INTERVIEW II

DATE: December 10, 1968

INTERVIEWEE: PAUL HENRY NITZE

INTERVIEWER: Dorothy Pierce

Tape 1

P: Mr. Nitze, this is our second interview, and today is December 10, Tuesday, and we are in your offices. I'd like to continue in this area of milestones of our relations, except that I would like to ask you this same sort of question in regard to relations with Communist China, perhaps not in terms of relations, but developments over the same period of time since 1960.

N: My mind was going back earlier than 1960.

P: Go right ahead.

N: To 1949. In 1949 two important events took place. The first was the explosion by the Soviet Union of a nuclear device, and the second was the consolidation of Communist control over the Chinese mainland. It seemed to me that modern policy toward mainland China really began from that period in the winter of '49 and '50. At that time serious consideration was given to our long-range policy with respect to China. One alternative was what was called the "two-China policy," that we would continue to recognize and support the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan, but would not support their ambition to return to the mainland, while we would then attempt to work out relations with mainland China, but not accept their claims with respect to Formosa. This was recommended by the policy planning staff to Mr. Acheson in 1949, but was rejected as being impractical of Congressional support at that time.

During the next period a good deal of support was given to the Chinese Nationalists in their endeavor to establish some kind of a position on the mainland. And in the election of 1952, this was an election issue. As I remember it, Mr. Dulles' phrase was "unleash Chiang Kai-shek." As it turned out, the moment Mr. Dulles became Secretary of State, he was as careful as anybody to be sure that the United States maintained sufficient control over actions taken by the Chinese Nationalists with weapons supplied by the United States to be sure that Chiang Kai-shek wouldn't get us into a war with the mainland Chinese at a time when we didn't so desire.

After that time, going now to 1960, the question arose again as to whether or not we shouldn't move toward a two-China policy with the objective of establishing relations of some kind with mainland China. The main argument in favor of such a policy was that it was difficult to foresee an agreement on the control of nuclear weapons, or at that tune of nuclear testing, which would be fully effective and which did not include the Chinese Communists. I think Mr. Kennedy was tempted by the idea of moving in that direction, but it did not turn out to be practical. On the one hand, the Chinese Nationalists have always continued to maintain their claim as being the legitimate government not only of Formosa, but also of mainland China; and secondly, the Chinese Communists have always maintained the unity of the mainland and Formosa and have been unwilling to give up their claim to Formosa. And what is more, it seemed impossible to work out any way in which one could establish relations with the Chinese Communists in a way which would achieve the objectives contemplated by the policy.

During the period of the Johnson Administration in view of involvement in South

Vietnam and the assistance that the Chinese Communists were giving to North Vietnam, it seemed unwise to get into any debate publicly on the subject of policy toward China.

In 1967 I was asked to speak at the National War College in a classified talk on the subject of policy toward Communist China, and did address the problems of policy toward Communist China. It was suggested that that speech be turned into an article for *Foreign Affairs* which I did do and *Foreign Affairs* agreed to publish the article, but the State Department decided that this would be a violation of the rule that no one was to discuss policy toward Communist China. And so that project died aborning. And I don't believe anybody since has made a serious attempt to express an executive branch view on the subject of policy toward Communist China.

P: Could you give me your judgment of what our policy should be?

N: I'd rather refer you to that speech, because then I worked at it hard and seriously.

P: Has it been declassified?

N: It has not been declassified, but it does exist in the classified records.

P: Could you include here any sort of just a summary, I mean very briefly, what you were aiming at in the speech?

N: I don't think I could. It takes longer than that.

P: Maybe I can get it another way. Would you analyze for me what you think the trend of our relations will be with both Russia and China over--this is in the future, say, the next ten years?

N: Now, that's hard to estimate.

P: Even your personal opinions on it?

N: Again, it's a complicated problem, and it isn't just a guessing game as to what one thinks one's relations are going to be. In part it depends upon what intends to do oneself; it isn't just an accident how policy turns out.

