INTERVIEWEE: NORMAN S. PAUL (Tape #1)

INTERVIEWER: DOROTHY PIERCE MC SWEENY

February 21, 1969

Mc: This interview is with Norman Stark Paul. Today is Friday, February 21, 1969, and it's approximately quarter-of-eleven in the morning. We are in Mr. Paul's offices in the Mills Building, 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. This is Dorothy Pierce McSweeny.

Mr. Paul, to begin the interview, I'd like to briefly introduce you by way of your background in terms of assignment dates. Your background includes almost twenty years of government service which began in 1948 after completing your law degree and an association with a New York City law firm. From 1948 to 1955 you were associated with the Economic Cooperation Administration, and your last position with them as the Director for Congressional Relations. From 1955 to 1960 you were with the CIA. In January 1961, Mr. McNamara appointed you Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs. From '62 to '65, you were nominated and served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower. And your last government position from 1965 to your resignation in September of '67 was as Under Secretary of the Air Force. Is this background information correct?

F: That's correct.

M: By way of getting into the interview, I'd like to ask you why you entered government service and continued through several positions related generally to defense and foreign relations.

P: I entered government service because I had been interested as a private citizen in the Marshall Plan concept which developed in the 1946 to 1948

era. I thought it was a very exciting idea. When Congress finally set up the ECA and appropriated several billion dollars to start the program, principally in Europe, I got even more excited about it because I still consider it one of the most dramatic and successful programs that the United States has ever fostered in the field of foreign affairs.

Quite coincidentally, a friend of mine in New York was coming down as general counsel for the agency and asked me if I'd like to come down with him for a year. I got a year's leave of absence from my law firm and did just that, and twenty-one years later I was still in the government. I guess the reason is that I like government, I think it's a very exciting way to devote one's time, and I've been very lucky in that I've had a lot of extremely interesting positions in government.

You didn't ask me why I left, but I'll tell you that I just felt that after twenty years with the growing family responsibilities and expenses, and various other personal reasons, that I had done my bit because, in addition to the twenty years civilian service, I had served four years in the Navy. So I had spent all but about a year-and-a-half of my adult life, after school, in the government, and I thought it was about time to try something else.

M: You mentioned someone who brought you down. Who was that?

P: Actually it was Mr. Roswell Gilpatric who was a partner in the law firm of Cravath, Swaine, and Moore, who later served down here as Deputy Secretary of Defense under Mr. McNamara, and was a long-time friend of mine. It was not he who was coming down as general counsel, it was one of his partners, Mr. Alex Henderson. So it was Mr. Henderson I actually came to work for.

M: Do you recall the first time that you met Mr. Lyndon Johnson?

P: I first met Mr. Johnson when he was a senator. I appeared before the Armed Services Committee in a hearing at which he was presiding, and to be perfectly frank, I don't recall the subject matter. It had something to do with the Central Intelligence Agency, but I just don't recall the subject matter. That was the first time I met him.

M: That would have been in the period of your association with the CIA?

P: Yes, somewhere in the late '50's, I would say.

M: At that early date, what had you heard about then-Senator Johnson in preparation for appearing for his committee?

P: Of course, you always get the usual briefings on senators before you go up so you won't make too many mistakes. I'd been told, and I had read, of course, and was generally familiar with him for years as an important member of the Senate, that he was a masterful politician that could get things accomplished as practically no one else on the Hill could; that he was extremely sharp and that he did his homework. The one message I carried with me was that I'd better have done my own homework because if I hadn't, I was going to get a rough time. I guess I must have done my homework because it was a very friendly session. It wasn't a controversial subject.

M: Do you recall any first strong impressions upon your meeting with Mr. Johnson?

P: No. As I say, it was more or less a routine matter, and it wasn't a big public issue of any kind. In fact, it was a closed hearing. It was on a classified matter, and I was simply really briefing the committee.

M: During this period, pre-1961, about how many occasions did you have in meeting Mr. Johnson?

P: Very seldom. I would say I might have seen him four or five times, but no more than that. And never on any matter of any great substance. I can't say that I knew Senator Johnson.

M: When do you feel that you first came to know him as a person?

P: Actually, I never was a personal friend of President Johnson's. It just never happened. In the official business sense, the first time I had any significant dealings in which he too was involved in was in connection with the Equal Employment Opportunity Program which, as Vice President, he had been delegated the chairmanship of. I represented the Department of Defense in the meetings of that group which he chaired. At that point I got a pretty good insight as to the depth of his commitment to the civil rights issue and to trying to make jobs available for people on a nondiscriminatory basis. That was the first time I really had anything significant to do with his activities.

M: Let me just kind of draw you along on this area. During your period in serving in Defense, about how many occasions did you have of meeting directly with the President?

P: He was then Vice President, at this time. I attended a number of sessions, I would say, twelve, maybe. I attended every meeting of the commission, representing Mr. McNamara except for one or two occasions when I was out of town at the time. So there was that contact. Do you want me to go on with later contacts?

M: Please.

P: After he became President, apart from White House ceremonies one time I had been invited to participate in, I saw very little of the President. I did participate in one session in the Cabinet Room--I would say this would have been maybe in early 1967--in which he called, you might say the sub-Cabinet people over. We were summoned to the White House by Joe Califano or someone on the staff to a meeting which we had thought was going to be with Joe or some of the staff to talk about legislative

programs, etc--they had frequent meetings of that sort. But instead, we were ushered into the Cabinet Room, and the President came in and spent, I'd say, an hour-and-a-half or so with us. It was a most revealing and most enlightening session, so far as I was concerned. That's the only time that you might say I had an eyeball-to-eyeball session with President Johnson. And that was in company with about twenty-five other people.

M: What was the subject of this meeting?

P: The President kicked it off by saying that, really, so far as he was concerned, it was a get-acquainted session. He wanted us to know that the sub-Cabinet level were the workhorses--of course, so was the Cabinet. But he did tell us he wanted us to know that he recognized the work we were doing and that he appreciated our efforts and that he wanted us to know that he wanted to feel close to us, etc. Then he went into some of the details of the legislative program and went around the room and asked questions of various ones of us. It was kind of a super bull session, you might say, with the President doing most of the talking. That was about it.

M: What did he address to you--do you recall?

P: He asked me about some legislation that was going on in the Air Force. I don't recall what it was. It wasn't a significant piece. Most of the Defense questions actually were asked of Cy Vance, who was the Deputy Secretary of Defense, who was also present. He took on most of the questions that had to do with Defense. He was more interested actually--Defense was a very small part of it. He had Wilbur Cohen of HEW there, for example, and they had a number of important pieces of legislation before the Congress. There was quite a bit of discussion with Wilbur about those problems and the status of legislation--how many committee votes he thought he had on a certain piece of legislation. I was very much

impressed, although not surprised, at the precise knowledge the President himself had of where every one of these bills stood. In fact, he probably knew more about the specifics of those pieces of legislation than the people that he was asking questions, and in one or two cases, I'm sure, made the other individuals fairly uneasy.

M: Were you ever called during this period to the White House for meetings, other than this, where the President wasn't directly involved? I am really thinking in terms of critical situations that occurred in defense-related matters?

P: No. I was over there quite frequently, usually talking to Joe Califano about the status of certain legislation. We had a number of sessions with Joe and, again, others of us on the subject of what the legislative program should consist of for any given year. That seemed to be Joe's primary responsibility.

