INTERVIEW I

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INTERVIEWEE: FRANK MANKIEWICZ

INTERVIEWER: STEPHEN GOODELL

PLACE: Washington, D. C.

Tape 1 of 1

G: This is an interview with Mr. Frank Fabian Mankiewicz, presently a syndicated columnist. I thought I would just begin by introducing you and then at the end of that, you can add whatever you'd like to it.

You were born in 1924 in New York City. In 1947 you received a B.A. from U.C.L.A. and in 1948 received a Master of Science degree at Columbia. What was that in?

M: Journalism.

G: In 1955 you received a law degree at the University of California in Berkeley. From 1948 to 1952 you engaged in journalistic practice in Washington, D. C. and Los Angeles, is that right?

M: Yes, and for about ten months in Europe.

G: With what newspapers were you associated?

M: Well, I worked in Washington for a bureau called Western Reporters that represented a number of western newspapers. Then I went to Los Angeles and I was city editor of a newspaper called the Los Angeles Independent. Then I went back to Europe with the chief of that bureau. We worked for North American Newspaper Alliance, which was a high-class way of saying we were free-lancing, but we made enough money to pay our expenses.

G: In 1955 you were admitted to the California Bar and from 1955 until 1961, you practiced law primarily in Beverly Hills, California?

M: Entirely in Beverly Hills.

G: In late 1961, I believe it was, you joined the Peace Corps.

M: That's correct.

G: And you were with the Peace Corps off and on or intermittently--

M: No, regularly.

G: I was thinking of your association with the task force.

M: No, I'll tell you what happened. I went directly to Peru with the Peace Corps, and I stayed there until May of 1964. Then I became the Latin America regional director of the Peace Corps until around April of '66. But in February of 1964, I think it was the first of February--you can check the date because it was a Sunday and it was the day that Sargent Shriver's appointment was announced to the newspapers as the Commanding General of the War on Poverty--I came to Washington as the director of the Peace Corps in Peru, for I think it was two days, to testify before the House Foreign Relations Committee. The Peace Corps appropriation was being considered and what the Peace Corps did was to pick the directors of two or three fairly typical overseas programs to come back and testify. That's what the committee wanted. I think that's why I was here. It was to testify, anyway, for a couple of days. I called Sarge Shriver that day, as I always did when I came to town, and read that he had been appointed the head of the War on Poverty; and the result was that I stayed for six weeks working on the task force that would later become the OEO. But at that time I was still the Peace Corps director in Peru; I was on loan, in effect, from the Peace Corps to that task force, just as other people were on loan from the Labor Department or whatever it might have been.

G: As were most of the people.

M: That's right.

G: Okay. So from '62 to '64 you were the director of the Peace Corps in Peru, and from '64 to '66 you were the Latin America regional director.

M: That's right.

G: In 1966 you joined with Senator Robert Kennedy's staff and I guess you functioned in the capacity of press assistant.

M: That's right. The official title was press assistant, but everyone called the job "press secretary."

G: Well, I'd like to begin just by asking you about the '64 task force. You said you called Shriver and that's how you learned he had been appointed.

M: No, I read it in the New York Times while I was waiting for the operator to get the number. I was reading the Sunday paper in my hotel room, and I saw this and talked to Sarge about it. He was his usual ebullient self. I had done a lot of reading on the question and I knew some of the players. I knew Mike Harrington and I had a close friend named Paul Jacobs who was very active in some of the research on the question. Sitting in Peru I had done a lot of reading; I hadn't done much talking to people. Sarge asked me, as a matter of fact, if I knew anything about the general question of poverty, and I said, yes, I did. So he started asking me about it, and I talked to him about Harrington, about that book of his, about Paul.

G: Had Shriver read the Harrington book?

M: I don't believe so. I think he'd read a review of it--the long review in the New Yorker by Dwight MacDonald, but I don't think he'd read the book. We talked about Harrington; I told him what kind of a person he was, and he said, "Well, let's get him here. See if he'll have lunch with me tomorrow" And I said, okay, I'd call him; and I told him I'd call Paul Jacobs--he wanted to talk to him too. And the upshot of it was I sensed that I was going to be doing some things, but I knew I had to leave the following night and I knew that Sarge knew that. And at about three or four o'clock that afternoon, it was a Sunday, I was over in the Peace Corps office writing up my testimony

for the next day to the House Committee. I got a call from Sarge's secretary, Mary Ann Orlando, who said to me, would I come to a meeting at Shriver's office in the Peace Corps at six o'clock? I said, "Sure, what's it about?" And she said, "Well, it's about the poverty war."

So I went. And at that meeting were present, in addition to Shriver and myself--I think Adam Yarmolinsky was there by that time, and the rest of the people were all from other branches of the government. Secretary Wirtz was there; Kermit Gordon, who at that time was the director of the Bureau of the Budget, was there; Charlie Schultze, who was his assistant, was there; I think Jim Reynolds from the Department of Labor and some others--I can't recall too well. And at that meeting, the Labor Department guys and the Bureau of the Budget presented what was apparently a first draft of a poverty message or bill--I think maybe both. But the point of it was all community action. I forget how much money they were going to spend; it was not very much because a lot of that money had already been allocated.

G: Was it about five hundred million dollars?

M: That's right, that's the figure. But it was an illusive figure because some of it was going to come from other programs for which money had already been appropriated. And it was the first I had seen of it; there was a draft submitted to everybody. We got through with that and Sarge--

Well, at the beginning of the meeting Shriver introduced me to the people I didn't know, and said that I was his-- I don't know, executive assistant, or functioning as his assistant on this project, or whatever it was, which was news to me. But I functioned that way at the meeting and gave my opinion of this approach. And the upshot of the meeting was that we didn't want to do that, but we were going to start from scratch and write up a program that might include some of that community action approach.

G: Who pushed for this omnibus bill rather than just--

M: Well, everybody else who was there except Shriver, Yarmolinsky and myself. And in fact, they regarded it as practically a foregone conclusion that that was what it was going to be. It wouldn't be that version, but it would be a tightened-up, polished--I mean that was a first draft, but clearly that was going to be the substance.

G: No, I'm sorry, I meant who were the people who felt that it should be a wider approach rather than--

M: Shriver, Yarmolinsky, and myself. That's all. And we weren't even sure what should go in it, but we thought it shouldn't be just that. There was talk about youth employment, talk about other things. So we left it at that. Shriver would in effect, I supposed, convene a task force in which these other fellows would, if not participate, at least play a role in the counselling of it.

And then we got together that night and talked about what kinds of things we might look into. By the next night Mike Harrington was in town and Paul Jacobs; and I think Pat Moynihan had already appeared, come over from the Department of Labor. And we began writing that night a series of memoranda to Shriver on some ideas that we had all sort of come up with about what kinds of things ought to be included in a poverty program.

G: Excuse me, was Dick Goodwin involved at this point too?

M: No, I don't think Dick Goodwin was ever involved while I was there. I'm sure he was--he was at the White [House]. Was he at the White House then or was that his period--no, I think that was his exile period. I don't know. I am trying to think. No, he must have been there. Of course, he was there, but he wasn't involved in this that I knew of. But then Bill Moyers wasn't either, and I'm sure he was, so that there was a lot going on at the White House that I, just in the nature of things, didn't take any part in.

Then we began moving. We had some offices at the Peace Corps. Pat Moynihan brought some office help over. At that time we were talking about all kinds of [things]. It was sort of a grab bag of proposals. I remember we--I think for the first time began to talk about the cigarette tax for employment. I don't have very many notes from this period; I gave almost all of them to Hal Horowitz. He's a fellow you ought to talk to.

G: He's at UCLA now.

M: He's a UCLA professor; he's a close friend of mine.

