INTERVIEW I

DATE: July 15, 1971

INTERVIEWEE: WILLIAM S. LIVINGSTON

INTERVIEWER: David McComb

PLACE: Livingston's office at the University of Texas at Austin

Tape 1 of 1

M: This is an interview with Dr. William Livingston who is a professor of government at the University of Texas. I am in his office in Burdine Hall on the campus of the University. The date is July 15th, 1971, and it is about 10:30 in the morning. My name is David McComb.

Start off with your background. Where were you born? When? Where did you get your education?

L: Born in Ironton, Ohio, in July 1920, which makes me fifty-one years old plus a few days. My family moved to Columbus when I was eleven or twelve. I went to Ohio State [University], which was one of the reasons why the family moved to Columbus, so they could be there. Went off to the wars. After the wars, went to Yale. Had a BA and an MA from Ohio State, and did the doctoral degree at Yale, finished there in the summer of 1949.

M: This is in political science?

L: In political science.

M: Any specialty in that?

L: Comparative politics, American government, constitutional law. When we finished, I began interviewing here and there for jobs. The University of Texas produced the best offer and the rank, which was assistant professor, and the opportunity to teach the courses I wanted to teach. So we came down here in September of 1949, with some apprehension because of the reputation which Texas has had for long years, and also it acquired especially during the war. We were in Paris, Texas, during the war for a year, and read the *Dallas News*, which was in those days a rather jingoistic newspaper, which announced with regularity that Texans were bombing Berlin and invading Italy and so on. Anyway, we came down here never supposing that the first academic job would be the permanent academic job, but we've been here ever since 1949. I've long since become a Texan--at least in the eyes of everyone except native Texans. (Telephone rings.) And there's the telephone if you'll excuse me.

(Interruption)

L: Let's see we were. . . .

M: Discussing the University of Texas as an assistant professor.

L: Right. We've been here ever since 1949. We like very much living in Austin. I'm deeply committed to the University.

M: I assume over time you advanced in the ranks.

L: Yes. Let's see, I became associate professor in 1954 and a full professor in 1960--very close to that anyway.

M: And did you get involved in committee work for the University?

L: Like everyone else, I suppose, I had all kinds of committees to worry about. Let's see, if you really want a kind of biographical summary, I was assistant dean of the graduate school from 1954 to 1958. I was--oh, there are all kinds of things. I could give you a documentary summary, if that. . . .

M: Well, what I'm curious about is your background for the work you did get into in the selection--

L: Yes. In large part, that background stems from my own activity in the department of government. I was graduate adviser for some years; I was chairman for about four years. I was very active in the graduate program during those years as graduate adviser, was regularly elected to the Graduate Legislative Council and then to the Graduate Assembly when it replaced it. I'm not sure what the dates of that was. I was the first chairman of the Graduate Assembly and helped to structure it and write the rules for it and so on. And, you know, I was a member of the Graduate Council, which is the advisory body to the dean; I was on the Advisory Committee of the Institute of Public Affairs, the old Stuart MacCorkle Institute.

And then I think what really led most directly into the appointment as chairman of this committee to plan the development of the Johnson School was a curious conversation that I had one day with--not a conversation, an exchange of notes with Harry Ransom. This must have taken place back somewhere in 1965, maybe in the spring, perhaps in the fall, of 1965. But at that time, let's see, Lyndon Johnson was, by then, president of the United States, so it may have been 1964, indeed. At any rate, I sent Harry a note and said in it, in effect, "Here is a great Texan who is now holding the highest office in the land. Why do we not get underway some kind of campaign to persuade him to leave all his

papers to the University of Texas library?" And the answer I got to that was one of Harry's notes, which were always very charming and complimentary, saying that this was a brilliant idea, but he'd already thought of it, and that negotiations were indeed underway, and had been for apparently some time, with the President with that objective in mind. Now at that time, no sort of structure had evolved for the plan that I knew of.

The next thing that happened that I recall was some kind of public announcement that the President had agreed to leave his papers to a library to be built on this campus. I'm not sure that those first announcements made clear what the relation between that library and the University would be or [what] the administrative structure and organization of it would be.

M: But a basic decision had been made then?

L: Somewhere, I gather, in--well this could be verified. It's public record, and somewhere I've got a copy of the contracts. But it was somewhere, I should judge, in the fall of 1965. Then it sat for a while, and nothing seemed to be happening. There was mention made of an institute of public service that was to be created on the campus as part of the same agreement that led to the President's decision to leave his papers here. And I choose the words carefully--it was referred to as an institute of public service.

M: Do you have any idea where that came from?

L: Where what came from?

M: Where that thought came from?

L: No, but I rather imagine it came from Lyndon Johnson.

M: You know it could be that he would just give the papers, and there would be no school of public affairs or anything.

L: Mmhmm. Well, the President was very concerned early on at the difficulty in recruiting for national government service people with a) training and b) background outside the eastern seaboard, and he repeatedly made mention of his distress at trying to find people. Obviously, a man who's got a great many appointments to make is always under tremendous pressure to find good people to use, to appoint. But I think he felt it all the more clearly because it was quite clear to him, as it no doubt had been clear to others, that the universities in this country were not training people explicitly for public service--quite different from the situation, say, in France or Germany where there's a very elaborate program of training directed . . .

M: So this thought of an institute of public service may well have come from Johnson himself?

L: Well, I know that he had it, I know that he expressed that thought on a number of occasions. I have no way of knowing who may have suggested it to him, but from my observations, it seemed to be Johnson's repeated idea and his own. What really bothered him was that he didn't find anybody being trained in Texas for these things. Now there were in existence, and had been for some years in existence, a number of very good schools, most of them associated with universities, that do have, at least one of their functions, the training of people for public service. The one he suggested from time to time was the one at Wisconsin, curiously enough, but the one at Wisconsin doesn't compare at all to the ones at USC [University of Southern California] and Princeton and Harvard, or, indeed, to the Maxwell School at Syracuse. I just think these are the most obvious ones--the Littauer School at Harvard, the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton, the Maxwell Graduate School at Syracuse, and the Graduate Schoo1 of Public

Administration at USC. And it really was those that served as the point of departure for our own inquiry. I don't say "model" because we deliberately avoided doing some of the things that those schools were doing. But certainly, they were in existence, and they served as a visible pattern that we could use or disuse.

(Interruption)

M: Well now, where did you, where were you brought into the development?

