INTERVIEW I

DATE: November 15, 1971

INTERVIEWEE: ROBERT NOVAK

INTERVIEWER: Paige Mulhollan

PLACE: Washington, D.C.

Tape 1 of 1

M: I've already identified you on the tape, but just to get the credentials on here as well, you are Robert Novak and you are a syndicated columnist with Rowland Evans, and author of ***Lyndon B. Johnson, An Exercise in Power***, as well as other books, including one now on the Nixons. To begin with, you were still a fairly junior congressional reporter at the time your book begins. How close on that level were you to Mr. Johnson when he was majority leader?

N: I became the Senate correspondent for the ***Wall Street Journal*** in September of 1958. Previous to that, I had been with the Associated Press, and I had not been close to Johnson at all with the AP, although Evans was quite close to him some years before that. As soon as I did become the Senate correspondent for the ***Journal***, by necessity I became intimately involved with him, and from September of 1958 to the end of his Senate career, approximately two years, I was in very close contact with him.

M: You were one of those whom he called regularly into the chamber there and administered, as you called it, "the treatment."

N: That's correct. That's right. There was a sort of law of perversity that when I wanted to see Senator Johnson it was almost impossible to get to see him, but when I had a date or I was on a deadline, he always sent for me. And it was hard to turn him down. In January of 1959 he moved into his fancy headquarters which everybody called the Taj Mahal and I spent a lot of time drinking with him in the late afternoons there.

M: What did he hope to accomplish in sessions like that, do you think?

N: He thought I was antagonistic to him, and I think he was trying to wear me down. He was trying to do two things: He was trying to establish a personal relationship, and at the same time he was trying to give me the impression that he was giving me a lot of inside information, exclusive information.

M: Was he?

N: No. He never gave me anything that was worthwhile. He gave me a lot of baloney. But it was still extremely valuable to get insights into his personality, what he really thought about. Sometimes he would let things slip that gave insights into his personality that didn't result in an immediate story but added to the background that I felt I needed as a Senate correspondent and as a political correspondent.

M: Was he usually trying to get you to write a favorable story about a particular topic when he'd call you in, or a particular major item on the agenda or something?

N: No, no, he was not. He was just trying to generally show what a terrific guy he was. And if there had been anything critical in any of my stuff that had appeared, he would talk to that point. He did more reacting to what already had been written. Since I was with the ***Wall Street Journal***, sometimes he would call me in on specific subjects--on economic matters, particularly. There was a great fight, and we deal with that in the book, on whether to take off interest rate ceilings in 1959. I remember he called me in one Saturday afternoon and I guess I spent about three hours with him that afternoon, extremely chaotic. Of course there were always phone calls ringing, people running in and out, and a lot of digressions.

M: Did he ever let you talk in sessions like that or did you just get to listen mainly?

N: I got to talk a little, but damn little.

I remember he gave me a document, a memorandum on the interest rate thing, and said, "Don't tell anybody where you got this from." I thought to myself, "Jeez, the first

time you really gave me something!" I looked at it when I got out, and while it was not terribly earth shattering, it wasn't bad. It was supposedly an exclusive. Then I picked up a ***Congressional Record*** from the previous day and started reading it and he had inserted it in the ***Record*** the previous day. Those were the kinds of things he did I could never quite understand.

It was also at that session that he told me--I think it appeared in our book, I'm not sure--that his economic mentor was Paul Douglas, and he never did anything without Paul Douglas' approval. In fact, I think that was the signal to show that he wasn't going to go for the repeal of the interest rate ceiling because Douglas was against it. But the "mentor" business was sheer nonsense; he never talked to Paul Douglas about that or anything else.

M: But then later on, ironically, he'd call on him during the presidency. But that's interesting.

N: As President, he did, but at that time he didn't. But it was his convoluted way of telling you that he wasn't going to be for repealing the interest rate ceiling. The thing was that at that time he had a terrific press with the Senate correspondents, all of whom were a little bit awed and dazzled by his performance. There were maybe four of us who tended to snipe at him. Sam Shaffer of ***Newsweek*** was his pet peeve. But I was the most junior of those who were critical, and he was always a little irritated with that.

M: You'd have been in your very early twenties at that point, wouldn't you? About twenty-five, maybe?

N: No, I was in my late twenties. I was twenty-seven when I took over as [Senate correspondent].