Also I dealt frequently with the legislative liaison staff--Henry Hall Wilson, Larry O'Brien, etc. But it was mostly in the context of either what to propose in the way of legislation or how the legislative program itself was going, that I participated. I did not get involved in any high policy, high strategy sessions with President Johnson, or with his staff.

M: Did Mr. Johnson appoint you to any task forces or commissions or boards, not strictly within the realm of your position in Defense?

P: No. Every committee I served on was directly related to my Defense department job. No, I didn't serve on any other commissions or committees.

M: What committees are you thinking of in terms of you--?

P: When I was Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, I was directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense for matters affecting civilian

personnel, for example, as well as military personnel. We had over a million civilian employees in the Department of Defense, so that was quite a responsibility. I served on several committees with John Macy on matters affecting pay, conditions of employment, awards for superior service, and things of that sort.

Then, of course, there were untold numbers of committees and ad hoc working groups on matters affecting military personnel. I was, I guess you might say, the principal witness for the military pay raise--no, that was during President Kennedy's--the first one at least. It's really awfully hard for me to remember the names of committees most often they didn't have a name. But they were all directly related to whatever I was supposed to be doing.

M: Did you ever travel with or for Mr. Johnson?

P: No.

M: Did you travel very often in your position in Defense?

P: Yes. I visited a great many military installations while I was Assistant Secretary of Defense, and later in the Air Force as well. I can't tell you how many. It must have been in the thirties or forties or maybe even more, because I wanted to get around and see all the major installations and get to know the people and see what the conditions of housing and otherwise were at these installations, and just generally what they were doing.

When I was in the Air Force, I made a trip to Europe, again, to visit Air Force installations. We started out in Spain, and went to Turkey, Italy, Germany, and England. This was, again, strictly military business, although, of course, you get involved in political type meetings as well. I had a long session with Ambassador Duke, for example, in Madrid on the

subject of the upcoming base rights negotiations with Spain, which I think are just about to begin this year. But he was beginning to prepare for what our position should be. So to that degree, I had political consultations wherever I went, but they are always related to Defense matters.

The only other overseas trip I took was in the spring of 1967--I believe it was April--when I went to Japan and the Philippines and Viet Nam and Thailand, again strictly on Air Force business.

M: Mr. Paul, how do you relate your first two Defense positions in OSD to the Under Secretary of the Air Force position?

P: How do I relate them?

M: Yes. Is there a direct corollary in this case of serving in the capacity of the Secretary's level and then going into the Service Secretary's--?

P: There was really no particular relationship. My first job over there, I never did know for sure why I was asked to take on that appointment. I hadn't actually made any particular plans to come into the Kennedy Administration. I had resigned the previous summer, and I campaigned for President Kennedy, but I had every intention of going back into the private world. I believe, as a result of consultations between Mr. Gilpatric and Larry O'Brien, that I was asked to take on more or less the Congressional liaison job for Defense. I did not know Mr. McNamara before I went to work for him.

And the Manpower job--when Mr. McNamara asked me if I'd like to take that job on about a year-and-a-half later, I said, "Oh, good Lord, I don't know anything about Manpower. You must be able to find someone better qualified than I for this post." He said, "Well, that doesn't make any difference. Anybody with any intelligence can pick up the pieces, and maybe it's better not to have a Manpower expert, per se." Well, I still

thought he was wrong, but it represented an opportunity at a presidential appointment in a very interesting area, and one which I had had a lot to do with in connection with my work on the Hill, so I took it on.

The Air Force job I had not planned to take on. Mr. McNamara and Mr. Vance--I had told them that I was planning to leave the Manpower job after three years. I held that post longer than anyone who has ever held it since it was created back in 1948, I believe. Three years of that job was frankly just about enough for me because it was a very difficult job in some ways--frustrating. So they suggested that I go into one of the military departments. After a lot of thought and some more discussion with them, I finally said, "Okay, I'll take it on." I made a personal commitment to myself that if I took the job on, I would stay two years and not leave until two years was up, and I left exactly on the day two years was up.

So in terms of relations between the jobs, there really isn't any, although no doubt the experience I gained in the Manpower area working for the Secretary of Defense helped me, I suppose, in connection with the Air Force job, although the Under Secretary of the Air Force gets involved in everything the Air Force has to do with--Manpower, weapons systems, policy, everything. So I wouldn't say there was any particular correlation. It just happened. It was just a happenstance.

M: Do you feel that serving in any position in Defense, as Mr. McNamara indicated, after that association you can transfer around and pick up the pieces?

P: Yes. Mr. McNamara was a great believer in promotions from within. And I think his record of people moving around in different jobs is really quite remarkable. You can find all kinds of examples. Paul Ignatius, just to

take one of many, started out as Assistant Secretary of the Army. Then I believe he became Under Secretary of the Army, then he became an Assistant Secretary of Defense for I&L, and then he became Secretary of the Navy. So this was typical of the way people moved from job to job in Defense. I think Mr. McNamara's theory was--I never philosophized with him particularly on the subject except in terms of my own inadequacies for the Manpower job as I saw it--but I think it was the fact that he had a feeling that if a person was basically capable, had basic intelligence, and a desire to work, that he could master any job in the Pentagon, possibly including his own. I think that was his very strong view.

M: Could you tell me briefly what you dealt with mainly in your position as Under Secretary of the Air Force?

P: Yes. I really served as an alterego to the Secretary. Dr. Harold Brown was the Secretary of the Air Force. He and I went up at the same time, and I believe an element in the decision to ask me to take the job was that his orientation had been mostly scientific. They felt that I could complement him with my sort of generalized knowledge of military matters and my dealings with the people-side of the equation. I didn't particularly want that kind of a relationship. I didn't want to be pigeonholed into any particular area. So, before I accepted the job, I had a long talk with Harold and he and I agreed that we would just share all our responsibilities together. This is exactly the way it worked out. He of course had to travel frequently, so I had to know what was going on. It was a very happy relationship. My leaving the Air Force had nothing to do with job dissatisfaction there. It was a great job, and I enjoyed it thoroughly.

M: What did you see as the Air Force's main function in Viet Nam and Southeast Asia?

P: There were a number of vital functions the Air Force performed. They protected our ground troops in South Viet Nam and were a vital adjunct to the ground troops--and I'm referring to both the B-52's and to the fighter aircraft that were engaged. I've heard a number of Army generals say to me that the life or death of certain missions, not to say hundreds of people, was a matter that was strictly the Air Force responsibility. And they were very pleased with the support we were able to give them.

Then, of course, there was the other aspect of the air mission in Viet Nam, which is now down to a minimum. That was the bombing of North Viet Nam, the purpose of which was to destroy--I wouldn't say destroy their war-making potential--but to make it as difficult as possible for them, particularly on lines of communication, bridges, roads. And this was devoted mainly towards sources of supply for their own troops and the Viet Cong in South Viet Nam. It was a dual mission. I would hate to say which is the more important mission. I don't think it's susceptible to that kind of analysis.

M: How would you assess the success of the effects of bombing North Viet Nam?

P: I was a bit of a maverick on that one, and although I accepted the policy, of course, and carried it out, I believed that the strategy which was pursued was questionable. I guess you'd have to put me on the hawk side of the Secretary of Defense in that matter. I felt, and still feel, that once the decision was made to go into North Viet Nam, that we should have struck at more meaningful targets. I don't mean bombing populated civilian centers, but there were a number of military targets in North Viet Nam which were hazardous, but would have been much more lucrative and would have had a much more damaging effect on their capability to produce, and in my judgment on their morale, which we were never permitted to attack.

