INTERVIEW I

DATE: July 25, 1969

INTERVIEWEE: JOSEPH KEENAN

INTERVIEWER: DAVID McCOMB

PLACE: Washington, D.C. office, 1200 15th, N.W.

Tape 1 of 1

M: This is an interview with Mr. Joseph Keenan, who is the secretary of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. I am in his office in Washington, D.C., and the date is July 25, 1969. My name is David McComb.

First of all I'd like to know something about you and your background. Where were you born and when, and where did you get your education?

K: I was born in the city of Chicago November 5, 1896; on the near west side, a short distance from the Loop. My education was just a grammar school education and some courses at night school at Lewis Institute.

M: You went to work at an early age?

K: I went to work when I was fourteen years of age and have been working ever since.

M: Did you from an early age get into electrical work?

K: No, I had a number of jobs until I was eighteen years old. It was impossible to work in the electrical industry until you reach eighteen years old. From fourteen to eighteen I worked as

a messenger boy, worked in a ladies' hat shop, and worked in a millinery dyeing room. Then I had my first chance, through my uncle, to enroll as an apprentice in the Electrical Workers Union, Chicago Local 134.

M: Do you remember what your first wage was?

K: My first wage as an electrical worker? It was a dollar a day.

M: And that was for what?

K: Five and a half days; it was five and a half [$5.50] a week.

M: Was that a ten-hour day?

K: No, it was an eight-hour day.

M: Well, then did you become active in the union in Chicago?

K: First, I had to serve an apprenticeship of four years, and during that period you are not a full-fledged member. I became a full-fledged member in 1922 and that allowed me then to attend the meetings. In 1918 I got my card rather, and then I immediately started attending the meetings. In 1923 I was appointed to a local union job as an inspector. In those days the meetings were very carefully checked, and we had what we called a working card. You had to show your working card before you could get into the meeting. There was a change in one of the offices' recording secretary, and they elevated the former secretary to full time representative. I was appointed by the President and re-elected at every election up until I retired in 1952 from the local scene. I only worked on meeting nights and a few nights a week.

M: So then for thirty years you were in Chicago.

K: No. See, the recording secretary only acted at meetings and other special assignments that were given him. For a long time it was a meeting every two weeks. Then it was changed to once a month. In 1937, I was also elected secretary of the Chicago Federation of Labor.

M: I see.

K: That was the first full-time job I had in the labor movement. I held the secretary of the Chicago Federation of Labor until 1949. In the meantime I was on leave of absence to the War Production Board during the period of July, 1940, until it was dissolved in November, 1945.

M: This brought you to Washington?

K: This brought me to Washington. In my relationship in Washington on the War Production Board I got to know General Clay very well, and then I went over to Germany with him, and for two and a half years served as his labor advisor. Then in 1948, after the passing of the Taft-Hartley Act, the AF of L set up an organization known as the Labor's League for Political Education, and I became temporary administrator in 1948.

M: This kept you in Washington then?

K: Yes, and then in 1949 I was appointed the permanent administrator. In 1950, I changed from there to the secretary of the Building Trades Department of the AF of L, and then in April, 1954, I was appointed

International Secretary of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, the job I still hold. I also happen to be a member of the executive council of the AFL-CIO.

M: Then you were off and on in Washington since the early 1940s.

K: That's right.

M: When did you first meet Lyndon Johnson?

K: I first met Lyndon Johnson in my duties in and around the Congress here and there during the war days. I really got to know him and work with him closely after I became a director of the Labor's League for Political Education.

M: I see. What kind of business would you see him about?

K: Well, I'd be in to see him on legislation or talk to him about legislation that the American labor movement was interested in. That was entirely my mission with him all those years. I may meet him once every two or three weeks, and sometimes I wouldn't meet him for five or six months.

M: I see.

K: Whenever I was interested in anything, well, then I would stop in and see him.

M: Was he generally receptive to your visits?

