INTERVIEW II

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INTERVIEWEE: RICHARD MOREHEAD

INTERVIEWER: Christie L. Bourgeois

PLACE: Mr. Morehead's office, Barker Texas History Center, Austin, Texas

Tape 1 of 2, Side 1

M: When we were talking before, we were talking about some things I'd like to add a little something to here. One of them had to do with the growth of Republicanism in Texas, and actually it stemmed--it got its main impetus in the 1950s when Allan Shivers was the governor, and he--the big political issue was the tidelands ownership. Texas was claiming three leagues, about ten-and-a-half miles, out in the Gulf under their Treaty of Annexation to the United States, and the federal government in the 1930s decided that Texas didn't have any valid claim to it even though they had a treaty with the United States, which was ratified by the United States Senate, I believe, in 1845, but because this tideland meant so much to Texas--it was an endowment for public education, and there was a lot of oil and gas out there. It became very valuable, so Governor Shivers went to Illinois to see Governor Adlai Stevenson, who was the Democratic nominee, and asked him if he would be willing to support the Texas title of ownership--it was even--the matter was in Congress at the time. Stevenson said no, he couldn't do it, so Shivers came out, and he made an announcement to some reporters out there, Springfield, Illinois, and just told them that--"Well, I've just told Governor Stevenson that I was not going to be

able to support him for president because of the tideland thing." And Dwight Eisenhower was a Republican and became the Republican nominee and promised that he would support the state ownership. Texas wasn't the only state involved. All the coastal states had--nearly all of them had; all of the Gulf Coastal states, and I think California had--well, they were claiming more than the United States said they were entitled to--but the upshot of it was that Texas eventually got a bill through Congress, and Eisenhower signed it, and the United States Supreme Court upheld it, so under that Texas got title. Meantime, Governor Shivers had organized the Democrats into something called the Democrats for Eisenhower in nineteen fifty--

B: --two?

M: --1952, and it became a pretty active organization. All of the Democratic officials except one that had been nominated on that ballot. They all supported Eisenhower--they had something called cross-filing, and the Republicans filed the same names that the Democrats were filing on their ballot, and so they--of course, the--

B: Was this a--how instrumental was Shivers in getting that cross [inaudible] in?

M: Yes, but, in effect, for state races, state-wide races, there wasn't any difference between the Democrats and the Republicans. All the Democrats were nominated by the Republicans, and then the law was changed to make that possible. That lasted only for one election, by the way, but it worked, and, of course, Eisenhower carried Texas and carried the United States, and in 1956, Eisenhower carried Texas again. Excuse me?

B: How influential do you think Shivers was in swinging the state to Eisenhower? Do you think--?

M: Well, I don't think there was any question about it. He did it.

B: And this wouldn't have happened without him?

M: No, not without him leading the [inaudible]. He individually didn't do it, but yet he put together an organization. Shivers, incidentally, supported a Republican candidate for president most of the time for the rest of his life, but he always insisted that he really was an independent Democrat and that he--he never did call himself a Republican, but he--go ahead.

B: Do you recall that he and Sam Rayburn fell out over this issue, that Sam Rayburn thought he had gotten a promise from Shivers that he would support the Democratic nominee, whoever the Democratic nominee was, whoever was nominated by the National Convention in 1952? Shivers said he never made such a promise. Do you recall that?

M: I really don't recall it, but I have no doubt that it was either true or was implied, because Rayburn was a leader in the Democratic Party, and he would try to keep Democratic control of the country. I believe he was speaker of the House at the time, wasn't he, and, of course, Lyndon Johnson was the majority leader?

B: Let's see. The Democrats won the--

M: Well, anyway--

B: --in the 1950s or 1952, I think.

M: Lyndon Johnson of Texas also was a big--if he wasn't majority leader, he later became majority leader, and he was the leading Democrat in the United States Senate, and between him and Rayburn, they had a lot of clout up in Washington, and they didn't want to see a Republican president in there. And, actually, Shivers and Johnson never did exactly fall out, but they were at odds a number of times on political candidates and so on from then on and over the control of the state Democratic organization, and I think

Johnson probably came out on top on that before the 1960 election, which was one thing--Shivers, by that time, was becoming a lame duck as I remember, and he wasn't running himself. It's hard to transfer powers after you get out of office.

B: Yes.

M: Another thing that we talked about--well, incidentally, we can pick up from earlier on the Republicans because, in 1960, Lyndon Johnson, as we said, was running for re-election to the Senate and for vice president on the Democratic ticket at the same time under another special act of the legislature, which, I believe it's still on the books, and since he couldn't hold both offices, he resigned from the Senate, and John Tower was elected in a special election. He was a Republican, and served for twenty-four years, I believe, longer than any other--maybe longer than any other senator from Texas. He retired, but Tower became sort of the lightning rod around which the Republican Party rebuilt. There's some disagreement over how he was rebuilding. The Republicans said he wasn't paying enough--that the party, during his years, didn't pay enough attention to local candidates and too much attention to national candidates, but that's all--that's another story.

Another thing we--I spoke of the 1960 election when Johnson was the running mate for John Kennedy on the Democratic ticket, and the result of that--the Democratic candidate got forty-six thousand, roughly, more votes than the Republican candidate, who was Richard Nixon, and there were about two-and-a-quarter million votes cast in that election. Of course, the other factor was this Constitution Party factor that I mentioned to you, that the Constitution Party was a conservative party that put on quite a campaign, but they were too conservative even for conservative Democrats in some cases. And the way the paper ballots were made up in a great many counties, the Constitution Party was

sitting out on the right-hand side of the ballot by itself. All they had, of course, were candidates for president and vice-president--electors, I believe; I'm not sure they were putting the names of candidates on at that time. And a lot of people failed to mark off the Constitution Party. They really just wanted to vote Democratic or Republican. More than a hundred thousand votes of those ballots were invalidated on the grounds that they were mutilated because they didn't mark out everybody they were supposed to, and the Republicans filed a law suit [inaudible] saying that they just threw out the ballots that had been voted for the Republicans in these Democratic counties where they had Democratic election control because they went--it went up to court to all Democrats, and, of course, the Republicans didn't get anywhere with it. And that could have, if it had turned out the other way, it could have changed the election to a Republican victory because it was that close in the electoral college. There was going to be a contest filed in Illinois over some alleged election fraud in Chicago in that same election, but, since the contest in Texas failed, the Republicans didn't see any point in continuing the contest up in Illinois, but it was close.

Then again, and incidentally I think I told you, or I'll say now, that the electoral college, I think, is a good thing. I haven't always thought so. I thought that if a man didn't--because you could get a--it's happened several times in the United States. The man who became president did not have a majority of the popular votes, and I don't know whether that was true in the 1960 election or not. There are always a lot of peripheral candidates. Some of them get a good many votes. For example, in 1968 when Hubert Humphrey was the Democratic candidate for president and Nixon was a candidate, was a Republican again, Nixon won the election nationally, but Humphrey won Texas. Lyndon

Johnson and some others put on a pretty heavy campaign, but for the--the main factor in that race was George Wallace, who was governor of Alabama. That was before he was almost killed in an assassination attempt, and in that election, the Democrats outvoted the Republicans by about forty thousand votes, and here again, there was a million--two-and-a-quarter million votes passed, but Wallace got the 584,269, so in Texas, nobody came close to getting a majority of the votes, but Humphrey got the electoral votes, and I think it's good for the country that when a man gets the majority of the electoral votes, at least he--nobody can claim that he was a minority president, and that's a pretty wise thing, I think, that they did. As I say, I haven't always felt that way, but I believe I do now. I believe that sort of catches us up here. What did you want to ask next?

B: Well, let me ask you about that Constitution Party in 1960. Do you recall who in Texas was behind that, supporting that? Was that [inaudible]?

M: Well, it was just a ripple of kind of hard-shelled conservatives. There had been a conservative element in Texas that was more conservative than the Republicans, and some of them are Democrats, conservative Democrats who couldn't stand to vote for a Republican regardless of how conservative he was. It was a hangover from--goes back to Roosevelt days, and there had been a series of conservative third party movements, all through the South.

B: The Jeffersonian Democrats in 1936. I was just wondering if J. Evetts Haley was a driving force behind that Constitution Party in nineteen [inaudible].

M: He probably was. I can't say that for certain. He considered himself a Jeffersonian Democrat, I know, and he always claimed that's the reason they didn't retain him on the history faculty at the University of Texas, because he was too conservative for the rest of-

-for the people who were making the appointments over there, and so he got out and became a historian and a writer. But he supported with his efforts and his money conservative movements as long as he lived. He's still alive, by the way. He ran for governor one time.

B: That's right.

M: I don't remember what election it was. I remember a little story about him though. He had gotten up kind of a nice brochure, and he was here in Austin. He had had a rally, and he drove--while he was driving out to the airport, and he stopped beside a car. Two women were in the front seat, and he rolled down his window and handed them a piece of his literature, and he said, "I'm Evetts Haley," and he said, "and I'm running for governor." And he said, "You read this, and if you don't believe I'm the right guy, by God, you just vote against me." And then the light changed, and he drove right on through.

He didn't get elected.

B: [inaudible]

M: Well the--what you saw, what you got.

B: Well, before we go on, I think you mentioned that you wanted to make one more comment on Governor [W. Lee] O'Daniel and his relationship with the legislature.

