INTERVIEW II

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INTERVIEWEE: MARY LASKER (MRS. ALBERT D. LASKER)

INTERVIEWER: MICHAEL L. GILLETTE

PLACE: Mrs. Lasker's office, New York City

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G: Let's talk about the genesis of that commission, Mrs. Lasker. You were saying that there was a reason for including stroke in the heart, cancer, stroke thing. The original idea did not include--

L: [The original idea] was cancer and heart, because they're the two largest causes of death. The third largest cause of death is stroke. Its major cause is high blood pressure. Stroke is a circulatory disease. We decided a little bit later to try to make an effort to get a Commission on Cancer, Heart and Stroke, which represented 71 per cent of all deaths then. Would you like a chart showing this?

G: Maybe we can add that as an appendix.

L: Yes. President Johnson--I went to see him in Palm Springs in the winter of 1964. He was visiting there for a day or two. He was very sympathetic. He really had deep sympathy for people's illnesses and for people's troubles. I don't know that it came from his mother, but I think he was deeply in sympathy with his mother. He realized how unsolved a lot of medical problems were, and that we were making big efforts in space, and I asked why shouldn't we also make an effort in "inner space?"--meaning more medical research on human beings.

He really had a deep sympathetic comprehension of human problems. He had a noble spirit. He was fast in going from the particular of some person's or his own experiences to general human experiences. He realized that if something bad happened to him or someone close to him, it was happening to tens of millions of other people, and he wanted to do something to help them.

G: When you first told President Johnson that President Kennedy before him had supported the establishment of this commission, he told you to talk to Abe Fortas.

L: Yes. He did, yes.

G: Do you recall your conversation with Abe Fortas, and what he told you to do?

L: Was it [Myer] Feldman again who was the counsel? Yes, President Johnson wanted it to be screened by Fortas, and Fortas was in sympathy with it. But it didn't strike a deep chord in Fortas. He was in sympathy with it, but felt nothing terrific. But Feldman, having been through all this with Kennedy, when he heard that Johnson was ready to do it, had names of people for the Heart, Cancer and Stroke Commission, and he was all ready with the Executive Order. Of course, the Surgeon General at the time wasn't at all in favor of it. But they got it going, and Dr. Michael DeBakey was the chairman of the commission.

G: Why didn't you go on the commission?

L: Well, because as I was the one that had suggested it, and really pushed it, it would seem self-seeking if I were on the commission. I didn't

want to be on the commission. I just wanted other people who knew about the problem and who would be sympathetic to make recommendations. I knew that the people that were appointed, in general, had the same feeling I had. Whenever I recommend anything to be done, I'm never the one that wants to do the work. I'm not ever making work for myself; I'm making work for other people. Johnson said to me once, "You know how to make more work for other people than anyone I've ever known." (Laughter)

G: Did the President try to get you to go on the commission?

L: No, I don't think he thought about it one way or another. He just thought I'd fix it up with Mike Feldman and that was all right.

G: Whose decision was it, do you think, to make Michael DeBakey chairman of the commission?

L: Oh, I think it was the President's. After all, DeBakey was the famous heart specialist; he was a Democrat--and there aren't all that many Democratic doctors who are well known--and he was from Texas.

G: You had worked with him before?

L: I had worked with him before. I know that he was sympathetic to liberal ideas about medicine and wanted more research in heart and in stroke.

G: This commission recommended setting up these regional medical programs that would have--

L: They didn't recommend the regional program.

G: Oh, they didn't?

L: No. That developed after the bill passed and [Dr. James] Shannon, who was then the head of the National Institutes of Health, decided to put in regulations. The regional centers was a later development. The original idea of the commission was to provide funds for clinical research in cancer, heart and stroke because those clinical funds were not being provided by the Heart Institute or the Cancer Institute as a matter of Dr. Shannon's policy. Shannon was head of N.I.H. I realized that there were things you could do. I realized that you could treat blood pressure and prevent strokes--there were many drugs available then--and that there were various things you could do about diet and pace makers, intensive coronary care for heart. There were the beginnings of chemotherapy in cancer, and I thought all that could be hastened by clinical medical research centers, which were dynamically interested in advancing the drug and other treatments for these diseases, by making applications for big clinical trials. That was the idea of the commission, this is the point of its report.

It was loused up by Oren Harris' letting the AMA get into it and make it subject to local committees overseeing what was done in localities. It should have been like the other N.I.H. Institutes only for clinical research. It really needed to be done on a national scale--clinical research grants--with a national advisory council, just the way the Heart Institute is run now, and all the other Institutes.

G: Did you try to counter this AMA influence?

L: Yes, but it was futile, because by the time I heard about it the bill was passed. I mean it was something they did just suddenly before

the bill was to be taken up in full committee or on the floor, I'm not sure which. I didn't have influence with Oren Harris, as he was totally allergic to health problems. At least, I couldn't get his attention easily.

G: You had to deal with not only the AMA but also the--

L: The management of the National Institutes of Health, right.

G: Did they try to influence the bill, too?

L: Yes. They just tried to influence the legislation. The bill passed in the fall of 1965. They didn't want anything about clinical research if they could possibly have it.

If they had done the trial that Dr. Freis reported in 1970 for the V.A. on treatment of high blood pressure, and made use of the results, the heart and stroke deaths could have declined much sooner and tens of thousands more lives could have been saved in the sixties.

Dr. Shannon finally made regulations that diffused the effort unbelievably, although some regional divisions did do some work in high blood pressure. One of the things that got done with that money was to make intensive care centers all over the United States. That was the best thing that got done with the money, and that was a great thing, because intensive care centers saved lives.

G: How did that get accomplished?

L: It was a concept that people had. There were a variety of people involved. Some individual started it. It was furthered by Dr. [Eliot] Corday of Los Angeles through the College of Cardiology; he obtained a special bill from Congress for intensive coronary care centers with

the powerful aid of Senator Hill. As they furthered it, they looked to see where there was money, and there was money in the regional medical centers.

G: Did you work with members of Congress on that?

L: I don't recall that I worked on it. I thought the whole thing had gone away from its original purpose, and that distressed me. The best thing that happened with it was the intensive care centers, which got started in large hospitals quite fast. In about three years they were multiplying.

G: It seems to me that President Johnson must have been receptive to the idea of advancing research in heart disease.

L: He was receptive. He was very receptive to the whole idea. The only thing is that he had such desperate demands on his time that he could not follow what was being done.

