INTERVIEW I

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INTERVIEWEE: A. M. "SANDY" KEITH

INTERVIEWER: Joe B. Frantz

PLACE: Mr. Keith's office, Rochester, Minnesota

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F: First of all, just tell me, as somebody named Alexander MacDonald Keith, who gets to be rather high in a state that's full of Johnsons and Swensens, where did you come from?

K: I am a--I was born and raised in St. Mary's Hospital here in Rochester, Minnesota.

F: You're a hometown boy.

K: I'm a hometown boy, and one of the few that stayed. My father was a physician at the Mayo Clinic who immigrated from Canada when the Mayo brothers decided to change their facility that they were developing from a surgical institution into a general practice of medicine, including internists and all other types. As a matter of fact, those were the days, when my father came, there were not any specialties in medicine, in 1920. They expanded the Mayo Clinic, and he came here and never left. So I was born here and raised in this community, and graduated from the local Rochester High School in 1946. Then [I] went up to the library one day--my father thought I ought to go to college--started with the As, and found a college named Amherst which I'd never seen or heard of, and decided this was a nice, small little school, a good long ways from Minnesota and my father, and that's where I went to undergraduate school.

F: Was George Taylor there?

K: No, but the famous man there was the famous senator from Missouri, Tom Eagleton, who was also in my class, whose father was a prominent Democrat from the St. Louis area in Missouri even at that time. And Tom had the same problems at that time as he got into subsequently. In other words, he learned to drink too much, which led to his demise--not as a senator; he's still there, and very successful, and I think he's got his drinking under control--but he learned a lot of bad habits, as I recall, at Amherst.

In 1950 I graduated from Amherst. My father urged me to go to law school. I did not want to, but I did, on his request. I was admitted both to--I remember I got admitted to Harvard and turned it down, and I was admitted to Yale, not at the beginning but at the second round; a certain number had turned it down. Yale is a very small law school, a very liberal law school at that time. This is the only one I wanted to go to. As a matter of fact, I was admitted two days before the North Koreans commenced invading South Korea.

F: Good timing. (Laughter)

K: It was a bad time. But anyway, I never studied, and I did very poorly. I had done very well at Amherst: Phi Beta Kappa, *magna cum laude*, and all that business. I went to law school, never read a book, never went to class. I really didn't like it; I never wanted to practice law. I read novels; I became an expert on many of our great novelists. And finally it dawned on me, you know, I was not doing myself a great service, nor my family--my father, who was a very remarkable man. I finally decided, after a couple of years of this nonsense, that I had to get to work. I joined the merchant marine and went out on the boats, and I learned--the first time I ever lived with a black, a Puerto Rican, a Jamaican; the first time I'd ever seen homosexuals *en masse*. The merchant marine--

F: You kind of started getting educated.

K: Yes, I started getting educated then, you know. Then I decided to come back and at least work for one year, and do the best I can. I still was way at the bottom of the class, you know; it was terrible, and a disgrace. But I did graduate, in 1953, and immediately enlisted, prior to graduation, and prior to any consultation with my famous father and mother, in the Marine Corps, which drove them right out of their mind. But, anyhow, then I went to boot camp, and they asked me to be an officer, which I decided to do, and I became a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps in the spring of 1954, and was immediately sent to Korea. The war [had] ended, so after spending, I suppose, three or four months as a platoon leader, an infantry officer, I was pulled back to become the legal officer of the Seventh Marine Regiment, one of the famous marine regiments at that time, and I got a whale of an education.

F: Where was this?

K: This was in Korea. We were stationed north of Seoul. We were actually protecting the Samichon Valley, which is the great invasion route of Korea; those poor devils had been invaded a thousand times, you know. Great people, by the way. And the British were handling--the British Commonwealth division was handling the other half of the valley; we were controlling the main invasion route.

F: The nice thing about being a legal officer in the service, I expect--you lose the [inaudible], but you get more variety than you get around in Rochester and--

K: Well, the marines--you know, they have a--their sense of justice is very clear. The colonel--who was a marvelous man; he became a general, named Conley--told me, "You know, Sandy, I don't want anybody brought up here who wasn't guilty." I said, "Do you

really mean that, Colonel? That's fine. Because it won't be many. We'll weed them out at the battalions, and not bother you. When we do bring them up here, why, it will be serious and we mean business." And that's just the way it was. We were very fair, and it was a great experience. We had a ton of problems. Marines are not good soldiers when wars are not being fought. They want to go home; they don't like to learn the languages; they aren't interested in the culture. They're just bored. You've got to keep in training all the time, and they want to get out of there. They're terrible sexually, and they get terribly frustrated and they'll sleep with anybody, you know. We had terrible problems!

(Laughter)

F: Or anything!

K: Anybody or any woman that will do it, you know. We had all kinds of difficult problems, homosexuality and this sort of thing, you know, things that I wasn't really very well aware of, although, fortunately, I had been in the merchant marines, which has a number of--a great number of homosexuals, so I was aware of the problem. And so on.

So this was a very interesting--I resettled a number of the Koreans into the area as we gave up control to the--Syngman Rhee was then president--to the government. We resettled, brought back a number of the Koreans, rebuilt the villages. They were marvelous people; they were intelligent, hard-working, a great sense of history, a great sense of art and drama and music, great poets. You would be surprised. A rather uneducated village person had a great sense of poetry. Their names are very poetic; their language is very interesting. I really enjoyed it. And they were very good to me, the Koreans. The local [inaudible] chiefs were very, very decent. [Inaudible] It was a great experience for me. And, fortunately, I didn't have any combat of any kind. In fact, I lost

more men tripping mines and horsing around than I ever lost in violations of the truce, which, fortunately, we entered into, I believe, at--that was the end of June 1953, I think, was the truce of Panmunjom. We were very close to Panmunjom; it wasn't very far from where we were.

So then I returned to this country, and I made the fatal error in Singapore--I took a group down to Hong Kong; I took a group of NCOs [non-commissioned officers] down. The colonel gave me a week, and I went, and took a whole group of men down to Hong Kong. My only problem was [that] I got terribly intoxicated the first night, and lost all my money in a poker game. My second problem was [that] I called my bride-to-be [Marion Sanford] via the underwater cable from Hong Kong, and the next thing I knew, my marriage date had been set--(Laughter)--for exactly one month after I arrived home from Korea in 1955. So, as soon as I came home, I went right back and married into one of the famous Mormon families of this country, if you can believe that. Here I was, smoking two packs of cigarettes a day; I could drink a fifth of whiskey better than any man in America--

F: Drinking coffee . . .

