INTERVIEW I

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INTERVIEWEE: SAMUEL V. MERRICK

INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette

PLACE: Mr. Merrick's residence, Washington, D.C.

Tape 1 of 2

G: Mr. Merrick, let's start out with your initial association with the task force. I don't know how you were drawn into the War on Poverty task force to begin with. Can you tell me that?

M: Well, I don't really think I ever was part of it. I only attended one meeting of the task force. I think my involvement with the task force really had to do with all kinds of activities surrounding it, the programs surrounding it. The fact [is] that I got into the manpower business when I was working for the Senate, specifically Senator [Joseph] Clark, who was the first chairman of what was then the Subcommittee on Manpower and Employment, which again grew out of my being on a special Senate committee studying unemployment problems which Johnson largely instituted in 1959 and was headed by Senator Eugene McCarthy. I was general counsel to that Select Senate Committee on Unemployment Problems, which produced the standing subcommittee called Employment and Manpower in 1960, of which Senator Clark was the head. So I got in the manpower business at that time.

That subcommittee dealt with a number of things which then much later became the poverty program, like training for unemployed people, like the Youth Conservation Corps--which I had got into in 1959 on

[Hubert] Humphrey's special interest--like the juvenile delinquency program, which was an experimental program when enacted but really got ballooned up into these poverty programs at the local level. So I was involved with all the people in all the programs which ultimately went into the poverty program, but I was never a part of the task force.

G: Well, did the Department of Labor have a representative in the task force?

M: Yes. Pat Moynihan was the official, and one would have to say that that was not exactly to my liking because Moynihan tends to be remarkably coherent, remarkably articulate, charming, all that, but not necessarily on top of things of which he speaks eloquently. But as a matter of fact, at the time when he was appointed to it, I think it's fair to say I was somewhat out of joint because I really felt it should have been me and not him.

G: Well, who selected Moynihan?

M: Oh, well, [Willard] Wirtz.

G: Really?

M: Yes.

G: Now, Wirtz gave me the impression that you, rather that Moynihan, were his representative.

M: Well, I think his memory isn't accurate.

G: Really? Okay.

M: I think, no, Moynihan at that time was assistant secretary of labor for policy and something or other, and I was not a presidential appointee. At that time the Labor Department had not upgraded its

congressional representative to be an assistant secretary, which I gather is sort of standard now. But in the books, in the way it read and the job description business, I was special assistant to the Secretary of Labor for legislative affairs. It was easy enough to sort of smudge a title into assistant to the secretary for legislative affairs. On the bulletin board downstairs that's how it read, and the ordinary person wouldn't appreciate the distinction between a presidential appointment assistant secretary and [my title]. But that's the appointment I had. Wirtz, I was his principal person on the Hill, of course, and much of our legislative program at the department became the poverty program.

But when it came down to the task force itself, Moynihan was the Labor Department's representative on the task force. As a matter of fact, I think Wirtz gets tight-lipped on the subject of Moynihan I think really growing out of--so I'm surprised he thought I was his representative. He really, maybe justifiably, credits Moynihan with giving up Labor Department's latch on some of these programs. One could easily say this is a struggle over turf, but it might also have to do with Wirtz' own conviction that the Labor Department would have done them better. That was fairly intense.

G: Was there within the Labor Department a notion of what the War on Poverty should be like?

M: That's a hard question. I think I would have had an idea then.

G: What was your perception?

M: Up until the time when Moynihan became involved in the task force, if you really would have looked around the Labor Department for people who might have had convictions on what the War on Poverty would have been, it would have probably been me that had more association with the pieces. And I'll tell you why. Because one of the key [programs], the Community Action Program, which is probably the most controversial and most far-reaching one into the warp and woof of the cities, was really an outgrowth of the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency activity. Do you know about that?

G: Yes, but I don't know about your involvement with it.

M: Well, the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency was a tripod organization basically under the direction of the Justice Department, with Bobby Kennedy being the nominal head of it. And he was. I mean, he was not only nominal, but he would come in at times of serious decision-making. But Dave Hackett was his deputy and really the person who ran the program, and I was the Labor Department's representative on that tripod organization. That's why. In other words, I had had three years of exposure in listening to cities on bended knee coming in and asking for money to run their community action programs. It wasn't called that then because community action, I think, was a terminology which the task force on poverty invented. Maybe that's not right. Maybe indeed community action was what the juvenile delinquence people called their programs. I've forgotten. But clearly, you know, there's a sort of sequence about this. There's the Ford [Foundation] Gray Area thing, and then came along the juvenile

delinquency program. Then came along Community Action, then the fourth step in this was the Model Cities program. And each one sort of built on the other.

In the case of the juvenile delinquency program, two or three million dollars a year was all they were working with, on a very experimental basis. In the eyes of somebody like Hackett, [he was] aghast at the sudden increase in size of this thing with all of its troubles as it evolved in the poverty program. I was astonished that the task force should multiply the program a hundred times--it was just buying trouble. Because even at [the] two million dollar level it was trouble, trouble in the cities where it was going on because the mayors were faced with power centers taking antagonistic positions. So that's why I felt I was knowledgeable, more so than others in the Labor Department.

G: Can you go into some specifics about that program? Particular cities and how the juvenile delinquency program worked and what the problems were? I think there were seventeen cities or something like that.

M: Yes. I can remember Chicago. New Haven worked fine because the Mayor of New Haven--

G: Richard Lee, I think, wasn't it?

M: Richard Lee and the people that subsequently got into all this really worked together, so that they had an in with the Ford people and they had everything clicking away. So the city, Richard Lee, community leaders and everything were all in one group and working together.

But my primary memory of cities coming in to Washington asking for some piece of this two-and-a-half million was a group of people around a room asking questions. You know, they would describe what they were doing and these people on board [would ask], "Well, why isn't so-and-so part of it?" And unless we have more community involvement or more charitable organization involvement, or unless we have more the city administration part, or unless we have less city administration control over it et cetera. . . . [They'd say], "Well, no, you'd better go back and redo your thinking and come in and smooth that out, and then we'll give you a couple of hundred thousand," or whatever. My overwhelming impression was that the effort to make an ideal kind of "everybody aboard" thing was just agonizing in the process of approving these plans.

