INTERVIEW III

DATE: June 1, 1987

INTERVIEWEE: EMMA LONG

INTERVIEWER: Christie L. Bourgeois

PLACE: Mrs. Long's residence in Austin, Texas

Tape 1 of 2, Side 1

B: I'd like to start today by having you talk a little more about your experiences on the Austin City Council. Were there any incidents that you remember taking place in Austin during the fifties or early sixties relating to civil rights, either regarding school integration or housing or--not only school integration but integration in other areas?

L: Yes, we had quite a time in the early fifties. The black people were very adamant about wanting a human relations commission so that they could have more to say, or the commission would do investigating in the police brutality cases that they claimed that there were. Also housing; they weren't really pushing for housing, but they wanted to have more rights. Even at that time we had separate rest rooms at the coliseum and the auditorium, and they wanted some relief there, and in the library and the golf course. The demonstrations became quite serious. The organized groups--the NAACP and others--of the blacks came to the council in great numbers, and they became rather loud, and it looked at one time as if we were going to have some very serious altercations. They had the police there. The city manager had them come in, with the mayor suggesting this.

B: Who was mayor at that time? Do you remember?

L: Mayor [Lester E.] Palmer was the mayor. He was a very mild-tempered type of person, but he was very much opposed to the establishment of a human relations commission. He felt that we had all the vehicles that we needed to take care of the problems. They would listen though, the council. I was working with the blacks all the time and trying to get a--and there were a group of white people who were interested in working with the blacks [and] establishing a human relations commission to push along civil rights of all kinds. All over the country the civil rights marches and demonstrations were going on, integration in the Mississippi schools--I guess the schools in Mississippi at that time. It was just a violent time and we were trying to keep that from happening here.

But the people that I remember--there was a man by the name of Dr. Simms [?]. He was a minister--black--and Bertha Means, Mrs. J. H. Means; her husband was a professor at Huston-Tillotson College for black students; and Ada Anderson, an activist black, well educated; her husband was in real estate; and Arthur Dewitte, he was a news journalist

for a black newspaper and a leader in East Austin for the blacks--these were all the activist blacks. Dr. [Everett] Givens, who was the old black representative before the council during the days where he'd come in, hat in hand, and ask for things, did not join this group. They were demanding changes of the establishment--and they would talk and would have hearings. But one time it got so noisy and everything that the mayor recessed the meeting and the council left the chambers, and the blacks then took over, and they were going to be the city council and--

B: So the council left and certain black members of the audience took the council seats?

L: Right. Then later we went back into session and the blacks were still there. One black was carried out, I remember that, and--I think that was Booker T. Bonner, called by some [a] radical, carried out by the police. We had this going on for at least two or three weeks. The mayor couldn't take it. He finally went to the hospital, and we never did really establish this human relations commission in the talk session.

I talked very carefully with the blacks to try to get them from becoming too rambunctious, because I felt that was not the best way to settle things. We had one incident where one black woman got on the streetcar and refused to sit in the back seat, and this person was taken off and put in jail. It was a state law at that time. And so they came before the council, and I made the remark that we didn't want to break the laws. We believed in civil rights, but we wanted to try to change the laws and make this a legal activity. Well, it made Arthur Dewitte angry with me, because he felt that it was a right that they had and there should be no law that denied this. But I was trying to be as lawful as I could and at the same time very sympathetic to the blacks.

Anyway, this went on, and it was near the sixties when we were finally getting an ordinance pulled together. We never did really get one until--well, we never really did pass an ordinance establishing a human relations commission until after the 1967 election, when Mayor [Harry] Akin was elected, and Dick Nichols, [a] newly elected councilman with my support, and I. That's when we finally started moving forward.

But in the meantime, early on, we had passed an ordinance with--Mayor [Tom] Miller was on the council at that time, in the late sixties, where we integrated the library. We had had quite a bit of discussion about integrating the library, and Dr. John King, who was president of Huston-Tillotson College, came and made this request. In the meantime we had a lot of back-room discussion and everything. But anyway, I made a motion that we integrate the library, and I believe Dr. McCorkell [?]--a councilman, a University of Texas professor, conservative, but okay on this issue--was on the council at that time. We got a third vote. We voted to integrate it.

B: Was this the late fifties or the late sixties?

L: When we integrated the library? I don't remember. We'll just have to look that date up. [The] same thing about integrating the golf course; that was kind of a funny situation. We had passed a bond issue, and Mayor Miller was on the council at that time, and he had promised Dr. Givens that if they would support the bond issue--the blacks--that we would build them a golf course in the city. So after the bond issue passed Dr. Givens came up and said, "Now, Mayor Miller, you know that you promised us this golf course, and we have passed that bond election and we want our golf course." And I said, "That's the most ridiculous thing I've ever heard of. Golf is a one-man game and they just follow around, and nobody's walking together or anything. I can't see why we can't just let the blacks"--we said "Negro" at that time; that was before the term "black" came along--"I don't see why we can't let the Negroes play on the course. I just make a motion that we open the course to all citizens." I got a second and it passed. Everybody was so surprised that it happened.

B: Was it unanimous, do you recall? Was there anybody against it?

L: I'm sure it was not. It was a 3 to 2 vote, I'm sure, because there were some who felt very strongly about it. But those were the first two things that came about. And then later we had our big demonstrations, and that's where people were demonstrating all over the country.

In 1967 I brought in with me--by throwing my support to Dick Nichols and Harry Akin, and those three people were elected. We didn't defeat two incumbents, because Mayor Palmer and Louis Shanks did not run at that time. Harry Akin was a fairly popular man in the business community. He was liberal, and in the meantime he had been working with the blacks, and the chamber of commerce, and the merchants, trying to get them to go along with the public accommodations law that was just in the passing at that time--just about to pass or had passed--to open all the restaurants and the public conveniences to the blacks. So when he got on the council--we never did pass an ordinance making it mandatory that the public places be opened, because we really didn't have that authority. But we worked--particularly Mayor Akin and some of the white activists--with a group of the chamber of commerce and prominent white citizens. [We] agreed that they would just quietly, in the university area--Harry Akin was the first one to open his place, and then it just finally happened very gradually. I know some people made their places into "clubs" to keep out blacks.

But then we went even further than that in that--1968, I guess it was. We passed an ordinance just about the time--maybe a little before the federal government passed the fair housing ordinance. We passed one--the city council; Dick Nichols, Mayor Palmer and I voting for it, and the other two council members--there were only five of us at that time--voting against it. It so incensed the real estate people, mostly--the real estate board and their friends were so incensed that they got up a petition to have the ordinance invalidated by referendum. And they got their signatures--twenty thousand, I believe it was it took

at that time--and the ordinance was voted down by the people. Either that or we--but I don't think we rescinded it. I think it was voted down. I think it was put to the vote of the people. It really didn't matter very much, because we did rescind that ordinance after the vote, but we adopted an ordinance in compliance with the federal government, which was a fair housing ordinance that passed about that time.

But it was very difficult for us "liberals" that were supporting the blacks. We got ugly phone calls and we were just--a lot of people said nasty things to us. I remember one time early on before we did pass these ordinances actually granting blacks privileges, their civil rights. I was defending the Hispanics in the--there's a little swimming pool over at Palm Park near Palm School, and they had some problems down there and I was defending that. There was a man by the name of Pickle, old Judge Pickle--not related to Jake Pickle, who is our congressman, as far as I know. Anyway, he jumped up and he pointed his finger at me and he said, "Mrs. Long, are you for niggers swimming in the swimming pool?" And I said, "I'm for civil rights." And then he pointed his finger and he repeated it three times, and I repeated "I'm for civil rights" three times. The Mayor then got the subject changed and--

B: This was in a city council meeting that this man stood up?

L: It was a meeting at the city council, right. But it was very difficult. Although Austin is thought of as a liberal city, there's an old hard core, or there was then, of many people that were so adamant against the blacks having the right of going into a cafe and eating, or going to the theater, which they weren't allowed to do. They couldn't even sit in the balcony. They had their own little place to go. And they had one library. The integration of the library was early, and that was one that I thought was very foolish not to have done always, because a library is something that--we had one little old library over in East Austin, and it wasn't very well stocked. So they got to use the public library, those that were interested and wanted to.

B: How did that happen? In much the same way that the golf course was integrated?

L: Right. I made the motion. This is the way I phrased it: "I move that everybody should be able to use the public library." And I didn't say who, I just said "everybody." I remember Mayor Miller made the remark that, "Oh, those black boys are liable to get back there and sit with the white girls at the tables, where they'll be reading in the reading room." He was a very kind, lovable man, but he just felt that the blacks had their place.

B: Did you make that motion in response to some urging from the black community, or did you just--?