I remember coming to see him one time at the time of the Cypriot-Greek argument. I got in there about seven o'clock at night, and he was just absolutely exhausted. All I should have said was, "Well, listen, I'm going home," or "You should go home and get a drink," or something like that. But instead I thought, "I have the only chance I have to see him, and I'm going to talk to him anyway." I think it was probably futile. I forget what I talked about. But I remember being in despair, that here was one person who had so much burden and who was the only person one could look to for help.

G: What did he say about his situation? Did he talk about the Greek situation?

L: He said to me, "Mary, I just haven't got the time. I'm just desperate for time, and I am exhausted because I have given so much time." He realized that his time was terribly precious and that he couldn't do everything.

G: His father had been the victim of a heart attack, also.

L: Yes, yes.

G: Did he ever talk to you about that?

L: No, he never mentioned that. He did mention his mother often, and that his mother was very dear to him. All her troubles and problems were still in the forefront of his mind, especially that she needed a place to live, and that older people didn't have proper housing that was convenient. That was one of the reasons for the Housing Act for older people.

G: He used to talk about the problems that Homer Thornberry's mother had, too.

L: He probably identified [her] with his mother. He never mentioned Mrs. Thornberry that I recall. He had sympathy for people. You know, sometimes I talked to people, both in and out of Congress, and I feel as if they aren't human and have never had any human experiences. They seem never to have had anybody that they love, die--anybody that they love be desperately sick. They have no orientation at all. Like Bill Proxmire, for instance.

G: We were talking about that Sunday night that you had dinner at The Elms, I think, right after the assassination.

L: Yes.

G: What did he talk about that night, do you know?

L: Well, I remember talking about the possibility that the Kennedy Center--what is now the Kennedy Center, which was then called the Natural Cultural Center--should be named as a memorial to Kennedy. I think Johnson said to Fortas, "Listen, look into that. It's a good idea," or something of that kind.

G: He called you, I think, right after he signed that.

L: He called me that afternoon, yes, that's right.

G: Later on, after he signed the bill naming it the Kennedy Center.

L: Yes.

G: Do you remember that conversation?

L: I don't remember what was said in the conversation, but his support was crucial to the launching of the thing and of getting more money. If he had been against it we would have had a terrible time, and I doubt that it would have been built, because it was so hard to raise money. With his support and the fact that it was going to be a memorial, we got half the money from Congress plus the money for a garage, which was supposed to be a loan. I think that it's been found that the Kennedy Center has been one of the more valuable things in the life of people in Washington, don't you? Do you ever go to it?

G: Yes, when I'm in Washington. [It's] marvelous.

He also met with you on the day in December, 1964, when he met with business and labor leaders urging cooperation and support for Medicare and civil rights. Do you remember that? Did he talk to you about his effort then?

L: The Medicare thing was really done between him and Wilbur Cohen and Senator [Robert] Kerr. I mean they really got it accomplished.

G: Did you work on that?

L: I didn't work on it. I was for a big, comprehensive health insurance plan, and I'm willing to have part of something if I can't get it all. But they were sort of ongoing in it, and Cohen had it very much in hand. I didn't find that there was anything I could do about it.

G: In your dealings with the President did you try to get him to go farther?

L: No. On National Health Insurance in the beginning, I dealt with people around Roosevelt, before his death. Then when Roosevelt died, Judge [Samuel] Rosenman was his counsel. Truman asked him, "What were the things that Roosevelt wanted to do that are unfinished?" He told him that health insurance was one of them. The need for National Health Insurance was understood by Truman. So Rosenman, whom I had worked on a lot about national health problems, and who was sympathetic to it, wrote a health message to the Congress for Truman. The Truman plan for health was a very good plan. It was written by Rosenman, and then Rosenman pushed him on it. I know I went to see Truman in September of 1945. I urged him to give a health message to Congress, the first one any President had even sent. I said, "Judge Rosenman has got all the material, and if you'd send this health message to Congress a lot would happen." In that message was a suggestion for comprehensive National Health Insurance. Now when Johnson got the Medicare and

Medicaid bills done, in the mid-sixties as I recall, he flew out to see Truman in Independence and to show Truman what he had done.

G: He signed it there.

L: Yes. It was an inspiration that Johnson had found that a health insurance program had originated with Truman. And Truman was delighted. But Truman, in the late forties, had so much opposition to it that, although he would speak for it every once in a while, he never did anything about it in the sense of trying to get a bill passed because there was so much opposition to it in the Congress due to the American Medical Association.

G: He was a believer in waiting until you had the votes, I guess.

L: Yes, he was. He believed in it, but he didn't have the votes.

G: Now, he went to a party at your house in February, 1964, the same day that he sent a message to Congress on truth-in-lending and truth-in-packaging.

L: Yes.

G: Did he ever talk to you about that?

L: No. That was a party after something or another. Wasn't there a benefit, a theater benefit?

G: I think so.

L: That had something to do with the Kennedys, I think. At any rate, we had a big party to which all kinds of people came, a great mixture of people, and I think some of the Kennedy people, at my house in Beekman Place.

G: But he didn't talk to you about truth-in-lending or truth-in-[packaging]?

L: No, I don't recall anything about it.

G: Okay. Let's talk about that visit in Palm Springs after he conferred with President [Adolfo] Lopez Mateos. This was on the salinity problem, and you were very active in this area.

L: Oh, yes, I was very interested in that.

G: What did he say about his meeting with [Lopez Mateos]?

L: He didn't say anything about it.

I really just had an appointment with him. I didn't go to visit him in the sense that I often went to visit him later, because I often went to the Ranch or I came to stay at the White House or something like that. I really came to him saying, "Listen, this cancer, heart, and stroke commission was something that Kennedy wanted to do, and it's undone." In the beginning he said to me, "This is the forty-ninth thing I've been told--"or the hundred and forty-ninth thing--"Kennedy wanted to do." I said, "But, he really did want to do this."

G: This is in February, 1964.

L: February, 1964. This was two months after Kennedy's death. I made a trip from where I was, which was in La Quinta, California, forty miles away, to see him specifically about getting this commission moving, because otherwise I know it would just never move. It would be like the Kennedy Commission. Kennedy was for it, but it got lost in the red tape that there is about everything.

G: Did he agree to do something?

L: He agreed about it, yes.

G: What did he say he would do?