P: All right. What do you see in your judgment is our role--the role of the United States--in Southeast Asia?

N: The answer I think goes back to some of the questions you asked earlier, about what is our role with respect to the Soviet Union, with respect to the Communist world worldwide; and it goes back to the question of whether or not one believes in the containment policy; whether or not one believes in maintaining a forward defense. In other words, if supporting those on the periphery of Communist China and the Soviet Union against aggression either direct or indirect through satellites by that threat; and if one does believe in the policy of containment and therefore in the support of those threatened by aggression, then our policy with respect to South Vietnam fits clearly within that general policy.

P: And within that general policy, it then becomes a matter that does involve our national interests?

N: It certainly involves our national interests. Obviously, it could be argued that the costs to our national interests of our involvement in South Vietnam has been greater than the benefits, because clearly it has added to divisiveness at home; it has added to divisiveness in the other portions of our alliance structure; we've paid heavily psychologically, politically, and materially, and in casualties in connection with the defense of South Vietnam. But policy-wise, I see no problem with our involvement in South Vietnam.

P: Have you been involved in any of the decisions, either in meetings as the deputy secretary of defense or for the secretary of defense or in just examinations at the Defense level regarding our policy of bombing North Vietnam? And I'm including in this all of it, from the point of view of limiting the selection of targets to the many pauses and restrictions that we've had on it to the ultimate stop within the last couple of months.

N: Yes, I have, one way or another with all phases of it.

P: Could you give me sort of an overall assessment on the effects of the bombing from your participation in these activities?

N: It would seem to me that question involves two subordinate questions. The first is, what has been the effect of the bombing with respect to the war in South Vietnam? The second part of it is, what has been the effect of the bombing with respect to bringing pressure on the North Vietnamese in the direction of inducing them to come to the negotiating table and arrive at a settlement that we could live with?

With respect to the first question as to the effectiveness of the bombing as a means of interdicting men and supplies moving from North Vietnam down to South Vietnam, it is difficult to establish any particular degree of effectiveness of that bombing. It turns out that it takes maybe twenty tons of bombs to destroy one ton of material coming from the North to the South. And it has been very hard to interdict any particular route and deny that to the North Vietnamese as they try to infiltrate men and supplies. There isn't any doubt but that the bombing has increased the cost to the North Vietnamese of infiltration into the South.

The other part of the problem, though, as to the pressure that it has brought upon

North Vietnam is a much more difficult question to answer. There is no doubt at all that it is a very dreadful thing for a country to be subjected to a bombing attack of the scale that we mounted against North Vietnam. All their industrial capacity was effectively destroyed. Certainly some two hundred to three hundred thousand people were diverted from other employment to repairing the bomb damage or doing things necessary to move goods despite the interdiction effort. So that the pressure upon the North Vietnamese from the bombing, I think, was very great. It can however be argued that being subjected to that kind of a bombing attack which cannot in itself really stop the war in a material sense, because most of the military supplies being used came either from China or from the USSR, so it wasn't denying military goods to them absolutely. Where it was really a question of will as to whether they would continue or not, at least for a period it may be that the bombing increased their will rather than decreased it. But looked at over a longer period of time, it is my personal view that the bombing did increase the willingness--or the desire--of the North Vietnamese to get into negotiation. And the threat of a resumption of a bombing may well have an impact upon the prospects for a satisfactory settlement with the North Vietnamese in the future.

P: Did you directly participate in some of these decisions at the White House, in any of the phases of the bombing?

N: Yes, I did.

P: On which occasions?

N: The San Antonio speech, for instance, was drafted by many different people, and I think the final drafts were worked out by Mr. [Nicholas] Katzenbach, Mr. [Walt?] Rostow,

Harry McPherson, and I, just to take an example. Although the crucial paragraph in that speech, or the crucial sentence, was in fact drafted by Mr. [Dean] Rusk.

