

INTERVIEW III

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INTERVIEWEE: WALTER JUDD

INTERVIEWER: Michael Gillette

PLACE: The Judd residence, Mitchellville, Maryland

Tape 1 of 2, Side 1

G: Let's start today with the whole question of Quemoy and Matsu. It was such a controversy in the early fifties, the defense of those islands and the Chinese Communist threat to the islands. Let me ask you to analyze that issue and--

J: Well, the Communists were convinced step by step that they could take over all of China and they took it all over except those islands and Taiwan and the Chinese on Taiwan were very determined to hold those island because they're a part of the mainland. They're part of Fukien [Fujian] Province. Taiwan is a separate province so they're a little more plausible when they say, "We're controlling parts of China, not just this island which we recently got back from Japan." Japan defeated China in 1895 and took over the island of Taiwan and gave it back. [General Douglas] MacArthur engineered the return of it after they were defeated in World War II and the Chinese were determined to hang on to them. I've been there on the island. You can look out and as far as when you get up to the ground and look from there over to where you join the--when you come out of the Lotsford Road and look over toward, what do you call it, Landover Center--Mall [in Landover, Maryland]. Landover Mall. It's just that close. You can see the workers working in the field over there and of course after they got the mainland they thought that

Judd -- III -- 2

they'd try to capture Taiwan and it was more important than those islands. It was a symbol. And they sent a five division attacking Taiwan and couldn't make it, got defeated. The Communists--great giant and accepted by all the world as the government of China. Couldn't--they attacked the island [Judd's biographer is not aware of five Chinese divisions ever attacking Taiwan]. They lost by something like thirty thousand people, men, captured and killed. Well, you see, they could claim control of the mainland by force of arms. When you conquer the thing you can say, "We've conquered it." But they couldn't claim Taiwan by force of arms because they didn't get it and that's where Peking changed its tactic to get us to desert Taiwan and thereby deliver it to the mainland what it couldn't get on its own and so they always said--they had a standard line which unfortunately President [Jimmy] Carter picked up and he said, when he recognized the mainland--when he derecognized the Republic of China on Taiwan--he said, "We're immediately accepting reality. The mainland is there. Communist China is there." But he was denying the reality that Free China was also there and his man [Zbigniew] Brzezinski put it--"We're ending the fiction that Taiwan controls the mainland." But he didn't add on to complete the sentence as he should have, "We're creating the fiction that the mainland controls Taiwan." The mainland doesn't control Taiwan. Doesn't control it now. And we [they] were asking us to help them get control of Taiwan which they couldn't get on their own. And that's where Carter's going to go down in history. What he did was indefensible. Something comes into my mind; I'll come back to it in a moment. He--nobody could reason his objectives of recognizing the mainland. It was the derecognition of the Republic of China on the mainland's terms. Now if it were our own interest and some reason of our own, that's one thing for us to change our alliances,

Judd -- III -- 3

but to do it only because Peking, figuring that he was weak and that he wanted it awful badly, Peking said, "We won't let you recognize us unless you derecognize them." Well that was just Oriental bargaining. They always ask for more than they expect. "You may be dumb enough to give it to me. Why not ask for it?" They always do it. So they have a saying, [foreign phrase]--"If you buy in three stores, three different prices, you won't need bitterness," because the second one sees you coming out of the first place and he'll follow you along and offer you a proposition. Talk to him, go down to the next one, and he'll offer you a better one oftentimes. And he'd have a sign up there, [foreign phrase]--"No second price," at this place. But you can still get a second price probably. Or the next one will have [foreign phrase]--"Really no second price at this store." But there is a second price. The Oriental is a bargainer. They say dishonesty consists of leaving someone with the wrong impression. They don't leave anybody with the wrong impression. The other person understands it fully. We feel kind of cheap.

Didn't I tell you about a piece that I got, a fellow helped me out? A piece of cloisonné that I bought? Well, at the end of my first year, 1925-1926 studying at the Nanking language school which was then the capital, of course, I expected to be way down in the interior in the South and I always wanted to go up to Peking. I didn't suppose I'd ever get up there otherwise so after we finished up the summer and there were two weeks before the summer school began a couple of fellows of us in the language school took a trip up to Peking to take a look at it. One of the things we wanted to see the Great Wall. I haven't seen it yet. Everybody sees it because I was so darn busy doing something I never did have a chance to go. Mrs. Judd did get up there but I didn't.

Judd -- III -- 4

She went up there when one of our kids was out there and she took them up. Well, whenever I bring this, throws me off the track.

G: The *cloisonné*.

J: What was I about to say? My mind some days is worse than others and it isn't apparently very good today. Well, anyway, I was up there in Peking and I went out shopping. All the *cloisonné* in one street and all the ivories in another street and all the tapestries in another street and so you can go [to] all the stores shopping at-- I went in there and there was a piece of *cloisonné* that was beautiful. And my older sister, she's a nut on getting those sort of things. I thought, boy, she'd pay a hundred dollars for that. I looked at it and I asked the man, an older man, in my feeble Chinese, how much it cost. He told me twenty five dollars. I thought, "Well, that's cheap. She'd pay a hundred for it in America." So I just took it right there. And after I had paid him he looked at me and he said, "You've only been in our country a short time I can tell. You didn't handle this very well. You mind if I make a suggestion to you?" I said, "No." He said, "You shouldn't have paid me twenty five dollars." Well, I said, "I think that's worth it." And he said, "But you didn't examine it carefully. If you'd turned it around and looked on the back that had been dropped and dented and the *cloisonné* squished in on the back but you didn't examine that. You should never buy anything without first examining it." "Well, you told me," I said. "You told me it's perfect." "Sure I told you. How else--you didn't expect me to tell you it had a defect. It was your job to find that defect and besides, you should never give a man his first offer. Never. We always ask to give more than it's worth. Maybe you'll give it to us, as you did." I said, "Well how much should I have offered?" He said, "Never more than eight or ten dollars if I ask you twenty five." Well,

Judd -- III -- 5

you know, I felt kind of cheap. Beautiful thing and offering eight, ten dollars for it. I said, "Then how much should I, if I had bargained." He said, "You could have got it for fourteen or fifteen if you'd started down below and then I'd come down and you'd go up and you'd have got it. I won't sell it to you if it isn't an adequate price. Don't worry. No fellow who sells you anything is cheating himself. He's getting all it's worth and probably a little bit more or he wouldn't sell it. He'd just say no." Well, the Russians are half Oriental to some extent, the Chinese say. And they have made more of their gains with the word no. *Nyet*. We make a proposal and they say, "*Nyet*." Well, then we make another proposal, cut it down. And the State Department is a mess at this because their whole notion to negotiate and agreement and negotiate and agreement but the agreement isn't worth anything with people who don't have a basic belief that there's an order in the universe that if you break the laws in the long run you can violate them but you can't break them. There are certain laws; there is a moral order. The Chinese call it Tao. Taoist, T-A-O, Taoist faith. There is an order. There is a--Tao is the word "road." There is a way. And you go along that way it goes right. You go another way and it won't go right. Temporarily, yes. In the long run it won't. They don't think there's a god, a person, but there is a moral order which is another way--closely related. It is a moral faith, not a religious faith. A religious faith requires a person, generally. Well, you learn so much from them and I got--I'm going to be in a program next week up in Minneapolis. The rotary club's putting on a big affair and they want Justice [Harry] Blackman and me to talk to them about certain things and I just wrote the letter to the guy who wrote and suggested what he wanted me to talk about. He'd like to have me discuss why would the mainland Chinese be so eager to get this control? Well, it's very simple. Two reasons. If

Judd -- III -- 6

they go in with the Soviet Union now on a re-establishment of an agreement, a coalition, a partnership, they have to go in as a very inferior member. They're a distant cousin and they'll be secondary. They've got to get more prestige, more standing, more power before they go back in with the Soviet Union in a coalition that will confront the world with a united Communist world, and Peking doesn't want them to come in with that Moscow is still maneuvering but Moscow is now going over to Peking. They're bargaining. If you can't get it the first time, they say, "*Nyet*." Then the Chinese will make some more concessions and the Russians say, "*Nyet*." The Russians don't so much. The Chinese don't make the concessions. When they say "*nyet*" we do. Four different times we raised the price that we would pay them on something and they said "*nyet*." Finally they say, "This is our last offer," and get on the plane and go home and then all the State Department negotiators have fits that [George] Shultz or whoever it is has ruined everything. Don't worry. They couldn't ever do anything about Berlin. They put on that Berlin blockade for a whole year but we got the old planes out. We do pretty well when we're in trouble. The old DC-3s and broke the blockade and so all right, they came along and made concession. And they are now making concession they never would take any of those missiles out. But we stood our ground and Britain stood with us and so they took some of the missiles out. It's too bad that our Anglo-Saxons insist on dealing with people with different backgrounds as if they're dealing with our rules. They're playing by different rules. They understand our rules, but they--let me get two things. Now I've got two quotations I'd like to--so Tung Shao Ping [Deng Shoa Ping], Zhouen-Lai [Zhou Enlai], Mao Tse Tung, they had to have more stronger relations, commercial and other with the United States in order to be in a better partnership to go back into the big

