INTERVIEW II

DATE: July 19, 1971

INTERVIEWEE: WILLIAM S. LIVINGSTON

INTERVIEWER: David McComb

PLACE: Livingston's office at the University of Texas at Austin

Tape 2 of 4

M: Let me identify this tape, too. This is a second session with Dr. William Livingston. Again, I'm in his office at the University of Texas. The date is July 19, 1971, and it is 9:10 in the morning. My name is David McComb. Last time we left off with the first committee being dissolved and the Regents appointing a committee to search for a dean.

L: Well, the Regents' action in July of 1967 was to thank and discharge the committee. Now the question was to create a new committee to do whatever else was necessary.

(Interruption)

At the July meeting, the Regents accepted the report and accepted in particular several specifics in the report--

M: Which we have on the tape.

L: --mentioned on the other tape. Now I find in my file a letter dated July 10, 1967, which I wrote to Chancellor [Harry] Ransom. This, obviously, is a response to a conversation that I had had with him in which he was telling me that the Regents were going to consider it at that meeting. So I was providing a kind of *aide-mémoire* to Harry about

what the Regents ought to do, and the letter is very general. It just says the Regents should be asked to authorize the appointment of a new and smaller committee to carry forward the task of appointing a dean. And then what I asked was for him or the Regents to make as clear as possible to the committee what they ought to do, how far they ought to go, and how the search for a dean should be integrated into the responsibilities of the Chancellor and the Board.

And then, at his request, I suggested the constitution of a new and smaller committee. One, two, three, four, five--I suggested six people including myself--no, not including myself--and those seven, including myself, were then subsequently appointed. What Ransom did, as I remember, was simply call and ask me if the present committee, the then-present committee, should be continued. And I said no, I didn't think so, because it was too large. It had about fifteen and counting all those who came in and out over the couple of years, or about a year, it had about seventeen or eighteen people all together. Well, that was too many, and some of them weren't interested really. Ernie Gloyna, you know, Don Goodall, they were interested and responsible people, but they didn't get to all the meetings. They were out of town; they obviously were not as close professionally to this concern as others were. So, it was obvious that we needed a smaller one. So I suggested a smaller committee, and he said well, who should be on it. So this letter I'm describing was a response to that invitation to suggest the names. And the names, for the record, were Pat Blair in the Business School; Millard Ruud in the Law School; Jack Otis, the dean of Social Work; Steve McDonald in Economics; Bob Divine in History; Emmette Redford in Government; and myself. So. . . .

M: Any significance in the discipline pattern of those people?

L: Yes there is. The significance is merely that we wanted a multidisciplinary committee. We wanted represented in it the disciplines that would be at most direct utility and relevance to the program of the School. This doesn't include all of them by any means, but it's a pretty representative committee. Also these people were very active in the earlier committee.

M: Also, one other point: is this sort of committee normal when searching for a person at the stature that a dean would have? I mean, is this the normal way it's done?

L: I think every university has its own scheme for those things. This was five, four years ago, and our rules have changed a great deal since then. We now have formal provisions for the election of search committees of deans and up, I guess. We didn't then. I think there was no formal rule at all, and they were appointed committees. And the notion that students should be on it, for instance, is widespread nowadays and hadn't even been thought of in those days. So there wasn't any question about it. We did get a student complaint late in the game that there were no students on the committee, and they wanted to discuss possibilities. It wasn't very urgently put, but it was some law student--I don't know now who it was. But this was obviously not a committee on which a student body could be represented because there wasn't any student body in the LBJ School because it didn't exist. That was one reason. Another reason was that there was a good deal of sensitivity involved in a lot of what this committee was doing. That doesn't exclude students, who are just as responsible as anybody else, [but] we were already a long way down the road, and to bring in new members, students or otherwise, and try to brief them on everything that had gone on would have been a very difficult task. So we fended off that suggestion.

M: But the procedure of appointing a small committee to search for a dean would not be too unusual?

L: No, this would be quite common. The size varies, of course. I think most of these elected committees we have now run to a dozen or more. This small-size committee was very effective, I think, at least from the viewpoint of the people concerned. And this was a very concerned and hard-working committee, and I think its smallness contributed to its effectiveness. We--well, the big committee worked a great many hours in preparing those three reports, but the small committee worked a great many more hours over a longer period of time and very intimately.

Shortly after that Regents' meeting then Ransom did appoint this seven-man committee, and the seven-man committee was instructed to do a couple of things--two or three things. One was--I'm not sure this was all laid out clearly at the beginning, but the committee began to function, and from time to time new tasks were assigned to it. The most obvious task was to find a dean. Another that took a bit of time now and then was preparing budgets for the School, because it had a budget long before it had a dean and long before it had any students or activities. Budgets have to be prepared so far in advance that nobody knew exactly whether it was going to be required [or] necessary since nobody knew when the School was going to begin its life. And it had a budget of oh, three or four hundred thousand dollars a year for a couple of years before it ever did come into existence. Most of that money just lapsed, I suppose, although I didn't have much to do with the spending of it.

The other thing we had to do was to perform whatever administrative role there was for the project called the LBJ School of Public Affairs in those days before a dean

was appointed and the program actually began. I'm thinking of architectural planning--we did a lot of that for the School's part of that building; budgeting; we made some recommendations with regard to appointment of' faculty. We had a, oh, a kind of a library-building project that took a bit of time. So there were a number of things like that, ongoing administrative kinds of things. So you had the administration, you had the budget-making, you had the architectural planning, and you had, above all, the search for a dean.

M: You again are chairman.

L: I was chairman of both the small committee and the preceding larger committee. Right.

M: And this was an appointment by Ransom?

L: Right.

M: Now. How much power did this committee have? Do your decisions have to be approved by Ransom, or are your decisions really recommendations to Ransom for the Regents to act on?

L: You're using the present tense, but you understand this committee no longer exists?

M: Yes.

L: Well, everything . . . we were an advisory committee. Everything we did took the form of recommendations or reports, first to Ransom and then to [Norman] Hackerman. That is to say, the administrative structure changed again during the committee's life, and Hackerman was named president, whereas when we began, he was vice chancellor for academic affairs and in a very difficult position where he was, but he wasn't the chief administrative officer for UT Austin. And there's a letter here somewhere in which Harry says to me--Harry Ransom says to me--"I think after this, you'd better send everything to

Norman," which was perfectly all right with us. Really, through most of the life of that second committee, we reported to, and worked with, Norman rather than Harry.

M: But your committee is, was, essentially advisory.

L: Yes.

M: But your advice was often taken. Is that correct?

L: Well, we . . . yes, I think, for the most part, the things we recommended were accepted. I think that the committee was also thought to be an obstacle--not on Hackerman's part, but on the part of [Frank] Erwin at least. And I suspect Johnson. Though most of my contacts with Johnson were indirect--not all of them, but most of them--particularly with regard to the deanship. Now everything else was all right. I don't think we could complain about inattention to our recommendations or complain that they were over-ridden, though they were not always put into effect.

For example, when it looked as though the search for a dean was going to be even more protracted than it was, it obviously was important to get this School under way, and we were on the point of recommending an acting dean for the School, which would have been really too bad. But this thing had so much publicity, and it was so important for the University, that we thought we ought to get the School under way no later than the fall of 1970 if we could do it, even if we didn't have a dean. And what we'd have done in that case, I don't really know. I think what we would have done would have been to recommend Redford. The committee got together informally in his absence--he doesn't know this--and agreed that if we got to that point, we would have named Redford. Two reasons: Redford was the single man on this University faculty who stands out most sharply in the field of public service [and] public administration. He was the senior man

on the committee in terms of years; he'd been most deeply interested in the development of some kind of program of this sort for a long time; he had a lot of national academic standing. And for all those reasons it seemed as though we--well, there was another reason; another is that he was old enough so that he was not a viable prospect to stay in the job. For example, if I had become acting dean of the School, there were obvious questions about whether I should continue to be the dean of that School. And I never wanted to be dean of the School.

Maybe I should make that point while we're talking about it, because the question was raised several times. I don't--it was never offered to me. It was a perfectly natural suggestion, however, simply because I was more intimately connected with the planning of the School than any other single person. But I didn't want it for two reasons. One reason is that that is not my own academic world. It could have become so, or I could have been, you know, modified somehow. But my world is comparative politics, and particularly Britain, the Commonwealth, and comparative federalism. Redford's in public administration. If I'd been in that field, it would have made better sense. The other reason, however, since we're being frank in this, is that I didn't have enough muscle to stand up to the pressures that would be brought to bear on that dean. And I'm talking about pressures from the political world.

One of the great dangers, we always felt, was that this School might become a kind of political instrument for the Johnson group. I don't mean just Lyndon Johnson, but, for example, the thing that we were most afraid of was that somebody would be named dean who was obviously a political appointment. And we feared that that would just wreck the School so far as its academic status and credibility were concerned. I think

we were quite right about that, and I think that got the committee into more hot water than anything else. It was very difficult to explain to the President why some man in whom he had great confidence, and who had an excellent track record, was not suitable for this deanship. And he had several pet candidates; they varied from time to time. The President never tried to tell the committee what it should do, but he made it very clear that he had some prospects for the deanship. That is, he never tried to guide the development of the School--no, that's wrongly put; I think he *did* do that--but he did not try to press the committee to recommend anything about the structure, organization, functions. But he did press the committee with respect to the appointment of the dean.

M: How did he do that?

L: Not always personally. Not always personally. He did it through Erwin. He did it through Hackerman.

M: Hackerman or Erwin would say, "What about so-and-so?" or something like that?

L: Yes, yes, exactly. I've got all kinds of examples of this sort. When the committee--now let's see, the original committee--we've got ahead of our story just a little bit. The original committee had three tasks that were assigned to it. One was that architectural space requirement thing, the second was the organization and function of the School, and the third was the recommendation of prospects for the deanship. Now we sent three reports--here it is--the third report came fast on the heels of the second. The second we talked about on the other tape.

M: Right, right.

L: That was August first.

M: Right.

L: The report on organization and program.

M: We didn't say anything about this third report.

L: The third one is dated August third, 1966. And it deals wholely with the deanship question. We had submitted the names of eight people, rank-ordered in terms of committee preferences. We added that everybody on that list we considered to be highly qualified, and although we did rank-order them, because that's what we thought was wanted, we didn't have any strong feelings that number one was far, far superior to number eight on that list. Shall I read in the names?

M: Yes.

L: All right, this is in the--this is the rank-ordering. Number one is the first preference and so on. First preference was Lincoln Gordon who was a long-time professor at Harvard and, at that time, was assistant secretary of state for Latin American affairs. He was very shortly to become president of Johns Hopkins University. In fact, within a few weeks he became president. The second man is Ralph Huitt who was assistant secretary of state for legislation, I think it was, in the Department of HEW [Health, Education, and Welfare]. A PhD from this institution, and he's now executive director of the National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges, a very distinguished political scientist. Number three: Charles Schultze who was then director of the budget, has now resigned and is at the Brookings Institution. Four was Bob Wood who was undersecretary of HUD [Housing and Urban Development] and former director of the Joint Center for Urban Studies at Harvard-MIT. He is now president of the University of Massachusetts. Five: David Truman who was vice president of Columbia--no, well, I don't know. He was the dean of Columbia College, and then I think became vice president, and was vice

president during the troubles, left there and became president of Mount Holyoke, I believe. Six: Gardner Ackley was an economist at the University of Michigan; at that time, when we first sent this in, he was chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. He then became ambassador to Italy, and since January 1968 has gone back to the University of Michigan. It turned out, curiously enough, that Gardner Ackley, as a fresh young instructor, spent a year or two on the faculty at Ohio State where I was an undergraduate, and I had him as a freshman in beginning economics course, and I didn't realize it until we met and talked with him later on about this job. Number seven was David Bell who was then director of AID [Agency for International Development], and had just, at the time we were doing this, resigned from the government to become vice president of the Ford Foundation, where he still is, I think. Number eight was Willard Wirtz who was secretary of labor under both Kennedy and Johnson.

Now those are the eight people. We sent that report to the Regents. One of the interesting responses to it was a note that came--I'm sorry, oh, six weeks later, something like that--from Erwin in which he said, "I've read your list of distinguished suggestions," and so on. "Have you ever thought about the following?" And he suggested some others to us. Now he didn't press us very hard. There wasn't much--you know, it wasn't embarrassing to us at all. And it was a sort of personal letter to me. I had known Frank for a good many years. But it was "Dear Dr. Livingston," signed "Frank C. Erwin, Jr." I don't know. It doesn't mean anything particular, I don't suppose. The names he suggested were Otis Singletary, who was by then--oh no, I was going to say he was at the University of Kentucky; he wasn't. I'm not sure where he was. He'd been the first director of the Job Corps, you know, when he left here. He'd been on the faculty in

history here, and then he was Ransom's assistant. And then he went to the University of North Carolina at Greensboro, I believe, as chancellor. From there to the Job Corps and then, I guess, went back to Greensboro and from there went to Kentucky. He's a man of some distinction, and it was not an inept suggestion by any means. The second was Dean Rusk. What the devil--who was the third?

(Interruption)

The third one that he named was Eric Goldman of Princeton who was sort of the resident intellectual in the White House, and who, according to Frank, was returning to Princeton to teaching and to writing a history of the first years of the Johnson administration. Well, Frank may not have known all that we all now know about the relations between Goldman and Johnson, which were--well, they weren't all that abysmal, but I don't think by the time this School came into operation that the President would have approved Goldman as dean. Maybe I ought to mention the--

M: Specifications?

L: Specifications that we were looking for.

M: Did your committee set these specifications?

L: Yes, yes.

M: These weren't dictated to you.

L: We weren't told, no, we weren't told at all. We were just told to get on with the job of finding a dean or making recommendations for the deanship. It was a little screwed up, I think, because we were never given enough guidance, I think. We'd have welcomed more than we got. Guidance in the sense that we were told if you've got one strong name, send it in. And then, on other occasions, we were told, "Send us a number of

names so we can choose." Sometimes we were told to rank-order, sometimes we were not. Sometimes I was told to get in touch with the people and see if they were interested before wasting anybody's time by recommending them. Sometimes it was just the other way; we had to have them vetted at the White House before we got in touch with anybody. It was a nicely confused experience. But [as for] the specifications, we had three things that we said were important. One was that the man be academically respectable. Now we didn't mean that he had to have long years of academic experience. He didn't have to come from a university, but he had to have--there had to be some reason to suppose that an academic community would accept him as legitimate.

M: Does this mean a PhD or the equivalent?

L: Or the equivalent. Yes, though you could find people without PhDs who would be academically respectable. So I wouldn't say a PhD is a *sine qua non*, but most such people would have a PhD, yes.

M: Publication?

L: Maybe, maybe. There are all kinds of ways to achieve academic respectability. You don't really have to publish; you don't really have to have a degree; you don't really have to have college teaching experience, but typically, you'd have all those things.

M: Right.

L: David Bell, for instance. I don't suppose he has a PhD, and he has taught very little, if anywhere, but he was a guy who was thought of as intellectual, had moved in academic circles, and would have been credible to an academic community.

M: Right.

L: So that kind of not very well-defined criteria were used. A second--beg pardon?

M: Go ahead, go ahead.

L: A second was that he have some kind of public experience, some reason to think that he would be credible as a public affairs man, just as on the other side as an academic man. Typically here the guy would have had twenty years in government service, you see, and that would have qualified him. But there are all kinds of ways to acquire that. A long-time academic student of public service, public administration, would have been all right. A man who'd consulted frequently, or been on a number of government commissions, or had been elected to office, or, you know, he'd had some direct personal acquaintance with public life. Again, it's almost impossible to specify what qualified a man in terms of that criterion. But you can tell when a man has or hasn't got it without being able to specify the criterion you judge by.

The third thing [was] that he must give evidence of some kind that he'd be a good administrator--either by having administered large enterprises or for some other reason. But these were the three obvious--the three tangibles.

M: Right.

L: Academic credibility, government experience or an equivalent, administrative capacity. Now the other one--the less obvious and less tangible [qualification]--was there was a political understanding here. However much it's an academic school, it is still a school named for Lyndon Baines Johnson. It's still a school in which he was going to play a very important role: in raising funds for it; at that time, we thought, teaching in it occasionally; being available to its students--coming and going. And it didn't make any sense at all to put somebody in this job who was just personally unacceptable to Lyndon Johnson.

M: Right, right.

L: If we 'd put, say, Barry Goldwater. . . .

M: Right.

L: Or Eugene McCarthy--to take one Republican and one Democrat--well, it wouldn't have worked, that's all. And the guy could not have succeeded in that job. So while we were not seeking a political appointee, we were seeking a man who would be acceptable to the President. Now, I think the President was pretty broad in his net here. I don't think he was--he never really insisted, "I want this guy." Except once. Now I think most of the people that we came up with, he would have been glad to have. We screened them ourselves for this kind of judgment, although we couldn't judge everybody. And a lot of people that we thought well of, and had reason to suppose would be acceptable, turned out not to be acceptable, for reasons that I cannot understand now.

M: Yes. All right, so you drew up these lists of names and you'd submit them.

L: Yes.

M: Then what would happen? They'd come back and say, "No, not acceptable?"

L: Occasionally it would be in that form. Sometimes it was a matter of my finding out orally finding out. For example, I would call Erwin, and I would say, "We've been talking about the possibility of X or Y. What do you think?" Or, "Have you any knowledge about the President's views about this fellow?" Sometimes he'd say, "No. Forget it." Sometimes he'd say, "I don't know. Let me check." And Frank is never very good at following up on things like that, so then I'd have to badger him occasionally. But for the most part he--through most of the period, we worked together pretty well.