K: --drank coffee morning, noon, and night, and smoked anything else that could be smoked. And I arrived--number one, my bride doesn't even know what a cup of coffee is; the family is a--comes from a very famous Mormon family from Provo, Utah; [they] all went to Brigham Young [University]. They looked askance at this--I remember burning out all the cuffs in my uniform just putting the damn ashes--because there never was an ashtray in the house! [Inaudible] And then I returned to--

F: And, worst of all, she's marrying a Gentile! (Laughter)

K: That's right, marrying a foreigner! [Inaudible] No, I think they were glad to get her married; I really do. I think they were pleased that--we were getting too old, and they were glad to have us out of the way. Neither one of us, by the way, are now Mormons, and [inaudible] at that time--she had left the Mormon church, although the Mormon culture is very much a part of our lives.

But, following that, I came back to--I ended up in Rochester. In fact, I was going to clerk, believe it or not, for the chief justice of the Arizona supreme court, who was a very prominent Democrat, and I had been selected, and I was driving from San Francisco--I had taken a few days off after I got out--I was driving to Phoenix to take over the job when he died. And at that time, [Barry M.] Goldwater was in control of the state, and, of course, they put in a Republican, and, obviously, my job was off.

F: [Inaudible] (Laughter)

K: When I got there, it was a 106 [degrees] or something in the shade, and I decided I didn't want to stay there anyhow. So I moved up to Denver, and I looked at Denver and I liked Denver too, but I couldn't see any job opportunities there. So, eventually, believe it or not, I came back, and I was to clerk for one of the justices on the Minnesota supreme court when Harry Blackmun, now an associate justice of the [U.S.] Supreme Court, called me from the Mayo Clinic and said that he needed a lawyer to help him at the clinic, that he was the counsel for the Mayo Clinic. And, of course, he had been my father's probate lawyer, and had written his will and so on. He was an exceptionally gifted and wonderful man. And so I came to work here at the clinic, and that's how I started for Judge Blackmun.

This was an interesting turn of events, because, in 1959, Judge Blackmun was nominated by the--probably the only man I can think of, and some historian should look into this, [who] has made it to the United States Supreme Court without one ounce of political moxie or activity in his whole career. And the irony of it was [that] we had two Democratic senators from Minnesota, [Eugene] McCarthy and [Hubert] Humphrey, and the Republicans controlled the White House; [Dwight] Eisenhower was in his final year. The old judge died, a very famous judge, a court of appeals judge which operates, in our district, out of St. Louis, and the Republicans sent up a number of names which the two senators turned down; as you know, they have absolute veto power over the appointment of federal judges. And, consequently, finally, the Republicans, due to the fact that Warren Burger was a great friend of Harry Blackmun's, due to the fact that he was now on the bench, and he went to--he had been in the Justice Department, urging certain appointments; one of his jobs was helping to select Republicans for judicial appointments. He urged the President to nominate Harry Blackmun, his good friend from way back as a young kid. And, by George, if they didn't do it! And I always remember Judge Blackmun, because at that time he had done nothing but contribute to the Republican Party. I had never seen him do any political activity of any kind, a very rational, very hard-working man. And at that time he made the decision that he wanted to be a judge, and I told him, "Hey, you've got to go down now and convince those senators [inaudible]; believe me, they can!" And he couldn't believe this. He said, "I can't believe that! I mean, that's just"--well, he went to the [inaudible]. The hearing that the old senator was conducting--from Mississippi, the old head of the Judiciary Committee who's now [retired]--

F: [James O.] Eastland.

K: Eastland. And I'll never forget it, because one of the famous Republicans of all time was nominated, one of Harry's classmates at Harvard Law School. Harry was *summa cum laude* from Harvard in mathematics, graduated at the top of his class from the law school, and this was another kid who was just as able as he was, and was nominated. And Senator [Prescott] Bush--not Bush, but the one who was eventually censured--

F: [Thomas J.] Dodd.

K: Dodd--this man was nominated--walked into the hearing room and said, "I object to this man, and"--senatorial courtesy--"I'd appreciate it if a motion would be made laying it on the table, because he's not acceptable." By George, if the motion wasn't made, and Harry's good friend was done in. And it never went to the President. So, the fact that he did a good job on those senators, both Hubert and Senator McCarthy--McCarthy hated Warren Burger, because he had run a campaign against McCarthy when he was in the House of Representatives; he had been the manager for a man by the name of Kennedy, and they had called McCarthy, among other things, a Communist. And he blamed Warren Burger for this, and he never thought Warren Burger should have been a judge, period.

So, in any event, this is how Harry Blackmun--and when he went on the bench, I decided to go into private practice. This was when I started working to establish the present law firm I now have. So this was--in the meantime, in 1958, I had been--[I] always had the political bug; always had the bug, it was in me from day one, and this is an animal that's hard to control. So I ran for state senator from this county, which has

always been a very heavily Republican county, and I won by fifty-five or fifty-eight votes out of many thousands.

F: You could sympathize with Johnson, and that eighty-seven-vote margin!

K: I remember going out to one of those precincts out in the country, and I got the clerk out of bed, because they never counted my votes! They could care less about my little old election, you know; they were worrying about the Governor--this was [Orville J.] Freeman, who was governor at that time, a remarkable governor, and Humphrey was our senator, and Gene McCarthy was elected that year to the United States Senate. That was the year he was elected against Ed Thye. So it was a fun election. Anyhow, I got him out of bed just to see whether--I was ahead by fifty-seven votes. This was a bad precinct. I went out and found out--I got him out of bed, and he went down and found out that the vote was equal, so I had obviously won, if everything else was accurate. So that's how I got into politics, from this county.

F: When you went there, I presume you were a delegate to [the 1960 Democratic Conventions in] Los Angeles?

K: Yes. As a matter of fact, for a delegate--I was one of Humphrey's--let me put it this way: I carried his bag. I was a young senator, you see, very ambitious, very eager, very anxious, and we were in a fight that--up here it was not Johnson, you've got to realize. In this area it was Kennedy. And I handled what was the old Tenth Congressional District in Wisconsin--it's now been redistricted. This was the La Crosse area, across the river. This was a very conservative, Protestant area, and it just killed Kennedy, because obviously this was a religious thing. In those days--people don't realize that the Catholic religion at that time was--it was an issue that really was far magnified--

F: Just like abortion.