P: Which one are you referring to?

N: The sentence involving the phrase, "prompt and productive talks."

P: What was your position in developing the policy that evolved from the San Antonio speech?

N: I don't understand the question.

P: What was your contribution, or what was your side, or part of the issue that you were supporting, or how were you looking at the question?

N: Oh, I think Mr. Katzenbach and I saw it eye to eye, and that was the initial drafts required considerable tightening up; and I think the final speech was much more satisfactory from everybody's standpoint than the initial speech. Obviously the final work on it was done by the President himself. He drafted the concluding paragraphs just the day before the speech was given.

P: Were there other occasions, Mr. Nitze?

N: Oh, yes. I think on every decision I've had something to do with analyzing it or advising Mr. McNamara about it or being at the White House or the State Departments I can think of few that I haven't had something to do with. Although the decision on October 31 to terminate the bombing entirely, that was handled by a very small group; the President didn't desire that anybody other than Mr. Rusk, Mr. [Clark] Clifford, General [Earle] Wheeler, and to some extent Mr. [William] Bundy at the State Department, and the other chiefs of staff, have access to the traffic going backward and forward between Paris and

Saigon and Washington. Mr. Clifford did however discuss the policy issues involved in that period with me on a regular basis.

P: Earlier in our first interview in discussing your relations with the President, you mentioned that due to your--and maybe I'm saying this wrong---criticism of the conduct of the war?

N: I didn't criticize the conduct of the war.

P: Opposing views; you indicated--I believe it was in regard to the bombing.

N: What I indicated was that in March I felt early that the decision should be a decision such as was taken in the March 31st speech.

P: Do you think we could have stopped it sooner than March 31st then?

N: At the time I thought so, yes.

P: How do you feel now?

N: I'm not as sure as I was then that it would have been wise to stop it prior to March 31st.

P: I'd like to go into some specific events in the Vietnam conflict, and just ask you what you recall about them or what your role was in them. I'm thinking first of all of the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August of 1964; the seizure of the *Pueblo* in January '67 ['68]; and the Tet offensive this last February. Could you reconstruct what your activities were regarding those events?

N: In the Tonkin Gulf crisis I was in Honolulu and then I was in Japan during the various phases of the Tonkin Gulf crisis, and then out with the 7th Fleet, as I was then secretary of the navy, so that I was not involved in the Washington decisions of the original Tonkin Gulf episode.

P: What was your assessment of it?

N: I thought the right decision had been made. I was surprised by the speed with which the decision was made in Washington; I didn't think it could be made that fast from where I was out in the Pacific.

P: And the seizure of the *Pueblo*?

N: At the time of the seizure of the *Pueblo*, the question at issue was, what do you do next?

P: What did you see were the implications in this event?

N: I think the important point was that by the time that we in Washington knew about the *Pueblo* seizure, there wasn't enough time to react effectively immediately. By the first time we heard that the *Pueblo* was being seized, there were very few hours left before she actually was in the port. And there weren't aircraft available to react within that time period, so no one here had the option of reacting immediately to the *Pueblo*. So the question at issue was, the *Pueblo* having been brought into port, was there some type of retaliatory action which would be wise from our standpoint? Obviously one of the objectives was to get the men back; a retaliatory attack was probably inconsistent with that portion of the objective. It probably wouldn't have gotten the men back, they probably would have been killed if you'd engaged in a retaliatory attack.

The other point of the problem was can a country such as the United States afford to have a ship in international waters seized, hijacked, without taking retaliatory action. We explored every conceivable kind of a scheme, but were unable to come up with a scheme which appeared to be net advantageous to the United States; and therefore we did not react. Instead the effort was put on negotiations to see whether through negotiations

it would be possible to get the men back, negotiations which as yet have not been successful.

P: Do you see this as a related issue to the Vietnam conflict?

N: I do.

