INTERVIEW III

DATE: December 26, 1968

INTERVIEWEE: PAUL H. NITZE

INTERVIEWER: DOROTHY PIERCE

Tape 2

P: Mr. Nitze, this is our third interview [first two interviews on one tape], and today is Thursday, December 26, and we're in your offices.

We had left off discussing our Vietnam involvement and I'd like to continue with one more question in that area. From a national security standpoint, has our experience in Vietnam made the U.S. both publicly and in policy dangerously wary of this type of involvement in the future?

N: I think it's true that both the experience in Korea and the experience in South Vietnam have made many people in the United States cautious about involving U.S. forces on the mainland of the Eurasian land mass, particularly the non-European part thereof. Both Korea and the South Vietnamese episode became highly unpopular during their course. I'm not sure that the Korean war wasn't even more unpopular than the Vietnamese war at the time; many people have forgotten that since. Obviously no one would like to see the United States again engaged under circumstances similar to Korea or South Vietnam; the cost in American casualties is high, the cost in dollars is high, the cost in political tension within the United States is high--has been high in both of them.

To be weighed against that however is the question--what would happen on the Eurasian land mass in the event it were clear that the United States would never intervene under any circumstances. It is doubtful that it is today possible to conceive of regional

alliances which would have enough strength themselves to deter either Communist China or the Soviet Union from exploiting their predominant military position in the event it were clear that the United States would under no circumstances intervene on the mainland.

P: Mr. Nitze, to use a lay term, do you see this as a preventive war? This is something we're kind of familiar with hearing.

N: If the term "preventive" means that by doing at this time we foreclose the possibility that it would happen again, I do not think it is a preventive war. In other words even if we come out of South Vietnam with our basic objectives achieved, as we came out of the Korean war with our basic objectives achieved, I do not think that would necessarily be a guarantee that a similar situation might not arise in the future.

P: In this type of engagement, if you must talk in terms of preferring--it certainly is better for us than a massive retaliation, and yet we are geared of course for both.

N: I doubt very much whether the American public really looks upon massive retaliation as being the alternative. I think they look upon the alternative as being noninvolvement rather than massive retaliation. I think everybody would be clear that U.S. involvement of the type of Korea and South Vietnam is much better than massive retaliation. I think the hope of people is that it would be possible to avoid involvement at all.

P: Do you think that this has developed from our contact with or sort of retrospect on Vietnam and with the cost it has as I was sort of leading into that?

N: I remember General [George C.] Marshall, when he was secretary of state and when we had just developed the Marshall Plan and were taking up with him the military assistance

program, talking to Mr. [Charles E.] Bohlen and to me, saying that we should be clear in our minds that the American public would not forever support these large and expensive programs to ensure security at the periphery of the Communist land mass; that these were too expensive and involved too much external commitment on the part of the United States to be supported long by the American people. And that whenever we developed a program, we should concurrently develop a way of getting out of the involvement. We'd said that we'd done this in the Marshall Plan, which was a self-liquidating program over five years; and Secretary Marshall's question was, "Is this military assistance program one which is similarly self-liquidating?" And we could not give him assurance that it would be. We said every effort would be made to progressively decrease U.S. assistance as the strength of the countries assisted went up, and this we have done.

But the third problem of whether or not the U.S. can avoid intervening with its own forces--that's even more serious than economic aid or military assistance; there you've put in the lives of your own people. And General Marshall was quite clear that a time would probably come when the American people would be unprepared to do that. I think he was particularly moved to that position by his recollection of the period in the middle-30s when the entire Defense budget was some three hundred and fifty million dollars, and Defense was totally neglected, and isolationism was the mood of the country.

P: Do you think that perhaps that was a problem in our approach to Vietnam--that we did not put a "get-out" clause or an "end" clause in our--

N: Once it was decided to intervene with large-scale combat forces, then one couldn't put in a withdrawal clause other than the achieving of our objective without greatly increasing

the price of that withdrawal over and above what the price might have been if we hadn't involved ourselves at all at that time in '65.

P: Along the lines of the Military Assistance Program that you were speaking about, I did have a question more or less on the evolution of this which I think you've just given me a little background on. Do you think we have fulfilled our objectives in MAP--military assistance?