Then we started bringing people in. We decided we needed lawyers, so I thought of Hal Horowitz who was at that time deputy general counsel at HEW, but was leaving anyway July 1, and so we thought that wouldn't disturb things too much if we got him. Eric Tolmach was an old friend of mine, and he was at that time a press guy. He had quit his job at Newhouse about six weeks before on a matter of principle the nature of which I can't recall. He was a good guy. He was at that time married to a very close friend of all of my family's--which was how I knew him. We decided we needed a press fellow, and he was at that time assigned as special assistant to Wirtz; there was thought that he would do press work. Pat Moynihan had met him and liked him, so we brought him over. I'm trying to think who else we got into that. Some people started participating regularly by the third or fourth day. For quite awhile it was still a very small group. There was a guy named Jim Adler--I don't know where he was employed at the time, probably the Labor Department; he's in California now. Horowitz--

G: Was Norb Schlei there?

M: No, he came later. John Steadman was another guy who came a little bit later. Oh, Jim Sundquist. Jim Sundquist came over early from Agriculture. I think

Pat Moynihan brought him. By the second or third night we were talking about employment programs, our charm school--

G: You referred to that in your review of Moynihan's book.

M: I referred to it in my review of Moynihan's book, yes.

G: Do you want to say a little bit more about that?

M: Well, it was a thought that we had had for some time. It went to the whole question of the fact that the Establishment in a sense was responsible for a lot of the problems of poverty, and one of them was that people who didn't fit the established culture didn't tend to get jobs. We thought that one thing that could be done: there should be some money for an educational program to, in effect, teach people how to apply for a job. If you can't beat them, join them. We called it a charm school, which was unfortunate. It made the Labor guys very mad. I think it made them mad because it suggested in the first place a kind of class bias which they felt was directed against them, but I think really it made them mad because it was a way in which members of minority groups would be able to get jobs and probably that way get into the union. Nothing was more likely to get the building trades mad than the suggestion that they might have to put up with some black members.

In any event, we did that. We spent a fair amount of time on problems of migrants, mobile schools, all kinds of ways in which migrant children could be taught. The problem with them of course is they never spend long enough in one place to fit into a school, and you can't get as much out of three schools in three months each as you can, obviously, at one school. So we thought about having schools that would follow the path of the migrant workers.

G: President Johnson's economic report, the one that was done in late '63 and I think delivered to Congress in early 1964--that, plus Harrington's book and other

related books and articles and so forth, were these the sources that you used? Were most of the people who were in the task force--

M: Well, most of the people who were talking at that time, Moynihan, Jacobs, Harrington, me, to some extent Horowitz, Tolmach, Sundquist, were all sort of familiar with most of the literature. In fact, another thing we did--you might try to find this in Shriver's files--we got up a list that first night of books and magazines and all kinds of things that we suggested Shriver start reading immediately. Oh, there might have been fifteen or twenty books on that list, not just Harrington--Harry Caudill's book and Ben Bagdikian had a book and what's his name--Herman Miller? Is it Herman I think it's Herman Miller, Rich Man, Poor Man, something like that; statistical material that Pat Moynihan had run across in the course of that report on the draftees. We even put James Agee's book in there, Let Us Now Praise Famous Men; and we had a secretary who didn't know what we were talking about. I remember that one thing in the memo came out--that book was listed as Let Us Now Praise Farmers, Men, which we thought was not a bad title for a different book.

Jim Sundquist was very interested in reevaluating and bringing up to date some very interesting stuff that had gone on in the Farm Security Administration in the thirties--in effect, land reform. We did some extensive stuff on that--on funding and devices whereby tenant farmers could purchase the land they worked.

G: That was in the original bill submitted to Congress? That wasn't deleted.

M: Yes, it was. That one survived. Then, let's see, what other proposals? Somewhere along there we began talking in terms of something that turned out to be the Job Corps. We talked a lot about "lighted schoolhouses." We talked about

reforming some of the uses of educational materials in institutions. We talked about non-school schools; that is, neighborhood schools to be run in people's houses, garages, where people could learn trades and where other people--in other words, instead of bringing the machine shop to the school so that in an academic atmosphere people would study machine shop, we talked about bringing the academic atmosphere to the machine shop or the garage.

And through all of this period Shriver was perfectly willing to let us do anything in a sense, come up with all kinds of suggestions, and these would all go into a pot and people would talk about them; we'd discuss it. It was rather informal. We spent a lot of time at Shriver's house. We would stay up late because it was the best time to get work done because there were no phones ringing. The press was now starting to come around and that was posing a problem.

G: He was still acting as the director of the Peace Corps?

M: Yes. But I think he was in town all the time. We began looking at educational stuff that led, somewhat later I think, to the notion of Head Start.

G: That was talked about at this point?

M: Well, we talked about the fact that by the time children got to school they were already behind. I mean, we were very concerned about the whole notion of the culture itself as a source of poverty; that once a child from a family where there were no books and no respect for learning got to school that the nature of the school system was such that he was inevitably going to fall behind, and then wouldn't be able to find employment, and then would go on welfare and all the rest of it would follow. So there was a lot of talk about that.

Edgar Kahn was around and through him we began to develop the idea of neighborhood legal services, but the notion of putting all this into Community

Action was far, fary away. The Community Action concept came really from the Peace Corps' community development work.

G: I wanted to ask you about that. You made that point also in your review of Moynihan's book.

M: I mean, that's where Shriver heard about it in a sense. I mean, that was what he was familiar with, the kind of community development work that the Peace Corps was doing, which I felt, and I was sort of the chief Latin American rhetorician of community development, as well as practitioner. Of course, there were other countires where they were doing a lot of it, but I think Peru was the first country in which the Peace Corps did urban community development, which was a much different thing from working out in a rural area because it meant that you didn't have much contact with the officials of the government; you were doing it pretty much on your own directly with the people. I'll give you an article of mine which describes that process.

G: I looked for it and couldn't find it.

M: We have some copies of that, don't we? It's in that Peace Corps book, and it's called "The Revolutionary Force." I think that impressed Shriver. I'm not sure when I gave that speech, but in any event the notion of organizing people around their grievances to accomplish a single thing, whether it was to set up a co-op or clinic or soccer team or to get the playground open at night or whatever it might have been, was one that we relied on in Latin America. It was in a sense revolutionary since the idea of it was to create alternate situations of power in a country where most people were powerless.

G: Was this the same intent that community action had? That you people were talking in those terms?

M: Yes. Exactly. Somewhere in there it says when that speech was given. I think it says it. If it doesn't, it should. Well, that was really the thought behind community action, and that is what led of course to the famous phrase "the maximum feasible participation of the poor." I'm as much in the dark as anybody as to where that phrase came from, although it was not in a draft that I guess Horowitz and Steadman and myself and somebody else drafted one night, and it was in by the following morning; whose contribution it was precisely I don't know. But we were talking at all times about the dangers of a society in which the people who had the decision-making power tell the people involved how it's going to be, without listening first. And that it was extremely important in locating a medical clinic or determining the curriculum of a school or whatever kind of program it might be that it come from the bottom up. In other words, we always had the problem in Latin America of the people organizing. We'd get them organized, and then it would turn out that the thing they wanted to do first as their highest priority was not the highest priority of the outside agency.

G: How would you resolve that?

M: If possible, let them do what they wanted to do. I mean, they understand their priorities and it's much more important than they have the sense of self-organization than that they do the right thing. At least, that was the theory under which I was operating; that it was more important for a people in a village to accomplish something than to accomplish something that we wanted. I mean, Americans always think that people in an underdeveloped country should develop their water supply, because Americans like to have a lot of water because they like to bathe a lot. Frequently, in these villages, what people would want would be a newer and better house of prostitution or police station. Rarely did they want another

classroom or school. We were always forcing schools on them; the AID missions always force schools on people. The fact is, in those societies they resent the schools because they are places in which the aggressions of the dominant group is visited once again upon them. I mean, you get upper class teachers and in an Indian village in Peru, those upper class teachers will tell the Indian kids that they are inferior; that their language is an animal language; that their culture is worthless. Well, nobody wants to build another place in which that will happen. It's much better to build something the community can participate in, like a urinal or simply a hall where they can have meetings. One community built a grandstand so the people could watch the annual parade, and we were perfectly willing to go along with that. That's fine, because the important thing is that they discover that they could build something by themselves. People who organize around something will stay together if it serves their purpose. But to build a school that they don't want means simply one more unused school and then a disintegration of the organization that built it.