L: He said, "All right, we'll do it." I said, "Will you speak to Feldman about it?" He said, "Yes, I will," and he did. He said, "Who are the people?" I had a list of the people, and he probably appointed most of them. He may have appointed some other people, but I think most of the people were appointed that I suggested. They came out with an excellent report, which if you'd look at it now, is really perfect.

I remember visiting him in a large Palm Springs house, like a fortress, and in a dark Spanish room, and seeing him and feeling that he had a lot of things on his mind and that he wasn't relaxed in the sense that sometimes he was.

G: He didn't talk to you about salinity at all though?

L: Not at that time that I recall. I first went to see him about that when he was majority leader; my sister and I had gotten interested in desalting of water. I had gotten interested partly because I had a ranch in Arizona. I used to fly over Arizona and New Mexico, and I realized that if we could ever get cheap water into this land it would be like oil. You could make a fortune. I realized, having this small ranch, how everybody depended so desperately on the water. I realized that Texas had similar problems and that Texas had a large border that bordered on salt water. He knew this perfectly; he accepted it instantly. He also wrote a piece that was worked on by other people, but that he agreed about and that was maybe partly written by him. It appeared in the New York Times, which you have a copy of.

G: In October, 1964, you proposed to establish fifty centers for advanced study in the U.S. Do you remember that?

L: Yes.

G: Did you talk to him about that personally?

L: I don't think that I talked to him about that or if I did, nothing came of it. I had intended to get this done with Senator Lister Hill, because I knew that the President would be for it. All Lister needed to do was to hold a small hearing in his subcommittee, because he was chairman of the subcommittee on health and also the H.E.W. subcommittee on Appropriations. He was the chairman of the full committee on H.E.W. and Labor--

G: Labor and Public Welfare.

L: Nobody was going to oppose Lister so there was no use to make a big thing with the President about it, because I knew that it was part of Johnson's spirit to advance science on whatever front he could.

The thing was that I counted on Lister running in 1968 and suddenly his wife had Parkinson's Disease. In the spring, without any notice to me, he announced that he wasn't going to run. Well, the minute he wasn't going to run, he became a lame duck and I got nowhere, having always thought that I was going to get this done by Senator Hill and that I had plenty of time. [With] fifty centers for advanced study, we'd be a long way ahead in science, generally. In other words, there was no reason, I still think, that we should have to go only to Princeton or to MIT or to CIT, California Institute of Technology. Every place where you have a state university there should be advanced studies centers, some of them in different things.

G: What gave you this idea to begin with?

L: Because I saw that the Russians were ahead of us in some ways, the Sputnik, for instance. I thought that our defense is brains, really. Our eventual success is advanced study. No? Don't you agree?

G: I think so.

L: I thought of the centers as not all necessarily being only in physics or only in mathematics. They could be in a variety of [areas]. They could be in space, energy or in any area. But four years of college is not enough for state universities to offer. They should be excellent and advanced in some post graduate areas.

G: Also in 1965 you had the health and research facilities bill which called for a three-year extension, and that was slowed down because of an amendment by Senator [Russell] Long on patents. Do you remember your work on that?

L: I remember that originally in the late fifties Senator Hill got money for medical research, but there were no adequate research facilities. So I told this to Lister Hill, and Hill said to me, "If you go over and tell Styles Bridges about the need for medical research facilities and he agrees, we'll get a bill." So I went over and told Styles Bridges, because he was the chairman of the full Appropriations Committee. Styles Bridges didn't disagree. He was willing, and we got a bill.

G: How about in 1965?

L: In 1965, which was it?

G: The health and research facilities bill.

L: That was a renewal of that.

G: Right, it was a three-year extension.

L: It was a renewal of the Bridges-Hill effort.

G: Did you work to get this extension, do you recall?

L: No, I didn't work on it, that I recall, because it was automatic. There was no dispute about it. Once you get something going a lot happens, if it's successful; you don't have to work on.

G: Also that fall you worked on the advocacy of clinical trials of drugs. Who did you work with on that?

L: In 1965?

G: Right.

L: This is all part of the effort behind the Cancer, Heart, and Stroke Commission. The Commission was interested in clinical trials of drugs. As I say, the drugs were available for high blood pressure then. Merck, [Sharp and Dohme] had developed its anti-hypertensive drugs. There were at least ten important anti-hypertensive drugs then that just needed to have big trials so people could determine which were the drugs of choice, how many lives would be saved from strokes, how many lives from heart attacks by drugs. Then the treatment of high blood pressure would have become a public health problem, widely treatable, and the national death rate could have declined earlier. It was just obvious to do. But the N.I.H. people in charge were non-clinicians and not motivated. It took seven more years to move them.

G: You also helped on the highway beautification bill.

L: Oh, yes, I was very interested in that, very interested in that. Where did you get all of this from, from the old text?

G: No, from correspondence that you had with the White House.

L: That I had with the White House? Yes.

G: Yes. What was your role in that?

L: Well, now, I'll tell you my role in that. I am very fond of Lady Bird Johnson. In the first place, I think she is a person of great charm, and [she has] an exquisite sense of words and the best judgment about human affairs that I can think of. She really is a mature and brilliant judge. It's innate, and it's also honed by a lot of experience. She's just really wonderful. When I called up to congratulate her on Lyndon's election in 1964 she said, "Mary, maybe you will think of some things that you think it would be good if I would do." So I thought, "Well, that's fine. I'll just sit right down and write some out." You have a memo, haven't you, from me, that I sent to her? Well, one of them was to improve the beauty of the United States.

Johnson had appointed a commission in 1964, without my knowing it, on natural beauty. But this committee was not oriented to anything specific in cities or towns or the planting of trees to relieve urban dreary ugly spaces, or the vast highways. I had been a victim of the Jersey Turnpike, for instance. I don't know if you've every been on it, but it's totally treeless and hideous. In the state of Illinois there are thousands of miles--or at least there used to be--of highway, totally without trees, which makes driving there a pain. I had also been the recipient of the pleasures of driving on the Taconic Parkway in New York State, which had been beautifully landscaped. I thought we should have beauty on the highways, and this was something that with

the Transportation Act that could be added. Johnson agreed about that. He did a lot about it. So did Lady Bird. She has a tremendous sense of natural beauty. She has a tremendous sense of the beauty of nature generally, and nature in the wilderness, in its natural beauty. But she also has a sense that towns are unnecessarily ugly, without any thought given to the planting of trees or flowers or anything. So she accepted this thought. I think she had it in her mind all the time.

