INTERVIEW II

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INTERVIEWEE: CARROLL KILPATRICK

INTERVIEWER: Ted Gittinger

PLACE: Mr. Kilpatrick's office, Washington, D.C.

Tape 1 of 1

G: Mr. Kilpatrick, is it correct that you began covering the White House in association with Mr. [Edward T.] Folliard in 1961?

K: Yes, that's correct. He had been the White House correspondent for many years and he was in his sixties and they wanted two people there. So I went down for the first time in 1961, although I had covered the White House some before, but just filling in and trips and various things like that.

G: I think you said at one time you went on the 1961 trip with LBJ, is that right?

K: I did, yes. I made the trip around the world with him, when he went to Vietnam.

G: How long, then, did you cover the White House once you had begun in 1961?

K: Oh, until I retired in 1974.

G: So you saw the whole Vietnam story from its inception.

K: That's right.

G: Let me talk for a second about the--

K: I said 1974; that was 1970--that's right.

G: I've seen the figure fourteen years somewhere, so it would have been close to 1975 if that's

correct.

K: It was the end of 1975.

G: End of 1975. So you saw Saigon fall and the whole thing. Well, let me just ask you one off the cuff then: as a reporter who was present at the creation and the demise, what are your feelings about the whole thing? Have you sorted that out?

K: Well, they are very mixed. Certainly they were sympathetic in the beginning; there's no question. I think the whole country was sympathetic in the beginning, with very minor exceptions. And then it turned against him, turned against the war. The *Washington Post* is probably a pretty good sample of that. It supported the President 100 per cent on Vietnam in the very beginning and certainly did through 1968, I would say. He appointed Russ Wiggins, James Russell Wiggins, who was editor of the *Post*, ambassador to the United Nations, I think in the fall of 1968, wasn't it?

G: I believe that's correct.

K: And Wiggins had been really a tower of strength to the President in the support he had given him in all those years. And after he left, or maybe just slightly before, you begin to get less enthusiasm, because Phil Geyelin succeeded him as editor of the editorial page. Wiggins was really editor-in-chief of the whole newspaper, but ran the editorial page but supervised the news as well. And before Wiggins left, there was beginning to be doubts about the Vietnam policy at the *Post*. Not by him.

G: Yes. Some of the younger reporters, perhaps.

K: Well, the younger reporters unquestionably, but I think also the owners of the paper, that was the--and they thought that the paper had become too strongly committed to that.

G: What about people like [Joseph W.] Alsop, and [Benjamin C.] Bradlee, and so forth?

K: Well, Alsop never deviated. He supported the President on Vietnam from the beginning. And I don't know what Bradlee's--my guess is that Bradlee was a skeptic more than anything else. Bradlee didn't influence the editorial page particularly. He may have had some influence; he had more influence than I would have had, for example. But the editorial page was separate from the news staff.

G: Okay. When LBJ went into the White House, there were inevitable comparisons made between his style, his approach, his expertise and so forth especially where foreign affairs were concerned. What was the climate of opinion concerning that?

K: When you say the climate of opinion, that's a hard question to answer, but there certainly was a feeling among a lot of people--and I don't know just how widespread this was in the country--that he didn't have experience in foreign policy. He resented that very much and he didn't think that was true.

G: Did he ever express this in your presence?

K: Oh, yes. I can't remember the specifics on it at the present time, but, yes, I've heard him complain about that, and he would say that he had been very actively involved in foreign affairs as a leader of the Senate and as--I guess on the Appropriations Committee. Wasn't he on Appropriations? I've forgotten which committee.

G: Armed Forces.

K: Armed Forces, Armed Forces Committee.

I might just interrupt to tell you one little story. I don't think I've ever said this in any way that it would--but to throw some light on the character of the President. When my

wife and I first came to Washington, which was late 1940, and at this party, we were invited to a Sunday dinner by some friends of ours from Alabama.

G: Should we know their name?

