

INTERVIEWEE: Edwin W. Pauley

INTERVIEWER: Joe B. Frantz

February 19, 1969, Los Angeles, California

F: This is an interview with Edwin W. Pauley, in his office in Los Angeles. The interviewer is Mr. Frantz and the date is February 19. Mr. Pauley, very briefly, tell us a little bit about your background. You are Indiana-born and came to the west then when you were a youth?

P: I was born in Indiana. Indianapolis, Indiana, and I spent the first full six weeks of my life there, but that's all, and I've never been back there since except to tour the town to find out, which I had difficulty in doing, where I was born.

F: Wasn't anything you recognized?

P: Right. Then I went to Alabama and lived there, aside from the time I was at various boarding schools and military schools, and among them was Georgia Military Academy, from which I was graduated and I'm still a trustee of. In fact, I think I'm a trustee of every school I ever went to except Mrs. Dalrymple's Kindergarten--Mrs. Dalrymple hasn't been able to find me.

I know you're interested in getting to the subject matter of Lyndon Johnson. I became quite active in Democratic politics. This was occasioned because there was a legislative bill which was put up, passed the legislature--put up as a referendum in California--which meant that it came up for public vote. It affected the oil industry tremendously, and I believed, as did my independent friends, that it was very harmful to the independent operator. So I formed, or

at that time helped to form, the Independent Petroleum Association of California, and during that time I spent some time in Washington and I knew Dick Kleberg of King Ranch reasonably well. And that's where I first met Lyndon Johnson.

F: He was his administrative aide or secretary at that time?

P: That's right. I think he had the title of administrative assistant. Of course he was a very personable fellow and one that you could easily get acquainted with and not only that, he was a very effective administrative assistant. He was able to accomplish things for friends of Dick Kleberg, and also do a good job for Dick Kleberg. One of the ablest I had seen.

I followed his career from the time that he went into Congress and then ran for the Senate, but before he ran for the Senate on one of the occasions I happened to be at the White House and he came in very nattily attired in his Naval uniform. I believe he had the high rank of Lieutenant.

F: Lieutenant or Lieutenant Commander?

P: Well, this was before he got to be Lieutenant Commander, although I'm not sure about that.

F: This was under Franklin Roosevelt?

P: Yes. I had the appointment right after Lyndon did with Roosevelt and so I walked in as he was walking out, but we caught each other right in the door and as he walked out, Roosevelt--President Roosevelt--said, "That's a great man. He's a very able fellow, and he'll go a long way in public life." Then he said, "You know that he may well be President of the United States someday." That goes back quite awhile.

F: Not very many people thought so at the time.

P: No. But he did. Not many people, including me, thought so. But I must admit I didn't know him as well as Roosevelt did. I told this story when I introduced Lyndon Johnson when he was Vice-President and we were giving him an honorary degree at U.C.L.A. (that's the University of California at Los Angeles), and I told this story as I introduced him. When he was Vice-President you could say a lot of things about the Vice-President, but after he became President you just said, "Ladies and Gentlemen, here is the President." But I told this story and Lyndon Johnson then got up and thanked me for this introduction, and he said, "My only regret about it is that my mother and father were not here to hear that introduction. My father would have been very proud of it. And my mother might have believed it!"

Well, needless to say, when he ran for the presidency, I saw him in the Senate and he asked me who I was for and I told him I was for Johnson, Kennedy, and Symington, but in that order. And this is before he became the Vice-President.

F: Going back a minute, in 1948 when you were so very close to Truman, you had some difficulty with Mr. Truman's campaign that you didn't have much opportunity to take notice of Mr. Johnson's senatorial campaign that year, did you?

P: Well, not only that, but Mr. Johnson has told me that one of the first substantial contributions he got when he ran for the Senate came from Pauley through Blalock--Jack Blalock to him. I contributed to his campaign and got others to do it.

