INTERVIEW I

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INTERVIEWEE: ROY MILLENSON

INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette

PLACE: Mr. Millenson's office, Washington, D.C.

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G: Okay. Mr. Millenson, let's begin with a discussion of your own background and how you--.

M: Well, it's Roy H. Millenson. M-I-L-L-E-N-S-O-N. I first went to the Hill in 1949 in the Eighty-first Congress, which is the first Congress after the historic Republican Eightieth Congress. That was when Harry Truman was inaugurated as president, and I was legislative and press assistant to then-Representative Jacob K. Javits from what was then the Twenty-first Congressional District of New York, which is the upper west side of Manhattan ranging at that time from West 114th Street north to the end of the island, Washington Heights inward. It included Columbia University. The district was later farther south to Cathedral Parkway, which is West 110th Street. I was with Jack Javits through to the middle of 1955 which would make it five and a half years. I was employed elsewhere.

Then when he was elected to the Senate, I came over. He was elected in 1956 and I started with him in 1957, and my first title was legislative assistant. After we were able to hire another legislative assistant, I got a new title of executive assistant. I handled

such things as education, health, the handicapped, arts and humanities, and a number of other things. I left Jack Javits in 1959, and again went off the Hill. As I tell people, the reason I left is I was working all sorts of hours and I came in late one night, crawled into bed and my wife said, "Roy, is that you?" So I decided I better get another job.

Then when Barry Goldwater ran for the presidency in 1964, Javits became ranking minority member of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, which is now the Committee on Labor and Human Resources. So I started then in 1965. I served on the professional staff of the subcommittees dealing with education, health, handicapped, the National Science Foundation, arts and humanities and veterans' affairs. As you can see, we didn't have much of a staff then on the minority side and my title was minority clerk because the senior administrator person on the majority side was the clerk of the committee. A few years later, Senator Lister Hill, the committee chairman, left and another person came in under Yarborough, Bob Harris; he called himself staff director. So I wasn't going to be a clerk while he was the staff director. So I changed my title to minority staff director. It didn't mean a bloody thing but it's part of the games people play. And those sort of titles have held up so I guess that's one indication of the change in things in the Congress where it used to be clerk hire and the chief person in the committee was the clerk of the committee and now they don't call themselves clerks.

While I was working for Javits and his staff in the fifties, Lyndon Johnson was majority leader of the Senate. He meant nothing to me when I was in the House and I didn't know him then at all and can't even recall ever hearing of him. We had other members we were active with like Jack Kennedy and Dick Nixon, but Lyndon Johnson,

no. When I was in the Senate he was such a forceful majority leader and he really controlled things that I recall I had a very minor operation where I had to have an anesthetic and my first words coming out of the anesthetic with my wife nearby and were all about Lyndon Johnson. It's said that when a man comes out of an anesthetic he talks about his mistress and my mistress then I guess was the United States Senate.

Lyndon Johnson really had a feel for the members of the Senate and how things were going. He knew when to let up; he knew when not to have his way and all, and he was really masterful. We would find things brought up without advance notice and all. It's very rough when you're on the minority or very rough when you weren't right there with Lyndon Johnson. But that's the way he ran things. I did think he had a great loss later on while he was president when Bobby Baker lost out and left the Senate because here he had his man right there and he could still have his fingers deep into the pie.

When I went to the committee in 1965 Lister B. Hill was chairman and he was also chairman of the appropriations subcommittee which handled our matters. The staffs were rather small and on the minority staff we only had two professionals. There were only two professionals. One handled labor and manpower, so called, matters, what they called manpower legislation then; the Manpower Defense Training Act I think it was called. And I handled everything else. And there [were] subcommittees on health, on education, on veterans' affairs, which was then part of the committee. We had one on the National Science Foundation, and that was my responsibility. So we had to keep jumping.

And of course the majority had a staff for each one of those subcommittees. So I was opposite a majority staff person for each one of those subcommittees and then they had Jack Forsythe who was committee counsel. But we had no separate counsel. They had one person for each subcommittee and a back up man who was an attorney and a very capable attorney. Jack Forsythe--have you tried to get hold of him? Well, you know his situation. I think we talked about it over the telephone. I must say that we all keep in close touch and by strange coincidence Jack Forsythe was an attorney in this firm where we are now and for a while I think occupied--I think this is his old desk that I have here.

