dishes or wiped dishes in ten years; we did it. We knew which one we were assigned and we did it. We didn't feel sorry for ourselves or anybody else in town doing the same thing. That's the way it was. But now you've got to spend your time watching the TV, or the radio, or so on. The whole attitude has changed.

Now--well, I got off the track. Oh--so we have to find out how much. It was about fifty per cent, then it got down to forty per cent, then thirty per cent and so on. So I say, "What's the percentage now?" Well, you're considered poor now if you're a family of four [that] gets less than I think it's about ten thousand, twelve thousand or something like that. Less than twelve thousand. Or maybe even fourteen now. I don't know how many there are out of the people there. Well, it used to be fifty per cent, forty, thirty, twenty, below the poverty line; now if it's about fourteen thousand, that's less than fifteen per cent of our people. Okay, fifteen per cent of our people are poor. That's bad, isn't it? "All right, what's the rest of the equation?" I asked the students. "Well, if fifteen per cent of our people are poor--it's only a little over twelve, but we'll call it fifteen per cent, that's easier to figure. What's the rest of it?" Finally some kid called, "Well, that means that eighty-five per cent of the people are not poor."

Well, now you see. Now, this is bad; fifteen per cent are poor. But eighty-five per cent of the people are not poor. That isn't bad. Anybody else any better than that? No. It's the best record in history. But instead of preserving and expanding and developing the system, which has given us less poverty, we must discard this system because of the fifteen per cent that are poor. And so I say, I'm a conservative. I want to conserve the system under which eighty-five per cent of the people could manage to

develop their own self-reliance, their own self-support, and become prosperous. In order--but most people say conservative means--what's the other word?--reactionary. I'm a conservative in order to go *ahead*! I want to conserve the system, the attitudes, the values, the approaches, which were most successful in the past in order to make headway. I call myself--I've always called myself a progressive conservative, but you've got to progress by conserving and developing and expanding and extending the system, which had worked. Look at the system, which had worked. Do I want to trade it in for some system that didn't--however bad ours is, there's worse. Well, it makes you lonely to be a crusader like this, but that's what I've been doing, as you know.

G: Tell me about your trip to China in 1944.

J: Well, we had to work in a business of trying--the war was on, you see. And we were concentrating less than one per cent of our assistance went to Asia. Ninety-nine plus per cent all went to Europe. But it was clear by 1944--this was when they had the landing that spring on the beach, landing in Europe, and we were able to make it, and it was clear--Italy was crumbling--that we were going to make it in Europe. Now the next problem, what are you going to do about Japan and Asia? And so the Foreign Affairs Committee sent a group of us over there. [Inaudible] was on that group. Always worked out carefully. Sent him to Europe. And this was a Republican Congress [Congress had a Democratic majority in 1944], so the chairman of it was a Republican. And we were over in Europe and they said--they sent a message to us, "Why don't some of you go on--especially a Republican and a Democrat so it's bipartisan--go on from there to take a look at the situation in Asia." I couldn't get anybody to go. They liked London and Paris

and Rome and Venice and so on. But I did. I left them in London and went down--with Hitler's planes attacking, I went down and I landed on the west coast, went down past Spain, France and Spain to Africa, in, I can't think of the name of the town. You know, right there. Well, that was one of our main channels. Stuff went across from Cape Horn to this center in West Africa.

G: You were flying?

J: Yes. On a commercial plane. The air force was assigned a plane to take--they flew us over to Europe and flew us back.

G: You went by yourself?

J: So I went all by myself the rest of the way, and the rest of them didn't want to go. Well, I knew the language, and I knew something about it and I went. So then we flew across North Africa and stopped at Tunis and got over to Egypt, and then from Egypt we flew over Jerusalem. I could look down on it. The next stop was at the head of the Persian Gulf, and then the next one was one of the islands there in the Indian Ocean, and then into India, and over through New Delhi into Burma, and there we had an air force base and flew over the Hump, nineteen, twenty thousand feet to get over the Himalayan mountains, and they're usually covered with clouds and we didn't have anything like the guidance by electrical measures they have on cars [planes] now.

G: What sort of plane were you in when you . . . ?

J: Well, we went over in a C-47. That's an old DC-3, and they're not supposed to fly higher than fifteen thousand. They had them and they also had a DC-4 which had four engines. I'd rather go in a DC-4. But we went over, and one of my best friends--I beg your

pardon, [the] son of one of my best friends went over in a--well, I don't want to get diverted here.

The Chinese asked for help, like we were giving to Europe, and as I said, less than one per cent of all our assistance ever went to China, and they asked for grain and fertilizer and planes and gasoline and things like that and instead we sent them paper money. Congress appropriated--I worked like the dickens to get five hundred million dollars, that's a half a billion, for aid to China. They cut it down to 175 million when it got over to the senate, 175 million instead of a billion. And they used most of it to pay printing establishments, one in Chicago and one in Newark as I recall, who printed money, printed paper money, to help China cure her inflation.

Her own inflation was because she's printed so darn much money of her own, because that's all she had to fight the war with Japan. She'd been at war, eight years! We hadn't been there. We were only three years. But China's supposed to not have any inflation, although she'd been at war eight years. And so what did we do, to help her cure inflation? Somebody--I just think there had to be Communist agents in our government. They couldn't be that dumb, and they printed up these bales and bales and bales of paper money from Chicago and Newark and one of those planes going over in the terrible storms and winds up the top of the Himalayan mountain.

The son of one of my closest friends, Dr. Watson's boy, he was graduated Phi Beta Kappa from Carleton College in Minnesota, and in the wind, the violence, the bales of money broke loose and fell over on him and killed him, in a plane, going over the Hump. Well, that's kind of a rough--I didn't have any storm like that when I went over.

And so I got over and landed in Yenan [Yan'an]. That's where [General Claire Lee] Chennault had his headquarters.

G: Had you met Chennault before, or was this the first time?

J: No, no, but he took care of me, his people did, and he had a couple of interviews and I became an admirer, a devotee. He was as levelheaded, and as right, and he was at odds with the Pentagon all the time, or--there wasn't a Pentagon there yet, but the War Department, because they were thinking of it in terms of previous wars. Our military almost always plans the next war in terms of the last war, but the next war's different. But Chennault, you know, he got kicked out of the air force because he had ideas that weren't according to the previous ideas, and when they took him back in he was a genius.

G: Did you meet him here for the first time or--?

J: When I was over there. Sure.

G: On this trip?

J: Yes. I met him on that trip.

G: Tell me what he was like.

J: Well, he was a quiet fellow. He was determined, effaced[?], and he was a little profane. He said, "Damn fools." But he never got up and walked the floor. He was not--he was cool; he was cool-headed. But he sure was warm-hearted. I remember he sat there and he said, "Look here," and he had a map, and over here we were doing all around the world what--here the Soviet--he was already thinking ahead, and coming across looking were Europe and Italy, defending [the] Mediterranean, all the way around Russia. When Japan is done we're going to have Russia, and they've all--everything's got to come

through a little two-[hundred?] mile gap between this lake, Lake Baikal, and the Gobi Desert. And he said, "Can you get the people in Washington to pay any attention to that? No. We've all got to run because the navy wants this and the air force wants so and so. But if we just block that two hundred miles they can't get through!" He was broken-hearted most of the time because they didn't follow his judgment. They followed the books on how to fight wars--previous wars. I have the greatest admiration for him. He was about as popular in the Pentagon as a fresh case of smallpox, but he was right as he could be, and now everybody recognizes it and he's honored properly but not very much. I've got a book I can give you. He wrote ten letters and I put it--it's not a little book, it's a pamphlet, like this stuff. I put them in the *Congressional Record*. I think I could get one down--in which he in polite terms, outlined what was ahead, and how to fight this war. He didn't unload in that vehemently as he did in private conversation, but he was just as right as could be. Uncanny, how he was, so--

He then arranged for me to go off to Chungking, and I landed at Chungking right at the time that the quarrel--not quarrel, difference of opinion--between the Pentagon, most of the Pentagon, and the civilians in Washington, and on the other hand Joe Stilwell--came to a head and Stilwell had to be fired. And Stilwell is a good friend of mine. He had come out--he was in charge of the military attaché adviser when the governor of China was still in Peking, before they had to move it down to Nanking, and he was a great huntsman and he said these cuss words all the time. "Those blank, blank, blank, blank. They won't tell you the truth. They'll just tell you what you want to hear. You can't find anything out." I said, "Well, come on out. I'm the last outpost before the

Communists. You want to find out what the Communists are about? You're just concentrating on Japan but the big one's going to be the Communists. We're going to lick Japan." So he came out and stayed with me a time or two.