K: Yes, it was, it was terrible. It was just like abortion. It was hard to control. Bobby Kennedy was running the campaign for Jack. He was tough, he was mean, he was incredibly able, and he just gave me fits, and taught me lots of things. And, as I say, fortunately, I was in a Protestant area. We were--as you know, Hubert was literally eliminated in Wisconsin, although he wouldn't accept it. He was thoroughly defeated, with a great Madison-area majority

F: Let me ask you: did you keep a native-son mentality here?

K: Yeah, right. Well, I want to tell you about Minnesota, how different it is from Texas. But anyhow, we went over into Wisconsin, and as I said, we carried only three out of the ten districts, as I recall; I have to check it. But we were really--

F: Yes, really devastating.

K: We were in a devastated--all urged him to get out. He didn't. He went into the primary in West Virginia, where money talked. You know, they could buy it.

F: The kind of ground that should have been his. Poor, Protestant--

K: I know. It should have killed him.

F: Kennedy comes in there and just blows him--

K: Blew him right out of there, right out of the saddle. We also, I found out, had--you know, the Kennedy operation in Iowa. Iowa is a heavily Protestant state, also heavily farm-oriented, which Humphrey was very good at, and yet I found that he had no votes. He didn't have any delegates. This was a state which elected its delegates; there was no primary. And, of course, what we found out was that basically the Democratic Party was Catholic, and they plainly felt they had a man who could win it. And they were going to

give him their votes even though he wasn't going to carry Iowa--didn't give a damn. You know, this was a--they had waited this long, and they felt that they now had a guy, and that Humphrey couldn't make it, and that their guy could. So we lost that.

So, basically, the Minnesota delegation, you've got to understand, did not go to that convention--did not go for anybody.

F: You went uninstructed.

K: Uninstructed, and it's just like Minnesota always is, there's just absolutely--(Laughter)--as a matter of fact, as Walter Reuther said, it's the only delegation he could ever conceive of--Freeman nominated Kennedy, Gene McCarthy nominated Adlai Stevenson, and Hubert sat there hoping somehow he would be the one. You know, it was all havoc! And we voted for Humphrey, who wasn't even a candidate for the office of president—if you can imagine that! (Laughter)

But, anyhow, that's where I first met--I was a delegate from this particular congressional district in Minnesota, a heavily Republican district, to the Democratic convention in 1960, and this is where I first met Lyndon Johnson. And at that time--

F: You met at the convention hall?

K: It was at the--I was just trying to think of the hotel. It's the famous hotel.

F: Biltmore.

K: The Biltmore Hotel, and he--and I met John Connally and a number of other prominent Texans at that time. We were all, obviously, wined and dined, even though the votes were not there; they knew that. They were just terribly gracious to us, and basically--

F: Was it a social occasion, or was it a political party, or--?

K: Well, they met with all of the delegates.

F: Or was it all politics?

K: Oh, yes, it was all politics. But, basically, it was--at that time, you see, Johnson was hoping to stop Kennedy. Humphrey was--

F: He had a lot of second-choice--

K: He had a lot of second--this was really his hope, that they would somehow stop him, although Kennedy, when he first arrived, felt he had it. It was awful close. But, at that time, this was Johnson's strategy, and it was the only strategy he could--he had the South, very solid; he had a lot of delegates out of the--all of the Deep South, Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, all the middle [South]. He had votes in Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri; he had some votes in Missouri. Maryland--you know, these are the border states. But nothing else. And one or two here and there, but really it was very, very little support anywhere [in] any other part of the country.

So, basically, this was his strategy, and of course he was--within two days of arriving there, the total labor movement committed to Kennedy. [Richard J.] Daley made his commitment. He was, as you know, the king of Chicago at that time, and a terribly interesting and able man. He made the commitment, and, of course, John Kennedy promised him everything from soup to nuts. Anything Chicago wanted! (Laughter) But anyhow, he got all those delegates. Daley had about--of the whole delegation, he had about two-thirds of it, which--he could absolutely decide how they voted. This where I came away with the idea that Minnesota had to learn something; we had to go there with some bullets in our hand and, you know, use them.

Anyhow, Kennedy was nominated, and the amazing thing was--we almost died when he picked Johnson. We all thought this was terrible. This was a conservative;

well, you know, we considered, at that time, young DFLers [Democratic-Farmer-Labor]--why, a Texas Democrat was more conservative than a reactionary Republican up here, you know. We thought this was another breed of cats; they were the oil people. We had no knowledge of Texas at all; we had no knowledge of the South, as a matter of fact. One of the great ironies of all this, to me, was the complete inability to understand the racial problem as it was evolving in the South, and not realizing that this was our problem too.

F: The battles being fought [inaudible].

K: As a matter of fact, it's over down South, and it's now in Northern cities, where it's very, very difficult, and we don't have much comprehension of it, to be honest with you. So, it was kind of a--it was just an uproar when Johnson was selected, [and] when he took it. A lot of people felt--

F: Did Minnesota plan any kind of a floor fight against him?

K: Sure! That was the first time we even--

F: Did Humphrey express himself?

K: Humphrey was very careful. Humphrey must realize--he wanted to be president, beginning in 1956. As you know, he ran; he tried to make a deal with Stevenson to get on the ticket in 1956. He ran in 1960. He ran with Johnson in 1964. He ran himself in 1968. He tried again in 1972. And, by 1976, he would have been delighted to run, but he was too sick. In other words, he tried for twenty-some years.

F: Takes a whale of a lot out of a man.

K: He wanted to be president, and he came awful close. But he was always careful. No, the ones that were anti-Johnson were, basically, people who were the so-called liberal wing

of the party. Most of the really good, tough political operators in Minnesota, the party people, thought it was a good choice--you know, that you've got to win the election, you've got to have Southern states. You can't win it with just--you know, this was a--see, this was the first election when [Dwight] Eisenhower was out of it. We had a chance, for a change! So it was kind of interesting. It was the first time I had ever heard the old-timers say, "Now, look, this is a big country, and you've got to have everybody [inaudible]. This man obviously has some strength, and we need him."

F: Isn't that a beautiful compliment to Kennedy.

K: Yes. He just absolutely was what we had to have. We would have lost that. As it was, it was damn close--I remember how close that was. We stayed up all night.

F: I went to bed at three o'clock that morning not knowing the result.

K: [Inaudible] Illinois was looking terrible. You know, we were pretty near done. We carried this state without any trouble, but--

F: Did Johnson come up here?

K: Yes. Johnson came, a number of--

F: [Inaudible]?

K: Not very much, just swung through, and it was a very brief stop. [Inaudible] to get him in here. He came here a lot, you know. He was here a good deal over the years.

But, anyhow, the ticket ran very well in Minnesota. We beat [Richard] Nixon rather decisively, whereas we had, eight years later, more trouble.