M: He was, in effect, a liaison between the committee and the White House.

L: Not always, but he did perform that role. It was not exclusively his role.

M: I mean you didn't submit names directly to the White House?

L: Yes, I did occasionally. Not to the President, but to Joe Califano, for example, or Larry Temple, or Jim Gaither, all of whom played some varying roles in the development of the School and who were very helpful to us, I must say. They worked hard on this thing. They'd come to Austin occasionally. I went to Washington several times in the course of it. And we were on the telephone frequently. And Norman Hackerman was in touch with the White House a number of times on these kinds of things. So it wasn't all going through Frank by any means.

M: Right. Okay, what happened to your original list then?

L: I'm not sure I can tell nowadays; I can't reconstruct the specific responses to it. Some of these people were probably vetoed. I'm not quite sure what happened next though. I know some of them were vetoed. By veto, I mean--

M: Eliminated by one, for one reason or another?

L: Well, by Frank or President Johnson for the kinds of reasons I've been mentioning. I'll just not be able to put all of it into sequence, I'm afraid, and whether it can be done that way by going through all these files I'm not sure.

M: Well, let's see what stands out in your mind about this.

L: Yes, let's do that.

M: Okay, you--

L: Early on, the committee, in going through this list, decided that some of these people were almost hopelessly unavailable. The list changed almost weekly. For example, Lincoln Gordon became president of Johns Hopkins, so we just forgot about him. Bell

we put very low on the priority list because he had just become vice president of the Ford Foundation. So we tackled these people one after the other, and we made a tactical mistake. I think, because we'd settle on one of these men as the most available and most desirable--that is a combination of these two things--so that he stood out. When Gordon left the government to go to Johns Hopkins, the next man, who was number two on the list, became number one as it were, and that was Ralph Huitt.

M: Right.

L: Now, Ralph Huitt was well known to several members of the committee: to me, to Redford, who'd supervised his dissertation, to Pat Blair, who'd grown up in the same town where Ralph lived long ago, Jack Otis knew him by reputation because of his role in Health, Education, and Welfare. I don't know whether any of the others knew him personally or not. Millard Ruud knew him personally for reasons I don't remember. Anyway, we all respected him very highly. He was a distinguished political scientist. He'd had this very appropriate experience in HEW. He had specialized in the study of the Senate. He had worked for Lyndon Johnson as senator. He had worked for [William] Proxmire as senator. He had worked in at least two of Lyndon Johnson's campaigns, and we had every reason to suppose that he and Johnson were very close. All right. We went at some stage, early, the next day presumably, with a recommendation for Ralph Huitt. We said, in effect, that he is so outstanding on this list, and the likelihood of our being able to get him is so much greater than [that] of anybody else on the list, that we recommend that he be appointed. Now what happened here, I don't know.

We had Ralph down here for a couple of days. He met with Ransom and Hackerman. He met with Erwin. We had a party for him at our house--you must ask me [later] about entertainment expense. Erwin and he were closeted--

(Interruption)

--for half an hour--not closeted, but they were back in my study while everybody else was out in the living room leaving them alone so they could talk. Erwin was very pleased with him; there's a letter from [John] Silber somewhere in these files. I don't know how Silber met him, but he did. We got several deans together and took them to lunch, and Silber was very strong on him. The committee was unequivocal and greatly enthusiastic about him. As far as I know, nobody said no. The question then was let's get an appointment to him. So I guess it was after his visit that we put in a letter saying let's go with Huitt. If we can settle it this way, let's settle it quickly. He's been here; let's not fool around rank-ordering other people. Let's just see if we can get Huitt. So that was our recommendation, and we sent it to--I've forgotten now whether it was to Ransom or to Hackerman. I think it's about the time when things were changing.

Then we sat and waited. And we began to set a sense of *déjà vu* because we waited and waited for the original report to be treated. Now we waited and waited and waited. It was out of our hands. We expected any day for Ransom to--it was Ransom rather than Hackerman--for Ransom to extend him an offer. Nothing happened; nothing happened. I'd called Harry, and he'd say, "'Well I haven't heard anything yet." Nobody even mentioned this to Ralph. Ralph was sitting in Washington waiting for the phone to ring, because the conversations had gone that far--not that anybody offered him the job, but it was perfectly clear what we were talking about. We had spent lots of hours talking

about the prospect and so on. Somehow Ralph got vetoed, I presume by the President of the United States. And finally, when word came back to us that that was not going to go, we were mad, we were irritated, and we were absolutely amazed. We got no explanation for it, never have had one. But the thing that hurts me most about it is that nobody had the courtesy to get on with communicating with Huitt, with Ralph. And he was--he's very deeply resentful of this treatment.

M: You mean he was just left, without. . . .

L: He was left without any word for three months. Finally--and finally Emmette called him--Redford called him. He simply couldn't let it go any longer, and when we found out that it was not going to be approved, Emmette picked up the phone and said, "Ralph, I've got to tell you that this thing is not going to go through." He said--and I didn't talk with Ralph about this at that time myself--he said that Ralph was simply quiet for about thirty seconds. And what had happened was that he and his wife had discussed this thing round and round and round, and they were prepared to accept it. And I personally think Huitt would have been a magnificent dean. As it turned out, he had a heart attack subsequently, and maybe, maybe you can say it turned out for the best. But we were non-plussed; we were appalled at the way he was treated. We resented the delay, we. . . . Well, I was going to say we resented the disapproval of our recommendation--I guess that's true, too. But we never claimed that we had the right to make the appointment, but only to recommend for it. But we thought we were pretty shoddily treated.

M: Sure.

L: So we then tackled the question, the task, of putting together another list. We went back to the old list, and we got together a new one.

M: Now this raises another question. Is there a problem of salary in all of this?

L: Scarcely ever mentioned. There was no real problem of salary. Uh, I couldn't tell you right now what the dean's salary is. I suppose it's on the order of $40,000. But it, the money, could have been made available, and if it was a matter--as it probably would have been in some cases--of finding supplements, I think that could have been handled. I think Johnson could have taken care of it readily enough, and I think he would've.

M: So that was really no difficulty?

L: No. In most of the conversations we had, it wasn't even mentioned. Because you don't. Before you get the appointment made, you talk about salary, but [in] most instances, it was not a serious question at all. I--I don't know whether it had been discussed with Huitt, although I suppose it had been. He and Erwin talked about a lot of things, and I presume it included that.

M: So, your committee picked up again?

L: So we picked up again. And we--you know, this committee ran by fits and starts. We'd sit and sit and sit for weeks on end sometimes without--just wondering what was going on. Let's see. If I could put a couple of dates together, it may make a little better sense out of this.

(Interruption)

Let's see, the Regents acted in July of 1967. Then, in August or September, the smaller committee was appointed and charged with the dean search responsibility. So it was in the fall of 1967 that we raised this question of Huitt, and by the time we got over it, several months had passed, you see. We'd really put all our eggs in one basket, and maybe that was a mistake. Maybe we should not have assumed that he was *persona*

grata. But we did, and it never once occurred to us that he'd be vetoed for whatever reasons they turned out to be. So we spent several months there in the fall and winter of 1967-1968, and I can't tell you now when we finally concluded that it was hopeless, and told Huitt that it was hopeless. But it was probably in January, February, March of 1968. Now, at that stage, we then had to turn and reconstitute the list. And that meant starting from scratch because people on that initial list had, you know. . . .

M: Long since scattered.

L: Yes, they'd scattered, taken other jobs, disappeared. So while there may have been other discussions, and there may have been another communication or two containing recommendations, the one I have here is in May 27, 1968, and this is the next major communication. Now meanwhile, a whole bunch of things had happened. Mr. Rusk paid a visit to Austin for one thing. Isn't that interesting? We had this letter from Erwin back in September 1966 that suggested these three names that I mentioned--Goldman, Singletary, and Rusk. Well, Rusk showed up; he was going out to the ranch for something or other. There was a reception given for him down at the Commodore Perry. And curiously enough, Max Brooks had a table model of the design, you know, a little. . . .

M: Right.

L: One foot high and about six feet square on a table.

M: Right.

L: And he carried that around. I don't know where it is now. It's quite an attractive thing. It was very very artistically done. But that was there on display, and Rusk met everybody, and so on. Now he was not--we were not being pressed to consider him, but I think that

was part of the reason he was here. I met him, though didn't have any long conversations with him. All the members of the committee were invited to the reception, and usually, around here faculty members just don't get invited to things that faculty members ought to be invited to regularly around here. But in that case, there were these six or seven people at the party. The repeated suggestion was made to us that Walt Rostow might be available for this deanship. The committee considered that very carefully.

M: This is coming down [from the top]?

L: Yes, I don 't know who really suggested it to us. I would frequently get suggestions from Ransom or from Hackerman that obviously were inspired. I mean by that that somebody deliberately inspired them. And I think that's probably how the name first came to us, although it was a fairly obvious suggestion. Now I might as well talk about the Rostow business. The committee weighed that one, deliberately and carefully, and came down with the very strong opinion, and quite unanimous opinion, that that would be a bad mistake.

M: Why?

L: Two reasons: one was that, more than any other single person, Rostow was the President's alter ego, the President's principal officer in foreign affairs. He was much more visible and obvious than Califano was in domestic affairs. But we'd had the same objection to Califano, and I told Califano that. Not that he was a candidate or applicant or anything of the sort. But the question came up because of Rostow. Now that's the first reason. We feared that he was so closely identified with Lyndon Baines Johnson that appointing him as dean would be construed as a political appointment and would be construed as symbolizing the extent to which the School was to be seen as an instrument

and extension of Lyndon Johnson, and that was the very thing that we were most afraid of. If this school was to have academic credibility, if it was to be an academic success, it had to be accepted as a legitimate academic enterprise. It could not be accepted or construed as a political instrument or a personal instrument of Lyndon Johnson.

M: Wouldn't you say the same thing about Dean Rusk?

L: Yes. Although I think our consideration of Rusk was also colored by the fact that he had had very little academic background. He taught one year at Mills College or something like that. I think at that time we did focus on that aspect of Rusk. I don't know, but I think most of us thought that Rusk was less obviously identified with the President's personal position than Rostow. You see, Rostow was, after all, the White House officer, and Rusk was a Cabinet officer.

M: Right.

L: So, I think there was a degree of separation with respect to Rusk that . . . didn't obtain with respect to Rostow. The other reason--I said there were two reasons principally why we did not want to recommend Rostow. The other was that--now let me state this very carefully--that we feared he had lost credibility in the academic community by virtue of his strong identification with the war in Vietnam. I am not saying--I am *not* saying that the committee disagreed with his political views and chose not to recommend him.

M: Yeah. Right.

L: I do not, to this day, know what the committee's views on the Vietnam War are, or were at that time. That was never considered. That was never part of this thing.

M: But you did recognize it as a problem?

L: We recognized that his position with regard to the war, regardless of our own views of his rightness or wrongness, had weakened his acceptability in the academic community, and we feared, therefore, that the appointment of Rostow as dean would impair the capacity of the School to recruit faculty and students of first quality.

Now it has been suggested to me, both orally and now in the newspaper, that the committee shot him down for his political views. That's a simple-minded view of it. You will recall that in July of 1971, a few weeks ago, there was a story in the Austin paper, which seems not to have been picked up around the country, to the effect that the committee rejected Rostow because of his "hawkish" views. Now that is a misstatement of what took place. Curiously enough, the letter I wrote to Norman Hackerman on May the twenty-seventh was obviously leaked to that newspaper reporter, because there isn't any question that he had my letter in front of him when he wrote that story. Now who leaked it, or who gave him a copy, I have no idea. I probably never will know. But on May 27, 1968, I sent two letters to Hackerman. One letter contained a new list of possibles. The other letter said, "I'm sending you a letter recommending persons for the deanship. The most conspicuous absentee from that list is Mr. Walt Rostow." Now the reason I wrote that letter was that we were coming under very strong pressure to put Rostow in that deanship, and we weren't going to do it. Now that is why I said earlier today that I think maybe the President, or--and certainly Erwin considered the committee as an obstacle to some of the things they wanted done.

The Rostow thing blew hot and cold. At one time, we thought we had it settled, and then, all of a sudden, Joe Califano and Jim Gaither and Larry Temple showed up in Austin, and we had dinner with them down at the Headliners [Club]. The committee and,

I think, Erwin and those three people. Now that was after this letter had been written. I think what happened was that the President sent them down here to talk to this committee and see if there wasn't any possibility of getting that changed. Erwin and I got into a shouting match at that dinner.

M: At the Headliners Club?

L: Yes. He saw--see now this is after May twenty-seventh, but I don't know what day it was. I suppose I could find out somewhere, but I don't know off-hand. He, by then, had seen both these letters. The leading candidate on our list was Ralph Huitt. We did this deliberately. Curiously enough, I'm showing you the letter right now, and you can see that the way the letter is structured, the list begins at the bottom of page one and continues on page two. Huitt's name is leading the list, and it is the only one at the bottom of page one. Pat Blair and I were having lunch down at the Citadel, and it was just about the time these letters were being sent in. I think they had been sent in, and I was showing a copy of it to Pat, who was on the committee, and Erwin walked up. And I showed him a copy of the letter there, and his response when he saw Huitt on there was to snort, take the copy with him, and walk away. Never said anything. Well, I don't know what that meant. I think it meant that we were putting him in an embarrassing position with the President. We didn't mean it that way, but we still didn't know why Ralph Huitt had been vetoed. He was still our favorite candidate, so we put him on the list again. In fact, I had checked that with Ransom, or maybe it was Hackerman, before we did it, and he said, "Well, if you want him, put him on there. It's all right." So we did.

Now we'd sent all these other names in. The White House obviously saw this letter, and obviously saw the Rostow letter; they were companion letters. When those guys came down here--Gaither and Califano and Temple--we talked about people on this list; we also talked about Rostow. Erwin accused the committee of making political judgments, or making judgments based on political considerations. I denied it, and explained, as I have just explained to you, what the bases of our decision were. I said, "If you read the letter, you can see in the letter very clearly that the reason is this; it's not that." So he went on talking and continued to say that we were making political judgments or acting for political reasons. And I said finally, "Frank, I don't think you ever read the letter, or if you did, you didn't read it carefully." And then he got mad. Of course, he was mad all along anyway.

Califano, during that meeting, made the sort of point you were making a moment ago. He said, "I don't really understand this. How come you say this about Rostow, but you've got Willard Wirtz on the list that you sent in for approval?" And then I made the point that I was making to you, that this was a very different kettle of fish. Walt Rostow was far closer to the President than Willard Wirtz ever was. Matter of fact, Willard Wirtz was vetoed, so that wasn't much question, I don't think. But when Califano was asking about, "Why is Willard Wirtz okay, and Rostow is not?" I said, "Wirtz is a cabinet member; he's not close to the President. He's not thought of--he's not identified with the President in the public mind, as Rostow is, and so on. And he said, "Well, how about me?" Lightly, jokingly. And I said to him, "Joe, deep as I love you, I think we'd take the same view about you, and we wouldn't recommend you." Well, this was given and taken as a friendly joke, but I'm quite sure that that's what the committee would have thought,

and it would have been consistent on it. I think both of the reasons I suggested with respect to Rostow were disqualifying reasons in our view.

M: Well now, is Rostow the man that the President said, "Now I want you to appoint this man?"

L: Yes. He never said that to me.

M: But he was the one.

L: It was clear that that's what he was saying to the University of Texas. And he went on from there. At that meeting--no, not at that meeting, but sometime shortly after that, I had occasion to talk in person with Califano--perhaps in Washington--and said something about Rostow, that I was sorry it had broken up in a shouting match or something like that. And he said, "Oh, forget about that. That's a dead question. Don't worry about that anymore."

But the President, it turned out, was still worrying about Rostow. I don't know quite what the sequence of events was, but it was pretty clear that the President wanted Rostow here. If he couldn't get him in the deanship, then he wanted him on the faculty. He wanted to bring him to Austin to help write the memoirs, you know, at least that. Maybe other reasons, too. Walt had served him long and faithfully, and skillfully. He depended on Walt and liked Walt. He has a kind of blind spot about Walt as a matter of fact. I think there's a--I don't know how to explain it, because I don't know either one of them that well. But on some things where Walt's just let him down since he's come to Austin, Lyndon is just blind to it. And I know this by talking to other people who work in that same team down there.

At some point in the development of the affair, MIT opted not to invite Walt back. Now when that really happened, I don't know. And I don't know where it fits in terms of the growing interest on the part of the President in Walt's appointment here. But it's true, certainly, that even after the committee had delivered this letter, and we'd had this long conversation with the White House staff people, the President was still trying to get Walt appointed down here. The committee never had any objection to appointing Walt, but they did object to appointing him as dean. He's a man who's controversial, no doubt, but that's all right. He's a man with a prodigious record of scholarship and a good teacher, I'm sure, a lucid writer. He was just a guy who's got all the qualifications, and we felt there was no reason why he should not be appointed to the faculty. There were others on the faculty who viewed that prospect with some dismay, but not in this committee. The committee was unanimous in its feeling that while Walt ought not to be dean, there was no objection at all to his being appointed to the faculty. Now let me just get ahead of the story a bit and finish up this Rostow story.

M: Right.