G: In Chungking?

J: No, in Fenchow [now Fenyang], in north Shansi [Shanxi]. This was before the war, before it got--the bad war when the war had to go in--when Chiang Kai-shek had to retreat into West China. And this city, Fenyang, is the beginning of a long caravan trail. It's on the great, rich agriculture basin of Shansi [Shanxi] province, and from there the caravan trail goes on up in across into Shensi [Shaanxi?] and then up to Kansu [Gansu?] province and then over into Chinese Turkistan and Inner Mongolia. And a caravan trail of maybe fifty, as much as a hundred cattle--wait a minute--camels would bring down hides and things like that. And the end of the trail is Fenyang, and all outside the city gates, the whole east gate part is made up of the stores that deal with those. They sell salt, and cloth and medicines and things like that in exchange for the hides, and some metals, rare metals which the camels bring down in the daytime, and the donkeys use the trail at night. They can't go on the trail at the same time because when they meet they get into quarrels, or fight and mix up. So the camels go by day and the donkeys go by night. And he--those guys, they know what's going on over there. Our people go and talk to the officials. They tell you what you want to hear. These tell you what's going on over there. So he came out and he stayed with me. There was no hotel in my town. He stayed with me. I'd gotten Mrs. Judd out earlier with two and a half kids on the last train that got through before they cut the railroad to the coast, and I stayed on there alone

trying to hold the work together. So I knew Joe, and then he--he was a great guy. He was the one bad appointment that Roosevelt made. He was a genius at selecting, picking out Ike [Dwight D. Eisenhower] to put him in charge of that. He didn't know whether Ike was a good soldier or not. He never had any combat. But he was a good organizer. And he could get people to deal with him. He could make them--get them together. And [General George C.] Marshall had, again, wasn't necessarily--he'd had some combat. Ike never was out in combat; Marshall had. But Marshall had [a] grasp of the overall thing. And he made him--but Marshall made the--recommended Stilwell because Marshall had been up at our mission at Chungking during--in Peking ever since the Boxer War, [the] rebellion in 1900. At the beginning of that century. We'd had a military unit of marines guarding our embassy. They were no threat to them, but there it was, in Peking, and Stilwell was there when Marshall was there, and they got to be friends. Stilwell, you put him in the field and he was a soldier. He was never ever better. He loved combat. He was great. He was like a [General George S.] Patton, I used to always say, a Patton and an Eisenhower. Patton was a--he wanted to be with the troops. I don't think--he couldn't have organized and united the people of Western Europe that had been fighting among themselves. Our people would. Because he was contentious. Ike knew how to get people together. I don't know how they'd be good in combat or not. Stilwell was a combat man, but what that place needed was a person who could do what Eisenhower did: pull the various factions together. And so I saw this and saw Stilwell and I happened to be there in Chungking and I went to Chungking and of course they had a big

reception for me because there hadn't been anybody else from Congress. I was the first fellow during the war that got out into--

G: Was Chiang Kai-shek there?

J: Oh, sure. I talked to him.

G: Was this your first meeting with him?

J: No, I had met him--I'll have to get these straight to make sure--I had met him before in Nanking. Was that the early part of the war? No, that was the later part of the war. No, I can't tell you on the spur of the moment which was the first time I'd met him. But I met him out there and I was greatly impressed with him. Cool, level-headed, undemonstrative, old-fashioned Chinese. To get excited was unworthy because it demonstrated you were allowing external things to have more control over you than your internal composure that Confucius had deified, practically.

Well, so they came to a head and Stilwell had demanded that he be put in charge of the troops as commander-in-chief of the Chinese army. He'd been given the power but he demanded the name, too. The head of no country, no little crossroads, will--the head of it can't put somebody else's name ahead of his own. And Chiang had promised to give him the full control. He already had practically full--but Stilwell had the name. The Generalissimo couldn't agree to that so he had to say--wrote to Roosevelt and said, "You'll have to withdraw this man because he's making demands, which no sovereign government can agree to." And that decision came when I was there.

Well, Stilwell had a dinner for me one night, the night before he was to leave, and he was broken. Not like the old man--not like the younger man that I'd helped entertain

up in Shansi [Shanxi] when he came in from Peking to see what was going on with these caravan trails and so on. And he gave this dinner for me and there were people there from the press and the civilians and various other things. Only about twenty people. I sat next to him on his right, a place of honor of course, and he went to sleep. He was exhausted. He was a broken guy.

He was going to leave the next day so I got up and went down there to see him off. At that time of year--it was October--the river's low and there's an island that comes up out of the Yangtze River and there's a little runway on it that a DC-3 could use and he was going to leave from there; otherwise he'd have to go out in the country about twelve miles to find the big runway--airport. So, I got up real early and went down there to see him off. And I never will forget when he walked up the little platform three steps to get into the tail-end of this DC-3, he turned around, he said, "Walter, God help my successor." Those were his words. And he went away. And that's the last almost anybody ever heard of him.

Well, he came home and was a troublemaker but--and bitter. Bitter, bitter about his own failure. Who was his successor? [Albert] Wedemeyer. And Stilwell didn't even do the courtesy to Wedemeyer to wait and turn the thing over to him. When he was pulled out he got up and left. Wedemeyer had to come in--but Wedemeyer succeeded brilliantly. Instead of going to Stilwell [Chiang Kai-shek] and calling you my--what did he always--Stilwell called Chiang Kai-shek--oh, he had a cuss--he had a derogatory word.

G: Peanut.

J: Peanut! Yes. "This is what you've got to do for me," and so on. Wedemeyer went in to the Generalissimo and said, "We're in a war together. You need us, yes, and we need you. How do we work together to win this war? That's first." And he immediately was given the powers and more that Stilwell had demanded and been refused, but he didn't demand the face. He didn't demand the position. He didn't demand the humiliation of the commander-in-chief. And he succeeded brilliantly, right off the bat. And one of the most successful operations in the whole war was Wedemeyer and Chennault [Chiang Kai shek?], the two of them. Both of them began and worked with the Chinese, and got the Chinese to work with them instead of ordering, ordering, ordering, handing out--domineering and--

G: Did you experience any threat from the Japanese while you were there?

J: Yes, the first--about the third or fourth day I flew up to Ch'engtu [Chengdu], which is the capital of that Szechwan province, and I had some friends there in the medical school and I wanted to see and the universities that I was helping raise money for in this country--

(Interruption)

G: We were talking about the threat from the Japanese.

J: They had their first air raid attack on Ch'eng tu [Chengdu], the capital, and they tried to bomb Chungking. There hadn't been any bomb, but Chungking [had] clouds in such a way that had they had their first raid, they couldn't do much damage in Chungking, but they did do quite a bit of damage--I was there when the raid came, and there's all kinds of odds and ends there but that's enough. So I . . .

G: Tell me the odds and ends.

J: Well, I couldn't get out of there. I wanted to get back. I had to get back to Washington, because Congress was having its autumn recess, and I was already gone longer. I had to wait four or five days, but I spent it. There were a couple of nurses there that had worked for me over in Shansi [Shanxi], but they'd fled west when the Japanese came in and occupied the town, and I saw them and they entertained me and enjoyed it, but I was anxious to get back.

G: Were they Chinese?