K: Clifford Durr. D-U-R-R. There was a lady there that I thought had a very strange name, Lady Bird Johnson, and she said that her husband, who was a representative, was ill and couldn't come that day. This was a Sunday or a Saturday. The only thing I remember in the conversation was she said, "He's just been appointed to the Naval Affairs Committee of the House." And she said, "He doesn't know much about naval affairs, but he's a fast learner." I remember that, nothing else really about the conversation. So he had that background in military affairs and foreign affairs, which he thought qualified him.

G: What did you think?

K: Oh, I thought that he had a great deal of background; I didn't think he had a student's knowledge about foreign affairs. He was a very fast learner. Oh, it's hard to say. I had tremendous respect, always, for his intellectual ability. I thought he was a towering--I thought that he was, that intellectually he was far superior to Nixon, to Ford. And Kennedy had a very quick facile mind, but Johnson in some ways had a deeper mind. Kennedy read more than Johnson and had been in contact with students and with foreign leaders and so on perhaps more than Johnson. But Johnson had, I always thought, the towering intellect of that period over all the other people that he associated with. Nixon, while he did not have the intellectual capacity of Johnson, had a greater interest in foreign affairs and was quite well informed on foreign affairs.

G: I think [Henry] Kissinger gives Nixon high marks.

K: He does, yes. And I give Nixon high marks on that. He was always interested in foreign affairs and he felt at home in it. I don't think Johnson ever quite felt at home in it.

G: That brings up an interesting point I just read the other day. Someone compared Johnson and [Woodrow] Wilson as two presidents who had high hopes to achieve things domestically and then got tangled in a war. Do you think that's a valid comparison?

K: Yes, yes. And I'm sure that Wilson was not terribly well informed, although he was a student and a scholar. I don't think that he was terribly well informed on foreign policy when he came into the White House, from the little I know of Wilson.

G: Tell me something about the professional end of covering a story. When a Vietnam story was in its inception, how do you divide up the territory? More than one reporter, I know, was interested.

K: Well, of course, there were many people interested. We had a foreign affairs reporter who spent most of his time at the State Department, but he wrote more about Vietnam than I did at the White House. I would cover the President's speeches, but he covered [Dean] Rusk on a day-by-day basis and he was writing about Vietnam almost every day and he went to the peace conference.

G: This was Murrey Marder?

K: Murrey Marder. He had a very profound knowledge of all the intricacies of foreign policy at that time. Then, of course, there were people going to Vietnam. We had reporters in Vietnam; their input was very important. And they varied; I don't know how many people we had in and out of Vietnam at different times. The editorial writers played an important role. As I say, Russ Wiggins was completely sympathetic to the objectives. I know that

Alfred Friendly, who was managing editor and in charge of the news department--I remember very clearly a conversation with him. It must have been shortly after the Baltimore speech in which he--in 1965?

G: I believe that's correct.

K: Spring of 1965, Johnson made his proposals, and Friendly thought, and I thought, that Johnson was going to pull one of the rabbits out of the hat just the way he was always able to do in the Senate, and that he had used enough force and enough diplomacy and enough carrot and enough stick to get some sort of a settlement. And I remember Al Friendly, who was also a very influential person, saying that he thought that Johnson had just done a superb job. And we were all surprised and disappointed of course, as Johnson was, when he couldn't bring this off.

G: I want to talk a little more about that when we come to a discussion of the chronology of the thing, because I think that's a very interesting period.

Did LBJ ever try to use you or manipulate you as a reporter?

K: You know, that was a part of his nature. He did, he did try to manipulate people, there's no question about that. I guess everybody does. I mean you and I would do it if we were in the same circumstances, though. So I don't see anything wrong with it. He'd always known how to use people in the Senate and make them do his will. He thought that the press could be persuaded to follow his--that was a question that always arose in my mind.