M: Well, I--the comment I intended to make on that was to reasons that I never did think that O'Daniel was a very effective governor. I don't think it's necessarily a good thing for a governor to be beholden to the legislature, the fact that, you know, they've got to be buddy-buddy about everything, even though we've had a one-party system effectively in Texas until the last twenty years, or even almost to the last ten years. But O'Daniel, as I

told you, he didn't know anything about government. He'd never had any experience at any level, but he got elected because of his popularity as a radio personality. One of his ploys was to go around flagellating the legislature all the time for not doing what he wanted them to do, and, as a consequence, there were speeches against him on the floor of the Senate. I remember particularly a senator from East Texas named Joe Hill who [inaudible] O'Daniel was terrible.

In his second race for governor, O'Daniel just--his campaign was just running against the legislature primarily, and then he did have a--his platform was the Ten Commandments, I think he said. And I remember there was one little old representative from over in East Texas that he thought O'Daniel just hung the moon, and he was one of the few real supporters O'Daniel had in the legislature. They said this man wouldn't vote to go to lunch if it was--without running in and asking the governor if it was all right, but he was on the platform, and this fellow had introduced him at a rally down in East Texas, and O'Daniel's--the gist of his speech was "Well, what we need is a whole new legislature," and this guy got beat, the guy that introduced him.

B: It backfired on him. Well, in 1947, the Texas legislature enacted the so-called right-to-work law. Do you remember anything about that and, particularly, the politicians who were for and against and how that split?

M: Nineteen forty--?

B: Forty-seven.

M: --1947. I believe that was the year that they passed several so-called anti-labor bills.

B: Right. Right.

M: Shivers was governor at that time.

B: Lieutenant governor, I think, still? [Shivers was lieutenant governor in 1947.]

M: No, Ben Ramsay was lieutenant governor, I believe. He was either that or senator. He was one of the sponsors of the legislation, and there was a whole--I don't remember the import of all of them. The right-to-work law meant that you did not--they could not require you to belong to a union to hold a job even in a so-called union plant, and the union fought it, and they're still fighting it. They're trying to get something through now called an Agency Law, which would require even a non-union fellow to have to pay union dues, if I understand it correctly, in order to get a job. You could hire one of them, all right, but he would have to pay union dues. He wouldn't have to belong. He'd just have to pay his dues.

B: Do you recall how the mainstream press handled this? Were most of the--was most of the press anti-labor or pro-labor?

M: I think--I don't know whether anti-labor is the exact word. You know, the sponsors of that right-to-work law said that the requirement that you could belong to a union was almost anti-labor.

B: Okay. [inaudible] union.

M: But, yes, most of the newspapers--I know, I'm pretty sure, the *Dallas News* did--I think they supported the law--these laws that would put some restrictions on, you know, activities of unions. You've got to remember that when he was--Allan Shivers came from a union area down in Port Arthur originally, and when he came up to the Senate, the unions never did support him. He never did ask for--"I won't ever ask for their support!" At least, they didn't support him when he got up to state level, and they had some sort of classic confrontations I can't get into. I don't remember all the details.

B: Shivers and the labor unions?

M: Yes. Union labor just fought him tooth and nail. They never did like him.

B: How about LBJ and labor? How did they regard LBJ as you recall?

M: I think they got along with him all right. The Democratic Party, the national party--and he was a national Democrat primarily--and it started back in the 1930s with a coalition of what you can call special interest groups, if you want to, and Franklin Roosevelt saw this well. He organized union leadership, which was a very strong political group, and they were strong in the 1930s, but heck, they've been losing power somewhat in more recent years, but they're still a powerful force. And then they had the backbone of the New Deal, and the coalition they put together. They organized the metropolitan blacks, largely through the ministers in the black churches. In places like New York and Philadelphia and Pittsburgh and Chicago, and, by that time, see--during World War II a great many blacks moved from the South to the North to get jobs, and they started voting, and they substantially bloc-voted for the Democrats and still do. And then there are some other minorities.

Roosevelt--I don't know whether they're minorities or special interest groups--Roosevelt had an intellectual appeal, which was usually attributed to the fact that he came from New England and went to Harvard, but they did put a lot of Harvard people and Eastern intellectuals into the government, and that didn't sit too well with some of the Southerners who were a different type of people.

B: Anything else on labor or the tidelands or anything before we get into civil rights?

M: Oh, I think not. The tidelands thing is--I'll add one little thing.

The first time the tidelands thing came up as a political issue was in--it was when

Price Daniel was attorney general, and he had decided then he was going to run for the United States Senate. I was down in his office one time--he had a sign over his chair that said, "Price Daniel, Lawyer," and he was asking me--he was kind of picking my brain on what chance I thought he had. He said he wanted to run on the question of going to the United States Senate to campaign for passage of the law that would recognize Texas' claim to the tidelands.

And I told him, "General, I don't think that will fly. I don't think you can ever get people interested in it. It's hard to understand, among other things." Well, I proved to be wrong because that's what he did, and he was instrumental in getting it through the Congress. And then, when he got it through the Congress, he came back and ran for governor. He had a hard time getting elected, but he did.

B: Well, what do you remember about the Heman Sweatt Case that began in 1945 or 1946 and was decided in 1950 against the University of Texas Law School? That started getting--sort of got the civil rights ball rolling in Texas?

M: Yes. I don't remember all of the chronology on the Sweatt case. He was the litigant that the NAACP [National Association for the Advancement of Colored People]--they had a legal branch that was supporting the case--he had been a mailman in Houston and never had been to college, but he did become their man to try to get into the University of Texas. Frankly, I don't think he had any--much university qualifications as far as a student was concerned. I think he did enter, but I don't think he stayed very long. There were some others, though, that did--that were admitted, but--I think he was not the first black to be enrolled at the University of Texas, I don't believe.

B: I think it was in the University of Texas Law School. This is what he was challenging.

M: Now he got into law school, I believe, but I think there was another one or two that had enrolled. There is a long, long history behind the black higher-education movement. First place, Texas then had--under the constitution of 1876 by the way--a university-level law school for blacks down at Prairie View, which is a branch of Texas A&M. And then the--they went through all kind of gyrations down in here in the legislature trying to make some kind of an arrangement for black higher education other than--in addition to Prairie View. They established a law school; I think it was in the basement of some building down in temporary [inaudible] by the capitol. And then they put up the money to establish Texas Southern University down in Houston. It had a law school in it. There was another law school a block away over at the University of Houston. But after the courts--after the color barriers were removed, so far as I know there wasn't any great effort other than the legal barriers that existed and were declared to be unconstitutional. I don't think they had any physical resistance in Texas. There was some political resistance. And, incidentally, there were some people--some candi--some politicians that originally said they were for segregation, but, as soon as it got to be popular, they got over on the other side, which is what makes politicians stay in office some time.

B: Well, did this case get much coverage in the press while it was [inaudible]?

M: Oh, yes. Yes. Frankly, a good deal of my newspaper career was devoted to civil rights reporting. I don't know what I did to deserve that, but whatever, it was a hot subject and, in some ways, it was an unpleasant subject because there were all these different ideas in the South about what ought to be done or what we were going to stand for and so on, and the federals were down there trying to make them do something else. And in 1954, when the United States Supreme Court handed down this *Sweatt* vs.--not Sweatt, excuse me--

Brown vs. *Topeka* case, that had to do with public school integration--that was a Kansas case, by the way--the Ford Foundation--I don't know whose idea it was, but I think it was a good idea--put--they put together an organization called Southern Education Reporting Service that had one newspaper man. They had some specifications of what kind of person it ought to be. It ought to be an experienced person with some political experience. All the formerly segregated states. The purpose of it was, however, to get out correct information about what was going on in the South, and I was selected. Actually, they asked the *Dallas News* to recommend somebody, and they recommended me to be the Texas correspondent. I put a lot of time in on it.

The headquarters were in Nashville at the Peabody University, and then--really some of the leading journalists--some of them became newspaper editors and publishers, were--took part in that. It went on for about twenty years, and we got out a monthly paper called the *Southern School News*, and they had the event which had taken place in the previous month in each state, and we were admonished not to show any bias or to use any adjectives that might show a bias, and it worked pretty well. We had meetings two or three times a year over in Nashville and talked about how things were going, and when--some of the--I'll say this. It sounds cynical, but some of the papers outside of the South didn't want to know the truth of what was going on in the South. They had their ideas of what ought to go on in the South, and they would contact *Southern School News*, which was supposed to be the fountain of correct information, but what was done--and the Southern Information Reporting Service would send them all the information they could get on that subject--they would ignore everything that wasn't--that was favorable to the South. For example, like they put--a great many Southern places, most of them, in fact,

integrated without any squabbles. It was a nuisance to have dual-education systems in a lot of these places. They could--they didn't have enough students or enough money to make two good school systems. You put them together, and you'd get a better school system. Also, even the athletic angle played a good deal to it. The high school football team changed perceptibly in a lot of cases. The white schools did--the formerly white schools, and they get all these black athletes over there, and that made a lot--the transition a lot easier, too, by the way.

B: Well, was this Southern education newsletter disseminated throughout the country?

M: Yes. They gave it away, and then you could get some subscriptions. They had subscriptions all over the world.

B: Who was paying for this?

M: The Ford Foundation. They awarded a grant, and they paid us correspondents a hundred dollars a month. I mean, without--but it was sort of a labor of love. It was about the worthwhile thing I ever was associated with almost, and the Barker History Center had a complete file on the things they published because I turned it over to them, and the news--I have got a complete file of all the newspapers. They got out a magazine occasionally. They got a whole series of books written by these correspondents on specific subjects such as school lunches, and it was really the in-depth study of twenty years of Southern education following desegregation.

And there also was an adjunct called Legal Reporting Services or something. They got out--I think it was a quarterly report on all the court decisions that affected this subject. As I say, I think it was a monumental work, and I didn't have anything to do with thinking it up, but I did participate in it.