- F: So you were aware then that he was making a bid for the Senate in that year.
- P: One of the first ones. I think he told me that that was the first check that he received, as a matter of fact.
- F: He needed it.
- P: Yes. That's right.
- F: That was a close one.
- P: How many votes did he win [by]?
- F: Eighty seven (87). I don't know, out of a million plus. The percentage is rather small there. Did you see him much during his Senatorial days?
- P: Yes, but mostly socially, and I was one of those privileged to be invited many times and perpetually to the Senate club up there. Lyndon would very often have lunch, and I would be there but I didn't have any political contact with him at that time because there was no use in my trying to influence him--he was already for everything I was. So I didn't see him to lobby.
- F: In 1956 at the convention there seems to have been a very faint hope that the convention might deadlock between Stevenson and Harriman and that Johnson might be offered as a compromise candidate. Were you aware of that?
- P: Not only aware of it but worked on it, up to a point and the only serious argument I ever had with the Governor of Texas who was his campaign manager--who was Johnson's campaign manager at that time [1960], was when he started diverting votes that would have gone to Johnson to Stevenson. Because he felt that was the only way you could stop

Kennedy at that time, and I blew my top because I thought the only way we could get Johnson through was to tie it up as you have just now described, and have Johnson come in as a compromise candidate.

F: This is John Connally you are talking about?

P: John Connally, yes. In fact I've seen John and we've talked about that several times and he's always said, "Well, we've never been in disagreement; it's just disagreement in the tactics to put Johnson over." Then when Kennedy came over and was elected, I got a call from Joe Kennedy. And he said, "Would you call--will you talk to Lyndon--?"

F: This is at the '60 convention here in Los Angeles?

P: Yes. This is '60; now you were talking about '56?

F: I was talking about '56 earlier.

P: Well, then, we're talking about two different conventions. This goes for '60. And he said, "Jack wants him to be Vice-President." I said, "Sure I will." His room, incidentally, Johnson's room, was directly below my room at the Biltmore Hotel.

F: And Kennedy was in the same hotel, wasn't he?

P: Yes. Kennedy's room was just above mine. We had three right there, one on top of the other.

F: Did it just happen that way, or done for convenience?

P: Remember, I live in Los Angeles, and I know everybody here, so if you want to know who was below that, it was Sam Rayburn.

F: You had pretty much of a straight shot, didn't you?

P: Well, it didn't take as long to move from one place to the other.

And so I called up--this was about 11:30-12:00 o'clock at night, not

much after 12:00-- So I got hold of Lady Bird on the phone and asked her if I could see Lyndon, and she said, "Yes, but you have to hurry, because he just took a sleeping pill. He's going to be asleep in just a few minutes." So, just like sliding down the bannisters at your home, I went down and was there in a minute and explained the problem of one heartbeat between the President and the Vice-President and said that isn't the matter of age, it's just the way with anybody. I didn't realize how prophetic my remarks were at that time.

But he said, "Well, Sam was just up here (meaning Sam Rayburn) and he talked to me about this." And he said, "I told Sam no, that I already had a good job. One that I could serve my country not only well, but happily. And being Vice-President at this moment does not appeal to me." I said, "Gee, I wish you would think it over and if he hasn't asked you to breakfast, he's going to do it."

F: John Kennedy hadn't approached him directly yet? They were just talking about a "what-if" situation?

P: Joe had told me. So just as I was leaving the room John called and they had their appointment, and incidentally I afterwards asked John Kennedy what Lyndon said and I told him what he told me but that was after he had accepted. I said, "Just as a matter of old Pauley's historical memory, tell me what he said." And he said, "Well, okay." And I said, "That's all?" and he said, "That's all."

F: I see. That was a short road to the Vice-Presidency.

P: Well, it was a very interesting historical factor.

F: The general feeling is that Mr. Sam was opposed to his taking it at that time. Do you think that's correct?

P: That what?

F: That Sam Rayburn was opposed to Johnson's accepting the Vice-Presidency.