Now I remember the Chicago one particularly. They must have come in two or three times. The fear was that the rather tired official establishment would really get hold of this and that there would not have been enough community input and control in what was going on. The key feature of the juvenile delinquency program was that there's no point in giving money for schools alone unless you do something about housing and jobs and health and family structure that are important deficiencies and all interrelated. But there's no point in throwing money at one without dealing with the spectrum of social ills. The other key thing was that the way that that's brought about would be by way of being sure that you just didn't have the established

political heads but that you had community groups putting in their vision, their perception as to what is wrong at the local level.

G: Was there a community organization element here, too, to try to create an awareness?

M: I think there was an effort to create a gathering of community groups to make these programs go. Obviously you had in Chicago very strong established and interconnecting community-serving organizations like the YMCA, what we now view as the Red Feather groups. In Chicago, the social service organizations were very strong, even so strong that there was concern in the juvenile delinquency group that maybe the voice of democracy at the lower end of the scale wasn't being sufficiently heard.

So there was the feeling that there should be more democracy. But it was rather typical. And I remember it being rejected and coming in a couple of times. In other cities the same thing. I remember having that predominant impression that you really had to stand on one leg and hold two fingers in this direction and another finger in that before you got your money. And of course, as a small scale, two-and-a-half million dollar program, the kind of antagonisms and frustrations in doing this weren't a major political problem. But increase that a hundredfold.

G: Did you see the local conflicts within a city here?

M: Yes. Because they very often came in, knowing that this was a meeting, and they'd get industry representatives arguing with the city

people, or the city people arguing with the established social-serving organizations and so on. Yes.

G: Would more experimentation have helped, do you think, in that [case]?

M: That's a good question. I don't know. It might have.

G: I mean, if the program had not been expanded so rapidly.

M: Maybe.

G: Do you think that the Dave Hacketts and the Dick Boones who worked with this program viewed inter-group conflict as an important ingredient, as something that was desirable? For example, having low income community groups take on city hall.

M: Yes. I'm not sure that Hackett [did]. I know Dave pretty well and I see him fairly regularly, a couple of times a year. I don't know how he would answer that question, but I don't think he would be that much of a social theoretician. Dick Boone I'm not so sure about. I suspect that Cannon--

G: William Cannon?

M: Bill Cannon? Yes. University of Chicago. He is a very critical player in this game, because he was the Budget Bureau's man on this subject. And really, he's got to be somebody you talk to. He was in on all of the fuss. But I'm sure that Hackett's view is that it got too big too fast. Dave is not an ideologist and he doesn't come on with the thought that it's good to have social ferment. Although the thing he's doing now is sort of tilted in that direction. I think his attitude was perhaps allowing some of the theoreticians a certain amount of latitude and allowing them a certain amount of validity and

judgment, but I don't think he was so caught up in the ideology of it. No, I think he had caught the germ of the idea from the Ford business that you needed more pieces in this than just shooting money at education. I think that was his impression. But it could be that the Boones of this world were more convinced that local struggle was a good thing.

G: How could this juvenile delinquency program have been improved?

M: I don't know. I'm almost tempted to say it couldn't.

G: But you seem to indicate that the attempt to get communities to reach a consensus or to bring in all of these different groups to satisfy representation requirements was a mistake, that they perhaps should have just given allocated money to one group that seemed to have a worthwhile program.

M: Well, you see, the quick answer to your question and the quick answer to the problem is that the cities ought to have the government capacity, financial ability and so on to deal with these local problems. I say the quick fix for this whole business would suggest that. But of course that's totally impossible. Cities have got to change a good deal in their attitudes and in their capacity to govern and the personnel that they hire and all the rest of it before they can deal with these intractable problems. I guess what I'm really saying is that the problems of poverty, the problems of bad schools, bad housing, bad health arrangements, all these things, are probably not capable of being improved without local government being much more able to do it and much more involved in doing it. The centrifugal forces at work.

As soon as you try to manhandle all these bureaucracies in order to get them to do anything, why, then your effort gets dispelled because the established bureaucracies have big stakes and go off in opposite directions.

I don't know. I guess if you really pushed me I would probably have to say that I really don't think that there's any solution. I think the experimental efforts were probably what needed to be done for a longer period before some kind of consensus could have been reached. You see, the Model Cities program tried to build on the failures of these other things. I worked for the Mayor of Boston for three years after 1968--

G: Kevin White?

M: Yes, and because of my interest in all this, it was inevitable that I should have something to do with things up there in this area. The Model Cities thing was as bad in its way as these efforts. Model Cities, of course, centered programs in the mayor's office so that programs should not escape to the local level and be controlled by community types. It picked up the idea that you couldn't do these things one at a piece. In other words, you couldn't deal with education separately from health and all these other little things. So it picked up that kernel of truth, if you will, and then put it in the Model Cities administration, which presumably became a part of city government.

Well, Boston's [Model Cities administration] wasn't part of the city government, it had its own separate existence. Paul Parks was

the Model Cities director, and he did what he pleased. I'm sure that in most other cities Model Cities created some very awkward problems for local government. Edith Green's pitch against Community Action was that the mayor should be given control. Model Cities tried to accommodate that criticism.

G: How did the juvenile delinquency program, then, if it was at best a qualified success, at worst a failure, become ballooned into Community Action and accepted during this task force period? Do you have any idea?

M: I'm not a firsthand witness to this, but I've heard the story a number of times. The story is--and you would have to ask Bill Cannon who was present and maybe Dave Hackett--that there was a meeting of the task force, not just the task force but the principals, Wirtz, Bobby--I doubt if he was part of it in view of the antagonisms there--but certainly the Secretary of HEW--

G: [Anthony] Celebrezze.

M: And others, probably [Orville] Freeman for Agriculture and so on, whoever was around the table, the cabinet-level part. But something like this conversation took place: "On Community Action we recommend maybe twenty million dollars, not two." And Wirtz, whose unfamiliarity with the Community Action Program was inevitable since I hadn't really kept him abreast of it, because he wasn't interested in it during the time when I was going to juvenile delinquency meetings, came forward with, "Look, if we're going to go to war on poverty, twenty million is a drop in the bucket. Let's do this in spades."

That was such an electrifying idea to the gathering that it suddenly became two hundred million instead of a more modest approach. Now, you will have to check that that's how it happened. So in the rhetoric and enthusiasm of not being just a gesture but doing a serious war on poverty, the program was enlarged.

G: Was this before [Sargent] Shriver's selection or after?

M: I think that was with Shriver present.

G: Oh, I see.

M: I think that was late in the task force period, at the point where the legislation was in draft form. A task force works away, and then the cabinet-level people concerned get together and they make their [recommendations].