G: Then it was your feeling that there was a rough analogy that could be made between the experience you had in--

M: Oh, yes, in underdeveloped countries, right. And in fact we thought about the poor in the U.S., at least in many ways, as an underdeveloped society. Now, that was rather primitive and maybe inaccurate, but I think Pat Moynihan is wrong--I don't think much of what he says is wrong, but I think he is wrong when he says that this concept of community action as an essentially revolutionary activity was not understood by the people who drafted it or by the OEO. It was pretty clearly understood by us.

G: I think this is a key point.

M: And we even referred to Saul Alinsky's model frequently. I certainly am an admirer of Alinsky's. This says here that this speech was given in '64. I

suspect that it was. I think it was probably given during that period when I was in Washington, but it certainly represented nothing new as far as I was concerned. It was simply a compendium of the things I had been saying and writing and acting on.

G: You said that Sunday morning or the first meeting you had at Shriver's house where a draft of the legislation was presented and it seemed to be mostly or all community action. This seems to indicate that there had been some prior work done before the Shriver task force got together. Do you have any knowledge of this?

M: Well, obviously, it had been. I gather it had been done in the Labor Department and the Bureau of the Budget, but I didn't know then and I never bothered to find out. We just assumed that this was the fait accompli that the Labor Department and the Budget Bureau had given us; but that we were not bound by it. Shriver understood, whether from conversations with the President or someone lower, that he didn't have to take that, that he could come up with whatever he wanted and however much money he thought ought to be spent; then the White House would approve it or disapprove it or approve it in part and disapprove it in part. Then it quickly became clear after a week or two that our job was going to be to draft a statute and a message, so at the same time these two things were sort of going on.

G: What I was getting at is whether in trying to delineate the origins of what became the Community Action Program in OEO, whether or not the same people were involved in the initial formulation of it. I gather from Moynihan's book that came from the Ford Foundation experience, the PCJD, and elsewhere that the same people came to the task force--

M: Well, I would say probably, now that I think about it, you've refreshed my recollection a little bit. I would guess that Paul Ylvisaker had a lot to do

with it. It also came out of some of the experience of the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency, which in turn came out of the Peace Corps. Dave Hackett and others worked early in, what, 1962, maybe, on a task force for a domestic Peace Corps.

G: Oh, yes, the National Service--

M: That's right. Now, that bears looking into, because many of the same people were on the task force.

G: Stephen Paul was head of it.

M: That's right. Including a guy named Carl Shugaar who now is at OEO working with the Job Corps. But he was at that time with the Labor Department, about to come to work for the Peace Corps. He never did, through an interesting little sidelight that, as a matter of fact, is worth your noting. In fact, maybe I'll digress for a minute and tell you about that, and you can take it off the tape and put it where it belongs.

Carl Shugaar is an old friend of mine from California. He served in the labor movement most of his life, got in trouble in the labor movement in the middle fifties, I guess, because he was working in San Francisco for the Office Employees' Union. He protested to the Central Labor Council when the Teamsters raided his union, and he discovered very quickly that you don't do that in San Francisco, or at least you didn't at that time. He challenged the Teamsters one night and the next day he was fired by his international president.

He then worked for a while for a friend of mine, a client and friend of mine, in real estate. And then he got a job through another friend in Texas, Houston, I believe, as a regional director of an organization called the American Council for Judaism, which is the world's only

anti-Zionist Jewish organization. An organization with which one may or may not agree, but its position is simply that Judaism is a religion and that Jews owe no special allegiance to Israel and indeed to say so suggests a kind of dual loyalty which this organization rejects. It's a small group, but a lot of wealthy people belong to it. It engages in a lot of controversy probably way beyond its importance.

In any event, Carl did that. And then while he was doing that, I came to the Peace Corps. The Peace Corps was having a big recruitment drive, and I suggested him as a possible Peace Corps director overseas. He came to Washington, and he interviewed everybody and went through Shriver. They all liked him, and he was assigned as the Peace Corps director to Ceylon. Then the clearance period went on, and he was even taking language lessons and going up to Pennsylvania to see the group that was in training. And then he was vetoed. Sarge Shriver told me that he had been vetoed reluctantly because Lyndon Johnson, then vice president and the chairman of the National Peace Corps Advisory Council, had called Sarge and told him that that he had had a lot of protests from supporters of his in Texas who had complained that Carl Shugaar was an anti-Semite. He is in fact a rather devout Jew. But the feeling was that this protest from Texas had been so strong and relayed through the Vice President that Sarge evidently didn't want to fight it. So Carl never did get in the Peace Corps. He then went with the Labor Department. Partly because of his Peace Corps involvement and he knew Shriver by then and he knew me very well, when they were looking for somebody from the Labor Department to sit on that early domestic task force, Carl was there. So he does know something about it.

My feeling is that in the course of developing these ideas for the domestic Peace Corps, they came up with some ideas which later found fruition in the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency. Dave Hackett, who worked for

Robert Kennedy who was then attorney general, and who chaired the Domestic Service Corps which was an idea of the Attorney General's. Then when that didn't go through, they went to the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency. Dick Boone, of course, was a leading believer in community development of this kind that I was talking about, more from domestic experience and so forth typified by Alinsky, than by anything overseas. But those two notions sort of dovetailed; that is, the overseas community development that I and others were sort of telling Shriver about, plus the local work that Boone and Paul Ylvasaker and Hackett and others had been developing through the Ford Foundation. But the draft community action thing was not really that kind. It was more of local organizations in welfare and employment and so forth, and they weren't thinking in the general sense of "go organizae something."

G: They were thinking more in terms of coordinating all these services.

M: They were thinking really in terms of what has finally emerged as the Model Cities Program, really, and not so much in terms of local groups which, with local people, would agitate for local priorities.

G: Can you remember whether this part of the language of this original draft legislation required community action agencies to come through the local political power structure?

M: Yes, I think they did, because one of the things we were very conscious of when we were writing and working was to keep it <u>out</u> of City Hall. And indeed our feeling was that in almost every one of these areas, the institution responsible for solving the problem was in large part responsible for the problem; that is to say, that people were being badly educated because of the public school system. The people were not finding jobs because of manpower training programs. And indeed the welfare program was a mess because of social welfare agencies,

officials, city hall, county government. Now, we may have been too strong on that; maybe it was more of a gut feeling than a researched analysis, but it was a strong feeling that a lot of us held.

G: This seems still to be the rhetoric of people at OEO.

M: Yes, well, that's right. Well, it's widely believed by me, among others. I mean I think that's one of the tragedies of the transfer of the Job Corps to the Labor Department and Head Start to the Office of Education. These are programs which were begun precisely because of the failings of the Labor Department and the Office of Education. I mean, there wouldn't have been a need for a Head Start Program had the Office of Education had these goals, and the same for the Job Corps.

G: As a matter of fact, as a sort of parenthetical aside, I think it was Johnson himself who said that the best way to kill the program was to put it in an old-line agency.

M: That's right. No, just to touch on the President for a minute--I never talked--Well, I did talk to him at one point with Shriver. We went over and outlined some of the things we had. And as I recall, he listened rather impassively and didn't object to anything. Ted Sorensen was there and he was going to draft the message but finally couldn't do it. Ted was, like all of those guys, quite incapacitated at the time. I remember once going over with Sarge and Adam Yarmolinsky to talk to Attorney General Robert Kennedy about it. And he listened dully to things that, as I later discovered, a year or two later, would have excited him a great deal. He just wasn't functioning really and contented himself with saying, "Well, is this what President Kennedy would have wanted?" And we assured him that it was.

But we never had any remonstrance from the White House on this notion of not only taking it out of the old-line agencies, but taking it out of City

Hall. You see, the first thing we had to decide was, were we going to have a separate agency at all? And that was quickly decided--that there had to be an OEO. We didn't name it, but a poverty office.

G: There were options?

M: Yes. Well, there were suggestions right along. The Labor Department--Bill Wirtz always wanted most of it run through the Department of Labor. Wilbur Cohen wanted a lot of it run through HEW. And we had to resist as much of that as we could.

