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INTERVIEWEE: SOL LINOWITZ, Ambassador to OAS, Washington, D.C.

INTERVIEWER: Joe B. Frantz

November 22, 1968, Department of State

F: This is an interview with Mr. Sol Linowitz, Ambassador from the United States Organization of American States in his office in Washington, D. C. on November 22, 1968.

Mr. Linowitz, very briefly tell us a bit about yourself. Incidentally, you can ignore the microphone because it's extremely sensitive.

L: It's just a little over two years since I came to my present assignment. I was actually sworn in on November 11, 1966. I came from Rochester, New York, where I had been for some time previous connected with the Xerox Corporation and a practicing lawyer. I was chairman of the Board of Xerox and had been General Counsel and Chairman of the Executive Committee, then became Chairman of Xerox International and had the responsibility for the international operations of the company. In 1963 I had first met President Johnson. I don't know whether you want me to go into all this now --

F: Yes.

L: I first met President Johnson. Actually my first meeting with him was at a Gridiron Club dinner in March, 1963. I was there with Paul Miller, who is now head of the Associated Press and head of Gannett newspapers and there was a little party after the dinner. And Vice-President Johnson came in. He was a friend of Miller's. He sat around and

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talked for a couple of hours. The Vice-President told stories and I remember being impressed with two things: One, his remarkable gift as a raconteur, and two, the fact that the Vice-President of the United States was so unlionized at an occasion of this sort as almost the forgotten man. When people were paying a lot of attention to others around, Lyndon Johnson was in this hotel room with about four or five of us for a couple of hours after the Gridiron Club dinner.

F: Do you remember what hotel?

L: Yes, it was the Statler. Thereafter I had occasion to come down here from time to time on various committee assignments and President Kennedy had asked me to serve as Vice-Chairman of a committee to aid the foreign aid program. And on those occasions I would from time to time see Mr. Johnson briefly.

F: How did you get involved with foreign aid? Through Xerox International or just from extracurricular interests?

L: Extracurricular interests. Xerox International was not an important factor in getting me into foreign aid. No, I have long been interested in the United Nations, long been interested in international activities. I was a member of the Board of Directors of the American Association for the United Nations, and New York. State President of the organization; I was one of the founders of the Rochester Association for the United Nations, one of the largest in the country. I had also for some time been deeply concerned with some of the problems of development. It seemed to me that this was, as Barbara Ward said, the most

tragic and the most urgent problem of the time and that we ought to be involving outselves in it. So this had deeply concerned me. And as a result I found myself participating in some of these things. I had written articles about some of the problems and had done some drum beating for foreign aid from time to time.

When I came down here, therefore, and was involved in the foreign aid committee by President Kennedy, I found that it was possible to have a greater impact on a national committee of that sort than in our own small vineyard putting up signs and carrying banners.

F: Are you a Democrat by political persuasion, are you apolitical or--

L: No, I am a Democrat. I've been a Democrat by persuasion going way back to the New Deal days. But I daresay, if it's not tautology, an open-minded Democrat. My law partner happened to be Ken Keating, Senator Keating from New York and so--

F: An open-minded Republican?

L: Yes. So it was not, I hope, a narrow-minded political affiliation. When I was on these committees, they were inevitably bipartisan committees and had been sure that that would be so. About that time I was also serving with some State Department committees in a couple of matters; but it was in 1964, after President Johnson was inaugurated, that I assumed a greater role in the foreign aid and in my State Department relationships.

I remember incidentally, [this may or may not be of any interest, but I remember the Inaugural Ball--not it was] the dance after the Inaugural Concert in the State Department and the President came

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with Mrs. Johnson. It was a smallish group. I remember we came over with Adlai Stevenson, who had been at the concert with us. And I remember the President was dancing with Mrs. Johnson and came over to greet my wife and me warmly. And Bill Moyers came over to me afterwards and said that the President had said to him, "Get to know Linowitz--I hear some very good things about him." And Bill reported that to me and I said, well, I was pleased to know about it.

It was not long thereafter that I got a phone call from Ralph Dungan, asking whether I would come down here and talk to the President about my becoming chairman of a national committee for foreign aid; that the President wanted to talk to me about it. And I said I would be pleased to do so but I had some questions that I wanted to resolve before saying I would undertake it.

I came down and we met at the White House in the Fish Room with Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara and Dave Bell. We talked for about half-an-hour about the need to have some national group which would constitute a constituency for foreign aid, and then we were to go in and meet with the President. I said to them in the Fish Rooom that things that concerned me most were: one, to be certain that the President was fully committed to foreign aid as a program--that I had heard some things which suggested that he really had not gone to bat for it in the past; and secondly, to be certain that if I did enlist, a group of top people in all areas of American life--business, labor, education--to come out and work together in support of the foreign aid program, that the rug would not be pulled from under us in this

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effort if we went forward.

Bob McNamara particularly encouraged me to ask the President those questions pointedly. We went in and the President joined us in the Cabinet Room. I remember he asked me to sit in Secretary Rusk's chair and Secretary Rusk sat in the chair that Fowler occupied, the Treasury chair. Across the table there were McNamara and Dave Bell and Ralph Dungan, who also came in at that time and joined us. And the President--

F: Had /Dungan/ gone to Chile yet?

L: No, he had not gone to Chile. This was still when he was special assistant to the President and was doing some of these things with foreign aid.

And we sat and the President graciously said something about he was pleased that I was going to do this; and I said "Before I undertake this, Mr. President, I want to tell you I have two questions," and I stated them.

And the President became very irritated and wanted to know who it was that was doubting his dedication to the foreign aid program. And wanted to know "Who the hell is it saying the President is a liar?" And I said that this wasn't a correct interpretation; that it was merely there were people who did wonder whether he was really devoted to it. For example I said that they thought he might have been able to do more with the Congress in the past efforts with foreign aid. And right in my presence he turned to Secretary Rusk and he said, "Let's make a list--get some fellows in here from the Foreign Affairs and the Foreign Relations Committees. I want to talk to them about this.

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And he then said, "Who do you think should be asked to be on your committee?" And I had a list of names. And he added some names. "How about these people?" I remember he added Jim Farley, among others, and suggested several editors and publishers.

The meeting, I think, was supposed to last about fifteen or twenty minutes. As I remember, there was a School Teacher of the Year award that was to be made in the Rose Garden that morning. And as I recall, he kept that school teacher and a large group waiting, it must have been forty minutes or so, while we continued on with what was originally to have been, I think, a very superficial session but which really did get into the entrails of foreign aid.

When we left, David Bell told me he thought this had been perhaps the most useful discussion with the President on foreign aid that he remembered. I agreed that I would do this and undertook the formation of the committee. And General Gruenther became Vice-Chairman of the committee. Eugene Black, John Gardner and people of this kind--I have photographs--joined the committee.

F: Was this strictly a citizens' committee?

L: This was a citizen's committee which was going to take the leadership to create a constituency in the country for foreign aid. And this would involve not only enlisting support of these groups--everything from the League of Women Voters to university groups to labor unions and so forth, but also going up on the Hill and talking to the member of the Congress about this.

We did a fairly good job. I think we probably made an impact--the bill came through in pretty good shape. The President was kind enough to write me a personal letter in which he said that he wanted

to express his appreciation for what we had done; he thought that it had made a significant impact and hoped that we would continue to work in this area.

Well, it was in the course of this that I did see him from time to time. Then the President set up the President's General Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance Programs. This was a Presidential committee which involved Jim Perkins as chairman, president of Cornell now, and there were about twelve or fourteen of us. And I served on that committee until the time I took this appointment.

I ought to also mention that about six months before I got involved in the foreign aid work I received a call from--I guess my timing may be off--but it was Bob Kintner, I think, who called me--who asked whether I would be willing to become a member of the board of trustees of the Kennedy Center for Performing Arts; that the President wanted to designate me and knew of my interest in the arts. I said yes that I would. And from time to time in that context he and I had some relationships which are relevant.

F: You weren't active at all in the 1964 campaign?

L: No, I was not. I was not active politically, I contributed to it. I never did become involved politically at all.

And there began to be discussions from time to time. They emerged because I started to come down here more frequently. There began to be discussions among the members of the White House staff with me and once or twice the President of whether I would be willing to come down and go to work for the President. I told him--

F: Nothing specific at this time but just to fit you where your talents would lead?

L: Yes. I remember one occasion the President said something about "We ought to get a fellow like you down here and put him to work for us. Can we spring you in order to come down here?" "Haven't you had enough of that Xerox and don't you think you ought to come down here and work for us?"

There was one occasion when I was in the White House for several meetings over several days. I would come down for one meeting of foreign aid committee and be involved in another session, then I was back for lunch the next day; the President saw me at lunch the next day and said, "Don't you think we ought to get you a cot here?" And he'd say, "You're here all the time now, aren't you?"

Well, it was that kind of thing. I was around and obviously indicating my interest and had said that if the right kind of thing came up, I would think about it very carefully; because I did want to serve him and I had great admiration for what he wanted to accomplish and great respect for him and felt that this might be for me the time when I could consider doing that.

So there were then various things that were proposed. And I don't recall the precise order but I was asked whether I would be willing to become a chairman of the Equal Employment Commission. And I said I didn't think that was one that I was particularly best suited for, really. I said that the thing that I wanted to do was get somewhere in the international area, that that was a place where I would fit--make a contribution. On one occasion, Abe Fortas

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spoke to me and asked me when I was going to be in Washington. And I said I was going to be coming down in a few days. He spoke to me about whether I might be interested in being the deputy head of the foreign aid program. Dave Bell was going to be leaving and I gather that it was not clear whether Bill Gaud was or was not going to succeed. And I said I didn't think that was the right role for me, even at the time.

Then there were one or two other things. Bill Moyers asked me, perhaps entirely on his own, about my interest in the Peace Corps. In that one, it was clear that at some point that Sarge Shriver was going to have to move over to the anti-poverty [program]. Sarge Shriver telephoned me some time later and asked me if he could come to Rochester and have lunch with me. I said, "No, I've got to be in Washington." We had lunch at the Madison Hotel for three hours. He wanted me to come in as deputy head of the Anti-Poverty Program. And he said that the President had talked to him about this and that he was going to explore it to see whether I might be interested. The implication was that he would be moving out of the anti-poverty program and I would succeed him as head of it in about six months. And again, I thought about that, and that didn't seem quite to have the direction that I thought I ought to be moving in in order to use what had been my interests and where I thought I had a contribution to make. I did say at the time that--I think to the President at that time, that my three major interests had been: one, international organizations--my

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involvement with the U.N. and what goes on in terms of international cooperation and understanding; two, the whole foreign aid effort--the effort to aid the developing countries; and three, education. I had spent a great deal of my time with the Board of Trustees of Cornell, of University of Rochester, of Hamilton College, was involved in a number of educational things, and I thought that something which gave me a chance to advance those would be best designed to use whatever expertise I had acquired, plus my legal and business experience.

And then one day I received a phone call from Bill Moyers, asking whether I could come down and meet with the President. He wanted to talk to me about some possibilities in the international area. I came down and sat with the President, Bill Moyers and Walt Rostow in the little den, the little room off his main office. He called to me about the fact that there were various things he was thinking about, that he was going to have to get an Undersecretary of State; that he was going to have to get an Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs; that there was this other position--Ambassador to the O.A.S.--and that he just wanted to know about my interests and would I be willing to come and how did I feel about this. I told him that I was pleased to have this chance to tell him again that I thought I was in a position where I could serve if I felt I had a real contribution to make, but I thought that it ought to be in an area where I could really contribute; that I wasn't looking for a title and honorific position. But that if I could contribute I felt I owed a lot to this country; I owed a lot to him and to the things that had been going

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on, and that therefore I would be glad to do it. But I had to feel inside of me that it was right for me. And he understood that and said that he appreciated that and that he would be in touch, or that Bill or Walt would be in touch--someone would let me know later what had happened.

I went back. And then I went to Europe on a trip. Now, I'm at the beginning of 1966. I was making a number of business trips to Europe and I went with my wife to Europe. I had been in touch with Bill from time to time, or Bill had been in touch with me; and there wasn't anything further. It was kind of an uncertain business because I felt that, well, I was going to hear something, and then you heard nothing. Weeks went on. And finally a few days, or week before I was leaving for Europe, I said to Bill, "I just want you to know I'm going off to Europe. Nothing's apt to happen?" "No, I don't think so."