L: Right. I'm off my subject here. Somewhere around the first of the year, that is, the first of the year 1966, there were three of us in the department of government who decided that, while a public announcement had been made that an institute of public service was going to be created, nothing visible had yet happened about it. And we decided that we would constitute a kind of delegation and pay a visitation upon the Chancellor. The three of us were Emmette Redford, Ben Wright, and myself.

M: Is that W-R-I?

L: W-R-I. Benjamin Fletcher Wright, who was then professor of government here, and now professor emeritus and had been a chairman of the department at Harvard for long years. He was an Austin, Texas, man originally. He'd been president of Smith and had resigned as president of Smith. And he came here--Harry [Ransom] brought him here really, I think, to head the American Studies program. We then arranged his appointment in the department of government. Ben was a man of considerable and national standing.

So the three of us went over to call on Chancellor Ransom, simply saying, "Look, this thing has been announced, we think it's extremely important for the future of this institution, and we would like to do whatever we can to get it started." Because, at least by implication, we said to him we didn't see anything being done to get it started. What

was holding it up, I don't know. There may not have been any particular reason. It was still obviously early. The President was newly in office, and chances were that he was going to run again in 1968--I got my dates wrong--in 1964, he'd already run, and there was no reason to suppose he would not run again in 1968.

Now, the Chancellor's response to this was warm and of the sort we hoped for. What he said, in effect, as I recall, was that there was no serious obstacle holding it up, that it was time, he agreed, to get on with the job. He would proceed to appoint a committee to begin the study of the problem. Well, that's what we had wanted to hear, so we left contentedly.

About twenty-four hours later, I got a phone call from Ransom saying, "I want you to be chairman of this committee." Now, that was somewhat of a surprise to me for two reasons: both these other men--that is Redford and Wright--were senior to me and considerably more distinguished. Moreover, my own interest in political science is in comparative politics, which means, largely, the study of various political systems, not merely American, and among those various political systems, I concentrate pretty strongly on Great Britain and the British Commonwealth. That would appear to have but little direct relation to such an institute of public service. So it seemed to me that I was not the obvious person to be chairman of this. On the other hand, I think what Harry had in mind was probably that Redford was getting on toward very senior years--he was not old, but he was over sixty by then, surely, maybe sixty-three or sixty-four. I had a good deal of administrative experience in the University. I had worked on a great many committees and councils and so on, so I knew people in a number of University departments and colleges, and it may well have been that Harry felt I would be more

effective in that kind of job. He never explained it to me. I didn't press him on it, and I don't know why he chose me, so I can't really answer the ultimate question, which is how come Livingston got so much involved? It's perfectly true that I have another academic interest in the comparative study of federal systems, the leading one being the United States, and I've taught American government for a long time, and if I'm not interested in training people for public service, at least I'm interested in some of the problems and processes of American government. It wasn't an unreasonable appointment, even if it was me.

So, the next question was to construct the committee, and he asked me, Harry did, to bring him a list of possibilities. So I did, and I included on it those people, those at least fairly senior people, in the department of government who had some interest in public administration or public service, but I tried to include in it a number of people from other departments for a couple of reasons. One was that this school was not to be an adjunct to the department of government--or of any other department. It was obviously to be broadly based and to encompass the kinds of training and skills that are afforded in a variety of at least social science writ large departments, by which I mean not merely sociology, history, economics, but also those larger social sciences, such as law and business and education and social welfare. Now that meant that the list had to be pretty broad-ranging, and it was.

M: There's a basic decision here that's been made somewhere along the line that this is going to be broad-based. Now where does that come from?

L: That's a University decision, I think, rather than a decision brought in from outside by, say, Johnson or--

M: Somebody has the concept that this is going to be an interdisciplinary, broad-based institution--

L: Yes. At this stage though, the stage I'm talking about, that decision was not clearly articulated. It was not--

M: Was it part of your task to articulate this?

L: Yes. Yes. Or, if not of mine, then of the committee.

M: Right.

L: The Chancellor, however, had the notion--in fact, I'd say he had a conviction--that this thing was to be a very broad-based thing. He was not saying to the committee, "Now here's the kind of school I want you to build." But his vision was certainly a very broad-ranging vision, as it is on almost everything. He was envisioning this as a focus for work in the arts, in philosophy, and everything that the national culture could be concerned with.

Now that's so broad-ranging that it gives you very little to go on, and obviously the thing is never going to be quite so broad-ranging as that because ultimately, I think, Ransom's notion, while it's very inspirational, lacks certain qualities in terms of our capacity to execute, to operationalize, the vision. Even so, there is another extreme at which this school could be considered as merely a formal training institute to equip people to pass the federal service entrance examination and go into the federal bureaucracy. And that's certainly not what we were after. I suppose the committee's conception of this thing was somewhere between these two extremes.

When I say broad-based, I mean it is not merely to be training for the national service; it's not merely to be training in a specific social science, such as political science

or law or anything else. Our feeling was--my feeling was--and obviously from his standpoint, Ransom would agree with this--that the training that the school should afford ought to be a broad-ranging, broad-based kind of training in the social sciences and in the adjacent or adjunct skills that would enable students to work at and solve problems in the social sciences. Because government is not something that exists in the abstract; it has to deal with problems, and those problems turn on questions of social relations and technological relations, and only with a good training in social science, technology, the law, [and] other things can a guy successfully tackle problems that government faces.

With that in mind, then, we set out to try to contrive a committee. Some of the people I suggested to him he did not include. One of them, for example, was Alton Burdine, who was on my original list, but Harry deleted his name because he didn't want any deans on the list. This was to be a faculty committee, and whether that's a good rule to follow or not, I don't pretend to judge. But anyway, that's what he thought. I think he deleted Page Keeton from the list for the same reason.