G: You're raising a number of questions as we go along. Is this what is referred to as-- I gather-- Maybe I'm reading too much into what you're saying. Some of the newspaper accounts during the time referred to the czars, the building of empires, the clashes between strong individuals in the halls, and blood running from the walls and so forth. I gather that this would--

M: It was rather romanticized and over-dramatized, but it really did describe what was going on. And it was because it became clear very early that there was going to be a little bit of the money here and that there were empires to be constructed. Pat Moynihan was in a very difficult position because Bill Wirtz was pressuring him to be the Labor Department spokesman; Sarge was sort of co-opting him as a Shriver-man. And I think Pat was more willing to go with the Shriver approach and in effect was torn apart by it, and his relationship with Wirtz was never the same again.

We had a guy over at the Defense Department--Bill, the manpower guy over there. I'd remember his name if I heard it. We've talked to him--Gordon? I'll think of it. He was an assistant secretary for manpower, and he was very helpful, budgeting a lot of these Job Corps estimates and things of that sort. Of course, the Defense Department didn't particularly want these things, so that he was very helpful. Gorham was his name.

G: At one point, I think it was in Chris Weeks' book on the Job Corps, where he points out that at one point in the Defense Department, it was thought that the Defense Department might better run the resident training centers and the Job Corps; that this, according to Yarmolinsky, offended liberals.

M: Yes, but I don't think the Defense Department really wanted it. It may have been Sarge's suggestion. He had great respect, of course, for Bob McNamara, but I don't think that ever went very far.

We talked a little bit about Indians. But mostly we were trying to figure out how to put some existing programs in. We wanted to take that Labor Department employment bill, S-1, the Youth Employment Act--that had to be part of it; it was decided early that that was going to be part of it. And then we began shaking down the major sections that we would have. And a lot of things of course, as we thought of them, co-ops, buying schools, places where people could be taught about the pitfalls of installment buying, consumer counsel, legal services, all these things gradually moved into the Community Action title.

G: Except the Head Start and the Legal Services which you say was talked about at the time wasn't actually put into the bill. Why was that?

M: Well, I don't know, because I left early. Wasn't Head Start in the bill?

G: I don't believe so. I think that came in '65.

M: Well, that's funny, because I remember Shriver talking about it.

G: It's my recollection that the words of the act were such that you could put programs like this in, and that the intent was not to impose national programs on little communities; that they could formulate them themselves and it was thought that they would do this.

M: Yes, well, that may have-- It seems to me that as these little things came up we felt that they would be subsumed within the rubric of the Community Action, and so we did that.

G: How much of what you did and what you talked about was done with an eye cocked to Congress as to what could get through?

M: Practically none. I mean, our job as we saw it, at least for the first four weeks was to come up with a maximum program, and then we'd start paring a little bit later down the road. But that process, of course, began earlier. and things would be jettisoned and toned down and so forth as a result of various meetings that Shriver would have. Then all during this time Shriver and I were talking to an awful lot of people, at first to get their ideas, and secondly, with an eye that they might join the program.

I remember we got an awful lot of industrialists to come in, presidents of large companies and so forth. I remember particularly going to lunch with the President of the Chrysler Corporation, whose major contribution to the War on Poverty, and the only one he really suggested, was that he thought that the whole problem could be solved if only the cost of domestic servants could be made tax deductible. He felt that this would open up wide avenues of employment for otherwise unemployable Negro women and provide a great boost to the middle class. He talked at length about how his wife was unable to get servants. It was rather a disappointing luncheon.

G: Were there other gems like this?

M: He did say one thing that was marvelous. He said he'd just come back from Mexico where he had observed that it was quite possible to live like a millionaire, even if you weren't one; whereas in the United States it was impossible to live like a millionaire even if you were.

We talked to a lot of people at that time--Jack Conway, too. We gave him a very hard sell at a luncheon. I'm trying to think of any of the other industrialists who were a little disappointing. But generally they were good

people that we tried recruiting. Ted Patrick, I remember, came in and we talked to him; Ben Heineman; a lot of good people. Howard Samuels. And some of it got a little politically crossed. Occasionally we'd hear, "Don't have so-and-so. He's--" you know, but it never bothered us an awful lot.

And then the last couple of weeks Sarge began going on the Hill a lot to sell these things. He particularly wanted Phil Landrum to introduce the bill, and Carl Perkins we saw quite a bit. Shriver did in a sense on it what he did with the Peace Corps, which was to sell the enemy. In other words, he always figured that the liberal Congressmen and Senators were going to be with him on it, and he spent an awful lot of time on recalcitrant Southerners and some Republicans. And I think to good effect. He's a good salesman.

G: Could you recall what kind of liaison existed between the task force and the White House? Who were the people responsible on the White House side?

M: I don't know, really. I wasn't involved in that. Adam and Sarge would usually make the White House visits; I know that Bill Moyers was very much involved. I suspect that Harry McPherson probably was as well. I don't think Joe Califano was at the White House then. He was still at Defense.

I do remember one very nasty incident which I have a feeling may have planted in my mind the first seeds that I didn't like the Lyndon Johnson Administration. It was early on, a couple of weeks into it, two and a half weeks. And a story appeared in the New York Times with the byline of Marjorie Hunter, which was really the first big long leak out of our task force, and it was rather authoritative. It had all the programs. It referred to the Job Corps, I think. It talked about some of the in-fighting. Somebody, maybe not at Shriver's level, but somebody at my level, which was the next level down, had clearly told Miss Hunter, had given her a chronology of what

was happening. I don't think she could have been slipped a memo because all of that didn't even exist in writing. And there was great consternation; although I couldn't see what the hell the problem was. It was all pretty accurate. And I think people in Washington tend to over-rate what's in the New York Times anyway. But there was great consternation about who had talked to Marjorie Hunter, and I remembered, luckily, that I had seen her the previous--I knew she was up there the previous day, because I had been introduced to her at the water fountain. And I think I said to her, "Hello," not much more than that. And she had said something like, "I want to talk to you about the Peace Corps some day," and I said, "Fine." And that was the end of it.

Well, that afternoon I got a call from Bill Moyers, telling me that I had talked to Marjorie Hunter and that the President was damned furious. And I assured him I had not. And he said to me, "Well, we know you did because we have it from the FBI," and it just infuriated me. It made me, you know-- I can't remember any time in the government when I was as sick-- Now, Goddamit, what does-- First of all, it annoyed me that the FBI was involved in finding out who had talked to Marjorie Hunter; and secondly, it infuriated me all the more that the clowns had decided it was I, and it made me wonder about the whole FBI. If they had come up with that conclusion, then, you know, it was clear why they didn't solve more major crimes. Because it wasn't a question that I had given her an interview and hadn't told her this or that. I had not talked to her at all. And here was Bill Moyers twice telling me that I had. And he was mad! And Bill was a good friend of mine. And that I would just have to learn, by God, he said, if I was going to take a responsible position in government, that I shouldn't talk to reporters like that. I said, "Well, you don't have to tell me that lesson; I know all about that. I've never talked to the lady." "Well," he said, "the FBI says you have and as far as we're concerned, that's it."

G: Excuse me, was that Moyers speaking or was that Johnson?

M: That was Moyers.

G: I don't mean that--

M: Well, he referred to the President as being angry about it.

G: I mean, was he doing a dirty task, or was he really--

M: Well, you know, I don't know. I've thought back about it and I've talked to Bill about it, and it may very well be that he was in a room with the President and sort of showing off. That's what I finally concluded was happening. If not the President, then somebody else whom Bill wanted to impress with how rough he was being on me. It's the only explanation for it, because it was totally out of character for Bill.