Here's a man who understands the Senate better than anybody we've had in the Senate in generations, really, just a superb manager of the Senate. There was no greater majority leader than Lyndon Johnson, and he understood human nature and yet he didn't

really understand the nature of the press. I never thought he really did. I can remember his jumping all over me about something one day in the White House. He was furious about some little thing in the *Post*. And I said, "But, Mr. President, the *Post* supports you 95 per cent of the time." He never heard me say it, he just wouldn't listen to it; he wanted 100 per cent support. I can remember Eddie Folliard one day said, "He really does want 100 per cent of the voters. He isn't"--this was in the 1964 campaign--"going to be satisfied with 95 per cent of the voters. He wants 100 per cent." (Laughter)

G: Well, I remember hearing someone say that Lyndon Johnson's idea of a good story was one that began by saying that Lyndon Johnson was a great statesman, a scholar and the best man of the time, or something to that effect. Anything less was not quite good enough.

K: Yes, yes.

G: Can you remember any specific time he tried to manipulate the news through you or mislead you?

K: Well, I think the most--you've heard this one before. But we were in Texas at the end of 1964. He'd just been in office a short time. I'm sure it was the end of 1964, not the end of 1965.

G: This would have been right after the election, then?

K: Wait a minute, this must have been the end of 1963. It was not long after he had been in, because this was a--

G: Yes, he did go to the Ranch in early December.

K: I know that, and it seems to me it was 1963. But he was saying that the budget would be over $100 billion, that story, you know that, where he kept telling us he couldn't get it

below $100 billion and we all accepted that and wrote stories. Then of course he came in with a $98 or $99 billion budget. I think we all felt we had been had a little bit on that.

G: Was that a fairly common thing, his approach to that?

K: No, I wouldn't say that was common. I wouldn't say other presidents have--

G: No, but I meant common for him.

K: Yes, when he got interested in something, he couldn't resist talking about it and trying to build up opinion the way he wanted it and so on.

G: Okay.

K: I think he did that in the Senate, too. I don't remember specifics, but I know that I was covering the Senate, you see, part of that. That's where I first got to know him, and I was up there a lot. We'd have these press conferences with him five minutes before the session started. And I remember once he said, "We can't win this vote; we can't win this vote." And went up and five minutes later the Senate voted and he won it. (Laughter)

G: Did he ever call one of your editors or try to bring pressure on you that way?

K: I don't really know that he ever--he certainly objected to certain things that were written, and I'm sure he expressed those opinions. My editors were awfully good; they didn't--they would take the criticism from him but maybe not tell me about it. I know that he called up on some things. He called me occasionally about something, or he'd send for me in the White House and complain. I never really objected to that. It didn't bother me that he objected to stories. It bothered me that he was so sensitive to small things. I remember one of the maddest times I ever saw him. Murrey Marder had written a story, which I don't think I'd even paid attention to. He said--he wrote a story, it wasn't but a couple of

paragraphs, that Alexis Johnson was going to be named ambassador to Japan, and Johnson just jumped all over me. I wasn't sure what he was complaining about at first, and he did it in the presence of some other people at the White House. He was just absolutely livid, saying that "The press is not going to tell me who to make an ambassador." And of course he did name Johnson as ambassador. He really was very--terribly sensitive to any leak of a story before he was ready to announce it.

G: I heard a follow-up on that concerning Ambassador [Edwin O.] Reischauer, who was then in Japan, that he had complained that he had seen it first in the *Post* that he was going to be replaced and was pretty mad himself.

K: That may be. I didn't know that story.

G: You've answered the first question I have here concerning Vietnam in 1964, about the climate at the *Post* regarding Vietnam. How did Vietnam figure in the 1964 campaign? Would you talk a little bit about how Johnson handled that as compared with [Barry] Goldwater, let's say? It's fairly well known, but you know--

K: I think that's fairly well known. I don't remember anything that I have that's not in the record on that.

G: Well, there was a lot of furor later about the Johnson--

K: Well, he was saying that it's going to be Asian boys fighting and certainly he made himself out as a peace candidate and Goldwater as a war candidate; there's no question about that. The Tonkin Gulf thing, we all accepted it at face value at the time.

G: There were no doubts about--what later became doubts about the second attack, or--?