L: No, there had been some urging. It was in the mood with the blacks and their desires.

B: During that time that they were trying to get a human rights commission?

L: It was a little earlier than that, before we had the demonstrations. Dr. King came before the council with a small delegation at that time, and made the request and told about how the books just weren't in the library that he wanted to use for research. So I just made the motion.

It was really interesting to see the change of the whole city council during my many years there, my sixteen and a half years. I served with six mayors and four city managers, and to see the times change and the attitude of the council--it was always dominated by the conservative element, and my influence on that council--not that I lobbied them and made an influence, but it was the influence of my constantly, publicly making demands for civil rights, and for the right thing and what I felt that the people needed. And it just seemed that the council and the public did support me on many of the issues that I was working for, like paving, and parks, and recreation, and swimming pools, and more street lights, and keeping the dogs from running loose. I really did get an awful lot of public support. The paper was good at making my demands headlines, not always putting me in a good light, but sometimes they put me in such a light that people just thought I was right, and they just seemed to come forward and show that what I was doing was what was wanted. It was interesting.

B: So that was your strategy. You had only one vote on the council, but you went to the public and made such a clamor over certain issues that that swayed, oftentimes, the council.

L: That's right, and not only that, but I had a pretty good organization citywide, and precinct by precinct. If a certain issue was coming before the council I could get a large group to come to the council and show their support. We had the bus-riding group and organization, and when they were trying to increase their rates one time we had about, oh, at least two hundred people at a meeting one night in the county library. They had a president of the group, and their position to present before the council, and a lot of them showed up at the council meeting. And neighborhood groups--that was before you talked about neighborhood groups, but we organized groups from neighborhoods.

Another thing that I worked on was flooding, like Shoal Creek flooding, and we would go out and go on the scene, and I would go and get the council to go, our part of the council. It was just closer to the people then than it is even now with your neighborhood groups that are making their demands, I felt.

B: I just have one last question on this civil rights business. Did you ever feel physically threatened during that time that you were speaking in favor of civil rights? Did anyone ever make physical threats against you?

L: I had phone calls saying they were going to kill me, or they were going to do this and that. I really never did--one time we were having a small group of people at my house, a party, and somebody saw somebody lurking in the yard, and they had the police come out, but. . . .

Well, one time the chief of police was not in very good standing with me because there was too much unlawful things going on, and nothing was being done about it--they had policy games running in East Austin, and they knew what was going on, and they had professional gambling going on, and they could buy pot in almost anyplace. The idea was [that] a certain man in Austin ran these little rackets and everything; supposedly he kept the big crime people out. This was the idea. You let these little things go. But I made an issue of these, and the grand jury decided to call me before the grand jury to make me--threatened to take me and my husband Stuart to task, because he was on the radio telling this, and I was in the council.

There was a gambling place right down in the heart of the city, right down a stroll from city hall, that everybody knew about, where you could bet on the horses and everything. I was after that, and so I bought a gambling ticket, and I got some marijuana and--I got all this evidence together because the grand jury was going to call me to prove the stuff that I had said. I called the chief of police and had him come before the city council, and--anyway, I raised so much Cain and made these acquisitions, and the grand jury did not call me, and the chief of police got put on a shelf. A new chief of police was brought in, and he was up for retirement, so he was given some office. That was Chief Thorpe [?], for many years chief of police of Austin--I think his name was Raymond Thorpe--and Chief Miles [?], a top deputy in the police department, was brought in. We did change the chief of police because these old petty things had been going on for a long time; it was not right, it was favoritism and all this [sort of] thing. So we changed out and Chief Miles--also lots of favoritism, you know, bad treatment with the blacks, and the Hispanics, and the poor. So Chief Miles was brought in. He was a very fine man, and he was distraught because he was between a rock and a hard place. I was driving this drive to clean things up and straighten things up, and he had these old-time policemen down there that believed in treating the poor and the blacks rough, and taking nothing from nobody, and they were *policemen*. It was a matter of appeasing these men. They'd been there a long time and they were good men, but they just had old-fogey ideas of how to run a police station. And getting those men to clean up their act and abide by the civil rights laws, and getting the new ideas and practices adopted, took a long time. But over a period of time we did clean up the police department, and with Chief Thorpe out and Chief Miles in there, he worked very closely with me. We did a good job, I think.

B: So you just went downtown by yourself and bought some marijuana?

L: Well, I arranged to get some.

(Laughter)

But it was so prevalent at that time. If that's all we had now it would be very good!

B: I guess so.

L: There's too much other stuff floating around.

But it was a jolly time. In fact, I was very sincere and felt sometimes threatened, really, but nothing ever happened to me. I wasn't afraid. I never had been afraid, but I felt that I was right, and I was happy in what I was doing and accomplishing. I didn't ever feel threatened bodily, but I was verbally threatened and talked to a lot. (Laughter)

B: In 1954 you ran for the state senate. Can you tell me a little bit about that campaign? Who did you run against and what were the issues?

L: Well, the issues were liberals versus conservatives again. I ran against Johnnie B. Rogers. We of the liberal group elected Johnnie B. Rogers in the past, earlier, as a state representative, and he was a great little guy. He got in there and he worked real hard. But then we elected him to the state senate and he switched. He became the shadow of Ed Clark, who was a very conservative man, and he was one of the biggest lobbyists in the state at that time. And Johnnie B. had to deal with corporations, corporate law, corporations' insurance, and tax. You know, whatever goes before the legislature and is for the big boys, well, old Johnnie B. was just going right along with the conservative group. And states' rights was always an issue.

But anyway, we decided we'd beat him. I was very popular at that time, and it was in between elections for me, so I didn't have to resign the council to run. So I ran. And all around in the district we had these little meetings, or campaign--political meetings on the courthouse lawns, and schoolhouses, and I remember in some places that the men sat on one side of the room and the ladies on the other. That's how antiquated they were. And here I was, a lady running for the state senate! But I got a lot of respect from them, even though. I was running just on the issues of being for the people, and had a liberal platform, and [was for taxing] oil and gas and the big corporations. [Needless] to say, I didn't want the sales tax and--of course, we didn't have sales tax at that time, but I was still against it, because it was always mentioned. And for better schools and higher education and--all the goodies.

I stood a very good chance of beating Johnnie B. Rogers, but the conservatives got the idea--they felt around and they saw that I was in a very good position to win. So they started running out first one person, then another, to also run and kind of dropped Johnnie B., or didn't really drop him, but they had to have an alternative, too. So

they brought out first one person, then another, and finally they got Charlie Herring. He was a perfect guy to run in the race against me, because he was moderate and he was Catholic, and there are a lot of people out in the district that are Catholic. Until then I had a very strong Catholic vote here in the city of Austin, like Mary Koock. Mrs. Chester Koock, was out of the old populist family of Faulks; her brother was "the Johnny Faulk." Mary was a big Catholic and started the famous eatery Green Pastures in the old fashioned Faulk home in South Austin. She was a good friend of mine, and the Bishop was a good friend of mine, and I had gone to--I don't know what they call it, because I'm a Protestant--a conclave, or a blessing of a new church, or something like that. I was always invited. One time they were marching around and the Bishop said, "Come on, Emma, get in this line with us!" And [he] had all the bishops throughout the district, and they knew who I was. The Catholics are indirectly political, and they let them know who they're for. So Mary Koock was one of my very strong supporters, and had lots of followers. She worked politically. Mary called me and said, "Emma"--after they got Charlie Herring in the race--"Emma, I can't support you for the senate. I'm going to support Charlie. But anyway, we need you on the city council. We just need you there." So that kind of got to be the way they used this: "We need Emma on the city council. We don't want to let her go." They used this in the city, and then out in the district they used the conservative [line], and the woman being home, and the Catholics plugged Charlie.

But I did run a good race. Johnnie B. got so perturbed by the race that he at one time, out at Doris Miller Auditorium, a city auditorium in East Austin where we were having a rally for the blacks, even endorsed me! (Laughter) But I came in second, and I ran a good race, and it was very early on for a woman to be running for the state senate. I did feel that I did a lot of good, because I got a moderate in the senate. He did a good job and he wasn't a yes man, exactly. And I continued on the council. So we beat the man that double-crossed us, anyway!

But today Johnnie B. Rogers and I are very good friends, and I think a lot of him and I think he likes me. I never made enemies of my political opponents. I always became friends, and by the time I went off the city council I guess I had as many conservative friends as I did [among] the liberals. They didn't always support me; some of them did. I run into them today and they say, "We wish you were back on the council." And I say to them, "Well, what I stood for then is old hat now. I'm afraid I'm more moderate than I used to be." I'm certainly not an activist now, but in those days I was way out. What was way out then is now accepted--like school integration and public accommodations!