And I then called Dick Goodwin and said, "What shall I do?" Because I didn't like the idea that the word was around the White House that I was the fellow who leaked things to the press. For one thing, I was working very hard at that time to become the Peace Corps Latin American Regional Director, which I thought I was entitled to, and which I thought Sarge would appoint me to. I didn't seriously worry about it. And indeed a month later when that appointment was up and I was back in Peru--you see, Bill Moyers was at that time still also the deputy director of the Peace Corps, although he was at the White House. And it wasn't as clear then, I think, that Bill was going to stay at the White House. And when the time came to appoint a new regional director for Latin America, it was Bill Moyers who was my strongest supporter on that. I remember calling him a couple of times and getting advice from him about when to come and who to talk to and what the opposition was and where it was coming from and indeed, we prevailed, and I think Bill was largely responsible. But that incident bothered me; I remember talking to Dick Goodwin and he said, "Don't worry about it; just ride with it; you get eruptions like that around

here now and then, and it'll be forgotten in a couple of days. I'll pass the word along that you're not just entering a pro forma denial, that indeed it is true that you didn't talk to her." I said, "Well, that's not so much what is bothering me. What bothered me was the tone and the fact that the FBI was in on it." Well, that passed by.

G: Was this symptomatic, you think, or characteristic, of the Johnson Administration?

M: I have no idea. I hear that it is, but I've no personal knowledge. I have no personal knowledge beyond that.

G: You haven't had or heard of other experiences of this type?

M: Yes, I've heard of other experiences, but they're all hearsay. But I was always inclined thereafter to believe them in my own mind because, of course, of what happened to me.

G: Was it ever explained to you what the problem was regarding leaks? Why was this done in total secrecy, the whole task force procedure?

M: Well, the feeling was that it would offer that much more time for the opposition to develop, obviously; that it was best to-- And besides which, we had not decided on any of these things. And even if we had decided, the President hadn't decided. I mean, I could see the importance of that, although, as I say, I think anybody who really wanted to know what we were thinking about could have found out. There were people from ten or twelve agencies working by that time; our task force had grown. We were very careless, obviously, about security and who saw copies of documents because we were all working so hard. We had no table of organization, nobody-- I was technically supposed to be a sort of funnel for documents, but it never worked that way. Sarge would call me in and he'd say, "Now, let's see if we can't arrange to get two meetings going on these solutions. Come to this meeting, would you come to

that?" I said, "Well, I'll get them there," and so forth. And then I'd do that and in the middle of it, Adam Yarmolinsky would call me and say, "What would you think if the Job Corps paid so much per month to the trainees," and I'd get involved in that problem; and then Chris Weeks would do the executive secretary thing for awhile, and then he'd get called-- I mean, everybody was doing everything, which was a very Shriverian way of operating. It worked well in the Peace Corps.

G: Could you elaborate a little more on this Shriverian way of operating? There have been a number of stories that I've seen, for example, and talk about this.

M: Well, I think that the OEO did Shriver in, because he was dealing for the first time with Civil Service. He came to the government and he had two great advantages. One was he was the head of an agency which was not a part of the government; that is, it was new. And secondly, of course, he was the President's brother-in-law. I suspect that people gave him credit for more clout than that in fact gave him, but it didn't matter. Because in Washington the appearance of clout is often more important than the thing itself. When Sarge would call somebody up, people would figure, "That's President Kennedy calling."

And what he did was to pick for all his key people in the Peace Corps, and particularly his people overseas, people who had never worked for the government before. And he made it very clear that you were going to be there two years, or at the most four. And at the beginning, the idea was you'd leave your law practice or your newspaper or whatever it was, and you'd go to Peru for two years, and then you'd come back to your previous calling. Or you'd take a position as associate director in Washington in charge of selection, you'd do that for two years, and then you could go back to your job as the personnel manager of Remington Rand, or whatever the hell it was. Then it became apparent

after awhile that some people would stay on for another year or two in some other job, but still the notion was that it was temporary service. I, for example, I think was much like everybody else in that it made absolutely no difference to me what my efficiency ratings were, or how much sick leave I was accumulating, because I didn't worry about how eight years from now somebody was going to look at my personnel record when it came time for me to be an ambassador or not, because that time was never going to come about. Eight years later I was going to be doing something else. And I obviously was never going to be using my accumulated sick leave or retirement.

As a matter of fact, I remember the interview I had with Shriver to take the job with the Peace Corps in Peru. We talked about everything except salary. And we agreed on the job, and everything was fine. It was in a motel room in El Paso. And finally--it was a typical affair--we had been trying to get together for six weeks, and that was the one place where he and I could both get to. He was down there for some Peace Corps ceremony, and I was on vacation in California and I left and flew down there. As we were leaving this motel room--or I was still there, and he was leaving, he stopped at the door and said to me, "Aren't you interested in how much money you're going to make?" And I said, "No, I assume it'll be okay. I assume that it'll be adequate to take care of me and my family. But now that you raise it, how much money will I be making?" And he said, "I haven't the foggiest idea." And that was the end of that.

And I remember that incident, and I remember an incident after I had started to work when the Ambassador in Peru was concerned that the Peruvian Army was going to move in and take over the government by force. He had a proposal as to what the U.S. ought to do at that time and he came up and talked to the President and Secretary of State, and they worked out a policy of what the U.S. would do

in terms of recognition and in terms of aid. Then he came over to the Peace Corps to talk to me and Sarge. I was in town at the time. I guess I hadn't gone to Peru yet. Still in the early period; I guess I'd only been there about three weeks. So the Ambassador explained all that was going to happen: we were going to withdraw diplomatic recognition; we were going to pull out our aid mission. And he said to Sarge, "What will the Peace Corps do at that time? What is going to be the Peace Corps policy?" Sarge didn't even hesitate. He just turned to me and he said, "Well, Frank Mankiewicz will be running our program there and he'll make that decision when the time comes," which struck me as a remarkable way to run a government agency and gave me enormous confidence. I didn't think there was any place in the government where that kind of authority was being given to field commanders, in a sense.

And that's the way he ran it. He was able to do that in the Peace Corps because nobody really cared about anything except getting the job done. If there were jurisdictional disputes or controversies, they could be worked out by Shriver or by somebody he had appointed, because everybody had confidence that whatever basis the decision was being made on, it was not being made on a bureaucratic one. You might think a guy was wrong, but you would never believe that he was deciding in favor of the other guy because he wanted the other guy's empire to be larger, or because in some future dispute, that guy might side with him. I mean, nobody cared about their futures in the agency. That was crucial, I think, to the operation of the Peace Corps.

And of course once he got into OEO, he began running into people who wondered why they weren't at the third step of a [Grade] 14 because the secretary was at the second step of a [Grade] 7, and the other fellow's secretary was only at the first step of a 7--why should he have a higher grade? And, you know, then it just went to hell.

G: How did he run the task force?

M: He ran the task force like he ran the Peace Corps. I mean, everybody had access to him at all times. He tried as much as he could to have personal access. I mean, Sundays would be just one big bull session, a little more formal than that, but, you know, he was available and everybody was supposed to be available. He never once said to anybody, "Here's where you job is."

G: There was no chart or box.

M: No, never, never, never. I mean, it was assumed that Jim Sundquist would have major responsibility, let's say, in the area of agriculture; or that Adam was going to work with the Defense Department people; or that Pat Moynihan was going to work that Labor Department Employment Program out, simply because that's what they knew best. I mean Iwasn't going to tell Jim Sundquist about agriculture, although on the question of land reform, Sundquist would ask me because I knew a lot about it from Latin America and elsewhere. So, you know, things worked out.

G: Do you have any knowledge of how it was that Shriver was chosen to be the head of the task force and subsequent to that, head of the OEO? He never told you anything about that?

M: No, except that he believed that he got along terribly well with the President. Shriver believed for some time that he had a very good chance to be vice president.

G: In 1964?

M: In '64.

G: He was given to believe that?

M: I have no way of knowing. I remember one conversation with him though, and I think it was shortly before I left, so it may have been around the middle of March.

in which he seriously thought about it. He said, you know, "How can anybody turn that down?" That sort of thing.

G: I gather from what you say that there was no systematic way of going about doing things in the task force.

M: Very little. Well, I used to give out things that came in in the mail and that sort of thing, you know, inquiries. People would call and then if they weren't calling anybody in particular, they'd usually come to me. They'd send the calls to me. And I would say, "Well, you'd better talk to Chris Weeks," or "Jim Sundquist knows more about that than I do," you know.