But the resulting list was about, I think, sixteen, maybe seventeen, in number. It was called a planning committee, and technically the Planning Committee for the--I don't know, maybe it was called the--for the Institute of Public Service in the beginning. The reason I hesitate is because we changed the name of it as was one of our first decisions. The people on that committee included, let me see, in the department of government, Redford, Wright, myself, and also Stuart MacCorkle, who was a student of public administration and the director of the Institute of Public Affairs--a specialist in municipal government. It included a couple in history--Bob Divine and, on occasion, perhaps as a substitute for him, it included Tom McGann. It included Bob Sutherland in the Hogg

Foundation who was professionally a sociologist. It included Jack Otis, the dean of the School of Social Work--now there's a dean that was not excluded, perhaps because Social Work was less, you know, a smaller school and was not so demanding. I don't know. It included Dewitt Reddick in journalism. It included Don Goodall, who was chairman of the department of art. This was something of a . . . I was going to say concession; that's the wrong word. It is evidencing of Harry's view that this thing should be very very broad in scope. We had C. P. Oliver, zoologist; we had Steve McDonald from economics; we had Pat Blair from the business school; we had Millard Ruud from the law school, Jerry Williams from the law school. We had somebody from education on that committee; I've forgotten who it was. I can get you a list of this easily enough and it was a matter of public record, I suppose, at least University record. But say seventeen people.

Now that committee began its work in, I should judge, late January or early February 1966. By that time, negotiations were already under way and perhaps had been concluded with a firm of architects in New York and in Washington. A decision had been made by the regents to build a University building and a presidential library as part of the same architectural, and, I presume, construction contract. When that decision was made, I don't really know, and I may have it a little bit too early in the way I'm reconstructing events. But the reason I put it that way was that there was pressure put on us immediately by the Chancellor to prepare some kind of projected space-use requirements for a building to house this school or institute--and that before we had ever had a chance to consider what the function and purpose of the school actually were. Now, I presume the reason why was that the architects had been told to get on with their

job. I don't know what other considerations--I'm sure that's what it was. Obviously, therefore, the architects had been chosen. For the record, there were two firms involved: one was Max Brooks' firm here in Austin--Brooks, Barr, Graeber, [and] White--and the other was Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill in New York, a very distinguished national firm whose representative for this purpose was a very skillful architect named Gordon Bunshaft. If anybody, [a] single man, designed that complex of buildings, it was Bunshaft, although it was an enormous operation that involved a number of architects, both from New York and from the Brooks, Barr firm here in Austin. I don't mean by any means to play down the role of Max Brooks in this thing because their firm labored very hard and put a great many ideas into it, and it really was a joint effort.

Well, but the curious thing from our standpoint was that here we were, just a newly appointed committee, and asked to do first a thing that should have come third or fourth in the line of sequence. So we got together and began to develop space-use, space-need requirements. And the only way in the world you can do that is to make some assumptions, if not decisions, about what will be going on in the building. So we began to reserve space for editors. Well, it's easy to put [in] a director's office, because you know there is going to be some administrative head, but once you say, "We'll have to have some space here for editors," you've implied even more than that--you've just concluded something about what's going on in that building. So we began to reserve space for editors. Somebody is going to edit something. Do we have faculty offices in an institute building? Well, yes, we quickly realized that if the school is going to teach anybody anything, somebody is going to have to do the teaching. So that implies faculty. So where are we going to house them? Well, we'll have to house them in the school. So

we began to line up rows of faculty offices in the plans. We worked, I suppose, six weeks or so on these questions.

M: Didn't you have to have some concept about how big the school was going to be?

L: No. Nobody told us.

M: Did you make an assumption about that?

L: Yes. We had to make an assumption about it, and what we assumed was a student body of two hundred and a faculty, including both full-time and part-time faculty of fifty. So we put fifty faculty offices in there.

M: How do you make an assumption like that? Why not three hundred faculty or seventy or forty?

L: Well, I wish I had a very careful formula which I could recite that we employed. I wish I could tell you that we arrived at this out of a deep experience and the depth of our knowledge about it. But I think somebody said, "Well, two hundred would be about right." And somebody else said, "How many faculty would that be?" And somebody said, "Oh, I don't know, say fifty at the most." So we put fifty. This is what you call scientific planning.

The truth was that the process was being telescoped. We might have arrived at a figure like that--I don't think it's an unreasonable figure, and I think it was a good guess. But it was not an informed judgment; it was a horseback kind of estimate of what might happen. And we said to ourselves, and we said to the Chancellor, and we said to whoever was willing to sit down and read what we wrote that there was a great danger in this because all these space-need requirements implied a great variety of assumptions about program and structure, and that we had not yet addressed ourselves to those questions of

program and structure, but were responding to a kind of crash need, a crash program to develop something about the space use. And we urged everybody to understand that we had the cart before the horse, and that no one should allow himself to assume that because the space requirements said thus-and-so, that the functional needs were thus-and-so. But, of course, that's exactly what happened. It happened to us, let alone those with whom we were communicating. And I suppose, inevitably. I suppose, too, what I'm really saying is that we made some decisions willy-nilly about the kind of function and structure that school should eventually have, because we had to make them while we were deciding on how many rooms should be devoted to this and that. It doesn't solve all the questions by any means, but it predisposed toward solution to some of them. So we produced that first report, and, in it, we recommended a whole set of specifications about how many square feet should be included for this and that and a variety of other purposes. We did not draw a layout; we simply added up figures: so many square feet for the dean's office, so many for his secretary, so many for faculty, so many square feet for classroom teaching, seminar rooms, editorial offices, lounges, men's rooms, elevators, mechanical space, the whole array of stuff that has to be included. What we also said in that--

M: Excuse me a minute.

L: Yes?

M: Did this get you beyond your technical capabilities? I mean, when you start allowing space for, say, maintenance and elevators and things like that.

L: Yes. Let me take that back. I don't think in that report we did specify [mechanical] space. I think what we tried to do is confine it to the operational space of the school, and

then left a margin at the end of 20 per cent or thereabouts for non-usable space. That is to say corridors, stairways, and, above all, mechanical space. I don't think we tried to go into that. We didn't have any. . . . I was going to say we didn't have any architects on the committee. I guess we did not. We had an engineer, Ernie Gloyna, whom I didn't mention a while ago. He was a member of it, though not a very active member. No, we didn't go into that.

What we did go into was the question of a site. Now that hadn't been settled. But in the course of those deliberations, there was offered to us some kind of suggestion about that east-side site, in part because it seemed to be available, and in part because it had to be a good sized site. That's not where we wanted it to go.

M: Where did you want it to go?

L: Well that's the trouble--we didn't know. We wanted it central. We wanted it close to the middle of the campus, but if it were to be combined with a presidential library of the dimensions that were pretty clear even then, then obviously it had to be on the periphery, because there wasn't any central site big enough to accommodate all of it. And we talked about that site as a possibility. I don't have any strong objection to the selection of that site. It was not our decision. But the kind of objection that I do have is the same kind of objection you have to everything. You want everything right in the middle of the campus, and a campus that grows incrementally, bit by bit, each decision being made on the basis of all other decisions that have previously been made, grows without any very coherent plan. There has never been a very coherent plan for the development of this campus. The result is that that site was chosen because it was available and it was big enough, not because it was in the right spot.