G: There was a good deal of cabinet input, though, before the formation of the task force and Shriver's selection. There were all these ideas from--

M: I don't know. Nobody asked me.

You'll notice an undercurrent of personal pique. I really felt cut out despite the fact that I'd been a key person in this area. Actually, to go back, to show you why I felt cut out, [Arthur] Goldberg hired me to be the legislative representative of the Department of Labor. I had spent quite a bit of time working on the Youth Conservation Corps on the Hill with the Youth Employment Opportunities Program. There had been a series of youth bills which I had managed for Clark. When Goldberg asked me to come down and handle legislation, I really didn't envision myself as the congressional

representative indefinitely. What I wanted was to be Mr. Youth Employment Manager. I wanted to run the Youth Conservation Corps, and said as much to Goldberg, and Goldberg said, "Oh, sure. You're my man for that."

Six months later, Goldberg became a Supreme Court justice and Wirtz became the secretary of labor. I don't know whether they talked about this commitment, but I think I had every expectation that Wirtz was proceeding in that same notion. I was allowed to prepare for the enactment of the Youth Conservation Corps by bringing in people from the field. I had a little task force in the Labor Department preparing to run the Youth Conservation Corps. Mark Battle was one, from Chicago; another, from the Budget Bureau, was John Cheston. There were three others, but Battle and Cheston were the two particular ones. I had this group of people working in the Labor Department in 1963, assembled for this purpose. So that when this poverty task force got put together, the fact that I was not invited to be part of it was, to say the least, distressing.

G: Did you discuss it with Wirtz?

M: Well, I think I did. I know I did a little later. I don't remember whether I did initially.

G: In view of what happened, Wirtz must have been more distressed about it than you.

M: Yes. Moynihan is the opposite of Wirtz. Wirtz is careful with words and he's a trained lawyer and so on. Wirtz had a Monday morning [meeting] with the assistant secretaries and me and his special

assistant who really was his special assistant, about eight of us. Each person had his turn around the table--these staff meetings are not usually productive because everybody's interested in talking about their own things, and they don't really have enough time to describe them in sufficient completeness. Moynihan irritated Wirtz. He often came in with some gaudy idea and, you know, you could see Wirtz tighten up. I suspect that Wirtz had a feeling that Moynihan's genius idea described effectively wasn't necessarily sound. But nonetheless he, I think, recognized [Moynihan's abilities]. And I must say when it came to the amount of firepower of the Poverty Task Force, such as [Adam] Yarmolinsky, Wirtz probably figured that Moynihan was a good representative. But I really don't know why he didn't take me.

G: At one of these early task force meetings, Walter Heller put forth the proposal for Community Action and that the War on Poverty be exclusively Community Action.

M: Did he?

G: And according to others' reflections of that meeting, Wirtz attacked this plan and proposed instead a more multifaceted attack, bringing in employment and housing, things like that. Do you recall Wirtz' position here?

M: I never identified Heller as having that critical a role. Of course it's likely that he and Bill Cannon should have seen one another a good deal. I think Cannon is going to be a very critical person for you.

G: He's on the list.

M: Yes.

G: Well, what was Wirtz' position in this whole perspective? Did he feel that the Department of Labor should run the War on Poverty? Did he think the established departments should do it through committee or what?

M: He certainly thought the Labor Department should run what became the Neighborhood Youth Corps and unfettered by somebody else telling him. He certainly felt that the Labor Department should be the central figure in the Youth Conservation Corps. I mean, that's the thing that I had been working on. Certainly that much.

G: Did he see the Job Corps as something that would detract from the Youth Conservation Corps? Did he oppose the Job Corps idea because it would undermine the Youth Conservation Corps?

M: Yes, I'm sure that he thought that the Job Corps was just another name for Youth Conservation Corps. The idea of having the Job Corps operate in places like Camp Kilmer, rather than out in the woods somewhere, were alterations in program content which could have been accomplished, calling it Youth Conservation Corps. I think Job Corps is just a name that probably was invented with the idea of getting away from the notion that it was just another CCC. I'm sure that Wirtz felt strongly that the Labor Department should not be divested of that piece. As I said, he blames Moynihan for giving that away.

G: Was Wirtz opposed to the establishment of a new agency, an anti-poverty agency to run the War on Poverty?

M: I'm not certain, but I suspect so. I think everything he said suggests it. When it comes to the Community Action piece of it, I don't think he could have assumed that the Department of Labor was going to be the key to that. But the two typically Labor Department things, given Labor Department's involvement in manpower training, were the Neighborhood Youth Corps and Youth Conservation Corps or Job Corps. Both are manpower related that he felt the Labor Department should operate.

G: Well, how did the Labor Department lose the Job Corps? Or how did OEO end up administering the Job Corps? Do you recall?

M: I believe Shriver was keen to run it and the Defense Department also, but I don't know whether it was negotiated or decided by the President.

G: But surely it would seem if Wirtz wanted to hold on to the Job Corps, even if Moynihan did not agree with that, that it would have to be settled between Shriver, Wirtz, and the President.

M: My guess is that Shriver insisted on it. I can't interpret what happened any other way.

G: And perhaps Neighborhood Youth Corps given to Labor Department as a compromise?

M: Perhaps, but it was not "given" completely. It could have easily been that the Neighborhood Youth Corps would have been part of OEO's operation, too. I think Shriver and Yarmolinsky and the people around who were slated to be the OEO high command really felt that OEO should do the whole job, because the Neighborhood Youth Corps ended up under the

Labor Department's wing but coordinated by OEO. It was "coordinated" for a couple of years until we grabbed hold of it on the second time around before Congress.

G: I think the philosophy that OEO should run it was based on their notion that existing departments were not focusing on the poor. Was the Labor Department focusing on the poor at this point?

M: I think the Labor Department with my preparations for handling the Youth Conservation Corps and preparations for handling the Neighborhood Youth Corps, was prepared to focus on the poor. We didn't have programs that especially did. Although I think there was probably a mistaken perception that if we really wanted to focus on the poor we'd get the Employment Service to do it more. But the Employment Service is a strange beast of state control. The Labor Department has very limited political capacity to make everything happen in the Employment Service. As a matter of fact, the operating incentives in the employment problem really push the Employment Service to give the "poor" a lower priority. The Employment Service's role is to get people into jobs. Inevitably it's much easier to get jobs for employable people than those who are less employable. So if you're going to have any success story at all, any reason for existence, you'd better get people jobs. How to get very difficult-to-employ people employable and employed is going to take more that the Employment Service, try as it might. The point is that it was fashionable to talk down the Labor Department on the basis of the reputation of the Employment Service.