B: In that 1954 campaign, were there any accusations that you were a communist, or was that over by then?

L: There weren't any in that campaign, no. In 1955, when I ran for the city council again, that wasn't an issue at all.

B: So that was just one particular campaign, I guess. Well, two.

L: Three, I guess. [In] 1948, 1951, and 1953 there was a lot of that. It was in the days of Joseph McCarthy.

B: So I guess it had died down some by then.

L: It had died down. It had lost its impact. I guess people began to feel how silly they were about being so anticommunist, and learned that the communists weren't going to take us over.

There's one thing about 1967, about being on the city council, where I got more prestige. I was elected mayor pro tem, the first woman mayor pro tem the city ever had, and served in that capacity until 1969, when I was voted out because of the fair housing ordinance. That was rather a fluke. I firmly believe that if I had run the next year I would have been elected. Dick Nichols was defeated that same year, and he ran the next year and was reelected. But 1967 was, you might say, one of my finest hours, because I did support and even threw my support to Dick Nichols and Harry Akin, and made the difference in their elections. [I] also decided that Harry Akin should be the mayor, and got Dick Nichols, who worked quite closely with me at that particular time, because he was new and I had been responsible for his election--we were quite close.

So Travis Larue, who was reelected councilman and was in line, so to speak, to be the mayor, and all the establishment--everybody thought he was going to be the mayor. It was just a foregone conclusion. And I said something to Travis about, "I'd like to be mayor pro tem," and he started stiff-arming me: "Wait now, I'm not going to make any deals." I said, "I'm not asking any deals, I'm just telling you what I'd like to be, and I can see if I can get some more votes." He said, "Well, I'm not going to talk about it." I said, "Okay." So I got Dick Nichols together with Harry Akin, and I made Akin the mayor, and I was mayor pro tem, and we took over! That was another, I think, fortunate thing because Travis LaRue was a Republican, and President Johnson was president at that time, and I thought it would just be an outrage for the city of Austin to have a Republican mayor, with Lyndon Johnson and all the Washington press coming to Johnson City and Austin. I reminded the President that I had elected him and sent him a mayor, a Democratic mayor, so he was very grateful for it.

I suppose you could say grateful, because he appointed me [to] the World Population Commission and sent me to Geneva for a very sensitive, very important worldwide organization that we were trying to have some influence on. I think I had the right attitude on population and its growth, and birth control was one of the big issues at that time, and trying to get other countries to join in this. But he appointed me, and then--he was so wonderful about it--when I got to Geneva, he called Roger Tubby, who was the ambassador [in] Geneva from the U.S., and he said, "Roger, Emma Long's coming there on such-a-certain day, and I want

you to take care of her." And of course Roger Tubby didn't hear from the President very often, and when he got this direct call from the President he was thrilled to death to take care of Emma Long. They really rolled out the red rug for me while I was there and I was treated as a very special person, which was great. It was a wonderful feeling.

I tried to do a good job, and while I was there I visited the mayor's office. Roger Tubby sent me a driver and an aide, and I went in and visited with the Mayor of Geneva. The Mayor Pro Tem of Geneva was a woman, which was rather unique, and I met her and they presented me with tickets to the opera, and they had a man who came in with the--I guess you'd call--all in uniform, with tassels on his shoulders and livery. And a big silver tray with a bottle of champagne. It was right in the middle of the day; there he was, serving me, and I thought, "Oh my goodness, if this had happened in the city of Austin the citizens would throw us out, the Mayor serving us champagne at the expense of the city!" But anyway, it was a nice experience.

Also, the President appointed my husband, Stuart, to the National Pollution Board, Water Pollution Board--or commission, I believe it was called, National Water Pollution Commission. In that, we traveled all over the country and I went with Stuart, having hearings on--it was the first of this kind--on water purity and pollution. We had one hearing in Houston, and one in Alaska, and one in Oregon, and one in California. All over the country, [we] had these hearings. I went to some of them. And Alaska; I think they had a hearing in Alaska. They did. But for Stuart it was a great thing because he was very interested in pollution. In fact, in water purity he started--we had in our business, Long News Services, and the capitol bureau that we had, where I covered the legislature for years went along with my husband, Stuart, and six other employees--we had a big bureau up there. And we had a newsletter called ***Texas Water Report***, and then we had ***Pollution Report*** another weekly newsletter, and we covered the Texas Water Pollution Board, I believe it was called, and all those different areas of conservation and pollution and clean air.

B: That was in the sixties or was it in the fifties?

L: Well, it was in the sixties that he started these. I don't know when we started the ***Austin Water Report*** [?]. It was probably earlier than that, because they'd been working on the Texas Water Plan and Stuart was very interested in that and followed it, and his newsletter was very valuable to the people who were interested in water and water conservation. But I don't remember what year it was. I guess I should have these things catalogued in my mind, but I don't.

Tape 1 of 2, Side 2

B: Before we move on, could you tell me a little something about your work on the World Population Commission, what you all tried to do and what you achieved?

L: I was the only lay person on the commission. All the rest were government representatives, permanent government. There was one man from Stanford, I don't remember his name, who was the leader, the chairman of the delegation. We had what you'd call working papers that were ongoing, long-running, and they went from year to year. The population commission met every two years, I believe it was, and it was a world organization. Our main concern, the thing we were most interested in and put our energies in, was population control, at that time, and help for people who were overpopulated, and health matters. It [health] really wasn't part of population, but it kind of dovetailed into it because the World Health Organization was meeting there at the same time. And we kind of--like supplying people with contraceptives and materials concerning birth control to other countries that would accept them, and trying to get--for one country, Russia, to make a bolder statement on population growth. But it was sluggish, long, drawn out. It's just like the State Department, and how they work with the people of other nations, and it just grinds on and on and very slow and very plodding. If we made any progress, I don't know. But it's a matter of just working with people and trying to get them to move forward, and I think that we felt at that time that we had moved forward in birth control and some of the areas of getting out more material to educate people along these lines. But it goes on and on, right through hearings on war, and controlling munitions, and what have you.

B: I'd like to change the subject a little bit now and get back to some of the letters your husband Stuart Long wrote to LBJ about various subjects, and I'd like to get you to comment on some of them.

On January 17, 1949, Stuart Long writes LBJ urging him to help get J. Edwin Smith, a black man, appointed to the Houston federal court. Long writes, "If Ed's appointment can be managed, it would do more than anything I know of to help people like me who carried the ball with liberals for you." Is this the role you and your husband played throughout your association with LBJ, as sort of a peacemaker between Johnson and the more ideological liberals in Texas?

L: Yes, Stuart and I both believed in trying to bring the conservative to our side if possible, and you get him as far as you could get and then make some concession so that you could hopefully get something done. J. Edwin Smith was not a black.

B: Oh, really?

L: That's right. Ed Smith was a prominent attorney in Houston and very active in politics there. His wife was on the State Democratic Executive Committee for a long time. That was pretty early to even consider a black in any court at that time; it would have been much too early. But Ed Smith was prosperous, a very prosperous attorney and very good, very well received in Houston, except he was very liberal. Virginia was his wife's name, and she was on the State Democratic Executive Committee. Ed Smith did not get [appointed], but that's the way that we

worked, and particularly Stuart. He was always very droll and humorous, and President Johnson thought a great deal of him. Stuart was a brilliant man, and sometimes Machiavellian in getting his ideas across. And sometimes some of his desires were getting something done that wouldn't be done otherwise.

B: What other liberals in Texas that you can recall played the same sort of role that you and your husband played, as almost a mediator between factions?

L: Well, I remember Walter Hall and his wife, Helen, of League City. Helen was on the Democratic executive committee for a long time. She is dead now, but Walter's still living and is still very interested in politics. He's not as active now, except with his money. He is well known in all Houston, and Galveston, and League City is where he lives, and Dickerson. He's a banker. He was very interested in getting things done and not just chopping off your foot to make a point, and I remember we had fights with what's-her-name of Houston, the committeewoman there.

B: Hilda Weinert?

L: No, no; she was from Seguin. She was the executive committeewoman [and] she was conservative. But I'm talking about Randolph, Frankie Randolph. Now Frankie was one that--she wouldn't make any concessions at all, and she made it very difficult for the liberals to accomplish something other than screaming, and hollering, and getting in a convention. We broke with her, or she broke with us one time at--I believe it was when President Johnson was elected to the Senate. I believe she felt that we had sold out, so to speak; the liberal group that went for Lyndon Johnson.