M: He would have seen that as pretty junior, I'm sure.

N: Yes. Of course it was a very important newspaper, and before most papers were doing it, they let me do a lot of signed, analytical pieces, almost commentary.

M: What they call the new journalism now, but it was being done fifteen years ago.

N: That's right. So I did a lot of stuff on Johnson. It tended to be on the critical side, mainly because at that time, as our book points out, this was a down-trend in his leadership. He had seen his best days and this big Democratic majority was giving him fits. He didn't have the mastery that he had previously. He was very concerned with me, I thought unduly concerned, but that was his way.

There was one night--a birthday party at the press club for Bascom Timmons--I was unmarried at that time, and I was drinking at the Press Club bar after dinner, about to go home, and somebody said, "Why don't you drop into Bascom Timmons' party? Lyndon Johnson is there and he's drunk out of his mind; it's the funniest thing in the world." So we went in and, boy, he was drunk as a loon. This I would say was early 1959. He put his arm around my shoulder and he said, "I like you, Bob, but you don't like me." He must have said that twenty-five times. And he invited me to the Ranch, and he said, "Why can't we have a better relationship?" Finally a fellow I was with, another reporter, we decided to take him home. He [Johnson] was very noisy, very loud--we asked around and he had no aides with him, he had no car. So we took him down the elevator and put him in a taxi and sent him home.

The next day, you know, the Majority Leader used to have a little five-minute press conference every morning on the floor. We got out there and he was very cool as usual and he said, "I saw Bob Novak dead drunk at the Press Club last night."

M: Depending on where you put that clause or those couple of words, he could have been telling the truth! (Laughter)

N: And everybody kind of laughed, and what the hell, I did, too.

M: Was he ever vindictive in the sense that he went to your paper with things that he thought you were doing to him?

N: I don't know if he ever did. He did with Sam Shaffer; I don't know if you've talked to Sam.

M: I've talked to people at ***Newsweek***.

N: There's a funny story. Sam once was called in to see him and he got in there and seated in there was the then-Bureau Chief, Ken Crawford, of ***Newsweek***, and a stack of ***Newsweeks*** red penciled and paper clipped to all the things that Johnson had objected to in the past year almost. And he [Johnson] had been talking to Crawford. I don't know. He would have gotten a very short shrift from the ***Journal***. Whether he ever did or not, I don't know.

M: They never said anything to you at least?

N: No, they said nothing to me and they probably would have if he had. He was later extremely vindictive after he was in the presidency, but I know nothing about his majority leader period. He, of course, always felt that I was salvageable.

I spent a weekend at the Ranch in 1960.

M: That was while he was still senator?

N: Yes. As we got off the plane in Washington, he took the ***Wall Street Journal***--it was Monday, we came in from the Ranch on Monday, and that morning's ***Wall Street Journal*** had a piece by me which was critical of Johnson.

M: Good timing.

N: He later told other people that it was a violation of his hospitality, to sit at the Ranch and write that stuff. It wasn't written at the Ranch, of course.

M: No telling how long before.

N: Well, it hadn't been long before, but it wasn't written at the Ranch. It was all written when I went there.

M: You said he had such good rapport with the press in his Senate days; did he do something noticeably different as senator that he quit doing before he was president? Did he change or did the press change? Or is the office just different?

N: I think the office is different. The press was, particularly in those days, not so much today, the guys who covered the Congress were very much interested in technical virtuosity. This used to infuriate the liberal reformists, used to drive them out of their minds. [Senator Joseph] Joe Clark wanted the press to be interested in issues and things like health care and poverty and education, and he thought they were more interested in the mechanics counting and collecting Senate votes.

I think probably the press today is more interested in the issues on the Hill than they are in mechanics. I think that they are more doctrinaire liberals and ideologues than they were in those days. But in those days they were guys who were more deeply interested in the legislative process, and he was a master of the legislative process. It was a small arena you were working in. I often felt it was such an in intimate little family of regulars who really covered the Senate that Johnson could work on all of them and flatter them.

M: Too intimate for the good of the press, that is.

N: Yes.

M: How close were you in the vice presidency? You stayed on the Hill now until 1963, didn't you?

N: Yes. In 1961 I moved off the Senate and became the chief congressional correspondent for the ***Journal*** and was in charge of covering both houses after that.