K: No, I don't think so. And I think the general feeling was that he had been courageous in

going in when we were challenged in the Tonkin Gulf.

G: Now, there was a mortar attack at Bien Hoa, a big airbase, just before the election, and we know now that there was a lot of pressure from Saigon to retaliate for that, but there was no retaliation. Did you get any inside story on that, as to why it was?

K: No, I really didn't. I don't know anything that's not on the record on that.

G: Okay. A similar incident right around Christmas time when they bombed the Brink Hotel in Saigon. We know now that Ambassador [Maxwell] Taylor was very pressing for retaliation and he didn't get it. Was any of this evident at all?

K: I don't know. I don't think I would know enough to--my memory's not good enough. Murrey Marder would be very good on things like this.

G: I'm going to talk to him.

K: Yes.

G: In 1965, which was the year that the first great peace offensive, you might call it, began, were we trying to get the Russians in on pressing the Vietnamese, the North Vietnamese, to come to the table?

K: Again, I don't think I'm well enough informed to answer that. I know that we were certainly trying, that we did want the Russians, wanted their influence. My own opinion in that time was that the Russians were not going to help us. Once I expressed that to the President. He said--he had a small group at the White House, I don't remember the exact time, but it was later than 1965 I think--and he said, "The Russians are trying to help us." And I expressed some doubt about it and he got very unhappy about it. And I said, well, I didn't see why they wanted to help us. "Looks like they'd like to keep our feet to the fire."

And he got quite angry with me and said that I was all wrong and didn't know what I was talking about and so on.

G: I think it was interesting, and maybe more than interesting, that the first bombing retaliation--in February, I believe it was, right after the Pleiku incident--took place while [Soviet Union Premier Alexey] Kosygin was in Hanoi. Seems to me that might have generated some kind of change in the situation.

K: Right. Yes.

G: Do you think the North Vietnamese mousetrapped the Russians on that one?

K: I don't know.

G: There was some speculation to that effect.

Were we really trying to get negotiations, do you think, in the spring of 1965?

K: I thought so at the time. I thought, yes, I think we were. I have no doubt still that we were trying to get negotiations and that the President thought that he could get negotiations and that he could sit down with [North Vietnamese President] Ho Chi Minh. I think he thought that right almost to the end, that if he could ever get this guy to the table they could work something out. And maybe that was the weakness of his whole position, that he thought that--or the weakest part of his position, because I doubt that Ho Chi Minh was ever willing to negotiate anything that would have satisfied us.

Johnson certainly was not a bloodthirsty guy or a warlike guy. He genuinely wanted a settlement that would have preserved the border there and kept the two countries at peace. He did not enjoy going into this war. He did it because he thought it was the right thing to do. Whether he was right or wrong is another question.

G: Do you think that the bombing pause, the week-long bombing pause that spring--some people have suggested that that was public relations, that it was not a sincere effort because we didn't think the other side was ready.

K: Well, no, I thought it was a genuine effort. Now, there may have been people in the State Department who didn't want it, or in the military who didn't want it, but I think the President wanted it and was trying to get the negotiations started.

G: There was a lot of talk about sending signals to Hanoi.

K: Yes.

G: Was Hanoi getting the signals, do you know?

K: I don't know.

G: How could we know, do you think?

K: I don't know how we knew that. They were certainly informed, I don't think there's any question, but they knew what--and they had their objectives and they--I never thought there was any give or take on their side right on to the end. I thought they were hard-nosed and determined and were not going to accept anything less. And I thought the Russians were supporting them. The President, I know, thought that the Russians were trying to work out something that would end this thing. And maybe they were trying to end it, but they were certainly not going to do anything to weaken their position in Hanoi.

G: You think that the speculation about the Russians competing with the Chinese for the leadership of world communism has some validity, then?

K: Yes.

G: There was a series of stories that appeared just about this time, in the spring of 1965, about

the use of riot control agents in Vietnam, and it really stirred up, apparently, a hornet's nest. What did officials make of that in the White House?

K: I don't know. I don't have any information on that, I really don't, that would be helpful.

