INTERVIEW II

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INTERVIEWEE: KATHLEEN C. LOUCHHEIM

INTERVIEWER: PAIGE E. MULHOLLAN

PLACE: Mrs. Louchheim's office in the Transportation Building, Washington, D. C.

Tape 1 of 1

M: Okay, you have no reason to recall where we left off. So I'll refresh your memory here. You were talking generally about the personal relations of Mr. Johnson with his close friends, and you'd begun a story about a man named Mike O'Neill.

L: Oh, yes.

M: And his introduction to the President in 1967, I believe.

L: Well, the story was to illustrate the fact that Mr. Weisl, who is Johnson's long-time friend in New York and his lawyer, became his committeman in New York City. Yet he had met few members of the press.

Mike O'Neill knew the President very well; if I gave the impression otherwise, I didn't mean to. But he was here as the head of the bureau, and then he was transferred to be the editor of the entire New York Daily News. So I had arranged for him to have a luncheon for Weisl and myself, so that the people at the News might get to know the representative of the President in New York. That was the story, and we did have the luncheon; and after the luncheon, I drove down to Wall Street with Mr. Weisl because I

wanted to talk to him about the President's television appearances; we also talked about his disinterest, really, in political organization. I think the President felt, probably, that political organization could be taken care of when he made up his mind to run for re-election and that he was too preoccupied with other matters to do anything about it meanwhile. And we also discussed the matter of his television appearances. Did I mention this to you?

M: No, I think not.

L: And how necessary, or helpful, it might have been if the President had taken some professional advice. And I mentioned to Ed Weisl the need for advice; I had tried to interest a friend who was working at the White House, who was an expert on radio and television. And Weisl said, "Oh, well, we had it all set up. We had two or three"--I've forgotten the number of people who were coming down, a couple of times--"to show the President a thing or two, and the thing leaked and it got into a column"--I believe a George Sokolsy column--"and the President cancelled it."

M: So no professional advice ever actually got through?

L: Not that I know of; not that I know of. There was, you remember, one television show in the East Room in which he walked up and down with a traveling mike which was a great improvement over previous performances.

M: But which was never repeated, as far as I know.

L: No. I was reading last night, if I may quote from this year's record of events that the encyclopedia puts out, what the President had

written about himself in relation to the press, and about how many times he'd seen the press counting up the numbers as against the times that Presidents Kennedy and Eisenhower had seen the press and how it really had not been as different numerically as had been indicated in the papers. But [he said] that he preferred--and he says this very distinctly--the intimacy of his own office rather than these big extended press conferences, and that he liked to talk, and sometimes at the last minute, which enraged the press because, you know, they might not have been available, and besides they are used to being treated as if they were more important than the president of the United States.

I remember the head of the editorial page, Phil Geylin, at the Washington Post saying to me--

M: What's his last name?

L: Geylin. G-E-Y-L-I-N.

M: I thought he was with the Wall Street Journal. Was he with the Post?

L: Well, he may have been, but he's been at the Post as head of the editorial page several years. He had complained to me about the time the President went to Williamsburg unexpectedly. I'm very bad on dates, but it was not so long ago. [Johnson] had a very good speech, and he [Geylin] said, "If I'd had any advance on it, I could have written an editorial, but I didn't have." In other words, there were times, I think, when the kind of, I hate to use the word secrecy, but the last minute changes of mind, the decision-making process that was

postponed because the President didn't like to be presented with a situation in which there was no flexibility, or for whatever reason he didn't like it, he didn't like it. And he therefore announced press conferences at the last minute, et cetera. And in that instance, or in those instances, I would be inclined to say that the press were right, that you can't work under those circumstances, if, as it happens, you're not in the White House the moment the bell rings and the President says he wants to see you in the office. It's tough. But again, I don't pretend to understand that part of the President's character. I think it had something to do with his having a mistrust of people who were, perhaps as he correctly suspected, out for him. He didn't want to give them too much advance notice on anything he was going to do. That could have been part of it or it could have been simply that he liked the element of surprise, the same trait we were discussing the other night with respect to appointments. It used to be said that it was fatal if an appointment leaked.

M: Right.

L: Well, I'm sorry to say that Washington is a leaking ship and always has been.

M: Not in the sense of a sinking ship, would you say?

L: No, it's just a leaking ship. He used to swear, the President--not in my presence, but I'm told--to the Secretary [of State], "Damn it, why don't you find out who the leaks are in your department?" Well, it would be impossible. I never even knew who they were, and I was pretty active at the level at which they probably occurred. They

didn't come from the very top. They came from the people who read the cables and the memos on the way through.

M: It was impossible for those people not to have read them, too.

L: That's right. And the temptation to leak, the temptation to have the "in" with a well-known reporter, was very great. It is a minor league kingmaker's role. Everybody likes to be a kingmaker at the top level, but it's the minor league kingmakers that make the mischief. But there isn't any way that I know that you could have controlled it.

M: You said last time you sometimes acted as Mr. Johnson's spokesman to the media. Did you find them reasonable, or did a lot of them just have their minds absolutely closed on the subject of Lyndon Johnson because of any one of a number of reasons?

L: Well, there was no rule. There were plenty of those with closed minds. I think I mentioned the last time we were together the influence I had on someone like Kenneth Crawford, I just gradually suggested to him that he get to know the President and find out what he was really like. And he became a very strong and useful advocate.

It wasn't always possible to have that kind of relationship. I sometimes had to work under what I call a one-shot arrangement, where I would run into somebody at a dinner table, or in a cocktail party, or at a luncheon. And I think I made a dent. I'm not sure that I made a convert.

Where there was the hard-liner, there was very little you could

do. I was interested in someone like Joe Alsop, who was very strong on Vietnam, very pro-Vietnam, but convinced that the President was a poor president because he was a poor administrator. And I don't know what happened, but I'm told that, in the last months, he and the President and Mrs. Johnson and Mrs. Alsop got very close. I don't know whether Joe had changed his mind about the President's administrative abilities or not, but I do know that there was a rapprochement there. I did work on Joe Alsop, the times when I had an occasion to. He's a neighbor and lives around the corner, and a most intransigent and intolerant man. But he has an admiration for, and an understanding for, the threat of the Chinese, and I think this helped. In other words, the prejudice that he had pro-President was larger than that against.

M: Right.

L: In the end, I'm told that most of the press corps at the White House came to be great admirers of the President. There was a man called Charles Roberts, Chuck Roberts, from Newsweek. Or, of course, Phil Potter, the Baltimore Sun, always was pro-Johnson, and any number of others whom I've talked to who were solid. The thing I'm interested in now, at this stage, is trying to reach the people who are still, or were, part of the Kennedy followers, devoted as they were, who could see no right in anybody else. And the new managing editor of the Post, Eugene Patterson, who came from the Atlanta Constitution, who says he has seen you. Is that right? Have you talked to him?