Judd -- III -- 7

coalition with the Soviet Union and second, they simply had to have help. Their economy was in such bad shape and as I told you I think, a professor up at--PhD, a Chinese at Harvard told me he went back to see his folks after it had opened up. He said, "I never would have believed it that anybody could make the Chinese lazy. They work. But old Mao Tse Tung has succeeded." He said, "Why I saw Chinese sitting around at two o'clock in the afternoon, just talking, visiting. I never knew Chinese and you never did that didn't work from dawn until dark. They always were the darnedest worker." But under the system of equality which they established, they give them quotas. The smart ones have got their quotas done by one o'clock or three o'clock or--why should they do any more? They don't get any more. So they sit around and loaf. And it makes the system--because it levels down to the capability of the poorest workers. It embarrasses them if somebody's better. They've got to have levelism. Not to level up, the poorest getting up better, but level down, resentment against the successes. Stick them with bigger taxes. And here I'm diverting but it's worth putting in for a moment. The standard approach that I deal with students, use with students when we get into this question of relationships between the poor. Well, I always start out by saying, "Well, let's get the facts. How many poor are there?" Well, they guess around. I say, "By present standards, sixty per cent of our people were poor after the civil war. And then it got down to fifty per cent and then forty per cent and then thirty per cent. Things went better and now those who get less than \$12,400 a year for a family of four are considered poor, right now. Well how many are at that level?" They don't know. Well, I said, "you dig it out". If we're going to have two sessions I ask them to go find out. You can find out. There between twelve and thirteen per cent. It varies between twelve and fifteen, some

Judd -- III -- 8

years more, per cent poor. Now that's bad. Call it fifteen. That's easy. Fifteen per cent of our people are poor. That's bad. The system's no good. We ought to be changed. Have a revolution. Communism. Then I say, "What's the rest of the sentence? Fifteen per cent of our people are poor. Now what's the rest of the equation." Nobody speaks up. Nobody ever followed this. And I say, "Think about it. If fifteen per cent are poor, what's the rest of it?" Finally some guy will say, "Well, that means, I guess, that eighty-five per cent of our people are not poor." Oh, yeah. That's not bad. That's good. Anywhere else better than that? No where else is that good. Now, you're going to destroy the system which has got the poor reduced to fifteen per cent just because [inaudible] and forget the help that improved the lot of the fifteen per cent has to come from the eighty-five per cent, so tax them higher and pull them down, and how will you be able to help the poor? I almost never find a college or university class whose professors have ever pointed this point out to them. It's unfair. Here are the rich and here are the poor. But they don't think about it the way a doctor has to analyze the way things--he's partly all right but he's partly sick. And you have to hope that the parts that are healthy will outweigh and overcome the parts that are diseased. This is so elementary it's pitiful but the Chinese are very smart at this kind of thing, they understand it. So they've got, I can quote what Deng Shao Ping said, because he was criticized for opening up and reestablishing relations with the United States. He was coming down from his communism and he was criticized. He had to defend himself. And he did in a speech in their party circles. Those secret speeches almost always leak. The *Washington Post* has got a long section this morning on something in the Justice Department criticizing [Edwin] Meese. His own subordinates. They want to be the secretary. He did this. I

Judd -- III -- 9

don't know if that's right or wrong but his own subordinates wrote this thing out and leaked it to the *Washington Post* and so he was criticized and he had to defend himself and this is what he said, I memorized it. It leaked out, just like this thing in the paper this morning. And it wasn't denied, nobody denied that he had said this, same as [Nikita] Khrushchev made his speech criticizing [Joseph] Stalin and it was secret, but it leaked out and then they had to admit that it had been done. And this is what Deng Shao Ping said. Oh, I can't think of the very beginning of it. Well, I'll have to get that--"We belong to the Marxist camp and will never be so thoughtless that we cannot distinguish friends from enemies." He's telling them, "Now we're dealing with the United States but we know they're enemies. Don't think I'm so dumb I don't know the difference between friends and enemies. At the very best the United States can be considered a temporary friend. As soon as our own strength is augmented, soon as he's done with us and we've helped them with their agriculture and so on it is natural that we will ask the United States to go home." Then there was a long discussion and the next day at the end he said, "The American Imperialists know absolutely nothing in this area. The bargaining area. The maneuvering. The behind the scenes. They are so childish that it is pitiful." Now this is his analysis of us. While we think we're dealing with this poor old dumb cluck, he doesn't know how to do anything, he's taking us in. It's just as plain as night but you can't get [inaudible] all it is. And same as I told you I think, I'm sure I did. The closing paragraph of [Mikhail] Gorbachev's speech, when he made his famous four hour speech a year ago on the seventieth anniversary of the October Revolution, and when he said at the very end, if I can get the first words of it. There was only just a very few--"We belong to the Marxist camp and"--no, no. This guy said we belong to the

Judd -- III -- 10

[inaudible]. What he said, "In October, 1977 [1917], we parted with the old world. We are moving toward a new world. A communist world. It's all there. We will never part. Never stray away from that path." Now after he made all this stuff up about the United States and all the rest and what they need to do, he winds up with his climax and we just read this [inaudible] tells them right on. Just like this guy. "We can tell the difference between friends and enemies. We've got to use this enemy temporarily, then we'll ask him to go." It's just pitiful. Now, let me say, while I'm on this, as really it's right related is something that George [H.W.] Bush said. See, he was our ambassador, our first ambassador, but when we derecognized, this was before he got--when we derecognized Taiwan, held on to the islands and defeated the mainland and then we went ahead and broke our relations with our loyal ally, Peking demanded that we break our, nullify our mutual defense treaty, that we take all our soldiers out--we had people over there helping defend them and our soldiers and then we had advisers strengthening theirs. Those three things. That's what Peking demanded. We did them. George said, "The tragic fact is that the price our government paid in recognizing the People's Republic of China has not only diminished American credibility in the world but has also darkened the prospects for peace. The terrible truth is that the United States stands exposed to the world as a nation willing to betray a friend even when there is no apparent gain." Now, George said that way back in 1978, at the time when Carter did the derecognition [1979]. He wasn't the Vice President. He was our ambassador up at the UN. "The terrible truth is that the United States stands exposed to the world as a nation willing to betray a friend, even when there is no apparent gain." We didn't get anything out of the thing. If we just held her[?] on, we didn't need to. Of course they asked us to kick Taiwan in the teeth and

Judd -- III -- 11

hope it would collapse and they could take over. Naturally. But they'd have had to come to us anyway. In order to get a better--more equality with the Soviet Union and two, to get better production and help meet the needs of their people. They had to come to us. We had the cards. And they know how to play their cards. It's just pitiful. That's why I say I'm glad that George Bush, today or yesterday got around to where some of us who had some experience out there were thirty years ago talking to [Andrei] Gromyko himself. Oh, gosh. People listen to me and they say, "I know that guy's sincere but golly, what he's saying is so different from what anybody else is saying." A prophet is lonely. And my father once said to me, "Son, you've got plenty of shortcomings but you got one strong. You somehow see things ahead. You have"--he used the word--"foresight." Well, that helped me. Because afterwards I read where somebody way back in history said, "Wisdom is foresight. Wisdom consists of being able to see what [is] ahead." And I could see this looked like a temporary gain and I don't object to doing it if we know what we're doing but we kidded ourselves. We thought we were making some real--that they had changed. No, we were the ones that changed. They know how to bargain. *Nyet* is the word. Now again, you got that whole small lecture out of one short question.

