INTERVIEWEE: ENDICOTT PEABODY (Tape #1)

INTERVIEWER: DAVID MC COMB

March 4, 1969

M: Let me identify the tape first. This is an interview with Endicott Peabody, former Governor of Massachusetts. The interview is in his office in Washington, D.C., at 1730 M Street, NW. The date is March 4, and the time is 3:00 in the afternoon. My name is David McComb.

P: The year is 1969.

M: Yes, you might add that, 1969--somebody may wish to know that 50 years from now.

First of all, I'd like to know something about your background, where were you born and when?

P: I was born in Lawrence, Massachusetts, February 15, 1920, the son of an Episcopal clergyman, who was at his first pastorate in Lawrence. He went there as a curate after he got out of theological school in the teens, and from there he went to war and served as a chaplain overseas and came home. I was the second child, the first, my sister, being born before the war.

M: You got your college education at Harvard?

P: Yes. I lived in Lawrence until I was 4, moved to Philadelphia, got my early education there, and then went to Groton School where my grandfather was headmaster. He was also the headmaster of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and he was still headmaster throughout the time that I was there.

FDR was President at that time, and we had the opportunity to see him at school on several occasions. My grandfather used to go to Washington for every inauguration, where he had a special prayer service for FDR--and then on special occasions.

M: This may be an unfair question, but where did you get the nickname Chub?

P: The nickname "Chub" came to me at Groton School from the junior headmaster Jared Billings, who had given it to my father when he was at the school some twenty-five years earlier. On me it stuck because all the new boys thought that was my name, when he called me that the first day of school.

M: You got an A.B. degree from Harvard--

P: It reminds me of Lady Bird Johnson. Someone asked her where she got the name of Lady Bird and she described that. She said, "Some people call me Claudia, but when they do I notice it's only the people with whom I went to boarding school." With me it was the reverse. When people call me Endicott, I know they met me before I went to boys school.

M: Then you graduated from Harvard with an A.B. in 1942, is that correct?

P: Correct.

M: That was an A.B. in what field?

P: I was A.B. in American history. While there I was also a football player, an All-American for Harvard.

M: That's when you received that Knute Rockne Memorial Trophy--1941?

P: Correct. That was after the war started, down here in Washington at the Touchdown Club. This was in January. [Must have been 1942 or later].

M: And then you got a law degree from Harvard later.

P: After that I went in the Navy, where I was in the submarine service for 3 1/2 years, and I came home--came home to Washington as a matter of fact.

M: And you won a Silver Star?

P: Yes. My skipper was awarded the Medal of Honor for one of our patrols. President Truman decorated him on the White House grounds, and that's why we were brought home to Washington for that purpose. Then Secretary of Navy Forrestal came down to the submarine at the Navy Yards on the

Anacostia River, and decorated the executive officer with a Navy Cross and me with a Silver Star and other officers and men.

M: Was this for action in the Pacific?

P: For action in the Pacific, right, around Kelpart Island, which is just south of Korea, where we went into a harbor one night and sank a munitions ship that was at anchor.

M: Did you have to go through nets and mine fields and all that?

P: Went through a mine field which we did not know about until afterwards.

M: Then it was after the war that you went back and got a law degree?

P: Came back and went back to law school. I got out of the Navy one day and I was in law school the next.

M: Is that from the frying pan into the fire, or just the opposite?

P: Actually, law school's much tougher. It seemed so at the time because I had forgotten all my learning habits.

M: And you graduated in 1948, is that correct?

P: Right.

M: Passed the Massachusetts Bar the same year.

P: Yes.

M: Then, did you go to work as a lawyer?

P: Yes, I went to work with Goodwin, Proctor and Hoar. I was just writing a fellow with whom I started the other day, who is still with Goodland, Proctor and Hoar, a well-known law office in Boston. He is still there as a partner; he's about seventh from the top. In the meantime I've had nine different jobs, including being Governor, and now I'm starting a law office here in Washington.

M: Somebody picked up the information that you are associated with a firm called Peabody, Koufman and Brewer.

P: That's the firm I started about seventeen years ago in Boston, and that lasted until I was Governor, and I had to resign from it. It merged with another firm.

M: When did you take up politics as an active participant?

P: I'd like to say when I was born.

M: It may well have been in the tradition of your family, as you indicated.

P: No, because actually in my immediate family, we're sort of apolitical--I mean in the clergy, although we certainly had an interest in it. My grandfather had a driving interest in his students taking an active part in public affairs, whether political or administrative. The record of Groton boys is certainly remarkable in the light of the numbers who have gone in and held distinguished positions.