N: I think the Military Assistance Program has been very helpful; I think without the Military Assistance Program it is probably that the settlement in Korea would have eroded by this time, and North Korea would have attacked South Korea. The Military Assistance Program has been essential in maintaining the deterrent military strength of South Korea. Similarly with respect to Taiwan, I would be amazed if the Republic of China had been able to maintain its position on Taiwan if we hadn't had a military assistance program to make the job of an attack by the Chinese Communists on Taiwan a most difficult one indeed. Similarly with respect to Greece and Turkey, it's perfectly clear that their continued adherence and capable adherence to NATO was contingent upon our being able to give them military assistance.

The real questions with respect to military assistance arise with respect to India and Pakistan where the arms that we gave them were used against each other rather than for the security of the area. And a similar problem arises in the Middle East where we're giving assistance both to Jordan and to Israel, and where those arms are being used against each other and not for the general security of the area.

The question at issue however is what would happen if we were to give no

military assistance, and only the Russians were to give military assistance. It's perfectly clear that giving military assistance is one of the most powerful diplomatic tools that is available to any country. People who are strongly nationalists in sentiment feel most deeply about their military capability against *vis-a-vis* those they consider to be their potential enemies. And so the one way in which one can most easily influence people is through the tool of being willing to help them in their military program. Now if we were to forego all that and leave that all to the Russians, I think the outcome would be reasonably clear. I think Russia would come to be the dominant power in South Asia or the Middle East.

P: Then in light of this, you would have to conclude that it is even better to have them fighting among themselves with our arms, than to remove the military assistance aid program?

N: You put it in a kind of brutal way. I have an idea they would have been fighting amongst each other in any case, whether we'd given them arms or not. In fact I'm sure that the Pakistanis and the Indians would have probably fought one against another; the degree to which they had armaments would have been less, perhaps the casualties would have been less. But you know in the Chaco war between the Bolivians and the Paraguayans, they had very primitive arms, but the casualties were immense. So that it doesn't necessarily flow that the degree of casualties are due to the assistance we gave.

P: In May of '65, Mr. Nitze, as you well know, we committed our forces in the Dominican Republic. In your judgment was our action and the size of our commitment justified with the information that was available at that time?

N: In my judgment it was. It can be argued that Tapley Bennett, who was then our Ambassador, took too pessimistic a view as to what was about to happen in the absence of U.S. intervention; I've never seen it demonstrated that he was too pessimistic. It's awfully hard to reconstruct history after the event. But the decision having been made to intervene, I am wholly clear that the right course was to intervene so massively that the opposition would be limited; and to use that large force--more than adequate force--with the greatest restraint, and this is what was done. We had plenty of men, plenty of armaments, and used them with great restraint; and I think the outcome was favorable.

P: There was a very fearful approach about more or less admitting that we were in effect trying to stave off any sort of a Communist organization from developing there. Do you feel that this was in effect what we were doing?

N: I think that was what we were doing, and I think it was quite a proper thing to do.

P: This sort of big stick action from the North--how do you think it has affected our relations with Central and South American countries?

N: I don't think our intervention in the Dominican Republic has at all hurt our relations with Latin America; I think the other members of the Organization of American States also thought that this was a threat from exterior to the hemisphere to the political integrity of a State within the hemisphere, and that our use of force in that instance was an understandable use of force. It's clear the Mexicans and some of the other Latin American countries would never admit that, because the one thing that is politically important in Mexico is that Mexico does not tolerate the intervention of some other country in its internal affairs, which is a position natural for them to take because they're

a small neighbor to a very powerful U.S. But I doubt very much that the leaders in the Mexican government, if one could ask them off the record what they thought about it, would really feel that this was a dreadful thing that we had done. I think they probably thoroughly recognized that if we had not done this, it could have turned out very badly for everybody in the hemisphere.

P: What were your activities during this period when we committed our forces?

N: In the Dominican Republic?

P: Yes.

N: The day was the day that Mr. [Richard] Helms was appointed director of the CIA, and there was a ceremony in the White House at which he took his oath of office. I talked to Mr. Helms during that ceremony as to what the risks were that we might have to do something, and he thought, as I recollected, that it probably would not be necessary. By the time we got back to our respective offices, it became evident that action probably was necessary. As I remember it, the President decided to act that very afternoon.

P: To bring us up to another conflict, the Arab-Israel war last June, 1967, what role did you play, and what were your views about both our response and the position that we took regarding the Middle East?

N: I didn't really see that there were any clear alternatives other than standing back from that conflict at any time; I didn't really see any realistic course of action for the United States which could have influenced the outcome very much one way or another.

P: If things had proceeded differently, do you feel that we would have necessarily had to commit a troop force in that area?