Why was Quemoy and Matsu so important? They're symbolic and they showed the Chinese strength, free Chinese, and the basic weaknesses of the mainland. Those that were free on Taiwan were doing so much better and on that island were the people in the mainland. Look what it is now. On the mainland the per capita income is still not up to five hundred dollars and its almost six thousand on Taiwan. Then why don't they go in? Why would people with an income of six thousand per capita go in with to folks who still less than five hundred. Our people, they don't analyze the basic urges of people, so

Judd -- III -- 12

Peking wants to use us. And it has been using us. And they've been mad at [Ronald] Reagan because he refused to be used and I think that George will be steadfast here because he knows. He served out there for a year or maybe only fourteen months, something like that, as our ambassador. And he knows those Chinese. He's smart enough to see that they're tricky. Jesus was an Asian. You've heard me, I've said that. He said, "Be ye wise as serpents." Now he didn't say, "Be serpents," but "Be wise as serpents and, not or, and harmless as doves." That is, if you want to be harmless as doves then do the good thing, you've got to be wise as serpents and he put it another time, "Beware of wolves in sheep's clothing. Don't get taken in by the sheep's clothing. Find out whether the guys behind it are wolves, or sheeps." It's all there. Jesus was an Asian. He understood these things. He uses so many things--get off the point--but I get upset with Westerners who try to read the absolute literal figures and commas into Jesus twenty--seventy times seven. So they say, "How many is that? Seventy times seven? That would be forty nine hundred." Well, that's silly. These are the way the Oriental talks. They live outside. They see the stars and the mighty, the psalms were filled with the power of the universe. They see those things. And we take these things literally, mathematical, and they laugh at us.

G: Was there a practical problem of actually being able to defend those islands?

J: What?

G: Was there a practical problem of being able to militarily defend Quemoy and Matsu?

J: Sure. Yes. But they were able to do it. Why? Because they were able to defend it because they had under the good leadership we've had out there at times, they had been trained with modern weapons and the people on the mainland were still using clubs pretty

Judd -- III -- 13

much and old fashioned rifles. And we under MacArthur, see MacArthur defied [Harry] Truman. Truman hated him because MacArthur said, "We've got to protect the whole line here," and he went over and visited Taiwan. I had something to do with getting him to do it.

G: Oh, really.

J: Oh sure.

G: Tell me the background.

J: I'd rather--

G: That's a good story.

J: Of course it's a good story [Judd's biographer believes Judd is mistaken regarding the time period of this story]. I wrote him a telegram, I sent him a telegram. I urged him. He was exploring all the things what he should do. Go to Taiwan. Now the Japanese, his job was in Japan. This was after the War was over and Japan was undefeated and Japan had what she called the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." That was her policy. Well Taiwan's right [in] the middle of it. From the Aleutian Islands down through Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, Southeast Asia, on down to Australia and New Zealand. That's the circle which Japan was going to get from Korea through Indonesia and so MacArthur was not supposed to go to Taiwan but he hadn't been absolutely forbidden. I said, "Go there. That's the key to it. That's the southern half, southern flank of Japan and Korea and the northern plank of the Philippines which is a possession of ours, we're going to have to defend it if they move in there." And he saw that and he went over there and boy he got blistered here in the Pentagon and by the State Department just the same as they're blistering Meese today. I don't know but what Meese is probably a little

Judd -- III -- 14

devious here and there but those underlings are devious too, I'll tell you that. So he was very grateful for that. He went over there. He had the best mind of anybody that I've ever dealt with.

G: MacArthur?

J: MacArthur. He had the sharpest mind, he had the whole thing. The greatest grasp of the total situation and he'd go in on DCS [Defense Communications System?] and then he'd always bring up something on the other side which a lot of people don't see. They see their own position so strongly and so sure that this is right and they don't examine the other side as well. They don't--but MacArthur did. The pros and cons. And partly because he'd been out there a long time and he studied the Chinese--I think I probably told you this some time didn't I? The Chinese had a whole philosophy, you know. They've got series of philosophies and religion. You've seen this. It's a whole philosophy of life. The yang and the yin. That life is a balance. We want it all right. No, they say nothing's all right. It's partly good and bad. But if you get a balance between the night and the day, the East and the West, the odds and the evens, the acids and the bases, the male and the female. And we want purity completely so. And they say get balance between health and disease; there's that whole philosophy. That's the thing that MacArthur saw very well and he handled the Japanese so well.

When I went out there in 1947 when he was already in charge on the mainland, I went to see him and he talked and he knew more about me than I knew about myself. He had a tremendous grasp of things and he had sense enough to keep his mouth shut. He made one mistake. He wrote a letter to Joe [Joseph W.] Martin. Joe sat out and said what to do. Joe was the leader of the Republicans in the House and he sat out there and

Judd -- III -- 15

asked for some advice and MacArthur gave him frank advice and Joe leaked it to the press and it insulted Truman because it didn't agree with Truman's position so Truman fired him. One of Truman's major mistakes. He didn't need to fire him, but again he didn't blow up. He kept his cool; he carefully finished things up and got it all into shape before he left and came back across the Pacific. He was a great man.

G: One of the issues, I think, as far as Truman was concerned was the notion that MacArthur was being insubordinate, that he was acting contrary to orders from the Commander-in-Chief. Was this a problem for you?

J: No. He wasn't insubordinate. He was smarter than anybody else and he took actions on his own that were not prohibited but they were not wholly in line with what was being advocated here. They were not against what was being advocated but he was sharper. He went off here and did all kinds of things. Look what he did in Japan. Took Japan prostrate and Japan today is due to two things, the wisdom and the foresight of MacArthur, the way he handled them. I had a broadcast, a [inaudible] of the air on this thing, one of the things I had [inaudible] dig it out for him. How to deal with Japan after the war. We were going to demolish the emperor. All the left was going to demolish the emperor. I said, "For Christ's sake, don't demolish him. The Japanese have a--use the emperor. Have him on our side inside of being on the militarists' side." And there were ten points I made and our government finally followed them. They didn't do it because I recommended it although I was recommending it before most of the other people were but MacArthur went ahead on his own. He was so much smarter and way ahead of them and if they had forbidden it and said, "You can't do it," he wouldn't have done it but he got there ahead of it. You could go on for this the whole story. He was a great asset in

Judd -- III -- 16

the war and after the war in dealing with Japan and dealing with the Philippines. I don't know whether I've said this or not, if I have interrupt me because it's a point--well, it's a little off and I'll let it go right now. Go ahead.

G: You talked about the threat of the Communists from the mainland invading Taiwan and being unable to take the island. Was there also a threat that Chiang Kai-shek would launch an offensive on the mainland?

J: Yes. I don't think there was a chance. People said there were. The mainland used that argument all the time. The Generalissimo was too smart. He didn't have the stuff to do it.

G: This was always referred to as "unleashing Chiang Kai-shek." MacArthur--

J: What could he do. That little island against that giant mainland. They had plans. If the mainland attacked they had some things that they could do to make trouble down on Hainan Island and the Hong Kong--they had plans for their defense and one of the best defense is a counterattack but the notion that they could go right away. Ultimately. They want and they haven't yet. They were determined to regain the mainland.

G: You don't think Chiang was ever serious about launching some sort of attack?

J: No. I have reason to believe he wasn't and he kept people's hope up. [Franklin D.] Roosevelt was great at keeping our hope up during two years when the Russians were demanding we use force and we weren't ready for it. Two years we stalled before we landed on Normandy while we built up our strength but we talk all the time, you know? Keep your morale up. We're going to do these things. There was hope, encouragement, and so on. Any good leader does that and Chiang did that. But I have no reason to believe--there is no evidence to the best of my knowledge that he actually had in mind.

Judd -- III -- 17

Here's a point. We've got this in mind. Now we'll work toward it. Land at such and such a place and start something going from [foreign phrase] up to Shanghai. His people plan all that kind of thing but the thought of doing it when they were so weak. I'm sure I told you, didn't I, when I was talking about what Chiang said on this issue when I was over there in 1967, interrupt me if I did. I had my seventieth birthday, it was my sixty-seventh [sixty-ninth]. The Chinese have your birthday a year older than you are, you see, so my ninetieth birthday from Chinese should have been in 1987 rather than 1988. Somebody, Marvin Leibman was with me and he told them this was my birthday and they had an affair and I--my part--I sounded off and congratulated them for what they'd done on Taiwan, taken this island, there's a little island. The State Department had no belief [inaudible] could be done. Chiang Kai-shek couldn't concede. Hadn't he been clobbered on the mainland? Well, if you fight twenty years an internal war and eight years occupied your economy is shattered. Eighty per cent of the industry and seventy per cent of the best agricultural land was controlled by the enemy and then he was not supposed to be weak. He was no good. I started to congratulate him on what they'd done on Taiwan, so it was a miracle on what they had done, gotten solvent, balanced their budget--we can't--and all these things were going ahead and he interrupted me. He said, didn't I tell you this? "We haven't done anything here that we didn't try to do on the mainland but we were too exhausted after all we'd been through. The inflation was out of control because we had to print money. Our industry, out of which we got taxes was controlled"--and he elaborated that--"and our people were exhausted. It was really wonderful that we'd been able to hold on all those years more or less on our just nerve." And then he said, "But here on Taiwan now we've had a smaller problem. Don't have to take care of seventeen

Judd -- III -- 18

provinces." They had to come back and reestablish governments in twelve of those provinces. I think that's the right figure. Because the Japanese had set up their own type of government. And to set up provincial governments, get the people in charge overnight. Well we want them to do it. The government's no good. Chiang says I told you, inept, incompetent, inefficient, undemocratic, corrupt and reactionary. By saying those a thousand times they paid attention, but then he said, "We had a smaller problem and we had a hundred miles of water between us and the mainland and your seventh fleet. Truman put the fleet in there [not] to protect the mainland against Taiwan but to protect Taiwan against the mainland because they have no fighting across there because after we got involved in Korea we didn't want to have a struggle down there, too. So here we've been able to work out." And then he went ahead and said, "Solution that's been so successful here and it's the solution that will enable our people on the mainland to begin at the bottom and build up their agriculture and build up their industry and their communications and transportation and then build up our foreign trade to get earnings and so on and we'll be able to do that on the mainland when we get back." And then he said, "And this is the pattern which something almost at the hundred newly independent countries that have been colonies for years haven't had self government will be able to use to get their new governments established in those colonies, sixty of them, in Africa." And they're called upon suddenly to become modern, efficient sophisticated governors or themselves when they haven't had the experience in it. Go ahead. I'm sure that's a repetition.