K: Oh, yes. You never had any trouble seeing him and talking to him. He gave you his time, and I must say quite frankly many times he gave you a straight-out answer, other times he left you with the impression that he wasn't in favor of what you were looking for. Then we'd find it out when the time came for votes on these different bills.

M: Did you ever consult with him about the Taft-Hartley Act?

K: Oh, yes. I talked to him. Especially on the repeal. I met with him almost daily during the 1959 session when they passed the Griffin-Landrum amendments and talked to him quite frankly on what we were interested in and looked for his help.

M: Did he give you help?

K: Well, yes and no. I always felt that he could have changed it around. This is my personal feeling. I always thought that he had the votes; there were some things that happened that always left me in doubt. Anyway, I hold him responsible for Griffin-Landrum, because I know his power and his influence and how he could shake down a vote here and there if he had to.

M: He wasn't on your side on that one?

K: That's right. I think the one occasion that brought it to me pretty strong was the fact that on the night of the passing of the McClellan amendments we had the votes and he sent Jim Murray home! We lost it by one vote. So that was said, I can't prove that. But some people that told me that I respect very highly, and I wouldn't doubt their statements a bit. But Jim Murray was sent home, and it was a crucial vote. We lost it by a tie. It was a tie vote. Nixon broke the tie and voted against us. So in my judgment--I felt pretty strong about it, because the year 1958 we worked very hard to elect a Democratic Congress. We had really done a job. I thought it was one of the greatest losses ever struck after we had done so much. And the important part is that he

was one of the real drivers in that 1958 campaign to get these fellows elected. I worked with him and went around the country helping in areas that were marginal. So I felt, above anybody else I think, that we had this coming. We didn't get it, but that's part of the game.

M: Then did you support Johnson in 1960?

K: Yes, I did. In 1960? No, I supported Kennedy, and Kennedy selected Johnson. I supported the ticket.

M: Had you forgiven Johnson by that time?

K: No, I hadn't. I was opposed to him in the convention. I happened to be a delegate, and I opposed him in the convention.

M: You were a delegate from where?

K: Illinois.

M: From Illinois?

K: I hadn't forgiven him. I thought that we had got a bad deal, and I didn't forget it.

M: Were you upset when Kennedy selected Johnson?

K: Yes, I was, very much. I guess that's a matter of record! But after it became a fact, then I supported the ticket. He was on the ticket, and I worked hard for the ticket.

M: Did Johnson ever come to see you at that point in time?

K: No, he never talked to me. He had some friends come to me and talk to me at different times, and I told them that it was history. I couldn't support Nixon under any set of circumstances, and I was very strong for Kennedy. I worked like the

devil for Kennedy in the convention and then worked very hard during the campaign. I felt that if Johnson was vice president that it was okay, because I thought we always had a friend in court in Kennedy.

M: Did you think that Johnson strengthened the ticket at all?

K: Well, it's doubtful under the circumstances. I think that he brought in three or four states that made the difference.

M: The traditional story is that he helped in the South.

K: That's right, and that's where we needed the votes. It was those two or three states, two or three areas, where he brought in the votes that made the difference. I don't think there was anybody that could have contributed any more in the North than Kennedy himself. I think that any person he would pick from the North would only get the support in the same states that he already had. There may be one or two that probably would have made a difference because of the religious issue, but I doubt it.

M: Did you have any connection with Johnson while he was vice president?

K: Very seldom, very seldom. The vice president--well, his duties are limited, and you don't have many occasions to go to him. He can probably direct you, probably can help you in stirring up a few votes here and there occasionally. Here our job is generally working with the chairmen of the committees, direct contact with the members and the chairmen.

M: How soon after Kennedy's assassination did you meet with the new President Johnson?

K: Almost immediately. He called us in.

M: Did he call in all labor leaders?