M: Right. I haven't. We will see him. I haven't yet.

L: He's a very good balance wheel; maybe needed at the Post, and maybe an influence to the good. Because he also spoke to me about the people around the Kennedys, not necessarily just the press.

M: Right. Social people.

L: With some of the staff I had some influence. Sorensen and Feldman were my friends in the Kennedy regime. I did not know the Bobby Kennedy people.

M: The Bobby Kennedy people were different from the John Kennedy people many times, weren't they?

L: Yes. Well, they became different. I was talking the other night to Gene McCarthy, and he spoke frequently of the fact that he would separate--he's writing a book--Bobby from his staff, from his people around him. He said they were the makers of policy; I wouldn't say that they were. Bobby was really not quite as sinister as represented sometimes by the positions that the staff thought were advantageous to take. I didn't know them. And I still don't know them. The one or two people that I did know in the campaign have been removed from the scene a long time ago, and as I say, I have seen nothing of them in recent years. To my way of thinking, the most interesting part of the history of the period was the very depth of feeling on both sides between Robert Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson; the feeling of dislike or distrust, or suspicion, or whatever you want to call it, which influenced their every action.

M: By both people.

L: Yes. I've tried to say, the other day when we talked, that among the

the Kennedys there was a feeling, with Bobby particularly, that if his brother hadn't gone to Texas, this wouldn't have happened. But I think it goes back before then. I don't think Bobby was enthusiastic. A great deal has been written about it. When the choice of the vice president came around to him, he said, "Oh, no!"

M: This has to leave a feeling with Mr. Johnson.

L: That's right; that's right. Yes, someone told me the conditions under which Johnson took the spot were that, one, the liberals would be agreeable and silenced, the loud "aginners," we mentioned this before, and the other that Mr. Rayburn would be in agreement.

This brings me back to the subject that I love the best, and that is the strong loyalty the President has always had for certain people. Mr. Rayburn was one of them. I think Mr. Rayburn's probably one of the very few where there was a difference in age, where there was a kind of father-son relationship, respect and admiration. I don't think Lyndon Johnson made too many moves without consulting Sam Rayburn. In a way, it was too bad that this influence was removed.

M: Sort of like the Walter Jenkins removal.

L: That's right. It was just as if all the good people who were devoted and objective, and I don't think you'll remember, but I do, during the Roosevelt early New Deal days, he invented a word about anonymous assistants.

M: Passion for anonymity.

L: Yes, passion for anonymity. Well, these two had a passion for anonymity.

Mr. Sam was a very modest man, and he never would have broken any confidence. And Walter Jenkins I don't think ever whispered about anything; he just never was that kind of a man.

M: Some of the later ones, perhaps not so passionate for anonymity.

L: They weren't passionate about their anonymity. They belong to another school of people. I keep looking for these same kind of people, and I don't find them. Johnson didn't attract them. They weren't there. The Kennedys didn't attract them. They weren't there. Much as I think highly of Sorensen and Feldman, whom I work with and whose talents I admire--particularly Ted, who is a great writer--they were pretty hard-boiled characters. They adored Jack Kennedy, true. But they are hard-boiled. They were the kind of men who are aggressive, insensitive, almost cruel in their attitudes toward anybody but the man they are serving. Now they may have turned around and used Bobby Kennedy: they're getting ready to use Teddy Kennedy. Then, somebody like Mac Bundy, I think, was more or less the same kind of man, not as obvious. Moyers certainly was. I never knew Watson, so I don't know, but he never appeared to me to have very much heart. He may have been loyal to the President, but I wouldn't think he was the kind of sympathetic person that Walter Jenkins was; he never bothered to try and understand others. [Robert] Kintner was the exception in the group.

M: He didn't stay.

L: I don't think he could have; he had problems with alcohol, and just between us, I think he would have stayed on. I have no reason for

saying this, except that the President was very devoted to him and would not have let him go if he hadn't found that the situation was impossible.

M: You've talked quite a bit about your personal contacts and relationships.

What about some of your experiences in your work? I believe you said you started the Community Advisory Service in the State Department. Could you flesh that out a little bit in regards to details of what you hoped and what actually happened?

L: Yes, but it had nothing to do with President Johnson. Do you want it anyway?

M: Certainly, I think it would be important. Because, for one thing, in President Johnson's time, one of the serious failings of the State Department seemed to be its inability to find some kind of rapport with the people in regard to explaining its policies. [It] goes back to the kind of thing you were trying to develop, apparently, in the Kennedy time.

L: After I had served a year in public affairs, I discovered I had taken the road show of leading foreign service officers, or appointees, assistant secretaries, under secretaries, to tell various groups what we were doing policy-wise, and I had also held conferences in the department. I suddenly realized that we still were only talking, really, to the informed; what we were reaching was an audience made up of groups of familiar-sounding names, large organizations or smaller ones, with perhaps some local leaders thrown in.

Second of all, I got to know through my travels abroad and also through meetings in the office a good many foreign service officers of

of the middle and lower echelon; upper ranks, but not ambassadors, people who were in the service in class II and class I, in another capacity. And I came to admire them, and realized that they had many hardships that nobody knew or understood, that their story had never been told and that it was about time that we got to the people. One day I called together all the public affairs officers of all the geographic bureaus, and with the assistance of James Greenfield, who was another deputy at that time, the way I was, we talked to them about the possibility of being notified when certain officers came on home leave, top officers who could communicate, so that we could set up meetings.

Some of them were actively resistant, some were passively resistant. I remember one man saying, "Well, when I was in the field, my ambassador, if I spoke while I was on home leave, would have fired me!" We were still dealing, or talking with, an entrenched conservative group who were really unhappy at the thought of being exposed to the public.

I carried the idea around in my head and wrote memos, but nothing ever came of it until 1964 or 1965 when William J. Crockett, the under secretary for administration, said to me one evening at a social event, "I hear you have a new program." And when I said, "Yes," he said, "Well, I want to talk to you about it." So he then offered to set me up in an office.

M: That was after Mr. Johnson was president then?

L: Yes, that's right. It happened during that time. Of course, Crockett

was only under secretary during that period. Roger Jones was the first, and then came--

M: [Idar] Rimstead took over--

L: From Crockett.

M: --in 1967, I think.

L: Yes, well, I was with Bill Crockett almost two and a half years, and I must have started it, I think, in 1965 or the end of 1964. I know it was 1964. I remember when I went to the 1964 convention, Mr. Crockett saying to me, "You can go, but if I see your picture in the paper, there's going to be trouble!" Anyway, I was given an office and a staff on the seventh floor, and this immediately gave the program a certain prestige.

M: Sure.