I think what we said in that first report was that if it was going to be put out on the periphery, and particularly over on that east-side site, then the University had to face, immediately and squarely, the question of internal transportation because we were getting to the point, with that building as an educational class-teaching institution, where it was impossible to get from one place to another in the ten-minute interval that we still hold to. Since then, of course, we've got the shuttle bus system, which helps, but doesn't solve that problem or come anywhere near solving it. I don't by any means suggest that the shuttle buses came in response to that point that we made; that was a point being made by a great many people who were more deeply concerned with traffic flow than we had to be. All we were saying was that if it was going to go on that site--and we didn't have any better suggestion--then we've got a problem with transportation, and we think that that ought to be included in the planning for that building. It wasn't, and I suppose we were foolish to think it might be, but we haven't really faced the consequences of inadequate internal transportation yet, at least so far as the LBJ School is concerned, because we're just now getting under way. The School has only had fifteen students this past year.

M: So in that first report you gave space requirements, or at least a pretty good idea of what they'd be. You mentioned this problem of transportation. Was that in the first report?

L: Yes. I don't know. It may have not been formally in that report. Let me check on that.

(Interruption)

The first report to the Chancellor from the committee was dated February 24, 1966. It concerned two things: one was the possible sites that were being considered and were available; and the other was to make specific recommendations concerning space requirements. In that report, we elaborated detailed recommendations, as I said, not by

diagram of building structure, but by aggregate space requirements for particular facilities that we assumed would go into it. The total that we recommended at the time was 110,000 square feet. It turned out pretty accurate, I think. I haven't followed through on this very carefully, and there were a number of changes as these several years went on after 1966. But I should just guess off-hand, and you can certainly check this [if] you want to, that the total space allocated to the school is about 100,000 [square feet]. That would include some, I think two, stack floors in the Johnson Library, which were, and I presume still are, reserved for the use of the School, really for inactive collections of documents in the School's library. But this original estimate held up pretty well, came out pretty close, although it's quite clear that the allocation of facilities within the building is not accurately represented by this tentative list that we put in there at the time.

M: Well then, after this report, your committee returned to its original question of the nature of the School?

L: Yes, encumbered by all the assumptions that we had made in this first report--what we had called "incompletely examined assumptions regarding the program of the institute." Well, that was perfectly true. The site was pretty much out of our hands, so we didn't have to worry about that much more. In fact, in that first report, apparently what we said was that site over on Red River had some obvious advantages, and it clearly does, but that if it was to be used, there ought to be same transportation provided. That will take care of itself one of these days, and it was no great issue by any means.

So we then went on to the next task, which was to study the organization and program of the school, try to figure out what we were doing, what kind of recommendations to make with regard to staffing, particularly faculty staffing; with

regard to administrative organization, that is to say, how it should be run and the relation of the school to the rest of the university--whom should it report to, for example; and above all, for the kind of program that ought to be undertaken in a school of that sort.

M: All right. Along this line someplace, is there any input from the White House, from Lyndon Johnson, or from White House staff?

L: Well, it was really quite limited. The label that was first given it was no doubt given it in conversations with the White House, and I suspect between Mr. [William Womack] Heath and President Johnson--Heath then being chairman of the Board of Regents. When you say "Institute of Public Service," that implies a number of academic decisions, it seems to me, and I can come back to those in a moment. But in addition, there was a broad and rather general statement or two that came along in the press releases announcing the agreement between the President and the University, and that kind of thing, which spoke of training people for the public service, or education of the young people of America to provide skilled persons in public affairs, or some such thing as that. But you see those were very broad and not very concretely stated objectives. So it was up to us to take those broad notions and reduce them to more concrete purposes, educational and administrative objectives that a school like this could use to work toward those larger goals. Beyond that, we were really not given either guidance, direction, restraints. And I think this was true through the whole development of the school. We were left pretty much on our own until it came to the question of who should be the dean. And then as we got more directly and ardently into that question, the evidence of interest became much more clear.

M: Before we get into that, let me ask a few more questions. Did you have in mind a model, or did you use another school for a model for this school? Somewhere in California or Syracuse?

L: Yes, I think that would be a fair statement. We didn't want to create here a school that was like any other school. That was just sort of natural jingoism of our own committee, let alone of President Johnson. In fact, I don't attribute that to President Johnson. I think President Johnson's idea was that there were some good schools like that around the country, and Texas ought to have one, too. If you'd pressed him, or if you'd press him now, I don't think he'd say, "Yes, I want to create one in the image of any particular other school." But I think we were trying to make a splash in the academic world by creating a school that had some unique features about it. I don't know whether we will have accomplished that or not, but I can tell you what we were trying to do on that score.

The schools I mentioned earlier in our conversation that were similar to what we were trying obviously did serve as models. I'm thinking of Harvard, of Princeton, of Syracuse, of Southern California. But our program, we early on decided, was to be different from theirs in several respects. The school at Southern California, headed for long years by a man named [Emery] Olson, and in more recent years by [Henry] Reining, R-E-I-N-I-N-G, is probably the largest school from the standpoint of number of students attending and graduating of any in the country. It has a very strong emphasis on local government, county and municipal, relations between them. It tends to train technicians--fire chiefs and sewerage contractors. I'm exaggerating that somewhat, but there is that kind of bias in the USC school. Now those things are extremely important, and I'm not depreciating them. I'm only saying that they may have three or four hundred students in

that school, and most of them will be engaged in sort of nitty-gritty, day-to-day problem-solving administration affairs of local governments.

The Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton is a school that resembles ours. I mean, I suppose we took it more nearly for a model. It doesn't resemble ours; ours resembles it. There is, however, in the Woodrow Wilson School a considerable undergraduate program. Students are admitted at the beginning of their junior year for a bachelor's degree program in public affairs. We think--we thought, as a committee, and I still think individually--that that's a mistake. I think if you're going to have this kind of program, it ought to be a professional or quasi-professional program at the graduate level and that you ought to be able to assume that the student has had a broad-ranging undergraduate program. So we did not anticipate any undergraduates. Now we may have differed somewhat from President Johnson on that. There was talk occasionally of graduate and undergraduate [programs], and when Mr. Heath announced this thing originally, he talked about programs from the undergraduate to the doctoral level. Well, that was, we thought, rather grandiose and ill-suited for a school of this sort. Or, at least if it was to expand into all those levels of activity, that expansion ought to be postponed for quite a while. I still think this is not the place for an undergraduate program. I don't know what an undergraduate program or degree in public affairs may be. At any rate, that's one count on which we differed considerably from Princeton.