J: Oh, Chinese, sure. I wanted to get back to Chungking and I wanted to see what was what up there and evaluate the situation. I had a long conversation. Wasn't it in one of these? Didn't I talk on one of those pieces that you've got there about my conversation with the head of the Communists? Let me see. The War of the Ideas in 1948, no I think it was "What is the Truth About China?" I don't know whether I gave you that. Well--in which I talked quite a bit about that. No, I didn't give you that. I've got one. I'll give you that and you take it along if you want. It was "What is the Truth About China?" It'd only take one second. There was in Peking a representative of Chungking--

(Side 2, Tape 1 of 2)

(Interruption)

J: Let's go ahead with the discussion. I'll dig it out. It isn't in there; I thought it was.

G: In any event, you were talking about meeting with the representative of the--?

J: Of the Chinese. He was in Chungking, the capital at that time in exile, same as the--they consider Chungking as their capital in exile, same as it's in Taiwan now in exile. That's incredible. I talked to that--I was outlining the problems that Chiang Kai-shek had. This

was a basic one. I'll give you a copy. You can send it back to me later. But--because that probably had more influence than any speech I ever made in Congress, because it was clear we were winning in Europe and now we had to shift over to Asia, and I had helped win the war in Europe, but now I could get attention to Asia. What is the truth about the things that were wrong in China, and the things that are wrong in ours, and one of the problems was the Communists, but I'll be darned--my discussions with them.

It was obvious that the Communists were in trouble. Whenever they're in trouble they're just like [Mikhail] Gorbachev now, as far as--I have to predict. I hope I'm wrong, but I have to predict you'll find that whenever they're in trouble they become sweet. They've got to have some help, and they don't get help by growling at us. They get help by being sweet. And he thinks he can handle us, and maybe he can. They have in the past. Every time a boxer gets in trouble he clinches. That isn't because he loves the other guy. That's in order to clear his head and make it.

G: Tell me about you conversation with the Chinese Communists.

J: Well, I'll have to look up the details of it. It's all in that thing. I can find it and get it to you, because it was clear to me from there, right there, that they were down there. They were out on the end of the rope, and so they wanted to have cooperation. There's a quotation in there, a classic quotation from Zhou Enlai. "A truce is the military equivalent of the political tactic of coalition." That's a classic, but we couldn't get it through people's head. In peacetime, if you're trying to win politically and you can't get enough support to win at the ballot box, well, let's have a coalition. We'll all go together, and you'll get in [inaudible] party and we'll bring them all in to a coalition. Old Gus Hall

advocates that--he used to more--in our country. So Zhou Enlai said, "A truce isn't a means of peace. A truce is a means of avoiding defeat." They don't ask for a truce except when they're in trouble. If they're on top, why should they have a truce? Go ahead and destroy their adversary. So he said, "A truce is the military"--we think it's a method of peace. "It's a military tactic which--as the equivalent of the political tactic of coalition in peacetime." If you can't win by votes in peacetime, have a coalition! You'll get a few jobs in the cabinet, you're on the inside, you know what's going on, you can influence.

In wartime, if you can't win on the battle field, have a truce, and get a breathing spell, and other people will relax and say, "We're on peace. We can cut down on our appropriations now, because old Gorbachev is talking *glasnost* and *perestroika*. But it's *glasnost*--there isn't very much *perestroika*. That's part of the talk. It's the sweetness. We should relax and so on. Talk, talk, as against deeds. There haven't been any deeds yet on their side! I keep hoping there will be. Every time he makes another--looks like a deed, but it doesn't work out yet. It's talk--their students. They make their people, you know, go to classes. Ordinary people go to classes a couple of nights a week, three or four hours, and study communism. Boy, that's the Bible. If the Christians made their people study the Bible, the way the Communists study the doctrines of Marx and Lenin and Mao Tse-tung and so on, all right.

G: Did you have any--did you do any medical practice while you were there?

J: No--this time? No, I was only there about three weeks. Two weeks, I guess.

G: You were saying that you had trouble getting out.

J: Well--

G: How did you finally get out?

J: Getting out of Chungking--getting out? It was because of the first Japanese bomb. And then, fortunately, a period of cloudiness came in. And those mountains out there--that's hairy. And I couldn't get back. Every day they'd say, "Well, it will be clear enough to fly tomorrow"--because Chungking is a bad place to land, as down in the riverbank like I told you. When you take off at that place in the river at I think it's seven seconds he has to watch it because he gets up just a little bit. He's in clouds, and at seven seconds he has to make a sharp turn, otherwise he hits the mountain, because the river goes down there and then turns right, and at seven seconds, he knows the thing, he can turn right in the clouds. Well, but you can't come in that way.

And when I went in about that time, the guy got lost going in there, and he turned and went the wrong direction. And he went way out there, couldn't see, and was running out of gas. I went up and talked to the two young fellows. They hadn't had much experience. And we had a little [inaudible] and fortunately there was a place where two rivers came together and there was a gap right over there, and on the map I studied it and showed him, because I was familiar with that a little bit, and that had to be so-and-so. So we knew where we were. And I said, "This is up about a thousand feet. Get down below that and stay in the river, and you just follow the bank, with the rivers on both sides, and we followed it back for a half, three-quarters of an hour, and got into Chungking. When I got in there, well you couldn't get--the weather was such, it was a blessing as far as protection from the Japanese, because they were--it gave them a chance to get organized

and get their defenses. They hadn't--it was a first attack, air attack. Came while I happened to be there. I don't have any kind of uncanny luck or bad luck to be at places where big things happen without my having anything to do with it, but I was able to observe and see it.

G: What did you do when the attack came?

J: Well, they went down into the basement of a home, a missionary home out there, can't think of the name of the fellow now, but he had--a professor from England was a guest of his. They didn't have any hotels for foreigners or anything of the sort to amount to anything. And I stayed in his home. His wife was a friend of one of the people that I had known well when I was in Nanking, years before. Everybody looks after everybody else. You don't hesitate to--they take them in sometimes. We had guests in one of our episodes. Miriam kept track of them. More than half the nights for the whole six months or so we had guests in our home. They were just stranded, you know. Everybody pitches in and takes care overseas, and missionaries do that all along and in wartime everybody does.

G: You were talking about flying in late 1945 after you returned. The Civil Aeronautics Board--

J: This was 1947. No. 1944.

G: 1944. You had--the Civil Aeronautics Board had approved an air route from the twin cities to the Orient, and then apparently on the Senate side, there was some lobbying to have that route go from one of the western states rather than from the twin cities. My recollection is that it was a case of Pan American versus--

J: Northwest.

G: Yes. Tell me about that.

J: Well, that's one of the places I had some problems with Eisenhower, because he--it's a long story but I could give you some of the materials on it to look at. Northwest--

G: You were in favor of Pan Am, or--?

J: No, I was in favor of the best routes. I have never operated in terms of being partial to this company or that person, or even that politician. I follow him not in terms of whether I like him or not, but terms of whether what I think that what he's advocating is the right policy or an unwise policy. Well, Pan American already had a monopoly from Los Angeles and San Francisco and Seattle, through Honolulu, on out to Japan. And then on to Hong Kong. Taiwan hadn't been developed much any time. And to Peking earlier, out to Hong Kong and down to Manila. That was the lines, out and back, out and back. And Northwest came out and went up to Seattle and went up from Northwest--Minneapolis up to Anchorage in Alaska. And then they expanded when they got better planes that could go a long distance so they could get out. There was a refueling place at the end of the Aleutian Islands, and the next one they could get to Tokyo--if they were lucky. And they wanted to--we needed more service, and so they applied for--well Pan Am--first, I think, I'm not sure of the order here--to go the northern route, because it saved you. It's about eleven hours shorter route to go up around the globe than to go around the belly of the globe. It's so much time and it's much cheaper; they can do it much more cheaply. And Northwest had a more efficient, therefore, operation, but it didn't have the population centers. Didn't have the passenger line, but it could get there in less time. So Pan Am, as

I think, first applied for that up there, whereupon Northwest applied for a route across the Pacific. Have two competing services on both routes. Well, Pan Am fought that tooth and nail. She already had more than three-quarters of the traffic across the Pacific, and Northwest had one quarter. But they were going to move in on Northwest, and Northwest couldn't move in on them. Well, there was some funny things about it, and one of them was that Sinclair Weeks, who was the minister of education or secretary of education, or secretary of commerce [secretary of commerce], I think, was on the board of Pan Am, and also Milton Eisenhower, Ike's brother, had a son who was hooked up with Pan Am. Well, it looked bad. I didn't think that; I knew it. I'm sure--I knew Ike wouldn't intervene [?], but I had to write him a letter. I can send you a copy of it, in which I said, "I've got to report that this will be interpreted as"--what do you call it when you--what's the word for using your family, your relationship?