M: Right. Was the 1960 convention the first one you were active in as a delegate?

P: The 1960 national convention was the first national convention I was active in as a delegate. I was active in four state conventions prior to that and I was active in the 1960 presidential campaign prior to being a delegate to the convention.

M: And did you support John F. Kennedy?

P: I supported John F. Kennedy in the West Virginia primary and then was a delegate pledged to him in the convention in Los Angeles.

M: Were you confident that he would get the nomination?

P: Reasonably. He'd done the spadework, and it seemed to me he had most of the votes going into the convention. The only question was whether Stevenson would be able to hold on to some pledged or semi-pledged Kennedy votes to make it a deadlock on the first ballot. Only in that case,in my opinion, did Johnson or Symington have any chance to become President.

M: Did you have an idea about who would be Vice President?

P: I had no idea who would be Vice President. It looked to me as though Senator Symington was running more for Vice President than he was for President, and he was a perfectly bland vice presidential candidate. So, I was amazed and astounded, but pleasantly so, when LBJ was selected as the vice presidential nominee. This was not shared, may I say, by many on the floor of the convention.

M: Why were you in favor of this?

P: I was in favor of it because it looked to me like a very pragmatic and practical solution to elect JFK President. I had had an opportunity to observe LBJ's work as the Majority Leader of the Senate. It was obvious that he had a lot of friends in the South, that Kennedy was going to be strong in industrial areas and that there were certain areas where he was definitely weak. One of them was the South, where his Catholic religion was going to hurt him a great deal. I thought it was a particularly good decision on Kennedy's part to select him.

I was amazed because living in Massachusetts, as I have, I know that the Kennedys don't always forget quickly any slights which may happen in the political campaign. That's true also of LBJ, may I say. The debate which took place at the convention in Los Angeles might well have left enough rancor in JFK's mind--apparently it did in RFK's mind--so that he might have looked elsewhere for his number two man. But it is certainly true now that JFK selected wisely and that a major contributing cause of his election was the fact that Johnson was on the ticket for Vice President.

M: Was the rest of the Massachusetts delegation in agreement with you on this?

P: I'd say generally, yes. There were a very few so-called "liberals" in the delegation. One or two of them expressed disfavor and I recall being in

the back of the hall near the Michigan delegation, which was very much opposed at the time to Johnson's nomination. In fact, they wouldn't even rise. They sat on their hands while the nomination was being put on the floor. I believe there was some booing that took place afterwards, because they looked on LBJ's nomination as a Southern selection, as a reactionary choice. As many of these so-called liberals have in the time before and since, they certainly didn't understand what was happening.

M: Had you had much connection with Lyndon Johnson before this? Had you met him and had any personal contact with him?

P: I had had very little contact with him other than to shake hands with him in Boston. I think he came up there to speak at Harry Truman's Diamond Jubilee, I guess they called it. Johnson spoke in Boston at the same time other Democratic leaders were speaking at other places all over the country.

M: Did you then campaign for Kennedy and Johnson in 1960?

P: Yes, I did. Quite arduously. I was running for Governor myself during the summer of 1960 in the Democratic primary. The primary was in the middle of September and I came out second. After I recovered from that, about the end of the first week in October until the end of the election campaign, I participated quite heavily in New Hampshire and in Pennsylvania and in Massachusetts.

M: This was giving speeches and meeting people?

P: I gave speeches. I organized in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, the Citizens For Kennedy-Johnson. This was at Robert Kennedy's request. We turned the city into a Kennedy-Johnson city, although normally it has been a Republican city in the past. I also went into the Protestant areas of upstate Pennsylvania--into Easton and Bethlehem and up into Williamsport--and I worked very hard to turn that area into a Kennedy-Johnson area or at least to reduce the anti-Kennedy vote.

M: Was the Catholic religion question most important in that area?

P: Yes, it was.

M: Did Kennedy's Houston speech offset that at all?

P: Not particularly in that area. In one area you had the Pennsylvania Dutch, who weren't what I'd call great newspaper readers. They're sort of phlegmatic and pretty well set in their opinions, and they didn't change.

In the Williamsport area, I think it was just a Republican area to begin with. Kennedy's religion just made it more difficult to reach them. So whether or not they were convinced by the Houston speech, they were still Republicans.

M: I see. Then after Kennedy was elected and Johnson elected Vice President, did you have any close contact with the White House?