P: Would you explain that?

N: It seems to me that Kim Il-Sung is very sensitive to his relations to the ROKS [Republic of Korea]--to the ROK; that he has every ambition of reunifying Korea under Communist rule; that he felt it demeaning to his sense of the dignity of the Communist regime in North Korea to have the South Koreans participating with us in the support of South Vietnam. The North Korean support of North Vietnam was restricted to the provision of some pilots who were fighting in the North Vietnamese air force. And I feel that he thought it was consistent with what he wanted to do to try to make an independent contribution to the Communists program, and that he wanted to show his exceptional boldness and his exceptional vigor and skill. And he managed to pull this one off in a way which was very disadvantageous to us, and it was quite a feather in his cap. I doubt very much whether he would have tried it except for the fact that this was related to a degree to the Vietnamese conflict.

P: Do you feel that it might have been conceived of as having a bearing on negotiations with the North Vietnamese?

N: I would be surprised if it was thought of in that context.

P: Can you continue on with the Tet offensive in '68--of your role and activities in that, and your assessment of it?

N: It's hard to separate that question from the entire question of the issues which led up to the March 31st speech. The job of defending against the Tet offensive was a job being handled by the commanders in the field--General [William] Westmoreland and the Vietnamese commanders; and politically by the South Vietnamese government and Ambassador [Ellsworth] Bunker. So that the crucial question for us here was, what does the United States do next? Should we supply more forces to General Westmoreland? General Westmoreland didn't really ask for two hundred and six thousand men; he was asked a question as to what additional forces would he like to have, and his staff came up with a computation of two hundred and six thousand men. And this came here to Washington, and the question at issue was, do we go down that route or do we not go down that route; do we change our strategy within South Vietnam; do we expand the bombing; do we expand the war, do we not expand the war? What course of action should we take from here on out?

And we had this group of which Mr. Clifford was the chairman and Mr. Rusk was a member and Max Taylor was a member and Dick Helms and Bill Bundy and Paul Warnke and I--I guess that was the group--and Walt Rostow; and we spent session after session beating this one around. But the final upshot of all that was the March 31st speech.

P: There was debate after the Tet offensive that it was almost as if it were seen in two lights; that North Vietnam had been at least successful in causing great disruption in the life of South Vietnam, and yet again they didn't get the response from South Vietnam that they perhaps anticipated. How do you see this?

N: Well, the shock to the government of South Vietnam was tremendous, and the damage to the pacification program was tremendous. On the other hand, the losses that the VC [Viet Cong] and the North Vietnamese suffered were also tremendous. The military forces of the South Vietnamese bore the main brunt of it, but our forces also bore some brunt of it. Our military forces did very well indeed, and the casualties on the other side were, as I say, very costly--the other side. So that the issue was really one of which was more important--the tremendous losses the other side had taken militarily, or the tremendous losses that the GVN [Government of Vietnam] and the pacification program had taken by virtue of the Tet offensive. So one could phrase that in another way and say that whether this was a disaster for our side, or whether it was a disaster for their side, would really be determined by who could pick up the pieces first and recover.

And as it appeared to us then in February and March, we all anticipated that there would be a second offensive, probably in May; and at that time one would be able to judge which side had been able to pick up the pieces first. The objective for our side obviously was to try to pick up the pieces first, do everything we could to strengthen the GVN government, the ARVN [Army of the Republic of Viet Nam] forces, and our own forces, and to solidify as best we could the faltering support for the Vietnamese war in the United States and in the world as a whole. And frankly I think the program that was put together at that time and was announced in the March 31st speech was a well designed program and merited all the work that had gone into it prior to that speech. Because the upshot was that it turned out that our side had picked itself up out of the dust far better than the other side, so that the May offensive was a failure, and the August offensive was

a total failure.

P: Can you give me sort of an impact that these type of events have on the decision making progess in Defense? Obviously if it's terribly critical, it's going to result in a reexamination, perhaps also a change. Is it disruptive in its impact?