L: We had this seventh-floor mentality to deal with. And the idea was, through publication and through letters, and the newsletter and other means, we got the foreign service officer on routine home leave to come by and call on us. We then said to him, "Will you or won't you make a public appearance at wherever you're going"--Bridgewater, or whatever the name of the place was--"You don't have to." And he often said, "Yes," more often than, "No." Then we would write to every organization in Bridgewater and say, "John Doe is going to be in your community for the next two months. Get in touch with him if you'd like to hear him talk about his experiences in Ceylon or wherever it was.

It worked like a charm, and there are huge files on the subject. We always had good responses. We had no flaps, no flops. The officer

liked it. When I talked to the junior officers during their first year, I would explain to them that this would be coming up. I'd say, "When you come home from your assignment and your mother-in-law and your aunts and uncles get tired of hearing about your experiences, we will provide you with a brand new audience."

M: And nobody likes a passion for anonymity that well.

L: That's right. They were able to talk about what happened to them, and then they could answer questions. There were two things it achieved: one was to break down this remoteness; the second was to give an idea of the kind of life these people led. They move, they have school problems, problems with health. It isn't really a very cushy job. It isn't a job of drinking tea or something stronger, and it is quite tedious at times, and difficult.

Through Mr. Crockett and some other friends, we learned that there was a woman working at the National Geographic, Mrs. Patterson, who had something to do with a foundation that had trailers. We got the loan of these trailers, and this was a great boon, because the young people that came home with four and five kids couldn't afford to go to a motel, and their mothers and mothers-in-law, like everybody else, had long since moved out of the big old family house into an apartment or into a smaller house, and couldn't put them up. They were delighted to have the trailer, and we had waiting lists. In fact, people tried to use their influence to get the trailers. I think we had six trailers, and we had to have a couple of people to keep the trailers going and to instruct the men on how to drive them and so forth.

They brought home fascinating stories and adventures. One family had some unknown people dig them out of an icy impasse in New Hampshire. I remember another telling me, "You don't have to make appointments with the radio and television station. All you have to do is drive up in this trailer,and they come running out and say, "Will you go on the air?" So it worked.

M: This was all done below the presidential level; this was within the State Department.

L: Oh, yes, within the State Department. Looking back over it now, I'm sure it was a step in the right direction. I used to get asked, "When will you see an effect in terms of the change of attitudes on the part of people who constantly abuse the Foreign Service, abuse the State Department, and say that they're nothing but wishy-washy people in striped pants drinking pink tea?" And I said, "Well, it's very hard to change an image that has existed for over a hundred years overnight. But I expect that in five or ten years time, a great many more people will have seen a foreign service officer and will know that they're flesh and blood and that they have all sorts of problems."

In my letter of resignation to the Secretary, Mr. Rusk, I said that I hoped they would continue the Office of Community Advisory Services, and he wrote me as reassuring letter. That's about all I can tell you about it.

M: Then you moved to be deputy secretary for educational and cultural affairs in the fall of 1966?

L: That's right, in October.

M: There's some relation between that new job and the one you'd left in the sense that there, too, you had people going out, but generally, I suppose, to foreign audiences as opposed to domestic audiences.

L: Well, we did have a big program that was a rather interesting one to me because it was a conglomeration of various functions that had taken place at one time or another, either in State or in USIA, and had all been lumped together in this bureau which had only been established through the advent of President Kennedy. The first assistant secretary had been a man called Philip Coombs, who I worked with briefly when I was first in the department. At the time I thought it was a most unfortunate bureau, the stepchild of the department. It was badly administered; it was misused; sometimes the Fulbright exchange student would be asked to engage in propaganda, a dirty word to the USIA officer who was already handling propaganda. There was a lot of overlap. We had USIA officers loaned to us; the staff itself was a conglomeration of long-time civil servants, who had been with the program for twenty years and who resembled immovable mountains. It presented a great many problems.

Charles Frankel, whom I went to work for, did not like to take responsibility for either budget or personnel, so I inherited both. That took up a great deal of my time. The communication part of the program that I supervised, which you just referred to, was sending Americans abroad under an American specialist program to lecture on a variety of subjects, on demand from the post, or on suggestion from us. It was in the most dreadful state of--disrepair is the wrong word.

It belonged to a series of little fiefdoms that were operating independently of each other. We had a man from USIA who was a senior officer, very gifted, who went on the road, making his own contacts and inviting people to come and lecture for us, that nobody ever heard of, or saw, or approved. And naturally, once in a while, we got some people that we didn't want. I put a stop to that. This man who ran it was left over from some kind of a minor patronage appointment, and I had to get rid of him. You discover it takes a long time to undo what has been done to others.

The only reason I mention its faults is that it became the program that was attacked most fiercely on the Hill. The last year when I acted as principal witness at Congressional hearings we were given an enormous cut. For the future, I think it should be noted that the argument came about through the Vietnam War.

M: Over the type of people you sent out?

L: That's right. They were supposed to be only people who were pro-war, whether it was their subject or not. Now Frankel was a very talented and flamboyant character, who could speak well and who wrote well, and was, as I say, not interested in administration. I'm pretty sure, to begin with, he had no very strong opinions about the war. But the first problem we had was with a very important member of the moderate black community who was assigned to go overseas and who was personally picked by Frankel,again without my approval, or the staff's approval, or without any screening. Johnson had a black friend in town who went to the President and told him, "They're

sending abroad somebody who's against Vietnam and who's against you personally." If you want to, I will mention names.

M: Yes, do. We'll lock it up.

L: The man who went was Sterling Tucker, who was then head of the Urban League, and the man who complained was Clifford Alexander. I never saw Sterling Tucker. He went out right past me, under Frankel's arrangements.

But after we had these very serious complaints, I said to Frankel, "I think we better do something about this." "Oh," he said, "All right, Katie, don't worry. I had a talk with him before he left and I explained to him that he has to keep his personal views to himself about Vietnam." I said, "Well, did you ever hear him speak of the President?" And he said, "No." Charles seemed to be innocent of any sinister intention. He had made a friend of Tucker, and Tucker had asked for this grant. Let me say, not parenthetically, but very emphatically, that everybody wanted these grants; everybody wanted to go, because their expenses were all paid.

Well, we got good reports from Tucker. He was going to the Far East and Tokyo. I suggested to Frankel that his offers to stop in Paris and Rome on his way home--after he'd done his stint, his wife was going to join him--be dampened down. We couldn't stop him, but once he got to Paris and got mixed up with left wing groups that there might be trouble, and that there would naturally be talk about the war.

The only reason I mention it is I handled the Rome end of it on the telephone, and Charles had to handle the Paris end on the telephone,

talking to the head of public affairs, USIA. They had made arrangements for him to go to something called the Draga [?]--I think it's a library or some other outlet that we have over there--and talk with students.

Charles talked to this man who was head of the Public Affairs Bureau in Paris who then turned around and told Tucker that he had a call from Washington cancelling his appearances. On Tucker's return, Charles would not see him alone. We saw him together when he came back and got through it as best we could. The whole affair was clumsily handled. The Rome episode never came up; nobody I spoke to reported back. I had used the right people there, people I knew.