L: There are two episodes. I don't have the whole picture; I can tell you what I know from my own experience and knowledge, which is disjointed. One episode followed shortly after the events I've just described. Norman Hackerman and Lady Bird happened to be on an airplane together going from Austin to Washington; it was a commercial plane. She came in and sat down beside him, and they talked all the way to Washington, and Norman called me the next day and told me about the conversation. Mrs. Johnson was deeply interested in the School, and was all along, and she was deeply distressed that it wasn't moving any faster. And principally that the deanship question was causing such

trouble. Not merely the Rostow part, but you know, we were having a hell of a time trying to find a dean. There's no question about it. And that bothered us, and it bothered her, too. She was sort of baring her soul, more or less, to Norman and part of the problem you see was, "Well, if we can't find a dean, we know where we can get one; he'll be a good one. Why don't we appoint Rostow?"

M: Yeah.

L: Now she put him on the spot this way, and he--I wasn't there, so I don't know how he handled it, but apparently he explained again why the committee wasn't going to recommend him and so on. Whether Walt was aware of all this, I don't know. He says now being quoted in the newspaper that he never was an applicant, never was a candidate, and didn't know he was under consideration. Well, we never told him, and Norman was quoted now in the *Dallas News* as saying that he never told Walt that Walt was being considered as dean. Whether he knew it from other sources, I don't know. Maybe he did. Maybe the President had said to him, "I'm going to make you dean," and this is why he was so concerned about it. That's guessing; I don't have any reason to think that at all. I'm just guessing.

M: What would have happened if Rostow had been appointed dean regardless of the committee? Say the Regents appointed--

L: You mean even after we had written this letter and made that recommendation? I suspect the committee would have resigned.

M: What I--it's obvious that your rejection of Rostow carries weight in the way people came to talk to you and your committee. They wanted your approval.

L: Yes, that's true, I'm sure.

M: And they did not choose to bypass you.

L: No, they didn't.

M: So I'm curious now what would've happened if they would have, or did they have the power to do that? Obviously. . . .

L: Oh, I think they had the power to do it. It depends on how much you're willing to pay.

M: Then the committee--

L: Usually, the exercise of power in that form carries costs that just have to be matched up against the benefits.

M: If you had resigned, it would have become a public affair then?

L: I don't know that it would have. I think it would have been very difficult--if the committee had resigned--to keep it from being a public affair, but I don't think that committee would have called a press conference and denounced anybody. In fact, I suspect that committee would have simply resigned and not said anything to anybody and declined to explain publicly why they had resigned.

The President is an interesting kind of fellow, you know. He considers himself an almost academic man. Now that may put it a little strongly. But he did teach at one time, you know. He taught high school speech, and he's talked since then about going *back* to teaching, which is a little ridiculous because he was never really did teach. That was a very limited experience. He has a kind of populist respect for the academic world. He's a little contemptuous of academics, but nonetheless, he knows they've got something he doesn't have. And he's a little jealous of it, I think, and so he's uncertain of his own position, of his own capacity in an academic situation. And this is one reason, I think, why he's never been willing to come back to the School and teach. When he faces it, he

doesn't want to do it. So I think he was more sensitive than a lot of people would expect about the committee and the committee's prerogatives. I think also that Erwin--Erwin was outraged at the committee--furious--and mostly at me. And he never forgot, never forgets, has an enormous memory for vindictiveness, Erwin does. Probably Johnson, too. The more curious question to me is why Erwin would be loath to stomp on the committee.

M: All right, why?

L: I don't know the answer to that one. I can sort of see a reason why Johnson would be wary of an academic committee, but I don't really see anything in Erwin that suggests that kind of delicacy.

M: Okay. Were there any sort of personal threats that. . . .

L: No.

M: They're putting pressure on you.

L: No, not directly to me. When you said, "Could they have done it?" and I was saying, "Yes, they could've done it, but it's a matter of the costs," well, you know, the members of that committee were all human beings; they were all vulnerable.

M: Sure.

L: Those guys play power with skill and knowledge; they know how it is. Maybe Jack Otis's mortgage could've been foreclosed, I don't know. There are all kinds of ways that I have no knowledge about, except that I know they can be found and used if you're serious about putting pressure on a fellow: bank loans, salary--

M: Right.

L: --your kid getting what he wants when it's time for him to get it. There are all kinds of ways to bribe people that are short of actual bribery, and they're both positive and negative. So, I have no doubt that if they wanted to do it, if they really wanted to press the question and pay the cost, they could have forced the committee into doing things of this sort.

M: But they did not.

L: But they did not. I suppose--now maybe I'm exaggerating their capacity to do it, and I'm really sort of speculating more than anything else because that's not my world, and I don't know how it works. I think the costs were more than they would have been willing to pay, or they didn't know how to assess the costs. That's probably the answer. What would they have done? What would Johnson have done if this committee had resigned, called a press conference, and denounced him for forcing a political appointment on them. I doubt if he'd want that, and he didn't know that we wouldn't do it. But, as I say, this is not any more than just speculation here.

M: Well, nonetheless, they respected the committee?

L: Yes, they did.

M: Which is. . . .

L: Yes, I think that's true. They respected it. At least they respected its position if not its judgment.

M: Yes, right, right.

L: Now the next thing that happened was, "All right, if you're not going to name him dean, then what about making him a professor?" Nobody objected; at least the committee thought that would be fine. But the committee wasn't in the business of appointing

professors. Universities have their own deliberate ways, usually, about appointing professors. Now this must have been late spring of 1968, and the question is how to get Walt appointed? Nothing happened. Well, the President's still in office by--let's see, I guess he had decided not to run again--that was March 31, 1968, wasn't it? What happens to Rostow? Well, most of us assumed he'd go back to MIT, I suppose.

Anyway, nothing seemed to be happening here, and the President got edgy about this. Mrs. Johnson got edgy about it. They'd keep calling Norman and saying what about Rostow? And Norman, I think, was a little reluctant perhaps to press that question with the appropriate department. But he got himself in a bind, and he called me one day, and he said, "I'm in terrible trouble. I had the most amazing conversation on the telephone last night that I have ever had." Lyndon had called him from Washington and just chewed him out for fifteen minutes on the telephone, and the longer he talked, the madder he got. You could tell whether he was happy or unhappy when he was talking to Norman because he was either "Doctor" or he was "Norman." When he was in his friendly, avuncular mood, it was "Norman" this and "Norman" that. When there was any strain on the relation, why, then it was "Doctor." Well, this conversation started out "Norman" and got very quickly to the "Doctor" stage, and--I did not hear it; all I heard was Norman's report on it. He said he was cursed, he was sworn at, he was told that if he didn't get off his A-S-S and get this thing done, he would never live it down. If we didn't want to appoint Rostow and his wife, we could damn well get somebody else to put up a school of public affairs. He was going to take the whole thing, including the presidential library, and put it somewhere else if we didn't hurry up and do something about this, blank, blank, blank, blank, blank, blank. So, Norman said, "I think if we're going to

appoint anybody, we'd better appoint him." Not only that, Johnson told him exactly what he wanted. He wanted Walt to be appointed--now I don't know--at $40,000--no, not $40,000; $35,000. $35,000. I don't know how insistent he was on that salary figure, but the salary figure was certainly mentioned. And he wanted his wife appointed at $15,000. And if the University couldn't do this, by God, he was going to put the School of Public Affairs somewhere where they'd appreciate it. Well, Norman, you know, how was he going to turn around and appoint these people overnight? That's what got Ransom in trouble was appointing people in airports and that kind of thing. Do you know that?

M: No, I don't, but. . . .

L: Ransom used to run into a guy and say, "My, I think we ought to have this man in Austin." And he'd appoint him right then and there, and then--well, you guys have got one like this in the history department Harry appointed in an airport somewhere, and when he got him here, the historians wouldn't have him. So he was appointed something else. But that's another story.

Norman called me and said, "What can we do about it?" And I said, "Well, I think the faculty will agree to these appointments, but it's not going to be easy, and I don't think you ought to call them up and tell them what you've just told me." And we talked about this for a while, and I agreed to be the middle man on this.

So I went to the department of government, the department of history, and the department of economics. I did not tell them that the president of the University had just been sworn at on the telephone for fifteen minutes by the President of the United States. But I did tell them that Norman was under enormous pressure to do something, and do something quickly, about the appointment of the Rostows. In about forty-eight hours, I

guess, I was able to arrange meetings of the history budget council, the government budget council, and economics budget council and ask each of them [to take some sort of action]. I didn't attend them. I had to work this through the chairman. I don't know how much he told each of the budget councils. But each one of them was asked to respond to the suggestion that either or both, or neither, of the Rostows should be appointed to their faculty, and would they be willing to recommend such an appointment.

Well, as it turned out, I'm not sure of the specifics of each one was, but there was a recommendation from each of the three budget councils sent to the President through the Dean--very quickly--and communicated to Hackerman by telephone at once. The department of government, of which I was chairman--but that didn't mean I was making all the decisions for the department by any means--invited both of them to become members of the faculty, that is, both Walt and Elspeth to become members of the government department faculty. I'm not quite sure how extensive the offers from the other two departments were, but in the event, Walt was appointed jointly professor of economics and history, and Elspeth was appointed associate professor of government and of American studies. Some of the people in the government department felt that that's not what they meant. What they meant was both or none, but I didn't understand it that way at the time, and I'm not sure it was articulated that way at the time. And in the event, it's turned out all right. Elspeth is a respected member of the government department faculty, although she's not here very much. She spends her time in American Studies and American Civilization, where she's associate director or something of the sort. And she's very good at that. But she's respected, liked, even welcomed by this department. I don't know what the relations of Walt with either the economics or the history department may

be. They've been pretty good with the government department, although they're fairly distant relations. But it's sort of interesting to me to find myself now accused in the public press of having thwarted Rostow's appointment as dean for political reasons, which on the face of it's not true. But what makes it interesting is that it was I who served as the intermediary to arrange the appointments of both Rostow and his wife to the faculty. So that's about the end of the Rostow-for-dean story.

M: Was there any more word coming out of the White House?

L: No, I don't think so. I may have forgotten an incident or two.

M: But, I mean once the Rostows were offered the appointment, did that end the White House. . . .

L: No, I--no, it's not the whole of the White House story here by any means. There were other suggestions made to us--both before and after the Rostow affair. The Rostow thing sort of built up to a great momentum, then we turned him down as dean, and then it took six months for all this, but finally their appointment was arranged, but we still didn't have a dean.

M: Right.

L: Now let's see, the people that the White House really suggested--this is not a sequence, but the first one, of course, was Dean Rusk. But that was a very low-keyed suggestion. There was no pressure brought on it. There was a public statement somewhere, because I've seen newspaper references to the possibility of Rusk's being appointed. But it was--he was never very seriously considered here by the committee. At one time we got the suggestion that Gale McGee might be interested and available and might make a very good dean. By that time we were getting very nervous about suggestions of that sort.

You know, Ralph Huitt had been vetoed and that strained the relations really from there on, probably on both sides. I think Johnson was skittish about the committee, and the committee was skittish about Johnson from there on. We lived together, but a little apprehensively.

Gale McGee had very little to recommend him, except that the President thought he'd be a good dean. He was obviously a strong Johnsonite and had been from the very beginning. He was in his first term as U. S. Senator. He was described to us as having been a member of the faculty of the University of Chicago, and then had taught at the University of Wyoming or something like that. Well, we did a little checking on him and found that those remarks were enormously exaggerated. He'd never been on the faculty at Chicago, as I remember checking it out; he'd been a teaching assistant or something there, and had taught only one year at the University of Wyoming or--it's that kind of very limited experience. He had no academic credibility. In fact, I don't think he'd ever completed his degree, had he? Do you know?

M: I don't know.

L: I could find that out, but at any rate, we were very dubious about his credibility as an academic; obviously, he would be thought of as a political appointee, or so we thought. So we didn't follow up on that very much, and there was no further pressure on it. We were very nervous. We checked it out very quickly, very carefully, and I reported to Hackerman that the committee did not think he would be suitable, and that's all we ever heard about him. You know, by that time we expected to hear an explosion about it, and we didn't. And I think it's--I think both those remarks are important. Johnson did not try to force that appointment on us. He didn't try to force any appointment on us. He did his

best with Rostow, but he never went beyond a certain honorable limit in forcing Rostow on us. Now if I hadn't written that letter that the newspaper got somewhere, maybe we'd have been in a different position. Maybe we'd have been forced into a more embarrassing spot--I don't know.

Another suggestion that Johnson repeatedly made was Orville Freeman. Now Orville Freeman's a very, very bright man. He's almost too bright. He--you know, he's very slick. He almost gives you the impression of being a little too slick; the British say, "too clever by half." He is a curious kind of fellow; he's not an academic man, never has been. He was governor of Minnesota, and then he was secretary of agriculture under both Kennedy and Johnson. Johnson admired him greatly.

Johnson invited us--my wife and me--out to the Ranch to meet Orville Freeman and his wife. And we had a very interesting evening. It was not made clear to us, except by rather clear indirection, that we were being asked out there to meet Freeman. We got there and--oh, there were a dozen people at dinner. My wife would know exactly who were there, but I don't remember at all who was there. The Ransoms, I guess. I just can't remember. At any rate, we were all seated at [the] table, and my wife was at the President's right. No, that's probably not true. Orville was at Lady Bird's right--and far, therefore, down the table. I was up at the President's end of the table, but not at his right hand. But during the meal, I know, Lyndon asked Orville some kind of question, "You're going to Japan next month. What are you going to do over there?" "Well, we're going to do this, that, and the other thing, Mr. President." He had all the facts and figures; he responded very quickly. And the President turned to me and he said, "Doctor, that's the smartest man in the world down there. He's just grand." And Johnson started giving me

a lecture about Freeman who was sitting right over there and everybody [was] listening. And I said, "Mmhmm, yes sir, he certainly is, Mr. President," and all that.

But there weren't any conversations about, "Orville ought to be dean." We didn't have any strong feeling about Orville. The only thing was he wasn't an academic; he had no academic experience. And at that time we were doing our best to find people with all three of these qualities I mentioned--all four counting the political. So our reaction to Orville was not a negative reaction; it was a non-reaction. I mean we were not forced into writing a letter like this letter about Rostow. We were never put in position where I had to write about Freeman the kind of letter I had had to write about Rostow. We just didn't include him on any list that we were doing. Freeman knew what this was all about, more clearly than I knew what it was all about at the time. I thought it was interesting, but you know, there were other people around the table, and it came later on in retrospect to be perfectly clear why this thing had been arranged. But it wasn't all that clear at the moment.

So we didn't do anything about Freeman at all until maybe a year had passed, and we'd gone through a number of people, we thought maybe Freeman would be a pretty good dean after all. You know, he did have a good many of the qualifications: an interesting combination of public experiences, a good administrator, welcome to the President; he met at least three of the criteria. And some people I think would've thought him a kind of intellectual whom academics would be comfortable with, you know, so it wasn't hopeless even on the academic side.

Well, again to jump way ahead of my sequence, because it does deal with Freeman. Much, much later, I suppose in the summer of 1969 in one of my travels

around the country, I was in Washington, and I tried to find Freeman. And I couldn't find him, to tell the truth. I thought he was in New York, but somebody said, "Oh no, he's in Washington." He had joined a company--I can't think of the name now, and I had deliberately gone there trying to find Freeman. I had somebody trying to find Freeman for me, and they couldn't find him. I was staying at the Watergate, and I was wandering around killing time, admiring the view and so on; I was looking in Watergate Building next door to the hotel. By god, that's Orville Freeman's name up on the building directory. So I rushed back up to my room next door and called the number, called the office there, and he was there. I made an appointment, and I saw him the next morning.

I told him what we were doing, reminded him of our earlier meeting out at the Ranch, told him we were looking for a dean, and that we had been talking about him as a possibility, and I just wanted to see what he thought about it. And he said, "Well, that's interesting. I suppose at one time I would have been interested in it. But I thought the committee had turned me down." And we really hadn't. I mean we really hadn't considered him at that length. We hadn't approved him. We'd talked about him a little bit and just passed on. I tried to explain that to him. And he accepted the explanation. We got along very well indeed. But by then he was deeply involved in this other job. You see, our timing was bad. If we had been in the mood in 1961 [1967?] that we were in in 1969 about all this--that is to say that if we had known that it was going to take so long to find a dean, we might have acted very differently about Freeman, and he might now be dean.

There probably are some others that I'll think of that were suggested to us by the White House with varying degrees of urgency, but these are the ones that stand out:

Rostow most of all; Rusk in a limited way; McGee very firmly and strongly, but very shortly; it ended quickly; and Freeman. That's about it. I may run into some others.

M: All right. On your side of it, who were you pushing after Huitt?

L: All right, that's a good question. We would pick up names from all kinds of sources, largely internally in the committee, but there were a lot of people sending us suggestions. It wasn't merely the White House. Other people in the department, my own colleagues, people around the country, the deans of other schools. Now you know these other schools. We brought in five deans to meet with the original planning committee. And they suggested lots of names to us. And we'd consider them, and if they looked at all promising, then we'd pursue them to some extent, until they were vetoed, they were shown to be disqualified for some reason, or to the point where they said, "Oh no, I'm not interested; forget about me."

At one subsequent stage our leading candidate was a man named York Willbern who is professor of government at Indiana University. Willbern is also in public administration. He's also a PhD Redford student, and I think that hurt him. He's not a public figure, but he's had lots of interesting and relevant academic experience. He was director of the Institute of Public Administration at Alabama, and went from there to a corresponding o[r] similar job at Indiana. He has taught in the field of state government, local government, public administration for years. He is a very charming, personable guy. But there was some remark made about that committee was still trying to get some Texas PhD into this job. Well, that was curious. You know that never really occurred to us. They were separated in time. The two, of course, would be Huitt and York.