P: I attended the inauguration. I was there in the White House the day afterwards when the Cabinet was sworn in.

M: Do you have any impressions from those days, anything that stands out in your mind?

P: The thing that stood out in my mind at the Cabinet swearing-in was, even then, the heavy dependence of JFK on RFK, was apparent. The Cabinet was sworn in and more or less drifted away and left standing in the floor of the East Room JFK and RFK talking together, which they did for some period of time.

M: That reminds me of another point. According to the books that are written about the 1960 convention, Robert Kennedy was most upset in the selection of Johnson. Is there any truth in that?

P: It sounds as though it were true.

M: It sounds as though it ought to be true.

P: Because Bobby remembered longer than JFK. On the other hand, the stories that it was a mistake on JFK's part and that he didn't really mean to ask

Johnson to be Vice President but just was going through the motions hoping he would say "no", that doesn't ring true to me. I think that despite the disagreement and the rancor which had been caused by that debate, that he recognized where he was weak, and he recognized that this would help pull the party together.

M: So the choice was deliberate then?

P: I believe so.

M: Then John F. Kennedy moved into the White House and you attended the inauguration ceremonies and that sort of thing. Then did you return to Massachusetts to prepare for the Governor's race again, or what did you do?

P: I returned to Massachusetts. I was very hopeful that I would be able to participate in the Administration, but before anything could develop I more or less determined that I would be a candidate for Governor again in 1962. So there I stayed until--

M: Continued doing law work?

P: Continued doing law work and laying the groundwork for the election.

M: So then you ran for Governor and Edward Kennedy ran for the Senate, is that correct?

P: Correct.

M: Did you support one another in your campaigns?

P: Yes, we did. After the convention and the primary was over there was some feeling that I was going to lose because I was running against an incumbent, namely Volpe. But I did extraordinarily well in the primary against the Registrar of Motor Vehicles, Clem Riley. I got more votes against him than Ted Kennedy got against Eddie McCormack. So this indicated that I did have some strength, and I'd say about a month after the primary, in October, Ted and I campaigned together from the same rostrum in different parts of the Commonwealth.

There's no question in my mind that his presence on the ballot enabled me to win. I only won by 2500 votes, and an extraordinarily large vote came out in an off-presidential year, which brought the votes that were needed for me to win. The President's coming to Massachusetts to vote contributed to the large turnout which elected me.

M: Was there any question that Teddy might have run for the governorship or you might have run for the Senate?

P: He could not have run for the governorship constitutionally. There was a question whether Eddie McCormack might run for the governorship. I guess in retrospect, he felt he should have. But he didn't see why anyone should come in and run against him for the Senate on the first crack where he'd been running for office for about ten years. So early in the campaign he told me that on no account would he run for the governorship. Ted may not have been a citizen of Massachusetts for six years before, which was important for him to run for Governor.

M: Then you took your oath--

P: Not only important but constitutionally necessary.

M: Yes. Then you served as Governor in 1963 and '64. During 1963, of course, John F. Kennedy was killed. I would assume that this came as a great shock to you, due to your close connections.

P: It certainly did, as much as anybody in the country. JFK and I were sort of close on a personal basis, but really not so close politically, if you understand that.

M: I've got some idea. You mean in working in politics or in political policy you are not close?

P: I was always a candidate from 1954 through 1962 every two years. Being a candidate, my interests and JFK's interests were not always identical. For that reason we were sort of separate and apart there, although I

participated quite heavily in his '52 campaign for the Senate and also in his campaign for the President in 1960.

M: Did you have any contact with the White House shortly after the assassination of John Kennedy?

P: I was present at the funeral, and I came to Washington the day afterwards. I brought with me the political leaders of Massachusetts to pay our respects in the White House at the tomb of the late President. I was in Washington for two or three days thereafter for the funeral and later for the meeting of the governors with the New president, Lyndon Johnson.

M: Then you served the rest of your term as Governor. Did you run again then?

P: I ran again, and I was defeated in the Democratic primary in 1964.

M: Did you campaign then in 1964 in the national campaign?

P: In the national campaign of '64 I campaigned as hard as I could and wherever I could for the President. This was somewhat difficult. I think that having been a defeated candidate, the doors weren't as open as they might otherwise have been. But I did campaign in western Massachusetts with Humphrey for the ticket, and I was present in Post Office Square when President Johnson came in in the late part of the campaign. I guess it was the last week, and he filled the square with supporters. I raised funds for the ticket and generally supported the ticket including Bellotti, my former lieutenant governor who was running for Governor.