But the Tucker affair was a very unpleasant episode, and out of it grew, or perhaps had already grown, a feeling of animus between certain people on the seventh floor; people who worked for Rimestad, who had replaced Crockett and Frankel. And there was a confrontation; we had received a memo saying that anybody who was appointed to any board or commission or an assignment must be cleared with the White House. Charles said, "The day that happens, they can have my job."

We had a meeting with the man who represented the White House. His name was Cheplinsky, he worked with Marvin Watson and others on Watson's staff--Rimestad, Frankel and myself. And as much as I tried to guide this meeting, I couldn't manage to do so. Charles repeated his remarks and affirmed he would not be guided by White House clearances. So the suspicion arose that we were sneaking people into the program who were anti the administration.

Actually, once I got control of it, I set such severe standards

and so many clearances that it wasn't possible to repeat the mistake. Thus, I was able to help the administration. I said to Frankel, "If anybody wants to go and talk against the war, that's fine. Then they can go on their own!" I said, "This administration and this government is supporting a war, and whether you're with it or not, you have got to understand that if anyone goes on government money, they are not going to talk against the policies of the administration." He never agreed with me, but when he resigned, he resigned in a great flurry of being anti-Vietnam.

M: Apparently his views had, by then, become pronounced.

L: He came to my house the Sunday before, he and his wife. And they had been very friendly and very grateful for all I had done for them. They were as bitter and as nasty as any people I've ever talked to. Speaking of powers of persuasion, they sat in my library and said, "We've just been in New York, and you don't know what the feeling is. You wouldn't show your face there." And I said, "I'm not ashamed to show my face anywhere. I'm not an expert on this subject. The way I understand things, there is no alternative at the moment. We're involved in a war which we went into for the same reasons that Kennedy and Eisenhower did, to protect the people of South Vietnam."

I then began to feel the usual animosity toward the President, so I took up the cudgels. It was an interesting afternoon, I kept saying, "This is a man who has been liberal in all things, who has been astonishingly, aggressively liberal as far as the Negro is concerned, and it wasn't easy for a man of his background, nor did it

help him in the relationships he must have had with people in his home state." And I said, "Furthermore, I feel very strongly that if a man has strong convictions that regard foreign affairs, and he has been advised on this subject by what he considers to be experts, a man like Lyndon Johnson, who respects the experts and the authority of the experts, would do exactly what he is doing."

And they would say to me, "You don't know what you are talking about. Being liberal in other things doesn't have any relationship to this war, which is. . ." And then they would damn it from beginning to end. But the whole conversation was the first unpleasantness we had had. I didn't feel they were saying, "Well, you're a nice friend, or you've been faithful or loyal to help us. We understand your point of view, and you must understand ours." Nothing of this kind was said. It was bitter and nasty. And when Frankel left, he did leak to Martin Kalb of CBS the fact that he was anti-Vietnam, et cetera. He didn't just resign.

M: You mentioned last time that you think the appointment of a man of Frankel's type, a scholar-type, to that job is probably a mistake.

L: Yes.

M: Is that because of the aversion to administration: budgets, and so on, or because of the passionate attachment to viewpoints?

L: No, I think it's just the wrong place for an academician. All that bureau needs is to be run, and it's never been run. I did my best, when I could get my hands on Budget personnel, to run it, and I did more with it than has ever been done with it. But Frankel wasn't an

administrator, he was a bright man, a showman.

Now, let's say you find an academician who might be an administrator; there might be such a combination. I'm sure there are today. College presidents have to be. But it takes them forever to find out what is the relationship to the rest of the government, what is the relationship to the Hill. By the time they've taken two years to find out what's going on, their whole place has been cut up! Which is exactly what happened under [Edward] Re and under Frankel.

M: I was going to say, Re was just the opposite type of man. Although he's an academician, he's certainly been in government, Re had none of the doubts regarding our policies that Frankel had. And yet, he, too, had his troubles.

L: He had his troubles. And I suspect that his troubles were augmented by the fact that he was not properly cleared with Mr. Rooney, or he was and Rooney didn't want him where he was. That was it.

(Tape interrupted)

M: Back on now. And you want to take the female side.

L: I'd like to talk, yes, because I'm just about to write about women. I had evidence of his pro-women feeling early on, when I first knew the President and Mrs. Johnson and his respect for her opinion. Also, although I never got to know her, on occasion I did meet his mother, who was a very shadowy creature by then. I never had a real exchange with her, but I knew how he felt about her. She did come to Washington.

Now, in the beginning of his administration, he did refer on occasions in which I was present how he had rather amusingly said

there wouldn't have been any point for him at home to have voted 'nay,' because he would have been outvoted three to one by two daughters and his wife. And he used to joke about it a little, but I think it was a serious conviction on his part, he believed that women had a great contribution to make and had made it. For instance, he liked to refer to the campaign in which Mrs. Johnson and some of his kinfolk took the telephone book in Austin, and tore it up, and called every single registered voter. He claims that made it possible for him to win in his first very tight primary, you remember, where he won by eighty-seven votes. He had respect for their ability, their judgment, their organizational talent, and the contributions they could make.

I know he was in earnest. Because when, in 1955, I heard of an organization that was being set up, and I'm sorry to say that I don't have the correct name for you this morning, but it had to do with investigating the subversive activities of the investigators. In other words, what were we doing to try to prove that government people were subversive, and was that fair? This was an overall organization composed of two members to be selected by the president, the vice president, and the minority and majority leader. In other words, there were to be eight members. And this was during the Eisenhower era. One was to be a public member and one was to be a member of the private sector.

So I wrote to him, to the Ranch, and asked him whether he would consider giving one of the appointments--in other words, the private sector appointment--to a woman. And this is a letter that I cherish.

It says, "Dear Katie: It is only 8:00 a.m. in the morning. My star route mail carrier leaves the mail in my box across the river about 6:00, and your letter was the first one I read and the first one I'm answering, just about the only one I'm dictating, because the doctor told me not to fool with the details for the time being."

M: This is right after the heart attack.

L: Yes, this is September 17, 1955. "Your suggestion appeals to me greatly. I do not know if it can be worked out. However, I would like for you to think it over a day or so and then write me airmail and give me the names of two outstanding women with your recommendations and reasons why they should go on"--he calls it--"the Security Commission." I don't know if that was the name or not. Then he says, "I originally thought of Mrs. Eugene Meyers and Elizabeth Rowe, but we appointed them to another commission. There is nobody in the country who wants to help you on your problem any more than I do, and I'll do my best. Thanks for reminding me of the telegram I am to send to Kansas City." That had to do with a meeting I was running, "Bird joins me in best wishes. Sincerely. . ."

