INTERVIEW I

DATE: March 23, 1970

INTERVIEWEE: WILLIAM F. KNOWLAND

INTERVIEWER: JOE B. FRANTZ

PLACE: Senator Knowland's office, Oakland Tribune Tower, Oakland, California

Tape 1 of 2

F: Senator, to get this underway, let's talk briefly about your early career until the time you came into the Senate in the mid-1940s.

K: All right. I was born in the neighboring city of Alameda, which is an island just adjacent here to Oakland, on June 26, 1908. I went to the Alameda public schools, the University of California, and in 1932 became a candidate for assemblyman, which is a lower house of our state legislature. That was a bad year for a young Republican to start running for anything. Mr. Roosevelt carried my assembly district by about seven thousand votes, and up until midnight I thought I had been retired on my first time out. But I finally squeaked through with about a thousand votes.

F: That either showed innocence or courage, didn't it?

K: But in any event, I was elected by a narrow margin at that time and two years later ran for state senator, which covers the entire county of Alameda--it did at that time. I served in the state senate for four years and then did not run for re-election, because in the meantime I had been selected by the Republican State Committee as Republican national committeeman for California when Earl Warren, who had been national committeeman, resigned at the time he was going to run for

attorney general of California. I served in the national committee from then until the time I went into the army in 1945.

I was serving overseas, served in England, France, Belgium and Germany, when word came of the death of Senator Hiram Johnson, but I did not know at that time that my name was under consideration for the vacancy. The Governor made the appointment on August 14, [1945].

F: That's Governor [Earl] Warren?

K: That's Governor Warren, who had then become governor. The Governor made his appointment on August 14, which as you recall was V-J Day. I suppose there were far more important messages going back and forth on the cables and communication networks than the appointment of a freshman senator. In any event, I didn't learn of my appointment [until]--

F: How did you receive the message?

K: Well, I first heard of it by reading it in the army newspaper, ***Stars and Stripes***. I could hardly, on the strength of a ***Stars and Stripes*** article, go to my commanding officer and ask for transportation home. But in about five days the official cable from the Governor caught up with me.

F: Your thoughts for the next five days, I would imagine, would be very interesting if you could have recorded them.

K: Yes. The officer there asked if I'd carry a letter to a friend of his in the then War Department, and I told him I would. He said there was nothing confidential about it, I could read it. As I recall it went something like this, it said: "Dear Jim. For the last three or four years you fellows over in the War Department have been sending congressional parties over here to the European of operations, and we have had

to take care of them. Herewith, we are sending you your first replacement."

F: I see.

K: I then came back to this country and stopped off in Washington briefly where I went in and called on Les Biffle, who was then the secretary of the Senate, to learn what the schedule was for the Senate, because they were in recess at that particular time when I reached Washington. He told me what the schedule was.

I then came on out to California and went through the process of getting out of the army. I called of course on Governor Warren, who was in Sacramento, and discussed some of the problems relative to the state that we might be facing in Washington, gathered up my family, and then went on back to be at the Senate at the time the session resumed. And I was. I took my oath of office at that time.

Then subsequently the following year--1946 was the year when Senator [Hiram] Johnson's term would have expired--so I ran for the short unexpired term between election day and when the next term would normally have begun. I was elected for a full six-year term, and then subsequently six years later was reelected, winning both the Republican and Democratic nomination under our then cross-filing system in California, and served in the Senate until January, 1959. In 1948 I ran for the Republican nomination for governor, was nominated but lost the election in November to Edmund Brown, who became governor of California.

F: This is getting ahead of the story, but it has intrigued me. You and Lyndon Johnson have birthdays that are very close. You preceded him into the Senate, but both of you were quite young when you moved up to

the leadership of your party in the Senate. You did it while you were still fairly junior senators. Do you think it was just the mood of the times? Why do they pick two men like you two to advance so rapidly? What do you think happened in that body that is known, you know, for a slow climb up the ladder of priority?

K: I suppose it was a combination of circumstances in both cases, in which we sometimes get a historical coincidence. It happened about the same time in both parties. First of all, when I came to the Senate in 1945, the elections of 1946 made quite a turnover in the Senate on the Republican side. We had a lot of new members so very quickly; the Republican membership had been down fairly low, as you recall, during the Roosevelt years, and your rise in seniority was fairly rapid on our side, particularly with the changes that took place in 1946. Then subsequently I had been selected by the Republican caucus to be chairman of what we call the Republican Policy Committee in the time Senator Robert Taft was the Republican leader of the Senate. When he went to the hospital he asked me to sit in as the acting leader in the time.

Now he could have selected any one of several people to do it. The Republican whip at the time was Senator Saltonstall of Massachusetts; Senator Gene Millikin of Colorado was chairman of the Republican conference; I was chairman of the policy committee. He made that determination, and as a result, when he died--and I had no idea at the time he was going to the hospital that he was as seriously ill as it turned out that he was. Whether Bob Taft knew it at the time or not I just don't quite know. I rather believe he did have an inkling that he

might not be back to the Senate. I think this combination of circumstances possibly accounted for the situation on the Republican side.

On the Democratic side of the aisle I think they also had a series of events, of leaders who had not been reelected. [In viewing] the change over there, I think possibly the man who might have been selected, Senator [Richard B.] Russell, was not interested in taking on that duty. I think that Senator [Lyndon] Johnson turned out to be a consensus person upon whom they could agree, and perhaps this accounts for the situation on that side of the aisle.

In any event, we had a long and cordial relationship over the period of time that I was majority leader, and then later when I became minority leader and he became majority leader the same relationship continued. In the very operation of the Senate, unless there is a good relationship between the majority and minority leaders, the Senate can be tied up in knots. Because on any one given day it is possible that even the majority party will have enough senators who are either ill or away, that if you just want to upset control you could do it very easily and have a chaotic condition. But our relationship was that the majority leader would determine the hour of adjournment [and] the schedule of the legislative program. The only thing that, in both cases, Senator Johnson and I insisted on was that as minority leader we should know well in advance what the program was going to be. This was the relationship we had. We not only conferred across the center aisle, but generally once and sometimes several times a day we would either meet at his office or mine in the Capitol Building to go over the legislative program that was coming up.

F: You had a good working relationship through the years. Do you think it was improved by the fact that both of you had served in a sense as a majority leader to the other's majority leadership, so that you understood the situation on both sides?

K: Yes, I think this in part accounted for it. In the whole period of time that we served--and I might parenthetically say that I was the only majority leader in history to be elected without a majority. Because the fact of the matter is that Senator Taft had been elected majority leader. But as you recall in the 1952 elections, while there had been quite an Eisenhower landslide, actually it didn't reflect in either the membership of the Senate [or] the House. We had a very narrow margin in the Senate. I believe it was a margin of two. But when Senator Taft died and the Governor of Ohio appointed a Democrat to succeed him, and prior to that time when Senator Morse defected, it actually left us as a minority party.

Had the Democrats at that point wanted to take over control of the Senate, they could have done so merely by moving to depose Senator Styles Bridges from New Hampshire as president pro tem and taken control of the Senate committees. I have often been asked why didn't the Democrats do it at that time, and I think the reason they didn't do it is that the Republicans had actually won the majority in the Senate at the preceding election. Eisenhower had just gone in, and they felt that while they could do it and had the power to do it, it might put them in a disadvantaged position to follow [them].

F: And at that stage I'm sure a lot of Oregonians were still voting for Wayne Morse as a Republican.

K: That's right. So it is a combination of these things. In any event, I did serve as majority leader from the time of the death of Senator Taft up until after the elections that took place in 1954, at which point we narrowly lost the Senate, or continued to have loss of the Senate but by a very narrow margin. Again it became important for the new Majority Leader, who at that time was Senator Lyndon Johnson, to continue a close relationship because, as I say, the Senate could have been thrown into turmoil if there wasn't an understanding.