P: I don't think he was enthusiastic about it, although I wasn't there when they talked; but from talking to Lyndon, I don't think that Sam Rayburn used his full personality to influence him about it--I did. Everything I had within me, I did. I don't know whether--I doubt if it would be the decisive factor but I would think that probably Lady Bird, who wasn't in the room, could hear all the conversation and she, after hearing the different things, probably talked to him and-- I'm sure that she had more influence than anybody.

F: Did you see any of the Kennedys besides John after that. Apparently Robert was not enthusiastic.

P: I didn't talk to them--I didn't talk to them--any of them. As a matter of fact my sole contact came from Joe, his father.

F: Did you get the feeling that Joe Kennedy was for Johnson, or just thought he would make a stronger ticket, or what do you think was behind his support of Johnson?

P: Well I think he realized, oh, by the way, I had talked to Joe before ---

F: Was this before the nomination?

P: Yes. And they were-- the whole Kennedy family were-- very disappointed that I did not support John Kennedy for the nomination--very, very disappointed, including Joe. And I had been in contact with Joe over the telephone. He would call me quite often, hoping for whatever

little support I could give him that I would give it to him. I maintained a solid front for Lyndon Johnson. And you realize that there were only 7 of us in the whole California delegation for Lyndon Johnson--just 7.

F: You know what it is to be a member of the minority group, don't you?

P: Yes. I could tell you a story about that, but I won't take the time because this interview is about Lyndon Johnson. But Lyndon knows all that.

F: There was some dissatisfaction among Johnson's adherents prior to the '60 convention because he was so slow giving anyone the go-ahead. Did you get in on that? There was a feeling that he could have done better if they could have started sooner, but he wouldn't give permission for sort of a national campaign. Of course, Kennedy had been running since 1956.

P: That's right. That's perfectly right. I got on the fringes of it by talking to John Connally, who's a very good friend of mine. You know you're bound to have some strange feelings when you come to a Presidential nomination because most everybody that's running has been active in politics--Democratic politics--you know everybody that's running. I'll never forget the look on Sister Pat's [Kennedy] face when the first roll call came in the California delegation and I was the first one that said Lyndon Johnson. She looked like somebody had just been shot.

F: Did you have any real hope that Johnson could make the presidential nomination here in Los Angeles?

P: I did at various times. But just before the vote was taken I had given up hope but not my vote.

- F: Did you have any difficulty then with the California delegation in accepting him as Vice-President? There was some rebellion in the ranks.
- P: Well, the usual--what I call the rabble, why yes, sure they did, but there wasn't any real opposition.
- F: Now Mr. Truman's candidate in 1960 was Symington; did he [Truman] try to influence you one way or another?
- P: Very much, very much. But there was some --I like him personally very much, but there were many political decisions and votes that he made in the Senate that did not fit my idea of a businessman, and I told him that very frankly. I told him that we had--that I had talked to Lyndon and I had told him that I was for Johnson, Kennedy and Symington, in that order. I said, "you never can tell what might happen, you might lock it up;" as a matter of fact he came out with more votes than Johnson did, didn't he, or did he, I don't remember.
- F: No, no. Johnson was second. Johnson got between four and five hundred votes, which was supposed to be respectable considering the type of campaign that he had run. What did you do then during the campaign of '60? Were you active in that?
- P: Very.
- F: Doing what mainly?
- P: My forte is money raising. And that's what I did.
- F: Did you have more than ordinary difficulty, or did you manage to get the money fairly handily?