And Virginia and Ed Smith--you know, we just talked about him--they would compromise to get a job done; not [so much] compromise as work in the direction and through--if our side got more people to join up with the middle-of-the-roaders, then we'd made a point and we traded out. We got what we wanted. And this happened. From time to time President Johnson was pliable, and he would have done more if he could have managed it. I certainly believe he would have, because he had the people's interest at heart and he had the feel for it. But he had to deal with people like Brown & Root. George Brown and Herman Brown were very, very conservative people, and while I can't think of any others, there were a lot of them that he dealt with; some of the bankers, big bankers of the state. There was Bill Cooper, Bill and Lucille Cooper of Dallas. They were willing to work with our majority, and join up with a few conservatives to get our point of view. Babe Schwartz of Galveston was a compromiser, not a way-out. None of us were. We weren't giving away anything; we just felt that if we wanted to get anything at all, we had to make some concessions.

There was Gilbert Adams of Houston, and D. B. Hardeman, and Jim [James] Sewell--what was his other name? He was a blind man, very

brilliant. He was blinded during the war and he probably--he was a state representative. He was very active in the liberal movement, a very brilliant man. Well, there are many others but I just don't have them in my mind right now.

B: Did you ever hear LBJ talk about that? Apparently that's the sort of thing that really could get him angry sometimes, that this certain type of liberal will not compromise, and he apparently felt that that was so useless because if you didn't compromise sometime, you couldn't get anything done. Did you ever hear him talk about that?

L: I think he was pretty bitter about some of the people that just wouldn't bend at all. I think he respected people that bucked him, but not to the point of actually just not accomplishing anything. When you could finally make a compromise it was worthwhile. But people like Ronnie Dugger, for instance, and Creekmore Fath, who were very effective people but they were just absolutely--they would not compromise in any fashion. And Senator Ralph Yarborough is another one. Well, he did work once in a while, but it sure did take a lot of doing to get him to!

I remember when President Kennedy was assassinated, President Johnson, then the [vice president], and Ralph Yarborough were both riding in the parade in Dallas, and they had a hard time deciding who was going to ride where. Just like children, you know. And Ralph wasn't going to ride at all, and finally they persuaded him to take a certain position in the parade. He was supposed to have some position there, some introduction or something. But he was a very stubborn man and not very good to compromise with. But I love him very much too.

B: Why do you think there was so much animosity between Yarborough and Johnson? Was it just pure politics or was there something else going on there?

L: I think it originated through politics. I think probably Ralph Yarborough felt that Lyndon Johnson had just treated him wrong when he did not allow him to name certain judges. I think it started there, the feud, and it just grew. And instead of getting over it or being able to find something else that they could agree upon, it just didn't happen. It was all over politics but then it became personal, I think.

B: Did you ever have any indication of what Johnson's private attitudes were on the race issue? During his years in the House of Representatives, of course, he voted against civil rights legislation, things like antilynching bills, but things that many southerners were against, based on states' rights. Then, of course, in 1957 he helped steer through the first civil rights law since Reconstruction, and then, of course, what he did as president with the 1964 and 1965 Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act. Did you ever have any indication what his private thoughts on the race issue were during this time, or do you think he really put much thought into it?

L: I think that he was a man that didn't have much feeling about the black man being put in his place. He never did have family that had slaves, as far as I know. He grew up in the Hill Country, where very few people had enough money to have a slave, much less know whether they liked it [slavery] or not. I think frankly he just didn't have a real solid position on it, and didn't need to have. Of course, when he voted with the South on those issues he was voting his constituency, and at that time he could not afford to vote otherwise, and be reelected. But later he had the power, and the party had the power, and they had been going in that direction and President Kennedy had started the ball in motion, and the bills were already in motion. President Johnson felt, I think personally, that they were right. And I think that he had the power to see that they got passed. Now when he was majority leader he might have had that power too, but the party didn't have it at that time, the Democratic Party. And it makes a difference.

B: How did Johnson relate to the press? We know later on, in the sixties and during the Vietnam war he had a lot of trouble with the press. But earlier, in the forties and fifties, how did he relate to the press? For instance, Stuart Long probably wrote more favorable stories than unfavorable when he wrote about Johnson, but when he did write something negative or something that Johnson perceived as being negative, did LBJ sometimes get angry about that?

L: Oh, yes. And he would tell him. They'd fuss, fight back and forth, but they always made up. They didn't make it a thing that went on and on, because Stuart was very fond of President Johnson, and he was fond of Stuart, and they were both sensible men.

I remember one time after World War II Stuart was walking along--he was working for KTBC, I believe, or KVET (inaudible). And the President said, "Stuart"--put his arm around Stuart, like he did--and he said, "I want to take you to Washington with me." And Stuart said, "What in the hell would I do in Washington? Besides, you can't pay me enough to keep me." And of course it made the President mad, angry--but then this was before he was president, of course--and it hurt his feelings. He thought he was doing Stuart a great favor by taking him up there, or offering to take him up there.

B: What did he want him to do up there, just work in his office?

L: Oh, I suppose. He had many people up there, writing speeches or being one of those officers that senators have, just appointing. I don't know what he had in mind for him. He just offered and Stuart didn't take it. He said, "Besides, you can't afford me." That's what Stuart said. But that was after we had Long News Service going rather successfully.

B: Why do you think he would get angry about even slightly unfavorable stories? Did he feel that you were being disloyal, to write something unfavorable?

L: I don't think he felt [that we were] disloyal, because he got angry with everybody who didn't say something nice about him. He was thin-skinned for a politician, he really was. He couldn't take criticism and he didn't like it, and I'm amazed that he didn't let it destroy him. But I think because he was big enough to see that he was acting childish, which he did at times, that he was big enough to see that he was in the wrong, that he was not acting like he should, and then he would go back and he would make amends. But when he got to the point of all the power that he had and *then* he started fighting the press, he made a very serious mistake. But he was so bitter by that time, I think, and so disappointed, and so frustrated with the way the Vietnam War was going, that he felt that the press had betrayed not only him but maybe the country. And so he became very embittered about it.

But as he went along during the years, the press was pretty good to him until he got all the power he had. When he was majority leader he never got any real bad press. There may be some negative business from time to time, but no real bad press.

B: Do you think Mrs. Johnson probably played a large role in getting him to see that he was acting childish at certain times?

L: I think she played a very serious role in advising him, and helping him, and keeping him from becoming angry sometimes when he shouldn't. I think she did. I think she had a very profound influence on him.

B: In February of 1950, Bill Deason gave Mr. Long two weeks' notice at KVET and Long wrote Johnson a letter informing him of this development, and there is some indication in the files that your husband thought that a longstanding campaign by Ed Clark to get him off the air finally bore fruit. I'd like to have you comment on this, if you will.

L: In what way do you want me to comment on it?

B: Well, do you think that your husband was correct in his feeling that Ed Clark had something to do with getting him fired from that job?

L: Oh yes, I don't think there's any doubt about it. It was either Ed or some of the establishment people. KVET was competing with KTBC at that time as a radio station, but they were friendly because they all belonged to the same family. President Johnson probably helped all of them that helped KVET get started. But my husband in his news broadcast was stepping on some very powerful toes, and one time he said that Ed Clark had the legislature and the state in the palm of his hand. That made Mr. Clark--Ambassador Clark--very angry, and I wouldn't be surprised if it was that incident that caused him to have Stuart fired. But when Bill Deason fired Stuart, Stuart knew that what they were doing was putting economic pressure on KVET, through bankers and advertisers--big advertisers--and KVET got to the point where they couldn't--well, they felt that they couldn't afford it. So they, I'm sure, hated to do it but they had to, and Stuart knew this. So when he wrote

to the President telling him about it, he wasn't complaining, he was just informing him what happened, and then of course I'm sure the President knew it before Stuart did. (Laughter)

B: Yes, I was going to ask you that. LBJ writes back that that was the first he'd heard of it, but don't you think, or do you not think that Bill Deason had checked with him and cleared it with LBJ before?

L: Probably. I wouldn't be surprised. It wouldn't surprise me at all because they're kind of a big family. I imagine he said, "Well, we just can't take this any more. We're just losing too much money." And probably the President said, "Well, do what you have to do." I just wouldn't be surprised.

But it didn't embitter Stuart or me. We just realized the realities of life and we went on. We had our news service, and then Stuart got a sponsor and bought his own time on another radio station, and I suppose he was on there for several years after that.

B: There's also some indication that a vote that you took on the city council, just before Stuart was fired, against Brown & Root may have had something to do with his being asked to leave KVET. Do you recall this? Do you think there was truth to it?