K: No, he called some of us that had been active in politics. You see we were in the 1962 campaign, and he always had a number of friends that he was interested in. He would call on anybody that knew anything about politics to help his friends. This I thought was an admirable, commendable part of him. He seemed never to forget a friend. I got to know him because of my activities in the Labor's League.

M: Did he say anything specific that you remember when he first called you in?

K: Well, no, they were talking about the 1964 election.

M: Oh, I see.

K: At the start of the campaign. I think Kennedy was assassinated in 1963.

M: Yes.

K: In November. It was only a year away until the election, and he started to mend his fences immediately.

M: So you were called in as a political aide?

K: That's right.

M: Were you willing to help him?

K: Sure. Sure, I traveled the country for him and with him. I flew with him for two or three weeks during the

campaign and then did a lot of other missionary work around in states where he probably needed some shoring up, meeting with people to set up organizations in the areas to use in the campaign.

M: What areas did you go into?

K: Every section of the country.

M: So you covered the whole country?

K: The whole country.

M: Would you usually work with the labor people?

K: Entirely.

M: Entirely?

K: And whatever they brought. You see, in many areas you had a working relationship between the labor people and the political people. Where they were working together we joined right in with them, and where there wasn't much of an organization as far as the Democratic Party was concerned then we'd try to build up the strength of the labor unions to offset the lack of support or lack of organization of the political party.

M: Was the 1964 campaign, as far as your work is concerned, easy or harder than it had been in previous campaigns?

K: No, this was a campaign that you could see the thing moving toward victory. Although Johnson seemed to run scared all the time. Those of us that had been in other campaigns--I'd been in the 1948 campaign, I was in the 1944 campaign, 1952 and 1956, 1960--could see a ground swell for him. It was just phenomenal the people you met and the crowds and things. So for myself, I thought the thing was over as far as the first of October.

M: You mentioned that you were in the 1948 campaign, the one which Truman won.

K: Yes.

M: Did you feel any ground swell for Truman?

K: Yes, I predicted it from my experience from riding with him. I was one of the few fellows that would come back after following Dewey and following Truman and predict Truman's election. I told some of my friends and they went out and made some money. They got some of that fifteen and twenty to one.

M: Was this just an instinctive, sort of inward feeling you had?

K: Well, if you're fooling around in politics as long as I have you have some regard for straw ballots if they're properly taken. You have some idea, you take some idea of the crowds. You can tell crowds; that is, some are just a crowd, and crowds with any enthusiasm are another thing. There were crowds even when we'd drive along at two or three in the morning, because Truman never ran on a schedule.

I was with him earlier in the year where there was nobody. He had a tough time going even filling a small hall. We started in early September traveling around and saw the crowds building up. Then that last week going into Chicago and going into St. Louis and going into Cleveland and going into Pittsburgh you saw the change and the enthusiasm. So I also kept track of how Dewey was doing. The thing that really [convinced me] was the comparison in Salt Lake, where Dewey was at the hall

that they use out there, and had it half full. A couple of nights later Truman was there and had the building full at six o'clock and people standing outside ten and twenty deep. That was a tip-off that the change had come. I think that's what happened this time.

M: Is there any similarity in the style of campaigning between Harry Truman and Lyndon Johnson? They are both pretty hard driving men, aren't they?

K: Yes, but Truman had a way all his own. Neither one of them were great orators. They were both down to earth, just folksy. Truman was more folksy than Johnson. Truman--you know his style, and it took people. They liked it.

M: Did they both like to get out and speak to the crowds and shake hands?

K: Yes, both of them were natural campaigners. Of course they didn't have the crowd problem with Truman that you had with Johnson. I think the first real problem, I'm talking about problems with crowds, was Kennedy. I think Truman in the last week or ten days had crowd problems, but there was no protection.

M: You mean to protect the candidate?

K: Yes. They drove in open cars in those days and getting through the crowds was quite difficult. They didn't prepare for them like they did after the Kennedy campaign of 1960.

(Interruption. Telephone rings.)

M: Since you supported Johnson, I assume you had some good reasons to do this.