N: It isn't disruptive, no. After all the business of the top people in Defense and State is to deal with very difficult problems with coolness and with wisdom. And the more difficult the problem becomes, the more important it is to operate with coldness and efficiency and wisdom. So this is the real test of how good your organization is, does it work better under a crisis than under normal events?

P: And do you see these as successful decision steps in decision making?

N: Frankly I thought the work that was done in that period after the Tet offensive was very good work, it turned out to be successful, and I am proud of the group that worked on it.

P: You did not mention in the course of the Tet offensive the impact of public response in this country. Now that could be also, I would imagine, considered a success for the other side too, because it did jell--

N: Well, I did mention the importance of maintaining such support as we could, domestically and internationally. Obviously one couldn't maintain full support; the support for the effort was weakened by virtue of the Tet offensive, both domestically and internationally. But I think the March 31st speech picked up as much support as was possible.

P: What is your frank appraisal of military leadership in Vietnam?

N: The team that we have out there now is absolutely first-class. General [Creighton

Williams] Abrams is an excellent general; General [Andrew] Goodpaster, his deputy, complements General Abrams, General Abrams is more of a fighting soldier while General Goodpaster is more of a thoughtful person--a policy man; but the two of them together work very well together, and they complement each other. General [George] Brown, who is in charge of the Seventh Air Force, is first-class; Admiral [Elmo] Zumwalt, who runs the Naval element in Vietnam is first-class; the subordinate Army commanders are first-class. They work together well. This is a good group of military leaders that we have in Vietnam. We should have, after all; this is where the best people are sent, this is where the fighting is going on, and the thing has jelled together to a point where I think we've got a first-class military team.

P: How would you compare this present team with the leadership of General Westmoreland?

N: It's hard to do because the situation is different. In a way the military situation is easier now than it was when General Westmoreland had to deal with it because of the fact that the May offensive by that time was a failure, and the August offensive a total failure. So that Abrams has more and better assets to work with against an enemy which is weaker. On the other hand it's my view that even taking account of that, I think the present military organization works somewhat better than it did under General Westmoreland.

P: Do you feel we've adopted the right military strategy and tactics in the ground war in Vietnam?

N: This has been a debatable issue for a long period of time. As I say, I think the present team there is absolutely first-class; I don't think it would be possible for somebody back

here to mastermind that. What you can really do from here is to be sure that you've got the right people running it out there. So that with respect to the conduct of the war in South Vietnam, I would have no way of making intelligent suggestions as to how it would be done better.

With respect to the bombing attack in North Vietnam, whether that could have been done better with the benefit of hindsight, this obviously will be a debatable issue for years. I think that probably the two subsidiary questions are, would it have been more effective had the bombing attack not been gradually expanded, but expanded rapidly in the first instance? This is the Air Force view--that the effectiveness of air power would have been much greater had it not been increased so gradually. I am very dubious of that proposition. I think it is right that a large scale initial attack would have initially been much more successful. But I think over time the North Vietnamese would have developed the same techniques that they gradually developed to counter the gradual attack; and I think that in the long run the difference wouldn't have been as great as my Air Force friends think it would have been.

P: What is your interpretation of the type of response we might have met had it been--?

N: More sudden.

P: More sudden and total involvement.

N: Obviously this is the reason it was done gradually, because the President and the secretary of state and his principal advisers felt that it would be dangerous from the standpoint of Chinese Communists and Russian reaction to undertake such a sudden attack. It's awfully hard to reconstruct what would have happened had you made another

decision, another decision than the one that was made, so that this is somewhat hypothetical. Those that support the Air Force position say that the Russians and the Chinese Communists would not have reacted differently than they did to the gradual approach; no one can guarantee that that would have been the case.

P: Has the rather deliberative debate over escalation or increase of, say, widening our bombing targets and things like that--has that been any sort of military hindrance?