So we were trying--we were very high on York, but the President thought that we needed somebody with more smash, more political or public visibility. And, no doubt, he was right. I think York would have been a good dean, and when we were pressing for him, we'd been turned down by a number of people, so we were very anxious that he be approved, but he was not approved. It was sort of left in limbo, and we finally gave up on it. It was one of those things where we sent in a recommendation, and nothing happened and nothing happened and nothing happened. Which is all right. You know, it was not that they were deliberately balking us by ignoring us. It was that they were reluctant to move, still hoping that they could find another guy. They weren't turning him down; they might have said yes, eventually. But they were trying to find somebody with a little more impact, public impact.

Now there are a whole number of names that I think it would be useful for us to record here that appeared one way or another in the list. I suppose we considered fifty people at least before we got done, and had conversations with many of them. I did a lot of traveling for this committee. I made little tours where I'd go to Washington and see two or three people and come back, or I'd go to New York and see two or three and come back, or I'd go to two or three towns in one trip. And my travels got ever more urgent as time went on, because we were facing this prospect of having to open the School and not having any dean. And when--well, at some point in there the pressure got to the point where obviously Norman Hackerman was receiving phone calls saying, "What the hell is going on down there?" And then he would call me and say, "What's happening?" So I'd tell him, "Well, we've got this guy, I saw him; we're waiting for an answer from him. He hasn't [responded yet]," and so on. It got to the point where I was sending frequent

written reports about individual possibilities to Norman on an almost weekly basis. And these files, I have some of those reports in here, I'm sure. But they were--you know, I called this man, I can't get hold of him, that fellow's in Italy, all that kind of stuff, you know. But then I'd get. . . .

M: Did you have people that just said, "No, I don't want that job?"

L: Yes, mmhmm. Yes. We'd get to the point where we had to speed it up. The fastest way to go was for me to get on the airplane, go tell the guy what we're talking about, and get him to react.

M: Yes.

L: If his reaction was absolutely negative, just hopeless, then we wrote him off, and I went to see somebody else. It wasn't that I was traveling around the country offering this job to anybody who would take it.

M: Right.

L: You've got to have a starting point, and a starting point is some declaration of mutual interest. And if I couldn't get that, why there wasn't much point in doing it. For instance, one time. . . .

M: You didn't handle this by phone?

L: No. I could've, I suppose. Well, I could've saved a lot of time and a lot of money by doing it that way. But the chance of missing--telephone inquiry is less impressive. You walk in and sit down and talk to a guy, and it turns out you've flown a thousand miles to ask him whether he'd be interested in this job--that's pretty impressive. And I was able to get time that way. I'd call in advance and make an appointment. Almost always. Or if I didn't do it, then my secretary would do it.

M: Well, I suppose you could present your side better.

L: Sure. And I could show him some documents--here's the budget, here's the picture, here's the. . . . There was always the chance that you might miss out on the one man you really wanted by not taking the trouble to go see him instead of trying to get by with a telephone call. We were, if not desperate, at least anxious and apprehensive. So there were several periods when I simply was in the business of dean-hunting, that's all. For example. . . .

M: What happened to your teaching?

L: All right. That's just what I was going to say. In the spring of, let me see, it was 1969, spring semester. I was teaching a course, the introductory course in American government. I was chairman, and I had all these other things, and I was only doing one course. It was a big 610 lecture section. Norman called me up one day, and he said something--we've got to move faster. He'd obviously had a phone call from somebody. And he said, "You've got, we've got, these people hanging fire. In your last letter, you said this, that, and the other thing," and so on. He said, "We've got to press them and get them on or off the list. You've just got to drop everything and go do this. Spend your time doing this." And I said, "Look, I'm teaching a course. It meets three times a week. How am I going to do that?" He said, "Well, get somebody else to teach it." Well, Wallace Mendelson, bless him, organized a group of my colleagues in the government department to take over that course. It's not a very good solution to a problem, but what they did was each guy took a topic and lectured on it, and Wallace managed the bookkeeping and the grade-giving, and that kind of thing, and I got on the airplane. I started following up leads.

And then, that summer the same thing happened; I've forgotten whether it was the first term or the second term of the summer. I was scheduled to teach my course on Britain, and did so. [A] phone call came half-way through the course--"You've got to get back on that airplane. I don't want you to--don't do anything else till we get this dean." So Bob Hardgrave, my colleague, stepped in and finished my course on Great Britain. Norman put up the money for whatever it took, you know.

Well, to take an example, somebody suggested Arthur Naftalin. Arthur Naftalin is a political scientist. He used to be on the faculty at Minnesota--long-time friend of Hubert Humphrey--and had for several years been mayor of Minneapolis. A man with an interesting mixture of experience--political, administrative, elective, appointive, and an academic background. So I called him up, or the secretary did--I make that point about the secretary simply because she can call and make an appointment without having to explain fully what the appointment's about. So he agreed to see me. I flew to Minneapolis, spent the day with him and talked with him. He put me in a police car with him and we went around to various places. I went to a committee meeting with him out at the airport, back to his office, and so on. And he couldn't have been more gracious--or less interested. But there was no way of knowing that in advance, you know. I could call him up on the phone and say, "Are you interested?" and the man would say, "Oh I don't think so," and that's it. He'd have been a good candidate, I think, and a good dean. He did not run for mayor again and is now back on the faculty at the University of Minnesota. But he didn't want this job. He didn't want to administer an academic enterprise.

M: Let me take a break. The tape's about ready. . . .

End of Tape 2 of 3

M: This is the third tape, the second tape in the second session, but the third tape overall, with Dr. William Livingston. Again, the date is July 19, 1971, and my name is David McComb. Now, we need to pick up where we left off.

L: We were talking about some of the personalities involved and some of the people that we approached on this dean question. Some of them were quite serious candidates about whom we had lengthy discussions and to whom I had talked at least once or twice. Some of them are mere birds of passage; their names popped up and popped back down again. We didn't consider them very carefully, and that was about the end of it.

The letter of May twenty-seventh, 1968, that I mentioned earlier on that second tape, the one that contains a list of names and was accompanied by that letter of explanation about Rostow--I might use those names as a starting point here. The first name on that list was Ralph Huitt's as I indicated. The second name was Willard Wirtz, who was then secretary of labor. We never got a response to this letter that included comment on each name, so we were left not knowing for a long time whether individual names were approved or not approved. Wirtz, it turned out, was not, not approved. That may be strong--too strongly put--but the President never picked up that suggestion, and it never came back to us in any form. And I don't quite know what that meant. We were not all that strong on Wirtz, but he had most of the qualifications that we had laid out. He was secretary of labor. He'd been in the Federal Service during the war on various things having to do with labor and stabilization of wages and manpower and so on. He'd been professor of law at Northwestern for some years. So he had most of the things we were

looking for. But in the event, he was not picked up, and we always assumed that the President wasn't very strong for him. Why, I have no idea.

In that letter, which is the focus of this present conversation, what we did was list seven people. We divided them into three groups, meaning that we were highest on the first group, next highest on the second group, and least highest on the third group. But we hadn't arranged people within the group. So the top group consisted of Wirtz and Huitt, neither of which proved acceptable, and the job was not offered to either one of them. In the second group, we had two people: Harlan Cleveland, who was a journalist, really, over the long years. He was at that time the United States Ambassador to NATO, had had a number of government posts of one kind or another, and had been dean of the Maxwell School at Syracuse. He was the immediate predecessor to Steve Bailey, whom we had consulted in the course of all this.

M: Right.

L: Now Cleveland is a pretty natural man. He had some visibility. He had had several jobs in the government. I don't know what all they were now, but he was visible as ambassador to NATO, he'd written extensively, he had been dean of a school like this. We never approached him because we could never get clearance on him. And having put his name in a pot, you see, we thought we ought not to go ahead without someone's having said so. Now, on a lot of other people, I just went off and talked to them without clearing it with anybody to begin with. Partly because it took so long to get clearance on anybody. For instance, if we'd waited on Wirtz there that would have taken forever. In any case, I couldn't easily go to see Cleveland because he was in Europe, and in any case, that didn't seem worthwhile. You know, unless there was some reason to think he'd be

interested or that the White House or Johnson would approve him. Harlan Cleveland was not approved, and again, as with all these others, I don't have any explanation for it. I don't know why. He seemed so obviously suitable as a candidate to us, but for some reason, and I take it it's just a personal reason on Johnson's part, we didn't get any approval on him.

The other man in group two was David Truman--by then vice president of Columbia. And Dave Truman is a political scientist of very great standing. He's one-time president of the American Political Science Association. He wrote a book called *The Governmental Process* back about 1950 or thereabouts, which is a modern classic really on the study of interest groups in government. He's a man of not very much public experience, but lots of university administrative experience, obviously. Now Dave Truman was one of the very few people who were offered this job. He was cleared by the White House, and brought here for a visit--he and his wife--entertained for a couple of days. We talked with him at great length, and he considered it at some length. My wife will tell you that she knew from the very beginning that he wasn't going to take it because she thought that his wife was not interested in coming here, and that may be part of the reason. But I think Dave gave it very serious consideration, and I think he would've been a good dean. In the end, he decided against leaving that part of the world, I think. He went to Mount Holyoke as president. They own property in New England; they're from New England--you know, it would've been a considerable move on their part. So that one didn't pay off.

In group three, on this same letter, William Carey, who's a professor of law at Columbia; Otto Eckstein, who's a professor of economics at Harvard and former member

of the CEA--that's not CIA--that's Council of Economic Advisers. And the third man was York Willbern. Now at that time, we had Willbern ranked down here that way. He rose by the fact that others on this list were turned down, or they turned us down, or we couldn't get any response on them. You see, Huitt--back down the list. Huitt was vetoed; Wirtz was vetoed; Harlan Cleveland was vetoed; David Truman was offered the job and turned it down; nobody ever approached Carey or Eckstein. I did talk with Willbern about it, and I talked with him enough so that I--I'm not sure he would've accepted it, but I felt pretty good about it. I thought the chances were pretty good. But Willbem was left in limbo; he was never vetoed, but he was never approved, either.

Now let's see. I guess the thing to do is to go on prowling here, finding more names. I can do it just by thinking about it. And I don't know whether it's worthwhile going down every list of everybody we ever considered or not. Let me just do it out of my memory and focus on those that were most seriously considered.

One man that we thought about and talked about at some length is Brewster Denny. Brewster Denny is dean of the Graduate School of Public Affairs at the University of Washington in Seattle. And he is a very close friend of Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson. Senator Scoop Jackson is a very close friend of Lyndon Johnson, and I'm sure that the President had a very strong affirmative feeling about Denny. I don't know that he has known him much, but he's heard very good things about him, and no doubt from Scoop Jackson, among others, at least. And Brewster I had known for some years. He's a youngish man--he's oh, forty, I suppose, maybe a little over forty. He's had that job up there for a good many years, first as associate dean, or director, and then as director. He's deeply involved in life in Seattle. His family is a Seattle family. There's a

Denny Building on the campus at the University; his grandfather gave the University a ten-acre tract of land right in the middle of downtown Seattle. He's a close friend of the Senator. He goes hunting and fishing out on the Olympic Peninsula. That is the kind of local dug-in quality that's very hard to move a guy out of. But he's very suave, very knowledgeable, a very intelligent guy. He'd be a good dean. He *is* a good dean, of a much smaller operation than this school is likely to produce, but a respected operation nonetheless.

I went to Seattle and spent a day or half a day with him and talked with him, not under any great pressure from the President, but simply because he was a natural prospect. He made it quite clear he wasn't interested, and it just didn't seem worthwhile to us to press the case. But we saw that in a perspective different from that of the President's, and so, the suggestion kept coming back, "What about this fellow, Denny, up in Seattle?" Well, you know, I'd get that message from Norman, "Do you know a guy named Denny up at Seattle?" "Yes, I know a guy named Denny at Seattle. In fact, I went up and spent half a day with Denny, and he's not interested in this job." "How do you know he's not interested?" "Well, his grandfather gave all that land. He says he's not interested." "Well, maybe we ought to check him out." Well, hell, that's what I thought I'd done, you know. But the suggestion kept coming in from the President, so we had to get it firmly stated, and finally, Norman and I decided that we would both go back to Seattle again. It was obvious that he was being pressed on this in a way that he was not pressing me, because there was no reason for him to go to Seattle otherwise. He didn't take these other trips with me. That's the only one we ever did together. Anyway, we got the tickets and were getting ready to go to Seattle, and the day before we were to leave,

Denny called and said, "My sister lives in Wichita Falls," or some such story as that. "We're going to be coming down there. Could I save you a trip by seeing you in Texas?" So Norman and I flew to Dallas, and we had an hour's conversation in the Braniff lounge in Dallas with Denny and saved the state of Texas some five hundred bucks worth of airplane tickets out there. But he made it quite clear, as he had already made it clear to me, that he was not interested in this job. So then Norman could say to the President, "I've talked to him. He's not going to take it; he's not interested." Denny was a leading figure in the discussions of the committee there for a while, but he was never a leading prospect, and I suspect he was a little surprised that we wanted to talk with him again.

Well, the other guy about whom everybody was very concerned was Gardner Ackley. Now Gardner Ackley is a very charming human being. He's a distinguished economist and has had a public career of considerable distinction, too, as chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers and as ambassador to Italy. He loved being ambassador to Italy; that was fun, he thought. And I think if Humphrey had been elected, Gardner was hoping against hope that he could stay on as ambassador to Italy. I don't know whether he would have or not. He did stay on a little while after Nixon was elected, as I remember, but obviously that was not the kind of job you stayed in indefinitely. He was among our very early prospects. He was on the first list, as I remember, that the initial planning committee submitted. At that time he was still in Washington. But it must have been very shortly thereafter that he went to Rome. I'm not quite sure; that would make it, say, oh, somewhere in 1967, I suppose, maybe in the fall of 1966. He had had public experience--both national and international--and maybe some more nearly local than that. He had a distinguished academic career; he had administered things; he was acceptable to

the President. We ranked him pretty high, but once he changed jobs, that made it harder to get him. Moreover, we were delayed for a long time in there, first, by the Regents' non-response to our second report on planning and organization, and then that long diddling around about Ralph Huitt.

So it was spring of 1968 before anything much was happening about the deanship except for Huitt. By that time, he [Ackley] was in Italy, of course, and we--well, we didn't approach him immediately. Obviously, it's more difficult to approach a guy in Italy. But it got to the point where we were losing possibilities here and there, and he became all the more attractive, and so I cleared this with the White House.

(Interruption)

I'm not sure when the thing built up to the point where everybody was feeling, "Oh, let's push this." But it did get to that point, and I suppose that was somewhere in the academic year 1968-1969. It got to the point where I was going to go to Italy. I talked to him on the telephone, twice I think. I told him pretty much what I wanted to discuss with him, just because it seemed such an adventure to go to Italy. He was willing to talk about it. When I called him the first time, he was leaving on a tour, and he wouldn't be back for six weeks. Well, hell, that postponed everything again. So when the six weeks was up, I called him again, [and he said] yes, he'd be glad to see me.

I got the passports. I was going to take Lana, my wife. A trip like that has to have the governor's approval, you know. Travel authorization has to have the governor's signature, so I filled out the form, sent it to Norman. And hell, I put two or three other places I was going to go while I was over there. And Norman called up--Norman's a very blustery kind of guy, and if he's harassed in any way, why, he's a very goddamitty kind of

guy. And that can be very irritating because it's. . . . but anyway, this was a goddamitty conversation and, "Goddamitty, why are you going to England? If you're going to Italy, don't you get over there [and then get back]?" "Well," I said, "I want to go to England because that's my professional niche, and I need to talk to some politicians now and then!" Well, [he] didn't think that. He was going to take all that off there. Anyway, he sent it down, the governor approved it, it came back, and I got my tickets. I guess on this go-round Lana was not going, but anyway, I had my ticket. Whether she had hers, I'm not sure. I was ready to leave the next day; I was going to leave here Saturday morning or something like that. Ackley was going to meet me at the airport and all that. The telephone rang Friday afternoon. [It was] Califano. "Call off your trip to Rome. We're going to bring him back over here for diplomatic consultations a couple of weeks from now." Well, I was sort of disappointed by that time--it was on again, and I was ready to go. I've telescoped some of this somehow because there were three separate occasions on which I was about to go to Rome, and I never did go to Rome.

Finally, he came back for the consultations--by then it was late spring or early summer of 1969--and we decided to meet him in Washington. Redford was already up there--it must have been early summer because Redford was in Washington already--and somebody else on the committee was in New York, and whoever that was came down to Washington. The rest of us flew to Washington, and we met with Gardner Ackley, had dinner with him at the Watergate, spent several hours talking about this thing, and came away feeling pretty good; we thought maybe we had a dean. We had not made a formal offer. It wasn't up to us to make formal offers. He said he would think about it, and write us a letter. So he did and took himself out of consideration, much to our disappointment.

He combined everything we were looking for and you know, I think he would've been a good dean. So we were let down quite seriously, psychologically, I mean. . . .

M: Right.

L: . . . by that. Because it had gone that far, and we'd built our hopes up on it.

M: Why did he turn it down?

L: Well, I think he wanted to get out of the Johnson circle of influence and control. He never said that. What he did, in fact, was return to the University of Michigan and the teaching economics. If he could have stayed on as ambassador, I think he would have, but he really didn't want to take on this job. He didn't explain it, and I'm only guessing.

You see, one of the problems of this deanship--and it's quite clear to anybody who thinks very seriously about it and knows anything about Johnson--is that whoever's dean has got to live under the shadow of Johnson all the time and to some extent, under the thumb of Johnson. Now, John Gronouski has done this pretty well. He's lived under Johnson before. But John doesn't hesitate to say no, and he said no on two or three occasions and made Johnson pretty mad--or at least so I hear second or third hand. But Ackley knew Johnson that well and could see what kind of position that dean was going to be in. Well now, John Gronouski can stand up to Johnson. To refer back to an earlier part of this conversation, he can stand up to Johnson far better than I would have been able to stand up to him. That is to say, he's got a standing ground that I would not have in that spot, or so it seems to me. Anybody can stand up if you're willing to pay the cost, but the costs are different.