N: It was my hope that we would not. It was the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concurred in by Mr. [Robert] NcNamara and the rest of us, that the Israelis had sufficient military strength so that they were not in danger of a military defeat by the Arab states, and this judgment turned out to be correct.

P: Were your views affected at all by the sinking of the *Liberty* ship?

N: Well, to have reacted against that would have been to react out of pique rather than from strategic interests. Obviously all of us were furious with the Israelis for the sinking of the *Liberty*. But just because you're furious with a country for an individual action does not mean that one should commit U.S. strategic resources in a way contrary to this country's interest.

P: Did you feel that that was an intentional thing--that we were perhaps getting a little too close in monitoring events of the crisis?

N: No. The Israelis had surveilled our ship earlier in the day; they knew it was a U.S. ship; they had taken no action against it. And the problem was that they had a naval headquarters separate from their air headquarters, and a navy command post in Tel Aviv separated from their general staff headquarters. And as we understand it, due to a change of officers in their navy headquarters in Tel Aviv, the position of the *Liberty* had been erased from the chart when the succeeding commanding officer came in. They attacked without knowledge on the part of the local commander at El Arif that the *Liberty* was a U.S. ship but he would have been overruled by Tel Aviv if this change of officers hadn't taken place.

P: Do you accept that explanation?

N: The Israelis have never really given us that explanation, but putting together all the facts as we know them, this is the way it shapes up in my mind.

P: Mr. Nitze, what do you see is the future and the importance of NATO?

N: Well, the purpose of NATO has from the beginning been to deter the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries from a military attack on any one of the members of the NATO allies. Obviously so far there has been no attack. Some people go so far as to say that the reason there has been no attack is because of NATO--I'm not sure that that's logically rigorous. It would be logically unrigorous however to say that it hasn't had some bearing on it.

Now with respect to the future, clearly the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia has reversed at least for the time being the declining enthusiasm for NATO which existed among the European countries. Due to the nature of the governments in Europe, the thing that comes uppermost to most of those politicians and statesmen's minds is the maintenance of power within their own countries. This then leads them to heavy emphasis on what conforms to popular opinion, and those matters are at least to some extent economic in origin, so that economic matters tend to have priority over strategic considerations because they more directly affect the political scene. So even though the government of the Republic of Germany or France or Britain may view the threat as being one which would merit some strategic action, if high costs, are involved, they are apt to consider it infeasible because the domestic political repercussion would be negative.

P: Hasn't this left us more or less with sort of an unbalanced commitment--I mean, in terms

of our holding--

N: It's true that we have taken NATO more seriously, and we've done more toward maintaining the military capability of the allies than we believe the other countries have. And I think we can demonstrate that with one hard fact after another, so that we are quite clear that the relative effort is unbalanced; we're doing more than our allies are doing.

The question at issue however is what do you do about it. Do you pull out? Do you bring more pressure on your allies? Do you do something in between? Do you encourage them to do more? Obviously you do a combination of all those things, and sometimes you move too far in the direction of bringing pressure; sometimes you don't move far enough. We're trying to streamline our forces in Europe. We've just authorized a program which would reduce our budgetary expenditures in Europe some four hundred and forty million dollars by consolidating headquarters and moving out things which we think can be done almost as well in the United States as in Europe. But on the other hand, we've also undertaken a program to greatly diminish the vulnerability of our air forces in Europe to improve our capabilities a great deal. So I think we're going to have in the future a less costly but militarily more effective force than we've had in the past. Now whether or not our allies will address it in the same way or not is still undetermined.

P: It puts us in the posture of actually being willing to carry the burden of NATO then, doesn't it?

N: Yes, because what is the alternative? If we pull out, what happens?

P: Mr. Nitze, during this previous campaign there were charges of a security gap with Russia. Do you feel that this is developing, and are we losing ground in a sort of missile

superiority ratio?

N: When this Administration came into office in 1961, it was clear that what we had then feared would be a missile gap was in fact no missile gap. We found that even though it was correct that the Soviets had the capability of introducing ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] at a faster rate than we had, they were discouraged about the reliability and the effectiveness of their first generation system, and they didn't put it in at the rate at which we had computed they were capable of doing. They were waiting for a second generation system before putting it in in volume. So that by the end of 1961, we had a substantial superiority over the Russians in numbers and in effectiveness of missiles. And that continued to build up for a period of time.

And then when the Russians actually got their systems that they were satisfied with, the SS-9s and the SS-11s, then they went into putting those in at a very rapid rate. So that from a position where we had many more missiles than they, they are now approaching the point where they have as many and shortly will have more land-based missiles than the United States has. And those missiles--at least the SS-9s--are more powerful than any of ours, so that their land-based ICBM megatonnage will be substantially in excess of that of the United States.