Harvard has a rather different kind of program. Harvard, like Princeton--these things get so intertwined and tangled--both Harvard and Princeton appoint very few people to the faculty of the school. The faculty of the Woodrow Wilson School is almost wholly drawn from persons who are appointed to the other existing academic

departments and borrowed for part-time or temporary time by the School of Public Affairs. At Princeton, the same thing obtains. At USC, they're almost all appointed to the faculty of Public Administration; that's a separate faculty at USC. Harvard has as its strongest emphasis, I should say, the training of persons who are already in the public service. A good sprinkling of foreign students, but a great number from Washington who have been five-to-ten years in the public service and are granted a year off to strengthen their training or re-equip them with skills that weren't afforded when they went to school and so on. Well, I think that's an important and very useful leaven to the program, not only because you do some good by training people like that, but because the presence of those people on your campus is a very interesting fillip to the educational experience of the other students. And so we intended from the beginning that there should be a considerable number of mid-career people involved in the Johnson School. But we didn't intend to emphasize it as much as the Kennedy School, then the Littauer School, emphasized it.

The Maxwell School is different, and I don't know how to explain that difference. The Maxwell School includes in it all of the departments in the normal social sciences. It's a thing you wouldn't want to duplicate because it's so clumsy. And even if you could, and I don't suppose you would. It simply grew incrementally in a local situation. It has a pretty strong bias in the techniques of administration rather than the substance of the problems being solved, or at least that's my impression. And it has, more than any of these other schools, a large increment of foreign students that are brought in there for training. Now, we couldn't possibly emulate Syracuse as to structure. We had no particular ambition to emulate it so far as its emphasis on foreign students was concerned;

we did not want to emulate Princeton's undergraduate program; we did not want to emulate Harvard's emphasis on mid-career people; we did not want to emulate Southern California's emphasis on the mechanics of local government. What we were therefore left with was a design that was being shaped in long conversations that would look something like a graduate program with a faculty based principally, but not exclusively, in the existing professional and social science departments rather than exclusively in the school, with a broad-ranging set of interests that would encompass not merely local government, but government at all levels. I mean by that county and municipal, but state-level government as well, national government of course; and indeed, there's no reason why a school of this sort cannot focus on international affairs in a couple of senses: one, that the national government, if not the others, has a continuing need for well-trained people in international relations of all manifestations, and the other is that there are a number of international institutions that are, I think, still increasing in importance--the United Nations being only the most obvious one of them. There's no reason why a school of this sort should not help prepare people for that kind of activity.

The other thing that we wanted to do, and I think this does distinguish it sharply from any of those other schools, was to encompass within our scope things that were not strictly governmental in character. That is to say, we did not confine our interest to the training of bureaucrats. Now most of these schools do, perhaps inevitably, and perhaps that's what we'll wind up doing here as well. But we wanted to see if we could not do some other things. One would be to prepare people for participation in life other than the administrative life. For example, what about . . . let's train a guy for legislative staff work. I don't know how you'd train a man to run for the legislature and win--I don't think

anybody can do that really. You might provide special training programs for newly elected legislators. That's done, and we've had one of them already here at the Johnson School, and that's very valuable, I think, but as for an ordinary student coming in, I don't see how you can do that for him. But there are other things. Committee staffs, for example--one of the things that makes the legislature work is the effectiveness and efficiency of its staff, and there isn't any place I know of that tries to train staffs of that sort. There's a good opportunity. Another kind of thing is the sort of publicly-oriented activity that is entirely outside government in the formal sense. I'm thinking of, oh, better business bureaus, chambers of commerce, the local Red Cross, the community chest--these may be the poorest examples rather than the best, but there are many more people concerned with public problems and public affairs than those who somehow are employed by government. And those people aren't touched by any existing programs, and somehow it seemed to us that if we could devise a program that would strengthen their hand, better equip them to do their very important jobs, we'd be contributing something of importance. So, we had that notion in mind.

M: Is this tied in with the change of the name?

L: Yes, you bet it is. The received title was "Institute of Public Service," and one of the very first things we considered was that title and whether it was suitable. And we decided it really wasn't obviously, and made a very strong pitch that it should be changed in two senses: one, we felt that the word "institute" was inappropriate because it somehow implies an organization within a university that is non-teaching in character. It seems to suggest research exclusively or research and public service training--I mean in the sense of short courses for auditors--or almost anything. It's a kind of catch-all label

for things that are not teaching departments. And we wanted it to be clear that this was a teaching educational enterprise. So we urged that it be called a school rather than an institute.

Then the other question was "public service." While that was less suitable, and it was true that we were thinking in terms of serving the public need, still the "public service" has a narrower meaning of the bureaucracy. It's a little like whether you take the term "civil service" to mean that organized and classified, security-of-tenure promise-of-retirement structure that has a capital "C" and a capital "S," or whether you mean by "civil service" merely the entire civil employment staffs of government. Well "public service" seemed to us to have that kind of confusion built into it. And we didn't want it thought that we were merely training people to be government employees. We wanted this concern about the public's affairs to be at the heart of it. And I must say that in this concern, I think John Gronouski has taken hold of this notion and carried it forward just exactly as we had thought and hoped it might be carried forward. So we suggested it be "affairs" instead of "service," and so our recommendation was that it be called a "school of public affairs." And that decision was accepted, as you know. That's what it's called today.

M: So this, in effect, symbolizes your concept of the school?

L: Yes, in a way it does. I don't suppose it symbolizes it to everybody, because not everybody is as concerned about the intricacies of definition as we were and as I must appear to be right now. But to us at least it symbolized that, and I think it conveys something, at least to an academic community.

M: Now, did your committee go so far as to try to define courses, specific courses?