Well, when he got to be vice president, I still saw him occasionally. He was not that newsy. I wrote some stuff again he didn't like. However, increasingly in 1961 and 1962, I was taking out one of his secretaries, and so I'd see him a lot more socially. I'd sometimes be invited over to his house for barbecue at night or something like that. I

thought he was really in a declining phase. I was appalled by the way he was reverting to reminiscence and always talking about his time being past.

M: Living in the past?

N: Yes. And an awful lot of self-pity, just a shadow of what he had been, and a hell of a lot less interesting, I thought, impressing me less than he had been when he was majority leader. Particularly into 1962.

M: Were the Kennedy men early on in the vice presidency making fun of him and so on regularly?

N: Oh, yes. It started in the campaign of 1960.

M: And just went right on through.

N: Absolutely.

M: Was it as bad up close to President Kennedy as it was in the lower levels? Was it typical of all Kennedy men whatever their jobs?

N: I think it was typical of all. Of course after the assassination a lot of them wanted to get on board, and they claimed they'd always been friendly to Johnson.

M: That's why I ask.

N: I didn't see any difference, I didn't think he had any supporters. I remember talking to Bobby when we were working on the Johnson book, Rowly and I had a long evening at Bobby's home, Hickory Hill, about a six-hour interview with him. And Bobby admitted that--this was about 1966, early 1966--he really had considered Johnson as an incompetent man, as a nonentity.

M: Incompetent?!

N: Yes! He knew nothing about Johnson's work as majority leader and he thought he was just a buffoon, a cheap politician.

M: Was there a fairly well-known split between them in 1961, 1962 period?

N: Oh sure, no question about it. Bobby made a lot of fun of him. Bobby was a very--well, he was a cruel man.

M: Did Johnson fight back?

N: Not very hard. He knew the reality of power, that the vice president doesn't have many tools. We have this in the book--he used to sometimes threaten to pack it in after 1964 and go back to Texas. Bobby Baker wanted him to run against Ralph Yarborough in 1964. I think Lyndon listened a little bit to it.

M: Oh? Seriously considered it?

N: I don't know if he seriously considered it, but you know it was a nice thing to think about.

M: Sounded good to him, the idea.

N: Yes. Just on my own personal relationship with Johnson. I got married to one of his secretaries in November of 1962, and we were just going to have a very small wedding in Washington, and Johnson insisted on giving the reception. And I said, "Under no event, I just won't do that." And he insisted, because this was his secretary. So finally he said, even if we didn't come, he was going to give the reception!

M: So, how did it work out?

N: I said, "Well, okay." So we had a lovely reception at his home and very, very nice, a lot of people. I was afraid he was going to invite all his friends, but it was just the people we wanted to be there. I said to Geraldine [Williams Novak], "He must really think a lot of you to do this." And she said, "No, he thinks a lot of you!"

M: How long had she been with him?

N: Three years.

M: Three years. She didn't really go back into the deep past like some of them did.

N: She was quite a young girl then. But what her point was: He was trying to influence me, and it was made clear. I learned that he felt that giving this party was a leg up. My

personality was such that it had the opposite effect on me and, as soon as I could, I wrote some highly critical stuff, and then he blasted me as an ingrate to his friends.

M: It sounds like he wasn't at all thinking in terms of giving up at that point, if he was still interested in mending his press fences that way.

N: That's true, that's true. It contradicts what I said before.

M: Was his press still pretty good then?

N: No, it was poor.

M: Just that quickly, from majority leader to vice president, it [declined].

N: I don't know a vice president who's got a good press, maybe Alben Barkley did. But Nixon had a poor press; Humphrey had a poor press; in my time all of the vice presidents have had a poor press.

M: I suppose that's true.

N: It's a tough job; it really is.

M: Probably an impossible job.

Did he keep in touch with your wife after she left him?

N: Oh, yes, and when he got to be president, he tried to hire her back.

M: In spite of her being married to someone suspect?

N: Yes. But I thought that was an impossible situation; she did, too.

M: What about the presidency? By that time you were not among the favored ones. Were you ever in the group that he favored with these long marathon night sessions, where he'd talk to two, three o'clock in the morning?

N: No, believe it or not. He was extremely accessible as president, but not to us. When we worked on the book, several reporters were kind enough to give us transcripts of their notes of their off-the-record meetings with the President. A lot of the funny quotes in the book come from these meetings. One reporter he saw maybe fifty times in his presidency

faithfully typed up a report of each meeting, and you can get a lot of funny quotes out of it.