President Johnson kept personal charge of all approval of bombings on these types of targets. Towards the end of my tenure there, he had released many that hadn't been released previously, and he seemed to be going in the direction of hitting them harder. Of course this was before he called the halt.

It was also my opinion that in addition to hitting more lucrative military targets, and I so stated to everyone who would listen to me, that a decision to halt the bombing would of course have to be made on a political level by the President, but I was never in favor of halting the bombing simply north of the 20th parallel. It seemed to me that for maximum impact, plus the old Oriental face problem in connection with negotiations, that once the decision was made, we should have stopped bombing North Viet Nam altogether. In other words, to sum up, I guess my philosophy has always been if you're going to hit them, hit them hard. If you're going to stop, stop! Don't do it half-way.

We'll never know whether I was right or wrong. It certainly is true that after Mr. Johnson's decision and announcement that negotiations, if you can call them that, did in fact begin--at least discussions, some dialogue began. And no doubt this had an effect on it. Whether our bargaining position would have been better, whether the negotiations would have advanced farther had we taken, you might say, my course of action--which incidentally I think was quite close to the course recommended by the Joint Chiefs, except possibly for stopping the bombing altogether--whether we would have been any farther advanced today, no one can say.

I would say that was my only major disagreement with the strategy of the Johnson Administration in North Viet Nam. However, I did not consider it sufficiently offended me, what was being done, so that I thought I

couldn't honestly carry it out or that I should resign, because it was a matter of degree, not of basic philosophy.

M: Did the military targets you spoke of include the dikes and dams?

P: No. I would not have been in favor of doing anything that would destroy or badly hurt the economy of the country. I think when you engage in that kind of destruction you're hurting a population base--you're hurting, really, essentially innocent people, and you're making it very difficult for a country to exist economically. I would not, under any circumstances, have supported that kind of a campaign any more than I would bombing population centers.

However, there were certain targets--well, the Port of Haiphong, I guess, is a famous one, although there were others in the vicinity of Hanoi as well, and in other places--the northeast corridor to China, for example, which, at least at the time I left, were verboten. I believe we could have bombed certain areas around Haiphong, to take that one example, that would have involved a minimum risk of damage to foreign shipping in the harbors--which was one of the main things that the President no doubt was worried about, but which in turn would have had to have had an impact on them both psychologically and physically. I'm thinking of such things as warehouses and docking facilities. You do run that risk, of course, that you're going to hit a Russian ship. The Russians did accuse us of hitting one of their ships once, I think, but I think wrongly. At least the evidence I saw didn't support that. But that's the kind of thing I meant.

M: Mr. Paul, we had complete air superiority in Southeast Asia, for that matter--

P: Well, no, we didn't. We didn't have complete air authority over North

Viet Nam.

M: Superiority.

P: We had superiority, not because we had better equipment because at least in the latter days of the time I was there, they were getting more and more MIG-21's instead of the 17's and 19's. And the MIG-21 in many respects is a match, and more than a match, for the F-4 and F-105, at least in certain types of missions. But I think it was the superiority of our pilots and their training that really accounted for our superiority, if that's the right word. It was the human factor, I'm convinced, that gave us the upper hand, not the equipment.

M: I don't mean in this question to underrate their effectiveness, but with it, at whatever level you choose to have it, really how much did we accomplish by having it?

P: Again, I'd like to go back to the fact that whether we had superiority or not is a good question. The sophistication and the sheer numbers of the anti-aircraft batteries that they had up there, and the SAM missiles, which is a good missile and killed a lot of our aircraft, was such that these targets were not easy to hit. And that was one of the reasons why I felt, frankly, that the top level decision-makers should have let us go after more lucrative targets, because, sure, they were very heavily defended, but some of the lesser targets which we were permitted to hit in my opinion weren't even worth going after, and they were also heavily defended. I think we lost a number of airplanes on missions that simply weren't worth it.

I had felt that if you were going to go up there and take this extraordinary risk that our pilots had been taking, that you ought to let them go after the major targets. And I disagreed with Mr. McNamara on this.

At times he felt very strongly that our bombing was ineffective. Well, I would have to agree with that, that at times it was. But one of the important reasons was that the targets themselves which we were permitted to attack were not the most meaningful ones. So in my opinion, although I have greatest respect for Mr. McNamara in a number of areas, I think he kind of met himself coming around the corner on some of those arguments.

M: Did this create much of a problem or frustration within the Air Force?

P: Considerable. Considerable frustration. And it's quite understandable. By the same token, the Air Force--"blue suiters," as we call them--from the Chief of Staff on down, they're good soldiers, they're military people, they know that the President is the boss, and they carry out his wishes. You've heard a lot about the military running up to the Hill to try to get congressmen to bring about a change of policy, but I think that not very much of that went on--a certain amount of course. But to say that they were unhappy is not an untrue statement. I think they felt, for reasons I've just been discussing, that they were being denied opportunities to be as effective as they could be. I imagaine to some degree the Navy felt the same frustrations. But I don't want to play this up as the admirals' or the generals' revolt. It really wasn't that at all. But they let the President have their views, and in fairness to President Johnson--I greatly admire him for this--he listened to the military views. He heard them out. So no one could say that they didn't have a chance to get their case across to him.

M: We had massive bases in Thailand which were long unacknowledged. Can you give me your opinion of their vitality in this situation, and what the reasoning was behind--?

P: The reasoning behind it was, of course, purely political. I really don't feel competent to go into all of the details of that. Thailand had a

problem internally by admitting that their soil was being used as a base for aggressive action, you might say, over North Viet Nam. This was something that politically they had great difficulties with; and finally it was resolved in the obvious way by admitting it because everybody knew it. It was becoming more and more ludicrous to pretend that these huge bases didn't exist. We couldn't have pursued the war in North Viet Nam without those bases. We never did send B-52's over the North. But all of the F-4's and F-105's and other attack aircrafts that operated in that area of course were all based in Thailand--substantially all of them. There were some missions that generated out of the northern part of South Viet Nam, but very few. So as to the worth of the bases to us, if you assume that the bombing program made any sense, they were absolutely vital. We couldn't have done it without them.

M: What do you think have been the heaviest requirements to come out of Viet Nam?

P: The heaviest requirements? I'm not sure I understand that question.

M: Of course, you did have a shortage in pilots--in terms of personnel or weapons systems, equipment.

P: For awhile, and this is characteristic of all military actions and wars, you might say. I remember very distinctly in World War II--I was stationed in the Pacific during most of my naval career, and back in 1942-43 and, to some degree, the '44 era, we just weren't getting the stuff--it was all going to Europe. We were badly underequipped and undermanned in certain areas, and then when the pendulum swung and the war in Europe--and the industrial might of the country got galvanized and organized and producing, then we were absolutely overloaded with--we had more stuff than we knew what to do with. And as you know, God knows how many billions of dollars

of equipment was left rotting on the beaches throughout the Pacific after the war.

To some degree this happened in Viet Nam, although we didn't have the competing demands of a second front. We did have the fact that in some degrees we were deficient in supplies. There were some ammunition shortages. This has been repeatedly denied, but the fact is, and I don't know why it was ever denied, we did have shortages, and it was quite understandable that we would have. However, this was remedied. I think Mr. McNamara and his assistants, and I would give great credit to Paul Ignatius for this, Tom Morris, and the others who worked for them--they developed an excellent logistic supply system. As of the time I was up in the Air Force, I would think there were no--as far as the Air Force was concerned--no great shortages. I am not as familiar with any of the other Services.