However in the submarine launched ballistic missile field, we are substantially ahead of them even though they are now building submarines which are modeled after our Polaris submarines, and won't have this full capability of the Polaris submarines but will approach it; and they're building them very fast, probably six a year.

Now our bomber force has always been superior to that of the Soviet Union and

continued to be superior to that of the Soviet Union. Their air defense system--they've always put much more emphasis on that than we have, and they've now put in this SA-5 system which looks like a very effective system against high altitude bombers. They're putting probably more money into research and development in this field than are we in the absolute terms, and certainly as a percentage of their effort much more than we. To me it is by no means clear that they put any conscious limit on the capability that they're attempting to create. I think it's rather limited by their capacity to improve their systems; I think they're doing everything they can that they know how to do to improve both their offensive and their defensive systems. So that to my mind it is absolutely essential that the United States not relax for one minute in being ahead of the game. I think we still are ahead of the game and can continue to be ahead of the game, but only if we proceed as we intend to proceed with the Poseidon system with the Sentinel system, with the Minute Man Mark III, with the disbursal of our SAC [strategic air command] bombers, with continued emphasis upon the things that would enable our bomber force to survive and penetrate, and all these things we're doing. I think if no one relaxes on this on the U.S. side we will continue to be all right, but if anybody relaxes on it I have the gravest worries.

P: What do you think our posture should be on the deployment of [an] anti-ballistic missile system? I think we use the terms "thick" and "thin."

N: At the moment no one quite sees how one could design a thick system which would really give assurance of protection of our cities against the sophisticated kind of an attack that the Russians are capable of. The Joint Chiefs think one should move down that line;

they don't think we ought to do it now, they're satisfied with the thin system today. I would think we would need a good deal more study and more progress in the ABM [anti-ballistic missile] field before we'd feel justified--or before I would feel justified--in moving beyond the current Sentinel system.

P: And this doesn't put us in any sort of an endangerment--this approach to it being a thin deployment currently?

N: This thin system is more sophisticated and more competent than anything that the Russians now have in deployment, but I think they're working hard on something which from their standpoint is as good or better than the Sentinel system, but they haven't shown anything along that line yet.

P: Where do you think the emphasis should be in the future to achieve a credible deterrent--sort of a proper preparedness level? I'm speaking in terms regarding conventional versus nuclear capabilities.

N: I think we've got to continue in the future in nuclear systems, the same kind of an approach that we've followed in the past, and that is to be sure that we have an adequate deterrent and that we've preserved for ourselves options which would counter unexpected developments on the part of the Soviet Union. Now with respect to conventional forces, those we've greatly built up in the last eight years; the percentage of our Defense budget which goes into offensive and defensive nuclear systems is fourteen billion dollars out of some eighty billion dollars so it's less than twenty percent of our Defense effort that goes into strategic offensive and defensive systems. The other eighty percent goes into conventional systems. Now I would put the first priority upon our offensive and

defensive nuclear systems as a matter of priority. As a matter of allocation, I think the less than twenty percent we're putting on that now is a proper allocation. I don't think that increased expenditures at this time would do us much good.

P: Is your philosophy that this is an effective deterrent in terms of staying on top of it--maybe I'm trying to say I think that by spending this much and achieving this type of capability, we probably will not have to use it.

N: That's right. That's the whole purpose of it.

P: It's just a very expensive way.

N: But again, what's the alternative? I take it the alternative would be not to spend the fourteen billion dollars and unilaterally disarm in this field, in which event you've said, yes, decisions will be made in the Kremlin as to what happens in the United States, because they will be. Now maybe that's what one wants to opt for, this isn't what I would opt for.

Now the other alternative obviously is to try to negotiate with the Soviet Union where you would maintain the security of both at a lower level. And this we've all worked extremely hard on; I think we've done excellent work particularly during the last year on getting a position which is supported by the Chiefs, by the service secretaries, and by the State Department and the ACDA [Arms Control and Disarmament Agency], which were all together on negotiating a position for such time as talks start between the Russians and ourselves, but we've spent an enormous amount of work on this--I should think I've spent more work than anybody else in the government on it.

P: Then this transcends into being an effective diplomatic tool too then?

N: I don't think I understand the question.

P: Having a credible deterrent can be also used to achieve diplomatic relations here, or sort of a give and take.