And so I went off to Europe and got to London and was in the midst of a very important dinner. And we received a phone call which caused the nervous English operator barely to stutter out, the White House was calling me. And so I left the dinner. Bill Moyers was on the phone and said he wanted to know whether I would seriously consider this O.A.S. Ambassador appointment; and it would also involve my appointment as U.S. representative to CIAP, the Inter-American Committee of the Alliance for Progress. I had known that Walt Rostow had been the United States representative to CIAP with the rank of Ambassador. Of course, Ellsworth Bunker had held the OAS job. And I said I really didn't know. I didn't know any Spanish; my expertise was not in Latin America; and I would have to think about it.

He said, "Well, you think about it. There isn't any rush but you just think about this, because I think that's what is going to come out of this--the way it's shaping up."

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So I continued on my trip. Went over to, I think, Italy and France, Germany--then came back. And again there was this period of delay--nothing happening. I came down here several times.

On one occasion--maybe twice--I asked Walt Rostow what was going on. He merely said, "The President has got all this before him, and he's trying to decide."

F: He sort of had a multiple transfer in mind, I guess?

L: Right. And he was thinking about it. Well, then we went through the summer. Now this discussion might have been June, we'll say. We went through the summer and in--Oh, I know. In the interim there started a flurry of activity to get me to run for governor of New York. Senator Kennedy was very instrumental--Bobby Kennedy--in suggesting this. But I really did not have the yen to do it, and I had talked quite frankly to some of the people here in Washington about it.

I was going on "Meet the Press" in the middle of August, I think. And I knew that I was going to be asked "Are you interested in running for governor?" The day before my "Meet the Press" appearance, Senator Robert Kennedy and Senator Ted Kennedy met me at the Paige Airways airport here in Washington, and we talked for about an hour in one of the offices. And Senator Robert Kennedy wanted me to say that I would be a candidate for the gubernatorial nomination, and he would immediately announce that he was for me. Then he would go around with me to all the county leaders and say "This is my man." I said, no, my feeling was, if there were what amounted to a draft I would think about it; I realized this was unrealistic and yet I certainly was not going out seeking this. This had been my position constantly. This was obviously not satisfactory, I gathered, but nonetheless, I went on the program and I was asked the question, and I said that "I am

not a candidate and don't expect to be."

And I was asked "Well, suppose there is a draft?" And I said, "Well, I don't anticipate that, but believing as I do in the necessity for a man's serving if he is asked to and he can make a contribution, I would not turn my back on it if the party designated or asked me."

That evening Bill Moyers called me and told me that the President had watched me on "Meet the Press," and had said some nice things about the appearance. He said that I was going to be hearing from the President before too long about the OAS Ambassador post, and he was sure I would be asked.

Well, then again time went on. Meanwhile, I married off my daughter and arranged to go to Europe again at the end of September or beginning of October.

F: No glimmers of anything at this time?

L: A constant assertion from Moyers and once or twice from Rostow that things were going on, but nobody offering--

F: Nothing you could tie to?

F: No. And I must say I was quite relaxed about it too, because if the President was cogitating all these things, so was I. So once again, when I was going off to Europe, I called Bill and I said, "Now look, I'm taking off again. Is there anything apt to happen?"

And he said, "No, the President is just going to make up his own mind in his own time when he's going to do this."

So we went to Europe. My business appointments were starting in London, and my wife and I decided we would go to Nice for a couple of days just to relax before going to London, where I was going to be thrown into a series of very important and somewhat strenuous negotiations. We got to Nice, checked into the hotel, went on to the beach, and we walked along the beach

and we were out about two hours. Came back to the hotel and the concierge saw me coming and started to run. "Where have you been, where have you been? We've been trying to reach you all over Nice. We've had the police and we've had the Embassy and everybody else up and down the beach calling for you. There is an important call. The White House has been trying to reach you for two hours." Well, this of course made me a local hero and I went up and telephoned; found that Bill Moyers had eagerly been trying to reach me.

F: This also reduces Moyers as a prophet?

L: Yes. The second time. And what was happening was, the President was going on television the next day and wanted to announce: one, that Ellsworth Bunker was going to become Ambassador-at-Large; two, that Tommy Thompson who had been Ambassador-at-Large was going to the Soviet Union; three Sol Linowitz was going to become Ambassador to the OAS and to CIAP. And he wanted to do this. He was going to have a nationwide television program, and he was going to really build it up so he could make this important announcement coast-to-coast, and he wanted to tell me to be sure that it was agreeable.

Well, I had been doing some more thinking of it, not the whole thing. I had made perfectly clear my own misgivings in connection with the language deficiency and lack of expertise, but had been looking into it and had been talking quietly to people knowledgeable about the OAS and about what was going on here. And I had come to feel that the three major concerns I had--international organization, foreign aid, education--were uniquely centered here in this--

F: You could also see both the problem and the opportunity?

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L: I could, and had so said to both Bill and Walt Rostow specifically. I remember before I left for Europe I talked to Walt too. This may be relevant. And had said to him, "Before I do take this on, if I am asked (it then had appeared as though I was really going to be asked) I would like to go over to the State Department and talk to Lincoln Gordon, for example, the Assistant Secretary, to make sure that I knew exactly where I would begin and he ends and how this shapes up, because this would be very important." And Walt discouraged me. He said I was not to talk to anybody about the thing, and he said, "You can work out this operating thing when you get over there. Nobody can really give you advance assurances."

Well, at first I said, "No I'm not going to do this then unless I get that clear. I'm not going to get myself into a can of worms situation." Then I thought about that and decided that since I had known Lincoln Gordon in Brazil, I thought we could work it out.

Well, then the call came to Nice and--this was interesting. Bill said to me, "When can you get back here?" I said, "Well, I've got to go on to London for meetings there." "I don't think that's a good idea." I said, "Why not?" He said, "Well, I think the President would like to have you right back here so he can talk to you about this, and you can really get into this."

So we packed up and left and came back from Nice to the United States. Never got to these business conversations in London. And that's how I got into it.

F: This was in October?

L: October 1966.

F: You were confirmed within a week?

L: Yes.

F: No confirmation problems at all?

L: No. As a matter of fact, Senator Fulbright, whom I had known for some time, when I got up there, started out by saying, "It's about time you got into government. It's about time we got you in here. I've been telling you that," something of this kind. There were other generous words by the Senators present.

I remember that one of the Senators asked me about whether I was breaking my ties with my previous life. I said, yes I was resigning from Xerox and all the other business connections. I was resigning from my law firm and that I had put my stock--all the stock I had--into an irrevocable trust for the period of my governmental service. This seemed to please them. And I remember one other Senator--Senator Mundt--said to me, "Well, look, you ought to talk to people like Dean Acheson and John McCloy. They come in and out. They come in here to government for a couple of years and then they go back to their law firms and what not, and you ought to talk to them about how you can do this without too much trouble."

It was a very warm and pleasant and easy procedure which I do remember--the only question of substance I was asked was "Are you an expert on Latin America?" And I said, "I certainly am not." The rest of it was agreeable niceties.

F: Unanimous recommendations?

L: Oh, yes, immediately.

F: And I suppose you had both Senators from New York behind you?

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L: Oh, yes. Senator Javits came and made a very eloquent statement. Senator Kennedy telephoned and said he couldn't come over but he had sent a letter or sent some communication.

F: Before we get into your career with the OAS and CIAP, did you ever get caught in any of the alleged crossfire or tension between the Kennedy and Johnson forces? Did that ever become a problem for you?

L: No.

F: Did you even see it?

L: I was surprised that I didn't get into any of it, because I did maintain a very close and friendly relationship with both. I had, by virtue of my position on the Kennedy Center [for Performing Arts] become very involved, particularly from that aspect--in discussions with Mrs. Kennedy--Mrs. John F. Kennedy--had been helpful, oh, in various ways. And I became vice-chairman of the Kennedy Center, primarily because she wanted me to. She and Senator Robert Kennedy had asked me whether I would be willing to give some time to the Center. It was then going through some very difficult and uncertain periods. Out of that there developed a personal relationship which continued and which was warm and which continues. I never experienced any feeling that this was getting to be any kind of a problem.

F: On the OAS, when you first came in and you had had the Dominican adventure--you had had the difficulty with Panama over the flag-raising--these were in the past, did you have any problems from left-overs, or were these closed out by the time you came?

L: No. The Dominican Republic hovered over a great deal. I sensed it and if I didn't sense it, I would have had to be singularly inastute, because when you poked a little hard at the beginning, you got back something which had the Dominican Republic all over. It was unquestionably a

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shattering experience for some of them and a dismaying experience for a number.

F: I wonder if at times it were a bit of a red herring that somehow got into other issues where it really wasn't pertinent?

L: Oh yes. For example: If you were in a disagreement with a Chilean, with whom our relationships were generally very close but they do take a different point of view, let's say, on intervention and Chile would abstain on Cuba and things of this kind. They would throw in, in the course of a conversation having to do with whether you want a human rights' commission to go to Haiti to see what's going on there, "No, we don't want this because this would bring in a Dominican Republic situation and some other intervention in other areas." I'd say, "That doesn't have anything to do with it. This is a case of going in---"

"No, but it's intervention," You see, that bugaboo was there. The Mexicans also used to use that.

F: To remain personal a minute, did the fact that you were not Catholic give you any handicap?

L: With the Latins?

F: Yes.

L: Not at all. I never had any such feelings. As a matter of fact, I had a feeling the other way. Let me tell you what it was.

F: Of course, I think they are less clerical than we are as a people.

L: Yes, and let me put it another way. As a member of a minority group in the United States and being, if I might say so, a committed Jew--one that adheres and makes clear that he does--I think there was a feeling of respect, if I may say so. That this was maybe not the usual Anglo-

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Saxon-Protestant who was there, conceivably the fact that I tried very hard to establish, and my wife did, warm personal relationships with these people, so that we tried to come through as human beings before we tried to see them on anything. Ellsworth Bunker, of course, is a different type. Ellsworth Bunker--whom they revere and of whom they stood in awe--was nonetheless a man with whom they never got very close.

F: No congeniality there.

L: He's just that sort of a person and one of his great gifts, I think, is to keep himself that way. And that's the way he is. Well, I'm not that kind of a person. I tend to want to know the human being with whom I have to deal and work. And I'm sure there was suspicion. This was a big businessman; this was a ---

F: I was going to ask you about that-- if your business background--?

L: I was sure this was going to be in their minds and so therefore, I carefully did certain things. For example: on my trips, the first six months or so--on my trips, I never met with an American business group, because I knew that my schedule was being followed. Everybody that I was seeing was in the papers or was known. And I very carefully--I went to the universities, I talked to the farmers; I talked to the labor groups; I talked to the peasants; the artists. But I stayed away from Americans--and I used to tell the ambassadors-- our representatives--

F: You stayed away from IPC and--?

L: Well, as a matter of fact, the IPC-- the first time I got involved in the IPC was when I was there this August 1968. And when Belaunde insisted on talking to me about it, rather than the other way around-- But what I did

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was, I laid the groundwork that this was not anything except being conscious of the fact that I thought I knew what they would be looking for, to see whether I am there-- There had been some advance stories about the big businessman, or the big business fellow, who will come here and try to sell the big business point of view. And I think they were surprised and probably, if I say so, pleased that I was conscious of things other than what's in it for business. I think, because they've told me so a number of times, that I went through a period of credibility in which they were testing what I was saying. And I had made up my mind that even though I was wholly a novice in diplomacy, that I was going to do here what I think you've got to do in any kind of relationships with other human beings. You have to level; you have to maintain your credibility; and you have to recognize that to make a contribution, you're going to have to take into account the other man's point of view. And this I could see bearing fruit as time went on. And so I never was personally rebuffed that I can think of. I made an assiduous effort, it was part of my policy from the President--what the President wanted done--to play a role as a partner and in some respects, a junior partner, in these undertakings, rather than to throw weight around. And our whole experience with the summit conference epitomized this, because that was an extraordinary experience. We had worked-- well, you know that.