Well, he did appoint a woman. I really tried to find the best woman I could and that turned out to be a woman called Susan Riley, R-I-L-E-Y, who was past president of the American Association of University Women, which is a pretty well-known and high-ranking American women's organization and at the time I think she was still head of Peabody Teachers College in Nashville, Tennessee. She was born in Tennessee, I believe. The President immediately accepted my

suggestion, although neither of us really knew her. We just knew her by reputation.

M: Reputation.

L: Yes. And there was an amusing postcript to the story. I had to clear her, and I called both senators, and they said, "Well we don't know her, but that's fine with us. She sounds like the right person." Then I had to call the state chairman, whom we knew as Mr. Hub, Herbert Walters. And he was about as unpleasant as anybody I ever talked to. "Well, now, I don't know her. I don't know her, never seen her at a Democratic meeting in my life. If you want a Democratic woman, I'll find you a Democratic woman." But as he went on and on, I kept arguing with him. And I said, "Mr. Hub, you don't understand. We're not looking for just any woman, and we aren't looking for a Tennessee woman." You know, I went through all the explanations, and I never did make him happy! He was as mad as he could be, a typical old-school politician.

But, anyway, we got her, and she served along with Senator Stennis, whom the President appointed. And served with great distinction. So I have the living proof, I think, of the President's interest, because here was the only private appointment he could make. In other words, there weren't too many appointments available to a majority leader, especially under a Republican administration.

When I spoke with Liz after the Johnsons came into the White House, we worked very hard, the two of us, to carry out what we thought was the President's intention of getting good women into the

government. To a certain degree, we were successful, and to a certain degree we failed.

I remember a Women's National Press Club Dinner at which I had invited the Rowes, amongst others, Jim and Elizabeth; and the President got up to speak; and said, "I can see someone in this room who turned me down. They talk about appointments for women." He had offered her a district commissionership, and her husband wouldn't let her take it. Well, there were quite a few such incidents. I know of one woman whom we offered an ambassadorship to who, unfortunately, we were never able to tell her the truth, but never cleared security. There were other such episodes. There were people who wouldn't leave home and so forth. But generally speaking, a great many women were appointed.

M: Some notable assistant secretaries.

L: That's right. Esther Peterson.

M: Dorothy Jacobson.

L: Well, I think Esther Peterson was assistant secretary by virtue of Kennedy.

M: That's right.

L: The President made her his consumer counsel, which I think was a mistake, because she couldn't carry two real big jobs. But anyway, he did. He had the same feeling, always, about people. When he liked you, he really liked you, and went all out for you. And he liked Esther and had confidence in her, and then, at a certain time, I'm sorry to say, I think he really turned against her. I think her activities as the consumer guardian were upsetting to him.

But at the beginning, we had the Status of Women Commission which Kennedy had set up, which the President endorsed fully. And I used to see him every year with six Federal Women Award Winners. I was chairman of this award, which only went to government career women. And among the career women, he gave several women presidential appointments. One was appointed to a commission. Her name was Penelope Thornberg, and I'm not sure whether it was the Federal Trade Commission. The other was called Ruth Van Cleve, who was in Interior, who was one of the first people the Republicans kicked out of her job--she was appointed head of the territories in the Pacific.

M: There's a certain sort of honor in that! To be the first one.

L: Yes. She was head of Territories, and they put another woman in her place.

M: Does that happen, incidentally? You passed by that. But does a particular job sort of become known as a "woman's job?"

L: I'm afraid it does. If you go back to the history of the Truman era, you'll find that Mrs. India Edwards, who deserves the credit for it, did make a woman "Treasurer." There had never been a woman treasurer before, and ever since then it's been considered a woman's job.

M: Right. That's interesting.

L: My two jobs, for instance, since the Republicans are in, my job in UNESCO and my job as deputy assistant secretary of CU, were never occupied by women. I was the first. In fact, it never occurred to

me to think of it that way. But now they're talking of women replacements.

M: Right. What about in the State Department? How much trouble does a woman have in high echelons in that bureaucracy?

L: I would answer that in a qualified way. There was a great deal of trouble within the bureaucracy in the State Department, just as there is in any other government agency. I would be less than honest if I didn't tell you that women in high positions are [rare]. They are hard to come by for women. For instance, my becoming a deputy was frowned on by old-timers, looked on askance. But they had no objection . . . for instance, the State Department is better than most to women ambassadors, if they are qualified. That gets them out of the building!

M: (Laughter)

L: They gum up the works, you see! But there is always a threat of a woman assistant secretary, something they wouldn't care for.

M: What about the Foreign Service women? Do they get an equal break?

L: No, but I was able to help them. There were three women who I was able to get promoted to Class I at the same time. And it was one of those periods when I was sorry I couldn't get the President to receive them. He had become preoccupied with the war by then.

M: Were those the first Class I's?

L: No, no. They were not the first. But it was a kind of stunning and unique story that three women at once became Class I. Two of them became ambassadors. One was Carol Laise, who became Ambassador to

Nepal and married Ellsworth Bunker. The other was Margaret Tibbetts, who became Ambassador to Norway. The third was a woman called Kay Bracken, who has resigned. She had problems with some of the men who didn't like her and was always being thwarted in her ambitions. It was rather sad, because I think she was talented.

And it was interesting to me that I once asked Margaret Tibbetts, who was a most balanced human being, although slightly masculine as a woman, after she had served on a promotion board, I asked, "What is the story on women versus men. What do the men say about women?" "Well," she said, "Katie, I've never heard them say anything. They did say they did not like women who have no humility and no sense of humor." And I said, "Well, Margaret, my answer to that would be that I don't like men who have no sense of humor and no humility!" There we were with all these absurd generalizations. Margaret, I think, laughed.

But that there is prejudice, there is no doubt. When Charles Frankel left, I made kind of an abortive bid for his job. I thought I deserved it. The President allegedly said, "That'd be good for Katie." Then the story I got back--which, as I say, I'd like to lock up for the future--would be that the Secretary disapproved of me; that he did not want to send my name up to the Hill; that I was too political, et cetera. Well, I don't believe it. There may have been some of that, but I believe that there was more than that involved. I think it was John Macy and his people who felt that they had other obligations, and one of them was to Edward Re, and that the post

would be better served by somebody who . . . . Macy had a strange gift. He was a very brilliant man, but he had a computer-type mind, and if you didn't come out of the computer, you weren't anybody.

M: That sort of is in relation to the other point I was making about . . .

L: Yes. Well, that's my theme song!

M: . . . the relationship of the humanist-poet type to the bureaucracy.

L: And I was indignant at the time, and hurt, because I didn't think Re was a very valuable appointment. But on the books, Re looks okay. Re was an educator; he had written a book on the law.

M: The computer--

L: That's right, but I had learned lessons that Re had never learned: which was how to get along with people, how to present our case best, et cetera. And I'm told that the other day in the last hearing which just took place a couple of weeks ago, Mr. Rooney was buried in his books when our bureau came up and introduced themselves. "Now we have the Mutual Education Act," and muttering along, "and the request for so-and," and Rooney said, "and Mrs. Louchcheim." And then he looked up, he said, "Oh, that's right, you're not Mrs. Louchheim, are you," to the poor man who succeeded me.