G: Do you think that this fact had some bearing on why Moynihan supported the idea that OEO rather that Labor run it?

M: Quite possibly. Because Moynihan wouldn't at that point have understood the operating incentives in the Employment Service picture. That's certainly one of the difficulties, that he really didn't have the background to understand these things. It would be an easy comment as you run by, "Well, of course the Labor Department isn't interested in poor people." But with Wirtz, Wirtz was interested in poor people and that's perhaps why he felt particularly cut out. He couldn't have been more interested in poor people. I'm not sure he had any better solutions than anybody else, but surely he was interested.

G: You don't think it was more a question of turf rather than wanting to do something for the poor?

M: Well, you know, it would be easy to say yes, but I think he had a deep conviction, apart from turf. And turf is always subordinated in the mind of a person; he overlooks the fact that it might be to his self-interest. But I think Wirtz had a conviction that he could have done this job better than giving it to these bunch of high-flying, publicly-oriented people.

G: Do you agree with that?

M: I don't think I can really answer that question; I certainly would have agreed to it then. I'm trying to be as disconnected from my own feeling of turf. I think probably because the overall entity of OEO added to the complications it was a lightning rod for criticism. I'm not sure about it, but I think it probably could have been. It would

have put it in the hands of people who would have been a little more successful, I think, at fighting its battles. Clearly the Labor Department would have had its problems with the labor movement. The minimum wage business would have caused trouble. There's no question that the Senate committee had [problems] during the 1960-61-62 period when I was working on the Youth Employment Opportunities Act, the combination of Neighborhood Youth Corps and Youth Conservation Corps together.

But getting the labor movement's neutrality, which is really all we've ever had, about jobs that might take construction work away from the building trades was a problem. It was in 1935 and 1936 they put a labor official, machinist union, who I guess was the number-two man in the old CCC, in order to allow an avenue of communication. Building roads is a recognized activity of a construction crew, and so building roads in a national forest then becomes an area of conflict. I suppose it could easily have been said in task force meetings that giving these things to the Labor Department is going to hobble you because the labor movement has such a strong influence. The labor movement, particularly in Democratic administrations in the past at least, did have a very strong grasp on what the Labor Department did.

G: Didn't they even determine who the under secretary was or keep Wirtz from hiring his own?

M: Well, there was some talk of that sort. But maybe that was simply Johnson's political weakness in that area that he had to do something, whereas a Democratic administration more in the tradition, a northern

Democrat, would have been able not to have to do that. Maybe. I'm just floating ideas that I've never really thought about answering them. But more importantly, the Under Secretary really never got much stature, the person you're talking about in the Labor Department. I mean, everybody figured him out fairly quickly as being a guy there without a hell of a lot of mental giant capacity.

But the key thing in the Labor Department, the reason I think the Labor Department was thought to be totally controlled by the labor movement, was the position of the solicitor which [began] back in 1948 or 1949 when the Labor Department for the first time really became a centralized department. As I used to laugh about it, you couldn't get out of bed without asking the solicitor. It was a strong thing. I mean the solicitor in the Department of Labor was an appointee of the building trades, and each of these activities in the department had its assistant solicitor in charge of his assigned area. It was hard to believe how hog-tied [they were]; those constituent agencies in the Department of Labor couldn't move without the approval of the assistant solicitor for that operation. But that had become eroded by the sixties, so that was a judgment based on past history rather that future history. I think Wirtz had a very clear capacity and determination to fight things of that sort. I think the Labor Department would probably have been a pretty good place for those programs and we would have been able to do it with just as much emphasis on poverty as the overall.

G: Could the Employment Service have been able to recruit more in the low income area?

M: Yes. And I think it did. I mean, I think it was massaged in that direction all during the sixties. I am out of touch with what they did after that. It depends upon the state. I mean, somewhere like California the answer is yes, or Connecticut, they were busy at working this. Other states, particularly the southern ones, I don't think you could have much influence. It was a very strong lobby group, that interstate conference of state agencies. It is backed up at the state level by the industrial development people for the purpose of keeping the tax rate [low]. Unemployment tax rate varies between states, and it's part of the economic development incentive of states to try to attract industry on the basis that they have a low unemployment insurance tax rate.

G: Did the Employment Services get involved at all in the formation of the legislation, the Economic Opportunity Act? Did they lobby for one position as opposed to another?

M: I don't think so. I don't think they have anything to do with it. It would surprise me.

G: Now, do you recall anything about the provision for a minimum wage for agricultural migrant labor? It was adopted, but it was proposed initially in the task force.

M: Was it in the task force thing?

G: Well, it was discussed. It was not [adopted].

M: I don't remember it. I might have known it, but I don't think at that point anybody would have thought that was a very practical legislative goal. It took the Johnson sweep against [Barry] Goldwater to do for minimum wage legislation what we then did in 1965 and 1966 when the minimum wage was extended to cover a whole lot of people.

G: Did you have an idea what Lyndon Johnson's perception of the War on Poverty was or what it should be?

M: Well, I did. Not at that point. I certainly listened to him enough in these legislative meetings in the White House and I have a very distinct feeling of what he thought of. The Populist attitude: if you give a little help to people, they'll emerge.

G: Can you go into detail here? Can you recall the circumstances under which he discussed it and what more or less he said?

M: Well, they were mostly ad libs and mostly in the way that he talked about any [issue]. These meetings were held by Larry O'Brien and they were efforts on his part to coordinate departmental legislative activities and to get some advance warning of likely crises. Subsequently the White House has been more overriding in control over what the departments had done legislatively, but then it was more decentralized and so he really wanted to know when you needed help. I'm sure my memos to O'Brien, reports, come up with "here's something we're going to need help on," or "this is something you needn't worry about. We've got it in hand."

But on the occasion of these weekly meetings, once every three or four, the President would show up unscheduled, unannouced, unexpected,

I guess, and in his own extraordinary way put on an astonishing show. Anybody who's been through it will remember them, and I must say I can't pinpoint them at any one issue, but it came through often enough.

G: What would he do? Would he talk about senators to approach or how to approach particular congressmen or senators?

M: No, they were more general that that.

G: The merits of the legislation?