But at any rate I did write to her about it, and she called me shortly in December [?] 1964 and said she wanted to do something. She was going to form a committee, which she did. I was one of the committee members. Then I spent quite a lot of money on flowering cherries and dogwood trees for Washington. Andre Meyer and I gave the cherry trees to Hains Point. I bought about twenty-eight hundred trees for the Lady Bird Johnson Park, which are dogwoods. Many of them have been ruined by the recent two terrible winters, and I am in despair. I don't know what to do about that.

G: Let me ask you in particular about this Highway Beautification Bill. You had some opposition.

L: On the highway beautification. There was some opposition to it.

G: The billboard lobby.

L: Yes. The billboard lobby was against it. I remember I did whatever I could at the time, not very effectively. But at any rate, Johnson is the one that did the real work on it. Because there was a fear that it wasn't going to fly in the way that he wanted it to. I

remember it was on the floor of the House or Senate at night. He did everything he could to lobby the bill through.

G: What did he do? Do you remember?

L: Telephoned to everybody himself, sent emissaries to people. He was just fantastic. It passed. Finally, in the bill there was a percentage of the total, something like a quarter of 1 per cent, some small percentage, that was to be allocated to the states for highway planting--I think the states had to do some matching. I think there was some matching in it, I'm not sure about that. But there was specific legislation urging the states to do highway beautification. Believe it or not, on the Taconic Parkway, which is already very beautiful, they planted groups of flowering trees as a result of that bill, which I pass on my way to my country home. They haven't improved the parkway between here and Newark Airport sufficiently, I can tell you, but in some places you can see the results of all the Johnsons' work.

G: Did you talk to members of Congress yourself and help lobby the bill through?

L: I don't think that I did a massive lobbying job. I thought that he was doing everything, and why should I do it.

G: You don't recall?

L: I might have spoken to a few people, but I didn't organize them. Because I thought that he had it all in hand, and he did.

G: Peter Rodino would have been one to talk to.

L: [He] would have been one. No, I'm sure I didn't speak to Rodino, because I don't know him. I would like to say I did, but I don't know him. I wasn't a factor in that. It aroused a tremendous amount of hostility from the billboard people.

G: Were you satisfied with the money the way it came out?

L: Well, it could have been much more money and specific. It could have been less weasel-worded.

Lady Bird's example caused people--she got the oil companies to come in and suggested to them that they plant to make their stations look more attractive. Many of them have done it. You will see, as you go through the country, oil stations where there is very pretty planting, especially in California. They are very good on it. [It was] never thought of before, unheard of. Washington, I think, is the prime example of what was done. Isn't it beautiful? It's the most beautiful city in the world in the spring.

G: Now the President called you right after the 1964 election, in November, and you were here in New York.

L: He called me the day after Kennedy's assassination. He said, "Come down here," and that's why I was there the night before the funeral, at The Elms.

G: This was in 1963.

L: That was after that?

G: This was a year later. This was after he had been elected against Goldwater. This was before he announced his Great Society program.

Did you have any input on that, or do you recall what he was thinking once the presidency was truly his own?

L: Have you got the date on that?

G: Well, the call was November 5, and the Great Society--

L: November 5 of 1964? That was a year after he [became president]. I don't know what it was.

G: How about the establishment of the East-West Center?

L: Oh, that. Yes, he was always interested in that when he was Majority Leader. I had been helpful to him. For some reason or another, he was interested before I got into it. He wanted to get an East-West Center at the University of Hawaii established, I think, because of the Governor of Hawaii. What was his name?

G: John Burns.

L: Burns, yes. It appealed to him anyway. I said, "We'll get some help." He said, "Get some help, and let's get some legislation passed." So David Lloyd, and I think Joe Jones--they were working for a committee that I was supporting at the time--got together some material that was the basis of the East-West Center. They organized the hearings for him. It passed, and some money was appropriated. Not a lot, I was disappointed in the amount of money. I think it was a few million dollars. When the President appointed me to the commission that sort of reviews or supervises the East-West Center, I was interested in it. I thought that if I was on the commission I could get more money from [John J.] Rooney, who was the chairman of the Appropriations subcommittee for the State Department.

I went to visit the East-West Center in Honolulu. I saw a lot could be done. I was very touched by it, because there were people from Micronesia, and there were people from all over the small islands of the Pacific and the Orient. But it was on too small a scale, it seemed to me, for the United States--for it to be a center supported by the federal government. It had the support of a few million dollars, not a lot. I went back to see Rooney, and I said that I thought it needed a much larger budget. He said, "Oh, they don't need any more money. They can't use any more money, and I'm not going to do anything about it." I saw I could get no place with it, so I resigned from the commission because my only effectiveness would have been to help them to expand the center and make a real bridge with the Orient, Micronesia, and the United States. I don't know what's happened to it. Do you?

G: I think it's still in existence, isn't it?

L: I don't know. I would think it's still in existence, but not moving on a big enough scale. At least it wasn't at that time. But I could get nowhere with Rooney, and without Rooney you couldn't move. I don't know if you remember what a tyrant he was, but he was.

G: In March, 1965, you had dinner with the President at the White House at a dinner honoring the Dukes. That was the same day that he had conferred with George Wallace. Do you remember that? It was at the time of the Selma march.

L: I can't remember. Isn't that awful? I ought to look at my own appointments, because maybe by looking at the appointments I would realize

what was around it, and it would bring it back to me. The Dukes are friends of mine.

G: You also conferred with him on occasions when he had Vietnam very much on his mind. Do you recall his--?

L: Oh, yes. But my attitude about Vietnam was that I didn't have the essential facts in hand and that he did, he had access to all the facts, and that whatever he was doing about it was what his best judgment was, and that if I knew more I would probably agree with him. I decided that as I didn't have the total factual picture, as he did, I just couldn't pass on that. I didn't make any move about it at all, except that I was on a committee, inadvertently, that was against Vietnam that [Dr. Benjamin] Spock organized. I maybe gave a hundred dollars or something like that to it, but I assume the committee either evaporated or I didn't do anything about it. But I never took any position about Vietnam because I felt that Johnson knew everything about it, and that it was his considered judgment that he was doing what he felt was right. I thought it was no use to second-guess him.

G: I think he talked to you the day after Anthony Celebrezze resigned as secretary of HEW. Do you remember that?

L: That might be.

G: Did he get your advice on who to appoint?

L: On who to appoint? Who was appointed, Cohen?

G: No, that would have been later. Wasn't it [John] Gardner then?