M: (Laughter)

L: And then, later on in the hearing, he just simply blurted out, "It was a shame that Katie Louchheim didn't get that job. She should have had it. And it was the White House and President Johnson's mistake, period, or the State Department and Johnson. I'm not sure

that it was presented to the President right." Don't forget that, at that time, he was really absorbed in the war and the feeling that Macy could go in there and say, "Now look, you don't have to worry about this woman. She'll stay where she is, and she'll do what she's doing; but we have to worry about Ed Re." There is always the feeling, if I may say so, that you don't know what happens to you, because you don't know how the person who delivers the message to the President phrases it.

M: Or even sometimes if it's delivered.

L: That's right. So I'm willing to give the President the benefit of the doubt on that one, although I think it was a great mistake.

And when the UNESCO job came up, Harry McPherson was the one who suggested that I have it. And when I called him a day or so later, I said, "Did you by any chance talk to John Macy?" He said, "Yes." I said, "Was he favorable?" He said, "No." I said, "I could have told you that." So it required a fight, and I managed to win that fight.

And I think that if I had known about Macy in December of 1967, I would have made a different approach. I would have gotten my friends on the Hill, and Rooney, and other people lined up, and instead of leaving it to the one or two people that spoke to me. And I think the President would have been prevailed upon to have given the job to me. It was a mistake. But I don't think that the Secretary had the kind of relationship to the White House, or to me, or to anybody that would require him to say "yes" or "no." I went

to see him at the suggestion of people, and he said to me, "Now, Katie, you know I have nothing to do with giving out jobs."

M: Secretary of State?

L: Yes. He said, "These jobs are not mine to give." And I said, "Well, I assure you, Mr. Secretary, that whether I get the job or not, I will stay here and continue to work with you."

M: You weren't playing the hardheaded new level of bureaucrat.

L: No. No. The only woman who was made an assistant secretary was a black woman called Barbara Watson, who came in as the replacement for Abba Schwartz in the Security and Consular division. She held an acting title for a long, long time. I never knew the inside story, but I suspect they were a little bit worried about the Hill, people like Eastland and others. And she was finally made Assistant Secretary.

So she became the first assistant secretary, and I went to her swearing in. And I've never heard Mr. Rusk more lyrical. Now, wehther it was because she was black or not, I don't know. But I could also say to you, if I wanted to be caustic or bitter, that my name came up at a time when they were very much interested in blacks.

M: (Laughter) You were discriminated against the other way!

L: I think if my face had been black, my chances would have been better. In other words, I don't think Macy would have been able to knock me down so easily.

M: Black was one of the qualities the computer would have to consider at that point.

L: That's right. The conversation that I must mention, and then I'll go on to my feelings, but Macy came up in a conversation I had with Walter Jenkins. And I told the story, and I said I felt very badly because it had hurt me to the extent that I thought Johnson knew enough about me and understood my value enough to go to bat for me. And he said, "Well, Katie, Macy's mind is a computer mind. But he never understood politics." And I think running through this was a not too subtle theme that because I had served at the Democratic National Committee that I was a detriment as an appointee.

M: Too political.

L: Yes, too political. I'm going to say in the book I'm writing that sometimes I felt as if I had a scarlet letter hung around my neck.

M: A "DNC," not an "A."

L: That's right! You know, it was just that way. The political route is all right, if you've been elected, if you've been a defeated congressman, or somebody who has been gerrymandered out of office, but not if you worked at the really hard nuts and bolts.

M: Professional.

L: As far as my relationship to my work was concerned, I was always hopeful and optimistic. I always believed that we could do something. I took the optimistic point of view, or perhaps even the dreamer's poetic point of view. It took me a long while to realize that people could smooth-talk you who really didn't want to do a

thing that you asked them for, or who really had no use for you, or, who were in some way trying to by-pass you. Although I got disturbed at times, I still never lost the feeling that you could do something about any problem under the sun. That, I think, is one of the talents that women have. I think they learn this from having to make a home: that you can't always have everything that you need, either in terms of purchasable goods or in terms of human relations; that you have to make the best of what you've got; and that you have to go ahead and try to achieve those ends that you seek despite these lacks and disadvantages. I think men give up more easily.

M: All men, or bureaucrats particularly?

L: Well, all men, not under all circumstances, certainly. You know, we were talking the other night about the kind of soldiers who fight well, et cetera, and I'm sure there are men who fight well and men who don't.

Bureaucracy, particularly, is full of people who have insured jobs and who have learned long ago that the less they say on paper and the less they do, the better it is for them in the long run. And in that poem about "The Bureaucrat," I have said that you never see a bureaucrat without a pen or with a dream. The poem offended my dear Bill Crockett, who believed one could do everything. And I explained to him that what I meant was that bureaucracy was a state of mind, and that we today had to face bureaucracy, in any large institution, be it a college, be it a research laboratory, be

it a corporation, et cetera, that bigness was the problem of the day. Layering, therefore, became a related problem, and the person halfway up the line gave up trying to reach the man above him, and the man above him, because it was impossible, and therefore, I was trying to say to them, "You have lost your dreams, but don't lose them! Beware . . . . . just don't carry around a pen; also carry around a dream."

M: A warning, not a judgment.

L: That's right. I didn't try to make a judgment. I don't think I satisfied Bill Crockett any more than I did anybody else.

But I can't tell you how many intransigent bureaucrats I dealt with. We had schemes. For instance, it's still kicking around, something that came out of the International Cooperation Year, which was youth fares for international students. We have them now finally, on airplanes. Oh, the letters, and the communications, and the meetings, and the telephone calls that I put into that, and nothing ever happened. I have forgotten even where it was stopped. I think somebody has revived the idea, and maybe it will go better this time. There were dozens of events of this nature, or programs of this nature that really got stuck, because you couldn't get a bureaucrat to move on them. They could see both sides of the question always; that's the trouble.

M: Also saw it in terms of their own rocking the boat to somebody above them.

L: I think so, or they knew already that they had been turned down. Now, I had one experience I think I'd like to mention, this exchange of women with the Soviet Union. Back in the fifties, I was seized in the 1958 or 1959 period with the idea that we ought to have a highstanding exchange with the Soviet Union; that they were constantly bringing women over here, their communist-trained experts; that they, in turn, were picking up leftists like with a vacuum cleaner and bringing them back as representing the USA. I went to see [Senator] Bull Fulbright and he, in turn, wrote to an officer in the State Department called William Lacy, and William Lacy thought it was a great idea. And the next thing I knew, I read in the paper where the Republican women of X state were starting to write letters to the Russian women of X city. And I really blew up. I was sore. And I went to Fulbright, and he wrote the hottest letter to Lacy that anybody had ever gotten! Well, anyway, Lacy reproached me and said he had never had such a nasty letter and I was a nasty girl. I said I was mad.