K: Well, I'll tell you about Johnson. I had a feeling about Johnson, and I can tell it to you. When I first came here to Washington Johnson was a very liberal fellow. He had made some great votes and took some strong stands. I think one of the most courageous stands that he ever made is voting for wages and hours in 1937. That was an unpopular vote in his part of the country.

The fact of the matter is Justice Black was the sponsor in the Senate. I believe that it was felt that he couldn't be re-elected senator in Alabama, and that the President, in order to pay him, put him on the Supreme Court Bench.

Now Johnson was very liberal up until the time of the campaign for Senate where he won by fifty-eight votes. I think he made some commitments to the people who furnished the financing to elect him, and he kept the commitments. I think this. But I always felt that if he could get out from under those commitments that down inside there was a good part, that Johnson was a charitable person and he had a heart and he had concern for the people, and if he could free himself he'd come through. I told that to people before the election. I never really hold it against him because he made a promise. I have a great regard for a guy that keeps a promise. Today it's

a rarity. But, by God, when the chips are down and a guy comes through when you need him and you stand by him, well, then I can't hate him. I can't dislike him for that. I said that if he ever got to be president I think he'd be a goddamned good president. And he proved it. There's nobody in this country [that] could have passed the legislation that Johnson did, I don't care who he was.

M: Then as president he bore out these liberal tendencies that you felt he had?

K: That's right. He bore them out. Aid to education, civil rights, Medicare, on all these issues he came through. Because, first of all, he knew how to manipulate over in the House and over in the Senate. He knew how to get things done. And I would say that he produced more social legislation. . .I'm his greatest admirer in all this world. In my early days it was Franklin Roosevelt, but Franklin Roosevelt broke the ground. But Franklin Roosevelt in his best days didn't match what Johnson had done in the four or five years he was president.

M: Did Johnson ever make any commitments to labor? Did he ever say, "You support me, and I'll work on this."?

K: No, he never did make it to me when he was a Democratic candidate. I only had started to get some satisfaction with his performance during the Kennedy Administration, but what I had thought about him was pretty much coming to the front. And then he talked to me about it at

great length. One night he told me that he had come down to Washington as a congressman, and he got in a fight with our people, I'm talking about the labor people, out in Texas. He thought that they should have supported him. He put his back up, and he gave us a contest. He said, "I tell you, Joe, I gave you hell every chance I could." Well, he did. He said, "But I'm a Christian now." So that was good enough for me.

M: Yes. Then as President did he consult with you about legislation?

K: Yes, he did. But most of the legislation, consulting about legislation, was done in the office of the AFL-CIO with George Meany; George had a committee, and with Andy Biemiller. Then we were called upon to use our influence to get the support of our friends in the Congress.

M: And so you'd go around and visit Congressmen.

K: That's right.

M: Was that your main function?

K: That's right. But we generally took our lead from the president of the AF of L-CIO who is our leader in that.

M: And then he'd work with the Johnson people?

K: That's right. He'd work with Johnson, and then he'd call on us. Johnson may call you over for a special assignment to go some place where they knew you had some influence and talk to the people.

M: Was there any particular piece of legislation that you worked on to a great extent, that you personally worked on, say, on the Hill?

K: Oh, yes. Right-to-work was one of the real important [ones], and then four or five times in appropriation bills and foreign aid maybe once or twice they called upon me. Then there may be the Medicare. We worked on Medicare. We worked on housing.

M: You would work on bills that were good for the labor people in general?

K: That's right.

M: Not just . . .

K: Not just for my own self. No, this was on the general program, housing, aid to education, Medicare, better Social Security.

M: Fair labor standards?

K: Fair labor standards.

M: All that?

K: Yes. That's right.

M: All that.

K: Wages and hours.

M: Did you support the manpower development and training acts?

K: Yes. That was the AFL-CIO. See, we have people here, and we all pitch in.