- P: Well Kennedy seemed to get his own money, and I imagine it was family money.
- F: It was a different source of money from what you had tapped in the past.
- P: That's right. Now I could raise money for Lyndon Johnson. Kennedy was a hard man for me to raise money for in the scheme of my life and my friends' lives, but on the basis of Lyndon Johnson and his great record in the Senate my friends all wanted him to be Vice-President.
- F: Did you have much association with Mr. Johnson when he was Senate Majority Leader when the tidelands issue was troublesome? Or again, did you just leave him alone because you had an idea of where he stood?
- P: Well, I not only had an idea, I knew where he stood. So there wasn't anything to do about it except to keep him on the same track and any conclusions that he came to, he came to by himself, not on account of me.
- F: After Mr. Johnson then became Vice-President, did you have any particular association with him during the Vice-Presidential years?
- P: Yes, quite often, both on a social basis, and also on an educational basis. Incidentally, he was, oh, this gets down to the Governor of the State of Texas, he once asked me would you --
- F: John Connally right now is trying to keep from going to New Orleans.
- P: He said, "Ed, I want you to get hold of my good friends in the University of Texas and also get hold of Brown [George] and tell them how we can make the University of Texas as great as the University of California, as eminent." I said, "I don't have to do that, I can tell you right now, you never can do it, never can, until you change your laws, and give your regents, your trustees, long-term appointments

such as the University of California has." Because I've seen that battle go on and on and on, and I've seen them try to get a president, a good first-class president and enroll first-class men on their faculty, but they're all scared to death because they're afraid they're caught in a political maze. I said, "Once you do that, then you'll find a whole new world, but as long as it exists you'll never have a great university, in my opinion." I know that's your school and I know that--

F: No, I'll go along with you on that.

P: Well, that's right. And I told President Johnson this; I said, "Now I'll never forget your good friend and mine, J. R. Parten, and he was once the chairman of the board."

F: I know the Major.

P: Sure you know the Major, and they just fired the president, I've forgotten what his name was.

F: Homer Rainey.

P: That's right--just fired him. And he appointed himself head of a committee to select a new president. That's what I did as Chairman of the Board of the University of California, appointed myself as chairman of that committee. I tell you, you never saw a fellow work any harder to get a good president than he did, but he came to that conclusion, they won't do it, they won't take that chance to leave a place where they feel secure to go to a place like the University of Texas. I've talked to George Brown about that and a couple of your regents; they come and go there so fast it's hard to get to know them.

- F: One of the administrator's complaints there is that it takes at least four years to educate a Regent and by that time you've just about run out of service---
- P: That's exactly right. Exactly right. I can testify to that better than anybody that's known, I've been one for thirty-some years, and I'm still trying to find out what the hell the score is about-- being a good educator. We've had a hell of a time. Now we've got a lot of new ones we've got to educate including some ex officio ones, the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, Speaker of the House, they're all new and they don't have the votes now but they will have before Reagan is out.
- F: Were you behind the move for U.C.L.A. to give Mr. Johnson a doctorate?
- P: Well, you say behind the move,---
- F: Did you initiate it, I'll put it that way?
- P: I'm sure I did, yes. You didn't have to organize anything to do that. They were as happy to have him as I hope he was to get the degree.
- F: Where were you on that fateful November 22, 1963, when Kennedy was shot?
- P: Having lunch at the Rockefeller Center in New York.
- F: What did they do, interrupt your lunch?
- P: Well, nobody could believe it. So I left immediately to go to my hotel where I could get on the phone and I passed a radio store, television store, there on 5th Avenue and 52nd, bought a portable radio and I still couldn't believe it until I heard it on the radio, and---
- F: Did you go on down to Washington or did you complete your business in New York?

P: I went to Washington.

F: Did you see Mr. Johnson those first few days?

P: Yes, I did.

F: What passed between you--the two of you?

P: Nothing but a few exchanges of mutual sorrow, but there was no business or politics.

F: Did he seem shaken by the turn events had taken or confident--what was the general attitude?

P: I think he was both shaken and he didn't show at any time any lack of confidence. But he was badly shaken about it.

F: Have you been involved with Mrs. Johnson on any of her beautification projects and most particularly on what's happened in the Redwoods?

P: I have not, although I've followed it just as an admirer and spectator.