L: Oh, yes. I think it was all of this, right at the same time; the Brown & Root incident and the Ed Clark thing. Yep. It sure had a lot to do with it, because Mr. Herman Brown was--this is unusual, because this is a very small project for him, I think $130,000, and he did millions of dollars and all kinds of projects everywhere in the world. But he knew that I was against this, and he knew that this vote was coming up, and he sat there in the city council. He was a very handsome man, very distinguished-looking, and I remember him sitting there just for this vote, and I voted against it. He had the lowest bid, but it was not the lowest and best bid because the unions were going to strike, and the strike would cost--it would not work.

Jamie Odom, who was the local contractor, was a union contractor and he had the building of the main power plant. The only thing that was left was the ovens, or the--it's not called ovens--well, I can't think of what the part is, but it's just $130,000. But shutting down the job, and with pickets down there, it would cost, every day that they didn't finish that power plant, an awful lot of money, a lot more than $130,000. This was my reasoning. So I voted against it, and I was the only one who voted against it. The rest of the council voted for it. There were four other votes, so it passed. So they did go ahead and give Brown & Root the contract.

But they were so angry because I had the audacity to vote against it and not make it unanimous. See, they didn't like to have this divided vote, so they--they were just up in--oh, they didn't know what in the world they were going to do. So finally they got with the unions

and they agreed to build a fence that would make it completely cut off from the main power plant. So the unions went ahead and worked, and they built whatever it was, [and] Brown & Root started on his job. It was just a small thing, but that's how they tried to make us do what they wanted to do. And they had pressured Stuart before on some of his stories, and I just voted the way I felt was right. They never did really put any pressure on me, exactly, but--I guess they knew they couldn't bribe me or get me to do anything I didn't think was right or anything I didn't think was right. I just was that way. But Mr. Brown was sitting there and oh, he just gave me the most hateful look you could ever imagine. (Laughter) But imagine, with all his millions and his big jobs, to come to the city council just for this.

B: Yes, I was going to ask about it. It does seem awfully odd that he would make such a big deal out of such a small thing.

L: That shows you what an impact Stuart and I were having on the city of Austin at that time, by being independent. And the establishment just couldn't believe that this was happening.

B: Did you know Herman and George Brown personally?

L: I never did meet George Brown. I had met Herman Brown but I didn't know him that well. I knew him when I saw him, and I met him just in passing. You know, like in a chamber of commerce meeting, let's say, or a meeting at the Headliners [Club], or something like that.

B: That's an interesting story.

Stuart Long writes LBJ in June, 1950 about J. E. McDonald's campaign for commissioner of agriculture. Apparently, McDonald had been a thorn in the side of liberal Democrats for some time, going back to as early or maybe earlier than 1940, and the New Dealers versus the anti-New Dealers. Could you comment on McDonald and his career as commissioner of agriculture, and his role in Texas politics?

L: Yes. J. E. McDonald was a Republican, and it was just very unusual that a Republican would have a state office at that time, because even though a person was Republican in ideals, they didn't run on the Republican ticket. But he was a known Republican.

B: He was? I mean, I know that he voted Republican, but--

L: He was a known Republican! Everybody else said they were Democrats, but everybody knew he was a Republican. He was very conservative. His farm policy was as conservative as you could get for the state of Texas. He didn't do anything for the farmers. And he was on the Democratic executive committee and he tried to dominate it, and so we wanted to--no, he wasn't on that committee either. He just attended this particular meeting. That's right. But anyway, we tried to get him off the ballot because he wasn't a Democrat. That's the reason we voted to

leave his name off. He took it to court and he did get on the ballot, but it defeated him politically. I mean, after years of just getting by, being voted in and no real opposition. Was that John White who defeated him? It was, wasn't it?

B: Yes. Other sources have said he controlled a lot of votes. Do you know anything about this?

L: Do you mean J. E. McDonald?

B: Yes, McDonald; that he could deliver a lot of votes due to his being able to appoint so many people and having so many people working under him.

L: Well, a lot of that's true. The Department of Agriculture is quite extensive and has branch offices all over the state, and I guess he had those people pretty well lined up. The Department of Agriculture in Texas at that time was rather a quiet office; it never had really been a great issue between the liberals and the conservatives. Mr. McDonald had run for a long time and had been there, just like Mr. [Robert] Calvert used to run for comptroller, and he was elected over and over; and Jesse James was state treasurer. He was elected. And those people were just elected over and over, and those officers were more or less like judges; people get in there and you never do--aren't contested. So he was very well entrenched, and he did have a lot of state employees who were his base of power. But we beat him.

B: I'd like for you now to tell me in as much detail as you can about the 1952 Democratic convention--the May convention and the national convention, [and] the September convention--if you were there at all three of them--and your role and your husband's role in these conventions. (Interruption)

L: [The conventions] were quite interesting. My husband and I were very active with the liberals. Stuart and I were very active with the liberals statewide, organizing for the conventions. We organized the Travis County convention, of course, and we won it--we thought we did, but we had a divided convention. Then, of course, first our precinct conventions were the big fights, where we had a majority of the conventions here in Travis County. But we did have--on the West Side, we always had problems getting the conservatives--getting control of those precincts. But then we went to the county, and our fight there was states' rights and tidelands, I believe. When you got right down to it, though, it was whether or not the delegate would support the Democratic nominee regardless of who it was. And there was a feeling that unless these people--whoever was nominated as the Democratic nominee--if they weren't states' righters, if they didn't believe that states had certain rights, that they just weren't going to go along with the convention.

So we got to San Antonio to the state convention, and I was a delegate and Stuart was a delegate. Mayor Miller was there, he was a

delegate; Creekmore Fath--these were prominent people at that time--and Marian Storm [?], a very active liberal, statewide. And those were the ones who were up front as leaders from Austin. I don't remember who the Shivers people were in that convention.

B: George Sandlin [?].

L: Oh, yes, George Sandlin. He was leading the--probably even chairman of the Shivers group, and he was a very conservative man. We really didn't have much respect for him. (Laughter) Anyway, when we got to the state [convention], the conservative states' righters had the liberals outvoted, and we of the liberal Democrats bolted, left the convention.

B: Why was that? Were the conservatives just much better organized? Shivers was governor then, so I guess he and his forces had control of most of the machinery.

L: They just out-organized us that year, because he had control of the party machinery, and being governor, well, if you work at it--some governors do not, but Shivers did that year; [he] worked at it and he had the majority of the votes. The governor has lots of power, and in the rural areas throughout the state, the middle-of-the-roaders that go along--maybe in West Texas particularly--they're inclined to go along with the governor. They have respect for the governor, and so the delegates--unless you really get out and organize and have a cause. So when we got to the state convention, they had the liberals outvoted, and the issue was whether or not you would take the pledge to support the Democratic nominee. That was the main issue, and states' rights. So the liberal Democrats bolted, and we went over to the La Villita. Maury Maverick, former mayor of San Antonio and former congressman from that district, led us over there; he was head of that group, and Mayor Miller, and Stuart Long, and Creekmore Fath. I had a picture of those people walking and leading this. And we went over and we had our convention, and our delegates were chosen all over the state. You see, it was a statewide rump convention. I was elected a delegate to the national convention that met in Chicago that year.

When we got to Chicago, Sam Rayburn and Lyndon Johnson were wheeling and dealing around, and they were trying to appease the liberals and the Shivercrats. Walter Hall and some others had even gone to Washington, and they talked to President Johnson and they'd also talked to Sam Rayburn, trying to get them to see what we were trying to do. We suspected that they were going to probably throw the election into the House of Representatives, and our electors would not vote for the Democrat.

B: That was the Shivercrat strategy.

L: Right. So we were trying to avoid that, and trying to point out to our leaders in Washington that they were on the verge of having part of us in the South disfranchised. And they were not only doing it in Texas,

they were doing it in other states, like Georgia, and Mississippi, and others. And we were very afraid that they were going to do that, and even if we elected a president that he might be just thrown out because of the electors going Republican.

Anyway, we went to Chicago, and I remember going to two or three different delegations myself telling our story, what we were afraid of and what we were working to do, to pledge to support the Democratic nominee.

Tape 2 of 2, Side 1

B: You were talking about having gone around to several delegations explaining what the Shivercrats were trying to do.

L: Right. We had high hopes for a while. We had a main group--I wasn't in it--with leaders like Maverick, and Mayor Miller, and others that were talking to Sam Rayburn and President Johnson and others, the people that were at the top there at the convention, trying to get them to go along with us.

B: What were--?

L: To seat us, to seat our delegation, because we were a legitimate--we said--the legitimate delegation because we had followed the rules of the Democratic Party and intended to continue to do that.