As for the pilot shortage, that was a problem of whether you had an adequate training base for your new pilots. It was not a problem of not having enough pilots to be able to fly in Viet Nam. We always had enough for that. But it was a question of whether or not the training base wasn't being cut back too drastically so that the future supply of pilots would be affected. Some of our pilots were getting pretty old to be flying that type of mission, and we in the Air Force were anxious to enlarge our young pilot training base so that we could replace these men with younger pilots when they were trained. If you talk about training a pilot, you're talking about at least a two-year procedure. We in the Air Force resisted the attempts by the office of the Secretary of Defense to cut back on our pilot-training program. I think we were right and they were wrong. I don't know whether that problem has ever been resolved.

M: We had some reverting back to older equipment in necessity of--

P: That's true. We didn't have the most modern equipment. We were flying World War II crates around for certain missions, but it turned out that for a particular unsophisticated military environment in South Viet Nam, they were just the right plane. That was luck.

Now whether our forward procurement--thinking a little beyond Viet Nam requirements--was the wisest, I have some doubts about that. To me, perfectly frankly, to take one example, the F-111 program was a near disaster. I am not assigning blame to anybody. First of all, I'd like to make it clear for the record that I believe the decision that was made on the TFX--later the F-111--was an honest decision. You always hear talk of political hanky-panky, and I just don't believe that existed. I think Mr. McNamara chose that plane and its manufacturer because he felt that General Dynamics had come up with a true commonality aircraft that could be used by both the Air Force and the Navy. I happen to think he made the wrong decision, but it was an honest one.

Why do I think it was the wrong decision? I think that an aircraft that is supposed to perform in the sophisticated era of the 1970's, which will be the main life of that aircraft, that by the time you put all the things on the plane that the Air Force needed and the other things that the Navy needed, that you just had too much airplane, particularly for the Navy. Now, I hope and pray that the F-111 and its further developed models will be a good plane for the Air Force. I sincerely hope this turns out to be the case. It's a little too early to tell. The Air Force is quite hopeful, I understand, that it will be a good plane for them, and I just hope it is. But I must say I think that Congress acted wisely in knocking off the F-111B program because I never believed that it would work, and neither did the Navy. I kind of got off the subject there.

M: That was my next question. Mr. Paul, what do you see as the Air Force role in Space, and what activities did you become involved in surrounding this issue?

P: I think the Air Force has a definite function in Space, and the Air Force is involved in Space activities, both manned and unmanned. Most of them are so highly classified that they shouldn't be talked about. But you read about things in the published budget of such as the MOL--the Manned Orbiting Laboratory. That is an Air Force project.

Now I do have some questions in my own mind as to whether there isn't some duplication of effort between NASA and the Air Force. This has always bothered me, and it still does. I can't give you chapter and verse because I haven't studied it, but I believe that there is great room for improved coordination and communication between NASA and the Air Force. I'm hopeful that with the new Secretary of the Air Force, Mr. Seamans, who knows the NASA scene very well, that this will be corrected. I hope it doesn't exist to the degree I suspect it does, but I'm afraid it might.

After all, when you talk about military space versus scientific space, it's kind of a false distinction. It's obvious to anyone that has a brain in his head that if you have something that will ride around up in space with people on it, they can do scientific things and military things; and to try to perpetuate some kind of a false distinction, I think, is ultimately going to break down. Because if you have a space station, it's going to be used for whatever purposes the national interest calls for. That's what the Russians are going to do, and that's what we're going to do. So why kid ourselves!

But a direct answer to your question, I would say of course the Air Force has to remain actively in Space.

M: Did you spend much time on this issue? Were there divergent views coming out?

P: Oh yes. I didn't get into the NASA versus military discussions at all really, although Jim Webb, the head of NASA, was an old and good friend of mine. I just never became involved in those discussions. I know there were a lot of them. There's always bound to be a certain amount of jealousy between agencies, and this, no doubt, existed to some degree in this case. I don't think it affected the programs basically.

I did get involved in, you might say, budget decisions relating to the Air Force-Space activities, but that was one area that Dr. Brown and Dr. Flacks really got into much more deeply than I did.

M: Mr. Paul, has the developing of Army aviation and air mobility caused any conflict and interservice problems?

P: Oh yes. This is one of those roles-and-missions problems that we hear so much about that is awfully hard to resolve. There was a treaty entered into while I was in the Pentagon between the Chief of Staff of the Army, then General Johnson, and General MacConnell, whereby the Air Force, in effect, agreed--the language was much nicer than this--but what in effect they were agreeing was that the Air Force would stay out of the helicopter business, and the Army would stay out of the fixed-wing aircraft business. And, in fact, the Army did transfer to the Air Force some twin engine transports--Caribou and Buffalo I think were the names of them--that they had been using. That move made sense. It was silly not to do that.

Now the problem is up again of course because there is a new thing that flies called AAFSS[Advanced Aerial Fire Support System], which at the moment is an Army development. But is this or is it not a helicopter? Is this or is it not an airplane? I imagine there'll be a lot of discussion

before that one gets resolved.

M: When these sorts of divergent views come up like this, how do you resolve them?

P: The respective Chiefs of Staff, if it's an important enough issue, get together and they negotiate, and their staffs negotiate, and they try to reach an agreement. If they can't reach an agreement, it goes to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and they can't always reach agreement. And if it's an important enough decision, it'll end up on the Secretary of Defense's desk or even possibly the President's, although I don't believe this particular one I was referring to ever got that far. The decision was reached at the Chiefs of Staff level between the two Services, and that was it--although this was a long time in coming, and there were months and months of discussion about it. So I'd say that's basically the way you resolve disagreements, and sometimes you never do resolve them, somebody has got to make a decision.

M: You mentioned the roles-and-missions analysis of our defense planning. [In] what other areas have changes come up that had to be decided?

P: It comes up in a lot of different areas, and I think most of it derives from the fact that you can't build and do everything that every Service wants to do. One of Mr. McNamara's great contributions to Defense was putting the acquisition of weapons systems on a logical and orderly basis compared to what it had been before. He and Charlie Hitch, his then-Assistant Secretary, Comptroller, deserve great credit for bringing order into that system. And it may well be the most important thing he did. Now this has to do with roles-and-missions. The Navy had developed intercontinental ballistic missiles, the Air Force had developed intercontinental ballistic missiles. You could argue that this was the

Air Force's job except for the fact that some of them were going to be based on submarines which makes it a Navy job. This is a roles-and-missions conflict only in the sense that the Air Force believes that the Minute Man missile was a more effective weapon, let's say, than the Polaris or the Poseidon. The Navy thinks its missiles are the best. And when you get down to slicing up the budgetary pie and decide how much to ask for and what weapons system, this inevitably involves roles-and-missions types of arguments. The decision as to whether or not to buy a new aircraft carrier with all of the expense that that entails, that's a roles-and-missions type of decision. That's what I mean when I say that. For example, a major roles-and-missions decision was to put the Army in charge of the Sentinel System--the anti-ballistic missile system. This could just as easily have been the Air Force's job.