M: Yes.

L: Well, Ackley was a close and obvious and hopeful prospect, but, turned out to be not the dean. Now, let's see--

(Interruption)

One interesting little side glance at that committee meeting we had in Washington with Gardner Ackley was that we were in close touch with the people at the White House while we were there. They knew we were there and for that purpose; of course, they'd arranged to bring Ackley back. And so, I called Larry Temple I think it was, who was helping us at the time, and told him what had happened, how the meeting went and so on, and then we were all coming back on the Braniff non-stop flight the next day.

Somewhere in the middle of the morning, Temple called us and said, "The President is going to Austin this afternoon, and why don't you cancel your flights and come back and fly back on Air Force One?" Well, we were delighted, of course, and that was a great experience. And we all did exactly that. I think maybe Redford didn't because he was in Washington for the summer. But the rest of us came back on Air Force One. We left about five in the afternoon, I suppose. We got a White House car that took us out to--is it Andrews [Air Base]? The one that's still in use, out in Maryland somewhere; it's about a twenty-five-mile ride out there. The President goes out in a helicopter, and we were out there waiting and the plane was all loaded and sitting there waiting to take off . . . and we sat there for about an hour waiting for him to show up as a matter of fact.

It's a very interesting thing. I could talk about the structure of the airplane and that kind of thing. I don't know if that's of interest in this kind of recording; it'll be recorded elsewhere, no doubt. But it was interesting to us. The back half of it is built

like a regular passenger airplane, and the front half of it is--maybe I've got it reversed? The other end in any case is a private office and quarters for the president and his family. There's a kitchenette back there and there are several bedrooms, and there's an office with a big kidney-shaped desk and telephones and communicators. They've got a very fancy communicating system in the airplane, as you can guess. So we're sitting back there with the--in the public sector of the airplane, and it was full of people. I don't know who they all were--newspaper men, some people I recognized, some people I didn't.

Anyway, when we took off, Temple came back to us and said, "Get your group together. The President wants you to come up and ride up with him." So the five or six of us--five, I guess, because Redford wasn't there, and Blair, by then, had gone to Mexico--the five of us went up and rode all the way back with the President and Mrs. Johnson. Luci was there, little Lyn was there pounding on the telephones, punching buttons, red lights flashing all over the place. The President having a perfectly marvelous time with that grandchild. He had him in his chair, in a big chair there with the desk out in front. And this big communicator, telephone, there must have been fifty telephone buttons on there. Probably ten, but I don't--seemed like a lot at the time. And Lyn loved to punch those buttons, and he'd smack 'em with the flat of his hand, and the President would laugh, hand him back over, helping patting those things and God knows what those communicators were doing up front, but he and Lyn were having a marvelous time.

M: What did he talk to you about?

L: Oh, just general conversation--about the School, about some of the people, talked about Ackley and the possibility of getting him. I don't remember details of the conversations, and the conversations were not all with us. There were other people up there in that

office, too. Their chairs just sort of sit around the room, and I've forgotten now; I think Pickle was with us. I'm sure he was, and Pickle and the President talked at considerable length. So it wasn't just a matter of our sitting there talking to Lyndon for two hours all the way home, but he did talk with us, and so did Mrs. Johnson. And it was very pleasant. It was very thoughtful, I thought, of them, to call and offer us the ride. Now let's see. . . .

M: Well, you still haven't found a man. Ackley turned you down.

L: Ackley turned us down. I'm just wondering where we should go next.

One man that I--oh, let me just throw names out, the people that I took the time to go and see. I can't think of all of them by any means. One of them was Ramsey Clark, who was by then--this was after Johnson was out of office--Ramsey was living in Virginia in Arlington or close to Washington. I went out to see him one day and talked with him, sat and talked with him and his wife and Barefoot Sanders, who was there working for him, I think, at the time. Ramsey had taken on a job with a New York law firm, which he still has, I think; it's a kind of part-time job. And then he was doing other things, as you know. He wasn't really interested in it, and I don't know that that would have been a good appointment, but he had been suggested to us a number of times, and we'd gotten to that point where we were simply following up leads, and we didn't want to be in position where if the President called up and said, "Why haven't you talked to somebody?" we had no answer.

So I was talking to a lot of people that we really didn't think were good possibilities. Another man was--oh, I can't think of his name to save my neck; he's in a big New York law firm. I'll have to come back to him. I talked with Dick Maxwell, who

was the dean of the law school at UCLA [University of California, Los Angeles]. I talked with another member of his faculty who has since then succeeded Dick as dean of the law school at UCLA. His name is Murray Schwartz and a very attractive guy--a very decent human being, and he might well have been a very excellent dean. I went to Stanford and talked to Bayliss Manning who was, and still is, the dean of the law school at Stanford. He used to be on the law faculty at Yale and has been developing at Stanford a law school oriented very largely toward the Yale model, which is to say it's very greatly concerned with public policy questions. Yale Law School has always been, I suppose, unique in that its concern is more than merely the technical study of the law, and it goes way out into other social sciences. They have philosophers, economists, political scientists on the law faculty--Harold Lasswell, for instance, F. S. C. Northrop--these are law professors at Yale. Well, Bayliss Manning was doing something of that same thing at Stanford. He wasn't interested, and said so easily enough, and referred me to a young man named Headrick.

I'd like to put Tom Headrick's name into this because I suspect he's a guy we're going to hear about one of these days. He's still very young. He was assistant dean. Manning said, "I know there's no way of convincing you of this, but if I had your job, I would name Tom Headrick dean of that school." He's about twenty-eight years old. He's a lawyer. Manning took him to Stanford with him from Yale. He was in England, I think, as a Rhodes scholar, wrote a thesis over there, and which was published, a little book on the town clerk. It's the authoritative work on the town clerk in England. He's now finishing a PhD at Stanford in political science, and he went off to--I don't know, New Zealand or Australia or somewhere for a year, and I've lost contact with him now.

But I talked with him while I was out there, and I've talked with him on a couple of occasions out there. But Manning was quite right--there was no way of selling that appointment to this committee, let alone to the others that were involved.

Let's see, I'm thinking of the West Coast. There was Manning, there was Headrick, there was Schwartz at UCLA, there was Maxwell at UCLA. I went to Davis and talked--I had two people in mind. One was a man named Lloyd Musolf, who was a political scientist and the director of the Institute of Public Administration and one of the old figures in this field. He was gone at the time, so that didn't work. I talked to another guy who was his assistant dean, also a political scientist, whose name I'll think of in a moment--Dick, Richard [Gable].

M: Another name that comes to mind is Wilbur Cohen.

L: I did talk to Wilbur Cohen. At one time, I think he might have been interested in it. Wilbur's position was he was secretary of HEW [Health, Education, and Welfare], of course, and had been in the government for some years and had almost written the original Social Security legislation, somebody told me. He had had about five years' experience on the Michigan faculty before he went to Washington. That had been some years ago if I recall correctly. He was interested, but he was sort of bemused at the idea rather than anxious to have the job, and he didn't really give me very much encouragement, I suppose. What he really said was, "I'm just not going to think about things like that while I'm still in this job." Well, I didn't know what to do about that really, so we sort of put him off to the side on the "future possibles" list. Then, when he did leave the job, we were at that point hot after Ackley or something of the sort, so we didn't pursue him right away, and in the event, he went back to Michigan and became

dean of the College of Education. He's been down here in Austin a time or two. He was here for the dedication last month, or in May. I've seen him maybe once since then, had a little correspondence with him. It did not get to the point of making him an offer, and I don't know that it got to the point where we were consulting with the White House, the President, about him because, you know, he had given us no encouragement on it, at least no encouragement that we could make use of. I'm trying to think of other people of public stature.

M: You might mention this guy that you couldn't place before.

L: Cyrus Vance it was. Cyrus Vance had been secretary of the army, wasn't it?

M: I don't recall.

L: Something like that. He was not an academic man; I don't think he had any academic connections at all. But he was an intellectual. He'd be respectable. We did not get to the point where we had to decide this. I went to see him, spent an hour in his office in New York. He's the one I was talking about was in a big law firm there. Very congenial and responsive, but he was busy practicing law, and he wasn't the slightest bit interested in considering this job.

M: Did the name John Gardner come up?

L: Gardner's name comes up for every kind of job. We never really pursued Gardner. I did not talk with him. I think what we felt here was that if he were going to take a university position, that he could have his choice in almost any university presidency in the country, so we didn't think it was worth the trouble. The other thing was we were a little bit skeptical about the relations between him and the President. I don't know anything about that personally, but I have the impression that they are not on very warm terms. When he

left the government--I've forgotten; I can't speak from any kind of authoritative experience, but I have the impression that they parted, you know, on something less than friendly terms. But that question will surely come up in other interviews so. . . .

M: How about any other White House staff people or cabinet people?

L: Yes, there were some others--David Bell I mentioned earlier. I went to New York to see Bell after he was with the Ford Foundation just to explore the possibility. He was not available or the slightest bit interested in it. Oh, he was interested--a lot of people were very interested in the development and what we were doing, and they thought it was very good, but not interested from the standpoint of their own personal involvement as dean. Now a lot of them would say, "Well, I'll be glad to come; ask me any time. I'll come down and lecture, I'll help you consult, do anything you want to do, but I don't want to be dean."

Now, lots of times as this was all going on, and obviously taking a long time, people would come back to me and say, "Look, what's the trouble? Why can't you find a dean?" And if they were shrewd or less diplomatic, they might say, "Is it because people don't want to work with Lyndon Johnson?" At the time, my response to that was that you couldn't tell, because when a man says no, he doesn't always explain. And that still has to be my response. But I think it's quite clear that there is something of that in the responses we got from some people. There were people whom I talked to who, as it turned out, were clearly not supporters of the President, and probably equally clearly, were people whom the President would not have had in that job. Whether this was an outstanding, or the most significant, consideration with very many of them, I don't really know the answer to that.

M: How about being in the southwest, in Austin?

L: I suspect that certainly colored some people's judgment. I suspect it was one of the influences that turned Dave Truman away from it, but. . . . You know, I think anybody at the University of Texas trying to recruit faculty faces something of that problem. It's a problem that can be resolved pretty quickly once you get them here for awhile, because Austin is not that big an obstacle; Austin is a considerable attraction. But a guy who's spent all his life and career in New England and the Northeast, he thinks of Austin, Texas, as very far away, and it's very difficult to persuade him to take it on. That's a problem.

M: Were the wives any particular problem?

L: Well, the wives didn't really enter into it unless we got pretty far with the consideration. Now, obviously, a fellow might talk to his wife about it, and he would cool off very quickly if she absolutely refused to have anything to do with it, but I didn't know any of those situations. We had only a small handful of people down here for a look-see at the job, and therefore, only a few brought their wives down. Truman came down and his wife was here; Huitt came down with wife.

Another man whom I haven't mentioned so far was Fred Cleaveland, who was chairman of the department of political science at Chapel Hill. He had taken a very mediocre kind of department and made it into one of the great departments, and he was very successful at this. He had a bit of university administration; he'd been consultant to a number of government commissions, but he had very little actual government experience. For a couple of years, he'd been on leave of some kind at the Brookings Institution in Washington. We had him and his wife down here at one time; this was

fairly late in the game. We'd sort of run out of all the big public figures we could think of, and we were trying other people. Fred is a student of public administration, and we had him down, and I think he had been vetted by the Johnson office and been approved. I'm not sure of that, but at least we got to the point where we were not making an offer again, but we were very seriously interested in him, and I think he was seriously interested in the possibilities. He was a little diffident about whether Johnson would want him, and he knew enough--he was savvy--he knew that that was important. But it never got to the point where we took it to the White House as a, "Here, let's name this guy dean." Because Fred backed out. This was late in the game after he'd been down here, paid a visit, and we were--we were frankly disappointed. What role his wife played in that, I don't know; I don't think it was a very serious role. In fact, I would guess that of the people we had down where the wives were directly involved, only Mrs. Truman was clearly a negative influence. I just don't know that about the others. The Huitts were willing to come--we know that. What role Mrs. Cleaveland played--or Mrs. Ackley for that matter, whom I never met--I just don't know the answer to that.

M: Well, maybe I should ask you about Gronouski.

L: All right.

M: Since he's the man who finally got the job.

L: Yes, and Gronouski is--it's a curious kind of story. We never thought of him. Nobody suggested him to us; his name did not come up. It didn't occur to any of us on the committee until, oh, the middle of July 1969. Then [?] Le Maistre of all people--why Le Maistre, I don't know--Le Maistre called me and asked me if I'd ever heard of him, and I just had to stop and think, "Oh yes, that's that Polish fellow that was named ambassador

to Poland." Well, that's not a very accurate description, but that was what popped into my mind, and I suspect into others' minds as well. Anyway, somebody had suggested Gronouski, and Gronouski was coming to town, he was going out to the Ranch, and he was going to be here a certain night, and had anybody talked about him for this deanship. And I had to say no, nobody had, and I couldn't figure out why. Because, you know, he was a natural and obvious possibility.

I was--I've forgotten where--I was lecturing somewhere, at the War College maybe. And I came back into town and got here just in time--I suppose on that 7:30 flight--and I went straight from the airport down to the Headliners Club. And we had dinner down there--Le Maistre, I think my wife met me down there, or maybe she met me at the airport and took me down, Gronouski, Le Maistre, Erwin, maybe Redford--I've forgotten--somebody else from the committee, a dozen of us perhaps all together, Larry Temple. Larry Temple and Erwin were both there, because they got into a storytelling match, one of the funniest evenings I can remember. And the funny thing about it is they were telling stories on Lyndon Johnson--"You remember that time he got the car stuck in the mud out in the back pasture at the Ranch?"--there were some funny tales told that night. I can't remember all of them, but I can remember one of them. I'll tell you in a minute. But Gronouski and I were down at the end of the table, very carefully put together for discussions, but we couldn't even hear each other. Here were Erwin and Temple shouting up and down the table.

And finally, because he was leaving, going back to Washington, I suppose, I finally got him [Gronouski] off to the side, and I said, "Let's you and I just get over here and aim ourselves away from the noise and talk a little. We've got to get acquainted."

He understood that, so he and I did that, and we got acquainted. I found him not only very charming, but very impressive, and he was obviously a reasonable candidate for this post. The suggestion, I presume, came from Johnson. It came to me from Le Maistre.

And I the next day got the committee together and said, "Look, we've missed the boat here. I think he's a guy we ought to be considering very seriously." So by pre-agreement, Gronouski sent me a vita, and we got all the stuff together, and we made a few phone calls about him, and then asked him to come back down, bring his wife, pay a visit. He did that, and we reached agreement on him very quickly. The offer was made to him by Dr. Norman Hackerman. I'm not sure now how quickly it all moved now, but that first visit when he came down here to visit out at the Ranch and the dinner I was talking about, that was in the last week of July. The appointment was announced by the Regents at the Dallas meeting on September six or tenth. So it moved pretty quickly; indeed given the turtle-like speed of this whole process in the preceding years, it moved with almost instantaneous alacrity.

And all of a sudden, it was over. All of a sudden, this long search was ended, and with a guy who combines in a quite remarkable way all of the qualities that we had been looking for. For example, Gronouski has an earned PhD in economics--the first, I think, cabinet member ever to have an earned doctorate. He had taught in two or three institutions, although his teaching experience is limited. But he taught at the University of Wisconsin and at Wayne State in Detroit. He had been state tax commissioner in Wisconsin. He had done some kind of a consulting job for a local government association; so there was a local level--slim, but there. Also he had been postmaster general under Kennedy and Johnson; he'd been ambassador to Poland. So he had a little

bit of local [government experience], but not much; a lot of state [experience]--administrative and political; at the national level, he'd been postmaster general and a campaigner for Hubert Humphrey, a very active politician. On the international level, he had not only been ambassador to Poland, but until the ping-pong episode, he was the last American to have talked to the Chinese, because the last negotiations with the Chinese took place in Warsaw, and he had been the chief negotiator. He had been the head of several things, had been the administrative head of several activities, so he had administrative experience.

He was personally acceptable to Johnson, so he really had all of these qualifications that we began today by talking about, and I don't know why we had not thought of him. I suppose we hadn't--there is no way to think of everybody, and nobody had suggested his name to us. But I think it's worked out very well indeed, and I think myself that if we had thought about him, if somebody had suggested him much earlier, the committee would have been more than anxious to have recommended him much earlier, and I wish now, of course, we had, because we spun an awful lot of wheels during those years.

Here are some other names by the way--or do you want to pursue the Gronouski thing a bit farther?

M: Well, you can go ahead and read those names in; I also want to get that story that you mentioned about Lyndon Johnson.

L: Oh, that story, yes. This--I wish I could remember all of them because it was a very amusing evening, just an uproarious evening, to the point where they shut the door, and then came in and asked us to be quiet. The story I'm remembering was Lyndon was

driving, as he invariably does. One of the things that happens all the time out there is that you drive around the Ranch and look at the cattle, and he has this big Continental that he drives. It had been raining, and as he started out, somebody--I don't know who it was--cautioned him that the fields were muddy. And he was a little impatient with that, so he started on out and spun the thing around and started down over the hill to show somebody some South African antelope or something. And promptly got stuck in the mud. So he's got a radio in the car, and he picked up the radio and he said, "Goddamnit! Why didn't anybody tell me that it was muddy out here?" "Well, I'm sorry, Mr. President. Where are you? We'll send a car." "I'm right out here so-and-so." He says, "Why do I have to do everything around here myself. I can't rely on anybody to do anything or tell me anything," he said. "It's just terrible." He said, "This car is stuck in the mud out here. What's wrong with that Butler anyway, sending a car like this?" He says, "Call Roy Butler; get him on the phone!" Butler being a good friend of his and the local automobile dealer and now the mayor. So they called him back in a few minutes and he said, "Mr. Butler is not in town; he's out of town." "Well, Goddamnit, call Henry Ford!" They didn't do that, either. Now what happened next, I have no idea, but you can just see him sitting out there.