F: I'll get to that in a minute. Something I wanted to ask about-- at the beginning one of the problems you had, of course, was Castro's dedication to hemispheric subversion. That must have been just about the first problem you faced, wasn't it?

L: It was a constant problem and it was one of the very first, yes it was.

F: Were you accepted as an equal partner in expressing opinions on this, or did the United States have such a reputation because of the Dominican intervention that you were sort of looked upon as trapped by the past?

L: I think the honest answer to that is that my views early were looked upon as the views of someone who had a large stake in preserving a position which the United States had enunciated. I tried very hard, therefore, for quite awhile not to speak on this unless I had to. I was not often going to take positions or assert our position on it unless it seemed that somebody had to present another point of view, but that wasn't often necessary. There were enough other countries who were-- And then I found, and this was when I knew that it was beginning to work, that they would come to me before the meeting and say, "How do you feel about this? I know you may not want to say this, but we can say it." And then I knew that we were communicating.

F: My experience isn't pertinent here, but I spent seven months in Chile in 1965.

L: Oh, did you really?

F: Amidst the crisis, and then one professor came up to me and said, "You realize now that I shall have to say daily to my classes that I abhor the U.S. position--but we're for you."

L: Yes, oh I could give you so many instances where they had to say something. This went on, for example, all during the election of the Secretary-General. They had to say something public, and both before and after would come to me and say, "You know we're going to be with you on the things that finally counts, but right now I have my orders or my

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instructions. I have to say this."

F: You actually became a member then of the delegation, OAS, in November?

L: Yes.

F: What were your first problems? I know one of the very first was getting ready for the summit conference but before that, you had a meeting in Montevideo with the Latin American Free Trade Association. Were you involved in that?

L: Yes. As a matter of fact my first experience was almost breath-taking, I had been in about two weeks and immediately was thrown into this preparation for the summit conference, which was then a possibility. Lincoln Gordon had been in charge of doing a number of things getting it ready. And I was made chairman of a summit committee, summit preparation committee, so that we would meet together several times a week--representatives not only from the department, but from all the agencies involved in the thing, in talking about what the conference ought to be. And the Treasury and the White House and the Scientific Advisor to the President--they were to meet in my office here. And we would sit around and talk about what the issues ought to be and what we ought to be focusing on and how we ought to get it narrowed down to things that might make a useful summit conference. But there was still great uncertainty as to whether it ought to take place.

I remember that the New York Times, on the occasion of my appointment, had had an editorial on Latin America-- a couple of sentences at the bottom saying that I had been appointed and that I had come from business and my predecessor had also come from business and that we would see whether or not this guy can also do something. And it said that for so long now--twice now, the summit conference had been delayed and "a stiff first test for the new Ambassador to the OAS will be to see whether he can do something about getting this summit underway." When I got here,

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I understood what this meant, because not only did you have internal problems of organizing something like this so that if it were to come off, it came off successfully. This was going to be the only summit of this kind. And secondly, to be sure that it did not appear to be the United States holding this summit and summoning the Latin American countries to come. So it had that delicacy of both procedure and substance. Now, as I say, shortly after I was appointed I find myself in this, which strictly speaking was apart from and in addition to the duties of the Ambassador of the OAS and to the CIAP. And here I had this summit responsibility.

F: And not knowing when or where or whether?

L: Exactly. And the thing that we had to do was to get ready a recommendation for the President. So it was decided that since the Central American foreign ministers were meeting in San Jose, Costa Rica; and I think that three weeks after I was appointed and had barely wet one toe, I went to San Jose to meet with the foreign ministers of Central America in order to discuss with them whether or not they felt a summit would be useful and to encourage them to attend the meeting of the LAFTA--Latin American Free Trade Association--in Montevideo, which was going to talk about whether a summit was a good idea. I went to San Jose and met--it was my first exposure to this--

F: Slightly apprehensive?

L: I must say I approached it with a great deal of apprehension and considerable misgivings. The session however encouraged me. I learned later that they had been somewhat taken aback by my candor. And I

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remember that foreign minister Eleta of Panama, a quite dynamic and quite outspoken man who was involved very recently in the overthrow of Arias, who owns the television stations and is a very important figure in Panama--

F: How do you spell Eleta?

L: E-l-e-t-a Fernando Eleta, a handsome Spanish-descended Panamanian of great impact, said to me, "We must tell you very frankly, Mr. Ambassador--" (his English was impeccable), "we must tell you very frankly, Mr. Ambassador, that we are tired of being treated like kids by the United States--being told what to do and when to do it and how to do it and being expected to jump because you crack the whip. We have had enough of that."

And as he told me afterwards and as someone else reported, I responded apparently in uncharacteristic, undiplomatic language, that, "if you have been treated as children it's perhaps because you have not yet assumed maturity; that I have children of my own and I know that I am seeking to have them grow up, but nothing you have said here this evening leads me to believe that you have put away childish things." This got a remarkable response of laughter and in any event, we ended up on a very warm, pleasant note and the friendships I made there went on. For example, Emilio Arenales, who was then foreign minister of Guatemala, became president of the UN General Assembly here, and our friendship developed from that original meeting. He remarked to me at a dinner which the Secretary of State gave at the Inter-American Center here in New York a few months ago that he still remembered at that first meeting when I passed the test, he said, and then he knew he could deal with me. And at one point in the critical negotiations for the new Secretary General, it was a phone

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call which he put in to me from Central America, which broke the impasse.

F: Gave you a little seed capital, didn't it?

L: It did, indeed. So I came back and then I think ten days later, took off on a trip to South America to meet with the Presidents of Chile, Peru, Colombia, and Uruguay in order to discuss this. Lincoln Gordon was going to Brazil and Argentina--then we were going to meet together in Mexico and then report back to the President at the Ranch. I took off on this trip, met with the Presidents of these countries. Again, mind you, it might have been a couple of months or less than that, it seems to me.

F: Yes, still learning names.

L: Names, and I was getting briefed on [air] planes, you know. What to stay away from, what to talk about--ended up in Montevideo where there was a meeting of foreign ministers. This LAFTA meeting that I have mentioned. Felipe Herrera, the President of the Inter-American Bank, was giving a luncheon. And my excuse for being there, because this otherwise would have been regarded as an intrusion, was that Felipe invited me to be a guest at the luncheon, since I happened to be "in the neighborhood."

F: Where was the neighborhood?

L: The last "neighborhood" was Chile. So I came there and met with the foreign ministers for some three hours afterwards, talking to them quite frankly about their feeling about the summit and whether it ought to be held and so forth. I reported to them on my discussions with the President and established relationships there which you could say was

good seed capital; came back after that trip, met with Lincoln Gordon and we saw the President of Mexico and the Foreign Minister of Mexico, compared notes; we were both in agreement that the summit would go, and that there seemed to be a real desire on their part; but that everybody felt that we should not have vague generalities; that we ought to be specific; that the thing ought to be well-prepared before the Presidents came together.

And then we went to the Ranch.

F: Was this your first trip to the Ranch?

L: It was the second. Earlier--now my timing is off-- the President had invited Ambassador Margain of Mexico and his wife, and my wife and me to go with him to the Ranch for a weekend before flying to Mexico, where he was meeting at the Amistad/dam with President Diaz Ordaz; and that had been a very warm, pleasant occasion--my first visit to the Ranch--which we enjoyed thoroughly.

This was the second visit then, and I remember this. We thought we were going to go to the Ranch the next morning after we arrived, when Lincoln and I had checked into a hotel. We went out to dinner; we came back and we found that we had been asked to come right out to the Ranch and that if we got out to the airport--air field--there would be a helicopter waiting to take us. We got into the helicopter and flew to the Ranch and arrived about midnight, very near midnight, and a station wagon had come up to the air strip, you know, on the Ranch; and we saw this farm hand, with a stocking cap over his head and a wind-breaker on, at the wheel. And the pilots took our bags out and put them in the station

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wagon and opened the door and the driver said, "Hello, Sol," and there was the President who had driven up to greet us at the airstrip--this really took us back. It was, as I say, about midnight and there he was waiting for us. We went into the house with him and sat with him two or three hours until about 2 or 3 in the morning; then he called his masseur in and had his rub-down; we kept talking all through this; he probed us--wanted to know who said what and how do they feel and what do you think about so-and-so.

And the next day we went down and had breakfast with him and walked around the Ranch a bit before we left. Flew into San Antonio with him; had a press conference, about fifty press people there--sixty--told them about this, and had been authorized by the President to say that he would go to the summit; that the Latin Americans had wanted this and he had made clear that if this was what they wanted, he was prepared to go along. And then we knew that we had a decision to go forward with the summit, but we were a far cry from knowing what about and how it would work out and so forth.

F: Why did you pick Punta del Este?

L: When I came, there were two places under consideration--

F: This is probably my last question, because I am conscious of your time.

L: Sorry. Am I going on too long for what you want?

F: No. If you will take the time, we will use just as much detail as we can pull out of you.

L: All right. When I came in, the two places that were under consideration were Vina del Mar in Chile, and Lima, Peru. The Charter of the OAS had, of course, been launched at Punta del Este, but it had not been

the most satisfactory place, so that it had been determined that Lima would be fine, or Vina del Mar. As soon as Lima, however, began to be bruited about, Ecuador indicated that this was not a place where it could--

F: It had a border dispute?

L: It had a border dispute. Chile was in a problem with Bolivia. And on these trips, when Lincoln and I would ask for comment, nobody would care, in particular, except everybody felt that there ought to be a place to which everybody could come. This narrowed it down appreciably. As it turned out, you know, the President of Ecuador didn't come anyway. So that Lima-- but at least there should not have been a real roadblock.

F: You had several early threats of boycott, didn't you?

L: We did indeed. The President of Ecuador had made it known that if it were held there he wouldn't come, and the President of Bolivia--Barrientos--had said he certainly wouldn't come to Chile; and so then the question is where do we go?

Well, one of my assignments when I got to Montevideo was to go take a look at Punta del Este and report on whether I thought it was going to be suitable for our summit conference. Now drawing heavily on my experience in setting up summit conferences, I went there. But you know, we looked around and it occurred to me clearly what you've got to do. I asked the head of the large hotel there to bring into one room the leading apartment house owners and entrepreneurs of the area, the man in charge of the harbor facilities, the hotel people of the area; and I wanted to find out what facilities could be made available; could we empty out all the apartment houses; what hotels could be made available--what do they do about producing food, because this was going to be off-season; help, of which there was

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none around; security possibilities, etc., and get the whole story from them in the course of one afternoon, which I then put into a report and came back with a recommendation saying that it would not be great, but it would be adequate. Just as a footnote to that: After I got back, the President called Bill Moyers back from Newsday to ask him to go on a special trip to Punta del Este to check on this, and I was interested to note that Bill came back and fully endorsed the recommendation that I had made, even though there was much skepticism in the White House among some of the others about going to Punta del Este. But that's how this choice got made.

F: Did most people fly into Montevideo and then trans-ship themselves over to Punta del Este--as a rule did not go straight into--You didn't have the facilities to handle travel?

L: It did not go straight into Punta del Este. One of the problems, of course--the security thing was a real problem, because even though it wasn't bruited about openly, in the event it should be in Lima or Vina del Mar--nonetheless, it was a problem. And the great virtue of Punta del Este from the security point of view was that you could close it off, and therefore it had that advantage. The disadvantage was that it was difficult to bring what was happening in Punta del Este to the world. I had been engaged in some negotiations, incidentally, to try to get the commercial television channels to broadcast live from there.

F: This was Canary Bird operation?

L: Yes. And it would have taken $150,000 in the commercial television channels and it would have been live, and they decided it wasn't worth it--they didn't want to do it. Leonard Marks spoke to them about it and Don Hornig and I tried to work out ways to accomplish this, but we couldn't get them to do it.

End of first tape ********

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ORAL HISTORY TRANSCRIPT
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Second session with Ambassador Linowitz, December 16, 1968

F: This is a continuation of the interview with Ambassador Sol Linowitz, the Organization of American States. We were talking about the Punta del Este conference, and about the arrangements leading up to the conference. Go ahead, Mr. Ambassador.