M: Yes, well, in that group of people that were more sort of philosophizing stories of how on such and such an occasion somebody suddenly got more agreeable or less agreeable, or you've got to appeal to people like so, like be sure of their constituents. He gave sort of little seminars, but in the course of which you would get pretty clearly his own philosophy of government.

G: Did he ever reveal his attitude toward the Community Action Program in any of these?

M: I never heard him on anything as specific as that, no.

w: How about Job Corps? Did he ever [discuss that]?

M: Well, he might have. I can tell you the sort of thing he would have said about it, "Here's this Job Corps thing that's trying to give people a chance to work and get an idea of what it's like to be at work. And it was a good old thing." I can hear him say things like that, but I don't remember him specifically saying it.

G: I wonder if he saw the War on Poverty as sort of an updated New Deal?

M: I suspect so. I've always said and Dave Hackett would have said, I think, that he had bad advice with the Community Action thing because it caused him much more trouble than the good it did. But I think it was perfectly predictable.

G: What about Shriver? Was Shriver aware of--?

M: Maybe Shriver didn't know. I find that difficult to imagine, although I must say I have a feeling--and this is something you've got to check out with Hackett, to the extent [possible], I'm not sure those Kennedy people will talk yet. But my guess is that Hackett probably wasn't able to communicate very easily with Shriver either. I think Hackett is critical of Shriver.

G: During the formation of the legislation, Wirtz went to Johnson and proposed a massive manpower program funded by a cigarette tax. Do you recall that?

M: No. I've never heard that one.

G: And it was rejected. Should more emphasis have been on the manpower?

M: Well, it seemed much the easiest of all those major pieces. I think the fashionableness of the manpower approach is considerably less these days than it was then. The manpower program addressed to people who are difficult to employ is much more difficult than we realize. The experiments that have tried to bring welfare people in have not been successful considering the costs.

G: Was there a recognition among proponents of manpower programs that these people did not always have the incentive and desire to hold a job if their job were--?

M: I think we were much more naive about it. I think we assumed that given enough attention, we really could do something. I think it's gotten to be realized that it's a far more intractable problem than we realized. I had the excellent experience of going up to Boston and being the manpower coordinator for the city, which meant that in discussions between the Mayor and the poverty program the connection was me. I understood these programs. Nobody else in the city of Boston had any exposure to them at all. I realized then for the first time the terrible gap between what was happening at the local level and reports on which the Secretary of Labor thought he was getting the truth. Indeed all he got were reports filtered through three or four layers of bureaucracy, and in the course of those filterings, to get the most misleading impression of what was going on at the local level. One could be convinced that one was doing a great job. You were able to say forthrightly to the Congress, "We've spent X million of dollars, but we've gotten numbers in thousands of people in employment who otherwise would not be employed." Well, boy, the capacity for statistical deformation was just unbelievable.

G: Were the same people getting temporary jobs over and over again? Or what was distorting the reporting?

M: People were getting some jobs, maybe not over and over again, but people who were getting jobs didn't hold them long, or they might move somewhere else and get jobs. Or the people that were trained probably would get jobs anyway, or they got jobs which did not relate to those they trained in.

G: Was underemployment, do you think, sufficiently recognized in manpower programs?

M: Well, yes, I think so. In that 1959 episode that I told you about, this Special Senate Committee on Unemployment Problems, we resounded with noises about underemployment then and I think it was in front of everybody all along.

G: Why did the poverty program emphasize youth unemployment rather than adult unemployment?

M: Well, demographic information made this likely. Really, my entrance into the manpower business [was] at the time I was appointed to a special committee on Youth Conservation Corps. Humphrey had persuaded Johnson, who was the majority leader, to handle Youth Conservation Corps as a special project. This is 1959. Johnson, in effect, asked Lister Hill, who was very wary about having larger committee staffs and additional subcommittees, to set up a special committee on Youth Conservation Corps. We held hearings in April-May 1959. I was selected, I'm not quite sure how, I guess really because I had a gap in my activity with what I was there for.

But anyway [we studied] these statistics, which I can remember as a moment of truth as the baby boom problem. In other words, if you look at demographic figures, you would see over a period of ten years, maybe two-and-a-half million babies were born up until the end of World War II, and suddenly the number got a million bigger. So a child born in 1947 had 50 per cent more fellows than the one in 1946. If you plot eighteen years from that to 1964, the avalanche of new

entrants would enter the labor force. The statistics were already showing large numbers of youths unemployed even in 1959-60, and one would have to say that in another three or four years that number was going to be much greater, that the unemployment index for youth would be growing rapidly.

Therefore, the youth problem, the employment problem of youth, became a concern for any of the people looking at the manpower scene. One might conclude that the younger you caught anybody--although I don't think we realized that maybe you had to catch them at age six months, but nevertheless, the younger you got them, the more likely it was that you'd be able to turn an unemployable person, a difficult-to-employ person, into one that was employable. I'm not sure that was a sound judgment at all.

G: Even though you were not on the task force, did you have an opportunity to observe how the Job Corps emerged and the various changes that took place as the legislation was enacted? Such as the inclusion of women as the result of Edith Green's suggestion, the adoption of so many conservation projects.

M: I did not. You see, I did go at one meeting of the task force, and I think this was done because at some point where Wirtz thought that Moynihan was giving the safe away to the enemy, he insisted that perhaps I should be there to talk about the Youth Conservation Corps and have my input as to why it should be in the Labor Department. And I went. This was eight or ten people in the room, and what I did when I got there was to explain the product of our planning activity, which

had really gotten quite advanced. I had had regular meetings with people in Agriculture and Interior as to how the interrelationships--complicated obviously--would work. I discussed what kinds of planning activities I had conducted. I might just as well have saved my breath because I think most of the decisions had been made.

G: Did they oppose the concept at the time or simply--?

M: In the room while I was there? No. They just listened.

G: Did this sour relations between Moynihan and Wirtz?

M: Oh, I'm sure. I'm sure. But the seeds of it, as I've said, were there before. But I'm sure that did, yes.

G: Did Moynihan cease to be a member of the task force?

M: No, I don't think so.

G: Moynihan was also assigned the task of drafting the President's transmittal message for the legislation. Do you recall that?

M: No, I didn't even know he had, but it would have been a very natural thing because Moynihan's artistry with the written word is considerable, or with the spoken word. That's how Moynihan got there, because Goldberg, one of the first things he did when he got to be secretary of labor was to arbitrate the Metropolitan Opera dispute. I don't think Goldberg knew very much about opera and certainly not about writing about it, so he looked around for somebody that could and Moynihan got hired for that. That was his first assignment. He's very good in writing. Very good.