B: Did the--did state organizations such as the NAACP support this, or did they just not have much to do with it?

M: No, I think they generally liked it. Oh, they didn't like everything that happened, you know, because a lot of people like to put their own bias or their own interpretation on what went on. I remember at one time I was criticized by the White Citizens Council, which was kind of a Ku Klux [Klan]-type of organization, and the NAACP over the same topic, and I thought I must be doing something right.

B: Do you remember what that issue was?

M: No, I don't have any idea, but that was a hard subject. I was up at Little Rock representing the *Dallas News* for three years at school openings--I didn't stay all year--when they were having this problem about trying to force integration there with the use of--

B: Tell me about that--

M: Well, it's a long story. I don't even remember the years. I think it was about 1957.

B: 1957, I think, was the first.

M: And they had the governor, a guy named Orville Faubus, and I don't remember what really set it off except there was--I guess it was a court order, a federal court order that--for the Central High School in Little Rock to admit black students, and there was a lot of opposition to it there in Little Rock because they just sort of sprung it on them, and I don't remember--the Attorney General of the United States--I think it was Herbert Brownell. He was Eisenhower's attorney general. They said that Brownell almost did it without thinking of the consequences as far as the president was concerned and so on. First, they threatened to send federal marshals down there and guard the students as they

came in. Next, the governor sent in the National Guard to stop the marshals, as I remember, and then Brownell and the United States Government got forty-nine--some parachute divisions from over at Fort Bragg, I think. They sent them in. It was wild, a wild affair. Nine scared little black people they were trying to get into school, and there was a bunch of mainly--well, they were out-of-town people that were squawking about that, and the Little Rock newspaper was supporting it.

B: Was supporting the [inaudible]--?

M: They were supporting the integration movement.

B: The integration movement. Okay.

M: And the thing was--never did really need to get into such a hot situation. It was a forced deal. You know, nobody likes to be forced to do something that they don't want to do, and there was--incidentally, while Little Rock got a reputation of being a city of violence over that, there wasn't anybody got hurt in the whole three years far as I know. The only thing that I saw that was anything like violence--well, two things: one, some black man came down there and said somebody pushed him off a sidewalk, and another time, there was a white fellow that was practically a mental case. He was around there all the time, and when they had the--the day the students started to school, the United States military had blocked off all the approaches to the school. They had guys with bayonets down there in the front yards of all these houses, and this guy was--he went up to one of the soldiers and, I think, tried to take his rifle away from him or something. And the soldier--the soldier tried to defend himself. He cut him across the chest, not deep, but it bled a good deal, and this [inaudible] made all the national papers with that. But so far as I know that was all the violence there was in the whole three years.

B: Well, so you think the press sensationalized--

M: I don't think there's any question about it, and I was there the entire time. Now, you may get a different view if you talk to somebody from Detroit because they had--they were a northern community. They had a--a lot of blacks were down there. It was an inflammatory kind of a situation, and, you know, they could kind of take the high road because they didn't have any problems at that time. They have had since.

B: Do you think it was part of a strategy on the part of black groups which were trying to [inaudible]?

M: Well, not really. I don't think it was strategy. It was a deliberate thing. They wanted to integrate all the schools in the country, and they pretty well did it. You know, they had to get court orders to do what the NAACP wanted. You see, there had been a whole series of Court decisions on this thing. I think the 1954 decision was that "compulsory segregation is unconstitutional." I think that's just about as far as it went. I don't think there was anything in it about "you're going to have to integrate," and there was certainly nothing in it about busing or, you know, a quota system, or even about affirmative action. They just said you couldn't have any legal barriers, and then the [inaudible] of that, the whole series of court things, the whole thing got a--went a whole lot further than the original court decision was. There wasn't any change in the constitution really because in 1896 there had been a previous Supreme Court decision that separate but equal facilities were constitutional.

B: *Plessy* v. *Ferguson*.

M: Yes, but then, you know, they had a difference of court. You know, [inaudible] you talk about strict constitutional construction, I don't know that the Supreme Court says

anything about it--I mean, that the constitution really says anything. First, they didn't say anything about education. They don't promise anybody an education.

B: Anything else about Little Rock?

M: Well, no, over a period of time, it sort of smoothed out, and I have a story over here somewhere--I haven't looked at in quite a while--1986, I believe. I think Central High School is mainly a black school now, and that's been almost--it's been the experience in a good many places. The integration in--I'm sure in the South, and I suspect it is all over the United States--has resulted in white flight from a whole lot of commun--a whole lot of areas because--not because they don't want to associate with blacks. They want to have a school situation where their kids can get the best education, and so a lot of times, these newly integrated schools did not have an atmosphere that was conducive to teaching. I could give you some examples of that, and you may have seen some yourself if you went to--I don't know when you went to high school. Where did you go--to Port Arthur?

B: Yes. It was before integration.

M: Was it?

B: Well, do you want to give some examples of that [inaudible]?

M: Oh, I don't believe I want to. Some of them are personal examples. My wife was a teacher, for one thing. She was a high school chemistry teacher, and because--it turned the schools, the public schools--there was so much litigation going on, and everybody thought they were being discriminated against whether it was--you know, whether it was deserved punishment or not, for example. You know, "The court said we could come up here," and there was an awful lot of ignorance involved in it. People really didn't know

what they were entitled to in these schools, and, quite often, the parents didn't seem to care. You know, they--you send them over there and look after them--and the upshot of it was that the principals in these schools quite often spent more time in court trying to defend what they were doing, which was uncommon when I was going to school. You know, you used--there was hardly ever a school--a lawsuit filed against a public school for making the child--for disciplining a child, for example. There may have been some cases where there should have been, but people didn't use to do that.

B: What was Shivers' role in desegregation in Texas?

M: Well, he--well, he was not an integrationist. Most of the politicians in Texas--and Shivers was governor at the time. I'd have to refresh my memory on what he did say, and there was a lot of bicycling around in the legislature and other places, trying to pass some kind of a law or file some kind of a lawsuit that would slow it down or stop it. They had some sort of a doctrine that some of the East Texas legislators wanted to put in called "interposition," which they said was a constitutional right. A state could interpose itself between the federal government and the local community on what they were going to make them do, and, incidentally, there is a rather well-known professor right here at the University of Texas, constitutional lawyer, who thinks that the whole effort for courts to order local school districts to do anything is itself contrary to the constitution. He has written a book about it. Lynn O'Ralia [?].

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M: They didn't necessarily become advocates of this promiscuous busing or quota system, but they saw the rightness of what the black people were trying to do, or, at least, the

black leaders said they were trying to do, and it had--it really didn't work out quite as ideally as a lot of people thought because there were so many deficiencies and cultural differences and so on that a lot of the black students really weren't even--weren't ready to go to the classes they were assigned to in the high school, and there was a big drop-rate. It was largely a fault of--the segregated schools in the South, the black segregated schools, often were just ridiculously poor. I mean, they were just--partly because the school system couldn't afford any better, partly because they didn't have enough students to constitute a real school. You know, you get eighty students and call it a school district, you can't furnish eleven grades. That's why they used to be--they raised it to twelve, and, I think, up to thirteen grades now. But there was a similar problem with Hispanic students in South Texas. They used to segregate them in some places, partly because of the language differences. And there was a lawsuit over that, and the court held in one case--and I don't know what--there've been some subsequent decisions, I guess--that they could have separate schools for Spanish-speaking students for the first year, and, after that, Hispanic--I think they legally defined Spanish students as Caucasian and entitled them to go to school with Anglo-students, but they didn't entitle them to bilingual education all the way through. They were supposed to learn English the first year they were in that segregated school and then be able to go on with the rest of them.

The black schools suffered not only under segregation but long after segregation by the fact that there were some very poorly prepared black teachers. I don't say that with any rancor or anything. I think it's known to be a fact, and some of those teachers stayed in the integrated school systems for years. Lately, they've passed a competency examination. I don't know anything about the coloration of the ones that didn't pass it,

but there seemed to be more opposition among the black teachers to the competency examination. A lot of them retired, and some of them had been in the system for years. I think about five percent of them left in one way or another, either retired or flunked, but that was the fault of the opportunities they'd had to a pretty large extent. I think Prairie View turned out some good teachers. That was the only place in Texas, though, a Black could go and get a teaching certificate except some private schools, most of which were badly under-nourished. I think there were six of them: Jarvis and Bishop, and there were two in Marshall. I don't remember--and Jarvis was over in East Texas, and there was one in Waco called Paul Quinn, and most of them were teacher training institutions, but they were in absolutely no position to give teacher training of high quality. A fair number of blacks that wanted to become teachers went to schools outside the South, and one of the--I don't know whether this is true or not, but it's been said that Southern--I mean, non-Southern schools had a sympathy for blacks out of the South who came up there to go to school, and they were easier on them than they were on the others and, consequently, they'd pass them whether they were that deserving or not. They'd give them a teacher's certificate, and they'd come back to Texas. They called them--I think they called them "black diplomas" or something like that, but they were--you know, legally qualified. I mean, legally certified.

B: What time period are you talking about?

M: Before desegregation. And I'm sure that's not still true, but a great many blacks enrolled in previously all-white schools. Not as many as the whites. The universities have put on a strong campaign, and still are, trying to get more black representation with some success, but not outstanding success. They're giving scholarships and all and other

special attractions, particularly for good students, but everybody wants the same students. And the same thing is true for schools outside the South. These formerly all-black institutions are really--they're having a struggle. The church-related schools are almost [inaudible]. [inaudible] up in Dallas declared bankruptcy the other day. It's hard for a university to declare bankruptcy, but they did, and I think they're maybe going to manage to keep it open somehow. It's been on a shoestring for all it's life, and Huston-Tillotson here in Austin is--I think, they have financial problems. Part of the--one thing is that a lot of their better students go on to places like the University of Texas, and they--there's some loss of leadership in there.