L: Oh, Gardner. No, he didn't ask me about Gardner. His advice came from [Douglass] Cater.

G: He would have been more in sympathy with Cohen, I would imagine.

L: Well, I tell you, Gardner is a wonderful man. He was extremely interested in education, but not at all interested in health and didn't know anything about it. Nothing. It's as if you would ask me about law, you know, marine law or something like that. It was a subject he hadn't thought about. While I admire him very much as a person, I don't think he made any real contribution to the health picture at all. Maybe I'm wrong, that he did things that I'm not aware of, but he had no real interest in it. But he was very good on education. The result was tremendous support for education from Johnson and from the Congress. I think Johnson would have supported education no matter what, but Gardner certainly seemed to be in sympathy with it and creative about it. Now maybe I'm wrong. Do you know anything about it?

G: No. What I've heard always squares with what you've said. I gather that it was John Gardner who convinced the President to fly in a helicopter to Bethesda.

L: Yes, it was. Because doctors were so mad that the President expected some specific medical research results. Those doctors never realized that they could have done something about treating high blood pressure on a big scale then and reducing stroke and heart deaths then. That was in 1965. We finally got something going in 1972 with Elliott Richardson. Many of the same drugs were there. Everything was there. Drugs <u>now</u> used in combinations successfully against some kinds of cancer were available then, too.

G: Did you try to persuade the President of your point of view here?

L: Sure, and he agreed with me. But he had such pressure on him. Gardner would come in and say, "They're all upset. Go out and tell them they're wonderful." They'd say this two or three times, and Cater was in the White House with much more access to him than I had. They just got him to do this, instead of telling the N.I.H. doctors he wanted more research results to reduce the death and disability rates of the people of the U.S.

G: "A billion dollar success."

L: Yes. He never wanted to downgrade the effort. He only wanted to make something better. He just did this to placate Gardner, or maybe Cater, I don't know. But it was really a lot of damn nonsense. If he'd asked me I would have said, "Listen, say it differently. Go over and talk to them differently."

G: You didn't argue with him about that?

L: I didn't know about it. I didn't know about it in advance.

G: Did he talk to you about it afterwards?

L: Oh, I probably said, "You should have given them hell as well, for not having gotten more done." He said, "Well, they were fussing with me about it." You know, there would have been some conversation like that, nothing crucial.

G: You saw him just before his gall bladder operation?

L: Yes, I did, I was the last person.

G: What did you talk to him about?

L: What was the date of that?

G: That was in October, 1965.

L: Was that just before he went out to Bethesda? October, 1965. There was an East Room signing of the heart disease, cancer and stroke [act]. Was that before his gall bladder [operation]?

G: That was just before that, right. I think so.

L: Well, then I went in to see him just before he went to the hospital.

G: What did he say?

L: He didn't say anything to me, really, about what he was going to do. We talked about the importance of this bill, but he was about to tell me something, and then some phone rang or something happened and he left suddenly. I was with him maybe six or eight minutes, not long. It was one of those hurried things that happens to you when he would have too many things happening. He must have had anxiety about himself.

I remember the dinner at the White House for the Snowdens. It was very pretty and very well done and very enjoyable.

G: He had a dinner the night before he sent that special health and education message in February, 1966, asking for forty-one million dollars for the first year of the health projects. Do you remember that?

L: For the first year of--?

G: Health projects.

L: That was the cancer, heart and stroke bill.

G: That was February, 1966.

L: Yes. You see, the bill had been signed in October, 1965, and the money would have been in the 1966 budget that was being considered.

G: Did you have much dealings with people like Representative George Mahon on this?

L: I tried to have dealings with Mahon, and I could get nowhere with Mahon. Mahon thought medical research was all a waste of money. I went to the President once and said, "Now, listen, I can't get anything done because George Mahon is against everything in the research field. What do you do about him?" He said, "You're asking me? I don't know how to deal with him either." (Laughter)

G: But they did have a rapport, it seems, didn't they?

L: They did have a rapport. You couldn't help but like George Mahon. But he wouldn't do what you suggested, and it wasn't for any reason other than just to save money and not to do anything.

G: Did he ever talk to Mahon?

L: About the health thing? Not that I know of.

G: How would you get to Mahon?

L: Well, I would just call up and ask for an appointment. I really don't know how I got appointments. But sometimes I would meet him at a party or at a dinner. I used to go after him and say, "You're really as powerful as Julius Caesar. You're the chairman of the full Appropriations Committee of the House, and yet you don't see that the most precious thing we have is the lives of the people of the United States. They are the capital of this country. People are dying for lack of research and lack of answers to the major diseases that we still have." He would laugh and say, "Oh, well, it's wonderful talk, but I don't

think you really need it," or something like that. We'd be on excellent terms, but he wouldn't do anything.

G: How about Wilbur Mills?

L: Mills I got to know once he was wanting to be president. But we never worked on anything in social security. That was all done.

G: I gather he and the President had a bit of a falling out.

L: That I don't know about.

G: I wonder if it was at all related to legislation.

L: I don't know. But the President didn't help me with Mahon, because he said, "I just can't deal with him always myself."

G: The President was the recipient of the Albert Lasker Award in 1966.

L: Yes. The jury who voted the award came to Washington, and it was presented to him in the Cabinet Room. I remember it was a very charming occasion. The President made some response, and it was all very pleasant and well-done.

G: Anything else on that occasion that you recall?

Now in June, 1965, you talked with the President at dinner about China, and you sent him some books on China.

L: Yes. I said to him, "You know, you're very busy about everything. I am sure that there is this great, enormous country that we've got absolutely no contact with and that nobody is worrying about. You should think about it and think that there must be things that should be done, that we should have some relationship with them, or that some consideration of this vast territory and this large number of people should be brought into contact with us." He would sort of say, "Yes,

you're probably right, but I'm just so busy," and nothing happened. I didn't know about it myself. If I had known more specifically, or been really better informed myself, I might have made a bigger dent on it. But he realized that he'd have to hand it to somebody, and it would be just one more thing he'd have to do something about. Of course, he could have done exactly what Nixon did.

G: Perhaps Nixon would have opposed him, though, if he'd done it.

L: I think he probably feared the opposition of Nixon and people like that, but he never said so.

G: Now in 1966 you supported the idea of a separate eye institute at N.I.H.

L: I certainly did. Where did you find that out?

G: Oh, it's in my notes.

L: Did you get it out of [Stephen] Strickland's book [Politics, Science and Dread Diseases]?