G: I'm not positive, I thought you had written a piece--and maybe it was another reporter--covering the adverse comment that was being made in the United Nations and various world capitals about gas warfare and chemical warfare and so on. It was apparently a great propaganda defeat for the United States. And I was always puzzled by the issue. After all, tear gas is--

K: Yes. No, if I wrote it, it was reporting on something but it was not based on any special knowledge. There may have been a statement from the White House that I reported, but I had no special knowledge on that subject.

G: Okay. When did you realize that we were going commit troops on a large scale? When did that become clear to you, do you remember?

K: Well, I was surprised. It seems to me it must have been after the Baltimore speech, wasn't it, when we began--

G: July.

K: July. Yes, I was surprised when we did commit that many troops. I had thought he would not do it, that he would use other methods and means.

G: Did you think Asian--?

K: --and it seemed to me that at that time we were getting in deeper than I had thought we [would]. Because I had been impressed by his 1964 campaign.

G: Asian boys would do the fighting.

K: Yes. And by his Baltimore speech where he said he wanted to negotiate. So I was surprised that we committed troops at that time.

G: There was no advance suspicion?

K: Well, there was suspicion and there had been speculation that that would happen, and I must say I thought that it would not be as extensive as he did. Now, I went to Vietnam with Humphrey--was that 1967?

G: I believe that's right.

K: And at that time I would say that the reporters on that trip with Humphrey, who made the trip from the United States with him, were generally sympathetic with his point of view and felt that we had this commitment. There was really no way to get out of it; it was tough and ugly and mean and dirty war and so on, but that it was the proper position for the United States. I would say that it was not until after that that you began to get more widespread criticism in the press. The reporters on the scene had a different point of view, the reporters that had been in Vietnam and knew the situation more intimately were more critical of the United States' effort.

G: Did you get a chance to talk to any of these reporters?

K: Yes, at various times either here or during that trip we talked to some.

G: Do you remember anything specific about any of those?

K: Well, I tell you one reporter I would talk to is Charles Mohr, M-O-H-R; *New York Times*. He impressed me as a balanced person who was very critical of the war effort. I know that he talked to Goldwater, he covered Goldwater, and I can remember his telling me--and I didn't believe him--he said, "We can't win that war," or "We mustn't get involved in it."

And I had a hard time following him and understanding him. I remember him saying to me, "Goldwater just never understood what I was talking about." And I've often wanted since to have more time to go back over those issues with Mohr, who's still here in Washington. But he was away for a great many years and I just haven't seen him. I'm sorry I haven't seen him. But he was not a--I mean, he was a very sensible, substantial guy. He'd been in Vietnam for *Time* magazine, and his point of view would certainly be interesting to you if you haven't already interviewed him.

G: Oh, he's on my hit list.

K: Right. You might ask him when you see him, ask him about his conversation with Goldwater. That would be very interesting. This was just a--I don't remember the details and I don't know that he gave me many details but he--I just remember that he had said that to me, maybe sitting on a plane sometime or waiting for a press conference.

G: What about some of your own reporters who were over there? Ward Just and [Peter] Braestrup and people like that.

K: Well, I don't have anything that I could tell you about them that would be of any real help to you. I think that Braestrup, it seems to me, was more sympathetic than Ward Just, if I recall. But they were both very sensible reporters and very careful and I remember Bradlee saying once about Ward Just--he was defending him against some criticism--he said, "You couldn't tell from his copy what he himself felt." Now, I don't know whether that would stand up or not, but certainly the *Post* was trying to get the whole story, and you were getting critical pieces, comments in their reports from other people and so on. But I'm sure that Ward Just toward the end was very critical of the war.

G: He was wounded, I think, wasn't he?

K: I think he was, yes.

G: Murrey Marder wrote a piece called--in which he referred to something called a "credibility gap"--

K: He sure did. (Laughter)

G: --in December of 1965. It's become one of those immortal phrases, I think.

K: Yes.

G: How did you feel about that? Did that seem to hit the nail on the head or not?