N: Obviously the military would have liked to have seen us bomb the port of Haiphong--mined the port of Haiphong, bomb more targets in Hanoi than were in fact permitted by the President.

P: Or bomb the dikes?

N: They never have recommended bombing the dikes; they did not think that would be militarily effective. There was a real issue as to whether or not that kind of a campaign would have been substantially more effective militarily; the analysis made by the navy department and by the air force when I was secretary of the navy and Harold Brown was secretary of the air force indicated that it was wholly dubious that one could in fact cut off supplies of munitions coming from Russia or China by the mining campaign combined with an all-out air attack. It would not have, in accordance with these analyses, cut the volume of munitions coming into North Vietnam by any appreciable amount for any appreciable period of time. Because the capacity of the rail lines coming in from China were such as to carry the full volume of munitions, and the ability of the interdiction attack to cut those rail lines for more than short periods nonexistent; and there was no way in which you could figure that this would really cut into the military

capabilities of the North Vietnamese. There might have been for some period of time a reduction in the volume of nonmilitary things, food and things of that kind, but it looked as though after a short transition period that the North Vietnamese would have been able to get those types of goods in adequate volume across the border from China.

P: On this rather slow and deliberative, say, in the area of the selection of targets I was asking you regarding--had that been a handicap to the military strategy?

N: The military thought so; I'm just saying that I think that if additional targets had been approved earlier, I don't really think it would have made a substantial difference.

P: What is your evaluation of the minimal objective in Vietnam?

N: This has never been a very difficult issue to me. It seems to me a perfectly clear simple issue that our objective in South Vietnam has been and always has been stated to be the preservation of the right of the South Vietnamese to choose their own form of government within South Vietnam; in other words, to hurl back the infiltration and the invasion from the North and reestablish the control of the South Vietnamese government over its own territory--or rather to assist the South Vietnamese government in so doing. That has been our objective; that remains our objective, and I don't see any complexity about it.

The argument has been one really about means--whether the best way to achieve that objective was to defeat the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese in South Vietnam, or whether to bring sufficient pressure through air attack on North Vietnam that the North Vietnamese would withdraw their forces and cry "uncle."

It has always been my view that it was dubious as to whether the Soviet Union

and the ChiComs would stand still while we applied that kind of pressure, which in my view would have involved mass attacks against the city populations of Hanoi and Haiphong, not just selected military targets. In other words it would had to have been an anti-population attack on North Vietnam in order to achieve that kind of pressure. I don't think we were, or should have been, prepared to do that, nor do I think that it's likely that we could have done this without an entirely different kind of reaction from the Communist bloc.

P: Mr. Nitze, over the last couple of years there has been a great deal of publicity regarding peace feelers, and they've had various names, and they've been through various intermediaries. How valid do you feel that the claim is that we have either intentionally or accidentally disrupted or disregarded opportunities to explore avenues of either communication or absolute negotiation?

N: We certainly have explored every avenue. I think the contrary complaint could be made that perhaps we've explored too many; some of them were pretty clearly non-starters--they certainly turned out to be ineffective. But I think it was quite right that we couldn't give the appearance of not exploring any potentially effective peace feeler, and so we did. We explored them all. So I don't think that can be leveled as a charge against the Johnson Administration.

The other question as to whether or not we could have conducted some of those endeavors better is a question which will remain debatable for a considerable period of time. But the complexities of that, I don't think it's appropriate to get into at this time.

P: There were times when it was of course carried in the press afterwards that various

people were either exploring these avenues, or there were signals or indications from North Vietnam, and that we did not follow through on them. You are saying in effect that we did in all cases?

N: I think we followed through on every worthwhile kind of a possibility that existed.

P: Did we examine the validity of it before we proceeded?