F: Between Hiram Johnson and Lyndon Johnson, you've kind of been surrounded by the Johnsons.

K: Yes, indeed. But as I say, the period of time was an interesting period. I learned to have a very high respect, which I still have, for a man who later became president of the United States.

F: When did you first become aware of Mr. Johnson other than just [as] somebody you read about in the paper?

K: This is an interesting story. As a fairly junior senator at the time, I was serving on the Rules Committee of the Senate. In the Senate procedure the Rules Committee at that time, and I suppose [it] still does, covered contested elections, and this was the time of the Johnson landslide in Texas, as you recall.

F: Those whopping eighty-seven votes.

K: Yes, the whopping eighty-seven votes. There was a good deal of talk that the election might be contested, and so forth. So one day I had a call in my office from Senator Lyndon Johnson. I really can't at the moment say whether he was senator-elect at the time when he first came

in or actually had taken his oath of office, but it was well before the Senate Rules Committee might have been called upon.

F: This was the first time you had actually met him?

K: This is the first time that I can recall that I had met Lyndon Johnson. He came in to talk about the situation. Sometimes men hit it off pretty well; they have a rapport or they don't, and we did. So as this thing went in, of course I don't remember all the details at this time, the Rules Committee did not adversely report on the Texas situation. From then on we got to know each other much better. But that was of course long before either one of us knew we would end up as a party leader in the Senate.

F: I don't presume at this time in the Rules Committee there was any partisanship really displayed on how to rule on this election, since it's going to be one Democrat or another?

K: No. That's right. No, there was no partisanship on it. There are feelings that had been held over a period of years that you should not question the election certificate from the state that comes up on it. This had been the precedent generally followed, though there have been notable examples where this was not followed precisely.

F: Before you and Senator Johnson emerged as your senatorial leaders, did you see much of Senator Johnson in his early Senate days? You are a bit senior to him.

K: Yes. Though as you pointed out our ages are very close together, I believe I am a few months older than he is. So when I became party leader I was the youngest party leader up to that time, and when he became party leader he was the youngest leader.

F: By a few months.

K: Yes. I saw him on various committees on which we subsequently served and got to know him, as you do with members on the other side of the aisle. I don't know that I can really say that prior to his assuming the leadership and my own assumption of the leadership that I knew him better than I know many other Democrats there, but I at least knew him as well and as favorably.

F: I know immediately in that new Senate [that] began in January, 1949, that you pursued a rule to push the two-thirds rule to limit debate. Wayne Morse had wanted just a simple majority.

K: Yes.

F: And the Southern Democrats are backing you in this.

K: Yes.

F: Were you aware of Mr. Johnson taking any sort of role in this? Did you think of him--what I am trying to get at--as a member of the southern bloc or as a senator from Texas?

K: No, I think I looked on him a little more as a western senator than a southern senator, though I realize that Texas, of course, is a southern state in the broad sense of the term historically. But I looked upon Johnson, while having strong ties with the South, as being more of a western senator than a southern senator.

F: One of your fortes in the Senate was always foreign policy, and in that you worked with the Senate Armed [Services] Committee.

K: Yes.

F: And that at times threw you into some contention with the Foreign Relations Committee under Senator [Tom] Connally.

K: Yes.

F: Did you through that get any sort of insights of the relationship between Senators Connally and Johnson?

K: This question, really, I would ask to pass on at the moment. Senator Connally was chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Dick Russell as I recall was chairman of the Armed Services Committee. The only time those two committees were thrown together was at the time of the MacArthur hearings. We had set up some joint hearings at the time, and--it is hard after this many years have passed without reviewing the situation--I can't at the moment really recall whether Senator Johnson was a member of that Armed Services Committee at that time or not.

F: No, he was not. This came later.

K: I know he was greatly interested in what was going on at the time. I think that probably came later, because I had served on the Armed Services Committee before I gave up my position on that committee to take one on the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate.

F: This is a period when Nationalist China is falling apart, and you are very much involved in this in trying to stem the communist aggression over there as best we can at this distance. Did you perceive, do you recall, whether young Senator Johnson had any interest in this, or was he domestically inclined?

K: No, I think he had some interest in this situation, and I felt at least a more friendly interest than Senator Connally had. Connally and I got to be friendly as the years went by, but he had rather a caustic tongue sometimes in the Senate and was obviously a person who was not sold on

the basis of trying to save all of China from going down the drain on it. So we tangled a great many times on the floor of the Senate, as the ***Congressional Record*** would show. But I never ran into that situation with Senator Johnson, who was a junior colleague of Senator Connally's.

F: Did Senator Connally have a strong sense of seniority in his position as against more junior members, or was he fairly approachable?

K: I think he, like so many of the older senators, had quite a sense of seniority, and I don't think he particularly was happy to be challenged by a more junior senator. But when you get down to the realities of the situation each person is a senator of the United States. Most new members, and I think this would be true of Senator Johnson on his side of the aisle and myself on my side, had a respect and a regard for the senators who served there for many years. It is not only because of the seniority system but just a matter of fact that they had more knowledge. You are very reluctant to challenge them unless you have a reasonably strong case. But at the same time I don't think any more junior senator is doing his job if he, feeling strongly on the subject, merely sits back and has the senior senator carry the Senate along with [him] when maybe that isn't the right way to go.

F: Right. Well now, this is the period of China's deterioration and it is the period of the rise of Senator Joseph McCarthy, which to some extent is helped along by what's happening in China. You have got the problem here of whether the State Department is soft on the Chinese situation, and you have got the problem then of Korea breaking out. There is plenty to think about.

K: We had lots of things going on at the time.

F: Right. Are you aware in your recollections of Senator Johnson's working with you or against you in these various issues that are breaking out at this time?

K: I always felt and still do that Senator Johnson was more alert to the problems arising in the Far East than many of the more junior senators on the other side of the aisle. I had gone to Korea. I had been interested in the problem of foreign policy on the whole Pacific, perhaps one reason [being that] we are out here as a Pacific coast state with the outbreak of Pearl Harbor and the rest of it. I had gone out to Korea and had gathered up a great deal of information from our military mission which was then out there, from our embassy officials, and from the Koreans themselves and came back to the Senate and made a speech in which I pointed out that there was every indication that within not too great a distance of time they might be subjected to aggression from the north. I had no definitive date or anything of this sort, but there was a general feeling there something was apt to develop over that period.

When finally hostilities did break out, the chief objection that I felt and spoke regarding the Truman action is that, number one, they had the Blair House conference. Now I didn't at that point have sufficient seniority to be included. I wasn't holding the chairmanship of the policy committee or of course the leadership position, but we did have Republicans who were [excluded]--Senator Arthur Vandenberg was a ranking man and our party leadership in the Senate. I felt that President Truman had made a great mistake in not including the Republicans in the Blair House conference when they discussed this situation. They had Senator Connally there, they had other Democratic leaders there, but no

Republicans. It is true that the next day, as Senator Vandenberg told me the story, he and a number of Republicans, I believe Senator Taft included, were invited to the White House. They were told what decisions had been arrived at the Blair House conference on the Sunday night that hostilities broke out. But by the time they had left the White House the press releases had been given out on it. That's when Senator Vandenberg made his statement which I have always remembered. He said, "You know, it would be a great thing to be called on for the take-off and not just the crash landing."

I think the President had made a mistake in that. Plus the fact I supported Truman from the day hostilities broke out on taking action which I felt had to be taken, and I am only sorry really that he did not ask for a congressional resolution at that time. I think had he done it he would have had overwhelming support in the Senate from both Democrats and Republicans. I think it would have avoided many of the problems that President Truman later ran into by not getting a resolution.

F: To a certain extent it made it also a partisan war, didn't it?