M: The reason I asked about that is that apparently there was some controversy with some of the unions over manpower training, and I was wondering what your opinion of that was.

K: Well, if it had the endorsement of the AF of L-CIO,we supported it, and I think it did. If it didn't, then we didn't. See this is

where we follow and support the program of the AF of L-CIO. Now there are some international unions that may feel it would harm them, and they'd be against it. But if it was the policy of the AF of L-CIO, in the majority of cases all the internationals followed behind.

M: Yes. I think you mentioned you were in the fight for the repeal of 14B.

K: 14B. We worked hard on that, hard and long.

M: Yes, and again you were working through your leaders in the AFL-CIO?

K: Everybody took hold for themselves on that one, because they're all affected. But we looked to the AFL-CIO for leadership. Everyone on his own went out and tried to round up the votes.

M: And you had adequate support from the White House?

K: Oh, yes. Yes, we got very much.

M: Then what happened to 14B?

K: Oh, we just didn't have enough votes. See, this old Northern Republican and Southern coalition is--

M: It's too strong?

K: That's right. There is a group of people that are . . . Well, we just never had the votes.

M: Was there any doubt that Johnson was fully on your side on that?

K: I never hesitated a minute. I never doubted it a minute. I think there may be some shenanigans in other places, but I'm sure it wasn't there.

M: Did you have anything to do with the National Alliance for Businessmen?

K: No.

M: I guess you would have had a great deal of contact with the Department of Labor. Is that right?

K: Oh, yes. That's an operating department, and we have many, many reasons to go to the Department of Labor.

M: Yes. Do you have any impressions about the leadership of Willard Wirtz?

K: Well, I didn't always agree with Wirtz. I thought that many of his decisions were legal decisions and not practical decisions, but that's just my judgment. I felt that we didn't get the same kind of representation, because of his legal background. I think the records will prove it. I never went into them, but I think that the people who represent the other interests go farther and look after their interests far greater than our representative in the Labor Department. They try to play it too--well, they try to play it up on the table. I don't mind playing it up on the table when everybody's got their cards on the table, but. . .

M: Yes. So what do you do about something like that? Go around the Labor Department?

K: No, you can't go around. In Washington, you understand there's a chain of command. You generally start with someone, and if it's the top fellow in a department and you start to go around him you always wind up back where you started. So you learn to go there first, and if there's any chance you'll get it. You don't try to put the heat on, so to speak, from other areas. It's pretty hard to go beyond the secretary of any of the departments unless you have a great case and can make it stand up.

M: Was there anything that you wanted that you took to the President, say, in the form of legislation?

K: I never did.

M: Did it always flow the other way?

K: It always flowed from the AFL-CIO. Now if you had a special condition in your industry, like for fishing and shipbuilding, well, then I'd go to him. But if your problems are general in the, , you may say, well then we use the AFL-CIO. Oh, we might go and talk to him, you know, to give our personal support, but we generally look for the AFL-CIO on these major cases to carry the ball for us.

M: Did Johnson ever call you in and ask you to hold down wage demands in order to control inflation?

K: Me? No. He talked to us in a group, I remember, 3.2 or whatever that was.

M: Were you in that group?

K: I was in that group, yes. But there were, oh, twenty-five or thirty.

M: Was he persuasive?

K: He didn't bring it in. See, it was brought in by the economic adviser.

M: I see.

K: I think it was the fellow that's in Minnesota now.

M: Walter Heller?

K: Heller. He's the one that made the proposal.

M: Did this sort of reasoning impress you?

K: Well, I think that he made a mistake, a tactical mistake. He should have got his sounding in advance. He brought it in to us cold, and the reaction was really bad. There wasn't anything he could do. You had to fold it up and put it on the desk. I would have thought that the people responsible to try to put this through would have made a pretty thorough sounding around before they brought it out in public. I thought it made the President look bad, turned him cold.

M: Did Johnson ever try to go back to that kind of reasoning with you?