G: How partisan were the staffs in those days?

M: Well, we obviously were all partisan because we each handled our own sides, and that's because some committees like the House Foreign Affairs Committee--I don't know whether the foreign relations committee was the same--was non-partisan, the staff served both sides, at that time. And Javits was on that committee in the House. So we each had our own side and part of the partisanship was that the members of the majority with a Democratic administration introduced the administration's bills and when the administration sent over a message, they got it, and we didn't even see it. The custom was in submitting committee reports on a committee report on a bill such as these we have here--and I'll lend those to you if you wish and then be sure to send them back or die in the morning.

The custom was that the committee report was dropped in the hopper, submitted, and the minority submitted their report at the same time. So I would get a call from my

colleague on the majority side, "We're putting in our report at two o'clock. We understand you have minority views," and we'd go over it at the same time and hand in the papers at the same time. Obviously, we weren't suppose to see what each other had written. From time to time we would consult with each other and we'd talk to each other about what we were going to do. The various subcommittees I think in part reflected the chairman of that subcommittee and how they ran things. For veterans' affairs there was a turnover in staff and I remember at one time I briefed the majority member, broke him in--helped break him in. On education I still keep in touch with my majority colleague, Charlie Lee. When Wayne Morse left the Senate the minority--Winston Prouty, the ranking minority member, offered Charlie a job. Later on I was succeeded on the health side and a majority senator offered him the job, Jay Cutler. If you want to talk to him he can give you the details on it. It's not up to me to tell you who it was.

The majority staff person, Bob--well, you've probably spoken to him. I forget his last name.

G: Barkley.

M: Bob Barkley, yes. He was the only health man and he had a secretary. His office was right next door to mine and I would go in there, and the way we brought up things was Lister Hill would have a committee meeting and he would have a committee print of the bill. If Bob and I had negotiated that we would have some amendments in there, they would be in there, and Hill would say, "Well, we got the bill here. Jack, that bill is all right with you, isn't it? It's getting a little bit late here. I think we might as well get it to a vote." We'd get this business on the floor and the bill would be reported.

The majority members of the committee would have a chance to look at the bill the day it was up there--maybe if some were interested, Bob might show it to them—and the same with the minority members. We just negotiated it out and we'd get things in. Sometimes an amendment might be brought up but there'd be a committee print with the things that we had agreed on.

Lister Hill was not under obligation as committee chairmen are now to file the report immediately and I recall a bill--please don't ask me which bill it is because I don't remember; I would tell you if I did remember--where we ordered a bill reported. He carried the report around in effect in his pocket for a couple of months and then filed the report and the bill was brought up in the next day or two. You're not supposed to do that anymore and also the staffs have grown considerably and more members participated in the deliberations at the staff level and all.

G: Did that weaken the power of the committee chairs?

M: Oh, definitely, and ranking minority too. Now the situation is and the situation had grown when I left--I retired from the Senate at the end of 1974--that other staff people and other staff look over your shoulder and have an idea of what's going on. But this was pretty much a monopoly situation.

You'll notice, for example, in one of these bills--the mental retardation amendments of 1967 I think it is. Let me see. No, this is rehabilitation. There was one bill the Johnson Administration sent down on mental health and we added mental retardation to it on the minority side. It's reported somewhere in there. Wilbur Cohen was then assistant secretary of HEW [Health, Education, and Welfare] for legislation.

What we said in effect--we told Bob--I told the majority, "We want mental retardation added to that mental health bill, and we're going to propose it in committee. The administration doesn't want it." And we told Wilbur Cohen this. "If the administration doesn't include it, all those in favor of mental retardation will vote for us in the committee. All those who don't want to include mental retardation will vote against us. Now we might lose out in committee. We're going to bring that up on the floor. All those in favor of helping mentally retarded kids will vote with us; all those against, will vote against it." The administration backed down and they put mental retardation in the bill. It became their bill, but they put it in. I always feel good I was able to roll Wilbur Cohen, who wasn't very rollable.