K: Yes, it did to an extent.

F: You urged him in there in the summer of 1950 to set up a bipartisan cabinet in view of the fact that the whole nation was involved in this. Did you get any response to that?

K: No. Actually the answer to that is no. I felt that his own hand would have been strengthened if that had been done, but he after all was occupying the presidency and for his own reasons determined not to do so.

F: At this time Dean Acheson was secretary of state, and I know at one time you urged a Republican no-confidence vote on him. Did the Democrats try to head this off, or did they leave this up to the Republican business?

K: No, I think it must be said that there--

F: --were some Democrats who would have voted with you, I know.

K: That's right. I think the Democratic leadership obviously did not want a motion of that kind to come before the Senate. I later, again, as so often happens in life, got better acquainted with Dean Acheson and the relationship improved greatly. But at that time I was one of the few senators who voted against his confirmation as secretary of state, primarily because I had felt that the handling of the policies in regard to the Republic of China had left much to be desired and that he was at least one of the architects of that policy.

F: When you get into a situation like this in which some agency of an administration like the State Department is highly controversial, does it tend to affect personal relationships between the senators from the two parties, or is this just an irritant that you live with and go on?

K: No, I think this is an irritant you live with and go on. I think most of the people who get to the Senate have had some prior political experience. They may have been in state legislatures; they may have been in the House of Representatives, as Senator Johnson had been; they may have been governors of their states, but generally they have had some prior experience. They learn that you may be on the opposite side of the aisle with someone today, even in your own party, or of the opposite party, and tomorrow you may be allies on something else. So I

don't think they tend to keep a grudge or let the lines become so tight that they are difficult.

F: They are a little like adversary lawyers who then go have lunch together.

K: Yes, that is right.

F: You had a problem in 1952, which of course was a crucial year for you because you were running for reelection, in this public housing project down in Los Angeles. You and Senator Richard Nixon proposed the cancellation of it, and the Senate refused to go along with you. Do you recall just where the opposition to your proposal came from?

K: This, really, I can't recollect at the moment.

F: But you have no memory of Senator Johnson surfacing on this particular issue?

K: No, I don't have a recollection of that.

F: Now then the American Federation of Labor took in after you on a few occasions, and I think they actually put you on a purge list for 1952. Is this effective, or does it just represent the hierarchy--?

K: Well, basically, take the 1952 situation: I have always felt that the primary race in California of 1952 was really, as it turned out, kind of a Gallup poll on what was going to happen in the nation in November of that year, because we then had a cross-filing system in the state which we no longer have. I filed on the Republican ticket. My Democratic opponent, who was then the congressman from San Diego, filed on the Democratic ticket and on the Republican ticket, and then I cross-filed into the Democratic Party. Obviously, when you are talking or meeting around the state you are talking to both Democrats and Republicans, and

I always make the same speech in any event. I mean I wouldn't change it on the audience that I was talking to. We discussed primarily, among other things, the Far Eastern situation. This was very much in the public mind at the time. I carried all fifty-eight counties of California on the Republican end of it and carried fifty-seven of the fifty-eight on the Democrat end.

F: That is fairly convincing.

K: Which is fairly convincing. So that actually, to all intents and purposes, I had my contest out of the way, though there was a Henry Wallace party candidate who filed for that party and had his name on the ballot in November. It freed me to campaign, which I did. I was asked to travel on the Eisenhower train and plane and traveled with him through some thirty-four or thirty-five states of the Union in the November election. I was convinced after that primary that with the feeling that had grown regarding the Far Eastern policies and our involvement in Korea and so forth, that we had the makings of a major victory in November, 1952. So when you mentioned being put on the purge list, it didn't do [any harm].

F: It didn't purge.

K: It didn't purge. Purges generally aren't effective. If you recall, FDR was going to purge a lot of senators, including Senator Walter George of Georgia, and they failed, I think, in every instance.

F: What is that, just the state's resentment of outside interference?

K: I think the state's resentment of outside interference. I think the people of the state feel they know as much as to what their senator is doing, and whether he is doing a reasonably good job, and if national

labor leaders or national business leaders come in and try to tell them what they should do it tends, I think, to strengthen the person who is subjected to that kind of a purge.

F: Well now, in the 1952 campaign Texas went Republican for the first time since Al Smith, which was a peculiarity as you know. Did you work Texas with General Eisenhower?

K: I traveled into Texas with Eisenhower on his trips.

F: As best as you can reconstruct--I know what time does to this sort of memory--what sort of situation did you run into in Texas?

K: Generally speaking, Texas has been looked upon by Republicans as a state in which potentially the Republican Party could gain strength, partly because of this western outlook that I have previously indicated. Even when lots of the Deep South were being written off, which isn't even true today because the Republican Party has made substantial gains in many of the southern states, Texas was looked upon as a potential state where Republicans might move, and particularly with Eisenhower it was felt that we had a good chance of carrying the state.

F: Right. So you came away from Texas feeling fairly optimistic?

K: Yes, feeling that was a state where we really had a chance to carry it.

F: Did you meet with Governor Shivers?

K: I don't recall at that time whether [I did], I have since become well acquainted with him. We have served on the Board of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce together and so on. I can't recall whether I did or not, but I am quite sure that, without having an independent recollection of it, he and Eisenhower had met, even if [it was] nothing more than the normal courtesies which are extended by a governor to a presidential candidate.

F: Did you, as best as you can recollect, get the feeling that Senator Johnson was campaigning actively for Governor [Adlai] Stevenson, or that he was just sort of giving party lip service?

K: This is a little difficult to know, what motivates a man. I had felt at least that Senator Johnson was keeping his party record clear and was supporting the nominee. Now how far he was knocking himself out in that support, I am just not in a position to judge. There would be far better judges than mine in Texas itself to know how much he did in that campaign. I cannot help but believe at least he was not completely unhappy with Eisenhower's election.

F: All right, you are back in the Senate. You have been reendorsed as California's representative again and they like you here, so you know what you are going to be doing. You run immediately into something that throws you and Senator Johnson into a real relationship. I mean not the fact that you first became the policy committee chairman and then the majority leader, but also the fact that the tidelands comes up as an issue. It had been an issue off and on since Harold Ickes, certainly.

K: That's right.

F: Did you and Senator Johnson talk about this issue?

K: Yes, we had many discussions on it, as did senators from other states which were concerned and had tidelands on it. This crossed party lines; you know, it was not a party issue as such.

F: More geographical.

K: Yes.

F: Did it give you much trouble as a party leader, since a lot of your party is inland?

K: No, it did not, because there were a lot of senators even in inland states who recognized the equity of the situation. For instance, California came into the union in 1850 under our constitution of 1849, and that had spelled out the boundaries of the state as being three miles into the Pacific Ocean and so on. We felt there was an historical case, and most other coastal states had somewhat similar language or background or historic setting for this. I think this was recognized by many senators in inland states, though not all of them, obviously.

F: Did you have to do any educating of President Eisenhower on this issue, or did he pretty well grasp it from the beginning?

K: No, I think that there was a lot of discussion going on with the President and in the administration, because there were obviously some who were for it and some who weren't for it. But I ultimately came to believe that the President recognized the basis for the tidelands out to a reasonable distance belonging to the states.

F: Something you did in this year of 1953 that most people probably didn't attach much importance to--it is only important in retrospect--you visited Vietnam and Cambodia, which were not on most senators' lists at that time. Tell me something about what you found out there at that time. Because here really is our first sort of thrust in that area, and as you know, that becomes the biggest issue of the sixties.

K: I had been out to the Far East on a number of occasions prior to that time, as I had been to Europe. I felt with the changing developments taking place unless you go back at least every year or two you lose touch with the feel of the situation. So on the trip that I made out there about this time--

F: It was September 1953.