G: Nepotism.

J: "Nepotism." It'll be--"Sir, much as I regret it I have to report that it's already being talked about as an example of your being influenced because of your secretary, who's on their board, and your--son of your brother," I think is--maybe those relationships I'll have to dig them up.

So Ike was angry I had written down this and he called a meeting on a Saturday morning down at the White House, when--that would be a quiet day and the press wasn't paying attention. So we had a meeting down there with him and his brother and Sinclair Weeks, and me and Sherman Adams and somebody else from Sinclair Weeks' people in the Commerce Department, and I laid out the proposition and showed that it seemed the

immediate fair thing was to have--everywhere else we want competition, what's wrong? We'd be dividing, Pan American's got the--as I recall Northwest was only asking for the right to go from Seattle across and not from Los Angeles because Northwest didn't have anything in Los Angeles, didn't have traffic in San Francisco and Los Angeles at that time. So Pan Am would still have the dominance, but she wouldn't have a monopoly of the central route and she'd still be getting in on the other route.

Well, I laid it out and presented it and I got back to my office, took about an hour and a half or so and within fifteen minutes Sherman Adams called to tell me that the President had decided in favor of what I was advocating. That meant he had to go against his brother, or at least it looked that way, and against a member of his cabinet. Ike was a fair guy, but it was a difficult one. And he was as mad at me as the devil in the beginning. But he was--

G: What did he say?

J: No, he didn't say to me much, but he did to other people. It got back to me. I knew he disagreed with me, and I had--well, I'll show you a sample of the letter in which I said I hesitated to do this because it can be interpreted as if I'm working for Northwest Airlines. No, I think on a basis of the needs of our country, and the service they rendered and equity and the principles of America that it would be--I didn't put so much that this would be so much favorable to my town and so on as that it would be devastating--damaging is a better word--to his administration. And I don't know what the arguments were. I never bothered as long as the decision was made, and Northwest got in there and Northwest worked harder. The underdog almost always works harder than the one who's got the

advantage because the fellow gets careless. If you have an advantage or a monopoly you can go as you darn please. If you've got a competitor there you've got to get down harder to work. So it was a good decision and I never held any grudges. But he made the decision on the basis of my representation, no arguing about that.

G: You discussed Joe Stilwell's removal. Let me ask you about the resignation of Patrick Hurley.

J: Well, Patrick Hurley was just as right as Stilwell had been wrong. And Pat went out there in a conciliatory way, just as Wedemeyer had, but the bureaucracy--what was ordinarily spoken of as the Communist cell in the Far East department, the four Johns. I told you about that, didn't I? The four Johns was [inaudible] spoke of. John Carter Vincent, John Stewart Service, John Payton Davis, and John Emerson. There were four Johns in the Far East division, and they were all against Chiang Kai-shek. They didn't consider themselves [as] being for the Communists, but the Communists are geniuses at taking something and making it even.

Chiang Kai-shek had six adjectives: inept, incompetent, inefficient, undemocratic, corrupt and reactionary; all of which were partly true. After all the years of fighting an external war for eight years against Japan, and twenty years against the Communists, an internal war. And a weak government just getting started and the first democracy in all of China's six thousand years of history, the real story was how they hung on at all! That was the remarkable success under the difficulties. Instead it was all--it was so bad. We had no business to go along with them, and--well, I ran across one here today. I think it's important.

(Interruption)

. . . extract of a letter of transmittal, about a thousand pages, on why we were not dumping Chiang Kai-shek and going along with the Communists.

G: The State Department's white paper.

J: Yes, the white paper. July 30, 1949. And here, Acheson said, in the introduction:

> When peace came, the United States was confronted with three possible alternatives in China. One, it could have pulled out lock, stock, and barrel. Two, it could have intervened militarily on a major scale to assist the nationalists to destroy the Communists. Three, it could--while assisting the nationalists to assert their authority over as much of China as possible, it could endeavor to avoid a civil war by working for a compromise between the two sides.

The compromise; the truce; the coalition. And then I wrote in there how naive or ignorant was [Secretary of State Dean] Acheson. Who has ever gotten a "compromise" with Communists unless you first defeat them? You can't get any compromise. Never amounted to anything. They get a coalition but they don't surrender anything. They get on the inside. Then I put a note by WHAC [White House Communications Agency, pronounced "WACA"] in the original. This was a later one I wrote in there. There was a fourth course the United States could have followed. The only course many of us advocated. Proper aid to the nationalists of the sort we gave to Greece [and] Turkey. Moral, economic and military support with our advisers authorized to "advise and train at all levels," as had been done in Greece. We did not, in Greece, "work for a compromise between the two sides." We went ahead and helped the Greeks win! And probably because we went into Greece and they had a rotten government. Everything in that government was as bad as possible, and it was in cahoots with Yugoslavia and the

Soviet--some of it was. But we--and we had a man. I can't think of his name. He also came from Minnesota, our adviser out there. He was not permitted--couldn't go anywhere near a field of battle. Couldn't go within fifty miles of a field of battle. So in China they had at one time--I forget the figure--over a hundred at least, advisers. But they couldn't go anywhere. They were in Chungking writing papers. Writing papers. Chungking. Couldn't go anywhere where the fighting was. And when--in Greece we didn't any--and finally Wedemeyer. That's the reason I got on--not Wedemeyer . . .

G: Hurley?

J: No. The fellow who went up and saved the thing in Turkey. As he had in Greece. He's retired now. Van . . . He's retired down in Florida and I don't come up with words. His name's well known. But when he sent him in there--and some of us worked on this and I got a medal here. That's a citation from the King of Greece because I--the intervention by me was responsible largely for the government giving effective aid to the government of Greece even though it was a rotten government! But at least it was on our side, against the Communists. Although we were--we gave it but, Wedemeyer--can't think of his name, it'll come later on. I hope. He insisted on having--they should advise and train at all levels. That is, his men had to go out with him, and if they--if it was a Greek general, he put a major in touch with him. If it was a Greek colonel, he put a captain in touch with him. But he went out with him in the field and worked with them. Always working with them instead of writing papers, and I tried to get them--that's what we could have done, proper aid, advise and train at all levels.

Then here Acheson went on--I'm pretty near through--"The unfortunate," Acheson said, "but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the government of the United States." It was in Greece! But we wouldn't give them proper aid. I use the word "proper aid." "Nothing that this country did," he said, "nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed that result. Nothing that was left undone by this country has contributed to it." Now that sounded awful convincing.

Note by WHAC: "Acheson carefully does not say that 'nothing we did has contributed to the result,' yet what we did was *a*, if not *the*, decisive factor in contributing to the result. He said (laughter) nothing that we did had failed to do so. He didn't say what we had done"--and I [gave?] four things we did. One: reneging on the promise at Cairo that "Manchuria would be returned to its rightful owners, the Chinese." Now that had been done in November of 1944 [1943], right after I was over and Roosevelt was there and he went from there to Yalta in December. Not to Yalta, he went into Tehran and then later over to Yalta, and gave control of the ports and railroads of Manchuria to the Soviet Union. There it is. It's in one of those documents there. The quotation. And without Manchuria Chiang--Manchuria was that part of China which was most developed, partly because it had been developed by the Japanese. Its industry, its agriculture, its oil, and its minerals, more than anywhere else in China. And we put the Russians in control, gave them control of the ports and railroads, and they blocked Chiang Kai-shek troops coming in, and let the Communists come in. That'll tell the next one, so that Manchuria's control was given to the Communists. We did that.