But I think you can say this abut the attitude, that we got along well on both sides on legislation, but when it came to other things, like parking places and office space, that was blood on the floor. I'll tell you. We got no concessions on that, and one of my few responsibilities as minority clerk or minority staff director was assigning parking places. The only time I ever really had a tiff with my colleagues from other senators' offices and all that--even though there was a wide spread of senators there--it was on the issue of parking places. That's blood. But on legislation there was an accommodation.

G: Was the problem here that the Democratic leadership in the Senate simply would not allocate the minority--?

M: Well, they allocated so many--not in the Senate--the committee had so many parking places going to it, and they had so much office space going to it. And they wanted it for themselves. I don't know whether you have parking places allotted in your place, but the

guy in office A who has so many to allot doesn't give it up to office B. He might make concessions on his budget or something like that, but not on parking places. It's just the nature of things.

I think on legislation, which is always an accommodation thing--and also we knew Lister Hill had the cards--we had to play it even more carefully than we would in the majority, and especially at a committee meeting where the chairman comes in. He has proxies in his pocket. "All right, that's it."

If I can go off a minute with Wayne Morse, one of my favorite people. I remember one time he had a proposal and we had one amendment we put in and another amendment we put in. We chipped away at it. He finally said in effect, "My proposal shouldn't be in there anyhow," and he withdrew it. Now that takes a pretty big man to do that. We convinced him that he should have done otherwise.

G: Do you recall the specific measure?

M: No, I don't recall.

G: Tell me about the relationship between Senator Javits and Lister Hill.

M: It was a good relationship. I think most of the members had a good relationship with each other in committee most of the time. There are times when somebody would blow their top and there were times when there would be a strictly partisan vote. But you had a committee, for example, where you had Senator [Jennings] Randolph of West Virginia and Senator [Winston] Prouty of Vermont or the other senator from Vermont. Vermont and West Virginia were rural states, and Alabama was rural. Then you had Javits of New York and you had the senator from Rhode Island, Claiborne Pell. This is an urban state.

We look at things differently. I think the biggest bone we had in the committee at all times was allocation formulas.

G: Allocation formulas to states?

M: To states. And with all respect to your great state of Texas--I remember [Ralph] Yarborough. We had a program to give additional monies to where concentrations of poor kids were and it went through almost the final vote in committee. It got through the subcommittee, went through the committee and Yarborough saw Texas wasn't getting what he thought was a fair share. He was chairman of the full committee. And the whole committee had to back down until we found a formula that we had done just on the basis of, "Here's how many poor kids there should be, extra Title 1 ESEA [Elementary and Secondary Education Act (of 1965)] kid," until it suited Texas. Javits, on his part, put--and it's in the *Congressional Record* and I don't have them--had a number of studies put into the *Congressional Record* showing how formulas were unfair to the state of New York. The Hill-Burton formula--there were formulas that gave a poor state--had a reverse formula. So if a state was, let's say, 1 per cent below the income level, below the national, they'd get a 1 per cent more--the percentages I'm giving you are off. But there was a consideration where they would get more.

The Hill-Burton formula squared that, you see. So not only would the poorer states get more, they'd get a hell of a lot more. So as a result under the Hill-Burton formula which was put in other bills--vocational rehab, which was also under him--vocational rehab later became a separate subcommittee, but it's part of the health subcommittee. Under the Hill-Burton formula--and we pointed this out in one of these

debates--South Carolina got four times as much per capita on a, I think, voc rehab it was, than Connecticut did. We were happy to have our poorer brethren in some of these states get a little bit more per capita than the so-called richer states. Although in New York State, which is a so-called richer state, Appalachia is up there too if you know the area. And in some of the poorer states like Texas I think you'll find some places in downtown Dallas where you have more millionaires per square inch than any place else. So it doesn't run evenly.