[interruption]

I think I was talking about the Sentinel System, and the decision in that case went to the Army, that that was one of their roles-and-missions to defend cities and to defend against nuclear attacks. It could have been given to the Air Force. It could have been made an independent agency. It's a big enough program, God knows. It went towards the Army. I don't say that was a bad decision, but I say it could have gone other ways as well.

M: What changes had to be made in the Air Force posture to develop flexible response in this Service?

P: I think we have to have a combination of missiles and manned bombers, basically as far as the strategic problem is concerned. As you know, Secretary McNamara was never convinced of that, and neither President Kennedy nor President Johnson ever--although they supported a certain

amount of development looking towards a new bomber--AMSA [Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft], as we call it--they never really let the Air Force go on that one. And whether the Nixon Administration will or not, I don't know. I do feel that there are missions that manned aircraft can perform that missiles can't. Also I'm just not that certain of the total reliability of missiles. So I think we need both. That's one thing the Air Force needs. The Air Force badly needs a new fighter plane. The F-4, which is the principal one we have now, is an old aircraft. I believe the first one was flown in 1956 or perhaps even sooner, before that. The F-105 is really basically not a fighter aircraft anyway, and it's old besides. And the Air Force desperately needs a new aircraft, and I think they'll get one--a new fighter.

In general, I think--and it is a critical statement, I mean it to be a critical statement--I do think that apart from the missiles themselves the Services have been held back in terms of modernization which they need. This has to be ascribed, if I'm right, to the Administration in office.

Now granted, if I were the President of the United States, I might have made precisely the same decisions, or at least close to the same decisions. But I think that R&D [Research and Development] was held back more than it should have been. No doubt more of this would have been done had it not been for the enormous cost of Viet Nam. But I think we're going to take a little time catching up. I don't mean to say that we're not militarily superior to the Soviet Union--I'm sure we are--but looking down the road, I worry a little bit that we haven't moved farther towards new systems.

M: That covered my questions on manned bombers too. Mr. Paul, the role of Service Secretary has been questioned. What is your view of the necessity

for them?

P: I think there's a definite need for them. Running a military department is big business. It's comparable to running the largest conceivable corporation, larger than any corporations in this country for that matter. It's a management job. It's a major management job which the Secretary of Defense should not undertake, and which his own staff cannot and should not undertake. I think there was a definite erosion of the responsibilities of the Service Secretaries under Mr. McNamara. I think it was unwise. I think he needed to bring them together as more of a team, and I think in that respect he was on the right track, but I think he overstepped and took unto himself and his immediate staff many of the decisions that should have been left within the military departments. I think that was an error. I think he went too far, even if his initial theories might have been quite sound.

For one thing, you're not going to get good people unless you give them responsibilities. I'm not saying that we didn't have excellent Service Secretaries. I think with very few exceptions we had very good people, but I think they should have been given more responsibility, and I hope that will be restored to them. This is not a problem for the President. It's a problem of the internal management of the Defense department, which is up to the Secretary of Defense. These are not the kinds of things that the President should have to worry about, and I don't know that either Presidents Kennedy of Johnson did particularly worry about it.

M: Did this centralization of authority have any impact on--I don't like to say overriding military advice but I'm thinking along that line, perhaps military advice on the Service Secretaries or civilian side of the service?

P: I think for awhile it did. And I'm just theorizing now. But you'll recall when the Bay of Pigs fiasco occurred just after President Kennedy took office--and to his dying day he never got over that. I believe that he felt he had gotten some bad advice from military people on that occasion, although of course he took full responsibility for it. I think there was a feeling of distrust for the military judgment on both his part and on Secretary McNamara's part. And I think this reflected itself in a certain downgrading of the role of the military in formulating policies as well as just plain doing the fighting.

I think President Johnson, who after all had had a lot of experience on the Hill and a lot of direct experience with military people, had a different view of the situation. And I think he restored--I think their status under President Johnson improved. Now its a fine balance, you know. It's a very difficult thing to bring about, but I do think the morale of the military went up significantly in the latter years of the Johnson Administration.

M: Mr. Paul, you served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower between '62 and '65. And it was during this time that the military became involved really in a new role of working with social problems on such programs as integration of off-base housing, Project 100,000, Operation Transition. I'm sure there are more. Could you tell me what your role and your activities were?

P: I was deeply involved in that issue, and I helped author a number of those programs you just referred to. I think they were, and are, basically sound programs. I think the manner of execution wasn't always as good as it might have been. I think we accomplished quite a good deal. I think there's a lot more room for improvement. There are those who feel that

the military should not be used as the instrument of social reform, including a number of very powerful members of the Congress. I would agree with them that the military should not be the instrument of social reform, but it seems to me that when people are in the Armed Forces, they should be completely free of any type of discrimination, whether it be in the area of housing or anything else. And I think it's quite proper to insist that that occur.

Now, as I say, I disagreed at times with the Secretary of Defense on some of the execution of this. For example, on off-base housing, it seemed to me that this program should be carried out in the context of a national program and that, for example, it was going a little too far to say to a man who owns an apartment house, "You take in Negro service families, or your apartment house is off limits to all military personnel." This was attempted at about the time I left the Air Force in the area around Andrews Air Force Base and other installations in the vicinity of Washington. I honestly don't know how effective that program was. At the time I left it hadn't proven too effective. And, frankly, I was lukewarm about its chances of success. I think persuasion, I think the enactment of general laws affecting all people, not just military people, is the answer.

However, in other areas, I do feel that this Project 100,000 is a good project. I think that giving a man an opportunity to come into the service who wants to come in but who is just under the qualification standards either physically or mentally--I don't like the word mentally, because it really is just a reflection of lack of education, not the fact that he's mentally deficient--that to bring in a certain number of people and fix them up, either educationally or physically, minor things, and give them a little extra help and then see if they can measure up to

qualifications six months or a year afterwards, is a good program. But the extent to which the military should be used, you might say, to bring about social reform is a big issue. In general, I certainly think that the efforts that have been made in that area were good efforts.

M: Where did the motivation for this emanate?

P: I think it's a matter that you'd have to say Secretary McNamara played a large role in. He is a socially minded person. This is the kind of thing that would interest him. And among his advisers in the early era were people who felt very strongly on this issue, such as Adam Yarmolinsky, who was his Special Assistant for awhile--before President Johnson came into office. I think a lot of the ideas were germinated out of that source. That's, I think, how it got started. I started a few of them myself, but I think most of the credit should go directly to the Secretary.

M: Which ones did you--?

P: There was discrimination actually not only in off-base housing, but in some cases there was discrimination on military installations which wouldn't be tolerated. We discovered it and we took steps to correct that situation, and, so far as I know, it has been completely corrected. President Truman made the greatest contribution to this whole thing 'way back in 1947 when he said, "Forget it. This is an equal situation in the Armed Forces. There will be no discrimination." Really, everything that was done after that was just a carrying-out of what he'd tried to establish back in the 1940's. It was a very courageous act and one of the many great acts that President Truman brought about.

M: What was the White House involvement in this?

P: The White House involvement--there was a presidential commission set up, Judge Gerhard Gesell was the chairman of it, I believe in 1962 or

thereabouts, called the President's Commission on Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces. Why the decision was made to make that a presidential commission instead of a Defense department commission, I don't know--I guess to give it more visibility. They did come up with certain recommendations, some of which were carried out and some of which were not carried out. But that was a presidential commission.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Committee that we talked about earlier, which the Vice President was in charge of, affected Defense operations because we were such big employers and big purchasers. There were certain things as the result of the activities of that group that led to language in Defense contracts, for example, that the Defense contractors would not discriminate. This affected Defense, but it was just a part of a national program. I think that was about the degree of the White House involvement.