We were out at the Ranch a couple of times, I suppose, in the course of all of this. I remember that one time driving around looking at all the cattle. He and Erwin were sitting up front talking about something. Erwin sort of jokes with him, you know, jokes at him, and does it very skillfully, I think, and they're very close friends. The President drives the car, people sit in the back and look around, admiring everything, and there's a Secret Service car that follows him--I don't know if it still does or not, but one of the

guys. One in the Secret Service--this is rather curious, I think--his job is to keep the President supplied with something to drink. And when they stop at a place, the President simply holds his cup out the window, and this guy in the car behind runs up and gets the cup and replaces it. And what is curious is that nobody else has anything to drink. I don't know what he's drinking. I know in the White House, he didn't drink. He drank orange pop and that kind of thing. But before that, and I suspect since then, he drank scotch and soda. But what that was that day I don't know because he was still President and he may not have been drinking.

M: So he didn't have to say anything. He'd just. . . .

L: Just put his--put his arm out the window, and the guy would put a new drink in it. The first time I met him--I guess this is--we're talking about Johnson, so we might as well talk about personal anecdotes. The first time I met him was, oh, years ago--he was a Senator. And I belonged then to a little group called the Foreign Affairs Club here that George Hoffman in Geography had organized and still is the main promoter of. That's now become the local Council on Foreign Relations, I think. But then it was just the Foreign Affairs Club, and it met once a month. I don't know how this was arranged, but George arranged it, and the whole club went out to the LBJ Ranch and were entertained by a kind of barbecue supper around the swimming pool. The President sat there that evening and for, oh, two hours I should guess--just talked. He loves to talk anyway, and he just talked about foreign policy. He wasn't president, so he wasn't talking about the presidency, but he was talking about the problems that the country faces, and it was as good and incisive and astute an analysis of American foreign policy as I've ever heard. I've no idea now what the subjects were, but I was very, very much impressed by the skill, the grasp that

the man had--and so is everyone else who meets him. He's really a man of very keen intelligence, and willing to work very hard. You put the two together, [and] he's a very impressive personality.

Next time I met him, I suppose, was during this period while we were working on the School. The first time was not at the Ranch, but at the lake house--they have a lake house up on LBJ. We were invited to come out, I think with the Ransoms. Maybe more than once we went out with the Ransoms, but we certainly did that first time. We got out to the gate and the Secret Service were there with their little walkie-talkies, and I was very much impressed with that because that was the first time I'd seen it. And we went on in, in our own car, up to this little house. Then we parked our car and got in a Secret Service car. Meanwhile, they're in constant communication with the boat--"This is Overlook II. We're coming around now. We'll be there in about thirty-eight seconds." Like a movie.

So we got in the Secret Service car and we drove around the end of the lake somewhere to a dock, and the boat pulled into the dock and picked up us and the Ransoms, and off we went on out on this boat. There's no one less suitable for a boating excursion than Dr. Ransom. That's just not his cup of tea. And here he was, trying to preserve his balance on this cabin cruiser. We were sitting up on the hood, as it were, the nose, the front end. There wasn't any comfortable place to sit, but we were sitting there. The Rostows were there, by the way. That's the first time I met Walt Rostow. Rostow was there and also the man who was president of Loews who has a ranch out there close by; he's been the chief money raiser for the Johnsons for a long time. I'll think of his name in just a moment. [Arthur Krim] He had a little French or Belgian wife. Oh, we've

met them several times now. Anyway, they were there, the Ransoms, we [were] all on this boat, and we started boating up and down the river. The President wasn't there. Mrs. Johnson was on the boat. We didn't know where the President was. Well, pretty soon, another boat, a small, outboard motor kind of boat, came up alongside, and it was in the dust by then, and the President got out of that boat and climbed up on our boat. Then the other boat--I couldn't even see who was in that--they roared off down the lake--whrrrrooaawrrrr, you know--and somebody said, "My God! What's that?" And Mrs. Johnson says, "Oh, that's Luci and Pat. I told that Pat not to do that to that boat, and he's just racing that [engine anyway]." She was quite distressed with Pat Nugent. And if I remember rightly, we took off after them in the big boat, to make them quit playing so dangerously with the little boat.

Then we came on back in to the house, and it turned out there were other people coming in for supper. This was not the Ranch; this was on the lake. I suppose maybe forty people all together, at tables outside under the trees--a very pleasantly done evening--not a very hard-drinking evening, by the way. There were drinks, but they were moderate and weak--weak drinks, which surprised me somewhat because Lyndon sort of had the reputation of a high liver, and that wasn't in evidence at all.

After dinner, everybody sat there and just listened, and the President told stories. They weren't political stories often; they were just stories. He wasn't making a point. And he wasn't pressuring me as a committee chairman; you know, we didn't have anything more to say to each other than just hellos. He was just including us in a group, and we were grateful. But he sat there and told stories, and occasionally, he'd be prompted by either Judge Moursund or Jess Kellam, who was there. They'd say, "You

remember that other fellow, Mr. President." "Oh yes, his name was Arthur," and then he'd go off on another story. Well, it was great fun. I wish I had a tape recording of that, or I wish you did. It would be a great thing to have. It was the kind of evening that people wound up saying, "Gee, wouldn't you like to have a tape recording of that?" Well, that was the next time.

Now let's see. The only other time that I remember that we were at the Ranch--no, I think there've been a couple of times, once with Orville Freeman that I've spoken of. Then there was another time--I guess after the Rostow business had been pretty well settled, and people were getting to be concerned about the deanship and what was going to happen in the School. There was a group that was collected out there for a meeting of some kind--I don't know if they all came because of the School. They probably came for all sorts of reasons, but Ransom and I, again, went out there. By that time, I had had a good bit of experience in this committee and in the planning, and I knew a good bit about the other similar schools around the country and what we were doing and trying to do that was different.

McGeorge Bundy was there, and he had obviously talked at considerable length with the President about the School. He was badgering me about some things that either he or the President thought ought to be done, and that we weren't recommending to be done. Now I can't remember what the issues were. They may have been fundamental, but there was no sharp dispute about them. It wasn't that we were being pressured into doing things we didn't want to do. It wasn't anything like the pressure, say, on the Rostow business. I remember, at one time, in the course of the conversation--there were maybe six people--Clark Clifford was there, Bundy, Ransom. The Johnsons withdrew;

they were not in the big conversation. Who the devil else was there? Tom Johnson was there. Well, a few more that I probably have in a letter somewhere. I remember Bundy and I were carrying on a kind of dialogue in this setting, and it was a serious conversation, and I made some kind of remark--I think it was about the kind of person we were looking for. And he came back with another kind of suggestion. I knew that he knew exactly what I'd said, but what I then said was, "I'm afraid I'm not making my point very clearly." And he smiled and said, "Oh yes, you're making it quite clearly." (Laughter) But what the point was now has disappeared. I have no longer any memory of it. Now I have a feeling if I'd really sit down and read through all these files, I'd come up with a whole bunch of things.

The next episode--that was just another dinner at the Ranch. Luci was there, I remember, that time. [I don't remember] whether Lynda was or not, but there were four or five other people I'll be able to remember.

The next time, and in some ways the most interesting episode, was at the White House rather than at the Ranch. My wife and I were in Washington, and I'm not quite sure why she was there, but we were staying at the Washington Hilton. Oh, I know why she was there, because she'd been invited! We were invited to come to dinner at the White House. So I called Ransom, and I said, "Look, we're broke, and we've got this invitation, and I'd like to accept. Is there any way you can pay my way and my wife's way up there?" So he found a way of doing it, and I was very grateful. We went up, and it was a dinner in honor of the White House Fellows, I think, and it was a big affair--lots of people there--two hundred people maybe. We met a lot of people that were very interesting--Sargent Shriver and Kermit Gordon. Oh, we made a pass at Kermit Gordon

by the way for this job, but he became the president, I think, of Brookings Institution. Oh, I don't know, lots of people; [Dean] Acheson was there, Rusk was there.

It was a stand-up buffet, drinks, a receiving line; they had a ceremony. They had a ceremony in the East Room in which all these people were introduced, about a dozen of them, and the President made a little speech. And then--I don't know what the rooms are anymore, but on the back door, really the front of the house, where the portico is on that side, there's the Red Room or the Blue Room and you pass through there in a receiving line. And we did that, and we went on into the State Dining Room, which was arranged for a buffet.

Well, obviously we'd been invited for reasons of the committee work. We were standing around having a drink, and I was talking to Congressman Jim Wright from Fort Worth, and when somebody came over--a Secret Service man--and said, "Mrs. Johnson would like to see you." So we went over there, and she said, "Please don't eat down here at the buffet. We're going to have supper upstairs in the--" What do they call it? The family dining room, the Yellow Oval Room, whatever it is--"and we'd like you to come and have supper with us up there." Well, we were delighted, the mark of distinction. So I told Lana, and she was even more delighted than I. And so we had another drink and waited for the summons.

Then pretty soon another Secret Service man came back and said, "Mrs. Johnson wants to see you." I said, "Well, I just saw her. We've already got that message." "No," he said, "this is another one." So we went back over, and this time it was, "Where are you staying?" And the answer was, "We're staying at the Washington Hilton." She said, "Now, after supper--if you don't mind--what we'd like you to do is to have us send a car

up to the hotel and get your luggage, and you spend the night here." Well, that was more than gracious; that was very generous, and we were doubly grateful. And that's what we did.

At supper that night, let me see, Jake and Beryl Pickle were there. This was not just a family supper; it was a seated dinner. Jake and Beryl Pickle, Allan and Marialice Shivers, whom we've known a long time and are good friends, another man from Fort Worth whom I don't know, the President and Mrs. Johnson, Lana and I--well, maybe one other couple. Oh, it was the fellow that I couldn't remember a moment ago, the little man who was the "bag man" for the Johnson campaigns." [Arthur Krim]

(Interruption)

M: Okay.

L: We're under way again.

M: We're under way again.

L: We've had an interruption here of two or three hours, and we're trying to pick up exactly where we left off. The tape was impaired because the batteries were running down, we discovered, but we didn't lose anything as far as we can tell. There's a scratchiness in the tape up to this point. It ought to be clear now.

I was talking about the night we spent at the White House with the Johnsons--not a unique experience, I suppose, but unique to us certainly, and I was trying to remember who it was that was at dinner. It included Allan Shivers and his wife, a friend of theirs and of the President's, I presume, from Fort Worth, whose name I don't remember, Jake and Beryl Pickle, Walter Cronkite and his wife, Lana and I, the Johnsons, and possibly another couple, but I'm not sure of that. I don't have a record here that'll tell me. We had

dinner seated at the dining room table, a very nice dinner, as I remember, but it was not what you'd call a culinary *tour de force*; it was simply a dinner. The President had tapioca pudding for dessert, which was his wont and famous habit. He also had a telephone hanging underneath the table right by his chair, and he used it several times in the course of the evening. He called somebody and asked them if Mr. Califano was still down in the office, and he was--this was 9:30 at night, something like that, and there was Califano still down there working. So he told Califano something or other--I have no idea now what it was.

The dinner went on very well, and when it was over, we got up, and the men went out on the balcony--the Truman balcony--and sat there and talked just by ourselves. The women rose and went off to wherever women go to right after dinner. So in a sense there was the old classical separation of the sexes immediately after dinner, but the men did not sit around the table with port and brandy and cigars; they went out and sat on the balcony and talked. The women then reassembled in a nearby living room, maybe that was the Yellow Oval Room. I rather think that's right. The Yellow Oval Room is a living room kind of thing, and the family dining room is what they call that other place.

We did not join the ladies at once. In fact, we were given a tour of the upper floor by the President, and he took great pleasure, I thought, in explaining the historical background of some of the rooms. He showed us Lincoln's bedroom and the Treaty Room and the Queens' Bedroom and whatever else there is up there. And he told a very interesting little story about Lincoln's bedroom. It's not a funny story; it's just a rather charming kind of story. He had Frank Dobie as a house guest one night, and he put him in Lincoln's bed, which is not ordinarily used--it's a museum piece rather than a usable

piece of furniture. But he thought it was appropriate that J. Frank Dobie should sleep in Abraham Lincoln's bed, so he put him there and told him what it was, of course. He said the next morning he was walking down the hall to the dining room or something, and here came Dobie, walking in the opposite direction. And the President said to Dobie, "Doctor, have you had a pleasant sleep?" And Dobie said, "I haven't slept a wink all night." And the President said to him, "Well, I'm sorry to hear that. I hope you're feeling all right." And he said, "I'm exhilarated." He said, "The idea of my lying there in Abraham Lincoln's bed was so exciting that I just couldn't go to sleep." That's a very interesting Dobie story, but it's also an interesting President Johnson story, because Johnson thought that was a good story and worth telling, and therefore, it's a Johnson story as well as a Dobie story.

What else? There were several things that night. You know, he [Johnson] had this famous reputation about turning out the lights, which was, I always thought, just a kind of myth that had grown up. But it was true--he did turn out the lights, and the funny thing was that as he'd show us into these different rooms, he would go through the door leading the group, turn the light on, show it, explain it, we'd sit there and look at various things and ooh and ahh about it, and then, naturally, he led the way back out of the room. As he went out of the room, he'd turn off the light, and leave the rest of us in the dark. I thought, my God, we've heard about turning out lights, but I didn't know it went this far.

Then in the Queens' Bedroom, we were going along, having a grand tour. It was very interesting. Cronkite and the President had known each other a long time obviously, and there was a little bantering going on between the two--very pleasant, but Cronkite, I

suppose, is as irrepressible as anybody else. And we were in the Queens' Bedroom, somebody asked--

(Interruption)

--"Mr. President, why do they call this the Queens' Bedroom?" And Lyndon, very seriously, said, "Well, the reason is that there have been five different queens who have slept in this room." And Walter Cronkite said, "Were they all women?" Everybody took a double take and then guffawed.

M: Did Mr. Johnson like that?

L: Yes, he laughed harder than anybody, yes. And I think he and Walter have apparently told jokes with each other many times in the past. Obviously, I wasn't about to make a remark like that, but it didn't bother Walter at all. He's a very charming fellow, Cronkite was. We went in the Treaty Room, so-called, where some treaty was signed, or maybe all treaties are signed, I've forgotten. There's a map that covers all the wall. It's not a very good map; it's kind of a wallpaper with a map design on it, and we stood there looking at it and observing the desk at which treaties had been signed and so on.

Well, then we were about to get ready to leave, and someone said we'd better join the ladies again, and so I started getting itchy, because we'd had drinks before, and then we'd had dinner, and then we'd been sitting out on the balcony, and then we'd been walking around, and I had to find the men's room somewhere. So I sort of excused myself quietly and gracefully and started out the door, and as I did, Cronkite caught up with me, and he said, "If you've got the same problem I've got, let's go together." I said, "Where do we go?" And he said, "Well, I've been here before, it's down the hall here on the left somewhere." So we started down the hall--we wanted to get this taken care of

before we joined the ladies. We tried one door on one side--on the right-hand side--and it was locked, so we gave up. Then we turned and crossed the corridor--it's a big wide corridor--and I tried a door on the left, and it opened, but it wasn't the men's room; it was a private dressing room, and here was Lynda--still Lynda Johnson, I guess--standing there with her bathing suit almost put on. That is to say, she was not dreadfully embarrassed, by any means, but she wasn't yet quite ready for company. Of course, we withdrew quickly amidst a little exclaiming and squeaking and apologizing, and she said, "Where are you--oh," she said, "I know what you're looking for." She said, "It's back in the Treaty Room," which is where we'd just come from. She said, "You go over and push on the map over somewhere near southeast Asia [Indonesia?]." And once you knew it was there, you could see it all right, but it was a flush door in the map, and the map went right over the door. If you looked carefully, you could see how to open the door all right. So that's where the men's room was, and we went back and rediscovered it. Then we joined the ladies, and sat there and chatted for a while.

Finally, the evening broke up. The Johnsons had sent us to the hotel--we went back to the hotel in a White House car, checked out, got our luggage, brought it all back to the White House, and somebody put it up in a bedroom on the third floor, which was called--somebody says to us, "Where'd you sleep in the White House?" Well, we slept in a room called "303" or "306" or something like that, up on the third floor. Of course, my story is that it's now called the Livingston Bedroom *á la* Lincoln [Bedroom], but unfortunately, nobody believes that. Anyway, we got the stuff put in up there, and then the Johnsons went up to the bedroom with us and showed us where it was. It was a very nice room--had a little lounge adjoining, a private bath and a large room and so on, and

we made whatever arrangements were appropriate for the morning, having to do with when breakfast would be sent up, if it was sent to the room. And then Lady Bird said, "Now I'll see you about 9 o'clock," I guess that's what it was. So we were on our own, and she said, "When you're ready for breakfast, just call downstairs at such-and-such a number and they'll send it right up," which is what we did the next morning.