G: Earlier I wanted to ask you, when you were talking about the people coming in, was it a sort of ad hoc basis?

M: Yes.

G: What brought people there?

M: Well, I don't know. I don't know, for instance, how John Steadman showed up, or how this guy or that guy showed up. But I know that if I would go to Shriver and say, "So-and-so is a good fellow in the Department of Commerce; I think we ought to have him for a couple of weeks to work on this or that," he'd say, "Okay, try to get him." Then I would go to somebody and say, "How do we get so-and-so," you know; and then were was always somebody who somehow knew the things that had to be signed. There was always somebody who knows how you get somebody, as they say, "on board." So I would think that it was all done that way. I think Moynihan would bring in somebody; Hal Horowitz would say he needed an assistant, and there was a good lawyer at such and such a place who was available, and we'd bring him in. They were all government people, I think. Paul Jacobs was a civilian, and Mike Harrington, but they only stayed for about two weeks.

G: How about Ylvisaker? Did he come in?

M: I don't think he was ever employed. I think he was around.

That's another thing that we did. We talked to a lot of mayors, mostly through-- originally through Paul. Then we talked to Richard Lee and then Mike Sviridoff was around for a while. That was a Ylvisaker operation. Then we talked to Mayor Houlihan of Oakland, who is now in prison--not for anything he did as mayor, but as an attorney. He dipped into an estate, I understand.

G: How about Mayor Daley? Were you ever in touch with him?

M: No, but we talked to his police chief, now dead--Ray Hilliard, I think he was police chief or the police commissioner. We were talking there about a school for taxicab drivers, and the great success he'd had in poor neighborhoods training people to be cab drivers. And he had some other good ideas. Maybe he was the welfare commissioner; I don't remember. I think he was welfare commissioner. He was very impressive. But I don't remember ever talking to Daley. I would assume Sarge did, but I don't remember it.

G: I was wondering whether the mayors that were talked to at this period were able to understand what Community Action later became.

M: I doubt that they were ever...I don't think it ever came up. You see, I know very well that Shriver knew what Community Action was, and I don't know whether it was in my article in the Post or not; it was in the draft, and they may have cut it out. But I remember sitting at a Peace Corps meeting some time in, oh, I don't know, late '64 or '65, after things were going, and Shriver used to have meetings twice a week of his senior staff of the Peace Corps. I think he worked two days a week at the Peace Corps and three days a week at OEO--I think that's how it worked. And at one of these he was joking with us and he was saying, "You know, I had a phone call from Clinton Anderson,

saying, 'Shriver, what are you doing? A bunch of your people are picketing the Albuquerque CityHall, and they want to go to the city council meeting, and the demonstration is being led by an ex-Peace Corps volunteer who's working in the Community Action Program now.'" Well, he happened to be one of my ex-volunteers who had been in Peru and who had done that very successfully in the city of Arequipa. And Sarge said, "You know what I told Clinton Anderson? I said to him, 'That's the best evidence I have that both of the agencies I'm running are successful. A guy who agitated the poor in Peru for two years took that training and used it, and is now working for OEO to get the poor to demand that they be allowed to participate in city council meetings. That's what it's all about.'" So he knew.

G: And you're suggesting he was committed to this as well?

M: Yes. Oh, he believed it, yes. I think so.

G: Well, this is just a digressive-- It's either in Moynihan or someone else in his book where he says that by 1965 when the pressures became so great that OEO had to back down on this?

M: Well, they backed down in some specific instances. They backed down in Syracuse; they backed down in Mississippi. But only where the pressures became intolerable and as a tactical matter. I mean, you can argue with those decisions; you can say Shriver should have been tough and hung in there and fought for those people, and I think it's probably right. But somebody made a political judgment, and that may have also turned out to be right. It may have saved the program for another three years by not making it explicit what was implicit, which is that the purpose of this program was to have what you had in Syracuse. I mean, I don't think you'd want to go running to Congress and rubbing their nose in Saul Alinsky, but the fact of the matter is that philosophically our program was an Alinsky

type program. Now, Saul Alinsky, for some reason, took great hostility to Shriver at the OEO. I mean, I think Saul Alinsky misconceived what we were up to. I remember writing a long letter to Saul, and I remember talking to him, and I remember being on a couple of programs with him in which he would say things like: "If I thought Mankiewicz was in charge of the Community Action program, I wouldn't criticize it, but Shriver's a boy scout and it's all fake. The government can't run a Community Action program." Well, as it turns out, I think he was probably partly right. The government cannot run a Community Action program; you can't ask congressmen for long to appropriate money to set up alternate power systems in their own district.

G: Except that the people who run the Community Action Agency would say the government doesn't run it; the community does.

M: Yes, but the government puts up the money. That's the problem. When I say run, I mean sponsor.

G: Was it initially thought that the ninety/ten funding breakdown would eventually be phased to the point where the communities were funding it themselves?

M: That was a thought, but we never believed it. I mean, that was a little bit of politics. Maybe it will happen, and we'll say that we'll try to work toward that, but I don't think anybody ever had any confidence that that would happen. At least I didn't. I remember being very impatient, too, with the whole notion. Suddenly we'd find that we'd have to get into state allocation formulas. We tried as hard as we could to stay away from that in everything, and I remember some knockdown, terrible arguments with Wilbur Cohen and others on just that question. And Wilbur pointing out that in education, for example, or anything else, you just couldn't do it unless you. . .And Sarge would say, "But if most of the money has to be spent in the big states, it may be self-defeating. Why does it have to be

spent there." And other people saying, "You're going to have to work out a formula: number of school children or number of poor," or whatever the hell it was. I remember we all fought that very hard, but somebody evidently decided somewhere along the line that it had to be done. We had that in the bill a couple of places.

I tell you a guy from Agriculture who was very sympathetic to us was John Baker.

G: He was on the task force?

M: Yes. He was under secretary, I think, or I guess he was assistant secretary. The Agriculture guys who had been in in the thirties were very excited about some of these proposals.

G: Were they ex-Tugwell people?

M: I don't know, but they were the outgrowth of New Deal stuff--of Farm Settlement Administration, Rural Resettlement Administration, and Farm Security Agency, stuff that had been proposed in the thirties and aborted after a year or two anyway. Here was a chance at last to maybe do something about land reform and some of the plantations.

G: These are the people who conceived of the Green Belt in Salt Lake City?

M: That's right. But in those six weeks there was a hell of a lot of enthusiasm. I imagine it must have been somewhat the same in the early days of the Alliance for Progress. It was that kind of thing, that we were going to transform some of this rhetoric into reality. And a lot of it did, a lot of it did. It was a revolutionary act in many ways. I believe Moynihan when he says Congress never understood, really, what the Community Action program was.

G: Congress didn't debate it very much.

M: That's right. I mean, maximum feasible participation was a kind of an elegant legalistic way of stating a very important principle.

G: This is what I'm trying to get at when I asked you earlier whether you constructed this program with an eye cocked to Congress. If you knew what you were doing, if you knew what the potential of Community Action was, did you also know that you would run into political difficulty not so much on Capitol Hill, eventually it would there, but it was going to run into problems at city hall and elsewhere.

M: Oh, obviously, we thought it would. We knew it would in the Peace Corps but we went ahead anyway. You don't have to work too long to get a situation in which the power structure is going to yield rather than fight it. I mean, if you got people organized and mad chances are you'll work the changes first, and you'll get people who will accommodate. And a lot of mayors did. Yes, I suppose we thought down the line there'd be political opposition. That was the purpose of the program: to pose some kind of situation of strength against the existing power structure, which included the Congressmen as much as the Mayors.

G: I think there's some division of recollection, if that's the way to put it, on this. The reason I ask on this is that Moynihan is saying this. You've said that you think Moynihan is wrong on this point. I think you said that.