I never saw him once under those conditions. Of course I would see him at functions and shake hands with him in line. Sometimes he'd pretend he really didn't know me, and would give Geraldine a big hello [?].

M: "How are you getting along with what's-his-name," huh?

N: Yes. We were invited to one White House state dinner the summer of 1964 and never again. Once we were at a reception at the State Department for somebody and he was there, and he made a big fuss over Geraldine and said, "Now you've got to come down for Thanksgiving," or something. It was a lot of crap. There was no follow-up on it. Rowly saw him once, I think it was after the book was published; Bob Kintner got him in, and they had a long session. But I never had a long talk with him that whole time, and we tried repeatedly to see him.

M: Did he tend to favor his old Senate day cronies during this period? How about Bill White?

N: Well, Bill White is a dear friend, personal friend. No, I think the reporters he developed were essentially new ones.

The thing that surprised me and indeed it saddened me was the vindictiveness he showed toward us in the presidency. He had [Jack] Valenti call papers and ask them to drop our column.

M: Was this before the book or after, or both?

N: I think it was both before and after the book, at least in that period, say through 1966, 1967.

M: I guess the White House was bound to have known you were working on the book.

N: Oh, sure, we interviewed all of them.

M: Did they try to influence the content directly, I mean by pressure?

N: They never tried to influence us, but we were being published by New American Library, which at that time was bidding for the Johnson memoirs and Mrs. Johnson's stuff. And Liz Carpenter told the executive vice president of NAL that if they published our book, they wouldn't have a chance at the memoirs.

M: Do you know whether or not this came from the family or was it overzealous activity by Liz or Jack Valenti?

N: I have no idea.

M: You don't have direct knowledge of where it started.

N: No. All I can tell you is what she said. But there were several attempts to get hold of the manuscript. New American Library is wholly owned by the ***Los Angeles Times-Mirror*** Company, which publishes the ***Los Angeles Times***. And at one point Valenti made a call to the president of New American Library from the office of Otis Chandler, president of the ***Los Angeles Times-Mirror*** Company. Now as far as Valenti's calling and calling on editors and asking them to drop our column, that, I'm sure, came from the President, because Valenti wouldn't ever do a thing like that on his own. The ***Houston Post*** was one, the ***Los Angeles Times*** was another.

M: Did any of them ever do it?

N: No. The only successful effort came in connection with our Johnson book. It was rather widely syndicated in newspapers in installments. The [***New York***] ***World Journal Tribune***, short-lived, was started in 1966, and Johnson had a close relationship with William Hearst. And Johnson told Hearst that "I don't think you're my friend if you're carrying Evans and Novak on the right-hand corner of your edit page," which kind of shook up Hearst.

M: Yes.

N: So they didn't want to drop us or anything, but that influenced the decision not to buy the serialized book. Frank Conniff now dead, the editor of the ***World Journal Tribune***, told

me that very frankly, candidly, that that was the reason he didn't buy it. The damage done to us was about zero, but what shocked me was that the President of the United States or his aides could be so concerned with such trivia.

M: With the presumed intensity of business in the job.

N: Absolutely. Fighting a war and so on. When the book came out--some of this appeared in print, but a lot of it didn't. This part didn't appear in print--the selection committee at USIA [United States Information Agency] selected this book for overseas libraries. The White House, the only time it ever happened, countermanded the order on it.

M: Not to buy it for that purpose? Was that changed after Johnson left the White House?

N: No, I think they thought we might write a book on Nixon.

M: They may not buy it.

N: I'm sure they won't.

M: What about the damage done to him in the press as president by the Georgeto-wn-dinner-circuit-Kennedy types? Was this an important factor in harming his image?

N: I don't really think so. I feel in the first place if you look back, he got a terrific press his first year. In fact, almost any President does. What finally brought him down with the press, as with everything, I think was mainly Vietnam. And then under the stress of Vietnam, his ruralisms, his lack of eastern sophistication, they all became very much evident, people writing about it. Of course, the mythology is that there was a cabal that was sitting around and trying to bring him down, but I don't think so. Of course our situation was always a lot different because we always supported him on Vietnam.

M: "Determinedly middle-road," as I think somebody called you one time.