But meanwhile, that night, we went back down in the elevator--I guess down to the main floor, back down to the family floor, and there was some kind of an exchange back in the living room again. Then we started on to bed, which seemed to be what was expected of us. And Lyndon decided that he wanted to go down and see the party, and we could hear the party, and the party was for the White House Fellows, and they were having a dance in the East Room with a band and--quite a good-sized dance, I suppose, although we never did go back down there. But the President went back down to say hello to everybody and say good night. He didn't know they were having a party, and he was complaining about the racket, and when are the girls going to bed and. . . . And Lady Bird was explaining what was going on.

So, the next--oh, there's one other story he told. I'm not sure I can get it all straight at this point. It subsequently appeared in the papers, so it could be checked all right. This is a story about the little monks. Luci had been converted to Catholicism, you may remember, and she had a favorite--I don't think it was a church; it was sort of a monastery-like thing or some kind of a place where these monks stayed somewhere in Washington but some distance from the White House. And the story is that when the first decisions were made to bomb the harbor at Haiphong, the President was very nervous, and understandably nervous about this. He felt he had to do it. He knew the

risks that were involved, he had given the orders, and all he could do was go to bed. Now it wasn't the night we were there. This was a story being told that night. Every morning about three or four o'clock, someone came to him with a report on what had happened that day in Asia--Southeast Asia, Vietnam. He would not hear what had happened with his bombing of Haiphong harbor until four o'clock the next morning. But he was very nervous, and he couldn't sleep, and once, when his light was on, if I remember the story, Luci came in and asked him if he was troubled, and he said yes, and he told her the story--why he was nervous, why he was worried, and what he was worried about. You know, there were all kinds of shipping in that harbor. If we bombed a Russian ship, all of a sudden we were in bad trouble. So he told her all of this, and she said, "Daddy, when I get in that kind of a state, I go down and visit my little monks. So why don't you go down and visit my little monks?" These were some Catholic priests in this priory or whatever it was. And so he did.

They called down and got the Secret Service and the car, and he and Luci went down to this chapel and talked to the little monks about this problem, and I suppose he *had* to conclude that that did him a lot of good, but he did say that it did him a lot of good. He prayed with them, and they prayed for him. He came back to the White House and an hour later discovered that all had gone well at Haiphong--or at least that the worst of his fears were not realized. This was a rather moving little anecdote, and three or four days later, we saw it somewhere in the newspaper. I suppose somebody--not necessarily that night--had leaked it to a newspaper reporter. Nothing wrong with it. It was a rather interesting little story.

M: Was that a story just passing around among the group or was it. . . .

L: Well, it was a story that Lyndon told to the whole group.

M: Oh, was it?

L: Yes, and told it with this, you know, sense that a story is important for its own sake, apart from the things it illustrates. It's similar to the story about Dobie, you know. It wasn't a funny joke kind of story at all, but a rather human kind of story. The man has a very human kind of quality to him in his own reactions to things, but also in his sense of human capacity for amusement and concern and romance and sensitivity--and depravity for that matter. He's a guy who's very sensitive to human beings as human beings.

That's about all of that trip, I suppose. The next morning we sat out on the Truman Balcony and had coffee with Mrs. Johnson. We did not see the President again. We left about mid-morning as I remember--I've forgotten now--we left maybe at noon.

M: You've had some opportunity to observe the First Lady then, too.

L: Yes, in a way, we've spent a little bit more time with her than with him, although that's--that suggests that we've spent a lot of time with her, and that's not so. Most of the times I've been with President Johnson, Mrs. Johnson has been there. And there've been a few instances when she--we've been with her and not him. The day--let's see, was it the day before that White House dinner, Beryl Pickle had a luncheon for Lana, and about eight or ten women, and Mrs. Johnson, came to the luncheon, which I thought was a very charming--completely unnecessary, and therefore all the more charming--gesture on her part. Beryl had it in some hotel out in Georgetown as I remember, I've sort of forgotten. I wasn't invited to the luncheon. So Lana's been with her somewhat more than I have been with her. But Mrs. Johnson showed a very keen interest in the development of the School from the very beginning, and she was obviously trying not to interfere with what

the committee was doing, but she was always very anxious to hear what the committee was doing. And she'd done a good bit of looking around and inquiring herself; she'd visited Princeton, and she'd gone to Harvard and talked to some people there. The President went to Princeton with her one time. And there were--well, yes, they made suggestions. Why shouldn't they? We didn't resent the suggestions that they made by any means.

(Interruption)

M: Do you have any insight about the way Mr. Johnson and Mrs. Johnson worked together--the President and Lady Bird?

L: No.

M: You know, I've heard all these stories about how she's a great support to him and how she's a sort of counterbalance at times, and things like that, but I've never been able to find any concrete. . . .

L: I don't think I can help on that, David. I've heard some of the stories that you have heard, and some of them are in print, about how she's done this or she's taken the responsibility for some things, but I don't think there's anything in my experience that helps with that.

(Interruption)

M: There are some other aspects to your committee work, other than the search for the dean and so forth which we've, I assume, pretty well covered by now?

L: Yes, for the most part, they were all. . . . Once we were launched on the dean search, those other aspects were pretty much subordinated to that question. But they did keep coming up. We had to make budgets each year. They were largely patchworks of

guessing because we didn't really know what resources were available to us. And it was never made clear to us the extent to which. . . .

(Interruption)

Well, do you--I've got some budget figures in these files and that kind of thing. Do you think that'd be interesting?

M: No, if you've got them there in the papers?

L: Yes, they're in the papers, and eventually the papers will be put away somewhere, so they can be used. The budget really was not a very crying concern. One had to be made, and nobody else could make it, so we had to make it. We tried to project it five years into the future, and that's even more difficult, as you appreciate. But one of the troubles was that we had to assume that the entire support of the School would be through legislative appropriations because we didn't have any guarantees about anything else. There was lots of talk, and there has been lots of money, but nowhere near as much money as the talk suggested. And I think probably the President overestimated his capacity to raise money after he left the White House. That is to say, while he was in the White House, he assumed somehow that that same capacity might continue, and I suppose it did, but on a much reduced scale.

The talk at the time--and this was his talk, it was a figure he used to us--was that he was planning a fund of some $25,000,000 as an endowment for the School. Now it wouldn't take that form. He set up about three foundations. They've changed somewhat, and I'm not sure that I knew precisely the structure of them at the time. One was called the Lyndon Johnson School of Public Affairs Foundation, which was designed explicitly for the support of the school. One was called the Lyndon Johnson Public Affairs

Foundation, which was designed, apparently, to support various kinds of public affairs sorts of enterprises, including the School. That one has had its name changed, and it is now called something else. It was in the news lately, because it was suggested that--[the weekly Austin newspaper] produced a story to the effect that Bauer House [the official residence of the chancellor of the University of Texas System] was being supported by a check, which had been drawn by Frank Erwin who is a member of the board of directors or something of this foundation. I forget what the name of it is, something like HEW [Health, Education, and Conservation Public Affairs Foundation].

M: There was that story--

L: You know the story I'm thinking?

M: Yes, that Bauer House had been $500,000 short.

L: This was not at the time of the big flap about Bauer House. This was more recent, say about a month ago.

M: Yes.

L: And it was suggested that the bill was being picked up by this foundation.

M: Oh.

L: Well, this foundation that was being referred to was in fact the Lyndon Johnson Public Affairs Foundation--

M: I see.

L: --renamed. I don't know whether that money went there or not. I have no reason to know anything about that.

The third one was the Johnson City Foundation, and I presume that was for local projects out there. Well, he was planning to raise all kinds of money through one of these

foundations for the support of the School and the library, and these were all mixed together, and I never knew which was which. Presumably, the School because the library was a federal project.

Now, as I remember, what he told us was that he had $8,000,000 in pledges in anticipation of the 1968 campaign, and when he had announced on March thirty-first that he wasn't going to run again in the fall of 1968, he had gone to each of these pledged donors and asked them to contribute to the foundation the amount that they had pledged to the campaign. I presume that didn't work, and I don't see any reason why it would. People contribute to a political campaign for reasons quite different from that which might stimulate them to contribute to an educational enterprise. So I presume a great part of that $8,000,000 disappeared. The $25,000,000 was a kind of airy figure tossed about, without any commitments or pledges or anything of the sort. My impression is now that it's going to be more like two or three million all together, which won't support the School at the level that we had planned it, which means that it's going to have to depend on appropriations and other sorts of gifts. Eventually, it will live off contract funds, research funds, and off appropriations. But the gift question is curious.

I haven't been close enough to any of those foundations. I don't know at all what they've been doing, but the President has said that he's going to contribute the fees from CBS for the interviews out at the Ranch--the Cronkite interviews. Two or three now have been produced, and half a dozen to be produced. That will produce a revenue of some hundreds of thousands of dollars--I don't know, the range is probably up towards a little over a million; maybe it's two million. Then, as I understand it, he is going to commit the royalties from his books to the School, and that's likely to amount to perhaps

a million or two. But I don't know how much private gift money there is. There may not be very much at all. The School has been making applications to Ford and probably some other foundations, but whether that's going to come through, I don't know.

M: Did your committee also work on the architecture?

L: Yes, to this extent, there was no single client, you see, for that project--unless it was Lyndon Johnson, and obviously, he wasn't going to be that closely involved. The library itself we had nothing to do with. As far as I know, the University had nothing to do with it. The design of the building, which came to be called Sid Richardson Hall, was a different matter because that was a University building. The University paid for the whole thing, but as soon as the library was completed, it was turned over to the U. S. archivist who administers it as part of the presidential library system. I think, technically, the building is still owned by the University, but the administration of it is entirely in the hands of the U. S. Archivist.

M: Something that's never been clear to me--was the library itself, the LBJ Library, paid for by the University of Texas? I mean the construction of it?

L: Yes, it's all part of a single design and a single construction contract.

M: But it's all through the University of Texas?

L: All of it is out of Permanent Fund money. Well, there's some federal money in it for the Sid Richardson Hall because that's an education building, and some of it was eligible for subvention by the HEW contracts. But I don't think that's true of the library itself, and the library--all the rest of it, as far as I know, every nickel of it--came from construction funds, permanent University funds, available funds, that is.

M: And did your committee have to do anything with appointments--other than the dean?

L: In the School, you mean?

M: In the School.

L: Not in any significant sense. There was a--there haven't been many appointments made in the school, as you know. When John Gronouski assumed the deanship, he was looking first for an associate dean. He consulted me, at least, and I'm not sure. Maybe the committee--I've forgotten. Well, the committee didn't exist. The committee was discharged as soon as the dean was appointed, so it didn't exist in any formal sense, but he may have talked to several people on it about Alex Clark, whom he named as associate dean. But that was John's appointment; it wasn't ours. And our role was merely advisory, say, at the very most.

M: Okay, maybe we ought to dissolve your committee then?

L: Well, there's one--yes, well, there wasn't any great thing about that. We got a letter the day after Gronouski was appointed, from Hackerman, saying, "Thank you all very much. You've done a grand job, and you're hereby discharged." And it said something about, "If I ever have another problem that is impossible to solve and will require enormous labor, I'll know where to look for help," or some such remark as that. But I must say we were not discharged out of rancor, at least we were not rancorous about our discharge; we were delighted. And that was the appropriate thing to do.

The only other appointment in the school that we had anything to do with was that of the librarian, whose name is Mary Louise Nelson. She's a professional librarian; she has a master's degree in public administration. She spent a couple of years at 1313 in Chicago, which was the headquarters for public administration in the United States. She was the social science librarian in the social science reading room over there. I'd known

her a long time. Redford had known her a long time. I think she did her master's degree with Redford, as a matter of fact, some years ago.

Now the reason we got her involved was that Jake Pickle and Ray Vowell, the vice chancellor for public affairs, worked out a program by which Jake got hold of a whole raft of documents, I think in the Capitol Building. They were cleaning out some space in there, and here was all this old stuff. And so Jake wrapped it all up in mail bags and sent it down here under his frank, and we began to accumulate vast piles of gray canvas mail bags full of old books and pamphlets and God knows what all--it was the most mixed-bag kind of collection of bags you can imagine. So something had to be done with all that stuff, and it was just being set aside and allowed to accumulate.

Tape 4 of 4

M: Again, let me identify the--this is the fourth tape of the series, the third tape of this session on July 19, 1971, with Dr. William Livingston, and my name is David McComb. You ready to go?

L: Yes.

M: And you were in the process of telling about this librarian. . . .

L: Yes.

M: And all the packages that would come from Jake Pickle.

L: Yes. I think most of them were arranged by Pickle because most of them seemed to be on his frank, you know. Maybe parts of them came from other sources, but we began to accumulate this enormous stack of stuff, and it was simply being put aside in the corner of a warehouse up at Balcones Research Center.

When I discovered the quantity of it and what was happening to it, I went to Norman and got him to approve our using some of the money that was already in the budget appropriation for the School to hire some people to get to work on that stuff--open it, shelve it, classify it, make lists of it if necessary. And we started doing that, but it also became pretty quickly evident that the people I had, who were principally graduate students in government, philosophy, history--they didn't know what to do, and I didn't know what to do. So what we needed was someone with some sort of bibliographical skills--library science kinds of skills. So I went to see Mary Louise Nelson and asked her what we could do, what we ought to be doing that we weren't doing, and she devised a kind of a system--not for cataloguing all that stuff by any means--but at least to list everything and identify it, rebox it so that we could get at it, and she supervised that enterprise. We had maybe half a dozen students up there working for about a year as that stuff flowed in. Then gradually it tapered off, and we wound up with the job we were doing largely completed. And that was a year ago, I suppose. Since then, the--there has been some continuous inflow of materials, but just a tiny trickle. So there may have been another dozen sacks that arrived. All together, we may have had two hundred sacks--I don't know how many all together.

So Mary Louise Nelson devised this system for us, and it became clear to me, in the course of our working on the thing, that she would be interested in becoming the librarian of the School. At some point, that had to be decided, because whoever was going to be librarian should be brought in as quickly as possible, because it was not only a matter of storing that stuff, but of planning acquisitions. And planning the library

itself--it's not easy to decide what kind of library to have in a school of so heterogeneous a disciplinary interest.

And she had to seek advice; she's talked to a lot of people in different departments here. A question: do you have all the law journals? Well, we decided against that because the law library is just across the street and up the road a little bit. Government documents? Well, before we even got Mary Louise Nelson, somebody had to decide what government documents we wanted. President Johnson had arranged very early on for it to become a depository [for government documents]. We now have three depositories on the campus, but you can--if you take everything, it just eats up your space, and you have stuff in there you don't have any possible use for. Somebody had to go through those cards, and who did it? Me. Well, that was ridiculous. Some of those things I didn't even know what it was, so I'd decide yes or no, we want it. I tried to err on the liberal side and say yes when I didn't know. But I know that she, since she's been appointed, has gone over what I did and corrected my grossest errors, and she did wind up as librarian. And I commended her very strongly to John when he became dean, and as far as I know, he's very pleased with her. She's an expert, very useful indeed.

M: A few other questions about Lyndon Johnson and the School of Public Affairs. You've mentioned a financial aspect of that, how Johnson would contribute to it through his fund raising or otherwise. What about teaching?

L: About Johnson, his teaching?

M: Yes.

L: Well, that's a very curious business. When he first got this idea, when it was first bruited, Johnson was quick to say, yes, he would like to come and teach. And for a period of a

year or two years, he repeatedly--not frequently, but every once in a while--made a public remark to the effect that he would like to return to teaching, and he was looking forward to it some day. It was a little amusing because, I think I said earlier, he really had not done any teaching, and to "come back to it" implied a different kind of situation.

But the closer he got to it--and especially after March thirty-first--the less interested he seemed to be in actually doing it. And I'm not quite sure what cooled that interest. I think it's a mixture of several things. One of them was that the closer he got to it, the more frightening it seemed. That's guesswork; I don't have any evidence to go on, but, you know, ultimately he hadn't done any teaching, and here he was going to be put with some of the brightest kids in the country, and put in a situation also in which he might be forced to defend himself again, and he didn't face that prospect with great satisfaction. The other thing was that he--as that time approached, so did the crisis of American universities, and while that crisis was not anywhere near so serious on this campus as elsewhere, still, we did have confrontations, we did have enormous rallies and a small amount of violence. And I suspect that the President did not want to be picketed or tiraded or denounced. He didn't want to go into the classroom and face bad manners; he didn't want to go into the classroom and have to defend his Vietnam policy all over again. Now, I have not heard him say that, and I have not heard anybody who claims they have heard him say that, but all I'm reporting is conversations that I've been in with other people who seem to agree with that kind of an appreciation of it.

M: And has he taken any hand in the actual direction of the School, I mean the actual, say, in effect, telling Gronouski what to do? And that sort of thing?

L: Well, I'm not a good one to ask that question of. I suppose someone will [ask], or will have already asked it, of Gronouski, who'd be much better. I don't know of any such instance as that. I do have the impression that he and Gronouski have crossed swords a few times, and he's wanted John to do things that John declined to do, but what they are, I have no idea.

Let me go back to the other question about Lyndon and his teaching. There's another factor that may have had something to do with this. Let's see, I forget how the question came up, but the question was what kind of an appointment is Lyndon Johnson to have in the Lyndon Johnson School of Public Affairs? There was all this talk about his being a professor, he's going to be teaching again, and being at the School and available and all that sort of thing. And so what appointment would he have? We considered this in the committee, and we recommended to Hackerman that he be named Distinguished Lecturer in Public Affairs. The reason we did that was that he was obviously "distinguished," but we thought it inappropriate to name him professor. Now, we didn't mean anything mean by that; it was not in our view *lese majeste* to suggest that he not be a professor. A professorship implies certain kinds of commitments, certain kinds of regularized obligations. It involves supervision of individual graduate theses. It involves--it implies at least--a kind of regularity of academic teaching. And we didn't suppose that Johnson would be interested in any of those things. He certainly was not expecting to meet a class MWF [Monday/Wednesday/Friday] at 8:00 a.m. On the other hand, we wanted him to have an academic title, and "lecturer" is an academic title.