K: Yes. I went to not only Japan, which I have a great interest in and felt was, and did of course become, one of the great economic factors in that part of the world, but went to Korea and to Taiwan and then went down into Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. I had constantly felt that if the Chinese and North Koreans were ultimately stopped at some line, and after Eisenhower became elected they did get an armistice line, that they would move somewhere else. I didn't believe and I don't believe now that they would remain in a stationary, status-quo kind of situation. I felt that in due time there would be problems in what had been the Indochina area.

F: You had some difficulty at this time getting into Cambodia because she was trying to split off from the Vietnams.

K: Yes, but finally managed to make the arrangements to get there.

F: Could you perceive that this was going to be an area in which we were going to be truly concerned from a military standpoint?

K: No. I felt that any area which was noncommunist in Asia could be an area where we would have trouble. To know that it would take precisely the form it took, of course I don't pretend to have any foreknowledge of that. But it was a likely and a soft spot, and my general observation is that whenever communism finds a soft spot, why, they tend to penetrate and to move.

F: They don't look upon one of these arbitrary lines of demarcation as a border but as a target.

K: No, that's right. That's certainly true.

F: Moving ahead to 1954, by now Senator McCarthy has become a big factor in American life. You have the problem in here at one time in which the Democrats, in a sense, walk out on the Subcommittee on Government Operations and you had the problem of trying to keep a subcommittee working. I would be interested in your reminiscences as to just what you did to get this little dispute settled down.

K: First, like so many people in life, and I think we all are in that category, you have your assets and you have your liabilities, and one of Joe McCarthy's liabilities was a tendency to overstate his case. I think he hurt himself a good deal by this overstating his case, and he offended a lot of Republican senators by some of the statements he made. Now I have never seen eye to eye with--

F: He sometimes used a shotgun when he could have used a rifle.

K: Yes. I haven't agreed with Senator Fulbright on the way he performed either during the Eisenhower Administration or during the Johnson Administration, or even currently. But he was a senator of the United States, and I really resented when McCarthy got up on the floor and referred to him as Senator Halfbright. I mean, it was this kind of a thing, you know, that just isn't done. You could say the Senate's a club; well, it isn't quite a club, but people, even though they may bitterly differ and vote opposite each other, still there is a certain both dignity and respect that they have for [members] across the aisle.

F: It is the highest elective office that the state can give a man.

K: That's right. To make references of this kind, I felt, cost McCarthy a lot of support that otherwise he might have had. That there had been attempts to infiltrate the government, I think no one really doubts

among the Democrats or Republicans. I think there is a doubt as to how much culpability perhaps those who are running the department had. I've never felt that they were deliberately trying to infiltrate communists in the government, but just knowing the communist animal as it is, I think this is the thing that they try to do in every country of the world. We probably, being a big government with more loose practices than others, had more than our share of people who had been infiltrated. To the extent that he was trying to expose this and get them out, I think McCarthy commanded the support of a lot of Democrats as well as Republicans. But when he seemed to get carried away with the situation and became careless on some of his statements, that's when I think he began to lose the support of both the Senate and perhaps the country.

F: Well now, you reach a stage where you had to pick this Senate select committee.

K: Yes.

F: That was a job for both you and Senator Johnson.

K: That is correct.

F: How did you proceed on this?

K: As I recall the situation now, we had some preliminary discussions. I think we had both agreed that we would try to get what you would now term, I think, a moderate-type of a committee there, not one that would prejudge the case one way or the other on it. For that reason I think that Senator Johnson discussed the names that he was considering [with me]. I don't mean by that he gave me a veto over them, but I think had I felt very strongly that one of them would be a mistake, then--

F: You each tried to agree with the other's selection.

K: We each tried to agree with the other's selections.

F: Were you satisfied with the committee?

K: Yes, by and large, yes.

F: This of course was a congressional election year, which made it a bit tender. Senator Johnson, for that matter, was up for reelection, but no great problem. I know that the Americans for Democratic Action hopped on both you and Senator Johnson for not pushing the select committee to give its verdict before November, and said that you were deliberately trying to delay until after the election. Do you go along with that charge?

K: Again, this is now 1970 and a lot of years have passed.

F: The ADA actually wanted the Senate called back into session.

K: Yes, I don't think Senator Johnson and I were prepared to go to that extent.

F: Actually, you are justified in one sense, in that the report did not come in until well into 1955.

K: That's correct.

F: It was months later and not just a matter of weeks. This was a bad year for Republicans in which you lost your Senate majority, which was already, as you have said, quite thin. Did you get the feeling that President Eisenhower just was not a political animal in the better sense of that word?

K: I would say this: that [Eisenhower was] unlike most of the presidents we have had in both parties. Most of the others had had political experience in the sense that they had been candidates for the Senate, for the House, for governors, or they had served in cabinets. Eisenhow-

er of course had not. He was a tremendous personality. He projected I think more of the father-of-his-country type of an image and not a bitter partisan or not even a consistent partisan, because you recall that some years earlier when they first began mentioning his name there was some doubt as to whether he would run as either a Democrat or a Republican. There at least is a story, that I can't vouch for, that at one time President Truman had thought of Eisenhower as a possibility of being a candidate, and presumedly a Democratic candidate for the presidency.

F: The ADA had wanted to dump Truman in 1948 and take Eisenhower.

K: So at least there was that background on the situation. When I first went up to New York with Senator Taft and Senator Millikin to talk with Eisenhower after he had become president-elect, but before he was sworn into office, we talked with him about the importance of at least getting control of the various departments. We told him that while the Republicans had a narrow margin in the Senate and the House, we felt there were enough Democrats who, even though they hadn't supported him in the election, realized that when the administration came in that at least down to the policy level he ought to have the chance to name his own people. Eisenhower was a little concerned that this would appear to be an attack on civil service, and we couldn't get him to move on the situation.

As a result, when for instance Mrs. Hobby had come in before the Appropriations Committee, upon which I also served, all the same people were there, except her chief assistant that had been there when the Truman cabinet people were coming out. And this was pretty general in a

great many of the departments. Nobody wanted to go back to the old spoils system before civil service, but we did feel that [with] those who were really up in the policy level the new administration should be in a position to make the changes. Well, Eisenhower did not buy that program, though it was urged very strongly by Senator Taft, Senator Millikin, myself and Senator Bridges.

F: Of course, you had a good political pipeline through Vice President Nixon.

K: Yes.

F: Who would have understood.

K: That's right, who understood this situation. But some years later Eisenhower at one of the weekly meetings we had at the White House rather indicated that if he knew at that time, the earlier period, what he then knew he would have probably taken the advice and sought to have some changes made. I think Eisenhower later learned a great deal about the party situation and that the president is not only the leader of the country, but in the American tradition he is the leader of the party, too. But most Republicans felt that there were many things he might have done to build up the party which, because he did look upon himself really as more than a party leader, he just didn't feel comfortable in doing.

F: So in 1954 in the congressional elections, from the standpoint of utilizing the executive branch you pretty well had to work with Vice President Nixon and not with the President.

K: Yes, very largely so. I don't know that that in itself accounted for the change, because historically the party in power normally loses

strength in an off election year. So I don't think this could be laid to Eisenhower and say, well, if he had taken a little different stand or made a few more speeches that it would have changed that situation.

F: Did you ever seriously consider going back on Mr. Eisenhower and supporting someone else in 1956?

K: No, not as long as Eisenhower himself could be the candidate. I think everybody was prepared to support him. The only point where any issue arose at all was when there was some discussion because of the President's health that he might step aside. The rumors at least were that Milton Eisenhower would be his choice for the presidency. Had this happened, I think there would have been a major confrontation in the Republican Party, because they were not prepared to accept Milton Eisenhower in place of Dwight Eisenhower.