F: In 1964 when he ran for re-election, or election, as the case may be, did you raise funds for that campaign?

P: Did I raise funds, yes, for the campaign, but not for the convention. Didn't need any.

F: Did you have any particular difficulty from the fact that Mr. Goldwater came from next door?

P: No. I'm friendly with him, but I wouldn't say that we're great friends, and we have no basis for either one of us complaining about what we were doing in politics. I know him socially through Del Webb, who's a prominent citizen of Arizona. Obviously, I wouldn't--

F: Do you get the feeling that under Mr. Johnson that during his Presidency machinery of the California State political party has gone downhill? Did he tend to neglect it? I'm trying to account for

California's behavior in Chicago, for instance, or Governor Pat Brown's loss to Reagan, and so on.

P: Well, put it this way. President Johnson did not pay enough attention to the political organization here, plus the fact that Unruh was a dyed-in-the-wool Kennedy man, and in fact on the Kennedy payroll and because of the lack of the Johnson attention, Unruh stole the show. I blame Unruh for the loss of these last elections more than any other person in the Democratic party.

F: You don't think that Johnson then could have courted Unruh and brought him around, that he was already committed to the Kennedys?

P: I personally know that he was on the Kennedy payroll. Whether he could have made other arrangements or not, I don't know.

F: Were you surprised by President Johnson's decision not to run again?

P: No.

F: Had you had any contact or conversation with him about that?

P: Yes. He called me up about three days-- this was a call at the house, called me about 11:30 at night, our time--

F: So it was late in Washington, then, wasn't it, 2:30?

P: And told me of his apprehension, and wanted to know how I felt about it. And I said, "Well, it just happens that I'm running a poll now in California that has to do with the proposition on the ballot called Proposition Number 3--has to do with financing higher education. And I know that the people doing the poll are being paid by your opponent to poll for him, or opponents. The fellow taking the poll, I have a great deal of respect for and I'll be glad to see if I can't get the

report, which I'll pay for, hopefully get it at the clergyman's rate, inasmuch as it's already been paid for." "Well I sure wish you would, and let me know as quickly as you can." I said, "Fine." The fellow who made the poll was Don Muchmore, called this poll the California Poll, and so I had him over here and we tried to get the President on the phone and give him the full facts of what this poll showed, and couldn't get him.

F: What did the poll show?

P: Well, I've got the report here if you want to see it. Anyhow, we couldn't get him so I said, "Well, Don, look, take your figures and all the things you've got there and dictate a memo to the President, and when we get him on the phone I'll tell him what it is." And I read it to him and it was not good. Very bad, as you will see. And so he said, "Well, do you agree with it?" I said, "Well, unfortunately I do; there's only one hope: Muchmore says that superhuman action on your part and the organization could probably change it. But it would take that." So he said, "Well, you've told me enough. If the people don't want me, I don't want to run." I don't know, but I would think that probably was the decisive thing that influenced ---

F: How close to March 31 was this?

Mc: [Mr. McCreary, Pauley's assistant, at the interview] The memo, when Gay gets here, has a date* on it. It seems to me it was very close. Not more than ten days.

P: Oh no, no, not that much, I mean before he made the decision. Oh, no, I think a couple of days.

* March 26, 1968

Mc: It was very close to the Sunday night that he announced that he was ---

F: You did not have any more contact with him after that until he made the announcement?

P: I talked to him a couple of times about who was going to be the Vice-Presidential candidate but there was no expression from him directly that it would be Humphrey. Talked about him in very favorable terms but they were inconclusive.

F: That brings up a prior question. Did you, with your antenna, get a feeling back there in the early part of 1963 that the Kennedys might dump Johnson in 1964?

P: I never quite felt it was a warm friendship, but I didn't get the feeling that it would affect---

F: You thought they were sufficiently practical that this ---?

P: Yes. I was sure there wasn't any warm feeling there.

F: But you had no direct knowledge of either keeping him or dropping him? Did Johnson ever talk to you about his anticipation along this line?