L: Not specific courses. No. Areas of interest, rather than courses to be taught. And in the second report, the August report, we detailed a good many of those areas of interest. But I think at no time were we saying, "Now there ought to be a course every so often on this subject," except in the very broadest terms. We did talk at one time about the importance of modern educational technology--computers and reading machines and so on--in such a school as this, and we allocated space in the building for such machinery. And that implies something about the courses that are to be taught. But nothing much more concrete than that I think. But, you see, if you set up a scheme in which one of the program emphases is to be on, let's say, the relation between science and government, that implies a range of courses that is almost inescapable if you're going to have that kind of program. And I suppose one could argue from our suggestions about program emphases that the courses follow naturally. But that's a different kind of thing. . . .

M: Did you define how long it would take a student to get through this?

L: Yes, we said two years. We were designing a two-year program, or at least that was what we expected. We didn't design it very precisely, for two reasons, I suppose. One was that we couldn't. That is to say, we were too far ahead of the event to be able to know what kind of faculty was going to be available, what the interests of society would be five years down the road, that kind of thing. The other was that we didn't have a dean, and obviously the dean and the faculty of that school would have to be allowed to shape it to a very considerable extent. So we were torn between two conflicting objectives: one was to keep everything wide open and flexible so that proper decisions could be made by those responsible for them in the end; and the other was we had to make enough decisions about what the school should be like to give us something tangible to work

with--to build a building for, to appoint a dean of. You know, you can't go to a guy and say, why don't you come down and be dean of XYZ, because the first thing he wants to know is what does that mean. And if you don't know, then you can't very well persuade him to accept it. So we had to have something, but we didn't want to have too much. And I think these reports that we put in are vulnerable on the grounds that they are neither the one nor the other. But that was quite deliberate, and we felt we had to have it both ways, in fact.

The reports do not go into full detail on a lot of things. For example, one of the things that a school of this sort can very well build into its educational program with great benefit to itself and its students, and other agencies is an internship program. So that for part of the educational experience, the guy goes out to a Red Cross office, or to a political party headquarters, or a government bureau, or a local city council, and he serves for a period of time--six months or something like that--in practical learning and in the practical performance of those functions. Well that's a very educational experience. If these guys are any good, and I presume they will be, then the service that they can perform for the agency where they are working is important as well. Now how much of that should be a part of the program? He's got two years, we were saying. Should he have six months as an internship? Should all students have an internship? What about a guy coming out of six years in the government service--should you make him an intern? That didn't seem to make much sense. So obviously, it was going to have to be flexible here and there. We didn't try to solve all those problems, and they haven't been solved yet. We do have an internship program going in the School this summer.

M: Now this same committee apparently was charged with finding a dean.

L: Later.

M: Later. Why would this committee select a dean? Is it natural that this would be a concluding function of your work? Or--

L: Well, let me go back and bring it back up to that point. The first job was that architectural--not architectural, but [that] space-requirement job. That was--I've given the date--it's late February, I think. That report was sent in, and, without any further instructions, the committee then plunged into the next task, which was devising the organizational structure of the School. We worked at that through the spring and summer of 1966. This group of, say, seventeen worked very hard. It was a very arduous assignment really, that committee was. They would meet at weekly, or more frequently than weekly, intervals from time to time.

M: What, about two or three hours at a--

L: Yes, usually in the afternoon, sometimes at night. We met down in the Alumni Center quite frequently, in that Nowotny room, you know that big room? And if we could meet after five o'clock, according to the then-existing rules, Jack Maguire would provide drinks. Oh, we co-opted Jack Maguire very quickly, not merely because he's such a good host, but because he's such a savvy person about the University and the University's relations with the rest of the world, including the political world. Jack has known the Johnsons and has worked with them very carefully for a long time. Well, anyway, we met in various places, but that was a common place.

During that spring, we brought in the deans of a number of these schools who sat down with us for a couple of days each and talked at great length about what they were doing, where their strengths were, where their weaknesses were, what they thought about

education for public service, public affairs generally, and this was enormously helpful to us all. We brought, I suppose, four or five. Steve Bailey was the dean at Syracuse; he came down. Marver Bernstein, the dean of the Woodrow Wilson School, came down. Henry Reining from USC was here for a couple of days. I had asked Don Stone who was the dean of the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at Pittsburgh to come down, and at the last minute our committee came unstuck in the middle of May--there wasn't going to be anybody here. So I had to call him up the day before and call him off, which was . . . I had to do rather sheepishly. Oh, Bill Carmichael, who was the dean of the Cornell School of Administration, came down. Brewster Denny, who is the dean of the Graduate School of Public Affairs at the University of Washington in Seattle, came down. There were, I guess, half a dozen all together and these were lengthy sessions. These were two or three three-hour sessions a couple of times with each one of these people. And it was there, I think, that we learned most about what we could do, where the problems were, where the support might lie for programs of this all went into the mill, grist for the mill. In the course of those interviews and the other conversations that this largish committee had, we arrived at a set of propositions about the character of the School. We did it by lengthy discussion, which was then crystallized bit by bit into a kind of an unstated understanding.

And then, ultimately, what I did as chairman of the committee was to sit down and try to write up what I understood we were going to do, going to recommend. And that write-up was couched in the form of a series of theses, and there was some ribaldry about the difference between me and Martin Luther when I laid the theses on the table instead of nailing them to the door. But we wound up with sixty or seventy propositions,

if not theses, about how the School should be organized. You know--the dean should be an old man, the faculty should be smart--there are several things you can say. And that was the basis of the second report, the report on organization and function. We took those theses, and we went over them word by word, we added to them, we knocked some out, we chopped them up, we rewrote them in committee meetings on the basis of all our previous discussions and particularly our previous discussions with these various deans.

So, the second report, which is really the most important of the lot, was a fairly elaborate report embodying this series of propositions, which did not deal with personalities, as far as the deanship was concerned at all, and no longer dealt, except by implication, with questions of space and space use. This was one of those we had already done; one of them we had not yet tackled. That report was then handed over to the Chancellor, in August, was it?

M: By the way, did your committee address itself to the problem of financing such a school?

L: Yes. August 1st, 1966, is the date of the report on the organization and program of the school.