K: He didn't with me. He might have talked to some of the other fellows. But generally when there was anything of that nature, he had about five or six of us that he called in and talked about it over the table.

M: Yes. Now this idea of controlling or holding down wages to control inflation goes back to the Kennedy time and the steel price rise.

K: Yes. When he took after steel.

M: Yes. Did you have anything to do with that?

K: No. I was around, but that was pretty much something that happened in the course of a day, two days. See, Kennedy had the Labor Management Committee, and this was one of the places where he had thought that he had an understanding. And steel jumped out, he took them on, and they backed down. That took a lot of courage.

M: You think Kennedy did the right thing?

K: I do, yes.

M: I mean from your point of view?

K: Sure.

M: Well now, in the Johnson years there were some threatened price rises, too, in aluminum and oil and steel also. Johnson also reacted.

K: That's right.

M: Sometimes threatening.

K: Well, I've been through two. I think that in wartime, and we've been in war whether we like it or not since 1935 and 1936, there should be some kind of regulations. I don't know how it's done,but I think that the wage-price control and profit has been successful. I think it worked in World War II. I think there were some mistakes made in the Korean War. I think they should have put the

freeze on in back instead of in front so everybody could run out. They gave them a month or two to go out and increase wages and inflation set in. I think we've never got over that. I think we come out of World War II in pretty good shape with the wage and price control. It's a big cumbersome job, but it's . . .

M: Did the White House ever consult with labor people about wage and price controls during the Johnson years?

K: I don't think so. No, I don't think so. When you talk about labor, they may have talked to an individual here and there, and it was off the record. But it's never been a public discussion that I know of.

M: Yes. You never had anything to do with this?

K: No.

M: Were you called in to help Johnson prepare for the 1968 campaign?

K: Yes.

M: You were under the impression he was going to run, or what?

K: Yes. I was in to see him four days before.

M: He had his campaign going, did he not?

K: Four days before he resigned I was with him. He called me over to the White House and gave me an assignment, and I was working on the assignment. I was sitting in my living room on a Sunday night when he made the announcement. I don't know what happened between Wednesday and Sunday.

M: What was your assignment, can you tell me?

K: To try and line up delegates in these statewide meetings where there were the state's selecting delegates.

M: Were you under the impression that Johnson could win the nomination?

K: Yes, he could have won the nomination. He could have won the election, too.

M: You think he would have won both?

K: I firmly believe some of the people around him outsmarted him. He probably had a bad day or something and may have decided. But I think another group around him may have told him that with his record, they would have let him resign. Well, I think it was an unfortunate thing. I think if he had stayed in there he would have won. He was no worse off by any sense than Truman at that time in 1947. In fact, he was better off than Truman. I went through most of1948 when everybody had given up the ghost. They wouldn't even spend time to talk to you. The only fellow responsible for Truman's election is Truman. He'd never give up.

M: Did Johnson ever give you any reasons for why he chose not to run again?

K: Never. I never talked to him since.

M: Never talked to him?

K: Never had a chance to talk. At some parties I've seen him, but I never had a chance to sit down and talk to him about it, which I could have if I'd been near him. But I never had a chance.

M: Then did you go ahead and work for Humphrey?

K: Oh, yes, right away. I got busy right away.

M: I see.

K: Because I was always very fond of him. It's the first assignment I had with Labor's League for Political Education. I came here in 1948 after the fellows that were responsible for Taft-Hartley, and Ball was one of them. He was then senator from Minnesota. We selected Humphrey as our candidate against Ball, and he was Mayor so the first important assignment I had was trying to help to elect Humphrey. So I've known Humphrey very intimately for all these years.

M: So you must have gone to work for him quite willingly.

K: We did, yes. We worked awfully hard. And as I say, if there had been another week we would have won. There again, because you could see the same thing developing, as far as Humphrey's concerned, as with Truman.

M: Is there anything that Johnson could have done to help Humphrey?