G: No.

Judd -- III -- 19

J: Again, it's been a program of success on free China. Taiwan is a sample and I've used this a million times. The Chinese are in some respects by centuries of elimination of the weaklings they've failed in one of the famines or floods or disasters or what not, they've got, by natural selection they're the strongest, I would say the toughest people, strong emotionally. They don't crack up the way we do. We pasteurize, inoculate, preserve, protect the life. So much of my profession nowadays is occupied in preserving the weak ones and the Oriental has--our future depends on the strong ones.

G: I wanted to ask you next about the Free China Fund that you set up for aiding refugees.

J: Yes. We set it up. It was really called Committee for a Million. We got--

Tape 1 of 2, Side 1

J: --statement, what they called a China Lobby, I gave you a copy of that didn't I? They called it the China Lobby. There wasn't any lobby. We never had a meeting; we got people including Norman Thomas and John L. Lewis and liberals and everybody. They're not dumb folks; they saw the importance of the Pacific and we drew up this manifesto, primarily on Manchuria, because we had brought the Russians into Manchuria and Yalta gave it control. It wasn't ours but we gave it control to the Soviet Union. That was supposed to please them. They must have laughed and said, "Those idiots in America." It's what saved the Communists. That's another whole story. They said they'd get out in six months but they didn't. They stayed there and blocked until a Communist could escape from North China where I was, Northwest, into Manchuria. We were within ten miles of cutting that highway from North, only one way they could get from where the Communists were in North [foreign city] over into Manchuria and allowed them to get into Manchuria. The Russians stayed armed, turned over to them all of the

Judd -- III -- 20

supplies that the Japanese had built up there for something like, I forget the figure, I think a--supplies they'd built for a four-year war. Suppose they got driven off Japan. They were prepared to, if necessary, long range, move into Manchuria and survive while they fought up. And those were all turned over in one stroke to the Communists. They got more in one gift than we gave Chiang Kai-shek in all eight years of the war. That can be documented. We saved them. Now, wait a minute, I got off the track. Come back to the question.

G: The Free China Fund.

J: So we saw the importance of free China. If the Chinese are free, they'll be friendly. They're a basically friendly people, and there's no insoluble problem over there. If the Communists had been able or if the Japanese had been able or if the Communists had been able or should have been able with our assistance or with the pressure we put on Chiang Kai-shek to pull him down, turn him over to the Communists, and thereby please the Communists, and they'd be friendly toward us. No, they'd still be Communists, dedicated to our destruction. If the Communists had--if our leftists had been able to enable the Communists to get control of China and develop the full potential might there. There's no solution for us in the Western Pacific let me tell you. So some of us saw this. We drew up this manifesto about Manchuria, signed it. There were less than a hundred people. That's all there ever was to the so-called China--the press and the State Department people on the other side, they took this line to discredit us. We were a China lobby, a bunch of simpletons until events proved how farsighted we were on that position and then I think I told you how we--about the fellow who came to see me, what's his name? The Russian--Count [inaudible] [Nicholas de Rockefeller, according to Judd's

Judd -- III -- 21

biographer]. I told you about him didn't I? Yes. He was half Russian and he came to me and said, "Why don't you get the Communist [inaudible], you just have propaganda. Two or three days of telling this story and [inaudible] agitate, agitate, agitate, agitate, agitate."

And after the thing blew up in Berlin and here's the worker's government spending its time mowing down the workers; it was an exposure of the fakerie. Way back there right at the end of the war. The tanks, the Russian people's government, mowed down workers and this [inaudible] said, "Why don't they agitate? Why don't you get the CIA and the CIO and the AFL and the miners to be carrying caskets up and down Broadway and State Street and Pennsylvania Avenue day after day after day after day after day." I said, "I don't know. I don't have any *entree* to the labor." And he said, "Could you help me? If you'd endorse a few folks," so I did and he went down to the AFL meeting in Miami and had this petition that we had prepared and he got signed there. Their leader said, "That's a good thing. Sign it." And when we got a little over a million signatures I took the whole list, photostats of it, in a wheelbarrow into the White House and presented them to [Dwight] Eisenhower, changed our name to Committee of a Million against admission of Communist China to the United Nations until she'll qualify. Everybody always left off the "until." "Until she qualifies." Whenever she'll qualify for membership, which means she has to renounce her program of world communization control of the world.

Whenever she'll do that she'll be in but you have to destroy the charter of the United Nations which was set up to protect law abiding, non-violent procedures and to oppose violent methods. So we worked at it. That's about all there is to it. The idea was a good idea; it was sound and there were a lot of people. Not a lot, but in the beginning a handful who saw it and they had influence in their own group. Some of the business

Judd -- III -- 22

people saw influence for their business group. The labor people saw the thing. If the Communists took it over at their standards of living they could undercut American labor standards. They were farsighted. We were foresighted again and we got--we agitated on these various things and the Chinese say that without that movement they couldn't have made it. They knew they had some support in the United States. People could hardly come out and attack us. They can laugh at us and call us the China Lobby but they couldn't attack the effort to support the efforts of people who remain free. The United States could be in the position of helping people destroy people's freedom.

G: In 1951 you had an internal problem with the Chinese Nationalist Air Force representative in Washington being accused of misusing funds and--

J: What do you mean by--

G: General Mao?

J: Mao Tse-Tung--no--Mao, Mao, see that's--my mind can't come up with those things. I'm largely responsible for that mess, too.

G: Tell me about that.

J: Well, that fellow was a smart guy and he was a friendly, easygoing fellow but he got intrigued with money; money corrupts. Look at the people in our own history. Very great guys. Look at the fellow who was numbered--who was it? One of Reagan's--he was the man that--[Michael] Deaver. Quit and took a job in violation of the rules. Greed caused him this. It's exactly the same sort of thing that happened to that fellow. Greed--he got bought off by the other side. I was with him. I have quite an extensive file on him. I can't think of his full name now. Names are the hardest thing at all to recall

Judd -- III -- 23

when you have deterioration of the mind like my own. But the facts of the basic arguments are there but the names, figures, don't come up.

G: But there was some question about the validity of the Mao's position. Whether he--

J: Yes. Whether he represented the government or not. He tried to indicate he was representing but he wasn't. He was representing his own position rather than the position of the government and when it came to light the Chinese didn't like to admit that their key man here in the early part of our relationships was either stupid or a crook or both. As a matter of fact I called Madame Chiang Kai-shek. I never did this until--there's an old Lucas law which forbids a civilian to carry on negotiations with a foreign government. Wright it [?] in violation of this law and I tried to avoid it. So I didn't ever have negotiations with him [her] except when there were other people present, and so I had this up and I called him [her], not from my home, when I [inaudible] about what I said I suppose. I called him [her] from the Foreign Affairs Committee with four or five members that were listening to the conversation. I called her and said, "You've got to repudiate this. It's a humiliation. You have to admit that this fellow's gone haywire but keep the blame on his defection; his default is a better word." His default rather than--don't let it appear that he was doing what he was doing with the approval and consent or even of the direction of his own government. He wasn't. He was on his own. And so they, with great embarrassment, had to repudiate it.

G: You were satisfied that he was working on his own and not with the--

J: Oh, yes. He was a crook.

G: But was he working with the acquiescence of the government?