M: Where did you see the primary resistance to this coming from? Or, perhaps I should say, who were the opponents and proponents of this?

P: I think the Armed Forces themselves resisted change of this kind--some of it. The decision, for example, to declare housing off-limits if they didn't permit Negroes as well as white military families was a very unpopular decision with most of the military people. It was not unpopular with the Negro military people, but it was, I think, unpopular with the various commanders because they felt that this was an area they wouldn't--I think a lot of them felt that their responsibility ended at the gate of a military establishment itself; that anything that was done outside of that area, for instance, in this field, would be a matter simply that you do the best you can. You talk to the local chambers of commerce and the city fathers, and you try to develop a program. You try to get them to cooperate,

but you try to do it by persuasion rather than threats or declarations of off-limits--things like that.

So there was resistance to that, and there was resistance to certain other things. I think the military people certainly were not overjoyed at this Project 100,000 because it meant they were going to have to spend more time training people, and they thought they'd get inferior people in the Armed Forces. From a military point of view, you can't knock that too much. But I believe most of them have come around now and feel that this is a program worth pursuing. They would never have come up with that idea.

M: Can you generally say its proponents were on the civilian side?

P: Yes, definitely.

M: And the congressional reaction to this--how did you see that?

P: Again, on the manner of execution--the first effort at something like Project 100,000--and I won't go into details, I don't think they're too relevant--was attempted, I'll say back in 1965 or thereabouts, on a small project pilot basis by direction of the Secretary of Defense to the Army. I was given the job of notifying the Congress, and it blew up in our faces. They were irritated that we hadn't consulted them before. They were informed of it, in their judgment, after it was a fait accompli, and they said, "Nuts, We're going to hold up appropriations unless you cut this out." So that's why I said that I didn't always agree with the execution.

When in the following year or two years it was explained, and when the program was worked out a little better and made more sense, then they, in some cases reluctantly, went along. So I think that issue is over, but it had become quite an issue. We really did get off on the wrong foot.

M: Mr. Paul, what is your view on the issue that we have a disproportionate

number of Negroes serving in combatant positions in Viet Nam?

P: I'm not familiar with the facts on that one. It didn't come up as an issue when I was in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. It came up later. We didn't have that problem, of course, in the Air Force, so I just don't know what the facts are. My impression is that it's not true. You could, if you wanted to, argue that there's a disproportionate number of Negroes in the Armed Forces. I don't believe that either. But for people who are disadvantaged, as many Negroes are, the military life is not a bad life. It's a respectable profession and, for people who are denied opportunities in other areas, it's a pretty good life. So you could expect that a lot of Negroes would enlist in the Armed Forces, perhaps more than whites on a proportionate basis. This isn't anything that gives me any great concern though.

M: Did you personally work or direct any activities regarding the integration of the academies or opening officer opportunities to the Negroes?

P: No, nothing specific in that area.

M: There has been often written and spoken about the ratio of combat to non-combat--that it's out of proportion in the military structure. What is your opinion of this?

P: I think that the military services, and particularly the Army, are overstructured; that there is an excess of back-up both in people and in systems, logistics, that is excessively complicated, so I do think there's an imbalance. But this is a very complex question, and really, if I were asked how would I improve the situation, I'd have to go and study it for a year. I know this is something that Secretary McNamara felt very strongly about and tried his darndest to get changed, but I don't think he really ever succeeded in that. But I believe that he was probably right in

thinking that. But that's a tough issue, that's a tough issue.

M: Did you work on this problem during your position in Manpower?

P: No. Because it involved the military force structure, most of it was done by the Services; and whatever recommendations came up, came up through the military channels. The Service Secretaries were involved, but it was essentially a military staff that did the work on this.

M: Do they tend to resist change, or I should say, support their situation as it exists?

P: There's a certain amount of that, but I think that the military are often unjustly accused of resisting all change. They really don't. In fact, they're great innovators in a lot of areas. So there's a certain resistance, but I think it's overplayed.

One issue that I had to deal with was the military pay structure, which is very, very complicated. A man gets base pay. He gets certain allowances for housing. He gets allowances for hardship posts. He gets this and that. There's a PX and commissary service which you can put a price tag on. The military compensation structure is very, very complicated. We tried on a number of occasions to simplify it. We ran into considerable resistance in the military and, to some degree, in the Congress. This is an issue that was tackled, you might say, during the Johnson Administration, but not resolved. There is in existence now a military pay study which has been completed several months ago. Whether that will ever see the light of day under the Nixon Administration, I don't know. It never saw the light of day during the Johnson Administration.

M: What do you think is the possibility and desirability of an all-volunteer Army?

P: The desirability, yes. I would consider it, on the whole, a desirable

thing. On the other hand, I think, as a practical matter, as long as we have to have Armed Forces of anything like the present size, that it is never going to occur. You can take certain steps in that direction by increasing military pay to make it more attractive for people to volunteer, but I don't think that's ever going to do the trick by itself because you simply can't pay enough in my judgment to guarantee an all-volunteer force. You've got to rely to some degree on inductees.

Now that doesn't mean that I defend the present draft system. I think the proposals that are now being made for drafting younger people first, using a lottery system, and that sort, are very interesting, and I personally would be inclined to favor them. I think the present draft system is outdated and should be scrapped. I believe that the Congress and whatever administration is in power will do that eventually.

M: We had a policy of minimum mobilization during all the years of our commitment in Viet Nam. Does this in any way defeat the purpose of the Reserves and the National Guard?

P: I think to some degree, yes--to some slight degree. I had felt that there was an over-reluctance to call up reserve units. I think the whole problem was handled beautifully at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. It was handled with great reserve and great care and brilliantly executed. There are situations since, in meeting Viet Nam requirements, where I think that instead of excessive use of the draft, perhaps calling up certain selective reserve units would have made sense. But I'd hate to have to scratch my brain for the details because this was less of an Air Force problem, which I was then involved with, than it was with the other Services.

M: During Manpower, you weren't involved in any discussions surrounding calling up the reserves?

P: Oh yes, very much so. As you know, we did call up reserve units before the Cuban Missile Crisis, and during. I was very deeply involved in that--recommending which units should be called and so forth.

M: On a selective basis though, not in--?

P: Yes. The first call up, as a result of the Berlin Crisis, was a mess. I wasn't in the Manpower job then, but I had to go up and try to explain what was going on to the Congress, so I did get immersed in it to some degree. That was, frankly, a bad show. We called up units that had no business being called up. There wasn't a job for them to do, and there was a lot of idleness. It was not well-handled, and I think everybody that had anything to do with it would readily agree to that.

The later ones--there were lessons learned, and that's really what led to the policy of being highly selective. It paid off. We learned a bit at least from our mistakes.

M: Did you think this was the most effective course to take?

P: At which time?

M: The highly selective calling up of the Reserves.

P: Oh, definitely. Now, as to the future role or the effect of all of this on the Reserves and the Guard, and as to their future role, I think there is a definite role for the Reserve forces. I think they had become over-fat, and a lot of their units weren't producing anything, weren't doing much that could ever be useful. Mr. McNamara, again, tried awfully hard, and with some success, to streamline the Reserve forces. I was active, one way or another, with that. I think certain of the reforms of the Reserve organizations were worthwhile. But I do feel, though, that there was a certain feeling in certain quarters--again, civilian-oriented primarily--in the Pentagon that maybe the Reserves were, on the whole, a

liability and would never really be an effective force. I didn't buy that. I don't buy that today. I think we need a good viable reserve, maybe not as big a one as we now have, but we need them.