F: Okay, you have got an overturn now in the leadership in the Senate in 1955. What did that do to your personal relationships with now Senate Majority Leader Johnson? One day you are on top and he's the leader of His Majesty's opposition, the next day, why, it's turned around.

K: Actually it made very little difference. We both went on with our party leadership.

F: Each went on and that's it. You are developing at this time out in California a Republican split, kind of a Knowland-Nixon-Knight split--the same sort of thing the Democrats are going to get in the sixties. I presume that this really became an issue in the sense of national importance in that it kept the Republicans from being cohesive in one of their key states.

K: Since you've touched on the subject, I'll just briefly go over it. You'll recall that there were rumors rampant, and some even appeared in the press, that perhaps Eisenhower would not be unwilling to have some vice-presidential candidate in 1956 other than Nixon. These were fairly widespread. Stassen's name came into the picture; other names came into the picture. There was also this problem of the President's first heart attack, which had occurred prior to that time, as to whether the President himself would be a candidate. It was at this time that in California, with the possibility that Eisenhower might not run for reelection, that discussions were going on the possibility of a Knight delegation or a Nixon delegation or a Knowland delegation. When the President finally made the public announcement that he would be a candidate for reelection, what actually happened in California is that a delegation ran in Eisenhower's name that was selected one-third by Nixon, one-third by Knight and one-third by me. Now this was how it was constituted.

Then the indications were rather clear that an effort was going to be made to find another vice-presidential candidate, and there was every reason to believe that Governor Knight was disenchanted with Nixon and might join in such a movement, whether it be Stassen or someone else that would develop. It was at this point that I called Vice President Nixon and told him that as far as I was concerned I intended to support him for retention on the ticket. With the one-third of the people who were likely to follow me on it and one-third of his people who were on the delegation, this came as two-thirds on the California delegation, and I think that announcement that the California delegation would

support Nixon had a lot to do with cooling down the fight against Nixon at that time.

F: There was another heart attack during this year, and that was LBJ's.

K: Yes.

F: Where were you at the time that you received word of this?

K: Again, the dates are not quite clear to me.

F: It was in July.

K: The Senate was in session at the time, as I recall it. Word gets around very fast in the Senate, particularly [about] somebody in the leadership position. I was personally grieved to hear about the situation, and I sent word to Senator Johnson as soon as I could that he need have no concern about any advantage being taken of his absence. As a matter of fact, when he got well enough to get mail I wrote him a number of letters giving him my observations of the situations that were there. He actually several times mentioned that the Republican leader in the Senate had kept him well informed on what was going on in the Senate.

F: In an instance like that, did you tend to serve as a kind of a majority leader without portfolio, or did the Democrats move right into the vacuum?

K: No, they of course under the party set-up had somebody to fill in during the temporary absence of Senator Johnson, but it made his temporary successor's job a lot easier that I was prepared to go along and not completely try to upset the apple cart than if it had been otherwise. But I did no more really for Johnson than I would have expected he would have done for me had the situation had been reversed.

F: These are rather remarkable days for the harmony that in some ways existed between the leadership of the two parties. You have got that charge made sometimes that the Johnson-Rayburn leadership was more cooperative with Eisenhower than his own party. Did Senator Johnson ever talk over with you this matter of trying not to obstruct the President unless they felt really concerned?

K: Yes, and I think that was the policy of both Senator Johnson and of Speaker Sam Rayburn. They recognized the country had selected Eisenhower. You can only have one president at a time, and so this, I think, was their general position.

F: Did you have a feeling that Senator Johnson came nearer ideologically being in line with President Eisenhower's views than the Republican Party was at that time?

K: I would not go that far. I think Johnson felt comfortable with Eisenhower. I think that he did a lot to assist the President in various things that the administration wanted, where it could be done without doing violence to Johnson's party position. There are many things in the field, certainly of foreign policy and defense policy, that do not necessarily follow party lines, and this works both ways.

F: Did you get the feeling there was a tendency on the part of the executive branch at this time to usurp congressional authority, or at least to make inroads on it? Or is there always a tendency?

K: Well, there is always a tendency for that. I think this was true under Truman. I certainly think it was true, though I was not there, during the Franklin Roosevelt years.

F: All right, Senator, we were talking about the supposed usurpation of congressional authority by the executive branch.

K: Yes, I said that I thought this was generally true of each administration. There is a complaint in Congress among members of both parties that there is a tendency for the executive to keep reaching out for power, and I suppose presidents from time to time have complained that Congress has sought to intrude upon the executive prerogatives. But this is why I think our system is a good one. There is this balance of power and some sensitivity. I think this is good.

F: There was some feeling that because of his health difficulties Mr. Eisenhower might not run again in 1956, and you were prominently mentioned at that time as a possible candidate for president.

K: Yes. There had been a lot of discussion on it, and every Republican that I know of in the Senate and those among the House members were prepared to overwhelmingly support Eisenhower if he were to be the candidate. The problem arose as to whether or not at the last minute, more or less, Eisenhower would say "no go" and would leave the party with a *fait accompli*, that Milton Eisenhower was there, and with the pushing of the administration would be in. There would have been a lot of Republicans that were very unhappy on this situation.

F: It was more a matter of being alerted.

K: It was a holding operation. It was an alertness; it was an indication that if Eisenhower himself would not go, they were not prepared just to accept *ipso facto* Milton Eisenhower as the substitute.

F: You took yourself out of any primaries, and yet you got votes in some of the early primaries in Minnesota, Illinois and Pennsylvania.

K: This was because of the problems of filing times. The filing times had been earlier than the Eisenhower announcement. His announcement that he would be a candidate again came about, as you may or may not recall, at a meeting that was held in Gettysburg. He had invited a group of the party leaders from both the House and the Senate to meet with him at Gettysburg. We met in a schoolhouse there, as I recall, and he asked for a general consensus of opinion and several spoke up. I think I spoke up among the early ones, if not the first, and said that I felt we would have a united party if he would make clear that he was going to be a candidate again. To the surprise and delight of everyone, he finally said he would be a candidate. For reasons best known to him he indicated that he wanted me to make the announcement. When we left there, of course the press was available. I did make the statement on behalf of the party leadership of both the Senate and the House, and this was the first news break that the President was going to be a candidate for re-election.

F: Did you have any idea at this time that Lyndon Johnson would like to be a candidate on the Democratic ticket in 1956? This is Adlai Stevenson's second run at it.

K: No, I don't think at that time that I [did].

F: This wasn't common senatorial gossip at that time?

K: No, I think a lot of people, as they do look over the various people of the parties, looked upon Johnson as one who might someday be a candidate for president or vice president.

F: Was it at this time thought that Senator Kennedy was a possible candidate?

K: Yes, I think it was generally looked upon that he, given time, [might be]. He was fairly young at the point when he came in there, but he was one of the up and coming younger Democrats.

F: In a year like 1956 you have got the problem of your conventions. You were the temporary chairman of the Republican convention. How did you as minority leader, [and] Senator Johnson as majority leader, work to find time so that the senators can do the proper political work, fence-mending, getting ready and so forth, and get all adjourned and get to the conventions?

K: This is a real tough problem. It is not only on convention years. The Senate is a political institution, and the only way people come back to the Senate is to be reelected. I think each party leader is sympathetic with the problems of a senator who is seeking reelection. But the problem is [more serious] when you have a closely divided Senate, as both Senator Johnson and I had at least for a part of our period, and me for all of the time I was there. If you have too many away campaigning and you have got a vote up, you just can't adjourn the business of the Senate. You have got bills coming up, many of them fairly hotly contested, and the party leader's problem is how he can get his senators back to vote at the time the issue comes to a head.