B: Do you think that there's still a need for these black schools? Black universities?

M: I'm ambivalent about that. I think there ought to be an opportunity someplace for blacks to go other than just to go to the double-A, triple-A university because so many of them cannot do the work, but they deserve all the education they can take.

B: [inaudible] educationally deprived and--

M: Junior colleges are doing a great deal. Excuse me.

B: You mean they can't do the work because they've been educationally deprived in [inaudible]--?

M: I'm not--I'm really not going to speculate on that. "Educationally deprived," I guess, covers a wide range. A lot of it has to do with the kind of conditions they were brought up in at home, I think. You know, the good students usually have an atmosphere conducive to learning at home. I bet you did.

B: Thank you.

M: And I think you'll find that--there was an Oriental student that was on television that had

recently won the National Spelling Bee and hadn't been in this country but two or three years, and they were interviewing, asking her why so many Orientals who--some of these boat people from Vietnam--why they were doing so well academically, and she said, "Well, for one thing, it's family honor." Another one is that their families are very strict on what they will let them do during school days in the school year. They don't let them watch television in the evening until they get all their schoolwork done. But I'm not sure that's true of all people in the United States.

B: Anything else on civil rights before we move on? [inaudible]

M: On the--let me make this other comment. This is a critical comment, but I've got stacks of stuff--I read this--on this--I'm not reading propaganda. I'm reading newspaper stories primarily, and then their reports by various people who have studied it. Even the best supported, at least in Texas, formerly all-black schools like Prairie View and Texas Southern--they're supported by the tax-payers, and they're having a lot harder time than Prairie View used to have, partly because their better students are going to some other place, taking for--Prairie View used primarily to be an agricultural and teacher's college. They did have some engineering courses. I question the wisdom of having two predominantly black state universities that close together because I don't think they've got enough students for them. Say, they're just sixty miles apart, and there are all kind of schools they can go to.

Junior colleges are probably doing a better job than anybody educating blacks beyond high school. But there are a lot of outstanding black students that go to universities and law schools and medical schools, engineering schools. The first black university professor in the South was at the University of Texas in the engineering school.

He died not too long after that, and he came of a family over at Cold Springs, Texas, but he was a brilliant engineer, and he had started out at Prairie View when he got his doctorate here at the University of Texas.

B: Did you know Ralph Yarborough? He used to cast a--

M: Yes, I knew him well.

B: --long shadow over Texas politics.

M: I've known Ralph Yarborough ever since he's been in politics.

B: Is that right? Tell me about him. Can you characterize him?

M: Well, he's sort of a--enigma is not the exact word, and I don't even know exactly--I don't know whether I would like to--I like him. He's a very brainy lawyer, and he was a good judge. He was the State District Judge here originally. But he had--when he got over into the state--national political arena, he became a zealot, and I couldn't stay with him. I really couldn't, and--

B: On what issues?

M: Well, on the [inaudible] issue, about the [inaudible] liberal issues. I don't recall specifically. I just thought he was--quite often, he and I were the voters on opposite sides if I'd been in the Senate when he was. But I see him. We belong to a club together. I see him several times a year.

B: What was he like as a campaigner?

M: Oh, he was tireless. He--he's still campaigning. He'll make a speech anytime you can get two people together. A lot of politicians are like that. Shivers was like that. You've got to like people. You've got to be almost immune to getting tired. But Yarborough--[inaudible] a good many of the liberal candidates didn't like to--didn't like the

newspapers. Some of them ran against the newspapers, particularly the *Dallas News*, which was more conservative then than it is now. They'd almost make it dangerous for a reporter to come to some of their rallies and to be identified as a reporter for that bad old paper and a--

B: Really?

M: --and a crowd would get like they were going to beat somebody up for daring to show up and [inaudible] what this fine man was saying.

B: Really, you, as a reporter and especially from a conservative paper like the *Dallas Morning News*, would actually feel threatened at times?

M: Yes. A reporter is not supposed to be part of the scenery. They're not supposed to be part of the story. And I say the same thing about civil rights, and a lot of reporters got to be a part of the story in the civil rights thing. Some of them inadvertently, and some of them asked for it.

Television seemed to be the worst offender on some of these things. I was in New Orleans. There was a school, when they were integrating the New Orleans public schools by court order, and DeLesseps [Story] "Chep" Morrison was the mayor down there then, and they were trying to--you know, handle a bad situation with the least possible commotion, and they had people coming down when the schools opened. They had protests and waving their arms in the TV camera. I personally have heard, particularly women, say, you know, "I'm going to be on the six o'clock news, and I've got to go home and catch myself." Well, Morrison called all the reporters in one time when I was down there. He said, "I wish you people would quit adding to the trouble we've already got." He said, "I saw a television reporter down there not far from my office was lining up a

bunch of people to have a parade, and he had a Confederate flag. He was furnishing all the props, and it was going to look like a protest. But he organized the protest."

B: Have you seen incidents--something like that happen that was almost entirely [inaudible]?

M: No, but I've seen posed pictures, and I guess posing pictures is not all that uncommon in the newspaper business, but, you know, you ask somebody "if you can run through that again? Shake your fist or something."

B: Have you seen Ralph Yarborough actually point out a reporter yourself--

M: No.

B: --or any other reporter?

M: No, I have not. Somebody told me O'Daniel did it one time to an Associated Press reporter that was following him around, and this guy had to leave. He was afraid the crowd was going to beat him up.

B: Well, Ralph Yarborough ran against Shivers in 1954 for the governorship.

M: Ran against Shivers? No, in 19--you were asking about Ralph Yarborough--in 1952, he ran against Shivers in the Democratic primary for governor, and Shivers got 833,000 votes to 488,000 for Yarborough. I well remember when Yarborough announced for governor, and nobody--at least, I did not expect him, and I saw him all the time because he was around town, and he was in politics. We'd heard he was going to run for office. I think he came into the Capitol Press Room one afternoon and said he had an announcement, and it was generally expected he was going to run for attorney general, and he would have been elected probably. He'd have been a good [inaudible]. He was well qualified among other things, but he said he was announcing for governor, running against Shivers. Well, and then he went off--but he was off and running until he finally

got defeated. But he ran in--he lost to Shivers again by a pretty close margin in 1954, but that was in the--that was after the Eisenhower defection that Shivers had led in 1952. They ran--those races had been run right down the party-loyalty basis. The people that did not follow Shivers out, the Democrats, they were accusing all these guys that did of being turncoats. It was a fairly effective issue but it didn't elect Yarborough, and then in 1956, Daniel ran for governor. Shivers did not run for re-election. Daniel ran, and he beat Yarborough very, very narrowly in the second primary. He beat him 698,000 to 694,000.

B: Was there any suspicion of voter--tampering with votes in any of those elections that [inaudible]--?

M: I never heard it. All--because it's not uncommon for people to say, you know, "If they'd counted all my votes," or something, "I'd have been elected." But I don't think--there wasn't any chicanery alleged that I heard about. Here again, this ran--this was partly on that party-loyalist proposition. Daniel had gone with Shivers on this tidelands thing in 1952, and in 1956, he ran for governor himself as a Democrat, and the fact, he had voted--he supported--Shivers supported Eisenhower in the previous presidential election didn't help him any. Almost beat him. That and other things.

B: Do you know why Ralph Yarborough decided to run against Shivers for governor rather than run for attorney-general?

M: Oh, the--he used to have some philosophical--major philosophical differences, and he--I expect he had some pressure on him from labor unions and others that would offer to put up some money, and he didn't require much urging to have to run. He likes politics.

B: Do you remember other--okay, you've spoken of some of the issues that Yarborough ran

on like this turncoat thing.

M: Oh, I guess the labor issues had something to do with it, but I don't specifically know. It just--"My crowd against your crowd," [inaudible] the "outs" against the "ins."

B: I would have imagined that he, as well as everyone else, would just soft-pedal civil rights as much as possible. Is that the case, or did that become an issue [inaudible]?

M: Well, he soft-pedaled it in the beginning, and he was embarrassed during the campaign in some stage, I remember, because there was a *Dallas News* reporter following him around over in East Texas, in which he--I don't remember what campaign it was or whether it was even before he started running for office, but he was a segregationist at that time. He thought that, you know, segregation was [inaudible] the best thing for that part of the country. But then when he started running, he was pretty fast on that--in fact, I think he never would admit that he had made that statement although it had been reported in the paper, and there was a capable reporter standing there taking notes. Sometime people hate to be reminded of what they said.

B: In 1956 at the state Democratic convention, Allan Shivers had a big political battle.

M: Nineteen what?

B: Fifty-six.

M: Yes, okay.

B: Do you recall that? Did you cover that, or do you--?

M: Oh, sort of. I wasn't heavily involved in it. As I remember it, there was a rump convention and a regular convention, but the national Democrats had turned thumbs-down on Shivers by then, and they were going to do anything--they were trying to get control of the state party, and they did. Well, in fact, they had control of it for several

years. They had control of it through 1960 and, I guess, 1962, and I--well, I suppose that you could say that they still have control of it because a lot of the conservative Democrats that were helping keep people like Shivers in office have either died or become Republicans. The next generations are a lot more Republican than they were when I was coming up.

Have we gotten into the growth of the Republican Party? You want to talk a little about that?