The second thing we did: four cease-fires which the Marshall mission imposed on the Generalissimo in 1946 when he had the upper hand over the Communists. At the time the Communists had been reduced to relatively--a few thousand. Not more than one of four of them had a rifle, and they were up in Northwest China right across the Yellow River where I was. And as I told you before, many of them came over as patients. They didn't have medical corps, and I took care of them. Never had any problem with them as individuals, and when the Generalissimo, Wedemeyer and Admiral [Daniel] Barbey took care of the naval end of the thing, and Wedemeyer took care of the land, and as soon as the truce had come on November the 11th or whatever it was, they moved as fast as they could up to block off the Communists, not to get over into Manchuria where the Russians--not to get them together with the Russians. They couldn't go across the Gobi Desert; they'd have to get up through Manchuria. Well, by golly, our people blocked them.

Generalissimo's forces, his best troops--Wedemeyer--had helped him and they had gotten to within about twelve miles of where they could cut the lone--there was only one way you could get to where they were up into Manchuria. That road is what, I can't think of the name of it, [inaudible], and what's the other name of the town. And by golly, Marshall imposed or pressured the Generalissimo--because if the Generalissimo wouldn't do it we would cut off our aid and he was finished. He had to do it, and his troops stopped there and allowed--only ten or twelve miles away, and they had much higher strength than--to let all those bedraggled Communists get through up into Manchuria.

Four cease-fires. Four cease-fires which the Marshall plan imposed on the Generalissimo in 1946 when he had the upper hand. The first was in January 1946, and it allowed the Communists to escape into Manchuria where they were reorganized, reequipped by the Soviets, and able to defeat the Nationalists when we refused--whom we refused to aid effectively.

The third thing: Marshall's eight-month embargo on thirty-caliber ammunition to China. For some 400,000 rifles of World War I vintage, the old Krag-Jorgenson rifle that I had used in World War I, with which Stilwell had armed Chiang's thirty-three best divisions. He had roughly about three hundred thousand--three hundred divisions, and the next one will be about that. They took about thirty-three, everything was on the base of one hundred. He was going down there. Washington told him he couldn't do this so he cut it down two thirds. Thirty-three divisions--that's roughly 400,000. He threw away all their Krag-Jorgenson rifles--and threw away all their old German rifles, and gave them all these Krag-Jorgenson rifles. But what--the caliber of the two was different, and the Generalissimo's arsenals produced the right kind of shells for the German [rifle] that they had. So they took away from the thirty-three divisions the rifles for which they had ammunition, and then wouldn't give them our ammunition for the rifles which Sherman [Stilwell] gave them. Then he said, "We didn't do anything to contribute to it." Marshall's eight-month embargo from about July, or first of August of that first year, [to] the end of the war was--came in May or so from about when the Generalissimo's troops--he rushed his troops up to the north. They got up there, but the thirty-three best

divisions didn't have any ammunition! Eight months! As Marshall said, "Stilwell armed them; I disarmed them."

Then the fourth: Marshall's deactivation program. They called it deactivation. The Generalissimo had about three hundred divisions and [General Marshall?] said, "That's not sensible," and he was right. You don't need that many divisions--"So you must get rid of them." Reduce them to a hundred--to two hundred. I think it was ninety in the beginning, left two hundred and ten, and then there was a second deactivation. They had to cut them down to a hundred divisions. Well that meant they had to dump people by the thousands, tens of--a million, on the street. They didn't have a veterans program. They didn't have a--like our American boys. When they're demobilized they're given thirty days' pay, and their transportation back. He was demanding that he take two thirds of his troops and just turn them on the street as beggars. What happened? Why they said that leader of ours, Chiang Kai-shek, he's knuckled under to this foreigner. They didn't realize that the Generalissimo had no choice in the matter, and they deserved it. By the mass they went over to the communist side. That's what defeated Chiang Kai-shek. And yet, Acheson said we didn't do anything that contributed to the defeat. Well, here's the four things. I use this in speeches and it's in one of these speeches at that time, and I happened to be sorting some stuff out there.

G: In 1947, you indicated that you were critical of Chiang in about an hour and three-quarter meeting with him in November 1947. You met with him.

J: Yes.

G: Tell me about that conversation.

J: Well, I don't think I was--I said to him, he was back in Chungking--he had moved--to Nanking. And I said to him I had been sent over there by the Congress to investigate. I said, "Now we're adopting a Marshall Plan for Europe. The Congress of the United States, the Republican Congress, has just passed this Marshall Plan." Now, they were devastated. Without the Marshall Plan the Soviet Union would have had all. They were helpless.

The Marshall Plan--just as a sidelight--the requests of the eleven countries in Western Europe--don't hold me to that figure because I'm not sure but whatever it was, there was about thirty-one or thirty-three billion dollars they would need. We said, "You can't do that." So they said, "Oh, we can't cut it down." So I had a bright idea. I said, "The French can't cut theirs down but they can cut the Italians down, and the Italians know what the Belgians need, and so on." So we set up a program and they worked on that and within a few months they came back and reduced it to, I think, twenty-three billion; from thirty-three to twenty-one. Well, we said we can't get it. We finally decided we couldn't give them more than seventeen billion.

And that's what the legislation was, to provide seventeen billion, if they would--and we found out afterwards, you know, and I was accused of deserting our allies. I said, "You can't tell me that they haven't hoarded an awful lot. And if they know they're going to make it, that'll come out," and as a matter of fact, they didn't use but about thirteen of even the seventeen billion! They started at thirty-three, because when they found they were going to win, there was no use hoarding it. They'd saved--everybody hoarded a little bit here and there, became an enormous amount

hoarded, because they didn't know they were going to make it. They have to hang on to your own family if you aren't going to make it as a country.

So I said to the Generalissimo, "We've adopted a program." I didn't tell him all that detail. "If our government should decide, as I hope it will, to carry out something equivalent to help you reconstruct--and your country is paralyzed, bankrupt practically; currency is worthless. Just sacks of paper. If we were to help you with that, what would be the most useful things that we could do?" He sat there and studied it a minute, and looked up at the ceiling as he often did. He said, "Well, it's hard to know how to answer that unless you can tell me first why you have such a different policy with respect to us from the policy that you've outlined, and you've already adopted for Western Europe, the Marshall Plan." And I said, "Just what do you mean by that?" and he said, "Well, you went into Greece and Turkey and those places and said we would help you if you keep the Communists out." The Communists always wanted to get into the government, the coalition. "But you sent Stilwell over here to tell us that you wouldn't help us, unless we took the Communists in to a coalition. Now why?"

I'll criticize my country here. I won't criticize my country abroad, and I hemmed and hawed a little bit, and then he said, "Is it because the difference in races? You're white people and they're white people and we're yellow people?" And I said, "No sir, I don't think that is the reason." I don't think that was the reason. He said, "Is it because your people think the Communists in China are different from the Communists in Europe?" I said, "Yes, that's probably the biggest reason. They've been sold the bill of goods that the Communists are agrarian reformers, and your government is corrupt,

inefficient, undemocratic, corrupt, and reactionary, but they're just simple peasants emerging, and therefore they're not dedicated Communists, dedicated to world domination." I said, "I'm afraid that's true." "The third thing is that you feel that the Communists, if they prevail here, would be less of a threat to you than the Communists if they won in Europe." I said, "Of course. We came from Europe. If they'd got control of all the machinery, the equipment, the industry of Europe, it would be devastating. You haven't got that sort of thing, so it was bound to be sellable that we've got to give our first priority to Western Europe, because the potential power for good or evil is so much greater there than the potential in China at this time." He sort of shook his head thinking of the long run. "Or," he said, "is it because our government has failed in anything to try its level best to carry out any agreement that we made with you, and we can't." They failed again and again. They tried their best and we never accused them of failure of effort, we accused them of inefficiency, undemocratic, bad management, corrupt and so on.