B: By "following the rules of the Democratic Party," you meant that you were going to support the nominee, no matter--

L: Support the Democratic nominees, no matter what. So they got Allan Shivers, who was heading the Texas delegation to Chicago, in a room and they talked with him and he pledged that he would support the Democratic nominee, that he'd always been a Democrat and he would support the Democratic nominee. Well, it seems to me I remember seeing him standing there with his hand up, "I'll support the Democratic nominee regardless of who he is." But later on it seems that when, after the convention--and I did not get seated; I got seated in the balcony. Our liberal delegation, our rump delegation as we were called, were given the privilege of being seated in the balcony, which meant that we would have the privilege of staying through the convention and seeing the operation, but we didn't have a vote. So I just came on home. I didn't see any reason to sit there and watch somebody else make the decisions when I thought I was a delegate. And I was disgusted because they had--the national convention had accepted--chosen his group, and I knew what they were going to do.

B: Did anybody else come home, or--?

L: Oh, some of them stayed. Some of them came home. I don't know. I don't really know, but I do know that some of the delegation stayed

right through it. I remember Walter Hall and Helen were there, and whether they stayed I don't remember.

But anyway, after they got seated and our--who was nominated that year? Do you remember? Stevenson?

B: Stevenson.

L: Stevenson. Governor Stevenson. Adlai Stevenson was the nominee, and sure enough, Governor Shivers went off and supported Eisenhower and carried the state for Eisenhower that year, which was very disappointing and very disgusting. I could not accept that. I thought that was very, very disappointing, and for years we had our differences with Allan Shivers. But we later--he mellowed and we mellowed and later we were very good friends. And when my husband Stuart died, Allan Shivers and Mary Alice, his wife, came to the funeral and Shivers came up to me. I was sitting there in the car and he kissed my hand and he said, "He was a great man. Always fair," talking about Stuart.

B: Apparently Shivers had that ability to maybe even have bitter fights politically but to have a good personal relationship with someone. I think he and LBJ had a good personal relationship.

L: They fought, they had their fallings out, but they always seemed to come back and make up. They had several fallings out, some of them almost bitter, but they did make up.

B: Do you think the tidelands issue--this is what Shivers kept talking about in 1952, that Stevenson would not support ownership of the tidelands by Texas and that Eisenhower would. Do you think that this was just a smoke screen, an excuse for the conservative Democrats to vote for the Republican nominee, or do you think this was the real reason that they wanted Eisenhower over Stevenson this year?

L: No, I don't think they wanted Stevenson. They didn't believe in anything that he--in his ideals or his idealism. They didn't believe in the New Deal ideology. Most of them had opposed it. They certainly felt very strongly about the tidelands, but the liberals felt that the tidelands could be settled without giving everything away and without going to the Republicans. If I remember right, Eisenhower didn't give the tidelands to Texas either. But no, I just think that that was one of the excuses. They felt strongly about it, I think, but it was an excuse, because Eisenhower didn't really make any bold commitment on that, if I remember.

B: After the Shivercrats gained control of the party machinery in 1952, and specifically the State Democratic Executive Committee, certain loyalists under the leadership of Sam Rayburn, I believe, organized a rival group called the Democratic Advisory Council. Do you recall that? Do you recall the Democratic Advisory Council and whether it was effective?

L: No, I really don't, because I think it was on a higher level. It didn't have too much to do with the state. It had to do with the congressional delegation. Of course, I'm sure they worked with certain higher authorities like Mayor Miller, and Maury Maverick, and some of the other--but it was a structure to work through Congress, I think, more than it was a state agency to try to control the local party. Because we'd lost that and Shivers had complete control of it.

B: Anything else on the 1952 battle? Do you recall LBJ's role in this? Anything specific about that?

L: Well, of course, the liberals felt that when he and Rayburn went with Shivers and seated that delegation, that they made a terrible mistake, and that Shivers was lying, we thought. We felt that they had certainly sold us out.

B: Why do you think they did that?

L: I think they thought that maybe Shivers would not vote for the Republicans, maybe, if they worked with him, and maybe we would carry the state for the Democrats. I think it was on a high political strategy, and they were just not informed as well as we were that had worked the state and knew what their aims were. I think they were just not as well informed and they didn't know the deep-seated feeling on the part of the Shivercrats at that time. They thought that they could make a deal with them, and they could not.

B: Shivers later claimed that the only pledge he had made at that convention was to make sure that the nominees of the national convention would be placed on the ballot under the Democratic column. And Sam Rayburn, of course, always felt betrayed. He felt that Shivers had promised to support the Democratic nominee himself.

L: I think he did.

B: You do?

L: Yes. I think he did, and what Shivers claimed there, to me seems a little ridiculous because they would naturally be--the Democrats would be put on the ticket. I think they would; I can't see why they wouldn't. That's the reason you have two parties. So he was just using some words to try to get out from under making himself a damn liar. (Laughter) Because I saw him hold his hand out--"I support the Democratic nominee." However, there were some that said that he did have that kind of language in the--did he pass a resolution, or what?

B: I don't know if there was a resolution. There was a pledge that he took.

L: The pledge that he took was supposed to [be to] support the Democratic nominee regardless. Sam Rayburn thought he was taking that pledge, and

I imagine Lyndon Johnson thought he was taking that pledge, but he maintains that he didn't. Now, I don't know. I thought he did. I was there at that time.

B: Anything else on 1952?

L: I can't think of anything else. It just didn't turn out good for me. (Laughter) And neither for the state of Texas, because we elected Eisenhower for president.

B: Let's turn to 1956 then. The Shivers forces were in control of the party machinery after 1952, and the liberals and moderates under Johnson then in 1956 finally forged an uneasy alliance to take back control. What were the roles of LBJ and Sam Rayburn in this battle? Did the liberals want Johnson to take a more aggressive and prominent role than he did, or--?

L: I don't remember as much about that 1956 convention as I should. I think that by 1956--it seems to me that Governor Shivers had kind of lost his interest. He wasn't that interested in controlling the party machinery. He just didn't work at it, and I believe that the liberals and moderates took the machinery over, and I don't know exactly what the issue was. I don't remember--unless it was tidelands.

B: I don't think it was tidelands at that point.

L: I know, when Price Daniel was Governor--he followed Shivers, didn't he?

B: Yes.

L: He made a big, big issue of tidelands. That was one of his main issues.

B: There were some articles in various publications in 1955, before LBJ had his heart attack, speaking of Johnson as a possible candidate for the presidency. Was that much talked about in Texas, or was that--?

L: I don't think that--as being one of the small party hacks at the time, we didn't give it much credence at that time.

B: The Shivers forces in 1956 apparently had a three-part strategy: to get favorable resolutions at the precinct and county conventions, to use the uninstructed delegation procedure, and to adopt the unit rule. Do you recall this strategy? Was it effective, and how did the loyalists and liberals go about countering it?

L: It seems to me in 1956, if I'm remembering correctly, that we just out-organized them. I don't know; I don't think Governor Shivers was that interested. I think it was the old party machinery, more or less, those conservatives that were still in the party, and wanted to have an instructed delegation and wanted to control [it], that were pushing their issues in the precincts. But I think they lost most of those in

the--we went uninstructed, I believe, it seems to me. Or was it vice versa? Was it--the liberals wanted [an] instructed [delegation].

B: Instructed, yes; the liberals wanted instructed.

L: The liberals wanted instructed, and I think we got [an] instructed delegation at that time from the precinct level all the way up to the state convention. And we won the state convention, and I don't remember too much about that. I don't even remember going. I imagine I did. But it was a convention that was not that important as far as--well, to me it just didn't have that much impact.

B: Not like the 1952 convention?

L: Right.

About the conventions we've been talking about: I remember in 1972 I went to the [Democratic] national convention in Miami [Beach], Florida. We organized that year on the basis of different Democratic candidates. I was supporting, in the state, from the precinct on up, Hubert Humphrey for presidential nominee for the Democratic Party. And then there was the McGovern group, and the Jackson group, and--now I can't remember who else. But I can remember very well the one I supported. I organized the state for Hubert Humphrey, and I was chairman of the delegation to the national convention. And it seems that our main push on all the different conventions was, who are we going to support for the nominee for the Democratic Party? And we didn't necessarily have--it seems to me that the liberals more or less prevailed in all the state conventions that year, because by that time there were some Republicans going in the Republican Party. The very strict Republicans had begun to show some impact. So we didn't have our liberal/conservative fight as much as we did just on who we were going to support.

So I went to [the] national convention and I supported Humphrey, and of course he wasn't nominated. That was the year that McGovern was nominated. Our fights there were over liberal resolutions; way out, and almost to the embarrassment of the party because some of the ideas on--oh, [the] gay subject came up, and the abortion [issue] I think even started then, and some of these resolutions were so way out for most people that it did give a tinge of, I guess, radicalism to the party at that time.

And so McGovern did get nominated and a lot of people were disappointed. I was disappointed because I thought Hubert Humphrey was the most wonderful man and had the most wonderful ideals of any man of that time.