G: Did the Labor Department participate at all in the legislative role of

the program, getting it through Congress? Did you lobby from the Labor Department to get the program passed?

M: I don't think so.

G: I know Wirtz testified.

M: Yes, yes, of course. No, I don't think we really did. I remember watching the scene and not really having much to do with it.

G: Did the Labor Department later in subsequent years lobby for more funds allocated for Neighborhood Youth Corps and fewer for Job Corps?

M: We certainly did in favor of the Neighborhood Youth Corps. We certainly lobbied for more independence from OEO and that was a very easy thing. The committee on education and labor [was] where I spent my days and I knew all these guys by their first name, compared to the OEO's legislative liaison, Bill Phillips. Phillips wasn't nearly as well acquainted; it was my back yard. So I had plenty of sympathy in that committee for doing whatever we asked. It was easy, so we took our little slice.

G: What role did Adam Clayton Powell play in the formation of the legislation? I know it went through his committee.

M: Well, obviously he was sympathetic. I don't know to what extent he insisted about having his little piece in the poverty program that was up there. I'm sure he had some little conversation with somebody. Of course, one of the juvenile delinquency/Community Action pieces was HARYOU-Act based in Harlem. When I was on that juvenile delinquency committee, actually, I remember going up and making a speech to a graduating class of HARYOU-Act at Powell's temple up there with the

fear that I might fall over backwards in the empty pool that was part of the baptizing arrangements. I got dragged into going up there and making a speech about the wonders of HARYOU-Act, which was a shotgun combination of two hostile community action agencies.

One of the key members on the committee that really got things done was not Powell but the lamented Thompson.

G: Frank Thompson.

M: Frank, who was stupid enough to get himself in the ABSCAM thing. Tragedy, just tragedy. But him and the then-congressman from Michigan, Jim O'Hara. I'll think of the others.

G: Let's see. What about [Phil] Landrum? Was he important?

M: Well, of course, but that was Johnson's doing, I'm sure. He must have gotten hold of Landrum and dusted him off and made him feel like he was about to ascend to heaven. Landrum was the totally unexpected candidate for managing the bill. Landrum up to then was nothing but bad news for any program we were interested in.

G: Landrum-Griffin, et cetera.

M: Yes.

G: Was it Johnson who got Landrum to sponsor it?

M: I'm sure it was. I can't believe anybody else would have been able to do it.

G: What about O'Brien? You don't think O'Brien might have had a hand in it?

M: That would surprise me.

G: Really? Okay.

M: I mean, I have seen Johnson when he was majority leader. You know, his capacity to snake charm individuals was unlimited. I've seen him do a selling job on these great leaders in the Senate. He'd never let them get a word in edgewise, so before long they were agreeing with him. If he really put his mind to it, and his mouth and his personality, he was unbeatable.

G: How would he persuade Landrum, I wonder, to sponsor that legislation?

M: Oh, probably appeal to his patriotism, to the memory of his father who grew up in poverty. You know, Landrum represented the northern part of Georgia which is the tail end of the Appalachians. And you know, it really wouldn't do him any harm with his conservative constituency, and this is his chance to have his name go down in history as the champion of the poor and downtrodden. I'm sure he had a whole arsenal of the kinds of things he would say to him.

G: Was Carl Perkins much of a factor on the committee? Of course I know he was later chairman.

M: Perkins is a savvy old fox, not very bright but incredibly effective for his little old Kentucky district. Indeed it's easy to underestimate his capacity in this regard. But after a time, those of us who were on the front lines of dealing with Congress began to compare notes, and whereas he might tell me that he really hadn't gotten anything for those poor people down there, you'd discover that an hour before he talked to you he had gotten millions of dollars from some other department or some piece of your own department without you

knowing it. He was crafty at that. But Perkins was not awfully smart, really.

G: How about Powell?

M: Well, Powell would have been good if he'd been a person that stayed with things that he was for. But he'd get interested in something and then he'd disappear to the Bahamas for a month while the important things were going on on the things that he [was interested in]. He got a guy whose name is not on my fingertips, an assistant.

G: Chuck Stone?

M: Stone. Exactly. Who really was consistent and who minded the store for him while he went off on his trips of pleasure, but really who got him into trouble eventually. The reason Powell got unended, I think, was in part of course because he played games with his funds, but in part, in large part, because he went back on something he'd told the Speaker he would do. I'm trying to remember the [details]. The situs picketing bill the construction unions were very much after. I don't know whether you ever heard of such a bill, but it had to do with treating the job site as though it were a single employer. Indeed the job site is a crazy collection of revolving employers depending upon what aspect of the building is being produced. The Taft-Hartley Act made it illegal to have secondary boycotts but what is or is not is complicated. If you've got a dispute with an employer on a construction situation because he is a non-union employer who doesn't recognize the union, the way to get him organized is you put a ring of people around the job site so that the employees of union contractors

don't cross the picket line. Of course, the heat is against their employer with whom they have no labor dispute. But the heat will also hit the fellow that is there with whom they do have a dispute. Putting heat on an employer with whom you have no prime labor dispute is a secondary boycott.

The situs picketing bill would have modified the Taft-Hartley Act so as to have made the job site in effect a single employer so that it would have been legal to picket. It was a primary legislative goal of that part of the labor movement, the construction trades, that this thing should pass, and the construction trades' capacity to talk to the Speaker, [John] McCormack, and the big city members is considerable. They're big contributors to their political campaigns and so on. The Speaker had been promised by Powell to cooperate despite a good deal of rhetoric on Powell's part that he didn't like the building trades because they weren't awfully helpful to blacks in many respects. They got a commitment out of the Speaker, and the Speaker got a commitment out of Powell that his committee would bring this thing up to the Rules Committee. So he went away on one of his escapades when this thing was bubbling up. The person who on behalf of Powell went to the Rules Committee and said he wasn't going to bring it up was Stone. Because the issue then was joined as visible black struggle, Powell never brought it up again. This was serious. He went back on the promise that he gave the Speaker. You don't do that in that league. You didn't use to, anyway. So they were out gunning for him, and I'm sure that's basically what happened. So

Stone, in trying to make the boss consistent, undid him. It would always be easy to find some crazy thing Powell could have been charged with.