G: I don't think so. I think that came out of the files. I'll have to check that.

L: I did support the idea of a separate eye institute in the sense that I urged it--it was all done in the House by Luke Quinn that had worked for me and also for the Research to Prevent Blindness organization, which I am interested in, due to Jules Stein. Stein wanted a separate Eye Institute and pushed me to work on it. Luke Quinn had really gotten it done in the House. Then when it came to do anything in the Senate side, Senator Hill didn't like Mr. Quinn. I said to Hill, "Listen, we're not getting much money for eye research in the Institute for

Neurology and Blindness. The only way we'll give it any visibility is to have a separate institute. Will you go for it?" He said, "Yes," because he really was research-minded. He saw the point of it all. Hill was chairman of the subcommittee on H.E.W. Appropriations and the full committee on Health and Public Welfare gave him the most terrific leverage in the Senate. He was the namesake of Lord Lister, the discoverer of how to prevent septicemia. Hill was tremendously sympathetic, and the crucial supporter of all medical research in the Congress between 1954 and 1968.

He attached the bill to some other large bill, and in conference--the House had been lobbied against it by the Public Health Service, or the National Institutes of Health--the congressmen on the House side didn't want to go along with the bill. Hill said, "All right, let me know when you are ready to go along with it, and I'll come back." And he got up and he left the room. Well, three days later they say that the overall bill that it was attached to needed to move, so the congressmen said, "All right, come back." That's how the Eye Institute bill got started.

Then a doctor, infuriated that I had had influence in detaching Eye from the Institute of Neurology and Blindness and starting a separate institute, called to say how horrible and awful it was. This was the man who was the head of the Institute for Neurology and Blindness. I've blacked out on his name. I've forgotten it now. I said to him, "This is after all an act of Congress, and I'm not entirely responsible for something that was done by it. I'm not a member of

Congress or of the Senate." But it was all heaped on me as a very evil thing. However, it's been a great success, and the Eye Institute has now, as of the last meeting of the full committee in the House and the subcommittee in the Senate, for 1979, a hundred million dollars for research. It shows that it needed a little more than eight million dollars, which it had before when eye research was in the Institute for Neurology. The Eye Institute has made great progress in research.

G: Did you talk with the President about that concept?

L: About the Eye Institute? I don't think so, because I thought it was something he would naturally agree about. All he had to do was sign the bill, and I knew he would sign it.

G: In 1968 you and Lister Hill spoke with the President about the appointment of a new director for the N.I.H.

L: Yes, yes.

G: Who did you advocate?

L: We advocated. . . .

G: Was it Stanley Yolles?

L: Stanley Yolles and several others, we suggested some other people. Wilbur Cohen was totally against them. Wilbur Cohen was secretary of H.E.W. and Phil Lee was the assistant secretary of Health I think at the time, were opposed to these people. Finally Lister Hill and I went to visit the President, a very great rarity on the part of Lister Hill, who practically never went to the White House and who

research has brought something to the surface that looks as if it should be tried on a large number of people. Now, you would think that's only horse sense and there could be no argument about it, but there was and is unlimited argument.

G: Is there anything in that list of legislation here that brings back memories of the President's involvement? Anything that you worked with him on or worked with the Congress on that we haven't talked about?

L: Community mental health centers, yes. I was working with Mike Gorman, who was the executive director of the National Committee Against Mental Illness. I really paid him; we paid him. He was one of the chief proponents of community mental health centers and really got the bill passed and also lobbied for the money. Now I may have done something to help about it other than paying for his expenses and salary, but he was extremely good at it, and he got it done.

G: He must have been very effective in all of these things.

L: Gorman? Yes. Yes, he's very devoted to health legislation. I've never seen anybody like him in health legislation. He's devoted to human problems, to try to solve them through legislation and appropriations.

Family Planning Services Act, oh boy, yes, I had something to do with that. Senator [Joseph] Tydings was very interested in family planning. John Rockefeller, probably in 1966 or 1967 wanted to get Johnson interested in family planning, to realize what a big problem overpopulation was in the whole world. I went with John Rockefeller to see Mrs. Johnson, because for some reason or other he couldn't

see us at the time John Rockefeller wanted to go. We begged her to talk to the President, and she did talk to him about it. He sometimes was friendly to the idea and other times was scared to death by [Jack] Valenti, who I think is Catholic and has Catholic ideas and would sort of politically put Johnson off it, I think. Johnson never really went all the way in the sense that family planning has gotten going now. [To] talk about family planning in 1966 was quite something politically. Now it's abortion, and that's much more in the open than family planning was then, ten years ago. It's fantastic what's happened to open up the population problem.

The bill for money for family planning was gotten through the Senate by Joe Tydings. I don't know how I happen to know him, but at any rate I did know him. One day I met him by chance in a hall. He said, "Listen, Mary, you could help me." I said, "What do you mean, I could help?" He said, "Well, I want to lobby Lister Hill about my bill on family planning." I said, "You're a senator, you can lobby him yourself." He said, "No. No. I can't get to see him, and I want you to go with me." I went to see Hill with Tydings. Hill was quite funny about it, but at any rate he was not opposed to the bill.

G: Why do you say he was funny about it?

L: Because it was embarrassing to talk about family planning to someone of his age. He remembered having gone to see Margaret Sanger thirty years before or something like that, and he was quite coy about it in a funny way. But he was for the bill, and then the bill passed the

Senate. Senator Tydings again got hold of me, and he said, "I don't know how to get it through the House." I said, "But you're a senator. You know how to get it through the House." "No, I don't. I don't know who's the chairman of the subcommittee." I said, "I just happen to know him. His name is [John] Jarman." "Well, will you go to see him?" I said, "Yes, but I'm not at all sure he'll do anything, because he's very conservative."

So Mike Gorman and I--and I don't think Mike even remembers this but I'm sure that we were together--went to see Jarman. We said, "We want to ask you if you would hold hearings on the family planning bill that's just passed the Senate"--we thought we'd get a long talk about how he couldn't do it or didn't approve of it or something like that--he said, "Yes." We said, "That's wonderful. We'll send so and so and other people to see you. Will you do it?" He said "yes" again, and we departed. He called the hearings, the bill passed. Isn't that extraordinary? Very chancy, isn't it?

G: Remarkable. That's a good story, too.

L: Let's see what else. The National Eye Institute, you've heard about that. Here's the first health research facilities act, and that was the renewal of that, 1957-58. That's really it.