P: No. By innuendo, yes, but not in so many words. He knew that Robert Kennedy wasn't the strongest supporter of Lyndon Johnson; those are things you don't have to hear, you judge them.

F: Were you listening the night of the March 31st address, when Johnson announced that he was not going to run again?

P: Yes.

F: But you had no surprise then at the end of it?

P: No. I knew it, and I told these fellows that, I told them all what he told me. I said, "He's not going to run."

F: Did you get in touch with him anytime soon after that?

What I was wondering was, did he seemed relieved, or indecisive or what?

P: Seems like I did, but I don't recall the circumstances.

F: You had the feeling then that the way things were going he could not have held California in line in----

P: He positively could not of. I don't know where that memo is, but if you want it, when we get it I'll read it to you.

F: Now when you say that when you thought he could not win in California, are you talking about the primary or the election?

P: I was sure he could not win the primary.

F: What about the election?

P: Might win the election, but it would take an awful lot of work.

F: He'd need that much time.

P: Yes.

F: This, of course, was before Robert Kennedy was shot. After Kennedy was shot, did most of the sentiment that had been pro-Kennedy go to McCarthy?

P: Yes.

F: There never was any real feeling here that Johnson ought to be drafted? Or that he could be?

P: Well, no. You see, Unruh had a hand-picked delegation. It was picked for Kennedy; then I'm sure that the people who were on it were anti-Johnson people and you know, for instance, he offered many of my friends, Unruh did, seats on the delegation but never me--never did, and that's

the reason at the last convention McCarthy came out with such an overwhelming vote on the part of the California delegation, and I went down into the gallery--from the gallery box that I was in, into the delegation and worked and worked fairly hard and I couldn't convince them. They were just anti-Johnson people.

F: I was circulating freely at that convention, and I spent a good bit of my time in the vicinity of either the New York or California delegations simply because they were the ones, you know, who were the most intense on this thing, and therefore the most interesting. But I never did see any spirit of compromise, acceptance as a whole.

P: No, there wasn't.

F: Did you take part in any of the caucuses?

P: I was an interested spectator, but as far as taking part in the caucus, I wasn't even a member of the delegation, so that when the various candidates came before the caucus, all I could do would be to listen and get up and hail for Hubert Humphrey.

F: Let's go back to that Muchmore memo, Mr. Pauley. Tell me what Mr. Muchmore found that the President found so discouraging.

P: I'm going to give you a copy of the memo that Muchmore dictated to me for the purpose of reading it to the President, which I believe had a profound effect on him when he made his decision not to run. These hieroglyphics you will see in my own handwriting are pretty hard for me to decipher but for what they're worth, they're there for you.

F: I'll get a translator.

P: It says:

"The President is losing ground in California at the present time due primarily to two basic problems. One, the lack of authority in the small steering committee or in one individual able to make decisions to do things that need to be done. Two, the lack of information concerning what needs to be done, and where it needs to be done within the state. One of them has Johnson 32, Kennedy 42, McCarthy 17. (These being percentage points). However, those ones probably, not totally, one's not totally valid, because it represents some incomplete sampling of the populace and there are, however, two other surveys which are more accurate because they are complete samples. One of them has Johnson 33, Kennedy 34, McCarthy 16, and don't know 17.

"But at the same time when this survey was translated to the actual ballot that will appear in California, the figures changed McCarthy 17, Lynch (favoring Johnson) 30, Kennedy 38, and don't know 15. There are also three local area surveys, such as congressional districts, taken since these surveys just mentioned, with about a week's lapse, and they show Johnson losing ground, compared to the previous figures. It is my understanding that a proposal has been made to Erwin Sprague, at his request, calling for regional studies to be taken of public opinion within the state. The state to be divided into regions, each of these regions would be polled as to if they like the President, if so, why, if not, why, etc.