G: Were they corrupt?

J: Oh, of course it was corrupt. I'll give you that piece that--didn't I give you the latest one to read?

G: Yes. I have it here.

J: Let me show you. Pointed it out right there. I pointed this out. Here--I talked about the diseases of defeat that--Churchill came up with that word and it's right here at the beginning. What is the truth about China? And the diseases of defeat were--they were corrupt. Corruption is one of them. And nepotism; you look after your own family. And

they were all there--went down through the list of them. They were there, no arguing about that. That was part of the problem. Then he said, "Well, if your government follows these policies within a hundred years it will discover they were a mistake." Well, I wish I'd have said, "I'm convinced that it'll be demonstrated within ten years it will been a mistake." But I didn't, and within ten years it was demonstrated that it was a mistake. We went into Europe and gave all this assistance, advice, and [inaudible] to try to help them win. We went into Chiang and said, "No, we aren't going to do it unless you take the Communists in." Chiang Kai-shek understood the Communists. We didn't. We compelled him to follow policies which were certain to fail. He knew it. Said so. Anybody can see now, because--was his government bad? Look what it has done on Taiwan. Where it had a chance. Where, as he said one time--

Another time when I was over there and I--in 1967 this was--and it happened to be my seventieth birthday--by one year--Chinese calendar it was my seventieth. Somebody found--told him that it was because they have one year ahead of us--a year older--It was my sixty-seventh--sixty-ninth but it was seventieth for him. So he had a dinner for me. On the spur of the moment. They didn't have enough candles and they had to borrow from a neighbor next door. The President of the country sent out his people to borrow some candles to put in the party for the foreigner. Now I got off on--I shouldn't have told that.

G: The point was the development of Taiwan.

J: Oh yes. In the conversation I started out by congratulating him for what he had been able to do on Taiwan in these years since they'd had their independence, now seventeen years

since they'd been in Taiwan. And he interrupted me and he said, "We haven't done anything on Taiwan that succeeded over here that we didn't try to do on the mainland. We tried to do these things on the mainland but we were too exhausted, the war had gone on too long, our currency was depleted, our people were too demoralized and divided and we didn't have assistance from the outside without--Europe couldn't have made it without assistance and our government couldn't make it." He said, "But here on Taiwan, we've had the advantage of a smaller problem," you see, at that time about eleven million, as against seven or eight hundred million [inaudible] and a small territory to defend--a little island as against that giant monster and then, he said, "a hundred miles of water, and your Seventh Fleet between the mainland and us--gave us credit." We had sent the Seventh Fleet in there. They knew that patrol meant that if they tried to attack Taiwan, the Communists from the mainland, we would use our fleet to help defeat them. Well they couldn't--their sailboats couldn't do it.

So he gave credit to all those things. And so we had a small problem. Therefore we were succeeded here as we couldn't do on the mainland. We tried, but we weren't able to; the problems were too great and we didn't have the assistance. And he said, "And then we've accomplished something further. We've been able to develop here the pattern by which a primitive people can modernize. It's been successful here, and this can be the pattern which will help you in almost a hundred other newly independent countries," colonies, all the colonies, the end of it--we were responsible for that decolonization program--our pattern and so on. I sat there and I sat in awe at the coolness. The old guy had had everything against him, had been able to succeed here,

and had developed a pattern which would be a pattern--oh, he said, "the pattern by which the mainland can be constructed when the day comes for its liberation, and the pattern that new independent countries can use around the world." Why, the old guy had a vision incredible: "Look and then," he said, "within a hundred years you'll understand." Well, within ten years we found out how stupid we'd been, although, you know, you couldn't expect people to admit it when you've been responsible for policies that failed. Acheson was going to justify--very clever lawyer. Nothing that we didn't do would have changed the character and so on, but he didn't mention those four things that we did which were fatal, and I tried to get those but nobody would ever publish them. I sent them in to the *New York Times*, the letter, and they didn't publish them. Three or four times I sent things. The *Washington Post*--they didn't publish them.

G: You get a sense that particularly with the 1948 campaign that Chiang Kai-shek really felt a need to make his case to the American people and the Congress and--

J: He felt he needed to?

G: That he really needed to make his case, that the State Department and the White House were not listening to them with regard to what their needs were, and you had what has become known as the China lobby. Tell me about that. The group of individuals that--

J: There never was a China lobby. That was one of the god-darnedest constructions by--the Communists, why, they're masters of deception. As I told you before, power and deception, and you have to misrepresent in a most favorable way your own side and misrepresent or magnify every defect in the people you're out to destroy. Dramatize it, emphasize it, keep the attention on the things that are wrong in the United States, for

example, because we're the target. They don't need this great army to capture Madagascar; they don't need this for Argentina. All their armaments for only one target: the United States! They're a mortal enemy of the United States! They have been all along! No possible justification for building all this thing when their people are poor as the dickens, except ultimately isolating and weakening--the best statement you've heard, now you should quote it every time you turn around. The phrasing of it was by Fred Schwartz: the pattern is external encirclement. Isolate the United States, or any country to begin with. China--they did it. Plus internal demoralization, get people to lose faith, "Doggone it, this system doesn't work. We're in trouble, by George." Plus thermonuclear blackmail leads to pressive surrender. Now that formula is [inaudible]. External encirclement: cut it off from external aid. Internal demoralization: get people to lose faith in their side. Look at all the people in America who everything goes wrong--the intellectuals--we are at fault. If we hadn't done so, this wouldn't have happened. We were at fault. We were at fault and that's internal demoralization, plus thermonuclear--good gosh, you have a nuclear war--and you can't have a nuclear war--lead to gradual, progressive surrender. Now that's the pattern that they've used and made perfectly clear. Fred Schwartz was one of the most astute persons that I got [inaudible] on because he's called him a name, called him a McCarthyite, or anyway some derogatory name.

(Tape 2 of 2, Side 1)

J: . . . more afraid of this than I am anything else. I'm more afraid of this than I am of the rest [?]. Let me say a point--at that time we were always afraid of a military attack. They

don't want to have a military attack on us and destroy the United States. They want to control this industrial plant! Their objective is to get control of the United States, not conquest of it, not destruction of it, not a war. A war is the last thing they want to get, but they used the threat of a war, used the threat of a war to demoralize us and make us make more concessions and more concessions and more concessions, and every time they'd smile and [be] courteous for a while, we'd say, "Oh, there's a mellowing, there's a maturing, there's an evolving. They're abandoning--they're changing their pattern." They're not changing at all. They're using power and deception, and they're not reducing their power as yet. After all, he comes up and says, "We'll cut down"--Gorbachev--"500,000," but still leaves them four to one superior, but the gesture--they're so smart--the whole business is the clinch. The boxer who's in trouble, he embraces the other guy. You think he loves him.

G: But describe for me the people who--or the groups that were committed to securing aid for Chiang Kai-shek.

J: Well, they were mostly like myself, people who'd worked out there, a fellow named Goldberg [Alfred Kohlberg] who was on the other side, on the--high up in the national security association--that's not the correct name. The thing that turned out to be Asian--Pacific--

G: [inaudible]

J: Well, and that everybody joined up and the Communists really took over the management of that thing, no argument about it. And Goldberg [Kohlberg], good old careful Jew that he is, when he found out what it was about, he exposed it, whereupon

Goldberg [Kohlberg] became one of the most evil guys that ever lived. He was an importer of linens--a businessman. And most of the linens, the best ones, come out of Amoy in Southern Fukien [Fujian] and so on, and he made--he loved the Chinese people. He'd been through business with them, but he was a real patriot and when he discovered this monkey business going on, he is a courageous guy and he attacked them. And boy, did they--like Joe McCarthy was essentially right, but he was the best ally the Communists had because he never would present it in measured terms. He had to use extravagant--I tend to use extravagant terms, and if you can prove that one of them was wrong, your accusations, they discredit all the other things that you've said. Joe was the best friend the Communists had in this country. I told him this a time or two.

G: Tell me about your conversation with him on this.