M: Well, I'm not suggesting that he's deceiving anybody. I think he believes what he says, but my recollection is that those of us who were working in that area knew exactly what this was going to lead to. Now, Pat believes that they didn't and it's quite possible that the people he was working with didn't. There's a divergence of recollection. I'm sure there is. We hardly ever got everybody in one room and said, "Now, what the hell is this going to mean?" But Jim Adler and Eric Tolmach and Hal Horowitz and I, let's say, understood A, but it's quite possible that Pat Moynihan and Norb Schlei and maybe even John Steasman, in a slightly different context, understood B, which

would lead Moynihan to say that we just proceeded on this basis and never really thought it out, and would lead me to say we knew exactly what we were doing and thought it out and would mean that both of us were exactly right. Pat and I have talked about this a number of times.

G: He seems to go beyond that though. I think what he does is almost draw a conspiracy theory, you know, or indulge in a kind of devil theory that all of a sudden a bunch of people came in under Conway and they went out to rouse the poor.

M: No, I just don't think that's so. I really don't think so.

G: Well, this is what I think has to be talked about.

M: Yes. Well, I don't think so. It may be that a lot of people came in under Conway-- You see, Dick Boone knew about it right from the beginning. You know, Dick Boone was in from the second of third day. Hell, Dick Boone knows a lot more about community development and organization than I do. And we talked about this stuff right along. And he's no conspirator. I mean, Dick Boone believed that he was hired to do this and did it. When he found he couldn't do it as much or as often or as well as he wanted to, he quit. Pat is right in the sense that it's a social science approach, but the only conspiracy consisted of our reading all those books.

G: What was Yarmolinsky's role in this?

M: Adam was very close to Sarge. I suspect that his real role-- well, he had two roles. One is that he could crack heads pretty good. He could sit in a meeting-- Adam in effect became the chief of staff, which was a role that Sarge was willing to let him have because he was quite good at it. He'd say, "Do this," or, you know, "What's happened to the such-and-such proposal," and somebody would say where it was. And Adam would say, "Well, that's not an adequate

answer. Do it faster." Or somebody would say something and he would say, "That's silly. We can't do that because--" And he was smart enough and sharp enough and direct enough to get away with it. That's why a lot of people didn't like him. So he was a coordinator, and he was also an indefatigable worker and I suspect did a lot of things for Sarge along the way. You know, "talk to so-and-so and tell him this or that. Size up this and that thing." I don't know, he worked very much with Sarge, and it was clear early on that he was going to be the deputy.

G: I was just going to ask you--was it assumed that Shriver would be the director and Yarmolinsky the deputy?

M: Oh, yes.

G: Maybe I can just pull this up chronologically. Do you have any knowledge of what is called the "Yarmolinsky Affair?"

M: I have no knowledge of it. When did it happen? I think it happened after I left.

G: Well, it was late in the-- I don't mean late in the session, but it was close to the time--

M: Oh, yes, it was after the bill had gone in and everything.

G: The bill had gone in and--

M: Well, I left Washington the day the bill went to the Congress and the message was approved. Now, Pat Moynihan and I worked on the message a lot. Pat had a draft of the message which I worked on with him and then Ken Galbraith came in, and we worked on a Galbraith draft for a while. I guess Bill Moyers finally drafted it.

G: The final draft?

M: Yes, the only final draft I saw was full of short sentences. You know, it was a real Johnsonian speech--I mean in form. Whitney Young had passed the word that no LBJ sentence could end with the word "Negro." Inside a sentence it was O.K., but at the end it still came out as "Nigra."

G: You mentioned Galbraith. Were there academic economists such as Galbraith who were brought in?

M: Galbraith wasn't brought in as an academic economist. He was brought in as a draftsman for a message.

G: Were there other economists who were consulted?

M: Leckman(?) was around. A guy from Wisconsin--

G: Lapham?

M: No, I'll think of his name too, but he was around.

G: Was Leon Keyserling ever talked to?

M: I think just once.

G: Because I think he had written a good deal about poverty--

M: Yes, I think so. Sarge talked to him once, but I don't think he was involved in any of the preparation. Isidore Lubin was around for awhile. Pat brought him in. I can't remember the guy's name from Wisconsin--it's like Helpman, Lippmann, Lepman, I'll think of it. But not really many. There wasn't an awful lot of expertise of that kind. We got a lot of help from Wilbur Cohen on some stuff, educational things. Pat, of course, had a lot of Manpower people around. But the period from the middle of March until-- Well, I really disappeared at that point, went back to the Peace Corps, and I don't think I ever did anything-- I mean, here and there I may have talked to a congressman or something, but-- And when the Yarmolinsky thing came up, that flap, I really don't know anything except what I've read, and I talked to Adam, and I talked to Pat Moynihan about it.

Pat wanted to be the deputy of course, and at one point I conveyed that message to Shriver. I'm trying to remember when it was. The question was whether Pat would stay, and he had asked me to tell Shriver that he would do it

as his deputy, but probably not in another way. I conveyed that to Sarge and got the impression at the time that Sarge was not going to give him the job. That was, of course, before the Yarmolinsky flap.

G: Right. Of course he didn't stay on after that anyway.

M: That's right.

G: One of Moynihan's points is that this was a time when the opportunity was ripe that an employment program on a massive scale--

M: Yes.

G: Do you agree with this interpretation?

M: I think the time was ripe for almost anything. Yes, I think that's right. You know, Moynihan has got in his book that memo we turned in early about the main problem of poverty, the main cause of poverty, is the lack of jobs. The real thing was jobs. Jacobs, Harrington, Moynihan, and myself--I think at the time that memo was written that was the whole task force. That was like day One or day Two.

G: Which article are you referring to?

M: I'm talking about Moynihan's book.

G: Oh, Moynihan's book, right.

M: He quotes that memo and the cigarette tax thing held up for a while on the employment. Then we talked about a massive public works program. And I guess that disappeared toward the end. As Pat says, the President was interested in lowering taxes, not in raising them. I don't know if that was the reason or not. I mean, I was just occasionally made aware of the fact certain things had been vetoed at the White House. Not vetoed really--we didn't expect to get everything. And I was really quite content with the

product as it finally emerged.

I named VISTA.

G: You did?

M: Yes, I remember that. We wanted to call it Volunteers for America, and I recalled that there was an organization called Volunteers of America and I worried about it. So I remember calling them up to find out what they did. And they were like the Goodwill Industry--you know, sheltered workshops, things like that. So then we began fiddling around with acronyms and VISTA--Volunteers in Service to America--. We came up with that finally. And the White House liked that, even though it was clearly the domestic Peace Corps under another name.

G: How did the other programs like Job Corps get named, do you know?

M: I was there when Job Corps was named. We were talking about-- I remember somebody came up with the argument, and I enthusiastically supported it, but I can't remember who it was, that one of the best words in the English language was "job." That it had no unpleasant connotations at all. It was even better than "peace." Some people were against peace, because the Communists were for peace. And peace is even a little weak, you know. Defense--some people preferred defense to peace. But "job," we decided, was one of the best words in the language, and it wasn't far from there. I think Shriver probably came up with Job Corps, I don't know. The discussion was at his home.

G: You mentioned in some of your own remarks, you reflected on the Labor Department--I think it was in the context of the charm school. What was the--?

M: Not the Labor Department, The labor movement.

G: Oh, the labor movement.

M: Oh, yes. Andy Biemiller--I remember six of them came over one day to complain about Paul Jacobs because he had written some articles critical of

the labor movement. They came pounding into Shriver's office, you know--there were six of them and they must have weighed close to 1500 pounds, gross. And I remember Sarge talking about them later as though it was a visit of a group of feudal barons to the King, you know. I mean, everyone of them very conscious of their own power and their own duchy. They were not much help. Lane Kirkland sat in on a lot of the meetings as George Meany's representative.

G: Conway came out of the labor movement?

M: Well, actually, Conway came out of the rebellious portion of the labor movement. He came out of Reuther's shop. Vastly different opposition than Lane Kirkland's, whose job was to say no.