G: That's fascinating.

M: Isn't it?

Tape 2 of 2

G: Let me ask you a few questions about the Job Corps as it emerged. Do you feel that the Job Corps should have been designed differently?

M: Well, let me say how it would have been run had I been the head of it, which is what I expected had the thing remained in the department. I'm not sure that my expectations would have been realized. I don't think we would ever have allowed more than fifty to a hundred people in any one location. That's number one. So that these masses of kids like those in Camp Kilmer, that was not part of our conception. And the reasons we thought the small numbers is because we realized that to maintain order among these kids would have required something like a police state, and of course this is what they discovered in practice. We had rejected that approach in our Department of Labor task force.

In making that decision, we realized that we were giving up something important, namely a curriculum that had enough complexity and sophistication in it that would allow the people who had been there six months, say, to have come out and been skilled in some particular serviceable, marketable occupation. In other words, if

you're going to put fifty people out in the middle of the forest, all they're really going to do is learn good work habits.

G: In other words, the urban projects had to have larger number of kids, or the smaller projects had to be rural? Is this right?

M: Well, I think we might have made urban ones, too, but that really wasn't our focus. Our focus was in the great out-of-doors. Our focus was avoiding the conflict with the trade unions--

G: I see.

M: --of doing things that really needed to be done. And it might have been done in the urban scheme, too, you know, in state parks or something like that. But certainly we did not envisage a live-at-home situation. We envisaged a removed-from-work work experience which would develop what it was like to do work successfully. And we did think that we could probably accomplish some training, maybe a learnable skill like welding or cooking or something, simpler kinds of skills, by having satellite installations where you could have enough of them within twenty miles of, say, some kind of a transportation potential for bringing people into a center for training.

But I think our notion was that we would have small camps, fifty to a hundred--I've forgotten--but certainly no more than a hundred and usually fifty in relatively isolated communities. That's what it would have at the stage of our thinking about it before the poverty program was launched.

G: Would the kids or the corpsmen then have been able to go back and find

some sort of employment or would they be suitable for employment at the end of this period?

M: Well, we thought so. I'm not sure it would have happened the way we expected it.

G: Presumably they would have had the people skills and incentives, if not--

M: Yes, presumably they would have and presumably they would have learned that you had to work and that it had its satisfying aspects. We would have, of course, heavily depended on the Employment Service to dig at the problem of getting them jobs. We thought that we would get preferred treatment, and we probably would have. As a matter of fact, I think that's probably what happened anyway. The Employment Service was incorporated in the planning.

G: Some of the surveys, the Harris survey and others that were done with former corpsmen seem to focus on the inadequacy of the training and the fact that so many of the graduates were not able to get jobs or did not feel that they had learned enough to secure jobs. That the whole thrust seems to have been toward a more vocational training.

M: Of course the problem is that--and I think this is one of the things that is responsible for the considerably lower expectations of manpower training generally. I mean if you had given them a four-year course in upholstery and the kid was unemployable--I hate to use that word--but his expectations about working were so low, and his disgust with working and finding it easier to hustle on the streets for money was so much easier a life, I don't think any amount of vocational

training for people of that sort would have been successful anyway. I think that's the trouble. The expectation that Wirtz had, I'm sure, and Ruttenberg and myself, and nearly all of us was that training would do things. I guess there's increasingly the realization that you've got a more basic problem.

G: Did you visit any of the rural conservation camps?

M: No.

G: Wouldn't, though, having smaller centers have run your per corpsman cost way up to an unacceptable level?

M: Well, yes. I mean, I remember Goldwater making a speech about costs--I'm pretty sure he made it in 1959 when we had that bill that the Senate passed like 46 to 47 with some of Johnson's legislative wizardry on the Senate floor.

G: Specifically, do you recall what he did to--?

M: Well, I mean there were senators in the cloakroon waiting to be told which way to vote in order to be sure the bill got passed.

G: Really? Any ones in particular?

M: I don't remember. I guess the Congressional Record would not show who came into the room last and who voted last but if you could show the last three or four who came into the room who voted aye, in order to just keep the score just one ahead of the no votes.

G: Were they Democrats, I suppose?

M: Oh, sure. But as I say, I think I remember [the speech]. Maybe it was then and maybe it was later, but my guess is that Goldwater probably used the same speech in later years, that it cost twenty-five

hundred dollars to send somebody to Harvard for a year and it cost ten thousand dollars to send somebody to the Job Corps for a year. That's his standard [criticism]. Yes, of course, that would send the cost up. But if you accomplish something, it was worth it. I think our hopes might have been beyond any likelihood of success, but what we expected.

G: There was also a proposal to have the Defense Department run the Job Corps eventually. Do you recall that and what happened to the suggestion?

M: Oh, yes. Maybe that was another turf thing. I mean, I recall it being made and I remember that it got shot down on the grounds that it might seem too much like kind of a Nazi solution. Of course in those days, we weren't all that far away from Nazi solutions, sixteen, seventeen years, something of the sort. But maybe this was Yarmolinsky's idea. I don't know. Yarmolinsky was a good person to beat the Defense Department over the head with. Have you ever seen him? I mean, Adam, well, he was scheduled to be deputy to Shriver, and Landrum, I guess, must have gotten him out of the picture. Landrum didn't like him very much and others didn't like him and they were offended by his personality. Adam couldn't be anything other than himself, God knows. But he tended to be fairly highhanded in his observations and suffered fools only with the greatest agony. He was too much for Landrum, and Landrum was as I understand it all ready to pitch the whole thing over. So he went to the President and said, "If that guy has anything

to do with it, I'm going to desert the ship." So the story ran. He never assumed any operating responsibility under Shriver.

But as I say, I think Yarmolinsky as the possible director of the corps was enough to lose the Defense Department's involvement. But there were the other arguments that it'd be too military and would smack of labor camps and so on.

G: Did Wirtz oppose this, the Defense Department's participation in it?

M: Well, I assumed so. I don't know whether he was ever seriously asked about it, but, apart from turf, I'm sure on principle Wirtz would have been opposed to the military doing it.

G: Let me ask you about the Neighborhood Youth Corps.

M: Yes.

G: This was delegated to the Labor Department to administer. Did the delegation process function adequately?

M: Well, you'd have to ask Jack Howard. I remember all kinds of grumblings about it. When you say, "Did it function adequately?" I think perhaps the way I would put the question is did it function in a way that the Labor Department thought it should? And the answer to that is decidedly no, and I don't know what their problems were. I expected to run the Neighborhood Youth Corps, too, and probably the point in my career that was most disappointing was when I was informed that Jack Howard was going to run it.