But anyway, the minute I entered in the department, I started in all over again. I can't tell you how many different arguments with different officers who held different titles like Soviet Exchange experts, et cetera, took place. They said, "Women are not specifically specified, and you can't have an exchange if they're not specifically specified." I even approached [Ambassador Antoly] Dobrynin one night. I'm never afraid. If I see somebody, I'll go up and talk to them, at some social event, at the State Department

after one of these Cabinet performances that we had in the big auditorium, where we had a soloist, or a recital, or something. And he said, "Oh, I will do something about it." And I said, "It's a pity that we don't have this exchange." And we finally got women specified in the exchange.

Well, along around, I suppose I should say 1964 or so, maybe it was earlier, we then got a list of women, and I was very careful to be non-partisan, et cetera, and to select the best women. And they came through the security check; they came through the innoculation; and they came through the briefing. A week or so before they were to go, I was to have lunch with them. And a man called Frank Sisco was a Foreign Service officer and a bureaucrat, who had some kind of prejudice. I won't say that he was difficult to everybody, but I have to assert that he was a difficult person. He simply announced that the Soviets had chosen to have the Soviet-American Friendship Organization as the host for these women and we could not allow that, because that was a communist front organization and we couldn't have them be the hosts for these women. And I remember saying to him, "Frank, what is there over there that is not a communist front organization?" (Laughter)

M: They could hardly be the host if they weren't!

L: He said, "Well, we've never admitted that they existed, that they were legitimate. Therefore, that's the kind of point we now have to make, and we'll cancel." So they cancelled it! And I never got over

the feeling that it was partly a lack of sympathy for the whole project as well as the fact that they were nit-picking.

On the side of Mr. Sisco, I must say to you that the General in charge of Berlin, when I was there in 1962, did tell me that we had to be very careful at that time--because we went over into East Berlin--of what he called, "salami technique," which I'm sure you've heard of. We mustn't permit them to dictate. And he was explaining to me why the man I was with, who was the minister in London and I had to go underground rather than overground, because we couldn't let an official military vehicle be stopped by the Russians at Check Point Charlie. And underground, we got by by just showing our papers. But we had a very unpleasant experience coming back; we had problems with really tough guards. Then I understood Sisco. But it was his training to think in those terms. It never went higher up. I learned a lesson out and when I had other such problems, I took them higher up.

M: Go around the obstruction.

L: Yes. But as far as I know, there has never been an official exchange. Oh, during this period, I was visited by a group of Soviet women, who were officially picked by their government. One of them was the editor of an important Soviet women's magazine, and she was the sharpest of the group. I remember I had been warned, and I insisted on my own interpreter. I would not allow their interpreter to serve us both. At the State Department, afterwards, our interpreter reported on the meeting and complimented me. He said that I kept

them off guard, which I did deliberately. Every time they got serious, I'd point to a different picture on the wall and create a diversion. Well, I said, "I'm an old hand at doing things like that. I didn't think that was anything special." Their chief spokesman asked me in the middle of the interview whether I would furnish her with a statement to include in her magazine, that she would be glad to take it. And I said I would be delighted. She said, "Well, what would I say?" And I said, "Oh, I'm not going to give it to you now. I want to give you my best thoughts, and I would have to compose them quietly when I'm alone." When it had been carefully written, we sent them a statement but they never used it.

M: Your best thoughts were not what she had in mind.

L: No! No, she was going to trap me into saying something about peace and friendship, or something of this sort. I realize that there's an art in dealing with communism, and I don't pretend to possess it. But I do know that we still have thousands and thousands of people going over there. And they do, on occasion, send women over here, for no reason except that they are well trained to dazzle and make a great impression on some of our pro Soviet ultra liberal groups, that I think ought to be offset in turn by our own official women going there. Instead of which the Soviet women invite slightly leftist women to come.

There have been special occasions in the United States, a Pug Wash conference which Agnes Meyer put up the money for, at which people like Congresswoman Edith Green spoke, where I think we held

our own. Just ordinary women, heads of department stores, buyers--I've forgotten whom we had at that time, but we did have a school principal--and people like that who would represent America, would be a healthy thing.

M: I know you feel very badly. I don't want to cut you off. Are there other subjects that you think we should put down here?

L: The subject of women is still very important because with President Johnson, we had our best chance. And I'm not sure that the war didn't impede our progress.

Let me just tell you one more story about women that occurred during the earlier period of the Johnson Administration, when Walter Jenkins was still there, and President Johnson kept on some of the Kennedy people. I had a friend come to town, who was the state vice-chairman of New Jersey, looking for a job. She had not been able to get one under Kennedy, because Governor Meyner had been for Lyndon Johnson, and she was a Meyner person. And I said to her, "You ought to get an Embassy." She and I grew up togther and she was about my age; her husband, unlike mine, had retired.

She made an appointment with Ralph Dungan, who was the Kennedy person in the White House whom we had to deal with on Ambassadorial appointments. Johnson had kept him in. The day before the appointment, I met with Walter Jenkins by accident, again at a social event, and I told him, "Mrs. White, Katherine White, is coming over; shouldn't she see you as well as Dungan." And he said, "By all means." So

I gave her strict instructions, "Don't leave that White House without dropping in to say hello to Walter Jenkins."

She had a terrible time with Dungan who wouldn't let her use his phone and made all sorts of excuses, "You don't have to see Jenkins. You've seen me. That's enough," and so forth. She persisted, and she did get to see Jenkins. And Jenkins took her right in to the President. The President offered her the job as ambassador to Denmark, told her how to go about it, said, "Get your governor's endorsement and the previous governor's endorsement." I think, by then, Hughes had become governor.

A day or so later, I was crowing all over the place. I was delighted. When Crockett sent for me, and I said, "What's the trouble?" And he said, "I understand the President didn't like Mrs. White." And I said, "Who told you that?" He said, "Ralph Dungan." I said, "Didn't like her? He offered her a job! He told her what to do about getting it." This was the kind of politics Dungan and others played. They didn't want my appointee, or any appointee except their own to succeed. Dungan was as anti-woman as anybody could have been. And I suspect that during the Kennedy time he killed women appointments, too, because of the conversations I had had at various times with Sorensen. He once said that John Kennedy said to him, "If we had more Katie Louchheims, we'd be lucky. We could appoint more women." Well, I said, "I hope you told him that they exist. There are a lot of Katie Louchheims, if you just let them come forward!"

M: There's not that many. (Laughter)

L: It was interesting to me that it was the men around these people who axed the women. And Jenkins understood the President, as I've said before, knew how to move, knew when it was the right time to take Katherine White into the President's office. The loss of Jenkins and the coming of the war did a great deal to hamper the President's program for women.