B: Did you know him?

L: I knew him. I met him at the LBJ Ranch when LBJ was majority leader. Stuart and I were invited out one weekend when Hubert and Muriel were visiting, and we spent the weekend there. It was the first time I met him. And then I traveled in Texas with him from here to Houston, and--where else did I go? I guess San Antonio, on his plane with him.

B: In 1972?

L: Yes. When he was running for the nomination. And he was here in Austin and I was there with him--around him, in the group. And I was very disappointed and I never could feel real strongly for McGovern. I was sorry when the Democrats lost, of course. I voted for the Democratic nominee because that's what I always feel that, as a Democrat, I should do. But that convention, I think, is the beginning of the real ultra-liberalism in the Democratic Party.

B: You think that's also, I guess, the beginning--or that's when the Democrats lost a lot of support because of "radical resolutions" and such things.

L: Yes, that's right.

And then--I didn't go to the convention in 1960. The Democratic convention.

B: Tell me about that.

L: Well, I didn't go as a delegate. We organized Travis County and had it in real good shape, and had won the precinct conventions and went to the county, and we would have won the county convention but there was some question--I have forgotten what it was, but it had to do with LBJ. They wanted control for some reason, and--I don't remember. Isn't that terrible? I think it had to do with delegates; who was going to go to the national convention. And there was one big box that didn't get its minutes in. They held them out on purpose, and it was one of LBJ's henchmen that was precinct chairman, and that box never did get in, or got in too late, or something. It changed the balance of power at the county convention, and--

B: In LBJ's favor?

L: Yes. And so there was a question as to whether they would let me go as a delegate or not. And they had somebody--I've forgotten. They made some kind of a trade and somebody else got to go. They tried to make amends to me, but I wasn't bitter about it. You accept those kinds of things, after all. But I did want to go to that convention, so Stuart and I went as press and represented the press, [the] ***New York Times***, for one, and our papers here in Texas that we--see, we represented in our news bureau twenty-seven daily newspapers in Texas. So we went.

LBJ was running for the presidency, and I didn't think he had a very good chance, but he was number two in the running. And at the convention, he was not nominated and Kennedy was, and I didn't know a thing in the world about Kennedy. I wasn't enamored of him, because naturally I was for the favorite son. So I left the convention and went over to Santa Ana to visit an aunt that lived in California, and drove over there. We drove out--Stuart and I drove to California--and drove out there and when I came up to my aunt's house my uncle was sitting there and he said, "Guess who was elected [nominated for] vice president?" And I said, "I don't know." And he said, "Lyndon!" I said, "I don't believe it!" And he said, "Yes, Lyndon was"--I didn't even believe that he'd take it, you know. I thought that if he didn't get [nominated for] president--he had a more powerful office than vice president, and I just could not believe that he had accepted that nomination.

B: So that you had no hint that he was being considered, or--

L: Of course, when I left the convention he was being considered for president and he had gotten voted down. Kennedy had won. So it was over as far as I was concerned, and I didn't wait for the nomination of the vice president or anything--or the rules committee to come in or whatever else--the resolutions committee and all that. I just thought, "Well, as far as I'm concerned, I'm going to go and see Aunt Claire." So I went over and missed the nomination of President Johnson as the vice president of the U.S.

B: Why do you think he took that? Do you think it was for the good of the ticket, the good of the party, that he thought he could help Kennedy get elected, or--?

L: I'll never know why he took it. I'll never know. For one thing, I do remember--it was early in the spring sometime before that convention. Stuart and I were over at the LBJ Ranch and it was--I don't remember who was visiting there at that time. But we were there for dinner and the afternoon, and after dinner that night we were walking down this road--I don't know whether you've ever been there or not, but there's a long road along the Pedernales River; you pass the cemetery, you go on down and you go to Aunt [Cousin] Oreole's house, and at--I guess it was early in the spring, because there's a big pear tree in the yard there and it was in full bloom, white blossoms, and it's moonlight. And Mary Margaret [Wiley] Valenti--she'd worked and got started in politics working in my campaigns, and she was secretary to President Johnson and married Jack Valenti. But Mary Margaret was on one side of Lyndon, holding his hand, and I was on the other. We were walking along and he said, "Sometimes I think that I just ought to give up the majority leadership and let somebody else take it. I'm tired." Things weren't going so good, and he was kind of discouraged, and he made this remark, and--"What do you think?" Of course I didn't have any "think" about it. I just thought that he was very powerful and he ought to stay where he

was, and I don't think he thought about giving it up. Maybe he was just mulling this over.

But on the other hand it could be that he was weary, physically weary. They were having terrible strife in the Senate at that time, and maybe he had begun to slip a little in his power. You know, he'd been so powerful and he'd been able to steer things in the Senate and manipulate things, and maybe he had some rough times there and felt that he wasn't doing so good or something. But that may be; it could be that he thought, "Well, this is a way out."

B: A way out.

L: I don't know.

But I was very, very surprised, and I think Sam Rayburn was absolutely crushed. He didn't believe it. Because Lyndon had just told him that he wouldn't do it.

B: Oh, he had?

L: I think he had, in the back room, and then he did it. Jack Kennedy came.

But Bobby Kennedy didn't want him. (Laughter) I didn't love the Kennedys. I never have known them at all. Some of the political strata of the Democratic Party that I knew--now I knew Henry Jackson, and of course, I loved Hubert Humphrey. I thought he was a great man. I met Stevenson; I knew him. I just met President Carter and Rosalyn, but I never did know them very well.

B: Did you ever hear LBJ talk about Bobby Kennedy at all? Did you ever hear him say anything?

L: No, I never did. I imagine if I did that it wouldn't be complimentary (Laughter) from all I've heard and read.

B: Did you see much of the Johnsons during the vice presidential years, after he was elected vice president?

L: No, I don't remember seeing very much of them at all. Let's see. In 1963--that was before--he was still majority leader then. I remember in that year I broke my hip. It was Christmas and I was running down the street Christmas shopping, and it was raining and my shoes slipped out from under me, and I fell and broke my hip. And Lady Bird came to the hospital and brought me a beautiful vase of yellow roses of Texas herself. It was Christmas time, and I thought that was--I want to bring this in because it shows just how gracious and wonderful she really is. I was talking to a friend of mine the other day, Josephine Bishop. Barry and Josephine had a son that got polio, and he was in an iron lung and he lived for about a year. But one time when President Johnson was

operated on for gall bladder--I think that was in 1967 [1965]--they were in Washington; the Bishops and their son [were] there, and I think he was in the hospital. And President Johnson just got oodles and oodles of flowers. So they sent young Barry Bishop a beautiful spray or bunch of flowers over to his hospital room, because they knew each other. The flowers were brought in, and she had a colored girl--black--that was his nurse, and young Barry saw who the flowers were from, the President of the United States, and he said, "Oh, these are from Lyndon Johnson!" And she didn't react or anything, and he said, "Don't you know who Lyndon Johnson is?" And she said, "Course I does! He went to the North Pole." (Laughter)

You asked me a question and I got off of it, about seeing him when he was vice president. We--Stuart and I--rode in one of the airplanes--jalopies--throughout the South for about a couple of weeks campaigning for him--with him and Lady Bird--campaigning for him when he was running for vice president.

B: In 1960.

L: In 1960.

B: And you went with him?

L: Yes. He was campaigning in Georgia, and Alabama, and Mississippi.

B: What kind of an appeal was he making to southerners in 1960?

L: He was making good speeches and he was well received. He was a good speaker if he didn't have to read a speech in front of television.

B: Television camera.

L: Right. He was good, and he was really getting good crowds and he was making good speeches.

B: Do you remember any particular appeals that he made? There was probably some concern about Kennedy being a Catholic. Did he address that?

L: No, I don't recall that he did. What he addressed was the need for the Democrats to win, and all the good programs that we represented, and farming--that was one of his--and rural electrification; the things that he had had a part in developing and bringing about. And then, of course, blending his ideas with President Kennedy's--or presidential nominee at that time, President Kennedy. But I don't remember seeing them when he was vice president. I can't remember ever--we could have, Stuart and I. But I know when he was president we saw him quite a bit.

B: Is that right?

L: Right. When I was on the city council, every time he came in the council would meet him out there at the Bergstrom air base, as a welcoming party, and I would go on out.

One time--this is funny--I went out and I got caught up in the crowd and I was late getting there, and I couldn't get in. He was already out of the plane and he was coming along the fence. So I was standing there at the fence, and he was shaking hands with everybody, and apparently he had on his contact lenses. He was kind of squinting, like this. And he was just shaking hands, and he shook my hand and I said, "Lyndon, it's me!" To the President of the United States! (Laughter) And he said, "Oh, hi, Emma. How's Stu?" (Laughter) That was a funny thing.