K: No, I don't think so. I think that first of all, the convention was too late. See, the convention was geared around Johnson running, and Johnson didn't want a long campaign. There wouldn't have been any fights in the convention if Johnson was the candidate, but when we got into these fights, bitter fights, we didn't have time to heal the wounds. Generally, in the past you held your conventions in early July, and then you had July and August

to straighten the thing out. Then you started your campaign on Labor Day. This year we didn't end the convention almost until the last of September, and there was no chance to heal those things. You had people going every way, and we had no chance to do what was necessary to win a campaign. It was unfortunate, but that was what happened.

M: In thinking back over the Johnson presidential years, are you impressed with what has been accomplished.

K: With Johnson?

M: Yes.

K: Oh, I should say. I think he's done more for the country than anybody in modern times.

M: Could he have done more?

K: I don't think so. I think he had stretched himself pretty thin.

M: Did he do too much?

K: Some would say too much, and it will take some time to digest it. But I don't think you can wait for the digestion, the country's in very bad shape right now. Two years ago the riots were spontaneous in four or five places, when you pick up the paper and read of five or six new locations every day. We're just sitting on a keg of dynamite, and nobody's doing nothing about it.

M: Did Johnson have any major faults from your point of view?

K: Oh, he had a lot of faults, but I couldn't name them off to you. In my judgment, my own, I think that one of the things [is] that he was overexposed. I think that people around him had him on television every day, and I think he was overexposed. I wasn't always in agreement with his advisors, the way they handled him. Cadets. But I'm just an individual. But that would be my [judgment].
I think he listened to . . . He got away from the practical politician. He let the Democratic National Committee die, and the National Committee is the politician's life's blood. He brought on his crony-ism; he brought a lot of people in that couldn't help him any. I think in order to have a successful political organization that you bring in all elements. I think that the National Committee was the gathering agency for the bringing of all the states in. He never used any practical old-line Democrats that knew the country.
He brought in people from Texas, and they were limited in their knowledge. Politics is a great game, and for success, it takes a great organization. You've got to have an operation much like the Kennedy's in order to be successful.

M: Johnson never built anything like that?

K: Never built it. And he let the thing just go to . . . He had a personal organization. He'd run this government personally with a few confidants. And their judgment, here again I'm going to use my own

M: You've been looking at the clock.

K: Yes.

M: Do you have another appointment?

K: That's all right. How long more will it be?

M: Well, let me ask you an open-ended question then to finish this out. Do you have any comment or statement that you wish to make in regard to the Lyndon Johnson years or Lyndon Johnson as resident to finish up this interview?

K: I would only say this. During the Johnson years there was more legislation passed for the ordinary people of this country than at any other time in the history of this country. I think that Roosevelt opened the door. He was the first one that put on the books social legislation that we built onto in the Johnson Administration. You take the 1933 and 1935 legislation passed, 1936 and 1937 and 1938, and the turn came. There was a constant whittling away of these social laws that were passed, and they lay dormant practically until Kennedy came back in 1960. He started on the move, but Johnson picked it up and pushed it through.

M: Well, I thank you for your time.

K: Okay. Fine.

[End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview I]

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Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of Joseph D. Keenan

In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Joseph D. Keenan of Washington, D.C. do hereby give, donate, and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recording and transcript of the personal interview conducted on July 25, 1969 at Washington, D.C. and prepared for deposit in the Lydon Baines Johnson Library.

This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions:

(1) The transcript shall be available for use by researchers as soon as it has been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

(2) The tape recording shall be available to those researchers who have access to the transcript.

(3) I hereby assign to the United States Government all copyright I may have in the interview transcript and tape.

(4) Copies of the transcript and the tape recording may be provided by the Library to researchers upon request.

(5) Copies of the transcript and tape recording may be deposited in or loaned to institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

Joseph D. Keenan
Donor

August 6 1978
Date

James B. Rhoads
Archivist of the United States

September 6, 1978
Date