L: In December, 1966, after a meeting with the President, I left on a trip to South America to meet with various Presidents and high officials of the countries there to discuss the prospects for a summit conference. I was to go to Colombia, Peru, Chile, Uruguay and Paraguay-- and Uruguay. Paraguay came later and I'll explain that in a second. And Lincoln Gordon, who was an Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, was to go to Brazil and Argentina; and then we were both going to meet in Mexico, and then from Mexico go on to the Ranch to report to the President. I did then go off on this trip and went first to Uruguay, as I remember, in order to meet with the foreign ministers of the South American countries who were assembled there for a Latin Free Trade Association meeting.

I was a guest at a luncheon given by Felipe Herrera, the President of the Inter-American Bank, and afterwards talked to the foreign ministers. I was there to say to them quite candidly that I hadn't come to lecture but to learn that my responsibility, my charge from the President, was to ascertain their own views with regard to the feasibility of a summit conference and then report back to him.

Incidentally, while I was in Uruguay President Stroessner of Paraguay, having heard that as an emissary I was being sent to some of these other countries, apparently sent a cable off to Washington which caused some reverberations in the State Department that this was unbecoming not to have a call upon him. So I had a telegram from the State Department

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saying can you work in a trip to Paraguay, which I undertook to do, flying in a DC-3 military plane attached to the Uruguayan Embassy in order to meet with President Stroessner and some of his people and to ask him for his views on the summit. It was the most festive day of all with the full accompaniment of bands and motorcycle policemen with screeching sirens and everything else.

But so much for that. I then went on from Paraguay to Argentina where Linc Gordon and I conferred briefly for about an hour or so on the plane of the Air Attache of the Argentine Ambassador Ed Martin. And then I went on to Chile and then Colombia for meetings with the Presidents and other high officials. And then we met in Mexico--Linc Gordon and I meeting at Panama, where he got on the same plane I was and we had that time to talk before we reached Mexico. We then had a conference with the foreign minister, Carrillo Flores, and later met with President Díaz Ordaz in order to discuss with him his views about the forthcoming summit. Linc Gordon and I compared notes and agreed, based on his visits and mine, that there was genuine interest in the summit conference; that the chief executives to whom we had talked felt this would be a worthwhile idea; but each felt and said it one way or another and that this should be a well-prepared conference; that the points should be clearly delineated in advance; should be specific; should be few in number; and that they should not be the occasion for a Presidents' debate with one another but the thing should have been worked out well enough in advance so they could come and indicate their agreement on the salient issues.

Linc Gordon and I flew to San Antonio from Mexico because we had been told to come in and report to the President. And we arrived about 6 o'clock in the evening, as I recall, checked into the hotel, called the Ranch, were told we were to come out the next morning. So we went out and had dinner in a German restaurant, an amiable dinner, and got back to the hotel and found a phone call--

F: With the President?

L: No. This was just Linc and I. And then we came back and found a phone call to come out to the Ranch at once. If we got out to the air force base, a helicopter would be waiting for us. We did repack and got out to the air force base where indeed there was a helicopter. And we came in a little before midnight on the landing strip at the Ranch, disembarked from the helicopter, and as we did we saw that a station wagon had driven up to help us with our bags; seated at the wheel was a hired man with a cap on his head and a jacket on, sitting there at the wheel of the car, while the two men on the plane took the bags off and put them in. When the bags were in the station wagon, I stepped forward and opened the door to get into the station wagon. And the driver said, "Hello, Sol," and there was the President. He had driven out to the air strip and was waiting for us, and we were both taken aback by this. But he took us to the house--and then, as I say, it was shortly after midnight, showed us to our rooms and then we sat with him for two or three hours or so and he wanted to know what we had done, whom we had talked to, and asked penetrating questions; was thoughtful and very relaxed and after a couple of hours or so, he went into his bedroom for his rubdown. And we continued our talk with

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him through the rubdown and talked about a number of things until it must have been 3:30 or 4:00 in the morning.

We then retired. The next morning we got up and came down to breakfast. He was already up and we had breakfast with him and then--

F: Did he have you up early?

L: No, he said "Sleep late," but there was movement downstairs quite early so we felt we ought to come down. We then flew in to San Antonio, where we went to a press conference and he went on to his own office.

The thing that was memorable and still is memorable is the fact that he was there, drove out himself and did this, and indicated his own warm interest. He told us when he left us for the press conference-- he said, "Now remember, tell them that we had four or five hours together talking about this--that I'm going to do it because these fellows want us to. And I want you to tell them what the people told you. Let them know I'm interested in this and I've spent a lot of time talking with you two about it."

I haven't forgotten, this was a personal thing, as I was about to get out, he turned around to me and he said, "Come on, I want you to get well-trained in this thing because I want to start moving you around into other positions." So we got out, and he took off.

It was from that point, after the announcement, that it then became clear that the die had been cast and then we began in full scale operations for the summit. This meant the setting-up of a special task force--under the auspices of the State Department, but involving the cooperation of representatives

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of other agencies and departments and the White House. And I was made chairman of that task force. We met three times a week, I think, in my office at 5 o'clock every afternoon in order to check up on what was happening and progress on various issues. There were a number of them. For example, there were the purely logistic ones and then there were such matters what to do on six key issues that had been worked out by the time the summit conference was actually coming up.

Now prior to the summit conference, there was a meeting of foreign ministers in Buenos Aires, Argentina, where I went with Secretary Rusk and stayed for two weeks. It was at that meeting that the points were really hammered out and the agreements reached on essentials--

F: Was this done now between or among the representatives of the several countries involved or was it done through the ambassadorial group to the OAS?

L: OAS. The ambassadorial group to the OAS had been working on this for months, almost from the day I arrived. There was an effort made to begin to put together some ideas. The original program--the original proposals--were drafted after countless meetings, hours of agonizing discussions and debate and argument at the OAS by the ambassadors here. And it was a document with which we were-- in which we were deeply involved. We had a lot to do with the way it was framed. And that document was then forwarded to the foreign ministers at Buenos Aires, and that was then shaped up as the document which became the basis for the action by the presidents. So it took these three stages. First, the OAS ambassadors; then the action by the foreign ministers in connection with this presentation by the ambassadors; then the action by the presidents themselves.

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F: You mentioned six key issues?

L: Yes. Six key issues were: First, the Latin American common market; secondly, regional cooperation by regional undertakings, river basin development, roads and so forth; third, education and science and technology; fourth, rural modernization and agriculture; fifth, development of trade, opening up of trade opportunities; and sixth, the elimination of unnecessary military expenditures. These six were framed actually by the foreign ministers, and this took a great deal of negotiation and discussion. The problems were particularly acute in connection with the trade aspect in several areas. And here Lincoln Gordon did some prior negotiation at Montevideo, so that much groundwork had already been laid prior to the summit.

The one that almost caused a real problem, almost an explosion, was the one on arms--limitation of military expenditures. I remember that the Peruvian foreign minister was the one who was particularly concerned about the impact on his own military. Parenthetically some of the the later developments indicated this concern was not far-fetched. And it was the Brazilian foreign minister Juracy Magalhaes who found the formula which became generally acceptable and permitted this very sensitive subject to be approved in principle, both at the Foreign Ministers' and later at the summit conference.

In any event, these six issues, now to revert to what we did after the foreign ministers' conference--these six issues became the subject of these meetings in my office. And we made progress in firming them up

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in evolving our own position papers and searching out for ideas that might be presented to the President for his own enunciation at the summit meeting.

Now before I had arrived, efforts had already been made to elicit all kinds of ideas from people both in and out of government, and there was turned over to me a fat book with maybe a thousand letters and ideas and proposals and suggestions. And we combed through those to see what there was that was useful, that might be feasible. Out of all this, we then shaped up the papers for the President, the proposals in connection with his response, and also the general outline of his own speech which was going to be a very important one at the conference. I can say that I was-- it was my suggestion that at the end of the speech he ought to talk to the youth of Latin America-- I thought this would be a way of putting in personal terms, and I was pleased that this happened. As a matter of fact, in his speech he said at the end-- the last several minutes-- "I now want to talk to the youth of Latin America" and did.

Now then this whole outline that I have just given you was accompanied by a struggle that was going on with Congress in connection with a Congressional resolution that I ought to perhaps talk a little bit about. After we had come back from our trip to Latin America and after we had made the recommendation to the President about going forward with this conference, the President decided that we ought to wait and see what the foreign ministers did before we definitely determined how to go forward and so about the end of February--well it was--February 27, that the

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Secretary Rusk returned with us from the meeting with the foreign ministers, which had taken place in Buenos Aires from the 13th to the 27th of February, 1967. On March 1st, we met with the President and---

F: Now, who's we?

L: Dean Rusk, Linc Gordon, and Walt Rostow and I, so far as I remember. And Bill Bowdler who was then a White House assistant for Latin America--in order to talk about the situation with reference to the summit. The President at that point said that he would--no, I guess it was suggested to him that he ought to make some statement to the Latin Americans about our willingness to support them with significant additional funds in order to encourage them to go forward with the plans in these vital areas. He said that he would go as far as Congress would let him, but he was not going out there making commitments and then find that Congress would not back him up. He said in effect, "You go ahead out," turned to me and said, "See what you can do about getting Congressional support for this resolution and if they're willing to back me up, I'll go as far as I can on it."

So I then undertook to plan a program which would result in that kind of endorsement. I prepared-- we prepared, I guess-- there were several of us working on it--a resolution which would be a joint resolution of Congress indicating our cooperation, our determination to work with them, our particular encouragement in the field of education and agriculture, our desire to see them go forward with the Latin America common market, and then indicating that we wanted to make available--that the President said, his intention to make available if they went forward, significant additonal resources. Those were the words--significant additional resources.

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Now I went up with that proposed draft resolution--I went up and spoke to Senators Mansfield and Hickenlooper first and they indicated their willingness to support and as a matter of fact, Senator Hickenlooper agreed to be a cosponsor of the thing in the Senate. I then went over and talked to Congressmen Selden and Maillard, who were the Democrat and Republican heads of the Subcommittee on Latin American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and also with Senator Dirksen, who--all of whom indicated their willingness to help and to go forward with this resolution. They said, "We're for it."

About that time I also conferred with Congressman Henry Reuss, who rather strenuously objected to the notion of Latin American common market, but later changed his mind on this.

F: Did you skip Senator Fulbright?

L: No. Next, on March 4 on a Saturday, because I couldn't get Fulbright earlier, I went over to see Senator Fulbright. Bill Macomber, who had just been reappointed as Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, was in to see him before I was. I remember--I went in to see him something like 11 o'clock in the morning. I told him what the plan was and told him what we had in mind and showed him the resolution. He said to me "I'm sorry that on this first thing you come and talk to me about, I can't be helpful to you." I may have mentioned before that when I came up for confirmation he had started by saying, "It's about time you got into government." And I had known Senator Fulbright a long time, so I went to see him as a friend and one who wanted his assistance on this.

He then gave me quite a talk on not wanting to see another Tonkin Gulf resolution. He said he got trapped into that one and "I don't want another open-ended kind of thing."

I said to him, "Well, there's an easy way to do that; we can put a figure on it, the President is perfectly willing to put a figure on it as a maximum. This certainly has no resemblance to Tonkim. But he said, "No, I'm not going to be for any other resolution from the Senate to the Executive."

He said to me, "Now, I'm not going to stand in the way of it though. You're going to get it all right." He said, "There'll be--Hell, you'll get all the majority you need. I'm not going to stand in your way. I'm not going to make any trouble, but I just personally feel that I was taken in the Tonkin Gulf thing and I don't want to have this happen again."

F: He didn't want any kind of association with anything to be construed as a carte blanche?

L: That's right. And therefore I even talked about ways of hemming it in, or restricting it, so he said, "No, that isn't going to make any difference." He was obviously determined--and he said so quite candidly. He said "That Viet Nam experience has been one that I haven't got over and I'm not going to get myself into another one." But he said, because I had asked him whether he would be a cosponsor of it, he said, "No, I won't, but why don't you go talk to Senator Morse?" He said, "He's chairman of the Latin American Suboommittee, and I think he may even be your cosponsor on it. Tell him I'm not going to stand in your way on this thing."

F: He didn't oppose the idea, though, of the Punta del Este?