J: Joe? Well, I said, "Joe, you're essentially right, but you're helping the Communists." He said, "Well! I'm not"--and I said, "But you don't demonstrate it. You don't prove it. You come and make the charges. Now you have studied these things but you don't go into the details." But there were certain things and he was exceptionally decent. He ran across a list of people who--knew all about them in the State Department, who [?] were ever identified, and I could tell who some of them were, because here was--if he was born in such a place, and he lived in such a place, and he attended school, got a graduate degree in--a B.A. here, and a Ph.D. over there, I could identify some of them. But I never knew his name. So Joe got up there and said, "I hold in my hands a list of the names"--he used the word, he didn't have a single name at all--"a list of the names of one hundred and twenty-three"--or whatever it was, something like that.

G: One hundred and eleven, I think [205].

J: Yeah. "--Communists in the State Department." The Communists were saved! "Give us the names, Joe. Give us the names." He couldn't. He didn't have the names. Darned fool! He made that speech over in West Virginia right after--we had it done--carried a lot of them. I went to him and talked to him two or three times, said, "Joe, don't make those extravagant statements." "Well," he said, "I got ahold of the names of a few of them, but I didn't want to--that's not fair. If I told their names, then I would be derogatory toward them. I would be damaging their character. I would be unfairly--not their character, but their reputation. So, I'm not going to do that. I'm just telling them they ought to investigate these things. Here's the problem. It's their job to investigate it." And I said, "Joe, but you do it in a way which antagonizes people." I said, "You like to go to the races." He loved to go dog racing. "Now, you see how that dog sees something white go by, and he takes out after him without finding out whether it's really a rabbit or just a piece of cloth, and the dog runs and half the time it isn't a rabbit! And--most of the time in dog races. You're doing, Joe, the same thing. Don't make accusations. Just say, here's so and so and so and something."

Well, Joe of course has been vindicated in recent years, substantially. For example, what was the name of the *New York Times* greatest correspondent, really, and got all the honors? He had that little program about 8:15 every night for fifteen minutes. Oh, I can't think of his name at the moment. But, in his final farewell, he used--they used--to show how right he'd been, the story of a case--one of Joe's victims--a woman--and made out that he was a brutal guy. And by golly, it turned out that she was

a Communist! And no doubt about it. The record was clear. They had--somebody else said there were two women with the same name. One of them wasn't and one of them was. And the one that--what's this guy [Edward R. Murrow?]--that *New York Times* [CBS?]--oh, gosh, it's awful to get old. But he picked out, or the media did, the thing that he put on his program every night as the final demonstration of his [inaudible] case in which he was wrong. And the girl--never was played up, of course. The paper never came out and announced with a headline that their old man was wrong, and that the woman who had been terribly McCarthyited and all the rest--but she was a Communist! And when she pinned her down she had to admit that she had been--although she denied it under oath on all the things. Well, that's a story that's never been dramatized and publicized--ought to be.

G: The accusation that is made regarding Chiang Kai-shek's influence in Washington was that they would take some of the money designated for aid and use it back in the United States to support their position. Any insights on this?

J: Well, there's some of it was used, and there were one or two people who abandoned Chiang Kai-shek when they were revealed and punished him. Same as when they went over to Taiwan and he appointed as the governor of Taiwan a military fellow and then a riot got started over a New Year celebration, relatively innocent, got going and the general lost his head. He didn't know what was going to happen and carried out when several thousand people were killed--massacred. And they always tell you that. That's what Chiang Kai-shek did to the Formosans. But they never tell you that Chiang took the guy back home and executed him! He lost his head. It wasn't China's policy. It was an

error by a man but they never heard that. No, nobody ever mentioned anything. They never mentioned anything good about anybody that they're out to destroy. Chiang was right on more important issues than Roosevelt or Churchill or any other statesman of our time.

G: Well, let me, for example, the whole issue of--

J: The China Lobby.

G: --of recognition of Communist China. Was this a consideration because of the assets in the banks?

J: No! It wasn't a matter on the corruption. It was the basis--it was partly--I was trying to preserve the United Nations. I worked hard for the United Nations. Harry Truman--I told you one time--[and I] went out on a two-week tour when he was a senator, and--a Republican and a Democrat, a congressman and a senator. We had six such teams [?]. And he and I--supposed to be Carl Hatch. Carl got sick and had to leave and so they sent out Harry and he read Carl's speech every time. He wasn't very much of an orator himself, but we got to be very good friends. He was from Missouri, right down close to where my father was born. Well, I got off--

G: The U.N.

J: At the U.N. The U.N. was--there's no authorization in the U.N. charter to take any action against any country unless it's hostile to the U.N., and yet they demanded we go into South Africa, which is not an enemy of the U.N., and the U.N. was taking over and I didn't want them to come after [?] Chiang Kai-shek. I said they shouldn't bring nations into the United Nations unless they qualify. And what's to qualify? To qualify for

membership they have to be peace-loving and agree to do certain things which Communist China never would do. Don't drag the U.N. down to the level of a country. The door's wide open. We always said the Communists--committee against the admission of Communist China into the United Nations until it qualifies for membership. But they always leave that off. But that's the official name for it, until they would qualify [for] it.

The Soviet Union--the problem was, and they would always come out, you've seen my arguments on this, they'd always come out and say, well, you've got the Soviet Union and what's the difference? Now they got in before they recognized--in the beginning. Well, then why don't you kick it out? You can't kick it out. It can veto its own expulsion. But then why bring in somebody else when you know ahead of time it will not accept? Then Communist China to this day has never been willing to renounce the use of force in the settlement of disputes. Every time in Taiwan. It says it has not renounced the use, possible use, of force for the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland. And so you bring it to the United Nations, put it on the Security Council, all you do is drag down the United Nations. And who has much respect for it anymore? That's what our case was. But they always just said, "You're trying to protect Chiang Kai-shek." I was--it was. That was part, but the main thing was don't admit lawless nations to the United Nations until they qualify.

Now there's one other thing--this is a diversion for a moment. Another error, if you spend my career--my career is almost entirely a career of failures. I crusaded for things all over the things--sometimes twenty or thirty years before--I had a certain

foresight. But when it came to admitting new people, I tried to get them, the U.N., to adopt a policy of taking--having a preliminary status. In the easy illustration, after the thirteen states formed the United [States], they never took another state in directly as a state; they made it a territory. And when it demonstrated that it could balance its budget, it could have a legislative branch, it could manage its own affairs, it qualified for membership and sometimes within three years or more often in eight, ten, or fifteen years it could move from territorial status to statehood.

Now I wanted that and the first one that got in--the former colony was [Malaysia] and I happened to be our delegate to the U.N. from the Congress, from the House, and there was a delegate from the Senate, the two of us in the 1950--1950? 1953? [1950]--General Assembly which admitted [Malaysia]. That never had--didn't have any legislature, had never had a day of self-government, but it got its independence from the Dutch and so we brought it in as a sovereign country. And they didn't know how to govern. They'd had no experience. They come in and they vote as a mob up there. They're doing better in some respects now. But we wanted to show them, I said--I used one of my standard illustrations--we want to show them--encourage them. Now they've gotten their independence. They've fought, they've got their independence, and we want to encourage them so we give them membership in the U.N. before they've demonstrated [inaudible]. Now that's like saying your kid's going to college. Oh, he's a good kid. He's worked hard. So we'll give him his diploma the day he matriculates. No, you give him his diploma when he earns it. Then he'll do brilliant. He'll work hard to get ahead. And if a nation looks forward to some kind of a preliminary status to real membership if it

does these things, then you've got a chance of it making the grade. Oh, well. It's perfectly clear, but those arguments never got to first--I never got to first base with them.

G: The supporters of Chiang in the United States--the term China Lobby is admittedly not a very good term to use. What did they call themselves?

J: Didn't have an organization.

G: They didn't have a--?

J: Never was an organization until we came up with this committee--it was the Committee for a Million. There was another one and they had to have a name for it. The head of it was--oh, that very distinguished--

G: [Frederick] McKee?