B: Sure. Yes.

M: Well, in--because of the defection that started as early as the 1920s in the presidential race and up to the New Deal days, the defections of conservative Democrats all over the South--I'm talking about the old brass-collar Democrats. They were left-over Confederates, and they had strong memories of the War Between the States and all the bad things that they said the United States government strapped on them. They couldn't stomach a lot of the national candidates that the national Democratic party was putting up, but they also thought their ancestors would be twirling in their graves if they voted for any kind of a Republican. Well, that became more respectable under Shivers, and in 1960, [inaudible] got elected, and the state party started stirring, and in 1962, as I remember, there were about a dozen Republicans elected to the Texas House of Representatives. I think maybe one senator, which was--there was one exception. Some fellow from Dallas got elected in 1952 for one term. Well, that was out of a one-hundred-and-eighty-one members of the legislature. The Republicans had those twelve guys in the House.

Then came the assassination of Kennedy in Dallas. Well, then Texas was covered

with embarrassment, and somehow they related that to--well, I won't say exactly blamed it on the Republicans, but it became almost sacrilegious to vote for anybody but the perpetuation of Kennedy's memory, which was something that President Johnson--he had become president after the assassination--he played that to the hilt, and he tried to get everybody into--all the newspapers in Texas to support him, and in the meantime, all of those twelve Republicans that had gotten elected in 1962, I think they all got voted out in 1964.

B: So you think the Kennedy assassination really thwarted what would have been a Republican [inaudible]--?

M: Well, it did temporarily, and then along--the Republicans were picking up steam again about 1968 and 1970. Along comes Watergate--they had about twenty people in the legislature by then--they got wiped out again, and it wasn't until--oh, sometime in the 19--later in the 1970s--but those, you know, they never did quit, and in the last--particularly in the 1980s, starting with Reagan, well they really got rolling, and all the time, they've had one senator since 1960, one United States senator. I think now there are fifty-six Republicans in the House and eight in the Senate, I believe. And there's thirty-one senators and a hundred House members, but they--fifty-six members of the House, they don't block votes any more than the Democrats agree to do. They don't have quite as much party politics as they had. But no longer can any governor--Democratic governor or--be certain that the legislature is going to support what he wants to do. You know, like on a veto or a constitutional amendment. It takes a hundred members of the House and twenty-one members of the Senate to--I believe it's twenty--yes, twenty-one members of the Senate to submit a constitutional amendment, and in order to override a veto, and

that's about a--the Texas governor doesn't have anything much except negative power anyway and appointment power.

B: Do you think Shivers knew where he was leading ultimately when he supported Eisenhower in 1952? Do you think [inaudible]--

M: Oh, I don't know that he knew. I don't think he cared. I mean, he didn't like those guys in Washington, and he--two or three times, he was importuned to run for senator, to run against Yarborough, or, I think, maybe even one time to get him to run for a vice-presidential nominee with the Republican or to run, you know, on a ticket with him. Seriously, he hadn't lost anything in Washington, and he grew up in Texas, and he liked it down here, and he just didn't have any zeal whatever to go to Washington. And he maintained that position, and also, I understand, his wife didn't have any interest whatever in going. And she was a pretty quiet type [of] person, but she had a lot of influence on him.

B: Do you recall the insurance and veteran land sales scandals that touched [inaudible]--

M: Yes.

B: --touched his administration--well, right before--

M: Well, the land scandals and the insurance scandals were both in the Shivers' administration as I remember--

B: Right, I think [inaudible].

M: --and he was the first to admit he made some mistakes in the people that he appointed. Well, I'll separate first--I'll first separate out the land scandals. Bascom Giles has been a career man over at the General Land office. He was a--and he had been elected commissioner, I think, oh several times. I know I liked him, and I voted for him every

time he ran. One of the things he did, though, as the land commissioner was to get a constitution and an amendment submitted where veterans for World War I and II, and later added later wars, they could borrow money from the state at a cheap price to buy, like, twenty acres of land. I think, $20,000 was the maximum they could borrow, and they would get a low interest rate. They had a very low down payment. I think 5 per cent. He wanted to encourage these guys to buy--you know, get themselves some property. And it was a good idea. It was very popular. Well, it was almost an antidote for what they called "a soldier's bonus." Some states just shelled out five hundred or a thousand dollars apiece to everybody that had been in the army or been in the military. And this was really a very sound idea, but for reasons nobody understands yet, Shivers--I mean Giles--became involved with some land speculators, and some boy was scammed down around Cuero to buy up some land and then sell it to these veterans for a profit, and the state was going to put up the money. That was the gist of it. Giles really didn't--he didn't need the money. He was from a respectable, well-to-do family up here, and to this day, I have no idea why he got involved in the thing, but there was a reporter--a newspaper reporter--down at Cuero called Kenneth Towery, and he discovered what was going on, and he kind of got on a one-man crusade to see if he couldn't do something about it. And the upshot of it was that Giles and two or three other people got indicted, and Giles was sent to the penitentiary and served his time. Of course, he was--it ruined him politically, and Shivers did get to appoint his successor while--when the--1951, I believe it was. I believe that was the election. Giles heard--knew during the Christmas holidays. He had heard that this indictment was coming up. It hadn't been announced previously, but the story broke during the Christmas holidays [Bascom was indicted in

March 1955 and went to prison in January 1956]. And he had been re-elected, but he declined to qualify and take the oath of office for another term, and so Shivers got to make an appointment. It was--became a vacancy, and he appointed Earl Rudder, who was a World War [II] hero, and Rudder served--I think he ran a time or two, and then he became the head of Texas A&M University.

On the other thing, on the--

B: Just one question before you go to that. So Towery really went after this story and--?

M: Well, it was--initially, he dug it up.

B: So it probably--it may never have come out if Towery hadn't gone after it?

M: Oh, I won't say it never would have come out, but he brought it out, and he won a Pulitzer for it, and before they got through with it, every newspaper in the state, and some out of the state, were on it.

We've had several rather major scandals that affected Texas politics one way or another. One of them was back--an issue during the 1950s. Yarborough got involved in one. He's always denied that he had anything to do with it. There was a Billy Sol Estes scam out in West Texas where some guy was--he was involved in some of those Federal Farms Storage programs, and he was--well, I don't remember all the details, to tell you the truth, but there was--part of the plot was they were selling non-existent fertilizer tanks, chemical fertilizer tanks, to some of those farmers out there, but I think they were borrowing the money from the federal government, and [inaudible] go to count them, they had a lot more loans out than they had fertilizer tanks, and I never--a guy got killed over it under mysterious circumstances. I don't want to get into that because it--because that story is still kicking around.

B: There were--you say there were accusations that Ralph Yarborough was somehow involved?

M: He was supposed to have gotten some money out of it.

B: Who made those accusations, do you recall?

M: Well, his opponent--his opponents. I don't remember who they were, to tell you the truth, and they had a guy who was sort of working for Estes; I believe he was. He had something to do with the operations out in West Texas. I [inaudible]--I think--since this is a sensitive issue about a guy still alive, I don't need to re-hash it. There never were any charges filed on the thing except newspaper allegations, and Yarborough denied that he got the $50,000 that somebody said Billy Sol delivered--had delivered to him.

B: What would Billy Sol Estes' motive have been?

M: Greed! But he was a big benefactor to Democratic politicians, including President Kennedy. The United States Department of Agriculture helped blow the whistle on these people after the thing first got uncovered.

B: Is that right? Did the Texas Agricultural Commissioner have anything-- He was--it was--that was John White at that time. Did he have anything to do--?

M: No, he didn't have anything--as far as I know--

B: --at that time [inaudible]?

M: --he probably didn't even know it was going on.

B: He defeated J. E. McDonald. Do you remember anything about J. E. McDonald [inaudible]?

M: Yes.

B: What do you--he was--

M: Well, he was accused of having Republican leanings back when it wasn't popular at all. And the Agricultural Commissioner in Texas is really a kind of a useless job, if you'll pardon the expression. They made various attempts to disband the department and turn the function over to Texas A & M, which has extension service offices all over the state and performs some of the same functions. McDonald, though--he was a fairly elderly guy, and he'd run several times, and he didn't pay much attention to the politics of his job, so John White was a young guy that had been to Texas Tech, and he lived in Wichita Falls, and he ran against McDonald largely on the basis that he had been in office too long. I don't remember how long it was, sixteen or eighteen years. White stayed in longer than McDonald did. Then White got out and went to Washington, a reward of the Democratic Party.

B: Let's see. You were going to talk about the insurance. Did you have something to say about the insurance scandals that went on in Shiver's administration?

M: Yes.

(Interruption)

M: Then White got out and went to Washington to work in the Democratic Party.

B: Let's see. You were going to talk about the insurance. Did you have something to say about the insurance scandals that went on in Shivers' administration?