G: Why was he selected, I wonder?

M: I don't know. I never really knew, except that I think it had largely to do with Ruttenberg's recommendations to Wirtz. There's something

in the chemistry between me and Ruttenberg, maybe, or me and somebody else in the department. I don't know. One never knows quite why things like that happen. But I thought it was fairly outrageous and I really blame Wirtz for not telling them no, but God knows what his considerations were. Maybe he thought I wasn't able to do it. I don't know.

G: Did the Neighborhood Youth Corps become, in effect, simply an income transfers program?

M: Well, I don't think Jack Howard would think so. I don't know what he thinks.

G: What did you feel?

M: Well, I saw it in action in a number of places but I had no overall position from which to judge. Statistically I'm sure that during the time when it was going, when Jack Howard was running it during the sixties up to 1969 or so when I guess he left, I'm sure he would not agree that it was just an income transfer program.

G: Was there any training?

M: Oh, yes. Now when I got to Boston, which is 1968-69-70-71, when I got to be the manpower coordinator at the local level and when I could see what was going on, then I'd have to say to you that it all depended. I mean the work stations of some were real and the supervision was real and people learned things, I'm sure. On the other hand, there were many in which it was just a "ho-hum, put in your time" situation. Here in the District, I know some people that were in the main library who had been Neighborhood Youth Corps people and [made] no effort at

teaching. Indeed, [there was] probably not enough put into supervision. After all, if you're going to take five people who are relatively uneducated and not disposed to be interested in things, you're really going to need a time set for them to do certain things and the training part of it and all the rest of it put together. It needs some ability and competence to arrange that sort of affair.

It's like interns in Congress. There are a lot of interns that come in that just fold envelopes for three months. On the other hand, the congressmen who have some concern about it and who are really working at it will involve them in serious activities so it's a much better arrangement. Well, I'm sure it varied all over the United States. There were spots in Boston that were really quite good. On the other hand, there were spots that were not and became just an income transfer.

G: Did OEO monitor the operation of the program at all, or did they just turn it over to the Labor Department and that was it?

M: I think they tried to monitor. I think by the time 1968 came along it was pretty much "let the Labor Department run it." When was the renewal? The poverty program was enacted in 1965, wasn't it?

G: 1964.

M: Oh, yes, yes, 1964, of course. And for a two-year period, so 1966 is when the renewal was and 1966 is when we got control. And I doubt if they could really do much more with it after that. I think it then became really an exclusive Labor Department concern.

G: Did you feel that there was an advantage to having a program like this in the cities, in the environment of the corpsmen, rather than taking them out of their environment?

M: I think we had the old model, the CCC on the one hand and the--what was it called?

G: National Youth Administration.

M: NYA. Yes, of course. That's what it was, in the thirties. So we assumed that such a combination of programs was in order. The size, until you know what you're doing is a problem. If you're going to get big all at once, you probably are going to run into troubles. Yes, we realized that the two things were complementary and the Neighborhood Youth Corps would be for people in school.

G: You still had to deal with the problem of minimum wage.

M: Yes.

G: Insisting that corpsmen get minimum wage in areas where other employees were not. How did you deal with this?

M: I don't remember how we thought we were going to deal with that. Now I'm talking about in the planning stage. Is that what you're asking? In the planning stage I don't think we really had been confronted with it. We just thought this was something that we had to work out when we got to it. We didn't have any deal where we discussed the thing with the labor movement in any formal way. We just knew that it would be a problem and assumed that we would deal with it when we had to.

G: In the implementation phase, where you actually confronted governors who would have to approve projects, how did you deal there with it?

M: Well, you see, by then, Jack Howard was running it, so I don't know. But in the planning, the getting ready, which was under my jurisdiction, we hadn't gotten to the point where we had settled anything like that.

G: Was there rivalry between the Labor Department and OEO after the program was enacted, during the implementation?

M: I assume so. I went on to other things and was really out of it at the point Jack Howard would answer that. Then there were always the kind of yakety-yak remarks that go on on such matters: "If they only did allow us to do so and so," or "if they only approved this," or you know, "they held up something or other because somebody's petty question," or something. But that's sort of in the nature of human affairs, if you will. I didn't really attach anything of great importance in my mind to it. Anyway, by the time we got the thing legislatively cured in 1966, there was no more problem like that. We got ourselves out from under.

G: There seems to have been a continuing problem with the Job Corps at legislation time. There would always be, it seems, incidents at the camps at critical stages of the appropriation or the authorization. I realize that you were with the Labor Department and hence somewhat removed from this, but were you aware that they were having these--?

M: Yes, of course. I remember on frequent occasions hearing about problems in these big camps. And in luncheon conversations with people that had been on my task force, in effect, [they would be] saying, "Well, we knew that this was going to happen. The crazy people

brought it on themselves. If they'd listened to us, they wouldn't have gone in for these huge operations." Because it's the big camps that caused most of the trouble. It's the police state problem. How do you keep order in large numbers of people who were essentially not disciplined to social behavior.

G: On the other hand, the argument is made that the Forest Service was well-equipped to handle these kids and just having them out in a natural environment would be [beneficial].

M: Well, that was how we were planning it.

G: But then once they went back to the cities, did they resume their previous lifestyle?

M: Well, I understand that that argument is certainly a very difficult one. I don't know what the figures are, and indeed if the figures help at all. I mean, if somebody said, "Well, look at the figures. There was a 90 per cent employment picture for those who had been to the forest camps," I'd say, "Well, that sounds like it was a very useful piece of business." But I'd be very suspicious about the figures, knowing what I do and the capacity of this whole system to produce fictitious impressions. And it really has that capacity. It's so easy to live in a world that is not--because if you're looking at figures you can get an impression which is not an accurate one of what's really going on.

What do the figures show? I've never looked at them. What do the figures show about people who had been to these Forest Service camps? There must be figures around on that score.

G: Yes.

M: Yes, I'd be interested in knowing. I guess I've noticed them from time to time, and I haven't been particularly surprised because knowing as I do the capacity for fiction, I just really haven't bothered with trying to find out.

G: Well, I don't have any more questions today on the Job Corps or Neighborhood Youth Corps. I certainly appreciate your taking the time.

M: Okay.

[End of Tape 2 of 2 and Interview I]

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