L: Oh, no, no. He thought it was fine. Said as a matter of fact, "I'll tell you right now. You come back after that meeting; you tell us what you need and you'll get whatever you need. It's just a matter of not giving a commitment in advance. That's something I'm against. That's what I've been talking about."

So I then went and called on Senator Morse, maybe a day or so later. And Senator Morse, when I presented it to him, said "Of course, I'll go along with you." He said, "This is the way the President ought to proceed, to get our advice and consent in advance and he's doing it just right, he's talking to us first." He said, "I'll be glad to be a cosponsor. I'm all for it. I think our Latin American policy is right, and I think we ought to give them this encouragement. Wish we weren't spending so much money in some of these other areas like Viet Nam so we could have more to spend here in Latin America."

I talked to a few more and handed a memorandum to the President, a copy to the Secretary of State, saying "I've talked to so and so and this is the story." At the same time Lincoln Gordon was talking to various people up on the Hill. Ellsworth Bunker came back and talked to a few of them. And the general report was very encouraging.

F: Did Senator Gruening take any place in this one way or another?

L: Senator Gruening seemed to be all right. He had been talked to, I think, by Ellsworth Bunker, though I'm not sure.

There were several things that happened in that regard. Because it began to get very clear that the President was personally deeply interested in the progress of this resolution. And of course our first struggle was with the House.

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F: Of course, you had a time problem.

L: Had a time problem.

F: It was short.

L: It really was. It was a time problem and we were going to be leaving in about a month and we had to get this whole thing through.

Now there still had been no formal resolution sent up. But when we came back with this report, then the President did send a resolution. Now one of the major problems, I think, arose and with hindsight it's hard to guess. In the resolution itself, there was no figure mentioned; but in the message accompanying the resolution, the President referred to two-and-one-half billion dollars over the next five years in order to carry out these objectives. There had originally been a figure in the resolution and when I had talked to Hickenlooper and to various others--certainly to Maillard and to Selden, they had said "Don't put a figure in. That's only going to cause a lot of trouble." So the figure was not in the resolution but it did get into the message. I understood, I think from Joe Califano, that the President felt that it would be more honest to put a figure in there rather than to leave it open-ended and that even though it was not in the resolution, he wanted them to know what he was thinking of. On the other hand, this did immediately confront them--one, with a modification to which they had not agreed; they had not talked in terms of a two-and-a-half billion dollar figure. Two, to those for whom a figure had not been suggested, with a rather shocking large figure that seemed to be more than that they had had in mind at the time we had talked and--

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F: They bring up always the psychological problem of the depth of target.

L: Exactly. But as I say, the President felt it was more honest; it was better to indicate to them what was contemplated; and a large part of this, of course, would be for the Inter-American Development Bank I think $750,000,000 of it, and the rest of it would go for other projects and there would be a fund which would be available for the common market effort, a sort of contingency fund, as they ran into problems, which would be available for their purposes. But we had never put all this together in a lump sum figure, and here it was in the message to the Congress.

Well, it went to the Hill and we had hearings first in the House. Secretary Rusk and I testified. Lincoln Gordon at that time was down in Montevideo; he was away during most of this now because he had gone down to negotiate some of the early terms, particularly with the trade and some of the other aspects. And I was responsible for the Congressional part of it. We went up and testified and the Republicans wanted to make some changes in the bill, led by Congressman Frelinghuysen and I think with the concurrence of Maillard, the House Foreign Affairs Committee wanted to make some changes in the language.

During the President's absence from Washington, I talked to Nick Katzenbach (I guess the Secretary was away then too)-- to Katzenbach and to Mike Manatos at the White House. And they said, "Well, these changes don't seem to be significant, do they?" I said, "No," and they said, "Why don't you indicate that they look to be all right?" I did so indicate and the President came back and the next thing

I knew, there was a phone call saying he doesn't like the changes. He wants them to take it exactly the way it was submitted. Well, this precipitated a problem because we had indicated that the changes, as they had proposed which represented a change in language, would not affect the part of the resolution, but we then had to go back and talk to them about it. And we were almost stymied. Then I learned that the President wanted to meet with Frelimghuysen; Maillard, etc; and there may have been someone else--I think there probably was from the House; the Secretary; Walt Rostow and me, one evening. I remember that I was that night guest of honor at the National Woman's Press Club, and I got a phone call saying "Can you get to the White House in half an hour for this meeting?" And I blurted out some few inchoerent phrases at the Women's Press Club and went dashing off and got to the meeting, and there the President talked to them and said that--he reminded the Republicans that when he had been Majority Leader and President Eisenhower wanted a resolution with requisite financial support for Doug Dillon to take to Punta del Este, he had led the fight and got it through in record time; and now he was asking the same kind of thing and apparently they were going to make a partisan issue of it. And if that's the way they felt, he didn't even know that he wanted to go to Punta del Este.

Well, this went on, back and forth, and he was magnificent in his oratory.

F: Fairly explicit.

L: Oh, he was persuasive; he played the emotions--there were all the keys; and finally Secretary Rusk sat down and penned a sentence or two. He said, "Well, Mr. President, maybe this will be acceptable," and he showed

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that to the Republicans and they said yes, they thought this was all right. And we left and the President said as we were leaving, "Well I find that's how I always win--by giving in." The fact is, of course, that what came out was pretty much exactly what he had wanted; and so the Republicans went back and went to work for the bill and it passed the House.

This brought us to the Senate. Now it was at that time that we began to hear that Senator Fulbright was not only unwilling to go along himself, but was going to raise some problems. And he began to advance various reasons, the Tonkin Gulf, and also the fact that there was a figure in there of two-and-a-half billion dollars. He did not in any way go back on anything he had told me. He had said that he would not oppose it, and I have no way of knowing that he-- I do not believe that he did anything beyond indicating his own concern and his own unwillingness to go along, but it did have an impact on the committee. And when we appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations' Committee, Secretary Rusk testified-- it was a difficult period for quite a bit, and of course they got into all kinds of questions and said, "How do we know this isn't going to be another Tonkin Gulf resolution kind of thing?"

It finally was clear that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was tied up on this one. And they did vote and-- But before they voted, they agreed that we could come up and meet with them and talk with them in secret session. So Secretary Rusk and Lincoln Gordon and I went up on the Hill and met with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in order to talk this through and to indicate what was involved. We left, they took a vote, and the majority

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was against it, or there were not enough to pass it.

At that point all the soundings we had taken indicated there was a clear majority on the floor of the Senate for this; that it would have passed with a very good majority--there wasn't any question about it. And as a matter of fact, there were strong requests that we go forward with this in order to pass it. Mansfield was in favor of doing it; Senator Javits called me to say that he was willing to take leadership in pushing it through; Senator Percy; there were a number of Senators of both parties who made clear that they would do battle for it.

F: Did you feel seriously that the President might not go if he didn't get it?

L: No. I did not. I thought that this was something to indicate how strongly he felt about it, but I just didn't think it was going to happen--that he was not going to go.

But with this result and with the feeling in the Senate that this was going to pass, and as a matter of fact strong reaction against the action of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, we prepared to line up in order to go to the floor and do battle on this. And again, I want to emphasize all the indications were that this was going to pass and pass well. And it could have been a way of confronting, if you will, Fulbright and some of those people, and really bringing it out in the open and coming out, I think, in a way that would have resulted in the resolution passing. It was with this view that I came into the office one day, a day or so later, and found that the President was calling me. And I got on the telephone. And he said, "We're not going to fight them."

He said, "If that's the way they want it--if that's the way they want their President to go there, that's up to them. I'm not going to bring this kind of a fight out in the open. The Latins are going to think that we are not agreed on being helpful to them, and I just don't want you to do anything more about it. We're just not going to have any fight about it. We'll let it rest where it is. We're not going to do anything more about that resolution."

I remember saying, "Mr. President, all the word I get is that it will pass, and that it will pass well." I told him of some of the people that had telephoned that were willing to go to bat and he said, "Well, that's so but that's all right; let them stew. If that's the way they want it, we're not going to fight them on it. We're not going to make an issue on it."

And that's why the resolution never came through. It just stopped at that point, even though I think we had been geared up to do a job and to--

F: You think he pretty much arrived at that on his own?

L: I think--my own guess--my own evaluation is that he thought he had Senator Fulbright in an untenable position, where he was against Latin American cooperation; that he thought it would look then as if the President was eager to be working with the Latin Americans and here Senator Fulbright, mounting his opposition on Viet Nam in an area where it had no basis for support, and that he just wasn't going to get him off that hook. That was my view of it at the time.

F: Leaving him exposed.

L: So we dropped it. We felt, as I say, we all felt that this was too bad because we could have made it. And then--

F: Do you think it hampered you any at the meeting?

L: I do not. As a matter of fact, in one way it may have been helpful--in two ways it may have been helpful. One, when he arrived--and that was an interesting moment, by the way, as the President came into the room with the other Presidents (most of them had already assembled at Punta del Este), he came in with Dean Rusk, Lincoln Gordon and me. They were over on one side of the room and we were at this side. And the President looked over. And there he was, this towering figure of a man, so much taller than his colleagues; and they were looking over at him sort of huddling in a corner trying to size him up, and he was looking over at them warily trying to size them up. And nobody was doing very much about it. Now, I remember Dean Rusk went over and brought some president over, and I saw President Frei of Chile, who, I know, would warmly respond and I brought him over. It was then and I think later that the President made some reference to, "We both have troubles with our Senate, don't we?" Remember-- Frei had been seeking permission to come to the United States and couldn't because his Senate prevented it--well, this caused laughter and broke the ice.

Several times thereafter in the course of the visit the President remarked about troubles with the Senate, and "we all have troubles with our Congress," or "people think that I am almighty-- well, you see some of the things I can't get done."

It had another advantage. It took away the dollar-sign from the

cooperation. It put it right down in terms of "We're committed to you in spirit; I want you to know that I'm all with you and that we're going to do what we can." But it took it away from "How big a check is he going to write?" And I thought it was tremendously important, and I think will be lastingly significant, that this close relationship which developed there--and it was a deeply close one by the time it was over--had nothing to do with any commitment financially or any assurance that they were going to get a certain amount of money by virtue of this kind of cooperation. It was purely --

F: Instead of a contract, it was a matter of "we'll do what we can."

L: Yes, and also, "We'll do what we can because we have faith in you; we like you; we're part of you; we feel that we're involved in what goes on in Latin America; and you're not going to be beholden to us." It was not a donor-donee relationship. It was not big, rich benefactor-uncle coming down, but a President of another American Republic meeting with them and talking about common problems. He was superb, by the way, in his individaul meetings and with these presidents.

F: I wanted to ask you about that. Before we get into that, I want to get on to one trivial thing, but the press make a lot of it. He had the Latin American ambassadors down to the Ranch and we've mentioned that already. There was a little bit of an outcry to the fact that he wanted to get them all Texas hats and a lot of them felt that was undignified. Is that press talk or is this true?

L: No, what happened was this. I ought to go back to that. The Ranch visit took place just shortly before Punta del Este.

F: Yes, over Easter.

L: Yes. What happened was that he had wanted to do something for the Latin American ambassadors and the notion came up-- why not have them come down to the Ranch? They might like this. Actually, I don't remember who first thought of it. I think he did. He did himself. He said, "Why don't I bring them down to the Ranch?" and we had thought about that and talked about it a couple of times. And then we thought timing it just before the summit conference would be right and nice.

I remember one Sunday I had a phone call to go over the the White House and went up to the living quarters, where Foy Kohler had also been asked to come over and when the President and Mrs. Johnson, Bess Abell, and Foy Kohler and I met to talk about what could be done down there for these ambassadors, and who ought to be invited. I, incidentally, thought they also ought to invite the United Nations' ambassadors from Latin America, but they thought it would be too large so it was limited to the OAS and the White House ambassadors. I also thought that the entertainment ought to be some world-renowned American artists like Danny Kaye and people of this kind. And the feeling, I think, on the part of Mrs. Johnson and Bess Abell, was no, to get authentic Texan entertainers, and they turned out to be right. It was a tremendous success.

Well then, the invitation came and we were all looking forward-- I must say the Latin American ambassadors were terribly excited about this. This was a ten-strike-- the notion of bringing them to the President's own home. The idea was that the President thought he would like to give

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them something, and I don't know whose idea the sombreros was, but this is certainly what he had in mind. And I believe they were even ordered.