M: Yes. That's a--it really pre-dated Shivers, but it reached its ugly climax, I guess, during Shivers' administration. They had an insurance regulation in Texas. It was something, I think, called the Texas Board of Insurance Commissioners, and I--they were all appointed officers, three fellows, and they launched insurance companies primarily and fixed rates and things like that and were pretty political. The insurance companies courted them all

time, and then there got to be what really was a sort of a scandal over the creation of--it wasn't just sort of a scandal. It was a big scandal. It went almost back to the O'Daniel years--on the creation of new life insurance companies in Texas. The way the thing--and it probably included other lines of insurance--the way it worked somebody would go over and get a charter for a new insurance company out of the commission--and there were various influences brought to bear on that--and issue a lot of stock, and the organizers of the thing would--say they'd get a hundred thousand shares of stock for themselves at ten cents a share. Then they'd go public with another hundred thou[sand] at five dollars a share, and then when things kind of got cracked up, they'd sell their ten cents stock to some sucker for five dollars a share, and then they'd pull out and go organize another company. All you had to do was have a name and some incorporators. Well, that got to be really pretty sticky, and then it came to light that--some of these companies were just awful. It wasn't life insurance companies that were going broke. It was some other--they'd always hand off their policies to a company that would take them over because it's a pretty good business to take over insurance policies. They were--I think these were liability insurance companies, and then it came to light that the commissioners were accepting various favors from these guys. I mean, like trips to Hawaii. Or they'd go to conventions, and the insurance companies would pay their bills to go to insurance conventions somewhere. Well, it got to be really pretty sticky, almost entirely because of the insurance companies' failures, and people--a lot of people lost a lot of money in them, all these guys that were buying this stock. It was no good, and this happened during Shivers' administration, and I--he had made two appointments out of the three, and the other guy was sick and had been for several years, and Shivers--I know in that case he

took the blame for it privately because he said one of these guys that he appointed was a friend of his; he'd been stuck with him politically ever since he got in politics, but he said, "I shouldn't have appointed that fellow." He said, "I knew he couldn't handle that job." But he didn't think he could do any harm over there. You know, appointing your friends to jobs is not uncommon in politics, and then the other--the other guy was a pretty well-thought-of attorney that Shivers appointed. He turned out--he was just doing business over there. He got into court. I don't think he ever went to prison over it.

B: Well, this came to light because so many of these insurance companies were failing. Was that right?

M: Yes, and the upshot of it was that they re-organized the insurance company and made the state board of insurance and appointed a whole new bunch of guys and put the whole department under a chief commissioner, I believe, and they filed a lot of lawsuits and cleaned it up, and as far as I know, it's all right now. But this was done under Shivers' administration. The cleanup was under his, too.

B: Did these scandals hurt him much?

M: They didn't help him any. No. He said it was partly his fault for not paying more attention to the guys that he was appointing.

B: Yes. Of course, he wasn't going to run again anyway. I guess they broke in a--

M: Well, I don't know. He--

B: --right time.

M: --may be like Lee Iaococca and the cars. You know, he's now--this fellow yesterday--they were saying he was selling used cars for new cars, and he said, "Yes, they were," and he said, "We sure did foul up!" So you were buying a new car--had one that had been

wrecked.

Tape 2 of 2, Side 1

B: You knew Price Daniel.

M: Yes, I knew him very well. He came into the house of representatives during the 1930s, and I was a reporter in there. Yes, we became good friends--still are, as a matter of fact. Price was sort of a low-key person. He didn't make waves like Shivers and [Tom?] Connally and some of these other people, but he was pretty effective, and he held more public--more top offices than any person in the history of Texas. He [Daniel] was a state representative, speaker of the Texas House of Representatives, he was attorney general, he was United States senator, he was governor, and then he was associate justice of the supreme court, so he had a pretty good track record. As far as I know, he never did lose a political race. He came pretty close one time, when Yarborough ran [against] him in 1956 for governor.

But he was a very, very honorable, had a fine family, and when he was--I remember what year it was, he opposed the sales tax. It went back, as I remember, to that 1938 thing with O'Daniel and the transactions tax. He was on record as being against all forms of sales tax. When he got to be governor--I don't remember which term it was--the state was in a financial bind, as it always is, over paying teachers, as it always is. And somebody--they had--he tried to pass a natural gas gathering tax, I mean not a gathering tax but a pipeline tax, so he could pass the tax along to the people outside the state who bought Texas gas. The United States Supreme Court said he couldn't do that. They decided three different times that you cannot tax interstate commerce; I don't know why the legislature kept trying to do it. They were trying, in fact, to tax out-of-state gas

without taxing in-state gas, and if they had taxed the part that was sold in Texas, it would have stood up in court.

But they got around to the tail-end of a legislative session, and they were going to have to--we were going to have to call a special session [and] try to do something else. They had a sales tax on. And he didn't even like to use the word "sales tax," he called it a "use tax," "sales and use tax" or something like that. So the legislature sent it to the governor, even though he'd said he didn't want it, and he let it become law without his signature. And the poor guy--it did get him beat, by the way. The first general sales tax Texas had had, they exempted food and drugs and some other items, but when he ran the next year, they had a "pennies for Price" thing, which all these merchants--you know, they'd had to add it to their purchase for the first time in the history of this state, and they said, "Well, here's pennies for ol' Price!" Price was against it, but he did let it become law, [and] it beat him. That was in 1962; that was when he lost to John Connally. But he later got elected to the Supreme Court.

B: Well, let's move on to the 1960 campaign, the Kennedy-Johnson campaign in Texas. First of all, I believe in your book you said that LBJ won the Texas delegation convention votes easily after crushing the efforts of a liberal minority at the state Democratic convention. Do you remember anything about that? Was this liberal minority led by Ralph Yarborough?

M: I don't have a clear memory; what's in the book is thoroughly researched, and I don't want to do it off the top of my head. But that's something called the Democrats of Texas, which didn't like the national party leadership, and that was a liberal organization. I don't know whether Yarborough took sides or not--he and Lyndon Johnson actually were on

the same side nearly all the time, and Lyndon courted him. Lyndon helped elect him, as a matter of fact, to the Senate. So I doubt that he would do anything Johnson didn't want him to do, or would really vigorously oppose him doing. But this was for a group that apparently didn't have any--Lyndon Johnson was a pragmatist more than anything else, and he was both liberal and conservative; it just kind of depended what circumstances were. In this case, well, I guess he was one of the best friends the oil business ever had up there in the United States Congress, and certainly the building industry in Texas.

B: You covered LBJ's campaign in the South some. Did you travel with him when he [inaudible]?

M: I didn't travel with him all over the South. I travelled with him in Texas.

B: Yes. When he--I believe Richard Russell was travelling him with him when he--?

M: Yes.

B: Tell me about that. What kind of appeal did LBJ make to Texas to get them to vote for the Kennedy--?

M: Well, he really tried to get them to vote for *him*. Originally, see, he ran for president, and he had the election laws changed so it would benefit him--he could stay in the Senate and run for president at the same time; if he didn't happen to get elected president he could still be in the Senate. But he did get it on the--he said worse things about Kennedy in the campaign for votes before the convention than any Republican ever said about Kennedy, his qualifications and his other--other things about him.

B: Really? What did he say--do you recall specifically?

M: I think he said in effect that in some of his political operations he was less than honest. (Laughter)

B: He said that publicly?

M: I think he did in West Virginia. I don't believe I want to get into that too much, though; I don't have any clear memory of it. But I do know he said some very unkind things about Kennedy, and Johnson supporters in Texas said, "Well, if Johnson doesn't get it, we're not going to take that Kennedy." And they got out there in Los Angeles, I believe, where they had the convention, and I don't know--there's still some mystery about exactly how they pulled this off, but Kennedy came out on top in the presidential balloting, for the nomination. And I think that one of the guys that really didn't want to have a lot to do with Johnson was Bobby Kennedy, the President's brother. They didn't like each other. I think that Sam Rayburn had a lot to do with getting Kennedy to ask Johnson to be his running mate, although it really came pretty much as a surprise, particularly to Johnson supporters. They thought that anybody who had been saying all the things about Kennedy that Johnson had been saying certainly wouldn't want to run with him for office. But Johnson was asked, and he leaped at the opportunity, and it did make a good ticket.

B: What do you think Johnson's motive was in accepting that vice-presidential nomination? Do you think that he realized that--

M: A step up.

B: --that the ticket needed him, or--?

M: Well, he was a political animal. It was a step up, and it put him in line to be president and he made it.

B: Because in some ways it was a step down, in power.

M: Well, you might say in political power, but again, Johnson weighed all the possibilities. He'd already done about everything he could do as senate majority leader, or the main

things he was going to do. The vice president doesn't have a lot of authority, and I don't think he ever really enjoyed being vice president; certainly Kennedy never gave him much to do. But back to the 1960 election, the Kennedy people weren't even very nice to Johnson. The night of the election in 1960 I was following Johnson around, and about five o'clock in the morning after the election--it was a very close election, and the Democrat was declared to be the winner at about five o'clock in the morning; all the states were in, I guess. And I called over to his headquarters in the Driskill Hotel here in Austin, and I asked if Mr. Johnson had a statement to make. I thought I was talking to George Reedy, his press secretary. He said, "This is Lyndon." (Laughter) And I thought--"Well, Mr. Vice President, I--I thought maybe you'd be in bed by now." "No," he said, "I'm staying up; I was listening to the thing." I said, "I'd like to congratulate you on winning the election. I think you made the difference on this ticket. You helped carry Texas and helped carry some of the other southern states." He said, "Why don't you write that?" (Laughter) I said, "Well, I intend to," and I did write it in the *Dallas News*. The Kennedys never gave him any credit, by the way. None! And as I said in this book, I think the only two writers in the United States that said that Johnson made the difference on that ticket were me and Arthur Krock of the *New York Times*.

B: Why do you think that was? Do you think that a lot of reporters just didn't perceive it, or they didn't want to [inaudible]?

M: They just didn't want to give Lyndon that much credit. I don't know whether they perceived it or not, but I think it was--of course, Krock also was a Southerner, I think, and--I think we understood, probably better than people did in some of the other parts of the United States, that a fellow like Johnson on the ticket--he was sort of a populist, and

he had a good track record as a Democrat from the South, he could help balance a New England intellectual, and a Roman Catholic besides--the first Catholic ever elected president. I don't think any southern state would have gone for Kennedy had it not been for Johnson on the ticket. That was just my opinion of it.