This is a fine balance. This is why there has to be an understanding between the majority and minority leader. Because if the majority leader sets it at a time that he knows he is going to have his people back and the minority leader isn't, this is an unfair situation, or if the reverse is true. Generally, if you have enough notice, then you can tell your people to be there on a given day. That's why Senator

Johnson and I tried to work out and did work out a lot of the time certain to vote, get a unanimous consent that [it would be] on a certain day after a period of debate.

F: There wasn't a case of one of you trying in one sense to outwit the other?

K: No, no.

F: And pull a surprise?

K: No, that you can't do without breaking down, really, the operations of the Senate.

F: In other words, both of you were dedicated to making the system work.

K: That's right. Yes, I think this was true.

F: Now in every administration the opposition party usually picks on someone they think is vulnerable. The Democrats in the fifties, it seems to me, worked over Ezra Taft Benson more than anybody else in President Eisenhower's cabinet, which must have created a bit of a problem for you as the senatorial leader for the Republicans. Did you and President Johnson ever discuss your positions regarding Secretary Benson? Also in 1956 the Democrats came through with the farm program, and President Eisenhower vetoed it and it stood up.

K: Yes.

F: What was your position in all of this?

K: Fortunately, with rare exceptions, I think the Republican senators had a very high regard for Ezra Taft Benson despite the fact that he had been the whipping boy by the opposition.

F: Being a whipping boy had nothing to do with merit.

K: Fortunately there were, I think, a considerable number of Democrats who had respect and regard for him. So that really was not too much of a problem, except it is always a problem of an administration when the Congress is in the hands of the opposite party. It's a problem President Nixon has today, one of the few presidents who at the time of his election didn't carry either house of Congress with him. It does present a problem, because the control of the committees is the opposite way and it is a more difficult task.

F: During the summer of 1956 we had a crisis overseas that affected the United States in California and Texas particularly, and that was the Suez closing and the oil crisis that came on. Now then, you and President Eisenhower and Senator Johnson and I suppose Speaker Rayburn all--Secretary of State Dulles--worked very closely on this.

K: Yes.

F: Can you recall just what went on during this period?

K: No, except that this was the period when a lot of things were happening, of course. The Hungarian revolt, as you recall, came about the time of the crisis over Suez, and subsequently the invasion by the French, Israel and Britain of the Suez area. [There was] the break with Anthony Eden, which probably led to his downfall at the time in Britain. It was a very complex, complicated period.

F: Did Secretary Dulles try to work with both parties in the middle of this?

K: Yes. I will say that both President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles, I think, recognized first, that foreign policy should not be a narrow partisan situation; and secondly, I think they believed that--whether

the Republicans had had an overwhelming majority in the House and the Senate I think this would have still been their position--the minority needed to be and properly should be consulted. They were realistic on top of it and realized that with the House and Senate in Democratic hands, the administration would be foolish not to consult with the leaders of the opposition party.

F: Was there any real division in thinking between the two parties during this crisis?

K: Of course, there are always differing opinions as to what should be done or what policy the government should follow. But basically I think they had the support of the majority of both houses and both parties in the handling of the situation.

F: Now, in the middle of this, while it is still going on, the United Nations imposed sanctions against Israel for its activities in Sinai, but did not against the USSR for what happened in Hungary. I remember that you made a rather ringing speech at that time. When you are making something like this do you try, for support purposes, to get together with the Senate Majority Leader and tell him what you are going to do, or do you go at this independently and hope to build up your own fire?

K: Now on this specific thing I can't recall whether I had any prior discussions with then-Senator Johnson or not. But it did seem to me then and it does today that it does not make very much sense for the United Nations or the United States to talk about imposing sanctions on Israel, which was a small nation, when the Soviet Union had just gotten through this devastating situation in Hungary. I pointed out in a Senate speech and in a statement which I made that to impose sanctions

on a small country, when they had lacked the courage to impose it on the Soviet Union for what was perhaps even a worse situation, was morally wrong, and what was morally wrong could never be politically right.

This was the general tenor of my statement, which received widespread coverage and reaction actually from all over the world. I received many telegrams from both this country and other countries as well. I am sure that the State Department was a little unhappy about the statement, because they were toying with the idea at the time of following up with a statement by the United States. I think it is maybe one of the few instances where a statement by a senator caused them to take a second look at the situation.

F: When the new Senate met in January, 1957, you were elected the Republican leader.

K: Yes.

F: And you announced shortly afterwards that you would not run again in 1958. Now when a president does that it is supposed to diminish his authority. Does that hold for a senator also?

K: Not as much, because once a president does that he is in a position where people are looking to the next one. But on the Senate leadership, no, it doesn't have the same effect.

F: So 1957-1958 went on just like the years before as far as the office was concerned?

K: Yes, I would think so.

F: You had during this period--and by now he has been chief justice long enough that they are calling it the Warren Court, and it is becoming highly controversial and remains that way--this very close early

relationship with Chief Justice Warren. Did this cause you any political problems?

K: No, it did not. Of course, I supported [him]. Senator Langer had led the fight, really, against the confirmation of Warren, and he never had too much support on it. But a senator can delay--he was a member of the Judiciary Committee--and he did manage to delay it for quite a while, but we finally were able to get action taken. While I am not an attorney and I'm not in the position to argue the fine points of the law, there were, I am sure, a number of decisions that I was not as a citizen particularly happy with. But I am sure that there are a number of my votes in the Senate the then-governor had not been particularly happy with. But this didn't interfere in any way with our personal friendship. I consider the Chief Justice a good personal friend. The last time he was in Oakland he dropped by, and we chatted about many things.

F: In this same period the Senate put through the first civil rights bill in three quarters of a century. Now charges go both ways. I've heard Senator Johnson praised for having been a key figure in accomplishing this; I've also heard him damned for having watered the thing down to satisfy the southern senators and perhaps his own prejudices. What would be your position in this?

K: I can tell you of the situation as I now recall it. I don't mean that my present observation is right or infallible, because I think a lot depends on where the person's standing who's telling the story--he gets a little prejudiced viewpoint perhaps. I took a leading part in the first civil rights bill that was passed since the Civil War period, and

worked with a bipartisan group of senators; among them was Senator Johnson. We had a fairly widespread spectrum of people. Senator Humphrey, later to be vice president, [and] Senator Paul Douglas sat on the committee. Many of the committee sessions were held in my minority leader's office just off the Senate floor in the Capitol Building.

F: Was it generally agreed that the time had come that something had to be done?

K: Yes. It was generally agreed that something should be done, and of course in the Senate it's always the art of the possible, what can be done. You now have a hundred members of the Senate, and if you asked each one to write down his own version of any particular law you would have a hundred different views of what should be done. Obviously you're trying to get something that can get, under the present Senate membership, fifty-one votes at least that will support it. So the problem was always what can you get that can pass the Senate and be acceptable to the administration and the White House, because the bill also has to be signed by the president. Senator Johnson and I worked very closely on this.

We only had one major falling out over the bill. I had used a rather unusual legislative procedure when the House bill came over to the Senate. Under the rules, if the bill is intercepted at the proper time it could be held at the desk of the Senate rather than being sent to the committee. I discussed with the parliamentarian this situation and determined that I wanted to have the bill there, so if the Senate committee under Senator Eastland did not report the Senate bill I would be able to move the House bill off the desk and onto the calendar.

Senator Johnson differed with this. I am sure that part of the reason was that a lot of the active southern senators didn't like this procedure, and they felt a little safer with the legislation in the hands of Senator Eastland's committee. So the issue came on the question as to whether or not the House bill would be sent to the Senate Judiciary Committee. Senator Johnson spoke for and supported the reference to committee. I opposed the reference to the Senate committee, and the Senate split not on party lines but on other lines. On that one, the side that I was on prevailed on it.

F: This is subjective, I know, but do you think that Senator Johnson thought this would tie it up for some time in a Judiciary Committee that was to some extent southern led or dominated?