At that point, we had not really dealt with questions of finance, except in the rather broad sense. There's something in here maybe about, "We assume that [the] State Legislature will appropriate funds to support this school," that kind of thing. We were quickly involved in it, however, at the next stage. The next stage was prompted by the report. Now, this report went in August first. Everything ground then to a halt. That was August 1966. We heard nothing out of that until October 1967. And we were much distressed. To this day, I do not know what caused that enormous delay. I think it was lamentable. The Committee got more and more edgy. And finally, many of them simply

lost interest because . . . what the hell! We had spent endless hours on this thing, and we were left with the feeling that nobody cared. So some of them felt kind of personally offended by it. But those of us who were more centrally concerned, and there are degrees of this in that committee, obviously, were distressed, not for that reason, but because here was a great project which seemed to be glimmering, and we could not understand, nobody ever explained to us, what was happening. I still don't know what was happening, except I presume that there was a serious disagreement between the Board of Regents--I mean at the level of the Board of Regents, the Chancellor, the President of the United States, and that body of advisors around the President who were themselves anxiously working on the Johnson Library.

Now I don't, to this day, know what the explanation for the delay was, but I've got a couple of intimations. There was one man on this committee who--to put it this way seems insufficient, and I don't offer it as a total explanation by any means, but one consideration--Stuart MacCorkle, who was a member of this committee, had for long years been the most active person in the University of Texas in the field of training for public service, because he directed that institute [Institute of Public Affairs], and while, in my judgment, he'd done a pee-poor job of it, he was, nonetheless, the only guy in charge of it. He usually had two or three graduate students over there, working as research assistants, and doing a graduate program in public administration, but he never would go anywhere with it. And he always complained that the University wasn't supporting him adequately, and still, when the University did support him, he wouldn't do anything. As you can see, I'm not one of his great supporters, and I have a very strong and a very accurate feeling that he's not one of my supporters, either. Well, Stuart was a member of

this committee, and I had recommended that he be put on it, and the Chancellor had put him on it for two reasons: one, he was keenly interested in the subject of public administration, which this is very close to; and the other was the position he occupied in the university. It was natural that he be on there. He and I always get along well. I'm not reciting any history of animosity between the two of us by any means. But Stuart disagreed very strongly with one of the committee's deeply held judgments and strongly offered recommendations, and that is that the basis of the faculty of the school should be the joint appointments, rather than appointment exclusively in the school.

Now that raises some awkward questions. "Public affairs" is not a discipline. It is a program that can be based on the use of skills derived from other disciplines and the employment of faculty derived from other disciplines. And the question that universities have to face in this instance, as in many other interdisciplinary instances, is whether you try to develop a faculty in the interdisciplinary program or draw that faculty from the established and acknowledged disciplines. Stuart felt strongly that this faculty should be a public affairs faculty, or public service, or public administration; whatever he was going to call it; he would have said public administration faculty, à la Henry Reining. He was a great admirer of Reining, by the way.

The committee, on the other hand, felt that you can't build an interdisciplinary faculty; you've got to build a faculty based on the existing disciplines, and if you're going to recruit faculty, you've got to be able to offer the prospective appointee a solid base in his own discipline. You can't go out and hire professors of public affairs; nobody produces them. You go hire economists and sociologists and historians and so on. And if you go to an economist or an historian and say, "We want you to come down and be in

this school," he wants to know, "What about the department of economics--what do they say about my coming? What's their reaction?" So if you can appoint him jointly between the two, we believed, you'd have a much stronger base for the ongoing operation of the school and a much more attractive position to offer a man who's considering coming here. Stuart disagreed, that's all. And when we turned in the recommendations, Stuart filed a dissent with the Chancellor. I presume it was with the Chancellor. And that may have been something that held the thing up. Now, Stuart was a Kappa Sigma; so is Frank Erwin; so is Bill Heath, as I remember. Whether that has anything to do with it, I have no idea. I recite it as a phenomenon. At any rate, nothing happened about our report for a long time.

M: What did you do about it?

L: I called Ransom up before and after each Regents' meeting. Ransom is not always as straightforward as he might be on some things, and he's been a very careful figure politically. He never gets out on a limb, and, in fact, I've seen instances, to be frank, where he's pushed other people out on his limb. Now I don't suggest that he was doing that in this instance. I only suggest that he probably knew a great deal more about what the problems were than he was ever willing to tell me.

M: So what would he do? Did he put you off, or what?

L: He would put me off. He'd say, "Well, they didn't get around to it this meeting. I've got that on the agenda for the October meeting or the June meeting, and I hope very much, I know that Mr. Heath has read the thing--he wants to talk about it with President Johnson." Well, that went on for a long time. When President Johnson makes up his mind to do something, he does it pretty straightforwardly, and he may do it with subtlety

and political skill, but he doesn't have to dawdle. There was some disagreement here. Whether it was that they wanted to check out this report with the deans of some other schools--that might've been. But who were they? They'd all been involved. Whether people in the White House--Johnson or others--simply felt that there wasn't any great urgency about it, so they kept fending off Erwin and Heath--I think that's a possibility. Or whether there was really a disagreement within the Regents, or between the Regents and the White House over the structure of the school--possibly.

In the event, what happened was that after a good many put-offs and "I'm-sorry-we-didn't-get-around-to-it-at-this-meeting" reports, as Ransom reported them to me, the Regents did act on it in October of 1967--I think that's accurate. They did several things at that meeting. They accepted in principle the report of the committee, without committing themselves to details. Somewhere I've got the minutes of the meeting. If it needs checking, it can be found in, I think, October 24th or 27th, 1967. First, they accepted the report in principle, but not committing themselves to all details, but they did explicitly accept the recommendation that the faculty be based on joint appointments. Second, that--and again, an explicitly accepted detail--that the Institute of Public Affairs be absorbed into the Johnson School of Public Affairs. Now that's another recommendation. I haven't mentioned it in this survey because there was never any serious discussion about it in the committee. But this obviously touched on MacCorkle. It was saying that the Regents had now decided to do what MacCorkle didn't want done about the appointment of the faculty, and had explicitly decided also to abolish the Institute of which he was the director and have it absorbed into the School of Public Affairs. It's curious that the only two specifics in the report that were mentioned and

approved were those two things about which MacCorkle was most directly concerned. It's about that time MacCorkle was declaring himself a Republican; I don't know when that was. I'm serious--I don't know when that was; it may have been a good deal earlier than that, and I don't know whether that's relevant here at all to what we are talking about.

The other thing that the Regents did at that meeting was to thank the committee and discharge it. Now, wait a minute; is that right? I ought to track that down; I'm not sure how they phrased it. Anyway, they said the next task was to go on with the job of finding a dean.