A few days before, the AP reporter, I think--Latin American reporter--was kidding with two ambassadors, and one of them said he would never dare put the hat on because he wouldn't want to be seen wearing something silly like that in his own country. And another one said he would do it only if he had to, or something of this kind. I happen to know who they were, and they made a newspaper story.

My own immediate experience was that a number of Latin American ambassadors called me to protest, saying they thought this was unfortunate, that this certainly did not reflect their feelings. Since the two were not identified, they thought it was too bad and they had been looking forward to it. They thought it was in keeping with inviting them to Texas, have the Texas headgear as a constant memento, and I so conveyed this to Bess Abell. I said, "Look, don't let this--" Well, she said the President was upset about it--concerned--and therefore she didn't know what they would do. I said, "Well, look, why don't you just leave them at the hotel room and those who want to wear them can wear them, and those that don't want to--"

But by that time, apparently the decision had been made not to pass them out. Incidentally, the ambassador from Argentina, Roca went out and bought one and had a picture taken wearing it, because he said he had been looking forward to getting it. But this was blown up--I don't know whatever happened to these sombreros--but it was a misunderstanding based on

a couple of ambassadors who had said this to an AP newsman. It embarrased the Latins a good deal, because they thought this was ungracious, and that's the whole story.

F: All right, let's get back to Punta del Este.

L: All right. I said he was superb there. He had individual bilateral meetings with each of the Presidents; and he would be briefed and have a clear concept in rather short order of what the main problems were confronting---

F: Was there any protocol involved in the order in which you took the leaders, or did you just take them as they were available?

L: I don't think it had protocol. For example, he had the five Central American presidents and Panamanian president at a dinner at the cottage he had there one night. So he had them-- all those six together. That was a very interesting evening by the way where he-- Again, he didn't know them; they were a little awed as they walked in. And he began to tell them stories about Texas--

F: Were they all English-speaking?

L: I think they all understood, but Don Barnes, I believe, was there--the interpreter, who-- but I think they all understood, even though they didn't all speak it.

He told them, for example of the race for Congress of Henry Gonzalez, in which Henry Gonzalez was running and the President got Cantinflas to come in and help him. And he told them that story, which some of them understood. He talked about his own experience when he had been going around with Cantiflas and Cantiflas would only be able to say in English, "All the way with LBJ" and he said, "That's enough. You don't say

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thing more than that. That's enough. You just keep saying that."

F: I remember that.

L: Do you? He also got talking about some of the problems of hoof-and-mouth disease, and what they were doing to overcome it and how they had overcome it in Texas, and how we could perhaps be helpful to the countries in Latin America who had it. And he began to tell them how it all worked--how they irradiated the fly and this would keep the fly from producing species which would in turn reproduce-- But as I remember, he told it to them and had the wrong sex irradiated, so that they were baffled for a time, wondering how this could happen. I guess he was irradiating the female, and that later was straightened out. There was this kind of talk that went back and forth.

Then there was the dinner, and at the dinner he was very easy-- it was a first occasion so he was trying to find his way of really getting them to relax with him and relax with them. I remember I was at another table, and of course you would remember things like this. But I remember that the President said to someone there from Washington, "Did you see him on television the other night," pointing to me, "talking about this conference?"

And somebody said, "No." He said, "He was damned good. I'm sure as hell glad I'm not running against him." Now, this was sort of strange, you see. I remember this because the presidents were sort of looking somewhat strangely at this thing. But then he got up and made a toast and was eloquently responded to by the president of Costa Rica--Trejos--with whom he established a relationship that carried over when he /Trejos/ came here.

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Now that, I think, was the first occasion when he met with presidents. It was that night. Then he lined them up in a way so that would fit their schedule and his. He wanted to have a luncheon with the president of Chile. And something very nice happened there. He learned that the president of Chile had his son at Punta del Este with him. And in the middle of the Presidents' luncheon, toward the end of luncheon, Marv Watson came in and whispered in his ear, and the President got up from the table. And President Frei was startled, as were the rest of us, because this looked like it could be something serious--he got up quickly and left the room. And we couldn't figure what this might be, but it sounded--looked as though it were something noteworthy. And in a moment or two, the doors parted and in came the President with Frei's son. He had asked that he be brought up there and the father was deeply touched by this--terrible pleased and never forgot it. Several times, when I saw Frei thereafter, he would say, "I never forgot what the President did in bringing my son there." And the son stayed with us, and he had this conversation--those two, Frei and the President, struck it off very well, and lastingly.

He reacted differently to different people.

F: How did he get along with Belaunde Terry?

L: Not too well. I think Belaunde delivered him a lecture. Belaunde was kind of talking at him rather than to him, and I was disappointed in this, because I thought that Belaunde could get through to him. There were one or two others that gave him this same feeling that they were not really communicating. But by and large his judgment, his ability to sense who these people were and how to get through to them--one of them, whom

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I don't think I should mention probably, but I remember one of them, after he got through, the President said, "You know that fellow went for half an hour before he came to a comma." I remember that comment, and it was so apt and it summarized exactly what had taken place.

He played a game with us too. At the luncheon before we left to go back, as the helicopter was hovering outside and we sat around the luncheon table there, he said, "If you had one fellow you could pick to stand with you, which one of these fellows would it be?" And we went around the table and he came up with his/choice/, which again, I don't think I ought to mention; but it was interesting,because none of us had picked him, and he picked him for a reason. He said, "Because this man, even though we can't talk the same language," he said, "this man you know when he gives you his handshake, he's with you and he's going to stand with you."

F: On technical question. In a luncheon-- dinners like this -- are the logistics handled by the U.S. Embassy in that country, or is this done locally? How do you set up such a dinner?

L: Well, it's done by the White House people.

F: It is?

L: Yes. They make the arrangements. He took over, you see- we all had-- not all, but most of us, had bungalows which we took over from residents in Punta del Este, which were--

F: What did you do with the people, incidentally?

L: They moved elsewhere, but--

F: By elsewhere, do you mean somewhere in the city?

L: In some cases, they did.

F: City is kind of a loose term.

L: Yes, in the apartments or some went to Montevideo. The one that owned the house where the President stayed came around before he left, and he gave him a couple of gifts which he had brought with him. They wouldn't take any rent. So he was very warm and very generous--

F: What kind of gifts?

L: Oh, I think a silver tray kind of thing. This sort of thing. And I think that in general-- I don't know how many --but various of them weren't doing this for the money; they were doing this just to be helpful.

F: Did the President come away rather satisfied with what had taken place there?

L: Oh, yes, you could tell that.

F: Arosemena didn't bother him?

L: Oh, no. Well in the first place, Arosemena was answered. By the way, I think, one of the links in the relationship between Johnson and Diaz Ordaz, and this is vividly in my mind because last Friday I flew with the President to this El Paso thing. One of the great links, I think, another link between him and Diaz Ordaz was that Diaz Ordaz answered Arosemena brilliantly, forcefully, and most passionately in saying that he totally disagreed and thought that this man was saying, in fact, that it was irresponsible for them to have entered into this kind of an arrangement and therefore he would not sign it. And he said, "Show me where I am irresponsible. I think that it is responsible for us to be working with this great nation, that great leader," and that kind of thing. It was a forceful response and others echoed it. There were similar statements by various of them, but the Mexican's response remains with me. And this of course helped.

Then it became clear, as these meetings went on, that it was really making an impact. All the press who were skeptical when they arrived, and we met with the press through this; this was one of the things we did right, by the way. Frequent briefings and telling them things rather than having them speculate--

F: Who briefed?

L: There were Rostow, I, Linc Gordon, and we really had full-scale briefings, I mean they would come in and in some cases, there would be three or four of them the same afternoon. And I remember I went out and had lunch one day with Scotty Reston and Edward P. Morgan, some of the others-- Max Frankel, maybe-- and the point is that you told them enough about what was going on, and in that context, they had a better feel for what was developing. And then they could see it.

F: Did this hold true-- Now, you mentioned U.S. press people. I know the Latin American press people fairly well, and they tend to be somewhat doctrinaire in their appreach to news. Did they come around, do you think?

L: They did, indeed, so far as we could tell. The press was unanimously, I think unanimously, of the opinion that this was (a) far better than anybody had a right to expect; (b) it was a real meeting of minds and not just going through verbiage; (c) that the agreements reached, the points on which agreements were reached, were the fundamental issues that had to be confronted; and that therefore having taken the risk of bringing presidents together, which had not happened before except as you know when Eisenhower did the Central American for largely decorative purposes rather

than substantive purposes, having taken the risk of bringing them together, here suddenly they found that they had achieved a milestone in a couple of days. And I don't know of any place, I'm sure there was some Communist papers which took cracks at it, but everything that we saw indicated that this had been a success. The President was aware of this.

Incidentally, Walt Rostow went back on the plane-- on the press plane, with the press and I think this too was helpful. But it was obvious on the way back, talking to the President it was obvious that he felt this was successful. He knew that the press had been hailing it. He knew that he had really made friends with the Latins, as he had. I think he was disappointed that he couldn't extend the trip and visit other places for security reasons, because he genuinely wanted to. But I think he came back with an assurance and a feeling that he had had a most successful meeting with these men; that they had reached some important understanding; and that he as an individual, as a President, had achieved a position of real respect and regard among them.

F: Primarily a triumph of personal contact rather than any other characteristic, wasn't it?

L: Of two things. Well, I guess you say that. Triumph of personal contact. But under that comes a great deal. If you say that you mean understanding of the issues, ability to articulate them, ability to sense what it is was on their minds, and another thing which also comes under that general description. I said this-- I was interviewed on a television program which I got back. I think he related very personally and directly to the problems that were disturbing them; the problems of the soil; the problems

of education. This had a kinship to his own experience, and he was able-- he felt comfortable with them. He felt as though he had been through some of this; and perhaps when he meets with more sophisticated representatives of some of the other countries, he doesn't feel the same thing. Here he did. He was able to say, "Yes, we've had that problem in the United States, and this is what we're doing about it," or--

F: They were his kind of people, in other words?

L: Exactly. I thought he felt that and maybe was heartened that he could go to such a conference and make this kind of an impression.

F: Did the issue of birth control, planned parenthood, arise at this meeting?

L: It did in previous sessions, but it didn't directly in this meeting. Now, it may have peripherally in one or two of his discussions bilateral--

F: Have you personally as an OAS ambassador had much involvement in this matter of planned parenthood?

L: Oh, yes, because you see I am also the United States representative on CIAP, the Inter-American Committee of the Alliance for Progress. And that committee, as you know, has annually a review of each country in Latin America, in which they set forth their plans, their projected needs, internal and external. And on the basis of this, the international leading institutions and AID decide what they're going to do. Now, in the course of that review, we are frequently able to probe: "What are you doing about population problems and how is this being taken into account in connection with your estimated needs" and so forth. And so I had direct involvement. I have been to several conferences on it. Actually, I was supposed to be there today, in Puerto Rico, on a population conference.

F: That's a good place to be.

L: Yes.

F: Is there any feeling that the United States is trying to limit population abroad just as a competitive situation, or is this a feeling that this is a good social and economic approach?

L: I think it's uneven. In countries such as Chile and Colombia, for example, they think it's a good thing and are implementing programs for it. In others, there are minor steps in a few places. We have to tread particularly carefully because there is resentment.

You may remember that in Northeast Brazil there was rumor that the United States was trying to do this in order to retard Latin American population rather than our own. Bob McNamara found on his recent trip that he got quite a reaction from Argentina when he spoke up on this problem. So it's uneven. But I think the tendency is very clearly to explore it and to face realistically the need to do something.

F: Do you personally get much static from the Catholic churches in the United States on this issue?

L: No, I don't. I talked with the representatives of the church down there about how to take into proper account the needs of the nation, and yet not do anything in contradiction of their religious principles. But, of course, the ferment that we see in the States is going on in Latin America within the church, and you get some of the most progressive voices in this regard that are coming from the church itself.

F: I didn't want to leave the aftermath of the meeting. What do you think

in the way of either tangible or psychological progress came out of this Punta del Este meeting?