As I look back on the time I served in the Senate either in a senator's office or in the committee, the worst defeat I ever had was on a formula fight. And our southern colleagues orchestrated that thing beautifully. As a matter of fact they even timed, I was told later--you talk about it; after the game you talk about it with the other side--that they even orchestrated a visit of a foreign delegation to the Senate floor, which as you know interrupts the debate, interrupts all business. Chair hits the gavel, "We'll take a recess. We have a delegation"--I think it was Indonesia--"from Indonesia. The parliamentarians from Indonesia in the new parliament." The members go over and shake their hands and then you continue. They even orchestrated that.

G: Why did they do that?

M: That fitted in--to break us up and so forth.

G: Do you recall the issue here?

M: Yes, I think it was the vocational rehab. I was down in South Carolina after that and I remember going to talk to the assistant, to Strom Thurmond. Strom Thurmond was our chief opponent on changing the formula for a good and proper reason. He said that the

South Carolina papers all carried the story of what he did. New York, nothing on this issue. The *New York Times* I don't think carried anything. And later on on these formula issues we couldn't get the *New York Times* to cover it. There's an old joke, you know, I take care of the big things at the house, my wife takes care of the small things--you've heard that. I decide whether we should recognize Red China and she decides where we live. Well, the New Yorkers decide their interested in whether we recognize Red China, but down in South Carolina and the southern states, they're smart. They go for the formulas and how that money's allocated.

I recall a delegation of professors, some of your academic colleagues came in, from New York State and they wanted Javits to co-sponsor a bill for education about health in the public schools. You should brush your teeth twice a day, or whatever. So I looked over the bill and I looked over the back. I said, "Well, under this formula New York State gets screwed"--I didn't use that term. These professors hadn't even read that part of the bill. The bill had been drafted by a member of their association from one of the southern states. Well, I was able to have a lot of fun and tell a bunch of college professors they should do their homework. And I sent it right back to them.

I may be digressing here, but I don't think I am. I think of the times--and if you're studying health legislation and all these matters you have to keep in mind the formula. Now when Lyndon B. Johnson sent down the Elementary and Secondary Education Act in 1965, which was enacted without any Senate amendments. He did not allow--no Senate amendments were allowed. I don't know whether you know that or not.

G: How was that agreed on?

M: Well, let me just--the House changed the formula that he had sent down, one of the few changes that was made. The administration felt--and this has been an argument I've had with some of my friends who were in the administration and all. It's Monday morning quarterbacking. I thought they were wrong. The administration felt that if there were any amendments in the Senate they would have to go to conference and they might lose the bill. They had had that much trouble with education. Remember this is pioneer federal aid to education legislation. Big church/state issue and all that, which is another matter. And the integration issue--well, it wasn't so much that. Big church/state and the whole business of federal aid to education was still in many people's minds a question. So they felt that if there were any amendments in the Senate it wouldn't go through. They got Wayne Morse and Lister Hill and others to agree to that, convinced them of that. This was against Wayne Morse's nature. He was an open guy and we were able to get some other things from him later on.

What we were able to get was we were able to get in the committee report interpretations of the bill that meant the same as if we had put in an amendment. But that was a bunch of hogwash because we had a letter--if you look at the report on ESEA in 1965, the Senate report, Assistant Secretary Wilbur Cohen signed a letter saying the disadvantaged included the handicapped and it never did. It never did and we had to enact education of the handicapped legislation so it might have turned out better, who knows. That's the way they got around no amendment.

No amendments were allowed. The thing was pushed through and it was signed in April. Just went through like that. I think that's one thing--if I may give you a

sidebar--that the first year or first year or two of the Johnson Administration, he just sent down everything and everything got enacted. One of the things I heard later on was that the administration didn't expect everything to be enacted so they sent down a lot of things in different bills thinking, "Well, some things will be out but we'll still get this core program through." But they got everything through.

Wilbur Cohen testifying before the Senate Labor Committee after he left--after he was later secretary--said that if he had anything to do over again one mistake they made was having programs begin immediately. They would enact the program and, like the poverty program, start off in high gear, like these cars. They tell how fast they can accelerate and all that. He said that was a mistake; they should have had planning, and I think he's right. One of the defects in some of these programs was that.