K: Yes, there was always that feeling of a credibility gap with Johnson because he certainly enjoyed playing games with the press. As I mentioned on the budget issue, that was sort of the first indication we had of how he would . . . But he was a very skilled politician who had been able to get away with that sort of thing in the Senate where he couldn't very well--every word he said in the White House was on the record. I don't think that he was a deliberate--deliberately tried to mislead people, but he was trying to get things done and he didn't want to give his--tell the whole story in advance.

He was terribly sensitive, as I said earlier, about leaks. One of his best friends in the press was Philip Potter of the *Baltimore Sun*, and Potter wrote a rather innocent story once saying that the President was going to grant the request of India for some more food aid. And Johnson really was angry with Potter about that. The story was true and it was announced the next day at the Agriculture Department, but Johnson didn't want it--so he tried to do everything he could to hold things back from the press and have it done his own way. And this set the press on edge and made it more critical.

G: Did the Dominican Republic business add to that credibility gap notion?

K: I think so. Yes, I think it did.

G: How would you evaluate the administration's handling of public affairs during that period? There were later accusations, just for example, that Johnson's statements on why we intervened contained an awful lot of hyperbole--bullets flying through the embassy and so forth.

K: I don't really have anything more on that, except one thing. I saw Johnson--I think it must have been the day that we intervened. As I recall, he got the word at four or five o'clock in the afternoon that there was trouble in the embassy, and then we intervened late that day, or said we were going to intervene. And when I saw him he thought the thing had been settled. I've forgotten all of the scenario, but there had been trouble, as you know, and then it looked like it was all right. And he said to me, "We've had good luck in the Dominican Republic and we've prevented another Castro taking over." He was referring to [Juan] Bosch. And I said, "Do you think that Bosch is a Communist?" And he said, "No, but he's very softheaded," or something to that effect, "and he could have been used." The implication was he could have been used. And of course that night things blew up.

G: There was some controversy later about just why we did intervene.

K: Yes.

G: Was it to prevent a Cuba or was it to save lives or what?

K: Well, I'm sure he--that was the reason I mentioned that he was thinking of another Cuba, and I think that's what it was. And he got--after that conversation he, as I understand it, went and took a nap. And Rusk had to wake him up from the nap to tell him that things

were--and that's when things--I don't know any more about the Dominican than is on the record.

G: Okay. How did LBJ feel about the performance of Ambassador [Ellsworth T.] Bunker and General [Bruce] Palmer? They turn up again, of course, later on.

K: I thought he thought highly of them. He did of Bunker. I don't know that I have any special knowledge about Palmer, but he always thought highly of Bunker.

G: Let me ask a couple of general questions here. How would you compare the performance of the various press secretaries under LBJ?

K: This is a subjective question all of us have been asked many times. [George] Reedy was certainly the nicest guy that was ever a press secretary, I guess, and one of the ablest. But I didn't think that Reedy was an effective press secretary for Johnson. I have a very high regard for Reedy and a great liking for him.

I thought that the most effective press secretary for Johnson was George Christian. I thought he was extremely good. He always reflected Johnson's thinking. You could be absolutely sure if he told you something that he was speaking for the President, and that's what you want, a reporter wants. Not somebody that is guessing what the President--and sometimes I thought [Bill] Moyers guessed, or tried to paint a brighter picture of something than Johnson would have painted. Moyers is a brilliant man and did a fine job in many respects, but there was a feeling of confidence with Christian.

G: Was he more prone to give you--?

K: He was not more prone to tell you things; he was less prone. Reporters wanted somebody who liked to talk, the way Moyers did, but I think after a long period they felt that Moyers

sometimes guessed at the answers or went a little bit beyond what he was supposed to, a little bit beyond where he was supposed to go. And that wasn't true with Christian. You felt you were getting an accurate--although we always pressed Christian to give us more and we wanted more from him, but there was a feeling of great confidence with him. I don't think he ever misled us.

G: Deliberately, or--?