M: All right, did they eliminate your committee then?

L: Well, that's what I'm trying. . . . Let's turn this off for a minute, and let me do a little checking.

(Interruption)

I've turned this thing off for a moment, and I've checked some records, and I'm wrong about the date of that Regent's meeting. It's July 1967, so instead of twelve, thirteen, fifteen months, it's ten months or thereabouts. July 28, 1967. What they did, several things, one: they officially confirmed the name of it as the Lyndon Baines Johnson School of Public Affairs, which is what the committee had recommended. Next, they recommended that the committee report be received--now that's the August 1st, 1966, report on organization and program--"that the members of the committee be sincerely thanked for their labors and accomplishments, and that they be discharged from further responsibility," which is not unreasonable, and nobody felt offended by that. Three, "that the planning committee's report be approved in principle and specifically,

that the school initially offer only a master's degree, with the granting of the doctorate be developed later"--I'd forgotten that part.

M: You had recommended this also?

L: That's right, yes, we had recommended that if there is ever to be a doctorate offered, it should be postponed for the time-being, or for the first years of the School. Now this may have been part of the obstacle because Mr. Heath had always been referring to programs from the undergraduate to the doctoral level. Maybe he got his back up because of our recommendation that that be put off. Second, "that the School be headed by a dean rather than by a director." And we had recommended that. We thought it followed from the change of title from Institute to School. So we were agreed on that. "That the School be administratively independent of other schools and colleges with its dean reporting directly to the Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs and the Chancellor." In modern terms, you'd define that as the President rather than the Vice Chancellor. And that we had recommended that it be treated like any other school on the campus--law, arts & sciences--all reporting to the President. "That that the faculty of the School be constituted through joint appointments, with the established departments and schools, with the interdepartmental professorships presently to be funded with money set aside for the School, and the individuals to be approved through the usual academic channels and recommended to the Board of Regents." All right, that's the joint-appointment principle that may have been the hang-up. All those things were approved explicitly in addition to the in-principle approval of the general report. Next, it says that "a small interim faculty advisory committee be appointed to go by the Chancellor to institute an immediate and urgent search for a dean and to proceed with the specific planning." Now that's the thing

I was unclear about. They discharged the existing committee. They instructed that a small interim faculty advisory committee be appointed to go ahead with plan and to go ahead with this dean search. Next, "that the present Institute of Public Affairs and its several programs be merged into the LBJ School of Public Affairs, and that Professor Lynn Anderson be named acting director of the Institute."

Now, it's about this time that MacCorkle resigned from the University, and that's a very curious story, too. By this time, let's see, I'd been chairman of the department by then for a year or so. MacCorkle was a member of the faculty of the department of which I was chairman. MacCorkle was scheduled to teach a course--he taught one course regularly--in the fall of . . . I guess it must have been the fall of 1967. The year I'm not certain about, but that's about right. I made some kind of phone call to Alton Burdine who was dean of the college. I guess MacCorkle was somehow scheduled to be freed from teaching that fall or something like that. That was the kind of question that came up. So I called Alton, and I said, "Do you know anything about MacCorkle's appointment this fall being, you know, free time or reduced load, or something of the sort?" And he said, "Bill, didn't you know he'd resigned?" And I said, "What do you mean, resigned?" And he said, "He's resigned from the University." That was the first I had heard about it, and I expressed some surprise at not having been advised. So I said no I did not, and Alton said, "Well, that's what Ransom told me." Apparently, Ransom had a letter. So I called Stuart, with whom I had, at least ostensibly, been on very good terms. And I said, "Stuart, Alton tells me that you have resigned from the University, and I don't have any record of that. Is that so?" His answer to me was that if I was getting my information elsewhere, I could go ahead and get my information elsewhere. I thought

that bizarre. And I said, "Well, look, I'm not trying to embarrass you. All I need to know is do I put your name in the Final Announcement copy or do I take it out?" "Well," he said, "you go and talk to your other friends up there who are supplying information." So I called Ransom--I don't know what he meant or not--and Ransom sent me a copy of a letter; it was not his resignation letter, but it was a letter from Ransom acknowledging the resignation, something like that--so I had something to put in the file. We took him out of the Final Announcement, and that's the last we've ever seen of him around here.

Now parenthetically, one reason he may have been that irritated was because I cited Burdine's name in my opening conversation, saying, "Alton tells me" this. He and Burdine were as near to being mortal enemies as anybody. They had nothing but absolute scorn for each other. And as long as we're recording indiscretions for posterity, I once heard Alton say, of somebody else, "Why, even Stuart MacCorkle wouldn't do a thing like that." What that all stemmed from, I don't know. It goes back to the [Homer] Rainey episode. MacCorkle was . . . MacCorkle changed sides in the middle of that, and Alton was, of course, vice president under Rainey, and it harks back to that. But I don't know about it, and I'm not making a great point of that. I do make a point, I suppose, of the curious linkage between MacCorkle's role and the long delay in the Regents' [response to our report], and secondly, MacCorkle's resignation and how it may or may not be linked with the decision by the Regents to do these things that he was either affronted by or opposed to. I must say, however, that Stuart did not, as I remember, make any great point about preserving the independence of the Institute of Public Affairs. That came up in the committee meetings, and it was agreed to easily; there was very little discussion about it. I think all the committee ever recommended was that it be absorbed

into the School, and that leaves open the question whether it should be retained as an entity within the School's structure and program. But I suppose, looking back on it, that Stuart was somewhat distressed that his Institute was being so cavalierly disposed of by this committee. I know that he felt very strongly about the question of the faculty structure. Now, how all that relates to his resignation, I simply don't know, and I will never have an opportunity to find out from *him* I suppose, because . . . oh well, for all kinds of reasons.

M: So, your committee then is dissolved?

L: Good for you. Yes, the committee was dissolved by the Regents at the July, not the October, meeting; and the next question was how to create a small interim faculty advisory committee. Well, it says here it should be appointed by the Chancellor.

M: Let me interrupt you a minute.

L: Yes.

M: This is a good place to check signals with you; it's kind of a natural breaking place. Do you have a luncheon appointment, or can we go on, or what do you want to do?

L: Well, I'm sort of wearing out.

M: Do you want to take a break?

L: Yes. Do we have to finish this today?

M: No. But see this is kind of a natural breaking point.

L: Yes, I agree. Why don't we call this off.

End of Tape I and end of Interview I

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