"On the basis of the regional reports a campaign can be developed on a regional basis which can win the state for Johnson. For example, it is quite possible that white suburbia will be strongly for Johnson if they are aware of the fact that Kennedy supports student boycotts and sit-ins. Only a survey can determine that these facts are on a regional basis so that if there are those areas where that issue can be used to get votes for the President it will be used, and in other areas it will not be used. Simply stated, the regional campaign can take advantage and make use of the strength of the President and alleviate to some extent the weaknesses that he might have in some areas. There is a very true saying in California 'You play your strength if you want to win campaigns.' First, you must know what your strength is and where it is. Those strengths happen to be the strength in terms of public support. The proposed survey of 4,000 interviews would run around \$25,000 up, and it can be used to plan a winning campaign. The turnaround time on the survey is two and a half weeks, which is the fastest of any survey of this kind has ever been done."

Of course that last paragraph had been dictated with the hustle for some business.

F: Yes. So you think that the President thought it just wasn't worth the effort.

P: Well, this is when he told me, he said, "Well, Ed, I'm not going to run. The people don't want me, I'm not going to run." I told these fellows that. So it was no surprise to me that he made the announcement. My wife was with me when he made the phone call at the house and of course

she knows him pretty well, and Lady Bird, and so she said, "My gosh, it's 11:30. He must be up awfully late." So he told me, he said, "I couldn't sleep," I guess this thing was preying on his mind. That's a tremendous decision to make, you know.

F: Right.

P: You know a fellow doesn't just give up the Presidency ---

F: Do you think he gained an effectiveness then for the remainder of the term by not being a candidate? Or do you think it made any difference? There's always that question, you know, whether a lame duck has any effectiveness?

P: He had over-stayed in Washington too long to do any good in California. They're perfectly right. He'd never delegated anything to anybody here, and he let Unruh run with the ball.

F: Did you just create a sort of vacuum here in which Unruh saw the opportunity and took it?

P: Yes.

F: Wasn't anybody really to oppose it?

P: Of course his [Johnson's] name was never on the ballot, you know.

F: Right.

P: Which would have made some difference.

F: Voting for Lynch to a lot of people would be voting for nobody.

P: That's right.

F: Let's go back just a minute, Mr. Pauley, to the 1960 nomination convention and that call that you received from Joe Kennedy. Do you think that to a certain extent that Lyndon Johnson was Joe Kennedy's candidate or his son's? How would you equate the father's influence in this?

P: I think his father's influence was very great. I think that his father probably had more influence on John than anybody, and I think he realized that first he had to have support of the South, which he did not have; and secondly, that Lyndon Johnson represented a more conservative part of the Democratic party than did John Kennedy. I think he felt it was very essential. In fact, he told me that on the telephone.

F: So that Joe Kennedy would have been more than just a messenger boy in this; he probably ---

P: No question about it. No question but what he was there. He was there all the time in the background, I think, masterminding the show.

F: Had Joe Kennedy, as far as you know, known Lyndon Johnson very well?

P: I don't think he knew him as well as I did. Joe Kennedy was a business associate of mine in several incidental oil well drilling deals, and John Kennedy knew this.

F: Did Joe Kennedy ask you what you thought of Johnson on that occasion?

P: Yes. Of course ---

F: But you didn't have the job of persuading him; he was already persuaded.

P: Oh, yes. He was enthused about it. Getting back, let me clarify one thing. I talked about Sam Rayburn, maybe his lack of enthusiasm in convincing John Kennedy that he should have Lyndon as a running mate. I don't think he was enthusiastic or as persuasive as he could have been, but I think that was because he was thinking of Lyndon himself and how useful he was as Majority Leader in the Senate, but as to whether or not he was for Lyndon Johnson, there was no question about it. No question at all.

F: I've often thought if Johnson, of course, he passed a bewildering array of domestic measures anyhow, but if he had had someone like himself and Sam Rayburn to run the two houses, there would have been no end to it. I've seen a number of instances which I felt that Mansfield and McCormack really didn't push, the way that Rayburn and Johnson would have, well, as they did for Eisenhower.