B: When Johnson was campaigning, when you covered his campaign in 1960, did he bring that issue up, the Catholicism? Or did he just--

M: Did Johnson?

B: Did Johnson bring up Kennedy's--?

M: Johnson didn't, but Kennedy did.

B: But Johnson didn't.

M: No, I think he would rather not talk about it. But Kennedy handled it very well. He got a bunch of Baptists and Protestant preachers together down in Houston, I believe it was, and he kind of begged for them to be broad-minded about this thing. He said he wasn't in favor of the Pope running the government, or some words to that effect. And as a consequence, a lot of them went off and endorsed him. It helped him.

B: Do you remember what exactly Johnson--what appeal he did make to try to get Southerners and Texans to vote for Kennedy?

M: Oh, party loyalty, and that the Democrats could do more for people in the South--the Democrats were traditionally the party of the South. See, the Republicans hadn't come very far at that time. Eisenhower was considered almost an aberration. He really didn't have any political coloration. Before he announced in 1952 as a Republican he had thought in the previous election about running as a Democrat. He never had been identified with any party before then. And, you know, he was everybody's father image, a

very amiable guy, a war hero. So the people--they didn't have any strong feeling about his political background. Nobody could get sore at the guy about what he might have done in the past in politics; he hadn't done anything. But Johnson--he got some votes that Kennedy certainly couldn't have gotten without him.

Johnson did offer me a job at that time, when I was talking to him that night. [He] wanted me to go up and work for him, and I told him I didn't believe I wanted to; I liked it down here.

B: The night that you called and congratulated him and said that you thought that he had played a big part in winning the election?

M: Yes.

B: He offered you a job--

M: On that phone call.

B: He said, "Come to Washington with me"?

M: Yes, he said, "Why don't you come--we'll go to Washington." I said, "I appreciate it, Mr. Vice President, but I don't believe I want to go."

B: What did he want you to do?

M: Well, go up there and work for him. He had a whole bunch of Texas news and press people. He also liked to keep people buttered up; he was a great hand at that. Keep them under obligation if possible.

B: How did he react when you said that you--?

M: Not at all. He may have known how I really felt about it; he'd been around politics for a long time. He kept books on everybody, I understand.

B: Is that right?

M: He had kind of a card file on people. I can't prove it, but I've heard he had, and he had people in his organization that were supposed to keep him informed about what people were saying about him.

He was the most meticulous politician that I believe I ever--he never passed up an opportunity to remind you that he'd done you a favor. I knew a barber one time, and he wrote the barber a letter during the campaign--"I want you to remember I came into your shop one time and got a haircut." (Laughter) The barber told me that. He said Lyndon paid him with a check and sent him a copy of the check! (Laughter)

B: A barber in Austin?

M: Yes, he was then. He's gone now. Haircuts were two dollars at the time, I remember.

B: Did you cover that incident in Dallas at the Adolphus Hotel?

M: Did not. I read about it, and I researched it. I can give you kind of an offhand opinion of the thing. I think he was an astute enough politician to know how to play that and turn it to his advantage. That's a fairness issue, and that's really one of the things that made the difference in Texas. I had some Republicans up there in Dallas that were really just beating their chest--a lot of them were women! I think they had a Republican congressman from there, a fellow named Bruce Alger, and these were really--I won't say far-out Republican people, but they had no use for Johnson or for the Democrats. They were political zealots, in their own way. And Nixon was really rolling, in Texas at that time, right before the election--I don't remember how close. And the Johnsons were at a rally up at the Adolphus Hotel, and there was a bunch of those people down there in the lobby, raising Cain--I don't know what form it took, placards and so on. The lobby was full of them. Johnson *chose* to walk out through them instead of going out another exit,

which he could have done; he wouldn't have had to go through them. But he--you know, then he had the wounded-feeling bit to go on after that, and "What kind of country do we live in, when a man can't bring his wife to a hotel and walk out without getting shoved around by somebody that doesn't like him?" It had an effect, it had a big effect.

B: So you think that he was astute enough to see what effect it would have?

M: Sure. I don't have any question about it. Those people were acting ugly; I'm not defending what they were doing. I'm just saying that he was a smart enough guy to see that he could make some brownie points right there. The election was close enough that it may have turned the tide in Texas.

B: I think in your book you mentioned that the pro-Johnson *Austin American-Statesman* called it a riot. You think that they really exaggerated--

M: I don't really--well--of course that's a matter of perception. It amounts to what you'd call a riot. You could say if somebody makes a touchdown in a football game you'd call it a riot, maybe, cannons going off. (Laughter) But it really wasn't a nice scene. I don't think anyone defended it. I'm sure the people that put it on were sorry as heck, because it had just the opposite effect from what they wanted it to have.

B: Once Johnson got the nomination, did most of the Texas papers rally behind him?

M: Well, they really didn't, I don't think, until--he didn't have much clout as a--as you were pointing out, he didn't have as much clout as vice president as he had had as majority leader. And he used to do some things that the President asked him to do, which wasn't much. He was just kind of a ceremonial type of guy, and I remember when--I'll tell you two instances. At the National Governors' Conference in Miami in--I guess this was in 1963--President Kennedy was invited to go down there and address the governors'

conference, and he didn't go, but he sent Lyndon, and Lyndon had a party for some of the Texas people there. Really, there wasn't anybody up there but a few Texas reporters and two or three Johnson people. It was a pretty nice affair. But you could tell then that he was just the loneliest man in town, nearly.

B: It was really--it really showed.

M: Oh, yes! He was sad, he really was, and he was trying to make friends with people who never had been very friendly with him, amongst all the Texas people up there. I felt sorry for the guy. Then later, when Senator Tom Connally died, and they had his funeral over in Marlin, I was assigned to go up there and cover the funeral at the Methodist church. The Vice President came down for the funeral. He had two or three Secret Service guys with him, and the service had to start late because he was late getting there. And after the service, I went out to the cemetery, and he had his own car and so on, and we were apparently the first two people to get out there; I don't know why. And the Marlin cemetery has a lot of old oak trees and had some benches out there, and he was sitting out on one of those benches, by himself. I walked up to him and said hello to him; I hadn't had a chance to during the service, or after the service. And we chatted there a minute, and he wanted--he said how [was] I going to go--if I'd like to fly back to Austin with him. I said, "No, Mr. Vice President, I've got an automobile here; I've got to get it back some way." But you could tell he was just dying of lonesomeness over there; nobody talked to him, not anything. And it wasn't just a few months till he was president of the United States. Everyone would want to get up and shake hands with him then.

B: That's an interesting story.

M: He wanted everybody to love him. I mean, we all do, but he especially--he worked at it. But he was an enigma; he had a love-hate relationship with some people.

B: Yes, I've heard many people say that he would just do anything he could to turn an enemy into a friend.

M: He would. That's right. And he was very successful in most cases.

B: Well, tell me a little bit about John Connally as governor. What do you recall about him?

M: Well, first let me say something about Connally's relationship to Johnson. Connally, when he was elected governor in 1962, the non-Texas press generally referred to him as a protégé of Lyndon Johnson. Well, that really wasn't true. Johnson was a protégé of John Connally.

B: Really? How so?

B: Well, Connally managed his campaigns. He made speeches for him at the conventions; he really was the articulate member of that--they started way back in World War II, and they had some business dealings together, and then they had political dealings together. I believe Connally was the manager of that 1948 campaign that got so much publicity. He never did brag about it too much afterward, but I think that's a fact. And they got along well. I'm not sure really when they split; I think it was during the 1970s sometime. They didn't ever really have a falling out, but when Connally got to be governor--in the first place, I don't think he ever liked this idea that Johnson was responsible for anything Connally did, because Connally pretty largely made it on his own, and he helped Johnson a lot more than Johnson ever helped Connally.

And after Lyndon got to be president, Connally was--I went to a lot of the governors' conferences, and Connally was--he's a dynamic speaker. And Johnson was

always asking him to do things for him at the governors' conferences, a lot of it kind of surreptitious stuff. The main thing he was trying to do was get the governors' conference to support his actions in the Vietnam War, which was very unpopular among a lot of people. And he got a resolution through the conference, or something.

B: Did Connally help him with that?

M: Yes, he did. I don't think he ever got any thanks for it, but he did. And one of the interesting things about it was that the main adversary on some of those things was Ronald Reagan, who was the governor of California. And he was just as articulate as Connally, and both of them were actors--you know, Connally would--I think he would have been a thespian if he hadn't gone into politics. I think he was active in the theater at the University of Texas. But the confrontation of those two guys was really something to see.

B: So they were--Reagan was opposed to Johnson's policy in Vietnam, I guess--

M: Not really that, really just opposed to the Democrats. He was a Republican at a time when Republicanism was in pretty sad straits. But he was a leading spokesman for the Republican governors.

B: So when you say that Connally and Reagan would clash at those governors' conferences, it wasn't necessarily over Vietnam.

M: He just didn't want Connally to be putting anything over on the conference or on him. Connally usually won because he had the votes. But I don't know whether they were--I guess they liked each other all right, but they were too much alike, really, to--I'm talking now about Connally and Reagan. There's not room for two guys like that in the room.

B: When Kennedy came down here to settle a fight in Texas politics, when he was assassinated--

M: That's right.

B: --can you shed any light on what was going on in Texas politics? There was apparently some animosity between Connally and Ralph Yarborough, and between Ralph Yarborough and Johnson. Do you know exactly what was going on?