K: I think that probably Senator Johnson, having his leadership responsibilities, felt that if he agreed to the bypassing of the committee it might open up precedents that would be very difficult for him in the future on it. I was personally convinced that he was going to support some kind of a civil rights bill. I recognized that the kind of a bill that he would support might be slightly different from the kind of a bill that I would support. But again, I recognized the problems he had, as I am sure that he recognized the problems that were confronting me. But in any event, it's my personal opinion, though President Johnson might differ with this, that we would not have had a civil rights bill passed that year had this gone to the committee. Senator Johnson always felt, I think, that with a time limit on the time the Judiciary Committee would have to act, that we would have had a bill. But time is so important in the Senate, and when you get up closer to the adjournment

period so many things start to pile up, that my personal opinion then and now is that had we allowed it to go to that committee we wouldn't have had such legislation that year. Anyway, that was the difference, and that's where the lines formed. I found myself having as lieutenants in this fight Senators [Paul] Douglas and [Hubert] Humphrey, that I normally didn't always [have].

F: You are running with a different breed of cats now, aren't you?

K: That's right. As I say, if you examine the vote on that issue you find it split across party lines.

F: Right. You had a problem in this year of 1957. This is when Joe McCarthy dies and William Proxmire is named to succeed him, and you wanted to bar the immediate seating of Proxmire because you didn't think he had been properly certified by the Wisconsin governor. I know that Senator Johnson tried to outmaneuver you on this. Do you remember this?

K: Really, now that you mention it, I don't recall the circumstances at the time. I would really have to reread the ***Congressional Record*** at the point. Normally, I would say unless they were trying to seat him based on the news dispatches that he had been appointed, without a certificate being there--

F: That was your position, [that] the Governor had not sent in the word officially and you just had public word.

K: That very well could be, and normally I don't think the practice of the Senate is to seat someone on a newspaper article. I haven't known a case where the credential wasn't actually there with the secretary of the Senate.

F: In that fall you had that Little Rock crisis, when Governor [Orval] Faubus decided to oppose the integration of Central High School.

K: Yes.

F: Then this brings you and the administration and the Senate very much into a close relationship at this time. What was your role in this?

K: The only thing I can recall at the moment is that President Eisenhower phoned, I am sure, not only the Republican leaders of the Senate but the Democratic leaders as well--I am quite sure that he did--telling what he had in mind doing. Right now the only recollection I have of my discussion with President Eisenhower is that because of the seriousness of this move he was contemplating, I hoped that he would make it from the White House itself as being the seat of authority of the government. I felt the backing of the country and so forth would be stronger if it was handled in this way.

F: You didn't have any problem with the Senate Majority Leader on this, on backing up the President in this move?

K: No, though I imagine that the Senate Majority Leader had problems with a lot of southern colleagues on this situation. I don't say that it was discussed at that time, but since that period I have heard both Democrats and Republicans express the viewpoint that rather than as a first step calling out the troops, that perhaps if the President had used U.S. marshals it might have been a better situation. Now, if then the marshals had *not* been in a position to enforce the edict of the court, then the next step would be to call the troops.

F: But you have to go through that to learn, I suppose.

K: Yes, I suppose you have to go through that to learn.

F: You and Senator Johnson were both on the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee, and at this time in 1958 it offered a resolution to form a special Senate committee on the space program. Here was the beginning of our landing on the moon last year. Tell me a little bit about what you tried to do there? Why, in other words, did you discover space at this time?

K: I am sure that various senators had been in touch with people who were interested in this program. I served as a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and discussions had taken place over the years as to what might be done in space. But basically I think that Senator Johnson was really the father of this proposal for a space committee. He actually had talked to me about the possibility of going on the committee, but I declined because I was on the Atomic Committee already. We always have a little problem on both sides of the aisle. There are so many people who have committee assignments that they don't feel are quite what they should have that I did not want to take what would be an important committee and still keep my Atomic Committee post, and I didn't want to give up the Atomic Committee post.

F: Now, I rather gather that this is a little bit like you two men's selection of the Senate select committee, that you tried to work together to agree on what would make the committee a good committee.

K: Yes, I think basically--

F: And it was a relatively young committee in a sense of being junior.

K: I think the reason for it, with one or two exceptions, is that the more junior members didn't have normally the more important committees in the Senate.

F: I guess Senator Johnson and Senator Symington were the only ones who were particularly senior on this.

K: Yes, I think so.

F: By this time also you are having a problem with Goodwin Knight. You have had it before, but it is a real problem. You are trying to be in the Senate and run for governor, which must have made you feel you were torn apart at times.

K: Yes. This was a difficult problem, because as I told you before one of the problems of either the majority or minority leader is to have his people from his party there when the votes were needed. Consequently, I've never believed in the doctrine, "Do as I say, but don't do as I do." Therefore, I felt that as long as I was the minority leader it was my job to be there when the Senate was in session. We normally adjourned on a Friday afternoon early and did not come back until Monday or sometimes Tuesday. As a result, here I had a campaign for governor on the way in California, and it meant for I think some thirty or more weekends in a row I would wait until the Senate had adjourned, fly out to either Los Angeles or San Francisco, campaign for two days, get the midnight plane on Sunday night and fly back to Washington to be there when the Senate reconvened. It was rough going.

F: You must have been the airline's favorite customer. Vice President Nixon tried to bring Governor Knight around, I gather.

K: This is another story on the situation. There has been a lot of misconception on it. I can say that when I determined to run for governor for various reasons--I had been in Washington long enough and I wanted to come out to the state--I fully expected that Knight would be

my primary opponent. I had no desire really to have it another way, because I felt then a clear-cut decision--whatever the Republicans of California wanted to do--between Knight's policies and mine would be decided. I was as surprised as anyone could be when Knight withdrew from the governor's race and ran for senator. I was surprised for two reasons: one, that Mayor Christopher of San Francisco had already determined to be a candidate for senator. He and I were very close personal friends and are to this day, and I would have felt more comfortable really with Christopher in the Senate as a Republican if I were to be governor than I would have with Knight there.

So I am sure that a number of Republicans, fearing a confrontation in California, were trying to devise a way to avoid it. Well, of course they didn't avoid it; they merely complicated the matter. I think probably the Vice President played a part in this, because once Knight got out of the governor's race and came into the Senate race it left the question of party leadership really undecided. Because he was still governor while running for [the Senate] whereas if we had had a primary and I had won this would have clarified the situation.

It also opened up the false charge that this was a deal, whereby in effect I had entered into [an agreement] with Knight to get him out of the governorship and in turn get him into the senatorial race, which plagued me during the whole campaign. So it was unfortunate, I think, that it happened. Now, I don't say that I would have been elected that year because we lost a lot of Republicans. You remember Sputnik had been put up. We had a recession on. We lost senators in the states where they didn't even have the right-to-work issue on the ballot. But

K: --never bothered me as long as local control [remained]. The problem arises [over] how much control does the federal government want to follow up with their dollars, and this is the debatable point.

F: Did you have any discussions that you can recall with Senator Johnson on this?

K: I can't at this point, no.

F: I was trying to see whether we could trace the evolution of his own thinking on this.

K: No.

F: You, of course, in 1958 are looking ahead to 1960. You are being mentioned as a possible presidential candidate; obviously Mr. Eisenhower isn't going to be a candidate. Did you generally feel that your support was going to go to Richard Nixon?

K: I can say that despite again the charges made that I was leaving the Senate to come as governor of California as a stepping-stone to the presidency, this was not in fact the case. Because I think that the position as party leader in the Senate is as good a stepping-stone to the presidency as a governorship would be. I came back because I had been for thirteen and a half years in the United States Senate. Our family was out here. Mrs. Knowland and I have eight grandchildren. My father was getting older; I wanted to be a little closer to home, and I would have liked to have ended up my career as governor of my native state here. This was the basis of my running for the governorship. I am quite certain that had I been elected governor I would certainly have filled out a full four-year term, if not an eight-year term. Then I would have at least had enough background and knowledge--you can't look

eight years in advance and see what the political conditions are going to be.