G: Wasn't this almost an imperative with the legislative cycle so that there would be enough of an experience factor there to deal with the next budget appropriation?

M: No, because you authorize something for five years or through four years or three years or something of that sort. Now let's say you enact it, as they did ESEA, signed in April, Public Law 89-10. As I recall it began with the beginning of the fiscal year on July 1. You must remember these programs dealt with monies passed out to the states and to localities. I'm speaking totality of all of these programs. So you're asking state and organizations within a state, not only political entities like counties and cities but you're asking non-profit organizations and so forth to gear up immediately. Hell, in Texas your state legislature meets every other year. In Maryland our state legislature meets the first four months of the year; in Virginia the first three months; Kentucky legislature meets

every other year. President Johnson could shove something down the throats of the congress and get it through right away, but can the mayor of Podunk do that with the city council; can the governor of Texas even get his government departments that activated?

In New York State--I used to go up on study trips and visit the various departments up there in Albany once a year because I felt, especially in education, that the Department of Education in New York State was just as professional, if not better, than the U.S. Office of Education. They had a very sophisticated operation there in New York State. I don't feel that was the case in all of the states. Some of the states--I can't think of any to specifically mention--just did not have that sophisticated an operation as New York State did in, I assume, almost every one of its departments. Why? Because New York had the money to spend and had the people to draw on and all that sort of thing.

I don't know how good South Dakota was or how good South Dakota would be able to receive these federal programs. But I suspect--you're the scholar; you can delve into it--that a state like South Dakota just wasn't revved up to do the things that these various Johnson programs, as good as they may have been, wanted done. We pass out money, and these are grants in aid programs. Most of the Johnson year programs, the Great Society programs, were monies that the federal government itself did not spend. They did not hire the guy to dig the ditch. The WPA [Works Project Administration] may have hired them, but the poverty program or something else was administered elsewhere. You had to gear up.

G: You've described an urban/rural dichotomy there.

M: That was at times. There were other times when there was no dichotomy between the urban or the rural because the issue wasn't that or so. Sometimes you could have a party cut there in committee for some reason or other where all the Republicans were united and all the Democrats were united, but most of the issues on health and the National Science Foundation and some of the others did not readily lend itself to a partisan view. I was told--I had a predecessor named Roy James, the late Roy James--that the loyalty oath provision, he was the one that had gotten it in. He had just mentioned it at a committee meeting and everybody approved it. Later on it became a big bone of contention.

We sometimes felt, and I guess on education and health legislation, that the role of the minority was--I don't know whether you've ever sailed model airplanes, but you need a head wind in order to get the little airplane to go up. And that was our role, to do that. On some things the majority--and I'll give you a specific example, which you can check up on, education of the deaf. It so happens that Jack Forsythe's wife has a deaf son so she was interested in that and she was at the department at the time as was Elizabeth Dole. They worked at HEW as Democrats.

There was a report issued by some committee on education of the deaf, one of these study committees. I think it was sponsored by the government, by the feds. So we pursued it. We asked the department "What are you going to do about this and all that?" People on the majority side said in effect, “We can't tell the Johnson Administration, ‘Why in the hell you aren't doing something?’” This happened on other things too. "It's our administration, so you do it." And this was with respect to other things too. And then we'll relax and enjoy it, and we'll tell the administration, “Look, the Republicans are

raising hell on this. What can we do? We have to go along with them. We have to do something on it." It might not have ended up specifically as we wanted it but they knew that we were raising hell with the administration and they approved of it on the majority side of the committee but they said, "You guys do it; we can't."

Now that's an example. There's other things where we were opposed and raised hell with each other and all that, but as you can see from these reports, we got for a minority. We're the only committee of the Congress, either body, for the ten years I was there, that submitted reports of minority accomplishments. But you can see from those reports that we got a hell of a lot in, most of it at the committee level, some of floor amendments. And you must remember also we were not only a minority, but they really had a hell of a majority over us.

G: That's true. Two to one almost.