M: What effects do you think our Viet Nam involvement will have on the military establishment, on the public, on our international standing and relations? This is a very broad question.

P: I think there are great pluses and great minuses on our Viet Nam commitment. I have felt that we got in too deeply on the ground. I had hoped that by now we would have significantly reduced the numbers of our troops in Viet Nam. In my judgment, there are going to be no meaningful negotiations until something of this sort happens, and I think that the United States should take some initiatives in that regard. I don't mean that they're sitting around doing nothing out there. They're fighting and they're working as efficiently as one could expect in that part of that world. But I don't see why we couldn't reduce both the size and the nature of our commitment. To me, this has always been a condition that I felt had to be met before we could really have meaningful negotiations, and I still feel that way. Now it means that the ground forces in Viet Nam can do less, but I think they can do less and the country won't fall apart.

M: When do you think that the nature of our commitment in Viet Nam sort of evolved from a military success to the present negotiated political settlement?

P: I don't think it has ever been a military success--well, it has been a success in that it has prevented a takeover by the Communist forces. I believe that to be the case.

M: I wasn't thinking of it being a success, but thinking of it in terms of a military, not win, but a military success in terms of forcing negotiations

along the lines and supporting the integrity of South Viet Nam as opposed to direct political negotiations.

P: I think the two have to go hand-in-hand. I think you've got essentially a stalemated situation now. The fact that neither side is winning in the sense that we're not cleaning out the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese entirely, by any means, and they're not taking over the country. So there's, what you might say, a politico-military stalemate. And I think this is an area when negotiations do get started.

M: Did you see the comprehension of this being the true situation as opposed to our militarily being able to solve the problem?

P: I have never felt we could solve the problem militarily. I don't know of anybody who does, except possibly a few military commanders. But most of the responsible ones, I think, would readily agree that you can't do it. You can hold a situation; you can improve certain areas of the country; you can open up certain areas of the country, temporarily in some cases, hopefully permanently in others; but it's not a war you can win.

M: Do you think that we accurately assessed the cost of our commitment there?

P: You mean in terms of dollars?

M: And personnel.

P: Yes. In the sense that we know how much it costs. Are you saying--?

M: Accurately assessed it back in 1965, say, to what it is now?

P: No, I think there was a lot of over optimism back in '65, '66, perhaps to some degree in the '67 time period, that somehow a great corner was going to be turned, and that we would have some form of military success. I think the facts just haven't borne that out. So in that sense, I don't think we assessed the situation correctly.

M: Can you view Viet Nam sort of in retrospect as a mistake, either in time or place?

P: It's easy to do things in retrospect, and I recognize that the policy makers at the time were confronted with an immediate problem and acted according to their best judgment. However, retrospect, having said that, I think that the degree of our commitment on the ground--and of course it carried the air with it--was probably too large; that we should have held our sights down; perhaps pursued a lightly different military strategy; and not gotten ourselves in as deeply as we have. But as I say, that's an awfully easy thing to say now. I think that the basic decision to go into Viet Nam on a fairly significant scale was a correct one. So I'm really disagreeing, I guess, in proportions, not basic decisions.

M: In working with Mr. McNamara on legislative affairs, did you see the beginning of sort of the growing wariness and criticism that Mr. McNamara found in his relations with Congress?

P: Oh yes, I saw it almost from the beginning. There was a honeymoon period, as there usually is, with the Congress. Here was a brilliant man, obviously a brilliant man, whom they didn't know, who was really taking charge of the Pentagon, some people say for the first time. I think there was an enormous amount of respect for his ability and his dedication and his brilliance. It began to wear off. I think the problems with Congress began to become acute at a time when they had a feeling that McNamara was just dictating to them. They were a rubber stamp, and they were expected to be rubber stamps. They didn't like that. They viewed their responsibilities under the Constitution as somewhat different than they thought he did. So personality conflicts emerged in time. Congress had always been great champions of military people, and they felt that he was downgrading the military role. The tensions built up over a period of time. I won't say they ever got to a point where they were absolutely so damaging that they

couldn't ever be corrected, but the situation between McNamara and the Congress deteriorated steadily over the period, and it was becoming a real problem.

M: Did you see it as much of a handicap for the effectiveness of the Secretary of Defense?

P: I think you'd have to say that it did impair his effectiveness to some degree because, after all, Congress has to approve the programs and appropriate the money. But to put a price tag on it or a specific example I would find very difficult to do. There was a mutual loss of confidence and trust, unfortunately, and I hated to see this happen between Mr. McNamara and the Congress.

M: From whom did you see this occur in the Congress?

P: It was quite apparent. You had only to read the hearings to feel the tensions build up. A number of members spoke to me from time to time. I always passed these things on to Mr. McNamara, as did other people who worked for him. There were countless examples of it.

M: Can you give me any illustration and tell me the people who were involved?

P: I think that McNamara's rapport, you might say, on the House side with the House Armed Services Committee in general, from the chairman on down, became seriously eroded. I think the same thing was true, to a lesser degree, with the House Appropriations Committee. On the Senate side, it was not the same problem, not as intense a problem, but it nonetheless existed. To start giving names, it would be awfully hard for me to do without including some people and leaving others out. I think it was a problem that President Johnson was quite aware of, as was Mr. McNamara. Whether this had anything whatsoever to do with the decision when he left as Secretary of Defense, I have no way of knowing. But it is a fact, of

course, that President Johnson, because of his own background, is acutely sensitive to problems with the Congress, and I have no doubt that many members of the Congress spoke to him on a number of occasions about this problem.

M: Were any steps taken that you were aware of to improve this?

P: Mr. McNamara himself tried to improve it. He didn't like the situation. He didn't want to embarrass the President. He didn't want to possibly affect the outcome not only of the military programs, but of other programs as sort of a fallout. I think he tried to improve the situation, but I think he viewed the relationship--he just viewed it differently than they did. He thought that he was in charge of carrying out the Defense program, and that Congress, sure, they could ask all the questions they wanted to--they had to appropriate the money--but essentially they were there to critique his program. They felt that they should have been brought in more on the formulation of programs. I think this was the real basis of the discord.

M: Did Mr. McNamara's emphasis on quantitative analysis affect this, do you think?

P: Not materially. I don't think so.

M: Was there an overemphasis?

P: On quantitative analysis?

M: Yes.

P: I think that--

[End of tape]

INTERVIEWEE: NORMAN S. PAUL (Tape #2)

INTERVIEWER: DOROTHY PIERCE MC SWEENY

February 21, 1969

M: I had just asked you about Mr. McNamara's emphasis on quantitative analysis.

P: I think on that, that Mr. McNamara--as I say, I think his principal contribution to the Defense Department and the country was that he brought some order into the programming process. That involves improved quantitative analysis, systems analysis, cost effectiveness--whatever you want to call it. I think the situation got to a point though where, particularly in the latter years of his administration, there was an excessive amount of attempting to apply cost effectiveness criteria to an increasing number of military types of problems, including the roles-and-missions, organization, and various things that weren't, in my judgment, as susceptible to that type of analysis as other matters such as how many missiles do you need and what kinds and how many ships and so forth. When you apply cost effectiveness into the element that involves human behavior and human beings, I think it gets more difficult. And I think in this case that possibly the Secretary of Defense attempted to apply this type of standard excessively.