M: You've been more than courteous with your time and generous to a fault. I really appreciate it and thank you very much for everything. We'll get this transcribed, ultimately, and get it back to you.

L: Yes, because I think after I finish my two chapters--I turn out to have two on the President--I would like to check some facts with you and see whether there were other historical matters.

M: Sure. And I'll be happy, too, to come back, once you return from Europe.

L: Yes. Let's continue this. It's fun.

[End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview II]

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ADDENDUM TO ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEWS: THE UNESCO

For the sake of future historians, the postscript to my appointment as Ambassador to UNESCO should be recorded.

The last day of William Benton's tenure--he served the full eight years in the post as Ambassador to UNESCO--he gave a sumptuous luncheon in his suite at the Crillon in Paris. Frequent references were made to the rare game and the expensive champagne we were served. In concluding remarks Benton referred to the post he was vacating; he regretted that no one had been appointed in his place and if he had no word from Washington by midnight, he would proceed and name his own appointee.

After the luncheon I went up to him and told him that I had been appointed by President Johnson and that I was certain he had already heard of the appointment just as others had. He affirmed his previous statement, repeating he knew nothing of any appointment.

I had been aware that he had tried to persuade Secretary Rusk to accept the appointment and perhaps other highly placed officials. He really felt that no one but someone of Rusk's stature should be put in his place.

After the post-luncheon conversation I telephoned the White House and asked that a cable be directed to him affirming my appointment. In the midst of an African reception that same afternoon, the news spread and the

appointment was officially announced by the head of the Secretariat, Robert Wade.

Benton had enjoyed the appointment; he had liked being in Paris and entertaining. He seldom, if ever, attended meetings. He was not, I feel, against women office holders so much as he was for a more prestigous successor.

A previous episode also belongs in the record since it concerns the appointment of women. In the fall of 1967, the delegation of UNESCO was appointed. I was included. One of Macy's assistants called and asked me to suggest another woman since there was only one, myself, on the list. I went to some pains to find the right person; Dorothy Lehman Bernard, a widow who lived in New York City was persuaded to change her plans for a trip to the Far East to accept the appointment. Macy's office asked me to make the necessary clearances. Ed Weisl, then Democratic National Committee man for New York, happily gave his consent. Laughing, he remarked that being the Lehman Brothers lawyer, we could not have found anyone more to his liking.

Some two days later, I was called by Macy's henchman to say that the President had been shown the list and had stricken Mrs. Bernard's name. Instead he had appointed Nan Tucker McEvoy. Angry, perhaps unbelieving, I questioned the assistant; "Why?" I asked, "did the President do this?" First I was told that he was in no mood to really study the list, and later I was told that he knew Mrs. McEvoy as a specialist on birth control would be useful in the Delegation.

Mrs. McEvoy, a very capable and delightful person, had been actively involved in the Kennedy Campaign for President. The explanations offered to me were most unsatisfactory. I was loathe to call Mrs. Bernard who had changed her plans in order to accept. Furthermore, I had chosen her because her help in the next Presidential campaign--thinking it would be President Johnson who would be running--would be invaluable; her handsome house in the East 70's, her connection with important persons in various groups in New York City, all would be most useful.

Annoyed at having been lied to--I knew the tale about President Johnson's having taken such action was a falsehood--I called Ed Weisl. Furious, he called someone in the White House. In turn, Bob Kintner called me and bawled me out; "Don't you ever dare do that again" were among the admonitions he used. I promised him that if such a trick were pulled on me again, I would do the exact same thing.

When I was appointed by the President as Ambassador to UNESCO, I paid a courtesy call on Macy. He asked me what I thought my qualifications were; I gave him a rather brief reply; "they are all on my record." He asked if I spoke French; I told him I did, fluently. "Ah" he said, "so that's why they appointed you."

In the interview with Paige E. Mulhollan, dated April 14, 1969, on page 32, there is reference to my "abortive bid" to obtain the position of Assistant Secretary for Cultural Affairs, the position which Charles Frankel left. Certain essential facts were not mentioned. I would like, therefore, to submit this Appendix for the record.

When Secretary Charles Frankel left, I asked whether he would support me as his successor. The answer was an unqualified NO. I went to talk with Harry McPherson, at the White House, a close friend, with the same request. His answer; "Sorry, but the position must go to an academician."

I then talked with Abe Fortas, who was very close to the President and asked for his help. Abe was happy to support me. I explained that I had carried the bulk of Frankel's job, personnel and budget, as well as avoiding the many political blunders that seemed not to trouble Frankel.

At Christmas, my husband and I were at the Homestead with our children and grandchildren. Abe called me and warned me that the Secretary felt that my name might not clear the Senate Committee. I had already talked with the Secretary at some length; he had assured me that these positions--as I had suspected--were not his to give or approve. After I had talked with Abe, I felt that his explanation was a cover for reluctance elsewhere.

At the same time, as I mentioned in the Johnson Library interview, I did not "go higher" for help. I never talked with Congressman Rooney, who admired my work and liked me, nor with other of my many friends on the Hill. Later, a story of sorts was told me; Macy, with the help or perhaps the prodding of Califano, also in the White House, thought it wise to appoint an Italian, since the President, who was then expected to run in 1968, had need of the Italian vote.

Re was an embarrassment to the Department of State. Rooney spent a good deal of time telling me how angry he had been at Re's claim that he was Rooney's appointee. Re refused to "come on board," a Department of State phrase, until after the Budget Hearing knowing full well that Rooney would harass him publicly. I prepared and appeared before Mr. Rooney on all the CU matters including our unhappy political errors--not relevent here. I served as Acting Assistant Secretary from November to April.

Re was eventually appointed Judge of the Customs Court in New York, a position he was waiting for after his agency, the Foreign Claims Commission, a World War II remnant, had been forced to close.

Over the years of the Johnson Administration, I had an annual encounter with Macy. As Chairman of the Federal Women's Award he was always a guest at the head table. In 1976, or 1977, Macy, realizing that the promotion of women had "come to stay," prepared a paper creating a special Commission composed of the winners to "study" the necessary problems in connection with the advancement of women. Nothing much came of it, but he did promote himself into the picture. The President, at my urging, appointed two of the winners, one to be Federal Trade Commissioner and one to be Chairman--Director?--of Territories in Interior.

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In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, Unites States Code and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Kathleen Louchheim of Washington, D.C. do hereby give, donate, and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title, and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of personal interviews conducted on April 1, 1969 and April 14, 1969 in Washington, D.C. and prepared for deposit in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions:

(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

(2) The tape recordings shall be available to those researchers who have access to the transcripts.

(3) I hereby assign to the United States Government all copyright I may have in the interview transcripts and tapes.

(4) Copies of the transcripts and the tape recordings may be provided by the Library to researchers upon request.

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Kathleen S. Louchheim
Donor

Oct 30/78
Date

James B. Rhoads
Archivist of the United States

December 19, 1978
Date