M: Lyndon Johnson carried every one of the fourteen counties in Vermont, every one of the counties in New York, places that hadn't voted for a Democrat for president since the Civil War. We had a hell of a loss, plus he really came in. So we felt we were able to accomplish quite a bit.

Now you must remember that on the area I worked in--I didn't work in labor and there weren't as many lobbyists around town too. I think what you should do sometimes, just for the fun of it, you look in the February 20 *Congressional Record*. Every quarter they put in the quarterly report of lobbyists. It used to be in the *Congressional Record* that each filing got about three or four lines. It was nicely arranged and all. Now each registration takes up one line, and these registrations in the twentieth record take up

eighty-nine pages. Go back to the *Congressional Records*--I think they were the *Congressional Records*--back in 1965. They had it then. Go back as far back as they are in the *Record* and see who is registered then and you'll see much less. Now they didn't rush to register as quickly as they do now either. Now it's a matter of pride. You charge the client, "Look, I'm registered for you," and then people would play games. But you can even look in an old telephone book in the yellow section under associations and see who had offices here in Washington. And you'll see in the classified section of the phone book that there weren't as much around.

Also the people, not only in terms of associations but in terms of governments--New York State had offices here and all, but a lot of other states didn't. A hell of a lot of states have offices here now.

G: How do you account for this large increase in lobbying and associations on the Hill?

M: I think there are probably a lot of factors. One is that the Congress itself has grown, I mean more staff. So what is it, the law that the work has to fit the number of staff? Also the proliferation of various programs has made it worthwhile for these organizations to get interested. I rent an office here. I'm not an attorney. This is a law firm and they sublease--it's a wonderful arrangement for me--an office for me. One of the tenants around the corner is Princeton University. What university are you a graduate of?

G: The University of Texas.

M: I think they may have an office here now. I don't know. By the time I left the Senate in 1974 there were organizations of organizations. All the educational groups that are lobbying for education combined had an organization. Charlie Lee, my former colleague,

was the one who organized [it]. All the various health groups, and I assume you've visited them, have an organization, a lobbying organization, a coordinating organization. A former colleague of mine worked there. I don't know whether she still works there, Judy Miller.

G: Who is this?

M: Judy Miller. She's married. I don't know what her married name is.

Also I think the television and the fact that there's more appeals to people and communications to the constituency. The members are able to get to members, to their constituency easier and more often with the TV galleries and their regular programs and all that sort of stuff and there's that natural reaction. When I retired I became a lobbyist for the Association of American Publishers on education matters and library matters. I'm not a lobbyist now. If you come in here and say, "I want to hire you as a lobbyist," all right, but nobody's hired for that and I don't know whether I want to do it because I have other commitments. That's the only reason. I have commitments at home with my wife.

G: Did Senator Javits have a shared authority in terms of the responsibilities of the committee? Did Lister Hill concede a certain--?

M: With respect to health, Lister Hill was Mr. Health. And before we came in 1965 the minority pretty well let itself get overwhelmed and went along with it. We decided we had some ideas of our own as you can see there. And Barry Goldwater as the ranking minority had other agenda and he was busy getting ready to run for president and all that sort of thing too. We had our own--we had some things we wanted, and also remember Javits was from New York. He not only had New York State government which had

some things it wanted, and some of these things if you'll look over the list of accomplishments--maybe this wasn't in health; it might have been in education--something like definition of a construction would include refurbishing an old building. Now that's important for New York City that was not building new buildings. Well, we would get stuff like that from the state and from the city, but we also--New York has a hell of a lot of organizations that are headquartered there and people interested in health programs and all that--Mrs. Krim and some of the others--who knew Javits. He's a senator and they knew him and he had his own interest too. I always used to say based on some of the things I worked on, "There isn't a sparrow that falls that doesn't have a cousin in New York."

I remember when I worked in his office I handled agriculture. New York State was the fourth biggest dry bean producing state in the union. And these dry bean producers from upstate New York would only get in touch with us once a year and they wanted money for research on dry beans in the Agriculture Department appropriations. Dry beans produce gas, apparently; they want ways to encourage people to consume dry beans. This was--I don't know--a couple hundred thousand dollars which is petty cash, and that's what I'd do for them as a staff person in the Senate.