N: I'm not sure that that's right except in the limited field of negotiation with the Soviet Union on the control and limitation of nuclear weapons. I don't conceive of our offensive and defensive capabilities being much of a weapon for other things--for, for instance, deterrence of Czechoslovakians; it doesn't deter Czechoslovakias, it doesn't deter Berlin crises, it doesn't deter Koreas, it doesn't deter attacks in South Vietnam by the North Vietnamese, because it is incredible that you would use your strategic offensive forces in that kind of a scenario.

P: Do you think it would have been ever to our benefit in Vietnam to use some sort of limited nuclear or atomic weapons?

N: I do not. And I think it would have been poisonous to have even suggested such.

P: Mr. Nitze, you were secretary of the navy from I believe '61 to '63; these are more navy-oriented questions.

N: I think it was from '63 to '67, was it not?

P: Excuse me, it was. What is your assessment of the navy's application and use and appreciation of the F-111-B?

N: Well, the navy was quite clear in its mind right from the beginning that it didn't want to have anything to do with the F-111-B built by General Dynamics; they wanted the F-111-B proposed by Boeing and not the one proposed by General Dynamics. And very early in the game in December '63, it became evident that the F-111-B as designed by General

Dynamics would weigh about forty-four thousand six hundred pounds as opposed to the thirty thousand nine hundred pounds that the navy had hoped for, and that this increase in weight would affect all the other performance characteristics of the plane. The question arose then as to whether the navy's commitment to the F-111-B should be cancelled or whether it shouldn't.

General Dynamics undertook a program called the "super-weight improvement program," under which they thought they might be able to shave some four thousand pounds off the weight of the plane, and bring it down to a weight which would be within the specifications that the navy was prepared to live with. No one had at that time any scheme for any other approach which had a better chance at giving the navy the type of plane that it wanted. I did ask the navy to get the Grumman Aircraft Company to conduct a study of what alternative approaches to the problem there might be, and they came up with three alternates, one of which was to completely redesign the plane. But that was estimated to cost some four or five hundred million dollars, as I remember it, of research and development expenditure; and even if everything came out of that that was anticipated, it wouldn't really have met the navy problem very well. It would have been not quite as good as what the navy originally had hoped it was going to get because it turned out early during the first year of this development program that within the then state of the art, it was just technically not possible to do what had been hoped for.

Subsequently in 1967 it became clear that the art had progressed to a point where you could design a new plane which could get for the navy what it wanted. By that time it was going to cost more, but that's what we're doing now--we're going down the route of

a new plane which will get the navy what it needs and will be a very good plane. But this incorporates all the things that were learned during the long process of working on the F-111-B, and all the developments in the state of technology during those years. I think it will work and it will be a much better plane.

P: Do you think this economic approach to producing one type of piece of machinery or equipment for more than one service is an applicable and feasible approach?

N: It all depends upon the circumstances. It worked beautifully in the case of the F-4. There was a plane developed by the navy which has now been adopted by the air force, and the air force has many more of them than the navy has; and both the navy and the air force are wholly happy with it. It's the best plane in the world.

It is easier to start with a navy plane because the constraints that are upon the designers if they're building a navy plane--the fact that a carrier deck is limited in length and catapults have limited capability and arresting gear has limited capability--we have to design the plane for those constraints; and having been designed for those constraints, then it's easy for the air force to relax those constraints because they've got longer air fields and don't need catapults and don't need arresting gear. So that any plane that is developed for the navy can be used by the air force. The reverse is not so. A plane that is developed for air force conditions--it is unlikely that it would be usable on a carrier because the constraints are much tighter.

P: Is this across service lines approach to equipment new in philosophy, and is it being continued?

N: The services obviously would prefer to develop each their own equipment for their

specific requirements. I think Mr. McNamara was wholly correct when he estimated that savings of the order of magnitude of a billion dollars could be achieved if one had a common navy and air force plane for the purposes for which the F-111-A and the F-111-B were designed. It's just regrettable that it did not prove feasible with the technology as it existed in '61 through '63, '65. And now the navy plane will be different than the air force plane. I think the support and lack of commonality will cost the government a billion dollars at least over and above what it would have cost if the two planes had been highly comparable. But as it turned out the F-111-B just wasn't going to do the job.

P: This in those terms was a sort of costly experiment.

N: Not anywhere near as costly as the public thinks. The amount of expenditure that was peculiar to the F-111-B and not applicable to the F-111-A was not greater than two hundred million dollars; and out of that a lot of the work was necessary for the new F-14 plane that the navy is going to build, so that the cost of the F-111-B not recoverable in the F-14 I think is less than one hundred million dollars. And I am sure that the public has in mind that funds vastly in excess of that were involved.