J: No, no. McKee was a hard worker on the thing, but the head of it was a New York--he'd been Secretary of the Treasury in--back in the Hoover administration I think, a Republican. He was--Wichita, Kansas--not Wichita, Kansas, another town out there, I forget, in Kansas. He was the head of it. I can't come up with the right name, then. Then we started out and the Committee for a Million to get a million signatures opposing admission of Communist China until they would qualify. Whenever they would qualify for membership we would vote for this membership. They would have to renounce the determination to use force against any kind of sovereign country. It used it against Cambodia, and in Vietnam, and used force in North Korea, and used force against Taiwan. Taiwan--a little bit of an argument, you could say that was a secession, and

therefore it's our own country, own territory, but it uses force whenever it invaded India and went clear down there.

G: But did the--what was the relationship between the Chinese who were here who were, let's say, pressing for aid, and the Americans who were sympathetic--the people [inaudible]--

J: They didn't have a darn thing to do. The head--I don't want this put in the paper, but the head, the secretary of our organization accepted some money--for our cause, not for himself--from a Chinese representative at the U.N.. He was our delegate, then he came in with a check from somebody or another and he accepted it and I fired him. Why, of course. I had to keep it circumspect. Nobody ever found a nickel wrong as yet. There probably are some somewhere in spite of everything, but never with my consent, and there were some Chinese-American citizens who were on that side, and we didn't hesitate, and they didn't give us much money but they did give us some, same as we accepted money from German citizens--German ancestry, they were American citizens--but they had German ancestors; they were against Hitler. They wanted freedom for the Germans and here Chinese wanted freedom for their people, not communism, and we accepted money from them. They never gave us very much. We got our money from Americans who believed in right and wrong and freedom [from] tyranny. But this whole business of the China Lobby, there wasn't--didn't I give you a sheet of the names of the people who signed the first big petition that we sent out on it, was three or four major labor leaders, and Norman Thomas? I gave you that, didn't I?

G: No.

J: Well, I'll give you one. I got one. I had it published way back there then. It had to do with Manchuria. It was--they tried to make it out that we were tools, or perhaps getting paid or subsidized, or underwritten by Chiang Kai-shek. Well, as I tell you, there was only one guy that took something from a Chinese official, and he lost his job, and I won't tell you his name because you know his name. And he knew--he was under me, he was the secretary, I was the chairman of it, and so I fired him. Didn't fire him nasty, I said, you can't do this because you compromise our government. If they come and show that we're being financed in any degree by the Chinese government then we're an agent of a foreign power, and we're not going to be an agent of a foreign power. This is an American organization.

But in the beginning when they called it China Lobby, there weren't--there were only about a hundred and fifty people that ever really got involved. We had--who was--Norman Thomas [Lowell Thomas]--who was the great explorer? We made him the head rather than me and that was a mistake. Couldn't anybody else take it on in the beginning except me, but when we set up with the Tibetan refugees driven out by--or who escaped, we set up the committee--American committee for aid to Tibetan refugees. This fellow agreed to be the chairman of it. I did all the work or we did, but he agreed to be the chairman. He had traveled--oh, great explorer, and writes about, he had carried out a tour and wrote a book on Tibet.

G: Thomas Laird.

J: Yes.

G: How about Styles Bridges; was he active in this?

J: Yes, he was solid. He didn't go into the details, dish it out. Nobody went into the details. I won't say nobody, but few did except myself because I'd lived there ten years of my life, and I saw the enormous importance for this giant which can be a giant for good or a giant for bad--China--and it was a pattern that we could work out. But we had these people who gave us support, moral support, well, I'll tell you how I--it first got out here. I think I did. Maybe I didn't. If I did before, stop me. When we were just struggling along, struggling along, a man came in to see me. His name was--a French name--oh, gosh, it's awful to get old and you can't remember names. You'd know it. I mean, I'll come up with it. I can get down and dig up literature. I've got all kinds of stuff on him. He came in to see me. He was a Frenchman--Von, Van . . . but his father was an official in Russia and married a Russian, and he was born over there, so he was half Russian and half French but his father was a noble--count, Count Van or Von or something--I can't come up with it--and see, he understood the Russian, and he was a refugee in this country--White Russian, I guess you'd call him, although he wasn't a Russian, he was a French citizen [Nicholas de Rockefort, according to Judd's biographer].

And he came in to see me one time and he said, "I've watched this thing. Why don't you mobilize the support that's available here?" And I said, "Well, explain it to me." Well he said, "What do the Communists do? They set up an organization and they go out and get everybody to sign a petition. Even if they know they don't like it or not. You don't make any effort to do it. Now, right now, they're in real trouble." This was in June of 1940--well, it was right after they had the riots in Berlin. The people's revolution, that's what they were called, and they moved the tanks in and mowed down

the workers, because the workers wanted some more freedom than the Communists were giving them. Berlin, in 1946 or 1947, right after the end of the war. He said, "The Communists then organized people all over the place. They had to put down this distortion"--and they sent the troops in afterwards to Poland, you see, and Czechoslovakia. It began there. But he said, "Here, you've got a chance to show how bad it is. Why don't you go get the workers of America to demonstrate?"

Now, he said, and I recalled, I--way back in 1926, 1925 and 1926, when I was a language student in Nanking and they had the first violence in China. There was a New Year's, a big celebration, the workers, the Communists, Mao Tse-tung's getting his little handful started, and they paraded and had a little violence in one place and the British, in the British concession where the British were responsible for order, and somebody shot and one of them was killed. They carried a casket up and down the street, Nanking and Szechwan, the two main streets of Shanghai, every day for a year! We call it propaganda; they call it "agitprop," agitation, agitation, agitation, not propaganda, not words, agitation. So we said, "Where's the U.S.--where's the AFL [American Federation of Labor] and the CIO [Congress of Industrial Organizations], that they aren't carrying a casket up and down Wall Street and Pennsylvania Avenue and State Street in Chicago and Market Street in San Francisco? Demonstrate the cruelty, the tyranny, the barbarism of the Communists!"

I said, "That's a great idea. I'll see what we can do." And he volunteered and we raised the money somehow or another. I forget the details but the records are there, and he went down to the meeting of the annual, in January, the following January, in Miami

of the A. F. of L. [American Federation of Labor], they hadn't yet [merged with] the CIO [Congress of Industrial Organizations]--and he got them to pass a resolution and to sign these things. That's where we got the million signatures. We had a committee. We'd only gotten a couple hundred thousand or something like that. It was hard. But when we got the A. F. of L., the CIO, and one other mass organization [the American Legion, according to Judd's biographer] to get their--they signed these petitions against the admission of Communist China until they would qualify. We always put that in there. It was against its behavior. It wasn't anti-Chinese or anything. It was trying to save an orderly world. So this fellow was really--more than anybody else, he was responsible for it. He's dead now. He got the job and worked in the Library of Congress as a researcher and married a relatively rich woman here, and she's still living, somebody told me. I've been down in their home in Georgetown. She had a nice home. Isn't that funny that I can't think of his name.

(End of Tape 2 of 2 and Interview II)

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WALTER JUDD

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(2) The tape recordings may be made available to those researchers who have access to the transcripts.

(3) I hereby assign to the United States Government all copyright I may have in the interview transcripts and tapes.

(4) Copies of the transcripts and the tape recordings may be provided by the Library to researchers upon request.

(5) Copies of the transcripts and tape recordings may be deposited in or loaned to institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

Mary Lou Carpenter
Donor

July 28, 2008
Date

Sharon Fawcett
Assistant Archivist for Presidential Libraries

11.21.08
Date

4/6/2009 MEMO FOR THE RECORD

In the process of preparing the Walter Judd oral history interviews for opening, Mr. Judd's daughter asked that we allow his official biographer, Dr. Lee Edwards of The Heritage Foundation, to proofread the interview transcript. Many of Dr. Edwards suggestions were incorporated into the transcripts.

Nicole Hartmann Hadad
Archives Specialist