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M: Our interest--you had a different sophistication coming in and different background so we were able to insert ourselves with Lister Hill. He was a very amiable, affable gentleman, especially as long as he got his way, and he worked well with Javits. They

knew how to talk to each other. Lister Hill is a very fine gentleman, a graduate of Columbia University.

G: Was there an alliance on the committee between the Republicans and the southern Democrats?

M: Well, I didn't handle those areas which are really political, which would be labor and maybe some of manpower, but labor was really the political thing. This is what I was pointing out with respect to the lobbyists. The really heavy stuff around town, the lobbyists who really wear the Gucci shoes and five hundred dollar suits, are the guys who deal with taxation, who deal with labor. Where changing a comma in a bill or something will really mean a hell of a lot. Of course, there is a lot more of that now when changing a comma means one university gets money and another one doesn't. That's why all these universities have offices here, but labor and taxation, that's the big money. That's the big stuff.

For the most part when a health bill--you look at the debates on these bills in the *Congressional Record*. For the most part the debates were--there wasn't really much going back and forth except when you got into formulas. And then it wasn't Republican/Democrat as what state you went on. Sometimes some of the members would switch because pressures were put on them. But the states that were really screwed--New York and Connecticut and all--we were not as strong. So there may well have been in the committee but not where I was.

G: There was, as I understand it, an effort with regard to Hill-Burton to create a more equitable balance in terms of the hospitals in the urban areas rather than simply just the rural.

M: That's your formula.

G: But this was defeated. Do you recall--?

M: I don't recall that. It may well have occurred during the time I was there but I don't recall. I just don't. I think one of the reasons I might not recall everything is I had so damn much to do. I gave you all those committees. Once something was out of the way—we got a small office. My space was less than the size of this office. We had a small office and you couldn't even keep a lot of papers around, historic records and all that sort of thing. You just got rid of it and you cleared your mind for the next fight. I was the only Republican staff person for health, the only Republican staff person for education, for National Science Foundation, for veterans in the U.S. Senate. The Democrats had two at least, professional staff: the committee counsel, Jack Forsythe, and Bob [Barkley] or Charlie [Lee].

G: In 1965 Senator Javits introduced legislation to eliminate substandard and dangerous practices by clinical laboratories.

M: That's what I referred to that we got in.

G: Inspections and licensing.

M: That's right.

G: Under the surgeon general. Tell me about how that--

M: The genesis of that I recall because I dealt with it. There was an article--I think it was in *McCall's* magazine, one of the women's magazines--which by happenstance my wife happened to have. And that told of the difficulties--how clinical laboratories were giving phony responses, what they called the sink test. They pour the specimen down the sink and say it's positive because why would you be sending a specimen in if you didn't think it was positive, that sort of thing.

We did some research and with the federal office there dealt with that sort of thing, contagious diseases and all. And I think I did some research in New York because this is one of the advantages. As I say, I used to go on what I called shopping trips to Albany and New York City and speak to the state and local governments and various organizations, which is also the genesis of the Javits-Wagner O'Day Act, and get ideas. We did some research and came to the conclusion that something had to be done. As a result of that--and don't ask me what the provisions of it are because I forget. As a result of it we drafted the bill, it was introduced and in effect it was enacted. And it has since been amended and amended a couple of times. But the Clinical Lab Act was the original Javits initiative.

G: Okay. There was also an Eisenhower administration proposal in 1965 that was introduced for the health professions educational assistance to encourage--

M: Eisenhower in 1965?

G: Well, Eisenhower--it was something that had been proposed earlier during the Eisenhower Administration to encourage young doctors to practice in the areas where they were most needed. Do you recall--?

M: Geez, I don't recall any specific proposals for that. I know that's one of these perennial things, a perennial problem, but I don't recall the details of it, when or how and all.

G: There was also a Republican proposal to guarantee the high quality standards for nursing homes, but the administration defeated that. Do you recall--?

M: I don't recall the details of that either. That's also a perennial, you know, nursing homes. I'm sorry.

End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview I

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