L: I think it was terribly important in that presidents could come together and meet at all, so that even from a cosmetic point of view, it had value even if nothing else had happened then they had come together. But the fact is that they came together, did talk about critical issues, did find it possible to agree on what principles they wanted to subscribe to in dealing with those issues, did establish personal relationships which meant that they would no longer again be strangers with one another, and did have a chance to do something which I think we lose sight of, and that is to build ties among countries of Latin America themselves and not only with us. Had it not been for this kind of a meeting, it's difficult to see how they would have been brought together. But to meet together with the President of the United States gave it kind of a body and a significance and they had to come, and I think, therefore, on every count, it was successful. My great disappointment, if I could just add the word, my great disappointment is that the Congress didn't live up to what was done there. I think when the President came back from Punta del Este, we were on a very high point in terms of our relationships in this hemisphere.

F: But we have, you think, frittered some of it away?

L: Well, I think we've lost a lot of good will. I think if he had not had this credit, if there had not been this investment of Punta del Este, I think the reaction against these cuts in the Alliance funds and some of this penny-pinching and bargain-basement shopping around that has been going on would have been far more serious.

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F: We've been living off our principal, then, for a little while?

L: Living off the principal that he put in the bank. I think he put it in the bank down at Punta del Este. I know my relationships--and I've been down there, you know, and I talk to the ambassadors here constantly--I know that these people don't question his dedication, his goodwill, his desire to be helpful. And it's not as though they have to do anything to push him, to push the Administration. They recognize that the Administration can want the right things and if the Congress won't do anything about it, okay, that's the kind of life you live. But there never has been a feeling that you have to bring pressure to bear on President Johnson. I haven't seen that.

F: Do you see any basic weaknesses in the organization or in the financing of the Alianza?

L: Oh, yes, sure. Any basic weakness, sure. I think the basic weakness, the great weakness, of the Alliance for Progress, and I don't know how you get at it, is that it is not an alliance of the people. It still has not reached through so that people understand what it is and what is must mean in their lives. And we still haven't found a formula by which we can be sure that whatever we're doing is really getting through to the people. That, I think, is the basic problem. I don't know how you get at it. I know that in terms of connecting it to the people--oh, it's easy enough to say and I've said it often that each country in Latin America has a responsibility to be sure that its citizens have an awareness, to stop this impression that it's a U.S. financed-bilateral undertaking which was prevalent, and is prevalent, in large parts of

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Latin America. And they agree with me, but then they don't do much about it. Galo Plaza has been on a trip through all the countries of Latin American and he comes back disturbed by this, that this is the fact. When I am in Latin America, I try to visit the favelas and shacks whenever I can, and talk to the people to see what's going on with them. That's what I look for, what difference has it made in their lives? I have my own families as it were, in these places that I go back to, time and again. I go back and want to see what has happened now. Have they added a room to the house? How many kids are in school now, and what is the father earning, and that kind of thing? And the first time I did it they were surprised. They couldn't believe that I was an American Ambassador coming around talking to them. But now when I come back, they recognize me and they talk to me.

F: Glad to see you?

L: Yes. And it gives me a feeling, you know-- what difference is all this making, and how is it and how is it affecting youth down there?

F: Do you sense a general U. S. apathy toward the Alliance for Progress?

L: Yes, I do.

F: What do you think can be done about it?

L: Well, I think somehow we've got to do what has to be done to get the mystique, the spirit, the ideological oomph that was there when it was first launched. I don't agree with the statement that I think President-Elect Nixon made in the course of the campaign that we don't need the ideological trappings for this kind of a program. I think without it you don't have anything except another aid program, and I think if the

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Alliance is to be what it was intended to be, the kind of thing that President Kennedy foresaw and the countries of Latin American foresaw in August 1961, then it has got to have this ideological format, and it has got to be something that has a sense of inspiration and a sense of hope for the people, because without it, I think we're going to have a great deal of trouble. And what troubles me in the United States is that for a long time the Alianza was captured by the statisticians and the blackboard scrollers and the graph makers rather than by the people who understood the Alliance has to have a soul if it's to be anything.

F: I wanted to ask two questions along that line. One is, and you can take them as you please, the role of private industry-- U.S. private industry-- in Latin America, particularly in furthering the Alliance objectives; the other one is where you have a breakdown of the Alliance, do you have an almost inexorable followup of guerilla warfare?

L: Okay. Let's take them in order. First, the role of American private industry: American private industry today has got between ten and twelve billion dollars invested in Latin America. It accounts for about a fifth of the taxes that are paid; a third of the exports; it employs one and a half million Latin Americans. I think it has been doing a pretty good job; I think it's doing a better job now than it did before, a more sensitive job, and is beginning to recognize in order to have a secure future in Latin America, it can't look to government guarantees or government protection, but must make its own future secure by building wisely; taking into account the needs of the people. I think that there are three ways that American business increasingly recognizes it must do this. One, it has got to train the nationals of these countries for more than a menial job; it has got to train them for managerial and

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supervisory jobs rather than do as so many American companies used to do-- bring all the top layer in from the United States and superimpose them. Two, I think it's becoming clearer and clearer that it makes sense to enter the joint undertakings with nationals of these countries, giving them a stake in the future of the enterprise rather than coming in and holding on to American undertaking. And three, I think that more slowly but nonetheless to some extent perceptibly, American business is recognizing that it ought to be moving into the less developed parts of these countries, not all huddling together in the places where industry has traditionally gone, but go out to Northeast Brazil; go to places where people are struggling to get some advance and put their plants and their developments and their enterprises down there. I think these things are underway. The Council for Latin America, it seems to me, is being very helpful in this regard. It's pointing up the need for introducing in the investments in Latin America the same kind of spirit, the same kind of responsibility that American business has assumed in this country. I think for too long, and I've seen this myself, American business thought that a man who wasn't quite ready to be the branch manager of Chicago ought to go down and run Chile or Peru. And as a result, you didn't put the right criteria. You didn't look for people with cultural empathy, with sensitivity, with an awareness of what's at stake, but you sent the guy you could spare, who wasn't quite ready for a good job in the States. I think there's a recognition now that you're not going to be wise if you do this.

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F: I've got one or two acquaintances who in effect got banished to South America, because they weren't vice-presidential timber.

L: Exactly right. I've seen this. And I've said this to the Council for Latin America; to the U. S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers whenever they would let me. So I think this is becoming clearer. And I therefore do believe that with this kind of leadership and in terms of self-preservation, the selfish purposes of self-preservation, the companies are realizing that they had better be more circumspect, and they had better ask,not what am I going to get out of it, but what can I put into it in order to be sure that I've got something for the future.

Now the question as the Alliance goes down, does the potential for guerilla activity increase. I think there is a relationship. I can't draw you a nifty little line, but I can say this: that if these people in the countries of Latin America don't see a way to get something better without violence, they're going to turn to violence. I don't have any question about that. I've seen too much of it in my two years not to believe that if we think we're going to save money by not trying to help these countries do the right kind of a job, furthering the welfare of the people; and if we're going to be willing to stand off and say "What the hell-- it's their problem. Let them finance it," we're just going to buy Viet Nams on our doorstep, that's the way I see it. And I think Castro knows this, and I think the guerilla activities in these countries is going to increase as the opportunities for making hay increase. When Che Guevara failed in Bolivia, he failed maybe because he hadn't done adequate preparation; hadn't attuned himself to the needs of Bolivia, but that doesn't mean they're not going to keep trying.

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can immediately be faulted. I can give you an illustration immediately. I have frequently used these figures. I say that since the Alliance started, $115,000,000,000 has been spent for Alliance objectives--Alliance goals--all told. That 88% of that, $101,000,000,000, has come from the Latin Americans, and 7.7 billion or 6.7% of that comes from us in the United States. I think those are relatively solid figures, but I have found that-- I'd say that Galo Plaza when he makes a speech, talks about $115,000,000,000 invested by the Latins themselves. Now this is the kind of thing I'm talking about that you can get a difference on.

F: What effect do riots here in the United States have on your relationship with OAS business?

L: I find they can't understand them, particularly the racial problems, or at least they say they can't. In Brazil, of course, they've had this intermingling, this working together with the races, in which while it is not true to say the differences have all disappeared, nonetheless our reacting so violently in connection with the color problem--startles them. So I think they find it hard to understand why this should have borne such violent fruit.

But I want to just mention another side of this. Personally, I see this revolution of rising expectation as the same thing we've got at home. As I look at Latin America, I have a better way of understanding what's going on in our own slums. And so I do think they are interrelated from that point of view. I do think if we think of them all as the same kind of eruption by people who are looking for something better, you can get a better hold on it.

F: Yes, I think the opportunity is there. What do you, as the representative of the United States to the OAS, do in the way of promoting tax reform?

L: Well, fortunately a lot's going on in that area. The Internal Revenue Service has set up a program with the tax people of the countries of Latin America, and I think some twenty countries have now had one or another kind of tax improvement legislation put into effect, most of them aided by our Internal Revenue Service, but also encouraged by the CIAP inquiries in which we say to them, you know, "what proportion of taxes are you collecting? What are you doing about tightening up?, et cetera." And then we call them to account a year later. So I think every country in Latin America has now excellent, or I would say very good, tax legislation, which is important. Most of them are doing a much better job of enforcing it, but there is still a good deal that can be done. But I see progress which is encouraging. Now, they have to do a lot more. They have to-- they really have to make great strides, but I think they're moving in the right direction.

F: Latin American statistics, in general, having always been a little untrustworthy.

L: Yes.

F: I've seen three or four sets of statistics on the same problem at the same time, none of which showed any relationship.

L: I am using in this kind of a situation-- I am using the broad language I have because I think all of that is supportable. Now if I began to quote figures at you, you'd be right. I have found this same problem.

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F: I can personalize that. I used to zip down to Mexico City and the poor peon, as I went by, paid me no attention because it never occurred to him he'd ever be in an automobile, or ever have one, or anything else. He was barefoot and hungry. And now fifteen or twenty years later when I go down there, it's in sight; and he's resentful because I do and he doesn't.

L: Exactly right. I've always felt-- I believe this is true psychologically and sociologically and every other way.

F: This is progress.

L: Yes. The fact that you've got riots proves that he figures he has got a foot up the ladder. A man without hope doesn't riot, because he has got nothing to riot for. But if he thinks he can push for something better, he's going to give it.

F: What do you and what does the Administration take in the way of a stance with regard to the defense budgets of the Latin American States and the so-called arms race?

L: Well, in the first place there is not what we think of loosely as an arms race going on in Latin America. I think the facts are these: Latin America spends less on arms than any other part of the world as a proportion of the gross national product or percentage of budget. It spends 1 1/2 percent of the GNP on arms, which except for sub-Sahara Africa, is unequaled anywhere in the world.

F: Of course, Costa Rica is a beautiful---

L: Costa Rica drags it down. Seven per cent of Latin America's budget goes for arms, seven per cent of our aid goes for arms--military purposes. Of that seven per cent, by the way, ninety percent goes for upkeep of existing equipment and ten percent goes for new equipment. They're just a few facts. Having said that, however, there's no question that the presidents of Latin America meant what they said when they talked about elimination of unnecessary expenditures at Punta del Este. It's a crime to waste precious resources on armaments down there. What you hear is, and the thing that's advanced with a great deal of vigor and sincerity, is that they ought to have modern equipment. It's not to do war but they ought to modernize and it's more expensive to keep up old---

F: Do you credit French salesmanship with any of this?

L: Yes, of course I do. I think the Mirages that get sold to a country like Peru, for example, play upon this very notion of why do you want to have an old tank or an old plane? I remember one of the things I did on these trips was to talk to Belaunde about the supersonic jets. That's an interesting story.

F: Let's hear it.

L: That was in the time of that first trip that I went down there. One of my assignments when I was down on this first trip that I described to you earlier was to talk to Belaunde I don't know whether I mentioned Peru among the countries I visited--

F: No.

L: I talked to Belaunde not only about the summit, but also about the rumors that he was about to do something in the way of acquisitioning of supersonic jets. And I was carrying with me suggestions for an arms limitation

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agreement with specific items enumerated, which I discussed everywhere I went. It was supposed to be done without any publicity, but I did talk to them about it. And we had not indicated to Belaunde yet that we didn't want them to have these jets, but we were worried about his desire to have the supersonics. And so one of my assignments was to try to talk him out of that. I went down there, knowing that this was not going to be an easy chore, and that he was already quite adamant in his position.