N: But we supported him on Vietnam, and I think probably if we had it to do over, we'd do it differently on that. Not that it was wrong to go into Vietnam, but the way we went into it was wrong. Obviously, unless you're an idiot, you've got to realize it was badly flawed.

M: Based on the results. You made a point in the book that you thought the great millstone was Vietnam. Now, looking at it from four years later, do you think that if that had been eliminated that most of the other difficulties would have gone away?

N: I really think so. I really do. Because all the economic difficulties, inflation and all, stemmed from that. It was also the fact that somehow or another he wanted to fight this war in secret, which was part of the whole syndrome of wanting to do every thing in secret, which worked very well in the legislative area and didn't work so well in the presidential area. He wanted to fight the war on the q.t. without financing it. But I think, knowing him personally, that he wants to feel that what happened in his presidency was a character assassination by unkindly people, and in part it was. I think he wants to minimize the enormous impact of the Vietnam War.

M: You think the credibility difficulties were worse enough under him to have made a difference, except for Vietnam, as compared to other presidents you've seen at close hand, four now.

N: I think the credibility problems with him were terrible. They were terrible in the Senate. Again, there was almost a fixation of lying to the press. A very small thing in the Senate: Tom Gates was up for secretary of Defense the last year of the Eisenhower Administration, and Russell Long was holding it up. And we asked Johnson at the daily press conference when it was going to come up, and he said, "I don't know." Then we went upstairs to the press gallery and had the prayer, and in the first order of business, he called up Tom Gates' name. And that accomplished no purpose. He showed himself to be a liar in three minutes. I think it was almost an obsession with telling untruths to the press.

And of course this book, ***The Vantage Point***, is the most incredible thing I've ever seen. When he says he didn't want to be president in 1960, I mean I sat next to him and it wasn't thirdhand, he told me of his plans to get the nomination and railed about what a

twerp Kennedy was. I mean he could taste it. I think he was always pessimistic about getting it.

M: Yes. Realistic.

N: Yes.

M: How about the rest of the book?

N: I haven't read the whole book. I'm very skeptical of his saying he didn't make up his mind to run until Atlantic City in 1964 because I know of some of the preparations that had been going on.

M: The elaborate vice presidential difficulties in the spring among others.

N: I think it's a disingenuous book. I'm not disappointed because I kind of expected it, but also it doesn't read much like Lyndon Johnson. You read the Truman memoirs, and Harry Truman jumps out at you even when he's not telling the truth. Even the Eisenhower memoirs sound like Eisenhower. But that doesn't sound like Johnson wrote it. It sounds like a committee.

M: And it was.

N: Yes.

M: Have you changed any of your basic conclusions since the appearance of your book? He had two more years of his presidency after that roughly. Do you think most of your conclusions still stand up?

N: I hold them. Of course the last two years were years of deterioration. After our book left him the fall of 1966, the process of political degeneration caused by Vietnam just went on a pace, I don't think there was any particular change. I think his presidency--I think the domestic operation was evidently affected by it. And, of course, as he got into economic trouble, he then tried to hide the economic trouble.

M: Was he well served by his press secretaries, or poorly served?

N: I don't really know. Obviously his favorite press secretary was George Christian who never gave out much information that didn't come out of a stamping machine. That was what the President wanted. Bill Moyers was trying to do something else. He was trying to butter up people like me and Evans and other people and trying to explain Johnson to them in the process of leaking some information. Now the folklore has it by the dyed-in-the-wool Johnson people that Moyers was undercutting Johnson, a sort of a secret Kennedy agent. That's ridiculous. In the many conversations we had with Bill Moyers, he never said an unkind thing about Lyndon Johnson. He did give out information without checking with Johnson, but it was favorable information. Whether Moyers was successful in his operation or not, I don't know, and it is debatable how helpful he was, but he was certainly loyal. And he was much more helpful to me than Christian or Reedy. The White House press, I think, preferred Christian because they were kind of interested in housekeeping things, nuts and bolts, and he was better at that than Moyers.

M: Do you know anything about the circumstances of Moyers' departure as a consequence?

N: Nothing that hasn't already been printed. I don't have much first-hand knowledge on it.

M: Having written a book on the White House operation and being close to it as a columnist, how much of everything that goes on do you think gets into print?

N: Oh, a very small amount in my opinion. And if you get a little piece of information off the top of it, you try to use as cribs to the whole puzzle, but most of what goes on there's no way of knowing. That's true of any White House, obviously.