F: Explain to me, for a minute, the DFL. Is it consistently liberal, or does it embrace, like the Democratic Party, all kinds of--?

K: It has basic--it's a very interesting political amalgamation. It consists of really two traditional elements. The first is the cooperative, almost socialistic element that came out of--the Farmer-Laborites, which came out of--which was my father's organization. [It] was Protestant, mostly Scandinavians; they all belonged to co-ops--

[Interruption]

K: They have--they buy everything out of the cooperatives. You know, their clothing, and their grain, and their oil, their--

[Interruption]

F: Okay, we're on the DFL.

K: The DFL is--as I said, the one element was the old cooperative Protestant-oriented. They were generally of Scandinavian descent, some German, and they basically are the liberal wing of the party. The other wing was the old Democratic Party, which was Catholic-oriented. And they are the same we found in Iowa--these were old Catholics that [Franklin Delano] Roosevelt brought into the party in the Depression. And, basically, it's not [because] they were Catholics that they were Democrats; they were minorities. They were a minority, and he brought in the minorities. So you had the Irish, the Yugoslavs, the Italians, and we have a fair number of those, as you know, in the Iron Range and in the metropolitan areas of this state.

So this was the way, and Hubert and others actually fused them. Humphrey is given more credit for this than he should. Basically this was a fusion of good, tough party people who were not being elected to office. As a matter of fact, Hubert really--he wanted everybody to love him, and he hated a party fight; he wasn't good at party fights. No elected official is, in my opinion. They're not really built for this. You know, you've

got to let your party people fight out--when your ideologies aren't too much different, you've got to let the party people fight it out. Why you would pick one guy over another, when they're all on issues pretty much the same.

F: [Inaudible]

K: You've got to realize, the Republicans controlled this state almost continually, with the exception of about eight years, in the Depression, from 1932 to 1938, almost continually, with very little exceptions. And until you were able to put together a coalition of the Farmer-Laborites and the old Democratic Party, in the late forties, we never won an election. And, starting in 1948, when Humphrey was elected to the United States Senate--he was the first major candidate elected. First they elected him mayor of Minneapolis. Then he went from there to the United States Senate. [Inaudible] In 1946 we picked up John Blatnik, on the Iron Range, which--a seat he held, and was very close to Lyndon Johnson, by the way. He and Lyndon thought alike. They were great legislators. They could get bills passed; they knew how to do it.

F: Blatnik's long gone, isn't he?

K: Blatnik is still alive, but long gone. He's living in the Washington area. God, that's a tough district. Even though it's heavily Democratic, they treat you just like dirt, you know. It's what you did--"What have you done for me today?"--not what have you done for the last twenty years.

But he was elected in 1946. We picked up, in 1948, Fred Marshall; we got another congressman. He was from central Minnesota. We picked up Hubert, and we picked up--I can't remember his name; I think he was Roy Weir, an old Laborite out of the Twin Cities. And we picked up Gene McCarthy in St. Paul. So we gradually were

beginning to move. We had hardly dented the state legislature at that time. As a matter of fact, we took over the state legislature in 1955. No, we took over the House; I was in the Senate. When I was in the senate, there were only nineteen, out of sixty-seven, DFLers. And today there's forty-seven, or forty-eight, or forty-nine--I can't give you the exact amount--DFL. The house has been heavily DFL for the last six or eight years. However, we lost control in the last election, due to being damn fools, you know, just being power-hungry and stupid.

But, basically--so the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party has always had a dominant, heavily liberal wing, which--when I say liberal, let me explain what I mean. They are liberal in civil rights; there are very few blacks in Minnesota. [Laughter] You can afford to be very liberal. The blacks we have are really, you know, well-educated; a lot of them are--obviously, they come up from the South, over the past twenty-five or thirty years. They are less than--at least--well, now there's more in Minneapolis and St. Paul, but really it's a very small minority, and, you know, they've never been any kind of a political force in this state. But we've always been very liberal, as I said, on civil rights. I sponsored the first open-housing bill, with Don Fraser, who was [inaudible] in the House of Representatives and for many years was a state senator, and now is running for mayor of Minneapolis.

And I--so we've, in that sense, we've always had liberal welfare laws, providing very decent benefits for people who are handicapped, of all kinds. We've spent probably more money per capita on education, elementary-secondary, higher education, than any state in the union. For its size and diversity--we also have an enormous problem of transportation because of the size of the state; it's 81,000 square miles, it's four hundred

miles north to south. It's very rural in many areas; you've got to have a lot of roads, and to maintain them in this climate is really a tremendous undertaking.

F: It strikes me [that] you've picked up the mantle that Wisconsin had back there in the early part of the century and dropped.

K: That's true. I think they dropped it, and we kind of picked it up. And I think this was really--the conservative wing of the party is very conservative, racially, terribly bigoted racially. It's very conservative about unions; even though they vote DFL, they have some reservations about unions. We--in the DFL, unions have played an enormously important role. For instance, the key people in the DFL--interestingly enough, besides the labor movement, a lot of the Jewish community. Hubert Humphrey--nobody realizes the amount of money that man got from the Jewish business community in Minneapolis and, ultimately--nowadays in St. Louis Park and Golden Valley; most of them don't live in Minneapolis any more. But this group--in St. Paul, in the Highland Park area--this group contributed enormous sums of money. And, while I'm on it, this is a very influential group in the party. The Farmers' Union, which is a farm organization, liberal-oriented, has always been a very strong and substantial supporter of, normally, all our candidates, and they have been able to convince the farmers that they've got to go along with the trade-union movement if they're going to be successful.

So these are really the most prominent, believe it or not, in the party, and this is why Hubert's commitment to Israel is so--you know, really, you look at Humphrey's career, and it's amazing, the Jewish community all over the United States--the money they gave to him, to support his efforts to become president. It's a staggering contribution, you know, when you think back on it.

F: Back to 1960, Johnson just mainly made token appearances for certain groups, and he was no factor at all in Minnesota's vote.

K: No, Minnesota's vote, I think you could say without question, was Kennedy. He was popular. He was very young. Actually, it was the first time we ran a Catholic, and he did struggle with this problem. For instance, I was making speeches all throughout this Protestant area, lots of--

F: How did you dispose of the Catholic issue? Or did you?

K: How could I dispose of that? It took me a while. I was kind of stupid, to begin with. It took me a while. The way I disposed of it among the Scandinavians was very simply--

F: [Inaudible] had a real concern.