G: What was Shriver's opinion or attitude towards some of these programs being run by other agencies, such as the Labor Department running--

M: Well, he didn't like it, but he made I remember what he called a treaty with Wirtz at one point. And he had to do it finally, of course, for congressional approval. I mean, the Labor Department has a constituency, and he just felt that he had to give up some of these in order to avoid fights in Cabinet meetings and ultimately on the Hill. I think maybe the President told him to do it, I don't know.

G: This delegation of authority, was this part of the original discussion, or was it something that came because of other necessities?

M: How do you mean delegation of authority?

G: Well, the delegations of programs like, for example, the Neighborhood Youth Corps being operated by the Labor Department, Adult Education Services--

M: Well, I think that came as a result, in effect, of treaties with the Cabinet people.

G: The reason I ask is because again I think it's Weeks' book where he says that Shriver didn't think much of the Employment Service, and the very fact that they were brought into the Job Corps was--

M: Yes. That was troublesome. Nobody liked the Employment Service.

G: Do you have any other recollections that you'd like to put on this tape about that period?

M: No, I think that's about it.

G: I'd like to move to other areas. You went back to the Peace Corps. You said before the tape was on that you had had contact with Johnson during the Dominican intervention.

M: Yes.

G: You could just take that from your own--

M: Let me put that on, and then I'm afraid I'm going to have to break off today. Maybe we can come back.

I was very disturbed about the Dominican intervention. It seemed to me wrong in almost every way, particularly since I'd been reading all the cables. It seemed to me that the President was just being terribly badly served; the facts that were being reported from down there simply weren't the case; there was panic. It was clear to me from the beginning that we were putting those troops in not to preserve order, but to do what we could for the military rebels. To put the right-wing military back in power.

G: You mean what were called the loyalist group?

M: General Wessin, yes. The Juan Bosch group were called the constitutionalists; at least they called themselves that. Sometimes they were called the rebels. I guess that's right. They were the loyalists. At any rate, the military. Wessin. I think it was after I came back, however; I was about to leave, and I'm sure I had been back once because I complained bitterly to Jack

Vaughn and he didn't give me much help at all. I gathered that Jack was a bit of a prisoner there. I think I went twice to the D. R. Because the day I met LBJ was a day in which I was about to fly to Puerto Rico and on to Santo Domingo. And I was having lunch with Bill Moyers to talk to him about this. I thought we were on the wrong side, ministerially, politically and spiritually. My wife was with me; we were in the White House Mess. And Bill kept being on the phone to the President all the time during this luncheon and finally he said to him, "But I've had lunch, Mr. President." Then he said, "All right, I'll come. I'm having lunch with Frank Mankiewicz, who is the head of the Peace Corps in Latin America and knows the situation. Shall I bring him along?" Evidently the President said yes.

So we left my wife, and we went up to the upstairs quarters. And the President was having lunch with--let's see, Jack Valenti was there and Milton Eisenhower. And he was talking to Milton Eisenhower about the Dominican situation, what he thought he should do; and I got the feeling that he was calling in a lot of people--that Eisenhower was not there for any special reason, it was that he was one of the people who knew Latin America. And the President also had a lot of polls that he was showing that 68 percent of the people supported him or 65 percent or whatever it was. And he asked Milton Eisenhower what he should do, and Milton Eisenhower said that he should get a statement from the Presidents of all the Latin American countries supporting him and saying that it was necessary to prevent Communism in the Caribbean.

The President just listened. He didn't say anything. Then he turned to me and he said, "What do you think of that?" And I said that I thought that if there was anybody the people in the Latin American countries disliked more than the United States, it was their own Presidents; and that probably it would be more helpful if he could get statements from all their Presidents opposing us; that then we would get the <u>people</u> of Latin America on our side. And the

President just said absolutely nothing. He just looked at me and to this day I wonder, you know, what was in his mind and what he thought of that.

And then he turned away and talked briefly to Bill Moyers about something. And then Tom Mann came in. It's this event that I remember that troubles me so. Tom Mann came in and said-- Of course, Mann by this time wasn't even assistant secretary for Latin America any more; he had become an under secretary. But he was clearly running this show. And Mann said to the President, "The whole problem, Mr. President," and I remember this word for word--"The whole problem, Mr. President, is left wing newspapers such as the Washington Post and the New York Times and the New York Herald Tribune, which always takes the Communist side." I couldn't believe it, but I did believe it. And shortly after that, I had to leave and Bill got a White House car to take me out to the airport, and that was the end of that.

Then when I got to the Dominican Republic, I was there for awhile, and then suddenly one Sunday in response, I'm convinced, to a long piece in the New York Times by Tad Schulz, showed up all of a sudden Mac Bundy and Jack Vaughn and Cy Vance, and I think Tom Mann. And Bundy proceeded to put together a compromise, not the first one that he wanted, but a subsequent one that worked out pretty well. And I remember Tom Mann leaving the next day and saying, "Well, I'm sure going back to Washington to argue against this." That was the original formula involving a guy, I can't remember his name now, who was going to be the interim head of the government. [It was Antonio Guzman, now--1979--the President.] Mann got back here, and there promptly appeared a couple of exposes of Guzman in the Scripps-Howard papers and elsewhere that he had somehow been involved in some sugar deal. He got torpedoed. It then took Bundy a while longer to put together the [Hector] Garcia-Godoy thing, which he did, which was a modification of the first one. Guzman, that

guy's name was. I understand that a fellow named Peter Nehemkis was involved in torpedoing that, who was the general counsel of the Whirlpool Corporation and had worked in the Dominican Republic.

G: What general conclusions have you drawn from this kind of experience?

M: Well, I think the President was badly served in Latin America at the beginning. I don't think really it was his fault; I'm not sure that any President with the political antenna that Lyndon Johnson had, getting the information he did for the Dominican Republic, would have acted a lot differently. I think it was excessive, but I think that's characteristic. I mean, once you put in 3,000 Marines, you might as well put in 20,000. But he never doubted it for a minute which troubled me. And he was really kind of incoherent and went much too far in a lot of his speeches at that time--with heads on pikes and all. And I understand in the Dominican Republic there was a terrible search for months to find a head. They finally did find one.

G: They had to find some Communists too, didn't they?

M: Well, they never did find very many of those. But there again, you see, when you get a report from your CIA station chief and the Ambassador, I mean, you should have known before that that every agency dumps its undesirables in Latin America and that Santo Domingo was one of the least desirable posts even among a series of undesirable posts. When I went down there, I talked to those people and it was just unbelievable. There was hardly anybody in that Embassy that had ever been downtown, that had ever talked to any of the leaders of the rebel group. And of course that's where we got in a lot of trouble down there. Bill Moyers called me, as a matter of fact, at one time and said to me, "You'd better go down there and shut those guys--Peace Corps--up, or the President's going to pull them all out," meaning the Peace Corps volunteers. Because they were being very pro-rebel.

G: Well, there was some report, as I recall, that there were Peace Corps people who were seen in rebel--

M: Yes, well, they lived there. They lived in those areas, and those were their friends, and they helped them. I mean, they helped them in ambulance ways, not obviously in any kind of war effort. But it really was appalling, you know. General Palmer was there-- I'll tell you what that did, the Dominican Republic did. It turned me off on Viet Nam. I mean, I had no particular thoughts about Viet Nam until around May or June of '65. I didn't like it too much, I was a little suspicious, but I really didn't like a lot of the people who were so strongly in opposition, and I felt that there must be something to the government's argument. And then I went to the Dominican Republic and I saw Army spokesmen saying what was happening when, in fact, precisely the opposite was happening. I saw the mentality and the spirit of the State Department and AID and the military guys who were there. And I came back and I remember talking to my wife and listening to all this stuff and looking at the news, you know, on the television that I had seen, and it suddenly occurred to me that maybe they weren't telling the truth in Viet Nam either. And I began then to be very much more critical.

G; This was also the point at which the late Senator Kennedy began to be more critical, is that right?

M; That's right. Oh, I don't know. I didn't know him at the time. I know he did make a speech about the Dominican operation; I didn't have any hand in that, although I applauded it. But I didn't meet him until the end of the year when he was about to go to Latin America and I sat in on some briefings.

[End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview I]

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