G: Let's pick up some loose ends here. You were a good friend of Adlai Stevenson.

L: Yes.

G: I wanted to ask you about his relationship with Lyndon Johnson.

L: I don't know that it was much of a relationship. I think they both respected each other, but didn't understand each other very well. Let's see, Stevenson was still ambassador, wasn't he, at the UN, at the time of Jack's death? He was still ambassador under Johnson.

G: Did President Johnson ever talk to you about Stevenson?

L: Yes. He'd always say, "Why do you like that Stevenson?" He couldn't understand such an idea. But Stevenson had a great deal of personal charm. He seemed astonishingly charming to women and to some men, but not to all men by any means.

G: Did the President think he was wishy-washy?

L: Yes.

G: Or indecisive?

L: He thought he was not decisive enough. They didn't have any natural affinity at all. His charm was obscure to Johnson.

G: How about their relations with Bobby Kennedy?

L: I don't know. He never got into that with me, really, except that he acted as if, "Well, let's not talk about it." I would think that Bobby Kennedy was very young and brash, and that his attitude after the assassination of Jack Kennedy was somewhat that Johnson is a "usurper," not an elected president. Bobby seemed to forget he was elected vice president of the United States. I think that the Kennedys were all very young and immature, and that their attitude toward Johnson was very poor. I mean poor in a human sense. That's my impression. I was never present at any confrontations, but I know that they, I thought,

behaved ungraciously--unintelligently--from the way I read it reported and heard it reported.

I never discussed it with Johnson because there was really nothing I could do about it. I really should have gotten Bobby in a room and said, "Listen, you're on the wrong wave length here, you know." But I really didn't know him intimately enough. I finally had a knock down, drag out talk with him about the Kennedy Center, because he didn't really support it sufficiently after Jack's death. I had a real talk with him about that, and I have a long handwritten letter from him apologizing. But that's the only big confrontation I had with Bobby Kennedy.

G: Did you get the feeling that President Johnson was preoccupied with Bobby Kennedy toward the [end]?

L: I think that he was preoccupied because he sensed that Bobby had great political ambitions, and that he didn't know where they would take Bobby and how or where he, Johnson, would be confronted by them. I think that he was very gracious about supporting him for senator from the state of New York, because he came here and made speeches for him. If it had been me, I fear that I wouldn't have been that well behaved about it. I think both Johnsons were extremely well behaved toward the Kennedys and full of forbearance about the nonsense that it seemed to me they were creating. But I was on the periphery of that. I was not in the middle of that at all.

G: Let's talk about Lyndon Johnson the man. What was he like?

L: Well, he was enormously energetic. He was extremely intelligent. He had, I'm sure, a very high IQ or whatever range of intelligence you want to talk about. It might not have shown in an IQ, but he was of very high intelligence. He was enjoyable to be with for me, because his drive was to get something done for people and on many, many levels. Mine was only to do it on levels of health through medical research, desalinization of water, and population and "beautification" let's say. Those are the most urgent things that I saw that I could do anything about. President Johnson was interested in every level and worked on every level. He was extremely practical in solving problems. He was driven basically by a noble spirit. The criticism of him annoys me, because nobody seems to talk about what he tried to accomplish and how he was driven by a sense of frustration about the fate of people and his wish to help them on every level. He's been criticized too much and praised too little, I think.

G: He was very human in this connection.

L: Very human, very human. He had vision, and he thought on a very big scale. I've never known anybody to think on a larger scale. No senators, nobody that I know of thought on a bigger scale. I don't know many other heads of state well. I know [Harold] Wilson from a long conversation rather well, but I would say that Johnson's sense of scale was greater than Wilson's.

G: You mean he had a vision of America, what it should be like?

L: He had a vision of America and the world, what things could be done in the world, what could be done in space. I used to say, "Why are

you spending so much money on outer space? We should spend more money on 'inner space,' meaning research on men's minds and bodies." He said to me, "Don't say that about inner space. That's very dangerous to say that. We're going to have marvelous fallout from this work in outer space. You're going to get tremendous benefits." Well, of course we have tremendous benefits from the advanced communications. There's no doubt about that. But we could have done both simultaneously in my opinion. But he was tremendously interested in outer space. Very few people [were] as interested as he was. Don't you agree?

G: I gather he was very difficult to argue with. He was very persuasive.

L: I would argue with him if I wanted to and thought that I knew my field.

G: Did you have much luck?

L: Yes, if I knew something and could interest him, I'd have luck. I wouldn't give in about it. We were always on good terms. Never anything abrasive happened. He would have gotten more for Medicare and Medicaid, but what they got was limited by the narrow spirit of Congress at the time. I think his education legislation really will be one of the great historic turning points in the country, don't you?

G: I sure do.

L: He would be thrilled if he knew that deaths from heart and stroke have declined nationally. Were he alive now and president, we could implement what has begun to happen on a vast scale, because he'd understand it and do something. Really, the high blood pressure drugs came as a result of the appropriation of Congress to the National Heart Institute

in the early fifties and from the study, finally, of the Veterans Administration published by Dr. Freis in 1970. All federal money really was in it. Of course, once you show that there were some drugs that worked, Merck, Sharp and Dohme devised even better drugs, and other pharmaceutical companies have other improved drugs, very much improved. But that was only after it was shown that it was possible, and without the Federal money there would have been nothing done because drug companies would have thought, "It may be wasting our money to do research where there's no payoff." But where the payoff was shown to be possible, then the pharmaceutical industry comes in. The national crude death rate has gone down 6 per cent between 1973 and 1977, almost entirely due to declines in heart and stroke deaths. The decline was made possible by the massive high blood pressure education campaign supported by the National Heart Institute.

I think the history of the last six years would have been different had he lived. I think he would have hastened better energy legislation. I think he would have seen the tremendous peril that we're in by being hostages to the Mid East for our supply of oil, and he would have taken some leading role in solving our problems. I don't quite know exactly what he would have done, but he would have had a fantastic impact on it at some point. I think we would have saved energy, and we would have done more and differently, faster. Do you feel that?

G: Well, he certainly seemed to be effective in getting the programs that he believed in, and I think he saw the need.

L: I think he would have seen that our independence was endangered by not having our own oil supplies, and that he would have gone across any lines to make the United States independent. Don't you?

G: Yes. Do you feel that he was an effective politician, political leader?