P: We've had two, and most recently, of the Scorpion and submarine disasters; has this been an indication that our art of construction of submarines is lacking, or is defective in research?

N: No. I think it would be almost impossible to have a program in which you don't have any operational losses. For every aircraft you build, you have on an average ten to twenty operational losses in the first ten thousand flying hours. No plane has ever been built with no operational losses. No missile system has been built in which you don't have a

failure. You have a certain number of failures in any complex item of equipment. Now obviously the object of the game is to reduce those operational losses to the minimum that you can. And after the loss of the *Thresher*, the navy undertook a program called the Sub-Safe Program in which every conceivable thing that engineers could think of was done in order to minimize the chance of a disaster.

Clearly the Russians have had accidents; they've lost submarines. But to summarize, one does everything one can do to prevent a disaster, but I'm sure that there will be further in the future; you can't design anything that is perfect, just as you can't design a spacecraft which will be perfect. When you have millions of parts, all of which have to work in order to avoid an operational accident, at some time one of those is going to fail.

P: I think in part the sensitivity to these disasters from a strictly military point of view is that this is of course part of our defensive weaponry. Is this any indication, or has this set back our program of our Polaris submarines?

N: No. As it happens we've never lost a Polaris submarine, although the Permit Sturgeon class, of which the Scorpion was one, were as carefully built as the Polaris submarines. But it certainly will not hold back the program.

P: Mr. Nitze, let me ask you a very broad question. What do you think has been our greatest research breakthrough in weapons technology in the last seven years since you've been here in Defense?

N: Well, the system which has been the most impressive system and which has I think been most capably handled has been the Polaris System. Now that system was started prior to

this Administration, but it was continued and completed during this Administration and a tremendous effort has gone into it. We've put fourteen billion dollars into it, and it has been a vastly successful program and extremely well run. And it's a very complicated system because it involves not only the submarine and its propulsion, but also all of the navigation equipment and communication equipment and fire control and the missiles systems, and a thousand and one other things, so that there's really a most elaborate system that makes this possible. And it's an absolutely first-class system. If one looks at things that are technically interesting that haven't the same strategic significance as the Polaris system, I should think our laser beam technology and the over-the-horizon radar technology. We've developed an awful lot of--numerous different types of ordnance, for instance, of shells and air-to-ground and air-to-air missiles which are just very sophisticated and very good.

P: Where do we go from here in weapons research?

N: Clearly one of the major fields is the one we discussed earlier, that is, the anti-ballistic-missile defense. I should have added the Sentinel system as being a system of outstanding engineering and technical competence, because this is really a most difficult problem to solve--the problem of anti-ballistic missile defense. And all the things that go into the Sentinel system--all these have represented a tremendous amount of work. I think it's one billion four hundred million dollars of research and development money that has just gone into that one system alone, with hundreds of different people in laboratories working on it. But there are further developments in that area which may be possible.

In anti-aircraft weapons the SAM-D [surface-to-air missile development] project which is a very ambitious project may work--I think it will. The advanced ship missile system--this is a very advanced scientifically program that's more certain of working; it's technically not quite as advanced--a very good system. The field of underwater technology, particularly with respect to underwater sound--this is a field that the public knows very little about which is vastly intricate; a lot of very good work has been done in that field. Advances and breakthroughs and perfection of this, that, and the other thing will take place all the time. It's hard to see exactly what direction it might go.

I think the two things which are now clearly possible which eight years ago did not seem possible--one of them the MIRV technology, Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicles--this did not seem possible eight years ago, and clearly is possible today. And the other is in the ABM field; the Sentinel system has effectiveness way beyond what any of us thought would be possible in 1961. So these are the two developments of strategic significance which have emerged in the last eight years. It's very difficult to see what comparable things might emerge in the next eight years.

End of Interview III

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By Paul Henry Nitze

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3. A revision of this stipulation governing access to the material for research may be entered into between the donor and the Archivist of the United States, or his designee, if it appears desirable.

4. The material donated to the United States pursuant to the foregoing shall be kept intact permanently in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

5. The donor retains to himself during his lifetime all literary property rights in the material donated to the United States of America by the terms of this instrument. After the death of the donor, the aforesaid literary property rights will pass to the United States of America.

Signed Paul H. Nitze

Date Nov. 12 1971

Accepted Harry J. Middleton for
Archivist of the United States

Date May 8, 1974