K: Oh, it was tough. Every time I would go into a--we would go into a church down in Mabel, Minnesota, which is south of here, right in the Bible Belt, Protestant Bible Belt. And every time I would come back--"Well, remember, they're governed from Rome." And the only answer I could ever give was a very simple one: "Do you believe in the separation of church and state?" They'd say, "Oh, [of course]." I'd say, "Well, that's interesting. Do you believe in socialism?" "No, absolutely not!" "And do you believe in government supporting churches?" "Absolutely not!" Well, of course, they all came from Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and they all had socialist governments at that time. They all had the Lutheran party, and Lutheran church, and they all were being supported. So I said, "Now, look. You're asking this man--you're saying, with regard to this man, that he's something different, even though you came from the same heritage. All of Europe has state churches. There isn't a country in Europe that doesn't have state religion in some form. And if you're going to judge people this way, then you've got to judge

your own, because, basically, the Norwegians are the same. They're all socialists over there; they've been controlling the country. All of which you say you don't believe in. Here's a man who says he isn't a socialist, and I don't think he is. Here's a man who says he's not going to be run by Rome, and I don't believe he will be." And this is the way it happened.

And all we did was to basically cut the--Nixon ran extremely well here. Although we did cut him down--you know, when we ran the tape from--a marvelous tape, done in Texas, in Austin, I believe.

F: The Council of Churches.

K: Council of Churches--we ran it over and over again in this area. We just ran it on television.

F: I think that was a masterstroke on Kennedy's part.

K: It was one of the best things that we had. He handled it well; it was extremely--it was perfectly timed. There wasn't--it wasn't too long. It worked out perfectly. That was one of the ways we were effective in being--in getting Minnesota comfortably into the Democratic column.

F: Okay, you elect Kennedy. Johnson disappears into the vice presidency. I presume you don't pay him any attention until November 1963.

K: Right.

F: Where were you the day of the assassination?

K: The day of that assassination I'll never forget. I was a--I had just left my old partner, an alcoholic partner, which I did not realize. I had discovered that he had a problem; I said, "Look, I'm not going to fight with you." I moved my office into another building,

another bank building here in town. And I had my first millionaire client. I'll never forget it. And I had arranged for the purchase of some stock from some farmers which got him control of a bank in southern Minnesota, which was going to make him $90,000 after the capital-gain period had run, which was at that time six months. And the closing was November 22, 1963, which is also my birthday. And I was preparing to go down to this little town, Lewiston, Minnesota, to close on this bank. And I received a call from Bemidji, Minnesota, an old friend of mine who was a clerk of court up there, a woman, who said the President had been shot. I didn't believe it. I said, "I can't believe it!" I ran out in the street, and I actually--the first thing I heard was Johnson being sworn in, or that they were going to swear him in. Some woman judge was going to swear him in on a plane, you know, the presidential plane. And that Kennedy had been pronounced dead. I burst into tears, and I came back up here, and I called my client. I said, "Look, I don't want to go. We've got everything set. I want to take the weekend off. And I never--I just want to go home. I'm miserable." And I said I had been out to the convention, I was deeply impressed with Kennedy--I didn't like Bobby, but I liked him--and I was really kind of--I was really very moved by it all. And I said, you know, [inaudible] president. And this man told me, "Goddamn it"--you know, he didn't hire me to screw around--"Get down there and get that goddamn bank closed." And that's all there it is to it. Beside that, I've never--when I finally settled up with that guy--he chiseled on my fees, too, by the way, as many wealthy people do.

F: [Inaudible]

K: I told him--I told him, "You know, my friend, you're never getting in this office again." It's the one nice thing about private practice. I said, "Never am I going to put up with

you. You're married to money. I never want to see you again." He said, "I can buy any man." I said, "You can't buy me, you bastard! Goodbye forever." And the irony of all this was, the biggest fee I've ever received in practice of the law was representing his wife in her divorce!

[Laughter]

K: It felt very [inaudible].

F: Which you took on with some pleasure!

K: Oh, I took [it] on with great glee. And he was, again, a fool.

Well, that was what happened. And we were all terribly moved.

F: Did you think catastrophe had come? Because shooting a president is one thing, and that is catastrophic, but as far as the country's future, did you--?

K: Oh, yes, we had an awful time adjusting to Johnson's style. He was so different. We had--

F: All the smoothness of John Kennedy, and--

K: Oh, yes, and those wonderful speeches--you know, they never said anything, but they were easy [inaudible].

F: They had good gloss.

K: They were great. And then, all of a sudden, we got Lyndon, and we were absolutely beside ourselves. The irony was, of course, that, basically, as Lyndon got into the job, and gradually took control of the White House, and gradually became his own man, after this--he didn't want to be the vice president--it became clear that Hubert--[Laughter]--wanted to be his running mate! And we all had to switch. We all had to become Lyndon lovers, you see. So this was a very difficult adjustment for the old

DFL, and all of us, and I always remember everybody--"My God," you know. Then, of course, the bills started passing, and then the Republicans nominated Goldwater, which no one could have--you know, we couldn't have found a better target, as far as the DFL was concerned.

F: Johnson started to look better.

K: Oh, my God! And so we were--of course, everything was geared to make the President happy. I was at the--the 1964 convention was in Atlantic City. I was on the platform committee. I always remember we had to check everything with the White House before we put one--I mean, I don't care if it was a comma! And, oh, I was furious, "My God, he's [not] even going to let me"--you know, do this, that or anything. Everything we cleared--I can't remember the man who cleared it, in the White House, but one of his close men in the White House cleared everything on that platform. I'll never forget that. Fraser was actually the delegate, but he wasn't there most of the time, so I would go and take his place. And, as I said, that was the experience. And, of course, we did everything to attempt to get Johnson to nominate Humphrey. As I said, we worked very closely with the congressional delegation. They probably had more authority then because they had known Johnson--not because they were senators, but, like Blatnik, they worked with him on legislation.

F: You worked primarily through your congressional delegation?

K: Well, they were helpful on this, because they knew the man better than anybody else. The man was the greatest legislator, probably, of this century.

F: He stayed in touch.

K: You bet he did. And he knew how to pass bills, I'll tell you. There aren't many who can do that.

So, anyhow, we were kind of impressed, and, of course, Johnson kept everybody dangling. [Inaudible]

F: Did you take Gene McCarthy seriously as a possibility, or did you look on that as window dressing?

K: Well, I had never taken--I've always--

F: I don't mean Gene himself, but Johnson's flirtation.

K: Well, no, I never took it seriously, because I didn't think Johnson would ever live with this. This man's a poet, you know! (Laughter) I just couldn't imagine Johnson ever being able to live with him.