The day before I arrived in Lima, his uncle died, Victor Belaunde--who was the representative of Peru at the United Nations, the dean of the United Nations corps. And I spoke to our ambassador down there, Ambassador [J. Wesley] Jones, and I said, "Look, I have an idea. Can't we get a plane to bring the body back? This would mean a great deal to President Belaunde and to the family. We ought to be able to do this, and it would help me, I should think, in meeting him under those circumstances."

Well, we tried and the State Department indicated it couldn't do this, no precedent for that kind of thing. I tried to reach Arthur Goldberg and couldn't get him at the U.N. So then I got through to Walt Rostow. And I said to him, "Look, if you can do this, I think it would be worthwhile."

He said, "Sounds right. Let me see what we can do about it." Well, finally we did. He got the plane and brought him back. And when I walked in to see President Belaunde the next day, I was authorized to say to him, "The President of the United States expresses his deep regret at the death of your uncle and as a mark of respect for you and your uncle, is assigning a

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special Air Force plane to fly back the body and any members of the family with an honor guard." He was deeply touched. He wept and never forgot this. He never forgot this and in many meetings I've had with him--my last visit there a couple of months ago when he had a luncheon for me, he gave a toast. It was just a few weeks before he was deposed. He told his whole cabinet that he has never forgotten the personal, warm feeling he had because of what was done for his uncle.

It was after that that I said to him, "Mr. President, one of the things I want to talk to you about is supersonic jets." And he talked to me at great length and with great conviction about his feeling that if they were going to make war, a slower plane would be more effective in Latin America because he could drop more bombs faster.

Bue he said, "You want us to keep a 1960 Cadillac rather than get a 1967 Cadillac. Why? Why should we have an old one when we can get a new one and one which is necessary?" That was his argument to me, and not wholly illogical. And so I remember that very well, because it was the context of the death of his uncle that we talked about it and I found that he was willing to talk reasonably and even though--And I think for quite awhile, it didn't happen, but do you know it finally did come to pass.

F: Did we do anything sub rosa or otherwise to try to stabilize the sol and keep down inflation in Peru prior to his being forced out, or did we pretty well leave that to local politics?

L: Well, actually, they had just begun to make some real progress, you know. He had appointed a fellow named Ulloa, as minister of finance. Do you know him?

F: No.

L: Extremely competent man.

F: I knew Belaunde fairly well. I've seen him twice.

L: Since he has been here?

F: No, not since he has come back to the States.

L: I see he spoke at Cornell a couple of days ago. I should think that it would be worth talking to him.

FL Yes, I want to talk to him.

L: But Ulloa, whom he brought in, fortyish, dynamic, imaginative, courageous, effective, had done a very good job of clamping on some real financial controls and on straightening out some of their economic problems. And we were very encouraged at what we saw happening and so was the banking community. So I think they had really begun to move in the right direction just shortly before this.

F: On another line, do you work on extradition problems?

L: No.

F: That's not part of your function?

L: No.

F: What about this fight over amendments to the charter of the OAS?

L: Oh yes.

F: Let's hear a little bit about that.

L: Well, it turned out not really to be a fight-- and what I did about it and what finally happened. There had been a meeting at Panama at which proposed amendments to the charter were considered among the representatives of the various countries. This was about a year before I came-- maybe six months or so before I came.

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Now previous to the Panama meeting there had been a very interesting development. It had been contemplated that there would be incorporated into the OAS charter the economic and social standards of the charter of Punta del Este, so that the charter would really have broad-guaged impact and spell out the rather generalized language of the charter in the economic social field.

Lincoln Gordon had gone up to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and had talked to them about the kind of changes that were being contemplated and wanted to be sure that if these were carried through, there would be approval by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. They objected to some and there were modifications of others, but by the time U. S. representatives went to meet with the Latin representatives Panama--they knew what would go with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Okay. This was on that part of the story.

When I came in there were other provisions that had to be worked out, and then these had to do with things such as the creation of the general assembly, which the OAS will now have; the change in the term of the Secretary General; the creation of a new, more effective, economic and social council and the education and cultural council, and so forth. The time came when we all approved this as we did at the Foreign Ministers' Meeting in February 1967 at Buenos Aires.

This meeting of foreign ministers had two purposes: one, to prepare for the summit; two, to prepare the amendments to the OAS charter and have agreement on them. And these were ratified. We had quite some fights there, but they went well. The biggest fight had to do with a misconceived

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proposal with reference on the Inter-American Peace Committee. It raised in the minds of some the bugaboo of an Inter-American peace force, and this frightens the Latins because they can see marching boots coming into a country. So Argentina proposed it and such countries as Chile and Colombia; Costa Rica opposed it and we played a rather strange role. We indicated first our willingness to support the Argentine proposal, but in view of the fact there was such opposition, we didn't think that we ought to vote for it. That was the posture we assumed.

In any event the amendments were approved and then the meeting was scheduled by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It was a rather unique episode, I believe. In the first place, I was the only one that testified. They didn't call anybody to testify against it or anything else. I testified for about two hours--two-and-a-half hours. The testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee covered not only the amendments, but as you might expect, are other commitments assumed here that we don't know about et cetera.

Senator Hickenlooper wanted to know about what was happening to the IPC in Peru and was the Hickenlooper Amendment going to be made effective and so forth.

But right after the testimony, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously approved the amendments; it went to the Senate floor, I think, two days later and was unanimously approved. So I think this may well be the--- I shouldn't say this quickly, but I know of no other foreign treaties that involved this kind of thing that were unanimously approved by both the Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate in such quick order, at the time

when everybody was being agonized about all these other foreign problems. That's really the story in a nutshell.

F: Does this Administration have any particular attitude on the inter-continental highway?

L: Yes. It was one of the things that the President called for at Punta del Este-- a completion of the Pan-American Highway, and the Inter-American Development Bank is working out a plan for this. The OAS is very much interested in it, and I think it's just a matter of getting it on the list of priorities for multi-national cooperation. But the Administration has supported it very strongly.

F: Do you want to talk a little bit in the remaining time about your meeting this past summer in San Salvador?

L: Do you mean in Guatemala?

F: No, it was San Salvador.

L: Which meeting are you talking about?

F: The one the President went down to the first of July.

L: I didn't go on that visit.

F: You weren't involved?

L: No, now let me-- We went to the HemisFair.

F: Yes.

L: What happened was this. We went to HemisFair with the ambassadors, and then the President was going to El Salvador. This would have meant leaving all the ambassadors in San Antonio pretty much to fend for themselves to go on to Austin, where they were to see the University and then come back. I thought this would be inappropriate as far as the ambassadors are concerned-- that the President had invited them down there and that they would feel

understandably that this perhaps was leaving them while everybody took off and left them to fend for themselves. So I volunteered. I sent word to the President that I would be pleased to stay with them if he thought it was a good idea, or join them.

In view of the nature of the trip he felt that this was a good idea, so I, as his representative, escorted them to Houston-- I mean to Austin, and then escorted them back to Washington.

F: What about the Guatemala trip?

L: Well, that really didn't involve the President. Now this was a meeting of CIAP which happened to be just a couple of weeks before the ambassador was killed. I just thought perhaps that was what you were--

F: What I was talking about. Our Latin American ties were something of an issue in the 1968 campaign and various people brought it up. Representative /Charles/ Goodell, and so on. Do you want to expand on that a little as to just-- for instance, Mr. Nixon has suggested maybe we ought to halt aid until some reforms are continued. Now I would like to have a viewpoint on this if you have one.

L: Well, I think it would be catastrophic to hold up what we are doing now pending a reexamination of whether we're doing /it/ the best of all possible ways. I do think it is true that the whole program could bear a careful examination. I think this would have been true regardless of who won the election because as I have said, there are some basic problems with the program. I think there is a need to find out what we're doing well enough and what we are not doing well enough and to reshape the program in order to do better that which ought to be done better. I think that when you examine what Mr. Nixon said, he's putting the focus on the same thing as the Alliance is putting the focus on. He's saying things a bit

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differently, but he's concerned about education and agriculture and trade and the Latin American common market; the same things that have troubled President Johnson and President Kennedy are troubling him. And the big problem now, particularly in the wake of the recent upsets in Brazil and the coups in Peru and Panama, will be not to get discouraged, not to feel that a plague on their house-- let them get their own house in order, and to think we can withdraw because we don't seem to be making any headway. This is going to be very, very, arduous, time-consuming, backbreaking work for which we need a lot of patience and if we are going to try to impose our American criteria on whether they are or are not doing things right and if we're going to punish them by withholding aid when we don't like some of the things they're doing, we may run outselves into more and more trouble. I do think it's right for us to make known our own position and to say we believe in democracy and we want to encourage democratic regimes and we're going to do whatever we can to further the progress of democracy in the hemisphere. All of that we've got to say and got to believe and got to do something about. But we've got to recognize a careful line between saying that and intervening into internal polities, and that we can only do so much. We can try, we can help, we can encourage, we can prod, we can supplement, but we can't be Mr. Big in Latin America.

F: Is your work as our Ambassador hampered by any leftovers from the Camelot experience or from other CIA activities--either real or supposed?

L: Oh yes. I get questions constantly about what did we do with Che Guevara and is it true that behind a number of these organizations stands the CIA and so forth.

F: I want to ask you about two more questions. Were you through with the CIA?

L: Yes.

F: A couple of questions. One is that there are the charges made that we have rather uneven representation in Latin America. I suppose you can do that on any continent, but do you care to elaborate on this?

L: I think it's a fair comment. I wish that I could say the representation was better than it is. I think a part of this is the heritage of the fact that Latin America is kind of the back-water of American diplomacy; that top people very often didn't want to go to Latin America unless they had to. And therefore the stars of American diplomacy, the Bohlens, the Tommy Thompsons, the Averell Harrimans, people of this kind just weren't oriented toward Latin America. I think there are some excellent people now coming into Latin American diplomacy, but as you look around the continent you find precisely this uneven quality that you describe and I think it's something that ought to get first attention, because particularly in Latin America your ambassador is really your country and with a kind of delicate, sensitive situation we have there, we've got to have the most competent people we can find.

F: Did you and Secretary Gordon work in pretty good harmony?

L: Gardner?

F: Gordon. Lincoln Gordon.

L: Oh Gordon. Oh yes. Now there is this problem-- there is a built-in problem in connection with my job and his job, as there is now between my job and Covey Oliver, his successor. It's hard to tell where multilateral concerns end and bilateral concerns begin. And very often we'd be dealing

with the same kinds of things and in different forums and with different objectives. So in a sense, as I said, there's this built-in ambivalence, built-in problem, but reasonable, mature men can say, "Look, we're going to be overlapping from time to time. If we keep looking over our shoulder to see who's on first, this is not going to be conducive to the most effective working relationship." And so you work it out.

F: A final question. We have turned over Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs with remarkable rapidity. Why?

L: Well I think that part of that is because it's a hot seat and people get into trouble there and move. Part of it is because men who take it on don't come committed to stay for the time they should. I think they should come. I think anybody who takes that on ought to come with a willingness to stay on for at least several years, three or four years.

F: The turnover has hampered it to some extent?

L: I do indeed. And above all else, you know, what disturbs me is, the Latin Americans are disturbed because they've come to me and said time and again, "You talk about our turnovers in Latin America. Look what you've had happen to us all the time." And so I think we've got to be a great deal more careful. And they regard this too as a deprecation of the position. One ambassador said to me, "You must remember, when you appoint an Assistant Secretary for this, you are appointing a Secretary of State as far as Latin America is concerned. And this ought to be bigger than almost anything else he could be doing."

F: And the people who work with personalities?

L: Yes.

F: When we started this first interview, you said that you had no great interest

in Latin America prior to coming into the job. You've become simpatico in the meanwhile?

L: Oh, yes, I think it's exciting and I'm fascinated by it. I hope I've made a small contribution and no matter what I do, I know I'm going to keep interested in it, because it seems to me of such vital importance.

F: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

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By Lola M. Lynowitz

to the

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