B: Did you ever go to the White House?

L: Yes. Stuart and I spent a night at the White House. They had some dignitary from some country, I'm sorry but I don't remember now. It's in my notes someplace. Anyway, he was there, and so Stuart and I were invited there for the reception for the head of this country that I don't remember. We were there with Judge Herman Johnson [Jones?] and Bess, his wife, and there was another couple. Then we all spent the night in the White House.

When you wanted to go someplace you just asked for a car, and--I didn't but Stuart did. He went over to the ***Washington Post*** to see--we were correspondents for the ***Washington Post***, and he wanted to see one of the editors there, Katharine Graham, that he knew. And so he ordered a car and went over there and went in to see her, and was talking to her, and he mentioned that he had a White House car waiting for him, that he had to get back, and she nearly flipped. (Laughter) That afternoon Lady Bird was having her beautification program, and she was meeting with a bunch of young kids in a park where they were doing some planting. I drove with Lady Bird in a car from this delegation going out there, and they had people around.

Then that night we went back up to the second floor where they lived, and--I think Stuart and I were staying in the Lincoln Room. If you wanted something to eat, well, you just ordered it, or if you wanted to get your hair shampooed you could go get your hair shampooed, and they had dryers up there. It was just great! (Laughter)

We had dinner in the White House that night. We waited for the President until almost ten o'clock. He was delayed, and we were sitting out there having drinks on this second-floor balcony, and they brought us a drink and we had a drink and--Herman Jones was an alcoholic so he didn't drink. He was AA, so he had a Coca-Cola. After a while, we waited for the President, we waited until they came and they brought us another drink, and he had another Coca-Cola! We always laughed about him and his Coca-Colas. I think he had three or four. The rest of us almost got too much [while] waiting.

Finally the President came and we had dinner at the family quarters upstairs on the second floor, and then we visited in the family room, or the living room where the family sat. It was a wonderful feeling, to visit in the White House, and it's a high privilege that I shall never forget.

B: What was LBJ--do you recall what he was like that evening? Apparently he was quite busy. Was he able to relax at dinner?

L: Yes. He came in. A bunch of editors were visiting there, and he had to make a speech to them, and then he had something that he had to sign. And then he came in and we all went in to dinner and sat down. We talked, and he said, "Emma, I want you to go on one of these things for me. I've got some things coming up. Just a minute." [He] picked up the phone under his desk [and] said, "Walter?"--talking to Walter--

B: Walter Jenkins?

L: Walter Jenkins was on--but it wasn't Walter. It was [Marvin] Watson. What's his name? Anyway, well--it was Watson. "I want you to look up something. I want to send Emma on one of these trips that's coming up pretty soon, and I want you to look that up and let me know about it."

B: This was at the dinner table?

L: At the dinner table. The phone was just there. I don't know where Walter was, but anyway--Marvin. Marvin Watson. Marvin. "I want you to"--and so after we got back, in about three or four weeks I got a call from the State Department. They had three things that were going; one in Spain, and the World Population Commission, and one other. The one in Spain would be all in Spanish. The other one was in some island. All the commissions or organizations that were having meetings had to have a lay representative. So I chose the World Population Commission meeting in Geneva, because I was interested in that anyway. Then the State Department got busy, and they went all through this rigmarole, and they'd call me every once in a while and give me information and send me stuff. Finally the date was set, and I flew to Washington and went to the--I guess it was the State Department--and got credentials, and they assigned a guy that went with us. He was kind of an aide, I guess he'd be, that tended to all the paperwork and getting the materials together. So he and I flew together to London and then we went to Paris, and I spent a night in Paris, and they arranged all my hotels and everything. From there we went on to Geneva.

Then when I came back I stopped at my friend Don Ellinger's--Ruth and Don Ellinger in Washington. I called the White House and I got Lady Bird, and I told her that I was back from my trip to Geneva. And she said, "Oh, we're having a reception here. Would you come this evening at six?" It was about four-thirty or something like that. So I said, "Well, I'm out in Virginia at Don Ellinger's house, and I really don't have a way to get there." And she said, "We'll send a car for you." So

I said, "Fine." But in the meantime I had called Don Ellinger, who was attending some function, and my friend Ruth was not there. She had gone someplace out of the state, and her daughter--some of the kids were there, and I was there with them. So Don came on home, and just about the time he got home this car arrived and I took off to the White House! He was so mad at me. (Laughter) But I went to this reception that evening.

B: How was that?

L: It was lovely. Everything at the White House is so well planned, and Lady Bird was so wonderful, and everything she did was to perfection. And of course I knew several of the people that worked for them, because they were from Texas and--I mean, you know, in charge. And it was, "Oh, hello, Emma. How are you?" You'd feel like you were kind of among home folks.

Side 2 of 2, Tape 2

L: When President Johnson was in office, when he would come home we would meet him at the airport, the city council, and as mayor pro tem I would go out and be one of the greeters. And then Stuart, being a newspaper reporter, he would always attend the news briefings. We'd go out to the the LBJ Ranch, or the Little White House, with the press, and we would meet with a lot of them down at the Headliners Club. So Stuart and I both became very good friends with a lot of the national press. We then would go out to the press conferences at the White House [Ranch], and sometimes he'd give a barbecue or something and the White House press would be invited. I guess we went out at least half a dozen times while he was president. I didn't always go, but [on] special occasions I would go out.

B: Can you remember particular members of the national press that would be there at those?

L; Oh, let's see. You caught my mind blank.

B: You could have told me if I didn't ask you, right?

L: Yes. I don't know. Of course, Walter Cronkite, but Walter is a friend of ours that we've known personally for years. Stuart and I went to school with him. Stuart and Walter were very close friends. But I don't remember Walter coming down for that. Well, there's a ***New York Times*** guy, Martin Waldrin [?]. And I just can't--my mind is all of a sudden a blank. It's a guy that writes a column for the ***American-Statesman*** that I knew quite well, and I can't think of his name, even, now. I see him nearly every day. (Laughter) So I've gone blank all of a sudden.

B: Speaking of Walter Cronkite, did you or your husband ever talk to Walter Cronkite or to LBJ about the relationship between LBJ and Walter

Cronkite during the Vietnam War, and how that relationship--if there ever was such a relationship--went downhill as Cronkite became more and more critical of the war?

L: No. We never mentioned it. Never discussed it with Walter and never discussed it with LBJ, that I--in fact, I doubt that anybody ever discussed with LBJ, that I know of, other than people maybe in his family, much about the Vietnam War, because he was--I don't think he liked to talk about it.

B: I imagine not.

L: But Helen Thomas was another one that kept--of the national press--that we became quite friendly with. And I don't remember the--if I thought long enough I guess the names would come to me.

B: Anything else on the White House years that you recall?

L: No. I can't think of anything that I haven't already mentioned, I don't think.

B: How about the post-presidential years? Did you go out to the Ranch much after he came back?

L: I never visited President Johnson at the Ranch after he came back. He'd ask us. He'd say, "Y'all come to see me." But it's a very strange thing. You don't call him up and say, "We want to come out," and I didn't feel like we should. And I feel now if he were alive I'd do it, because I think he was lonesome during those last years. But I just felt that he would call me if he wanted me to come. We did go out--they dedicated a park for Lady Bird, and we went out--naming it for Lady Bird. At--past Johnson City. A state park, I believe it is. We went to that and I saw the President and Lady Bird. Then Lady Bird started her awards to county supervisors of--or superintendents of highways, and she had one of those each year and gave them a prize. And we went out to those. There was a barbecue and Stuart and I went out. He would be covering it and I'd go out with him every year, and I guess one or two other occasions--some special occasions like that. In fact, one of those occasions we went out there I had a name tag on right here, and President Johnson--I always called him Lyndon. I guess I shouldn't have. Maybe I should have called him president. I said, "Lyndon, how about signing my name tag?" And so he signed it and somebody took a picture, and I have a picture in there of LBJ signing my name tag.

B: Oh, really?

L: But I imagine those were lonesome years for him, and I just regret that Stuart and I just didn't call him up and go out.

B: Do you recall the last time you saw him?

L: I guess it was one of those occasions, probably when Lady Bird was giving out one of her awards, usually at one of those state parks or one of the ranches. But I guess that's the last time I saw him alive.

I didn't go out to the funeral. Stuart did, and I don't think I did. I think I was sick or something. But Flora Schreiber was here, and she went out with Stuart. She's the author of ***Sibyl***, if you remember, and she's a friend of ours and lives in New York, and she came.

End of Tape 2 of 2 and Interview III

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