F: [Inaudible] can just see them in the same [inaudible]?

K: It was--Gene McCarthy is something you can't even describe. He's a marvelous human being, but just completely different. You can't conceive of [his] being president of the United States, in my view. But, anyhow--so I never did think he was going to--but I knew he was dangling everybody on a string, and he was so good at it. And, really, we didn't know! I didn't know. I had no idea. We went--I remember driving to Atlantic City, that miserable town, you know, dirty, crummy--remember the big fight with the black lady from Mississippi?

F: Yes, that delegation--

K: The contested delegation. Otherwise, there was nothing to fight about, you know. It wouldn't matter if--

F: As dull as the Republican convention.

K: The dullest thing I ever went through.

F: And hot!

K: And hot, and the Boardwalk was lousy, and it was dirty, and Atlantic City was at its all-time low, you know. It was really--

F: Just left over from another era.

K: Another era, and this was the biggest shot they'd had in five years, you know! (Laughter) So it was kind of a boring convention, but, as I said, we were so confident we were going to win that year. Johnson, by the way, came to Minnesota several times. I was there in the summer--he spoke at a big Norwegian festival in Minneapolis, in Minnehaha Park, where he had a huge crowd. He also--

F: This was before the nomination.

K: No, after the nomination. And then he came in again--he was there at least two or three times.

F: Did he consciously work the Minnesota delegation, or was he so sure of things he just took for granted--?

K: Everybody took it--there was no question. [Inaudible] He didn't come there till--

F: [Inaudible]

K: --that he was invited, you know. So it was--oh, hell, he had his people there, you know. He had the votes for [inaudible]--it was something. And, of course, we were just absolute patsies for him, because Humphrey was so anxious to get it that he could almost taste it. And, you know, Hubert is an interesting human being, and when he wants something, he'll do most--

F: [Inaudible]

K: He'll do whatever he has to do to get it, put it that way. Within limits, you know, good judgment. He's not about to blow something when he's got [inaudible].

So that was the situation. And they were--I guess that election was won long before--you know, the minute Goldwater was nominated, the Republicans were--

F: There never was much question up here of Goldwater--?

K: Never, never. Johnson carried this state by one of the biggest pluralities we've ever had, just killed him. I think they carried--I don't think Goldwater carried half a dozen counties. But I might--

F: There's an estimate--was that anti-Goldwater, or was it because of Johnson's social legislation?

K: Oh, no, I think it was anti-Goldwater to begin with, and, you know, it all of a sudden dawned on people--you know, this man really could pass more--and they needed more for the blacks!--than anybody in history! The man really, as far as being able to do what liberals claimed they want to do, he was probably greater than they'd--ever dawned on them.

F: But you can't erase three hundred years of history in one stroke. [Inaudible]

K: As I say, he--you know, civil rights [inaudible], he was able to pass a first-rate education act, which saved a lot of our higher-educational facilities, which--you know, all of this then took place, you see. And yet they really never liked him. That's why I say, when he began the war--

F: Why didn't they like him?

K: They can't adjust to his personality. The man was--overpowered them.

F: [He] came on too strong.

K: Yes, I don't know what you could--it's hard to say. I admire him more than probably ninety percent of the Democrats, even to this day. But--you know, I admire his ability to do what I just--I have very little use for [Jimmy] Carter; he can't govern. He can't govern the country, you know. He can talk, but he can't govern. This is a--this man could govern, whether you liked everything he did or not. But the man knew how the Congress operated, understood pretty well. He wasn't a great communicator; if Lyndon had any faults. His wife was very popular out here; she was always very well respected. But he wasn't--he isn't the kind of orator that we like. You know, Humphrey could talk an hour on anything. Lyndon would come in, and in maybe ten minutes, you know, make one point, and get on with it. He was not of the type that Hubert was--you know, [inaudible] and then some. I used to get so tired of listening to him! (Laughter) If you followed him for a day, you know, it meant the same speech twelve times. That would be twelve hours of oratory! That's a lot of--

F: And he was still ready to go!

K: Yes, he was still warmed-up and raring to go. It was unbelievable that Humphrey--how much he could put on.

But, basically, the man was never really accepted by, I think, the so-called DFL party faithful, despite his performance. It's an amazing phenomenon. And, of course, the war--as you recall, Lyndon inherited one hell of a problem, and this--I remember Humphrey coming back after the decision had been made, in 1966, to expand the war, to try to really give the substantive--and front-line troops to help the South Vietnamese government. And Humphrey came back and made the great speech, that this was the greatest war since--believe me, this is exactly what he said--"This is the greatest war

since the Revolution!" You can imagine how Hubert gets carried away with these sorts of things. Lyndon sent him out, and, by George, this is what we were going to do, and we could have guns and butter. I always remember that was the first thing I always--I always remember, [in] the back of my mind, guns and butter--it will never work. You know, this country--it is a tough thing. I was in Korea, you see, and that wasn't a very popular war.

F: No.

K: And I had already remembered a little bit, you know, that you've got to sacrifice if you're going to fight a war. Everybody's got to pitch in. You can't have--it isn't possible to do it this way. And that was the first indication I had that we were in trouble. As you could--as you know, in the last analysis, enormously huge decisions are made on Main Street, despite politicians attempting to control, and Washington [inaudible]. But, in the end, the ultimate great decisions--war, peace, this sort of thing--you really do decide it down here [among] the little guys, and we all wonder how smart they are, but, by God, they do--

F: Cumulatively--

K: They cumulatively begin to make these decisions, just like they're doing on energy now, and other issues. We're gradually seeing people begin to decide how they're going to live now.

Well, this started to happen, and basically, within the party, Fraser [?] spoke up early against the war; others were beginning to question it, as the--obviously, as the casualties began to mount, we began to lose men in these little towns. You know, it was so well--the TV had it on every night; it was so well covered. No one had ever seen war

before, really; no one had ever seen war before like that. I never even--you know, being in the trenches, and being where, once in a while, something happened--you know, none of this.

F: [Inaudible]

K: There it was, every night. And I mean, it was terrible. It would show these terribly difficult--and these men are coming back, and they all have, you know, drugs and lots of other problems. So it became--you know, it was a difficult problem. And that was--you see, I ran for governor in 1966, for governor of Minnesota, against an incumbent governor of my own party, and actually got the nomination in a very interesting convention in which I was nominated, after twenty ballots, for governor, over an existing incumbent governor. And then the governor had agreed--we both had agreed, whoever got nominated, the other would step aside. It didn't happen; he ran anyhow, and [inaudible]. And it was--obviously, the public thought I was terribly aggressive, stabbing the hand that had made me lieutenant governor; I had become lieutenant governor in 1962. And, consequently, I got into a terribly divisive and destructive primary fight and was defeated, and then the governor was defeated in the fall, due to the fight. [Inaudible]

F: (Laughter) You killed each other.