Judd -- III -- 24

J: He may have thought that this was the right thing to do. He may have thought that he was the true patriot like--and as I said a little earlier MacArthur was the wise--not the true patriot--but he was the wise planner in the Pacific and he may have thought this was the right way. He can take Americans in and accomplish this and I don't remember all the details, although I had a great, long, thick file on it and I sent it out. I think it's out at the Hoover Institution. And I can't remember too much of--he lived a long time down in Mexico. I don't know that he's actually dead now. I think he must be but I haven't heard. Now the Chinese, you see, they--when somebody goes wrong and it's taken care of they're not vindictive. [Foreign name] the so-called Christian general, he wrecked. Chiang Kai-shek has one period when the summer of 1930, one of the worst disasters that happened to the nationalists and yet what did Chiang Kai-shek do? After he was defeated he took--any other country besides ourselves would have executed him as a traitor. No, he sent him around the world with a caravan, a handful, three or four people, to go out and observe the world and see that he was disgraced but they didn't rub it in. He's a human being. He's got family. He's got children. And the Chinese are so sensitive about that sort of thing and I think wise on the whole. We--the son of a gun was a traitor, cut off his head. The Chinese, they'll banish him or they'll isolate him but very seldom--never killed a single one of the people who fought him. It's an extraordinary. And he was smart. He was a benevolent guy basically. He was spurned, he was tough, he was strong, but he wasn't vindictive.

Well, I talked about myself. Mrs. Judd and I were talking the other day. I fight against positions that I think are unwise as hard as anybody, but I don't ever get mad at the people who [inaudible]. The fact that I'm against his position, I'm not against the guy.

Judd -- III -- 25

I always begin with the hope that the fellow is just as sincere and patriotic in advocating the position he takes as I hope he'll give me credit for being sincere, at least, in the advocating the position that I take. I don't see any business in getting mad at people. I don't get mad at people. That was a bad thing that happened but I think it was handled very well and when I took off and the Chinese didn't try to harm him, didn't try to send somebody out to assassinate him. What's that guy's name?

G: Was it P.T. Mow? M-O-W?

J: Yes. P--

G: T.

J: P.T. or T.P.?

G: I have letter P letter T.

J: I think that's right. P.T. Mou. It was M-O-U. There's Mo; the Chinese spell it M-A-O, Mao. That's the way it ought to be. We spell it M-O-W because O-W is "ow." A "cow," if the Chinese write it they say C-A-O. Cao. It's a diphthong. I can't imagine that word coming into my mind. I haven't thought about it for a long time. Diphthong.

G: Okay. Let me ask you to describe your efforts to equalize the immigration laws.

J: Well, that's the first thing I worked out. Didn't I give you a copy of my basic speech on that? I'm sure I did. About the first speech I made out there [in Congress]. Here we were at war with Japan and I said, "You can win the war but you aren't going to get in the long run the two strong countries on the opposite--if the opposite sides of the Pacific are controlled by forces friendly then there's no insoluble problem there. We can work out the difficulties and so you aren't going to have friendliness across there as long as you write in your log that anybody that isn't white or black or red is inferior. No matter,

Judd -- III -- 26

Gandhi or Madame Chiang Kai-shek are inferior but a brut of a son of a gun if he's a black or white or Indian, he's all right. He's eligible to bring in. You can't insult people because of something that's not part of their control. They were born this. They've studied. They're PhDs. They're brilliant, gifted, pianists, artists, whatever it is, but it can't be accepted in our society because they're the wrong color. I had said when I ran I was going to work to try to get that thing eliminated and I did in my first speech because they'd all heard me talk about it and somebody said, "Well analyze it," so I get up, extemporaneous, and all my speeches are longer than necessary because they're all extemporaneous, not written out ahead of time, not condensed. Then I have to tighten them up and straighten them up after they give me the transcript.

We organized the churches on that. We got the churches on a basis of right and wrong, you see, and they supported our efforts on that.

G: How did you organize it?

J: Well, of the churches I knew people of my own denomination, I talked to Harry Emerson Fosdick about it; he had great influence. He brought the Baptists along pretty much and I think the Federal Council of Churches passed a resolution or so. Details like that--and I couldn't work at it too much but if you take that list--let me get that for you. It won't take me more than one minute. No, be sure and let me get you before you go. They thing we were out--the China Lobby and the signatures of it.

G: Oh, good.

J: It was called the China Lobby to make fun of us. There was in the State Department what used to be called the "red cell" in the State Department. I told you about the four Johns and others. Those guys fought us. Our problems didn't come from the leftists; it

Judd -- III -- 27

came from these guys who saw what was bad in China and they didn't see there was good. It was like the ones who say you've got to destroy our system because twelve per cent of them are poor. But eighty-eight per cent are not poor. That ain't so bad.

G: In one of your letters what has been called the China Lobby was described by you as friends of China. That was the term.

J: Yes. That's what we changed it to. We called after [?] the Committee for a Million then the Committee of a Million. And it went on and it was largely responsible I think for preventing the folks who were sure the thing to do was to forget about that rotten government on Taiwan and go with the mainland, Mao Tse-Tung, Zhou Enlai and so on.

G: I want to ask one more question about that Friends of China of whatever the adversaries called the China Lobby. Mike Mansfield at the time charged that some of the aid money going to Chiang Kai-shek was coming back into the China Lobby and being used to finance politics.

J: Yes. Well, he was just as wrong. They never got one dime from them. They were offered. A man came in, a Chinese, came in and gave an envelope, had ten thousand dollars in it and I opened the envelope and I said, "Get out of here and take it back." That's how the Oriental went. That wasn't dishonest. We were their friends. You help your friends, don't you? We were so careful. They tried with a fine toothed comb to find someplace that [they?] could give us and I fired the man who was in charge of our program over that because he did accept some money. A fellow, Eugene Low [?], he's now their ambassador down in Nicaragua.

Taiwan has--in Guatemala I should say. Taiwan has recognition, commercial relations with us. They've got about twenty countries, twenty four countries that

Judd -- III -- 28

recognize them. They just got recognition with the exchange of ambassadors with the Bahamas. They have a little government in the Bahamas. So they've got these governments that give them stature, status is a better word. Officially they've got twenty-five countries [inaudible]. And this fellow was one of their representatives in Peking and I don't want to get into personalities here but one of the men that worked with me on my daily program, John Lewis, helped write. We talked over what I wanted to say and he boiled it down to four minutes and I had a radio program on eleven hundred stations. Largest network we've ever had in the United States was Washington Report of the Year, Walter H. Judd. John Lewis put the things in better shape than I could get them written and he came to me and he said, "I know that you don't approve of something I've seen happen." He hesitated to tell me because he was a friend of the other guy but he said that this man who is our secretary told him that Gene Low had come in and talked to him. He said, "I'm glad to be able to help you," and laid some money down and he took it. It wasn't an awful lot. I never found the details how much but it was against our principles and I had often said, "Now if there are Chinese in this country, American citizens, and they want to help free China against the other, that's not the same as--we didn't hesitate to take contributions from Germans, Americans of German ancestry when they were fighting Hitler but we didn't take it from Hitler or any of his millions," and so I stalled on the last thing and before the deadline came I had to call this man in that was our man and dismiss him. I hated to do it. He hadn't seen wrong but I couldn't be--I used to have a saying my father used to say that a raft that's full of holes will float but one leak will sink a battleship. So son, if you're going to amount to something you can't have any leaks. One leak will sink a battleship. A raft that's full of holes will float. And so we had to

Judd -- III -- 29

dismiss him. It was a jolt. Then we changed, of course, after the government went ahead and derecognized under Carter. No, I beg your pardon, when Nixon was president went over there thinking we'd help him on his reelection in February of 1972 we had to be perfectly clear so we changed then the State Department, then the following fall of 1972 the Peking was recognized, the nationalist government, and the nationalist was derecognized and the Peking government was recognized as the official government and given the seat in the United Nation and so, no you couldn't have a movement committee against the admission of Communist China you'd have been admitted but we had won ten years. The ten years that made possible the miracle on Taiwan. They couldn't have done it without that thing. And they are the ones who say this all the time in my presence or when I'm around that, "You're the fellow who bought us the time to show what the Chinese can do when they have an opportunity and you can and will do when they have an opportunity so then we came up with the Committee for a Free China." A Free China. Not *for* Free China. We had to hammer that and we're not just a committee for Taiwan. We're for the Chinese people. If the Chinese people will be free, they'll be friendly, no insoluble problems. We're for having the Chinese free and developing a government of their own, not one dictated by a little, self-appointed handful of Communists.

G: Were there other ways that money from the nationalist government could get back in the American political system like giving it to Chinese Americans who would then use it to--

J: No, I don't think so. We watched that very carefully and they just took for granted there would be that but nobody's ever documented a single case of it.