F: Did you begin to discern by this time a rise in presidential ambitions on Mr. Johnson's part?

K: Yes, I did, and as a newspaperman--I was then out of public life--I attended the Los Angeles convention.

F: You really had no feeling as a newspaperman that Senator Johnson had a chance for the presidential nomination?

K: I did not know really enough about it except to get the information, wire services and so forth. I didn't think that Johnson could defeat Kennedy in that race, but I think it is quite fair to say, just as a person who knew both men, I would have been happier with Johnson as president.

The only part, a little bit of unrecorded history, is that I was asked by Senator Price Daniel as to whether or not I thought that Johnson should take the vice presidency if offered to him. I said that I thought that he should. I well remembered, and I think I related to him the story, that Senator Hiram Johnson told me in later years when I was Republican national committeeman about his turning down the vice presidency under Warren Harding. He told me that he had turned down the vice presidency three different times. Once he had been sounded out by one of Harding's floor managers, who said that he believed that Harding would be nominated and would he, Johnson, consider the vice presidency. Johnson said, no, he was a candidate for president and not for vice president. He'd rather stay in the Senate. He said then after the third or fourth ballot--I forget now, [in] the 1920 convention--and

Harding had been nominated, someone a little higher in the echelon called him [Hiram Johnson] and said, "Now that Harding has been nominated and obviously your presidential thing is out of the way, would you be a candidate for vice president?" He said, "'No.' I turned it down a second time." Then he said that Harding phoned him and said, "Senator, you represented the progressive wing of the party in the Bull Moose period, and I have remained with the regular party during that 1912 campaign." He said, "This would be an indication to the nation that both wings of the party were united, and I personally would like to have you as my running mate." And Johnson said no. Of course, if he had accepted he would have been president of the United States.

So I think I related that story to Price Daniel at the time. I can't say it had any effect on it, because I am sure that he [Lyndon Johnson] was getting advice from people who were much closer to him than I was. I did ask for an appointment with Senator Johnson in his suite at the hotel and told him that I thought it was not unlikely that he might be asked to be the vice presidential candidate, and personally, as an American citizen and one who had served with him in the Senate, I hoped that if that situation developed that he would accept it. Again, I think I may have discussed with him this Hiram Johnson story. So that's so much for that.

F: That was good. Did you campaign against him then in 1960?

K: Yes, I supported the Republican ticket.

F: Did you get outside of the state in your campaigning?

K: I think once or twice, yes.

F: Did you see candidate Johnson at all during that 1960 campaign in California?

K: I may have met him at some occasion; however, I don't think I did during the campaign. The first time after he became president was when he came out to some dedication ceremony they had for the Bay Area Rapid Transit System out in Concord. He was there, and I did have a chance to speak to him very briefly in that time.

F: Did you see him at all when he was in the White House?

K: I did have some correspondence with him during the period he was in the White House. I saw him once or twice when he was in the White House.

F: Did he ever seek your advice?

K: I can't say that he sought my advice, but on one or two things where I felt that he was right and needed support I did ask to see him and related my views at the time. I think I gave him a copy of an editorial we'd had in support of his position.

F: Did he ever talk to you at all on the Far East, since you do have many special feelings about it?

K: No, but I did have some correspondence with him.

F: Well, that will be in the file. Let's take a moment and assess him as a senator and as a Senate leader, which is where you knew him most intimately. You got to see him from all directions.

K: I would say that if I had to classify the leaders of the Senate that I have known or read about I would put Lyndon Johnson up in the top bracket of any of the leaders that the Senate has had.

F: Did you feel that he did serve President Eisenhower well while he was majority leader?

K: Yes, I did.

F: Did you have any difficulty at all with his trying to move in on your people? You were, I suppose, the articulation, the voice of the Republicans all during the 1950s, and Johnson the Democrats. But Johnson was charged with getting a program through for the Democrats, the primary responsibility there from 1955 forward.

K: No, I was not sensitive on this point. Because I recognized that the President--well, from the very beginning, as I told you, I was the first majority leader without a majority. But from a practical matter, the President, to have any kind of a batting average with his program, would have to get substantial Democratic support. I thought Rayburn and Johnson could do more in getting that support than any other two men. They obviously, as leaders of their party, didn't want to get their information from the President secondhand through the Republican leader of the Senate. I mean that is a natural situation. I think if our positions had been reversed and I was majority leader in a Democratic administration I would expect the President to contact me personally on it as a party leader--not as the individual but as a party leader--and not send me messages through the Democratic minority leader.

F: Now your successor in the Senate is Mr. Republican, Senator [Everett] Dirksen, and Senator Dirksen was not as consistent in his positions as you were all during this period. Is there any explanation, other than just his own personal makeup, for the fact that he did so often start out opposing Mr. Johnson both in the Senate and later as president and then would shift positions?

K: No, I suppose this was a personality situation. Each person is different.

F: I didn't know whether Senator Johnson [or] President Johnson had some sort of a special persuasiveness with him or not.

K: Johnson was always quite a persuasive man. I didn't have, obviously, the relationship with him when he became president that I had when he sat across the aisle from me. I think that Johnson as president had problems which he didn't have as majority or minority leader, which you well know. I don't know quite really why this was so, because I don't think any man has ever gone to the presidency with any better background than Johnson had had as a congressman and as a senator and as a party leader in the Senate. He knew the sensitive nature of the Congress to a president. He knew some of the mistakes which had been made by Truman and by FDR and by Eisenhower, to avoid that type of pitfall and yet. . . . Maybe it is just the times that he happened to come to the presidency, in that the combination of circumstances presented him with a lot of very tough problems.

F: For a long time we got the bulk of our presidential candidates from the governors, but for a generation now they've been coming out of the Senate. Why do you think the Senate is the breeding ground?

K: I think possibly because of foreign relations and national problems.

F: They just become more involved.

K: Yes, and they probably have a little better understanding of the problems of the federal government than any single governor can have. I don't mean that we won't see other governors who will become president because I think we will, but it just happened that more recently they've

graduated really out of the Senate and some of them through the vice presidency. Some of them who haven't made it have come, like Humphrey, from the Senate to the vice presidency.

F: And Nixon.

K: And Nixon, who didn't make it and then did have a comeback.

F: Do you see any evidence of the so-called Johnson treatment, or is that newspaper talk?

K: No, I don't know that it is newspaper talk. But I think that Johnson, if he really set out to convince somebody on it, had a good chance of getting him to see his point of view.

F: You got to see him from another vantage point as a private citizen, but one who was extremely knowledgeable and who had known the man way back when. Did he tend to change style or tactics after he became president over the way he worked as a senator?

K: I thought he did, but again I don't really have the day-to-day knowledge that I had when I was in the Senate.

F: Did you see any change in his style?

K: Well, first of all--

F: I am talking about the public view now.

K: *I* am talking about the public view. First of all, I think Johnson always was too sensitive to newspaper criticism. I remember when we were both party leaders in the Senate, he used to bring out and show me remarks that had been made by columnists. I said, "Look, Lyndon, why don't you let that go off like water on a duck's back?" I said, "After all, you are doing a job here, and you're bound [to]--This is part of the job that we have. It is par for the course. Why let it bother

you?" But it apparently did, I think, even then. I think it got under his skin more when he became president.

F: Did he seem to get more deliberate as president than he had as senator?

K: Again, I wasn't close enough to him in his presidential period to really give a fair answer to that.

F: Thank you, Senator.

[End of Tape 2 of 2 and Interview I]

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WILLIAM F. KNOWLAND

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