K: We killed each other, and then the Republicans just picked up the pieces.

But that was the first inkling I had that the war was going to be difficult, because I was running into a lot of it out in the country. I was running into really very concerned parents. They were concerned, you know, that basically--could we fight a war in Asia successfully with limited goals, limited expectations? I've always been one to believe you never win a war anyhow, that you always fight for limited goals. I used to argue,

when I was in the marine corps, with the regular officers, because they--you know, they would have gone right to the Yalu [River]; they would have gone into Peking if they could, you know! (Laughter) They believe in this. They believe in victory. There's no victory over there; there are so many of them, they're so well--they're very gifted fighters, North Koreans.

F: And you can hardly beat people on their home ground.

K: Damn right. And they're tougher than nails, and they're well--once they get the armaments and the equipment, as Moscow is very capable of providing, you find out it isn't so easy fighting them.

So I was always worried about this, that--I began to see that more and more skepticism of the war was coming. Johnson was having difficulty--you know, the program was moving, but the war--we had to build it up. He obviously had made a decision to inflate the economy, in other words, pay for it out of paper money, as I call it. And I don't blame him. I just say this as obviously what he had to do. He didn't dare raise taxes, and basically pay for it out of current income; he basically just--we went into deficit worse, which they all do, by the way.

F: I always thought Muhammad Ali summed it up ungrammatically but quite correctly. Of course, he was a spokesman, and he refused to report for induction: "I haven't got nothing against those guys."

K: No. And, really, it got to the point where, basically, we really didn't know why we were there, except to stop communism, which I guess we can all understand, but we really--the American people--one of my great fears for this country is [that] we don't understand

totalitarianism enough. It doesn't matter, right or left; they're all the same. As far as how they treat people, it doesn't make much difference; they're tougher than hell.

So, I found this beginning to become a problem, but, as I say, I was defeated. I was so devastated, I really had to make a very clear decision then, to do nothing, or get out of politics, or--

F: Johnson showed no interest in the gubernatorial race?

K: No, he stayed out of it completely. I can say that Humphrey was completely unable to do anything. After I was nominated, he was unable to convince [Karl] Rolvaag to step aside, which was what his role was supposed to be, although he--I'm sure, really, that's a weak hope. And I was naïve. That's a weak hope, to think that an elected official can ask another one to step aside. Why, that's ridiculous. You know, he doesn't want a fight with the governor, especially if he's thinking about running and having ambitions to be president of the United States, having--you know, preparing himself ultimately to run, which he had done every four years! I was foolish to even think that he could have gotten him out of that, and, consequently, it was a very foolish thing for me to do. I should have waited and gotten my turn, like everybody else, sooner or later, and perhaps I would have been the governor someday, or at least I would have had a shot at it. Whether I would have been elected, that's another--only one makes it, you know.

F: When you come down to 1968, is Johnson showing any interest in Minnesota delegates?

K: Right. Johnson was, as you know--obviously you were probably better prepared, but at least we anticipated he was going to run again. And we--

F: So did I!

K: You know, we really did prepare, and we had the state--we were having a hell of a time lining it up, and Humphrey was just as unpopular as he was, by then!

F: I was going to say, did--that association really hurt Humphrey all over the country, but did it hurt him at home?

K: Well, sure. Darn right it did, and there was a lot--within the party, a lot of criticism. And, as I said, everyone assumed he was going to run, and we were just almost shocked when, after the New Hampshire primary, we had the announcement--or soon thereafter, I can't remember. It was after Wisconsin.

F: No, it was just before Wisconsin.

K: Just before Wisconsin. Right.

F: He had a team out in Wisconsin, working the place like dogs, and finally he found out they were working for nothing.

K: Nothing, right. No, he got the picture, and he resigned. And, of course, then we all had to shift to Hubert. And, of course, there we had McCarthy running. So we had another division. We're always divided in Minnesota, you know. This is kind of typical.

So we really had a terrible division between the liberal wing, which is McCarthy now, and Hubert, which is the traditional labor movement, basically, the old-line farmers out in the country. This was a horrendous fight. I really wasn't in it much, although I supported Humphrey, because I just can't see Gene McCarthy as president of the United States. Even though I might have been critical of the war, and--I wasn't sure of the war. I never have been sure of that war. To this day I'm not sure of it. I just don't know the answers to it. I've read everything, I've--

F: And, I think, also, you've got always that alternative of Munich, and if we had turned our back, would Johnson have gone down as another Neville Chamberlain?

K: I see this as a very serious problem, now. I really do.

F: You don't take the U.S. word--

K: I don't think anybody takes us very seriously. I really don't. And I don't think we--I'm not sure we are prepared to do much, in a matter of use of force, today, as--I think there's a lot of truth in what Johnson said, that this is something that we--I guess basically, could be a world where we're not prepared to do that. And I don't know if we can, with a kind of Republican diverse--you know, there's fifty Democratic Parties.

F: (Laughter) There are three in Texas! You've got at least two up here.

K: We've got at least two here. And, you know, you look around, and in the Republican [Party], why, Nelson Rockefeller was probably the most liberal man that ever lived! And here he was, a Republican. You know, my God, I've never seen such laws as they've got on the books of [New York]; it would be the envy of any liberal in this state. Housing, you name it. He's got them. So, it's hard to pigeonhole people when you see the whole process.

So, in 1968, when he stepped down, then we all had to reverse ourselves. And, again, it was a terribly emotional fight between McCarthy and Humphrey, and, of course, Humphrey was successful and was nominated. As a matter of fact, I think he'd have won the thing if they had got another two weeks, three weeks, you know. I think the--

F: They held it [the convention] late, and they had utter confusion.

K: And Humphrey is not a good organizer, you know. He's not a good--you know, in knowing what to do and how to do it.

F: He prevailed on sheer energy.

K: And he always did it himself here. You know, literally. The man would campaign--I mean, the night before an election, when he was going to win, by every poll he had so damn many votes you couldn't even count, he'd still be standing out here on the corner, shaking hands, and trying to convince--literally, the man would work until the last dog was hung. Of course, that's why it was hard to beat him, you know. The man could have been elected till he was a hundred and five.

But this was very emotional. We did carry Minnesota quite well.