L: I think he was enormously effective except in connection with Vietnam, which was evidently, without using an atomic bomb or our total force, an insoluble problem. I think he was right not to use it. It probably should have been de-escalated. I read something recently saying that--where did I read it?--Kennedy had intended to withdraw American troops from Vietnam in 1964, completely. Where was that? Someplace recently, and fairly authoritatively. At any rate, he didn't, and Johnson was the victim of advice that escalated the whole thing. I think that was his main problem. Don't you? I think he was enormously effective politically, in other areas.

G: Why? What assets did he have that made him [so effective]?

L: He had great mental and physical energy. He knew the people in the House and in the Senate. He knew the mechanics of the Senate and the mechanics of the House. He knew that often if you could get a chairman of a subcommittee to agree--some of them didn't have very effective committees, probably the chairman's word was it. You didn't have to lobby the whole committee. In another case he might know that the whole committee was full of dynamite, and you had to work on the whole committee. He knew all that in his head without having to find it out as Carter is doing.

G: Right. How did he lobby these chairmen though?

L: He would talk to them. He would call them to him.

G: What arguments would he use?

L: Whatever the arguments were, depending on the situation. Sometimes, he would use things like appointments and perquisites, whatever he thought the people wanted.

G: Whatever arguments would work, I suppose.

L: Yes, whatever argument would work. Then if they were coming to see him about a judgeship or something like that, and everything else was even, he'd say, "Well, listen, if you don't do it, I have to appoint some other judge," or something like that. I mean he would really use whatever it took.

G: Can you recall a particular example where he did horse trading in this respect to get something accomplished?

L: Oh, no, but among other people there are many people that have examples of it. Valenti would have many examples. You haven't got any on this?

G: Well, we've got a few, but if you have any. . . .

L: I can't remember a good one. But this I took for granted. It was part of his skill. It was part of his know-how. He had know-how, intuition about people's motives. You see, Carter comes without knowing anything about any of the human beings or the key people in the Congress, and his people came without knowing anything about the intricate relationships of the key people. It is just inconceivable. For instance, I never lobby in Albany for anything because I get mixed up where the

power points are, because I can only remember one system, Washington. My sister lobbies in Albany and never goes to Washington. (Laughter)

But he knew all these things from the past. He knew the people, and he would use his office and his power to help them where they could be helped. But depending on what the size of the thing was that he wanted, he knew how to give just the right amounts to everybody.

G: You saw him in retirement. What was he like in retirement?

L: I saw him with many people, usually. There would be seven or eight or ten, or maybe twenty people sometimes, around, and he was sometimes marvelously entertaining and full of reminiscences. He would tell wonderful stories. But many times they were western stories, not just stories of Washington. I think Mrs. Johnson has some tapes of those. He was really wonderfully entertaining.

G: Did he often seem morose though?

L: Not to me, no. When I saw him I worried about him because he'd looked older. But he looked rather well. He was never pale. He was always sort of a ruddy complexion. I always enjoyed being with him. I enjoyed him, and I was amused by what he said. I like people that talk a lot. I was brought up in a family where nobody talked very much, and I enjoy people that are talkers. So I enjoyed him and Mrs. Johnson. I always had a great affection for her. It's a pleasure to be with her, and I respect her deeply.

G: I have an impression that she was perhaps one of his best advisers.

L: Oh, I think she was. I think she had just natural horse sense, plus wisdom.

G: Did he rely on her?

L: I think in many cases he did.

G: Can you recall his seeking her advice on things?

L: I can remember her saying some things sometimes.

G: What, for example?

L: I remember, in the beginning, he was with [Stewart] Udall, and I was at the White House. We were dining at the very beginning of his administration. He said something to Udall, "Oil comes under you, doesn't it?" Udall said, "Yes." He said, "Well, that's good. I'm glad." Lady Bird said something like, "Well, you should not have anything to do with it," to him in a very direct way. "Don't have any connection with oil." And she was right. Don't deal with it, because it could have been endlessly complicated politically.

G: [It would have been] perceived as a conflict of interest.

L: Yes, and she said it, very directly, to him.

G: What was his reaction to that?

L: He didn't say, "No, I'm going to do as I please," or anything like that. He just took it.

G: That's a good example. Can you think of any others?

L: No, I don't think of anything else as direct as that. She absolutely said, "Don't have anything to do with it," and I thought that he considered that she was right.

G: I've often heard that she was a big promoter of the Head Start Program.

L: Oh, she was.

G: Do you recall her role?

L: I'll tell you who knows about that is Florence Mahoney. Do you know Florence Mahoney?

G: I know who she is.

L: She knows a lot about it. I think Florence was one of the people that came to her with the idea, from some source that I don't really remember about. Lady Bird gave a luncheon or a reception for people that were interested in it, and she helped in it very much. But Florence knows the detail of that.

G: Good, I'll have to interview her.

L: That's very much what I had in mind.

G: How about Mrs. Johnson in retirement?

L: Mrs. Johnson I thinks enjoys herself really quite a lot in retirement. I think that she probably enjoys it more than Lyndon did, because although he didn't say it, he was used to being concerned with very varied and large-scale operations. When I would visit them he would be concerned with things to do with his ranches and not involved in big political or world decisions. Although he didn't seem unhappy to me, he probably was. I don't know. But he didn't seem to be when I was present. She enjoys being in Texas. She enjoys travelling. She enjoys her friends. She's, on the whole, a happy person I think, and very charming. She and I are very interested in a park in Austin. Do you know this park?

G: Oh, everybody in Austin knows about it. It's just beautiful.

L: I'm trying to get her to go to the legislature, get a real appropriation of about two or three million dollars to finish it off and really make

it superb, because it's about six miles on each side of the river and really needs a lot. But if they did that it would be the showplace of the city. Can't you do that? You're down there. Couldn't you just do that little thing? (Laughter)

G: Anything else that you want to add to this?

L: Oh, I don't know. I think of things from time to time and I try to make notes of them, but I don't think of anything.

G: Maybe later on we can do an additional interview on Mrs. Johnson and her [role].

L: Yes. Yes. Well, Mrs. Johnson, I really think, made a tremendous difference in peoples' attitude toward cities and toward environment. So did he. I think if they'd been in office another four years that it would have consolidated and enlarged itself and been something that would have been even more visible in the smaller industrial cities of the country. The country is still full of ugly cities now. It's really Washington that's been most improved.

G: Well, I certainly do appreciate it. You've given us some marvelous things.

L: Well, I appreciate your coming.

[End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview II]

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