G: You didn't suspect that it was getting in to--

Judd -- III -- 30

J: Oh, we watched for it. We thought it might happen. If they were Europeans. We know that Hitler's agents and Soviet agents are doing this all over the place all the time. But we never were able to get any evidence that the--well, some of the American Chinese, the Americans of Chinese ancestry, their relatives were on the mainland. The family is the closest tie in China and they weren't sure whether it would be all right to go along with the mainland. We didn't get as much support from the Chinese in this country as we wanted and as we ought to. We got support mostly from Americans who saw the overall problem or the Christian groups who stood for freedom against slavery and our support was relatively little support from the Chinese community. This was a sign of American organization but it was primarily you looked through the list of the people who run in the show and providing the money and the energy. I spent hours going through our lists of contributors. We didn't have any big contributors. We had lots of small contributors. And it was a skeleton. We only had two people working at headquarters. One man and a woman secretary, that's all. There never was more of a cripple and if there's evidence of it I have never found it.

G: Well, I'm not suggesting with regard to your particular group but there were a lot of suggestions that the movement or the cause of a whole or individuals in it were getting funds from Chiang Kai-shek.

J: There was a lot of money into it. That's a *non sequitur*. It's an attempt. The Chinese say [foreign phrase]. They're determined to find a bone even in an egg. "There's got to be a bone here, so we got to find one." You run across that in politics all the time. There must be something unworthy about this. Well, there's so much that does have unworthy things. I don't think you can ever get a movement that's perfect. You'll have shortcoming

Judd -- III -- 31

but actually this movement stayed as clean as any that I--I didn't see any major dishonesty or under the scene operations in this at all. I know how hard it was to--nobody knows better than I how hard it was to get Americans to come along and do it. People did it because it's right and in their own countries' interests to be on the side of the ones who are working for freedom for the Chinese than for those who are working for a regimented China controlled by a dictatorship with a world mission. As Deng Shao Ping says, their goal is winning the world and Gorbachev said in his big speech just a little over a year ago, a year and two months ago, "We will never"--their sentence was, "In October 1917, we parted from the old world, rejecting it for all time. We are moving toward a new world, a communist world, we shall never stray off that path." And here, in this speech we think he's straying off the path; he's becoming less than Communist when he declares this is the means by which he intends to win but you can't get Americans to believe. Hitler wrote it out, great detail, exactly what he was going to do, but a lot of good [it] did. The people were free. There was no poverty in Germany, no poverty, no unemployment. The women had maternity benefits. More benefits, better off than anybody else in Europe, what could be wrong with a system which did so many--made possible such great and good living for the common people. Hitler did it, but his purpose was beyond--you don't get acceptance by doing bad things. The wolf makes headway when he's able to sell himself as a lamb--sheep's clothing. My whole life has been mixed up in this. Go ahead.

G: In 1954 the Eisenhower Administration had to weigh to what extent it would assist the French in Vietnam at Dien Bien Phu. Were you involved in this policy decision?

Judd -- III -- 32

J: No, I was not involved in it. They were--Eisenhower would never have got us involved in Vietnam the way we were for heaven's sake. John Kennedy is responsible for Vietnam.

G: Why do you say that? Would you elaborate first with regard to Eisenhower?

J: [inaudible] pressure on Eisenhower but he said--he was a simple Kansas [?] thing. If it's on a basis of helping an outfit that uses compulsion and enslavement and murders its opponents and so on, he wouldn't have anything to do with it. I think I told you--if I did stop me--about when he took over when Truman pulled MacArthur out of [inaudible] and I went over there when he was a campaign take a look at the thing and he took a lot of time, he negotiated, he tried to get settlement but he, then there was a paper. I was down speaking in Texas and I saw the morning paper that there was a rumor in Washington that Eisenhower was about to make a deal and send back--there was about twenty thousand of those Chinese Communists fought with the Chinese forces and we captured them and had them in asylum down in an island off the end of Korea. And the story was that he was about to send them back. [Dean] Acheson was pushing for that, that we send them all back after all they came over here, they're invaders and Peking was demanding they come back and probably some of them got assassinated for defecting. Anyway, I called him on the telephone and I said, "Sir, this morning's story worries me." He interrupted me. I didn't get more than twenty words out, thirty practically. He said, "Walter, this is one you don't need to worry about. I had the job of loading thousands and thousands of defectors from the Russian forces into boxcars and sending them back. I had that job. I opposed it but that was the order and I carried out the order. You don't need to worry." None of these go back if they don't want to go and he took time, took about fourteen

Judd -- III -- 33

months he negotiated, moved along, moved along but not any were sent back, about seventy per cent, seventy-two per cent I think it was, of those prisoners opted to go to Taiwan and freedom rather than go back to the mainland and the regimentation that was there. This was one of the most dramatic repudiations of a regime. It would happen all over the place if people could. Here they had a chance to. I'm mad because some stories come out about Eisenhower was responsible. Why he sat there and when he was nominated and we were out--maybe I told you this. Did I tell you about how he drew a diagram?

G: No.

J: I said, there were five of us there, one of whom was one of the editors of the *Time*, and all but one of them are dead now except me and there was all these rumors that he was responsible and I said, "Let's find out," so [inaudible] and I would always stick my neck out. I said to him--we were all in Denver from about the last of July, first of August when we just got the nomination. I said, "There are rumors going around. How much truth is there? If they're untrue, we've got to refute them. If they're true we just have to look in other directions and emphasize something else. We've got to get you elected." He said, "All right, I'll be glad to." "Can we sit down and ask you all the nasty questions we can think of that might be said?" "Sure. You want to do it this afternoon?" "Yeah." So all five of us sat down out in the hotel in Round [Brown] Palace there in Denver.

G: Who were the others? Were they members of Congress or--

J: No. I was the only member of Congress. Most of the members of Congress, the Republicans were on Taft's team and one was--well, I can't come up with their names. I've got pictures of them in my mind but I can't think of their names. Well, so we sat

Judd -- III -- 34

down and I asked him a question about that. "The charge is being made that you were responsible for dividing Berlin and turning over control of East Berlin over to the Russians and sending back all these defectors and prisoners for slaughter, especially the officers of your own armies, of the communist armies who had defected." He said, "Walter, the Democrats and some of the opponents of my nomination made those charges because they don't know any better. But I don't think that you'll find in the campaign major charges by the democrats because they do know better. They know I opposed in the inside circles every one of those things that I was ordered to do and carried out and I was called home." Didn't I tell you this? He said, "I was called home during the Battle of the Bulge. That was long about December of 1944 when it looked as if they were going to break through and I got orders to come home and I was sure we were going to make it in the Battle of the Bulge but I shouldn't be leaving right then but I called home and it never has been published that I was called home, that I was at home in that time, I've never seen it to this day. I'd gone into the Pentagon here at the end of the day, and I said, 'What in the hell is going on? I need to be in Europe where the battle is and I'm ordered home. What's going on?' The fellow said, 'There's a plan. There's going to be a big meeting. The President is going over to meet with Stalin and Churchill in Moscow at a place called Yalta. They're getting this plan ready and there's a plan to divide Germany. They want your advice as to where the dividing line should be.' A Russian controlled part of Germany and another part that we control? The German people aren't going to have any say about their own city? And they said, 'Yes'." And he said, "Why there'll never be peace if they divide Germany. Never be real peace. I'll go see the President." So he said, "I went the next morning to the President. It was about nine

Judd -- III -- 35

o'clock. He was lying in bed. I hadn't seen him in fourteen months. He had a deterioration when he came home from Yalta," and the place up in Persia where they had the meeting right after--

G: Was it Tehran?

J: Tehran, yes. Right after the Cairo conference where Chiang Kai-shek was there and then in Teheran [Tehran]. "And I [Eisenhower] said, 'Mr. President, I hate to bother you but I've been called home here when I ought to be over there and I'm told that there's a plan to divide Germany and give Russians control of one part of it.' I said, 'Mr. President, I beg of you not to do that because if you do you will not get real peace,' and the President interrupted me and said, 'Take it easy, Ike. I can handle Stalin.' He said Eisenhower said, 'he [Roosevelt] was a sick man. Sick unto death. I didn't know then there were two weeks at a time he hadn't been able to do work. Hadn't even gone to his office. He never was able to work more than two hours a day all those last fourteen months of his life. I didn't know any of that, but I saw him. Well, I had to go back and carry out the argument. So he said then when they told me we had to divide Germany I made a couple of end runs on my own. I did all I could that I wasn't forbidden to do. So he said, 'Here's Berlin.' And I made an end run up to the north and there is Denmark coming across and I got to Lübeck up that corner. If I'd been twenty four hours later they'd have been there and they would have got over here to where Rhine comes out at wherever it is at the other side and Denmark would have been controlled Skagerrak [strait], they'd have control of it. They'd have had Denmark because they would have blocked it. I made that on my own. And he said I made another end run. Here was Vienna. I didn't get there. The Russians, under the deal that was being made, got there before. I got there forty miles

Judd -- III -- 36

away, Linz," L-I-N-Z. And this story has never been told to this day. Says, "I opposed it every mile that we withdrew and allowed them to come but I was commander in chief and I followed my orders. You see, this is a thing that--civilians don't have that kind of discipline, much like the people who leak everything that doesn't--the underlings, they leak stuff and get bad publicity on everything they themselves don't approve."