M: Did you see any occasions of communication, either coming from the President down through the Secretary, or emanating with the Secretary through his staff and to the Services, being a problem?

P: I don't know of any problem of communication between the President and the Secretary at any time. Mr. McNamara was intensely loyal to both Presidents he worked for. The communication was, as far as I know, excellent.

M: I was thinking more along the lines of directions coming from the Secretary and the Secretary passing it along.

P: Below him?

M: Yes, below him.

P: Yes, there were problems there, because frequently the directions were passed along by some of his staff, "The Secretary wants this. The Secretary wants that." I think this caused irritations, and the communication wasn't as good as it might have been. Again, this is a function I think of the Secretary getting into more of the details of what went on, everywhere in the military establishment, than he really had time to adequately do. The result of this was that increasingly he farmed out this detailed supervision to his own immediate staff. To give you a specific example, you would find a young analyst who worked for Alan Enthoven, let's say, in Systems Analysis--you know, calling a bunch of generals in and telling them that their plans didn't make any sense and stuff like that. It was a source of considerable irritation. That's about all I can say on that.

M: Mr. Paul, I'd like to ask you some sort of general questions on our defense posture, sort of drawing from all of your experience with the establishment. Where do you think the emphasis should be in a nuclear age on conventional versus nuclear capabilities?

P: I think we should have strong capabilities in both areas. I think one of the major contributions of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations which, again, you have to give Mr. McNamara a considerable amount of credit for, was to develop the conventional capability that we simply didn't have before. I don't think we're, in the immediate future or perhaps even long range, ever going to be free of the threat of fires breaking out around the world where, whether we want to or not, we're going to have to get

involved. With the nuclear holocaust as the only alternative, I just don't think that ever can be our only alternative. We've got to have conventional capability. Now the way in which we use it is another matter but I think it has got to be present. Even if we never use it, the fact that it's there is in itself a deterrent to certain types of trouble that could otherwise spring up.

M: What about the possibility of the introduction of small tactical nuclear weapons? Does this immediately escalate it into the area of being a nuclear holocaust?

P: I think so. I can conceive of a lot of situations where a tactical nuclear weapon might have to be used to save a situation that would otherwise be doomed to defeat. This doesn't necessarily mean that that presses the button, but it's a grave escalatory action and should only be used under the gravest circumstances. I think there are people that would disagree with that, including a number of people in the military establishment, but I don't believe that they are in a majority by any means.

M: What do you think the U.S. posture should be on the deployment of ABM's?

P: I think we should deploy the system.

M: Thick or thin?

P: I think ultimately thick. To me the name of the game is deterrence. I think that if we are defenseless, if we cannot defend our missile sites and to some degree our people, that we're not providing that aspect of the deterrent. If the Russians were not to deploy any anti-ballistic missiles system and there were to be some agreement with us that we wouldn't deploy one, I would applaud that. But under the current circumstances, I really don't see any alternative but to go ahead with it. I mean, if you've got a system--so it does cost twenty or thirty billion dollars ultimately over

a period of, say, ten years or so, that's two or three billion dollars a year. If you're going to talk about terms of "if the war ever were to start," saving fifty million people who would otherwise die, which is a practicable application of this system in my judgment, I don't have any difficulty reaching a decision. It's expensive. People say it will be obsolete by the time it's deployed. I an not a technician, but I don't believe that's the case. I've been briefed on the system, and I believe that certainly it will have to be improved as time goes on. But the basic system, which is where most of the money is going to have to be spent, I think is not going to grow obsolete fast. You can always improve things. But, from what I understand of the situation, these are relatively minor things compared to the initial cost of getting started. So I don't believe the system would be obsolete by the time they've deployed it.

M: Mr. Paul, from your six years in the Defense department, looking back or thinking in terms of what occurred, would you make any changes, or would you make any suggestions for a difference in approach or organization or commitment?

P: No. We've talked about specifics where I tended to disagree with what the final decision was, so there's no need to go back into that again. I think as far as the basic organization of the Department of Defense and its role in the national picture, I don't know that I'd change anything drastically. As I said, certain of Secretary McNamara's methods I felt were incorrect, but I've already discussed all of those I can think of.

M: I think you really have. Mr. Paul, have you ever been interviewed before for any sort of project similar to this?

P: No.

M: I'm sure you've been interviewed by the press and TV at times. Are there

any occasions where you feel that you should correct any statements--?

P: That I might have made?

M: Yes.

P: No. I can recall having been interviewed, for example, by some radio and TV people and by U.S. News and World Report on the draft. This was at a time when we were making studies on the draft to try to improve the system. At the time I was defending the existing system because we hadn't come up with any other plans, but since then they have been developed. So if I were giving the same interview today that I was, I would answer the questions differently. But, at that time, we didn't have a better mousetrap. I think now it's in the process of being developed. But other than that, no, I can't think of any. We've all made mistakes. I've made a lot of statements in testimony that I probably wouldn't make today, going back many more years than my Defense department years, but I just hope they stay in the files and nobody ever digs them out.

M: Mr. Paul, I just realized I didn't ask you this. Did you become involved in the Palomares situation in Spain with the A-bomb?

P: No, I didn't. Palomares. We were all rather concerned about that.

M: I couldn't recall the date exactly, and I was thinking it was before you had left the Pentagon.

P: It was before I left the Pentagon. It definitely happened while I was there, and we were all greatly concerned. But I think the Air Force and the security agencies did an excellent job, and as good a job as could be done. To my knowledge, everything that could have been done was done--and done efficiently. But that became an operational and security problem, and we civilians didn't have too much to offer.

M: I'd like to just ask you one last concluding question--how you think

history will view and rate the Lyndon Johnson Administration, the military establishment of this period, the Defense organization.

P: In general, I'd like to say that I think history will judge President Johnson very well. I think he was a great innovator, he had great compassion for people, and his domestic programs I think were excellently conceived. I hope they'll be carried forward, improved, of course--there's always room for improvement. But at least the basic program, I think, was sound. And he'll be remembered very favorably for that.

As far as Defense is concerned, I think that, in general, the conduct of the Defense department during his administration will also be judged on the whole favorably--although I think that there will always be criticisms of certain areas. Now, I'm not talking about the war yet. But I think in general the verdict will be favorable.

I think that as far as the war is concerned, I don't know. I don't know. Mr. Johnson didn't start our commitment, but the fact of the matter is that most of the heavy troop commitment occurred during his administration, so that's his albatross to that degree.

Now how history will judge him, I don't know. It depends on a lot of things that haven't happened yet. I do think that the idea of a military commitment to Viet Nam was a sound thing to do. Without it, I think we would have lost all credibility around the world, both with our friends and with our enemies. Whether the degree of the commitment was justified is a matter that, as I've told you, I have had some misgivings about, but, as I also said, I don't know whether I was right or wrong. I would say in general, I believe history will judge Lyndon Johnson a good President--perhaps, as a great President except for the fact of the Viet Nam war. And then our inability to get out of it during his tenure of office, I think will just

have to be minus. And I think he feels this and knows it.

M: I have no further questions. Do you have anything else you want to add on anything that we've covered or not covered?

P: No, I'm exhausted.

M: Thank you very much, Mr. Paul.

P: You're welcome.

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By Norman S. Paul

to the

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