M: The press generally knows a lot more than it writes.

N: That's right.

M: Or can write.

N: That's right.

M: Do most of those things get saved somewhere? What about the book? Your book. Have you kept a fully-documented copy and an updated copy based on what you've found out since then?

N: The former yes, the latter no. We have not attempted to update it. Obviously there are some things we know that are different. We know them differently today.

M: Almost any book is that way.

N: No, the idea of writing books about administration in midstream, I think, is difficult. Of course, the Nixon book is considerably different than the Johnson book. The Johnson book is a political biography and over half of it deals with the President before he got to the White House, and it deals with him; it's not supposed to be an account of the administration. The Nixon book is an account of the Nixon Administration, and it begins when he's in the White House.

M: What made up your mind to write such a book in the first place?

N: The Johnson book?

I was talking to an editor. This was in late 1964, just after the election. The guy was with McGraw-Hill, talking about the possibility of Evans and I doing a book together. We were just kind of brain-storming and I mentioned the fact that both Evans and I had covered Johnson as a legislator--Evans for his whole term as majority leader and I for his last two years--and that we were fascinated by his legislative techniques, and we knew a lot of stuff that had never been in print. And we saw him as a legislator as president using these techniques. We talked about a book about Johnson the legislator, just strictly geared to his legislative record.

M: Stopping in 1961?

N: No, as a legislator both from the majority leader's seat and from the presidency. This would not put in his abortive presidential campaign of 1956. It wouldn't include the 1960 campaign. It wouldn't include the 1964 campaign. No politics, no foreign policy; just

strictly legislative. And then as we talked more about it in the weeks to come, we decided that was an arbitrarily narrow gauge, and why not just do a political biography on him? That's how it started.

M: Certainly the commercial prospects on a book on Johnson didn't look very good then.

N: No.

M: Most Johnson books, I guess, have not sold very well.

N: We sold about nineteen thousand hard-cover and about fifty thousand paperback.

M: You've probably got the best record for Johnson books.

N: I think we sold more than any of them.

M: It's certainly a big help to us in our activities, as I said. Are there any other areas that we haven't talked about at all? Did you ever travel with Johnson overseas?

N: Not overseas, no.

M: But domestically?

N: Oh, yes, and that was always an experience, because he'd talk his head off in the plane and that sort of thing.

Just a personal anecdote, again I'm giving you more personal stuff but it's stuff that's never seen the light of print.

M: That's what we want.

N: And I'll never write this stuff. We feel that the book was not a hatchet job on him.

M: I don't feel that it was a hatchet job.

N: It was critical, but it showed an admiration for him that you can't find in the Nixon book certainly. For some reason or another, he really feels that we were two of his greatest assassins. Maybe it was the fact that he had been on very close terms with Rowly, and had at least some relationship with me through Geraldine. My wife is from Texas, and we spend Christmas down there. We were there last year, and we went to the Cotton Bowl game, Texas versus Notre Dame. There was a brunch given by the University of

Texas, and Mr. Johnson came in with his two daughters. I was there, and they were just cold as hell to me and very nice to Geraldine.

M: Still?

N: Yes. I was the guest at the game of Bob Strauss, who is the Democratic National Committeeman, a close friend of Mr. Johnson's. And at the game he passed Mr. Strauss a note. He either passed him a note at the game, or he mailed it to him later. I think he mailed it to him later, in which he said, "If you keep palling around with Novak, he'll ruin you just like he did me."

M: A long time to carry a grudge.

N: I don't even know what he's carrying a grudge about because, as I say, maybe it's my style of reporting, but I really believe in a kind of adversary system with the great political figures; I don't think you're supposed to be their puff men. I know that Barry Goldwater was a good personal friend of mine before he was nominated, and he really thought I betrayed him. The point was that he was a hell of a good guy to drink with, but the prospect of being president of the United States was just horrible. And it had nothing to do with ideology.

M: Politicians don't define the adversary relationship the way you do.

N: No, that's right. And so I wasn't going to pull any punches with Barry Goldwater running for president. And this has happened with other people. I was a good friend of Gene McCarthy till he ran for president. And then I put him in a very critical focus. So I think it would be very hard for me to ever be a very good friend of any president or presidential-level candidate.

M: Well, we certainly appreciate your time this morning and enjoyed getting a chance to talk to you.

N: Nice talking to you.

End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview I

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