N: They were all examined, and it was decided to go forward with all these various peculiar tries. Some of them turned out not to be peculiar; some of them were authentic, and one could actually establish negotiations with the North Vietnamese. All I'm saying is that it can be argued whether we conducted ourselves with complete wisdom or whether we didn't with respect to some of those. But this is again very hard to judge as to what would have happened if you'd done this somewhat differently or that somewhat differently.

P: But we did not miss an absolute opportunity to open it up sooner? In other words, concessions would have had to have been overriding?

N: Let me repeat. I don't know of any feeler or any line that we did not try to explore. Again I say, however, whether or not we could have handled ourselves differently along some of these lines with greater prospect of success, I think that can be argued.

P: In looking in hindsight, retrospect, do you think that our involvement in Vietnam was either a mistake in time or place?

N: Well, frankly I had grave reservations as to whether or not we should have made the decision to go into South Vietnam with major forces--the decision we made in the spring of 1965. I had grave doubts as to whether that was the decision we should make, because

it was perfectly clear what the difficulties would be, and what the international costs would be.

Now the other side of it was also dubious. If you didn't, it was clear that the South Vietnamese government was going to be defeated; and the consequences of that would have been very serious too. The one thing that seemed to me to be absolutely clear was that if we were to make the decision and move in with forces, we'd have to move in with very substantial forces and do so fast, which we did.

The one thing that we did not do that I would have advocated and did advocate at the time was that having made the decision that we should go in with very substantial forces, we should in my view have gone concurrently before the Congress and asked for the funds and authority which we really needed, and gone through the debate right then and there with the Congress rather than avoiding the debate and postponing it to a later time.

P: Did we significantly understand the cost of Vietnam? You indicated just briefly that--

N: I think so. I was out there just prior to this decision and came back and talked to Mr. McNamara about it at length, and the desperateness of the situation, and the difficulty of reversing this militarily. And the cost to us in casualties and in international prestige and in difficulties with the South Vietnamese government and so forth and so on, I think were clearly foreseen. That's what made it a difficult decision.

P: Do you see that our escalated involvement in Vietnam is related to the unsuccessful Chinese attempt in Indonesia? In other words, our definite commitment to Asia.

N: I thought it was, yes. I've got to leave because I've got somebody waiting for me.

P: Thank you.

End of Interview II

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
NATIONAL ARCHIEVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

Gift of Personal Statement

By Paul Henry Nitze

to the

Lyndon Baines Johnson Library

In accordance with Sec. 507 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (44 U.S.C. 397) and regulations issued thereunder (41 CFR 101-10), I, Paul H. Nitze, hereinafter referred to as the donor, hereby give, donate, and convey to the United States of America for eventual deposit in the proposed Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, and for administration therein by the authorities thereof, a tape and transcript of a personal statement approved by me and prepared for the purpose of deposit in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. The gift of this material is made subject to the following terms and conditions:

1. Title to the material transferred hereunder will pass to the United States as of the date of the delivery of this material into the physical custody of the Archivist of the United States.

2. It is the donor's wish to make the material donated to the United States of America by the terms of the instrument available for research in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. At the same time, it is his wish to guard against the possibility of its contents being used to embarrass, damage, injure, or harass anyone. Therefore, in pursuance of this objective, and in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 507 (f) (3) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (44 U.S.C. 397), this material shall not, during the donor's lifetime, be available for examination by anyone except persons who have received my express written authorization to examine it.

3. A revision of this stipulation governing access to the material for research may be entered into between the donor and the Archivist of the United States, or his designee, if it appears desirable.

4. The material donated to the United States pursuant to the foregoing shall be kept intact permanently in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

5. The donor retains to himself during his lifetime all literary property rights in the material donated to the United States of America by the terms of this instrument. After the death of the donor, the aforesaid literary property rights will pass to the United States of America.

Signed Paul H. Nitze

Date Nov. 12 1971

Accepted Harry J. Middleton for
Archivist of the United States

Date May 8, 1974