M: I don't know exactly; I know that there was this animosity. It had to do with who was going to run the Democratic Party in Texas, partly. And also how the Democrats *nationally* were going to do in Texas. Kennedy, I think, was of the opinion that he had to come down here and see if he couldn't serve as a peacemaker and get the state Democrats somewhat in harmony for the 1964 election, when he was planning to run for reelection. So he came, and he made a stop in Houston, I think, one in San Antonio, one in Fort Worth, and he went to Dallas. Yarborough was kind of relegated to the back seat, so to speak; he wasn't in the first car. Connally was riding with the President. But I don't think Connally and Yarborough were riding in the same car with each other at that time; certainly not in the parade.

That was a political trip, though, and a party peacemaking thing as much as anything else.

B: When LBJ became president, that must have changed things for political reporters here.

M: Oh, yes, this became the White House of the South.

B: Yes. Could you tell a little bit about that, and what changes took place because of Johnson's presidency?

M: Well, Johnson really--there was a certain amount of jubilation among people down in this part of the country, because he started spending a lot of federal money down here, and built the telephone lines to Stonewall, and put in an airport out there at the Ranch. They even fixed the roads; the Highway Department built some more roads out there. He was here frequently, at the so-called White House thing out there. That was not his ancestral home; he bought that from a relative after he got in the Senate. They had a press room set up, a press briefing set up at the Driskill Hotel, which was sort of the headquarters for the Johnson entourage that came down here, and he frequently decided at the last minute he wanted to come down here and brought a whole planeload of people. The Driskill usually had to throw some guests out in order to get all these press people and the guys that were coming along with the President. But they managed to do it, and the press would have briefings here, usually in the Driskill ballroom down there, pretty informal. I found out something about White House briefings then that I didn't know: a lot of these sources are just sending up kind of a balloon that the press will carry, and if the idea doesn't fly they can deny ever saying it. (Laughter)

Then we went out to the Ranch, frequently. They'd usually have a press bus go out there, and there were all sorts of festivities, frequently centered around Fredericksburg, which is the closest town. Fredericksburg is--they gave Johnson a lot of support. They never had supported him politically until he got to be president; that was a German Republican stronghold. But it was handled in very nice style. I was out there one time with General [William] Westmoreland when he was commander-in-chief out there in Vietnam, and they had the chancellor--they had two chancellors from Germany in there, and--I don't remember all the other VIPs. They had an entertainment program for

one of the German chancellors out at the livestock barn, I believe it was, or somewhere, a tent or something out at Stonewall, the little town out by the Ranch. One of the entertainers was Van Cliburn. I think he sat on a bale of hay to play the piano. (Laughter) I remember they brought a whole planeload of German officials over here, including reporters--they're not officials--and they gave them all a cowboy hat when they got here. They just had a whole room full of hats, and these guys just started trying on cowboy hats--they were the funniest-looking bunch of people I ever saw. They had them down over their ears. (Laughter) But they really thought they'd come to Texas.

B: Do you think Johnson was usually behind [inaudible]?

M: Oh, yes, I don't think he paid for them, but he got somebody to do it.

B: Yes, he liked to give Texas hats, I think.

M: Yes. They were nice hats.

B: You mentioned in your book that when George Reedy was press secretary to LBJ, Johnson would just frustrate him in many ways. Could you elaborate on that?

M: I don't know the details of that. Reedy was a pretty intellectual kind of fellow, intellectually honest, among other things, and sometimes things would happen that he just couldn't--usually he would--the Headliners Club was down there on the first floor of the Driskill, and you'd see him down there sort of lightening his wounds. (Laughter) Reedy wasn't--the first press secretary that he had was Kennedy's secretary, who's now ABC correspondent in Paris.

B: Salinger, Pierre Salinger.

M: Yes. Well, as far as press secretaries are concerned, Bill Moyers was down here part of the time, and he later left the White House, and he's well known now. One of the things

that I really do think helped Lyndon greatly was to hire George Christian, who was at that time John Connally's press secretary. And George got a real good send-off from the people who knew him down here, including the capitol press. Well, George has a great knack for--he smiles a lot--for telling you something that you don't want to hear and sort of making you like it, or not telling you anything you did want to hear. But he just had a touch. Lyndon really wasn't all that popular with the press, the eastern press. Some of them really almost resented him being president when he first--after the assassination. And it showed in what they were writing. He did a pretty good job of winning them over. They really felt like they had come to the frontier, though, when they got down to Texas.

B: Is that right?

M: Oh yes, they'd buy blue jeans and boots. I remember one fellow was writing about all the antelope he'd seen out there at Johnson's ranch, a bunch of goats. (Laughter) Give a little local color.

That's about all I've got on that subject. Later, you can get into something on the judicial thing--it's not a long subject, but it's an important one. Well, I am going to have to leave here about twelve o'clock.

One of the things we haven't touched on that has been important in my life was the judicial side of it. I was on the Texas Judicial Council for thirty-one years, appointed by a whole series of governors. Originally there was a law that was passed in the 1920s [that] said the council shall be composed of a certain number of judges, and lawyers, and two laymen, one of whom must be a journalist. Well, it's kind of a dry business and very few journalists were interested in that, but I got interested in it, first as a reporter, and Coke Stevenson appointed me to it. The purpose of it was to try to see if you couldn't

keep improving the system of courts. Now they've included criminal jurisdiction, lately. We went for a good many reforms, some of which got adopted, like limited ages for people on the appellate courts. The way it works in Texas is that after you--I believe after the age of seventy--if you run again, your pension starts being reduced. You can run if you want to, but you're not going to have as good a retirement as you would have. And that's conducive to a fellow to start thinking about getting off the court when he's seventy years old, which I don't think is a bad idea. You can finish your term if you've been elected before the age of seventy.

But the main thing we got into was trying to improve the selection of judges. As long as Texas was a rural state, nearly everybody knew their public officials, including the guy that people were voting for, for judge. Texas got to be an urban state, which it certainly is now; about 80 per cent of the people live in what they call urban districts of Texas. Hardly everybody knows who their local judges are, much less who they're voting for, for the Texas Supreme Court or the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the two top courts in the state. And they get them by direct political election. Well, it worked all right as long as people knew who they were voting for. But in Harris County, for example, I think they elect ninety different judges, and I daresay if you lived in Harris County, you wouldn't know who two of them were. But you'd still have to elect them, or vote for them; *somebody*'s going to vote for them. And I doubt that right now--you maybe can--but the average person in Texas might not be able to tell you the name of a single member of the supreme court, much less all nine of them.

But they're the most--I've always considered the judiciary to be the most important part of the government. You know, the rest of the government can err, the governor or

president or the Congress or the legislature can make mistakes. But if you've got a really good judiciary, they can keep these people from straying far off the designated course of our system of government. But if you've got a judiciary that is highly political, or even dishonest--there are various forms of dishonesty, you know, like catering to certain lawyers or accepting campaign funds from certain law firms or certain groups of lawyers or so on--[then] you've got a corrupt judiciary.

Missouri in 1940 or thereabouts established a plan that the judicial council tried to get adopted in Texas; it applied mainly to the appellate courts. They have nominees selected by a commission--a non-political commission, by the way; the guys that are on the commission can't have any other political office, or they can't be appointed to the thing--when there's a vacancy the governor has to choose one of three nominees. Then the fellow has to--in the intervals whoever gets appointed--he has to run against his record. You can kick somebody out, as they recently did in California; they voted two members off the supreme court in the last election. But then they have to go through this nominating--at least the people who are making the nomination know who they're nominating, which is more than the public does when they're voting in Texas. And as you know, there are some scandals brewing right now in the state of Texas, and the further we go it seems that the worse the judiciary gets.

B: Do you think that the Texas judiciary has had a history of corruption?

M: Excuse me?

B: Do you think that there has been a history of corruption--?

M: No, not a history of corruption. There have always been incompetent judges, and occasionally there has been a corrupt judge. But this business of judges who are

practically on the payroll of certain law groups--what brought it on as much as anything else is the requirement to raise so much money to run for any statewide office in Texas. And about the only people who put up money in a judicial race are lawyers. They're the guys who practice in those courts. I think it is true that there are certain people, many of whom have litigation in these courts, who put up the money, and don't tell me that the judges who, if somebody put up ten thousand or a hundred thousand dollars to help elect them, they're not going to think of that when this fellow's case comes before the court. If he's not, then [he's] an ingrate!

And it's gotten to be a very bad situation. In fact I think the cost of running for office generally is obscene in the United States, and this thing where it's widespread, these so-called office accounts, like nearly every elected official has. Lobbyists and special interests are just giving them money to live on; they say [the] job doesn't pay enough for them to live decently, and maybe maintain more than one residence. So the people that have things before the legislature or things before the courts--so they furnish this fellow with some living-expense money, or they cover the expenses that their office expense account probably doesn't allow. I think it's terrible, and the judicial council has been trying to do something about it. There's been some success but not near enough.

B: You are still on that council?

M: No, I retired a few years ago. I'd had it long enough.

B: A long time.

M: Well, when I got out of the newspaper business I thought I might as well get off of that too. The judicial council is--the legislature never paid very--it's a branch of the legislature; it's legally established to advise the legislature on these things, but most

members of the legislature don't even know it exists. It's gotten to be better known in the last few years, and I hope and expect that when we get a big enough scandal in the courts in Texas they will change the system of electing judges. But it's going to take a major scandal.

B: To bring it to the attention of--

M: We may have it pretty soon.

End of Tape 2 of 2 and Interview II

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November 26, 2008
Date

Assistant Archivist for Presidential Libraries

1-29-09
Date