F: Did you ever hear him say anything about Johnson, whether he thought Johnson treated him shabbily, or--?

K: Well, yes, I think he was--I think Johnson always found Humphrey a little hard to handle. I think--I think they were better together than people give them credit, however. I'm not sure of this.

F: I think Johnson admired him inordinately but didn't understand him.

K: Yes, I think he was a hard--I had a hard time understanding Hubert. You know, he wanted to be loved by everyone. That I can understand; I've been elected, and I know you've got to get fifty-one per cent, and I understand this. And Hubert always liked to have a big vote, and so he was never ideological, and neither was Johnson. I think they had a very basic understanding of the process. They had both been senators a long time; they both came out of a--really a populist background, Humphrey out of South Dakota, Lyndon out of west Texas. You know, they weren't rich men; what they got, they got through politics. Lyndon may have died worth a little more. But, basically, they had come out of a--they understood the process. They understood you have to--you know,

you're cutting up a pie; everybody's got to have a little piece of it. They were great on everyone having a piece of it. They knew that you've got to expand the middle class. They really had, I think, a lot in common.

I think they were--I don't how they ever talked together, things like that; I was never involved. I'd be interested. But I think they had an enormous respect for each other. Hubert was never, ever, during his period as vice president, critical of Johnson. He was a terribly loyal man. You see, my great crime was disloyalty, and I paid the price. But Hubert was very loyal to this man, and I think there was a--there really was a bond there that people did not realize, being as different as they were, in terms of their style.

F: Did you ever have any other personal contact with Johnson?

K: Never, no. Hubert got me an appointment, which was cleared through the President's office, in 1967, to go to Geneva with the United Nations, and--Richardson [?] was our ambassador at that time. He was nobody; I mean, he was a wonderful guy, actually, but he wasn't like this--

F: He wasn't a name.

K: No, he was--no name. He was out of Texas, by the way, and an awfully nice guy. And he was--so I spent three weeks in Geneva with the United Nations--UN Development Council, which is sort of an agency which gives away moneys based on ideologies. We get half of it, the Russians and their satellites get half of it. And it was used for underdeveloped countries. It was kind of interesting. And this was cleared. But other than that--and I remember thanking him, writing to him, because it was cleared through him. But it was Humphrey that got it for me. And I enjoyed it.

And that was really the last political activity I've ever been involved in. I've never been to a caucus. I had to make the decision--when I was defeated, I owed fifty thousand dollars; I didn't have fifty cents. I had small children; I had a wife. I had no law practice left. [Inaudible] And I just had to make a decision. I can't do anything well--if you're going to spend your time--I either had to hook on to Humphrey and stay in politics or I had to get out. And I made the decision to get out. And I've never regretted it. Because if I'd--

F: I think it's a loss, but we won't go into that. (Laughter)

K: Well, no, it wasn't any great loss. Dare I say, when I die, there won't be a ripple on the water.

F: Do you think--this is purely speculation--that if Johnson had run in 1968, he could have held, one, the Minnesota delegation to support him, and, two, do you think he could have gotten in past the voters?

K: I think, number one, we would have had an awful fight to get him nominated. If Humphrey were on the ticket, we would have, I think, been successful. I think we would have carried the state; yes, I think we could have carried Minnesota. After it was all--you know, Nixon's a hard man to love. Even then! I mean, people forget, he was not an easy guy--we've never--he's never, you know--and [George] McGovern beat him, in this state! Didn't he? No, he lost to him by just a hair. Oh, Christ, it was twenty thousand votes. We damn near beat [Nixon] with McGovern, and, God, you couldn't find anybody for McGovern! (Laughter)

F: One of the world's most inept campaigns.

K: Oh, God, it was awful!

F: Can you think of anything else we ought to add to this story?

K: I think this is an end of an era. I do think these are men who--for instance, I think, these were men whose economic philosophy, I think, was, frankly--had become outdated.

F: The Depression [inaudible].

K: They were shaped by this tremendous Depression. For years they had the Keynesian philosophy, and it was the greatest--why, it was a politician's delight, because to go to the United States Senate, and all you had to do--you could be for everything, and all you had to do is raise the debt, and no one said a word, and it was the greatest. And, of course, Humphrey and these men basically never understood what this was doing over the long haul to the economics of America. But it was solving some problems. It was certainly expanding the middle class. It was certainly saving us from, I think, some kind of totalitarian who-knows form of government that might have occurred had we not done this. And, as I said, these were--but these were men who had, I really believe, basically, by the time 1968 came and we inflated the economy to fight the war, we had precipitated a problem which, now, we're going to take another decade to solve, because of energy and the economics of America.

F: We've got a confluence here that isn't very pleasant.

K: Right, it isn't very--and I think basically both parties are now beginning to sense this, and they're going to try to have to deal with this. It's going to be very hard politically, because we're so used to it. I mean, I was all for things that, you know, I never figured out how to pay for, but you'd better figure out how you're going to pay for them now, because I don't think you can sell it.

F: I don't know how many times I heard Johnson say, and I suspect he had lots of echoes in Washington, "You can't tell me a country of this size and wealth can't afford" whatever it was he had on his mind.

K: The same with Hubert. Absolutely the same. This is exactly his philosophy, and I believed it until I saw that really you can't buy--for instance, you can't buy the racial problem. You can do a lot of things to help a lot of people, but you can't buy--the welfare system is obviously flawed. It has some problems that are precipitating other problems, which, obviously, money isn't going to solve. And, obviously, now we've got energy, and this is going to be one hell of a problem, because obviously we're going to pay a ton more, and we've got to understand this. I always remember Johnson handling that energy crisis--I always remember that one, very clearly. The first energy crisis, you know, was Johnson's administration. And when those boys, the Arabs, you know, raised hell, and were beginning to organize; I'll always remember how effective he was. He got the production up in Texas by a million barrels per day, and he could do it, you see. He stopped them cold. He was the--and, from then on, Nixon couldn't handle them; no one else could. I've always thought Lyndon could have handled those--I don't know how, but he did know oil; he did know energy. And how you would handle that thing today--I've always wondered if he couldn't have, when OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] basically--you have to read *The Seven Sisters* and some of these books to see whether--how effective Lyndon was, and whether he wouldn't have been able to handle it much better due to the fact that he was from a state where this was a powerful resource, which is still a great resource for the country. And how do you handle--and knowing the men that were also running Exxon, Texaco, all these multinational corporations, whether

he wouldn't have been able to better cope with OPEC. That's one of my more interesting questions.

F: Well, thank you very much.

End of Interview I

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