G: What else did you ask Eisenhower? What other questions did you pose to him?

J: Oh, we went through a whole series of them and I have the tape of it. I didn't have the tape; I have the transcription. There was a person and that was sent out, Hoover Institute.

G: Good.

J: So there's no argument about it but nobody ever seems to want to find out good about people. They only want to find out the things that are bad. The press just concentrates on the negative, the negative.

G: Do you recall who else was there in the meeting with him?

J: Well, I'll have to look it up. One of them was this man from *Time* magazine. One of them was the fellow from up in Minnesota--what the heck was his name--an adviser in the campaign and he went out with Ike when Ike was out campaigning with him all the time and I can't--he's a friend of mine, but I haven't--this is part of my mind I haven't thought up. Now, one of them was this writer for the *Reader's Digest* who had--he wrote an article for the *Reader's Digest* about me. I could go down, dig that out, and get his name. I know where the article is but I can't think of the name. And who were the five. They were all people key but my mind goes blank at the moment. Tonight it'll come to me after I'm in bed but I can't get them now.

Tape 2 of 2, Side 1

Judd -- III -- 37

J: --was the man that saved Greece, went over there, and we insisted on putting in these orders that he would be permitted to advise and train at all levels. Those six words are what saved Greece. He would put a major with a German with a Greek general and the American major or lieutenant colonel smarter because most of them had generals opposite of political appointments. And he worked the thing out and handed it to him and the guy said, "That makes sense," would sign it but the order came from the general but the plan came from the American that was out there and when we tried to do the same thing in Korea and this man went up to Korea and he would advise and train at all levels he changed the whole situation in Korea, this American. He retired down in Florida, can't think of his name, come to me after a while. Well, we tried to get the same--I tried hard to get the same thing for China. I couldn't do it. Chiang Kai-shek's government people so corrupt and we sent over I think a couple of hundred Americans over there. They were in Nanking. [Foreign phrase]. They were forbidden to go within forty miles or fifty miles of any combat so they didn't know what they were talking about, and they said, "We've got all these advisers but Chiang Kai-shek won't accept our advice. He knew the problems. He was fighting out there but we wouldn't let our own people go there. I tried to get this man appointed to China. No, no. The brass down at the Pentagon wouldn't do it. The thing that succeeded in Greece and in Turkey and in Korea we never tried in China because the boys down, the red cell said, "Chiang Kai-shek is hopeless, inept, incompetent, inefficient, *et cetera, et cetera*," and their minds were closed and yet see what he's done on Taiwan where he had a chance. He's the most successful developer of an undeveloped country in the planet. Not anybody's done as well as Chiang Kai-shek has. But he couldn't do it on the mainland. The problem was he

Judd -- III -- 38

said that "our problem here is so much smaller and we were so exhausted. Our currency was inflated. We didn't have the strength to do it on the mainland but here on Taiwan, we had a smaller problem, and a hundred miles of water to protect us while we worked at the thing and your seventh fleet." I never will forget that. We put the seventh fleet in their crew primarily to protect the mainland against this fool Chiang Kai-shek but it served to protect Chiang against the mainland.

G: How would you evaluate Lyndon Johnson's attitude toward Asia?

J: Well, Lyndon was--his instincts were fine. He was for helping them. But he is not as determined. He was more concerned with his own position and his place in history and so on. He wasn't as determined. I've got a picture here I'll show you. I got it out--
(interruption)

--and then I did his name. Names just won't come to me.

G: Stanley High is the article on . . . Is this an extra copy?

J: What?

G: May I keep this?

J: Sure. It's a public article. *Reader's Digest*. Is that--what did he say? Is that wanted more men like--

G: Yes. More men like us.

J: You can keep that.

G: Good, wonderful.

J: But they had a notion that there was a secret outfit was supported by Chiang Kai-shek. Finance, a lot of money, we didn't have it. We were living on a shoestring. Had one

Judd -- III -- 39

room with one person, Marvin Liebman, and his secretary. That's all there was to it. But we were right. The point was the truth was on our side.

G: Let's see. Let's go on to-- Let me go on to another question here. I don't want to take up too much of your time today but I've got a couple of things I would like to get you to talk about. One is your work in--I'm going to switch to domestic issues now.

J: [inaudible] there's a discussion of where Marshall went wrong.

G: Good.

J: Look up page ten of the War of Ideas. If you haven't I've got extra copies because there in one paragraph that our government made it impossible for Marshall to succeed. And then he was--they showed him all couple of places where there was corruption all over the place. You remember in my first major speech on this in Congress I talked about the diseases of defeat, what Churchill called the disease. Corruption is the disease of defeat. People have to survive and whenever you get defeat and things are going bad, there's corruption. That was one of the problems we dealt with in the Senate. We blamed Chiang Kai-shek for the disease. It was the defeat. Well, look on page ten there, General Marshall was doomed before he started as plenty of persons who knew China told him. It's possible to get agreement in almost any controversy no matter how great divergence there is at first if both sides really want an agreement but if for any reason one side doesn't want an agreement then there's no way you can get a real agreement. We have learned that the hard way with respect to Communists at Moscow, Paris, late success. We haven't learned it. They haven't even learned it yet. The Chinese had learned it in 1927. Unfortunately we refused to learn it until 1947, twenty years later, and now it's

Judd -- III -- 40

eighty seven twenty, another twenty [?]. Here's this thing about Vietnam. Did I give you this?

G: Yes. You did give me that.

J: Well, he made this stupid mistake. Didn't I bring the picture in? I went out to get the picture. Stupid mistake. See, we'd served together in the House and we had good relations.

G: You said he made a stupid mistake?

J: Stupid mistake that I had said to him, "Bring, go home, our people don't understand Vietnam, but [General William] Westmoreland and so on, they understand it. Bring them home and let him tell the thing." No, I beg your pardon. I'm screwy. I didn't want them to bring them home. Tape over there a briefing like members of Congress go over and take a look--overwhelmingly they're impressed and Westmoreland and his men have their maps and their so on and they describe, you see what it's about, and they understand. And so I said to him, "Speeches and exhortations here will not do the job. The people must be given the more detailed facts that convince you and me"--I was talking to him--"these facts will also convince them. The briefings in Vietnam were all marked secret, but the enemy knows most of the facts presented, fully ninety per cent could be presented on television with maps, charts and graphs. When the President kindly received me on October 16, I urged that such a nationwide briefing be presented on TV, initiated by Ambassador Bunker and General Westmoreland and the details presented then by the colonels and majors who prepare these estimates and by the embassies political, economic and CORDS [Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support] officials"--that's an outfit--"including perhaps a few from IVS, International Voluntary

Judd -- III -- 41

Service. Not only their presentations but their convictions and enthusiasm as to the rightness of this cause and to the importance and necessity of our Southeast Asia effort will be convincing to our people. It might be more effective to have it taped in Vietnam," and Lyndon said, "That's a good idea," so he brings Westmoreland home and has him make speeches here and the press says he's trying to justify himself. If he'd done it out there people would see the situation, instead of saying, "Oh, Lyndon's just doing politics." They will not follow your advice. I'm probably careful before I analyze it. Let it be done. Let the people here see what we see, what convinces us. Most people who went out there to Vietnam came home saying, "This is right." We had it practically won. And then by golly, you didn't ask for that explosion but we missed the boat so many times. Now go back to where you asked me a question about.

G: My question had to do with your efforts to transfer the Indian health facilities from the Bureau of Indian Affairs to the Public Health Service. This was something you succeeded in. Any--

J: I succeeded and after I got going Senator [Edward John] Thye from Minnesota, we had a huge big Indian population in Minnesota, you know, in reservations here and there, and also I came to [from] Nebraska where we had Indian reservations and that's one of the things I felt best about but it hasn't been carried through and we just treat them as objects of charity to be tolerated without recognizing they had a culture; they had a civilization. They had profound understanding of the laws of nature, and they believed in a moral order, the heavenly father so to speak. I forget what they had a fancy name for him. Our record of treatment of the American Indians is disgraceful. One of the worst in our whole history. I can't describe it as otherwise. It wasn't--did you read some of the things during

Judd -- III -- 42

the debate, the discussions on that? Well I don't know anything to add. I was awful glad that we got it through and the Indians were so grateful, the same as the Japanese were for my getting the racial discrimination--not my getting--but for our getting the racial discrimination clauses out of our laws. Because if you aren't going to treat them as equal human beings you aren't going to have peace. That's just--you can just say that absolutely without exception. They may have peace temporarily, before the inevitable. Jesus said, "You don't take on twenty thousand if you only got ten thousand." The timing, the showdown comes when there's a better chance of success, so you don't just go out and tilt the windmill like Marco Polo [Don Quixote]; you wait until you've got advantageous. You've got to be wise as serpent.