P: There was a great man--Sam Rayburn. A great man. And I'm sure Lyndon Johnson thought so too.

F: Yes, definitely. You recall the Johnson visit to Cocoanut Island, Mr. Pauley?

P: Yes I do, very well.

F: Can you tell us about that?

P: As a matter of fact, I'm going to do a play on that one time, gonna write a play, with a Bohemian Grove; there were so many funny incidents happened, but ---

F: You ought to identify Cocoanut Island for the future.

P: Cocoanut Island is a little island that I have over in, my wife and I have, over in Hawaii. It's on the windward side of the Island of Oahu and is in Kaneohe Bay and it's near the Kaneohe marine airbase, and I gave this party for the Vice-President and all of the assembled Governors at the Governors' convention, so we were quite pleased that he came over. I was very much amused by all the walkie-talkie procedure, the Marines would tell them just where Johnson was, that he's now coming through the tunnel getting from one side of the island to the other, now boarding the boat, so on and so forth. They had life

guards around all the pools, Marines in full regalia to guard him and everything, made quite a spectacle over there, something that was quite unusual in our ordinary calm life at Cocoanut Island. The most exertion anybody ever takes over there is fixing a drink for another fellow, and even though we did have President Truman there when he was President, he enjoyed himself. Were there any incidents that you had in mind?

Herb Childs: I don't remember exactly what Johnson, the Vice-President, wrote in your guest book but it was to the effect that it was a good day, I think. Beautiful island --

F: Sounds like a little bit of Gilbert and Sullivan updated.

P: Yes.

Herb Childs: Couldn't be a better place for such a thing.

P: Well that's about all.

F: You've known him now for nearly forty years, have you seen any particular changes or development in him over that period? You spotted him early.

P: Well, any changes have been all for the better, and he didn't need much improvement to start with.

F: When did you suspect that he might make President?

P: Oh, after Roosevelt made his remark.

F: After Roosevelt called your attention to it, right? Did you follow his career as a Congressman rather closely?

P: Oh, a lot of the time he was in Congress I was Treasurer of the Democratic National Committee, and I paid attention to most Democratic Congressmen, particularly those who would be influential in raising money, and he was one of them.

F: By the end of World War II then, you began to see him as a sort of leader among Democratic Congressmen?

P: Yes. He was. Definite leader.

F: Did you have much opportunity to observe his relationships with Mr. Truman?

P: Yes, their relationship was always excellent, very, very good. Mr. Truman was a great admirer of Lyndon Johnson.

F: Of course the sponsorship of Sam Rayburn would have gone a long ways with President Truman, too, as far as Johnson was concerned.

P: Yes.

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

Gift of Personal Statement

By Edwin W. Pauley

to the

Lyndon Baines Johnson Library

In accordance with Sec. 507 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (44 U.S.C. 397) and regulations issued thereunder (41 CFR 101-10), I, Edwin W. Pauley, hereinafter referred to as the donor, hereby give, donate, and convey to the United States of America for eventual deposit in the proposed Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, and for administration therein by the authorities thereof, a tape and transcript of a personal statement approved by me and prepared for the purpose of deposit in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. The gift of this material is made subject to the following terms and conditions:

1. Title to the material transferred hereunder, and all literary property rights, will pass to the United States as of the date of the delivery of this material into the physical custody of the Archivist of the United States.
2. It is the donor's wish to make the material donated to the United States of America by terms of this instrument available for research as soon as it has been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.
3. A revision of this stipulation governing access to the material for research may be entered into between the donor and the Archivist of the United States, or his designee, if it appears desirable.
4. The material donated to the United States pursuant to the foregoing shall be kept intact permanently in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

Signed *Edwin W. Pauley*
Date 9-14-70
Accepted *Dan X. Hadden - for*
Archivist of the United States
Date September 30, 1974