K: Well, I don't think he--if he couldn't give us an honest answer, I think he just shut up. (Laughter) And that's better than some song and dance, then you write something, and . . .

Now he would, he sometimes did not know what Johnson was going to do. There were many little things where I got in trouble with my paper. For example, one day the city editor said, "Can you find out when Johnson is going to sign a bill?" It was a bill that Johnson had supported; we knew he was going to sign it. He just wanted to know when to have a reporter available, that's all he wanted. He wasn't going to write a line about it. So I asked Christian, and he asked the President, and he came back and he said, "He's not going to sign it until Congress comes back into session, which will be next Thursday," or something, "because he wants Congress in town." By golly, he signed it the next afternoon. My paper then thinks, well, Kilpatrick doesn't know what he is doing over there. Little things like that happened many times, and why they did, I don't know. It wasn't Christian's fault. And I don't know whether the President wasn't thinking or whether he just later changed his mind and never thought to alert me. You just never knew about things like that. He changed his mind a great deal on things, as you know. He would not make up his mind on trips and things like that until the very last minute.

G: That's pretty hard on the press corps.

K: It's very hard on them, yes.

G: Did you go to the Ranch a good deal in those days?

K: Yes, a great deal.

G: There are lots of stories about the press covering the Ranch and the rather arbitrary treatment they got sometimes. Do you remember any of those?

K: I don't. I remember the first trip we made. Johnson went to St. Louis. He had been in office just a short time, and [Pierre] Salinger was still press secretary. It seems to me we went to St. Louis on a Friday afternoon, so we assumed we'd go from St. Louis right on to the Ranch. And Salinger told us to be prepared. And he made the speech in St. Louis and we still didn't know whether he was going to the Ranch or coming back to Washington. I'm not sure the pilots knew. And we did come back to Washington, much to our surprise, because we'd all packed to stay the weekend at the Ranch. I gather that Mrs. Johnson was as much in doubt on a lot of these trips as the press was. He used to tell us, he said, "When I make up my mind, I'll tell Lady Bird and then I'll tell George Christian"--or whoever was press secretary--"and he can tell you." And that was true. I think he just didn't make up his mind on these things until the last minute.

That famous trip around the world, when he went to the funeral for Prime Minister [Harold] Holt of Australia, he stopped in Rome on the way back and there had been rumors of that. I don't believe he made up his mind on that until the last minute. I think he had it in mind that he wanted to do it and just had not worked out the details.

G: Did you accompany him in *Air Force One* on that trip, or were you--?

K: No, I wasn't on *Air Force One*. There was a pool on *Air Force One*; I don't believe I was on any of that. I may have been on it one leg of that, but I don't believe so. I don't remember it. But we were following in a press plane. It was a hectic trip.

G: Yes, I've heard that. Did you get any Christmas shopping done that time?

K: (Laughter) Surely didn't.

G: I thought they might have let you into the PX [post exchange].

K: No, it seems to me we were gone five days, but we were in a hotel only about two nights. We were on the plane all the time.

G: How do you maintain your energy level on a thing like that?

K: Oh, it was pretty rough. How he maintained his energy level is hard to understand. Of course, he could sleep on the plane; at least he could stretch out, where the rest of us couldn't. But I don't know how he stood up under all this.

G: Here's a question that's a general question. Now, one of the more interesting appointments Johnson ever made when he was in office was the appointment of [Vice] Admiral [William F.] Raborn to head the Central Intelligence Agency. Did you get any feeling as to why he did that, what kind of an appointment that was? I know it surprised an awful lot of people. And of course Raborn only lasted a year.

K: No, I don't. I really don't know a thing about it, what was behind it.

G: Do you know why he was in only a short time?

K: No, no, I don't.

G: Okay.

End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview I

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CARROLL KILPATRICK

In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Frank W. Kilpatrick, of Madison, Wisconsin, do hereby give, donate, and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title, and interest in the tape recording and transcript of the personal interview conducted with my father, Carroll Kilpatrick, on May 24, 1982, in Washington, D.C., and prepared for deposit in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

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