G: In 1953 you were critical of the Voice of America and the suitability of some of the programs they were running abroad as offensive to other cultures.

J: I forget all the details.

G: Let me remind you.

J: We showed them America as if--we don't interpret the Golden Rule. We do unto others as we would have them do unto you so we did to those people what we'd like to have done unto us. When you're dealing with people of different cultures you ought to interpret it in its true sense, do unto others as you would have them do unto you if you were they, so we went out and treated them with a lot of jazz and stuff that was a popular thing at home but they weren't accustomed to that. They liked--out in Minnesota all day even yet the radio plays Swedish Schottisches and Danish dances and stuff. They loved that kind of music and we go over and give them the latest hot rod, just all it does is convince the people that we're not cultured. Do the things that they like. Let them see

Judd -- III -- 43

that we like them, and indicate that we understand them, by giving the kind of things that they want. You know I say our foreign aid. Didn't know how much they need. That's astronomic.

Second, how much can they effectively use, but that's more than you ought to try to do. The measure your aid should be how much they can self respectingly receive. That's the measure. When you go over and give them more than they can handle and thereby show how rich and powerful, strong we are, and how weak and backward they are, they just have got their independence. They need reassurance that we're independents. One of the major failures, I've talked to you I guess about this, the one I regret as much as anything is the failure to get a territorial status on nations in their independence before they're brought into the UN. I talked to you about this, didn't I? We bring them in as soon as they get their independence. They never had a balanced budget. They never had any self-government. They've been controlled by tribal chiefs or controlled by Britain or foreign powers, colonial powers and then we bring them right in as if they were right along with the rest of us. The net result is--they aren't going to say so--but they're uneasy, they don't know how to do it. Let them run their own show as we did with the territories after the first thirteen and if additional states were not brought in as states off the bat they were given territorial [status]. They had to see if they could govern themselves; they had to elect their officers, get a budget, manage their affairs. When they were able to do it, then they were brought in full state. But we said, "Oh, don't it make them feel good." They brought in the first one, Malaya, when I was up there. I worked at it and failed. "We want to encourage them." I said, "Well why don't you give a kid when he goes to college his diploma the day he matriculates. Encourage

Judd -- III -- 44

him." No. He gets it. He works harder if he's got to work hard to get it. [Inaudible] "I'll become a state. I'll get into the UN." Do a good job. Work hard at home. Give it to them first--oh, what can you do with people who just think with their hearts instead of with their head. It's partly because they haven't lived abroad close to people. They've lived there as foreigners. They've lived in a ghetto, so to speak, of Americans in Paris and Americans--but living out with people where I didn't see anybody but one white man for almost two years, that's different. I got to think of--my thoughts were Chinese thoughts, not American thoughts. I had some American thoughts but I had to balance them. I wasn't smart--all I'm trying to say--I wasn't right on these issues as proved by thirty years late because I was smarter. It was because I had been exposed to the background which enabled me to see things that folks that haven't been there don't see. So I'm talking a foreign language. I was in those days. I was lonely. Lonely. To see these things and see ourselves, well-intentioned, high minded. Acheson is a sincere and patriotic guy and he was as wrong in many of his attitudes toward dealing with the other powers as anybody could be. It's proved. It went haywire.

G: In 1946 you supported an atomic energy bill that would place the atomic energy research development under a civilian commission rather than military controlled one. Do you want to elaborate on that?

J: No, except that I think that the control of these weapons and whatever kind should be not in the hands of the people who produce them. They've become over enthusiastic. They've become somewhat unbalanced. They don't look at it from the standpoint as much--some do--but most of them don't look at it from the standpoint of the best interests of the nation as a whole as they're interested in the success of their project. This is what

Judd -- III -- 45

they work at and they want to adopt it that way and that's why government ought to be limited government. We call it limited in what sense? I got a card in there. I'll go get it for you. When I used to make speeches when I was a candidate of about six or seven things that I favored. If they wanted a guy under these ideas they could vote for me and I'd do the best I could, but if they didn't they shouldn't vote for me. And that's one of them. The final say should be on the parts of the common people. They pay the bill, the government exists for them, and they all look at it in a more balanced way than the guys who are the experts. The experts always pushed their own specialty. That's inevitable. That may not necessarily be wise for the whole situation. The common sense of the people, given the fact as to what's possible. Here's an example in the morning paper. You see where eighty per cent of the people you see this morning's paper unfold get a long Gallup poll. Eighty per cent of the people are opposed to increasing the pay of the Congressmen, Senators and so on, fifty per cent. It shouldn't be done. They were doctors. They were lawyers. They were businessmen. If they preferred, if they aren't willing to make it on this they should go back to their own job. You heard me talk about that from the beginning. They've now become hired employees to work for their district or their state, not to work as the board of directors of the United States of America. They're no longer custodians of the nation's destiny. They shouldn't--they are custodians but they think of it in terms of their own local district. "What's necessary to get me reelected? How much money can I get?" You see when they came out, wanted to close, what was it, thirteen of all these army bases, old obsolete bases? One of the stories said there wasn't a single member of Congress that didn't make an effort to keep the one in his district going. No longer does he think as a member of the board of directors what's good

Judd -- III -- 46

for the United States. His job is to work for the well-being of the United States. And if the United States is prosperous and secure that'll be in the long [term] the best interests of his own district. But no, the shortcoming of my old text [inaudible] I memorized from that old Scotch two hundred years ago student of Greek and Roman history was so right [from Int. II, Sir Alex Fraser Tytler]. I've told it to you and I don't need to say it again. "A democracy can never exist as a permanent form of government." Never has, never can. Why? "Because it can exist only until the people discover they can vote themselves the largesse"--we'd say benefits--"out of the public treasury. From that moment on the majority always votes for the candidates who promise most benefits and the democracy goes down over a loose fiscal policy, always to be replaced by a dictatorship." Now I think that's a law of history. The United States, we just finished our second century. A third century. I would doubt it. I'd work--if I were living--my best to get it but I doubt that we'd make it. I wouldn't be surprised if we didn't make it more than twenty five years. I hope not. I don't predict it, but it could happen. I'm anxious. As anxious as can be. Our freedom is involved and our people don't see it. How many more benefits will we get and how much more of my social security and all of these things are necessary, but the government doesn't have any money. The government should do these things for us. If we did we wouldn't have any money. There isn't any such thing as public funds. All there is is private funds. People earn money. Take it from them and pass it out. But calling it public funds won't [inaudible] my standard saying, they want these benefits from Minneapolis, my district, where do they come from? St. Paul? Where do benefits for St. Paul come up? Minneapolis. We're doing this out of our own pocket money. They [The?] whole line is all ready. A majority is developing that will vote in terms of

Judd -- III -- 47

the candidates who promised most benefits, and the democracy go down because--over a loose fiscal policy. After a while you can't finance it. Well, we're headed toward that direction. We've been two hundred years. We're one of the longest in history. Only a half a dozen has ever been as long as we have. And we're going down. We're already over the--the rise and fall. You know, I told you this. We're over the hump. We're on the downside. It's not fatal yet, it's not hopeless. I wish I was younger, could continue to struggle, but the odds are against it.

End of Tape 2 and Interview III

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Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of

WALTER JUDD

In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Mary Lou Carpenter, of Minneapolis, Minnesota, do hereby give, donate, and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title, and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of the personal interviews conducted with my father, Walter Judd, on November 11, and December 20, 1988, and January 17, 1989, in Mitchellville, Maryland, and prepared for deposit in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions:

- (1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.
- (2) The tape recordings may be made available to those researchers who have access to the transcripts.
- (3) I hereby assign to the United States Government all copyright I may have in the interview transcripts and tapes.
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Mary Lou Carpenter
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Sharon Hewitt
Assistant Archivist for Presidential Libraries

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4/6/2009 MEMO FOR THE RECORD

In the process of preparing the Walter Judd oral history interviews for opening, Mr. Judd's daughter asked that we allow his official biographer, Dr. Lee Edwards of The Heritage Foundation, to proofread the interview transcript. Many of Dr. Edwards suggestions were incorporated into the transcripts.

Nicole Hartmann Hadad
Archives Specialist