Well, I think he was offended by this. He never said it to me, but the reaction was rather cool. The Regents discussed this with him--I suppose that means Erwin and

maybe Heath--and the answer that I got--this was from Hackerman; I didn't talk about it with any of the Regents or with Johnson. The answer we got was that that would be all right, but he would like to be offered a professorship, too, and let him take his choice. So what we said was well, it was okay with us; we don't care. But I think he was sensitive to this in a way that we were not.

Now, I think this is attributable to his misunderstanding of the academic life and what the terminology of it really means, and I think maybe it was a little insensitive on our part not to have sensed that sensitivity on his part. I was saying earlier that he had a curious sort of apprehensiveness about academic people, and a rather curious old-fashioned deference to them. Deference is probably too strong a word for his general attitude toward anybody, but we talked about this a bit earlier on the tape. It may have been that that sensitivity extended to his own preferences for titles, you see. And it may be that one reason he sort of backed off from that repeated statement that he was going to come back and teach was that we hurt his feelings by not offering him a professorship, which was certainly far from our minds. You know, I've always sort of regretted that little episode because I think we unintentionally offended him where it hurt. Because, you know, if it was a matter of just political struggle or a difference of opinion. That's not the human sensitivity of the man; that's just his continuing struggle for power and the opportunity to use it. But this was--this hurt him in his ego. That's too bad because we didn't mean to do that.

M: Do you know if there have been any lectures scheduled, a series of lectures?

L: By him? Not here. None at all here, at least not to my knowledge, and he has certainly not performed any. He did make a commitment to give some lectures, explicitly, at TCU

and at Rice, maybe one other place, and he backed away from those. He's never given a lecture--at least I don't remember hearing that he ever did. Why--I'm not sure. He's working on the book, yes, but he's not working all that hard on the book. Other people are.

M: Now after going through all this long struggle since 1966 to get this school going, to select a dean and so forth, are you happy with what you've done?

L: [It's] too early to say, I think. The School is barely begun. Basing the judgment merely on what it now is and what has been accomplished, and those who've been appointed and so on, I think that our view--my view at least, and I can only speak for my own--is that things have worked out very well. I think the prognosis is distinctly favorable; I think we have an opportunity here to create a very fine educational institution.

Now, that's not to say that I--it's all turned out exactly as I was expecting or, indeed, hoping. Gronouski and I have differed on some things, and he knows it, and I know he knows it and all that. I think John thinks our disagreements are more serious. I don't mean that we think we disagree more or less, but only that it is more important to me than I think it is. I know we disagree on certain things, but I don't think it makes all that much difference that we do, and I think he's a little more sensitive to our differences than I am. For one thing--oh, well, let me come back to the main question first. The School really ought not to have begun until this fall, that is, the coming September, 1971.

M: It started a year early?

L: It started a year early. It started with eighteen students--that's a very limited group. They had a very limited program, very limited faculty. In fact, they didn't have any faculty. Those kids were taught by faculty members borrowed from the existing departments.

There is nothing wrong with that, but I think that we'd have been better off with another year's preparation.

And the reason we started early was that we had to--it was political in the best sense. We had all this talk, we'd had a lot of publicity about it, the President was leaving office, and, you know, it would have looked funny. So we pushed faster than we probably should have done. I don't think this has had any ill effects so far as I can see. I think the danger was that we would wind up starting with any group of students we could lay hands on just to get a school started, and that didn't happen. The people were very carefully chosen, and they were very good-quality people.

And the same is true now. Gronouski and Clark themselves have interviewed every applicant for that School; they've done a lot of traveling around the country, and they've brought people here. An awful lot of time and money [have been] spent on making sure that those students are first-rate students. And I think that's very important. If you can start out a new program with assurance that the people you're using are superior, the program itself just establishes itself. This is what happened to the White House Fellows, for instance. I mean those people go through a more rigorous screening than Rhodes scholars do. And the result is that, right from the beginning, the White House Fellows program was a high-prestige operation. Now that's what we wanted for the LBJ School, and I think the promise is pretty good, and I think that a lot of that is due to John Gronouski's very careful concern about the quality of his student body.

Where he and I differ is on the faculty. My view, and the committee's view, and--though I never put it to him this way--the explicit commitment of the Board of Regents, was to the joint appointment as the basis of the School's faculty. Now, we had

said a faculty of fifty. In using that figure, we meant joint appointments; we didn't mean fifty full-timers. But John's view differs really as a matter of degree from the committee's view. We would have said--although we never put it in print this way—that, of those fifty, probably forty should be joint appointments, and the other ten might be persons appointed exclusively to the School so that they'd become professors of public affairs. You need, I think, a core faculty in that enterprise to assure yourself of continuity, of 100 per cent concern on somebody's part, reasons of that sort. And there may be some special people who don't have an academic discipline, who have spent all their life in the Bureau of the Budget, say. And while they may have been an undergraduate in economics, they're not trained academics; they're practitioners. Well, the School has got to have practitioners, or it's lifeless. [Without them,] it's got a sense of unreality built in, because ultimately, what we're still talking about is training practitioners, so you've got to have some people with professional experience. Well they might well be named to the faculty of public affairs without being named to any other faculty.

But John's view, I think, is that we ought to reverse those percentages. He doesn't mind having a few joint appointments, but basically, he wants a core faculty that is the bulk of the faculty. Well, I think that's open to lots of objections, as I've already said here and earlier on the tape, I think.

John also, when you get right down to it, although John has all these qualifications that we were delighted with, [he] has not spent a whole lot of time in a university, and he doesn't have the sense of the faculty members', oh, sensitivity, position that the faculty member himself has. I don't mean anything smart-alecky by that. I just mean that different people have different experiences, and it's hard to understand how a

faculty member's mind works qua faculty member--if you haven't been one. I have trouble explaining myself and my colleagues to public citizens of Texas all the time, including some very intelligent folks. It's not a matter of intelligence; it's a matter of experience. Well John hasn't had that kind of experience and it's a little difficult for him.

One of the things that we get to arguing about is tenure, for instance. He's trying to create a faculty over there without tenure. You can't do that--and he's going to learn that you can't do that one of these days. In the first place, a lot of the key faculty people won't talk to you if you're trying to withhold tenure. And in the second place, the AAUP [American Association of University Professors] is going to get after you, and he can't afford that. The University of Texas can't afford trouble with the AAUP nowadays. It's been a quarter of a century since we were blacklisted, but it's going to last for another quarter of a century, I expect.

M: Okay. Now you've commented on the potential of the School, and you've commented about whether or not you're happy about it and so forth. Now what has that School contributed to the University of Texas as a university?

L: The main thing it's contributed, I suppose, is an enormous notoriety. It has been given lots of attention, lots of space. I've got a file full of clippings down here of the public attention sort. It has also created a considerable measure of interest--curiosity, but sympathetic concern as well--in academic arenas around the country. It's given the University of Texas a new image that is not unequivocally good, because--we might as well face it--Lyndon Johnson is not a great favorite in the academic communities. And many people see this and scorn it as another personal domain and personal insignia of glory for Lyndon Baines Johnson. Well, it is those things, but what's important about it is

that it's a damn fine educational institution--or it's about to be. I'm saying [while] that it's not unequivocally favorable newsworthiness, it has caught attention all right, and people know that Texas is doing something, and something of considerable importance in education for the public service. I suppose that's the main thing it's done.

It has also caused a good many people to have some concerns here on the campus, faculty members who are worried lest--oh, one of several things may happen. Lest the Johnson School is going to come along and have so much glory that it outshines everything else. Lest the Johnson School will have so much money that other people suffer by comparison, if not by direct consequence. And there's reason for that. The Johnson School's budget was unaffected in the recent flap in the legislature and, indeed, for another year the Johnson School is given its own line-item appropriation for fellowships, which is one-fourth the total granted to the whole University of Texas. Well, maybe it's more than that. It's $100,000, as I remember, for the School. It's--I thought I could lay hands on this very quickly, but I don't seem to--oh, wait a minute, here it is. Lyndon Baines Johnson School of Public Affairs, $400,000. This is the 1971 fiscal year. Now, fellowships at the Lyndon Baines Johnson School, $100,000. Doctoral fellowships in physical and biological science, mathematics, and engineering, $115,000. Graduate fellowships, $180,000. So you've got about $300,000 for the University and $100,000 for the Lyndon Johnson School. So the proportion is such as to seem to validate some of these apprehensions.

Also, what happened last year in the teaching program was that the School simply borrowed faculty members [from other colleges and departments]. Now, they paid for them. We lent them half of Emmette Redford, and he taught one seminar, or whatever he

taught over there, and he taught one course here. We got half of his salary that we could use to hire somebody else. So there was a transfer of funds, but still--what do we do now? If that's on an annual, regular, repeating basis, then we've got to have an assurance that we can go ahead and hire somebody with that money on a permanent basis. But if it's a one-shot deal, then all we've done is lose half of Redford's services and then we have the burden of going out and hiring somebody to replace him for the time being. Well, that's distressed--well, maybe that's too strong a word, but that's bothered some people here and there.

And finally, I think a lot of people around the campus have been a little worried lest that School become shoddy, that it not be a strong academic program. So far, I'm very encouraged, as I say, about that. I think the evidence is that it's going to be a first quality school. But I can't prove it yet.

M: All right. I think we've pretty well gone through everything, but I want to leave you with an open question. Is there anything else we ought to talk about?

L: Yes, one or two things. They are sort of miscellaneous things. One remark that we got into very quickly as we started this committee and were talking with people around the country about it was that Lyndon Johnson was the wrong man to have his name attached to an important educational enterprise, because he was a bad guy, or because he was a peasant, or because he didn't represent the intellectual life of America as John Kennedy had done. Now, this kind of thing just makes Johnson furious. I don't know that it's said much to his face, but you read the newspapers, and there it is. Moreover, the student group and the eastern group accumulated a very considerable disdain for Johnson--not

universally--it wasn't true of everybody we talked to--but it was true of an awful lot of people.

I kept pondering this, and I think there's an explanation that's rather curious. He has an accent that's quite different from the accepted literate accents. Kennedy had an accent, too, but it was a combination of Harvard and Boston Irish, and it was within the pale, and Johnson's accent was outside the pale. That's part of it. But another part of it, and I suspect more important, is that Johnson was so damn successful. What made those people mad at him was the fact that he was so successful. Because Johnson did what Kennedy could never do--he could get his programs adopted. Kennedy never got anything adopted virtually. It's just almost impossible to find anything that Kennedy was able to get going. The Alliance for Progress is often cited, but it never much amounted to anything, but I concede that as an exception to what I'm saying. But here was John Kennedy who was the darling of the eastern intelligentsia, who had, for all his undoubted charm and great virtues, political strengths, acceptability to the right people, had been remarkably unsuccessful in his three years as president in getting anything accomplished. Here came Lyndon Johnson succeeding him, who was the reverse of all those things that were admired in Kennedy, and who made that situation all the more difficult and unacceptable, unpalatable, by the fact that he could get all those things accomplished. The history of welfare legislation and of civil rights legislation of Lyndon Johnson is enormously successful. He came a cropper on the Vietnam War, and if it hadn't been for the Vietnam War, my guess is that Lyndon Johnson would go down in history as one of the great, and one of the successful presidents. But as it is, he's going to go down in

history as the guy who failed in Vietnam. That's part of the tragedy of the man, I think. And he knows that, too, I think, and that makes it all the more tragic perhaps.

Well, that's one of the things I'd say. Another thing I want to emphasize is that Norman Hackerman's role in the development of this School was a very important role. We didn't fully appreciate it at the time, I think, because he's such an abrasive kind of fellow. I don't know if you know Norman at all, but Norman is a--is a guy who can be very charming. He doesn't have much small talk; he's ill at ease unless he's working, and he gets impatient. I think he learned patience as president of this University. He learned--well, maybe he always had a sense of responsibility. But Norman was brought under enormous pressures, that's quite clear. I've recited the story of that horrible conversation he had with Lyndon. I suspect there were many other conversations he never told us about. And as I look back on it, I just know there were a lot more pressures brought to bear on him than he ever conveyed to us. Frequently, he would call us up and say, "We've got to get moving," or, "We've got to do this," or, "We've got to do that," or, "You quit teaching and go do this." Or he'd say, "I've had this phone call, and what do you think about so-and-so for a dean?" But it was never, "I've been told to do this, and I'm putting the pressure on you." I mean he was--he handled this beautifully. And I think he protected us, as members of his faculty, on a number of fronts and, on a number of occasions, from pressures that were being brought to bear on him, and, while I've gotten very mad at Norman on occasion and very irritated with him--and in the last year when he was president and I was vice chancellor, we had some very serious spats--I'll be eternally grateful to him for the way he handled this committee of ours and for the way he played his own role in the creation of the Johnson School. He came into it late--he

had nothing to do with it initially. He was vice chancellor, but he was bypassed--it was the Regents, and it was Ransom, above all, who were ramrodding the thing, and Norman was brought into it very late in the game, and he came in and did a very nice job. So I'd like to record that here.

M: All right.

L: Another thing is that this is one of the most difficult committee jobs I've ever run into--mine or anybody else's, in part, I think, because there were so many constituencies involved in the creation of this School. There was the University administration, there was the Board of Regents, there was our own faculty here, and these are not always the same constituency by any means, and they are not unique to this School. But beyond that, there was a whole series of other kinds of constituencies. There was the political constituency surrounding the White House and Johnson, and there was a broader political constituency, I suppose, that I never had any contact with, but which we were made aware of indirectly from time to time.

There were also the other schools of public affairs--whatever they're called--around the country, of which this was now to become a very important participant or part. That educational enterprise is organized as an adjunct to the American Society for Public Administration. There is, for example, a body called the Council on Graduate Education in Public Administration, I believe it is, and it goes by its acronymic pronunciation like CGEPA or something horrible. The whole committee--not all of them, but about three or four--went to a meeting of that Council on Graduate Education at College Park, Maryland, early on. Three or four of us attended a national convention of the Council on Graduate Education and Public Administration--

(Interruption)

--and it's a very useful group because a great many of the people I've mentioned earlier in our conversations here attend those meetings regularly, the deans of the other schools--Brewster Denny, Henry Reining, Don Price, and so on. And I got to know all of them quickly that way, and it was very helpful because they've been very helpful to us in the planning of the School. But they also are looking very carefully to see what we're doing, and they're anxious--I think it's fair to say--they're anxious that Texas do a good job of this. Henry Reining, who is the dean at USC, was president that year when we were there, and he introduced us to the meeting which has maybe forty or fifty people. And he said, "Here's proof that Texas is finally doing something about public administration." Well, he was saying welcome to the fold; be sure you do a good job with this. So that was another constituency.

And I suppose another one yet is the whole world of American higher education, which, in a sense, has a kind of close-knit quality to it. So we were always working with people looking over our shoulders from very different sorts of perspectives, and we felt that attention pretty keenly sometimes. The difficulty was that you couldn't satisfy all of them with the same decision, and what was acceptable in one area was anathema in another.

Oh, one thing I promised to mention at one time was the expenses involved in all this. I don't suppose it's very important for posterity to know that it cost me a bit of money to be chairman of this damn committee.

K: You mentioned some of the things you did, for example, entertaining people and travel of course.

L: Yes, regularly.

M: Now, are there other expenses?

L: Well, not really, no. That's mainly what I had in mind. Travel never quite pays for itself. Texas then was on a--I don't know that it was seventeen or fourteen dollars a day per diem--

(Interruption)

This isn't a point of any real great consequence, but for a couple of years I was traveling--I wish I had a nice record of all the trips I took. I suppose they could be put together out of what records I do have, but I would go to New York, I would go to Washington, I was in Chicago, I went--you know, short trips lots of places, back and forth to Washington a dozen times probably, because a lot of people were in Washington whom we were interested in. I took several trips to the West Coast--Berkeley, Seattle. Let's see, I was in Portland, Oregon, for somebody one time. I was in Los Angeles several times, Princeton several times, to Harvard, Minneapolis. Well, my point is there was a lot of traveling involved, and the University's pay system, the state's pay system, is such that they pay the actual travel expenses plus a per diem, and the per diem is never enough to pay your hotel room.

(Interruption)

So there's always a little slippage from that standpoint, and the more you travel, the more you lose.

The other thing was the entertainment part. The University picked up some of that, I'm sure, and I can't remember now how. If we entertained in a public place, they could handle it, but a lot of that entertaining was at our house and up on the lake--we took

several people up to our place up on the lake. And there isn't any way for the University to cover that sort of thing. Not because it's me or because I'm complaining about it--my wife had a tendency to view that thing with some concern--but my point is simply that universities have never learned how to handle things like this skillfully, and I suspect this is true of virtually every university. And I suspect all together, while it was worth it, this experience cost us something like, oh, I don't know, several hundreds of dollars, at least--maybe a couple of thousand.

But I wouldn't have it any other way because I met an awful lot of interesting people, I tripped over the feet of the centers of power, I was privy to a number of activities that I would not otherwise have known much about. I think, on the whole, it's been a big advantage to me in all sorts of ways--not least because I've gotten to know a number of very admirable people, including a president of the United States. That's about all I can think to add to this. We may think of twenty-five more things as soon as we shut off the machine.

M: Well, let me thank you for your time.

L: It's been a pleasure--a great pleasure.

End of Tape 4 of 4 and end of Interview

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