M: Were you impressed with the effectiveness of that campaign--the '64 campaign?

P: No, I wasn't. I was impressed that it was not very effective, but as it turned out it didn't have to be. There was no political organization <u>at all</u> worthy of the name in Massachusetts. It just so happened that Goldwater did worse and worse everytime he opened his mouth, and all the Republicans came tumbling over onto our side, and no real organization was necessary.

M: So then the overwhelming victory of Johnson was more due to Goldwater's ineptitude and the circumstances of the day rather than to, say, Democratic organization. Is that correct?

P: No, that's not correct. The first part of it was true but also I think by that time LBJ--you had a fallen President. I think that played a part in the campaign. You had Johnson, who had a magnificent record in office, and that played a part in the campaign. I think all those three were factors but insofar as political organization and drive were concerned, it didn't exist.

M: Did you have any particular conversations with Johnson during this period of time in the '64 campaign, that stand out to you?

P: There were several occasions that I was with him. One was the night before the Democratic convention opened up in Atlantic City. He called the governors to the White House. We had a very nice dinner with our wives there, and at the dinner we had a very good political talk from him. He did bring out the polls, which he was known to report, and he told us what the polls were saying for Johnson.

M: This is sort of a miscellaneous question that comes to mind, but are these governors' conventions they have periodically useful politically? Are they a good political tool? Is there any value to them, or do you have any opinions on that?

P: They are good both politically and substantively, I would say. First of all, anything that can develop a stronger personal relationship between the governors and the President is good for the country, because so many of the problems require excellent communication between the two in order to be worked out satisfactorily. On that basis alone they are helpful.

M: They are worthwhile, then.

P: They're helpful also to the governors, dealing with other governors, to trade on their experience in dealing with certain problems and particularly on an informal basis where you get together man-to-man and find out what another governor's doing. And they're helpful politically in that this is a place to trade ideas and information and knowledge as to what's going on.

M: Did you have any connection with Johnson then after his election in '64 and up to the point you were appointed to the Office of Emergency Planning?

P: I would say that from the time LBJ was nominated in Los Angeles that I was a very good friend and a supporter of his. I do recall that he came to Massachusetts soon after the convention, and actually before my primary for Governor, and we were excluded from the stage at that time. So I didn't see much of him at that time. They handled him with kid gloves and kept him cooped up, and that was the only occasion I saw him during that campaign.

But when I was Governor he came to Massachusetts for a visit, and I have a picture of myself greeting him at the airport. I think he was coming up to get a degree at Tufts, I believe. I'm not as clear as I could be on it.

Then he came up later to speak to the Associated Industries of Massachusetts, where I gave him a hat and sat next to him. He was then Vice President. We always liked Johnson, and we always liked Lady Bird, too. We think she's a wonderful, wonderful lady. Then at the Governor's Conference in Miami, Florida, in 1963 Johnson came to it as Vice President. It happened to be my wife's birthday, and he presented her a cake. We had a lot of pictures taken with him and the other governors who were present, who, may I say, were very happy to receive the pictures later because for some it was the only picture they had taken with the Vice

President before he became President.

M: How did he know it was your wife's birthday?

P: We made that clear! When he came to Florida, we got him up to our room--we were giving my wife a little party there--and he came up to the room and presented her the cake. We have a picture and an inscription of that occasion.

M: After Johnson became President, did you have much contact with him?

P: That was in the winter of--late '63 he became President--

M: Then of course the campaign which we've spoken about.

P: I think I must have had a conference with him in his office once--in fact, I know I did--when I was in Washington on one occasion. We had a picture taken at that time, and then we were there again for the summer meeting, as I described to you, which was just before the Democratic convention.

Then I don't think I saw him much until after I lost. After I lost he came up on a swing through New England, and he stopped to see Teddy at the hospital. I met him there at the plane. We had a late-night picture; he was going home to Washington on an old DC-6--plumb tired, he and his wife were at the time.

Later he came up on another swing through New England, and he was going to Boston from--I beg your pardon--this was on the first one. He was going to Boston from Manchester, and I was going up to Manchester to meet him. Kenny O'Donnell, who was handling his campaign from the Democratic National Committee, called up to say on no account was I to meet the President at the airport. So I went back home to Boston, wondering what the score was, only to be called on again by Bud Dunphy, who was the national committeeman, imploring me to go back to New Hampshire and to accompany the President to Boston, which I did.

M: What's the explanation of that?

P: I suspected at the time, and I believe still, that there was some jealousy between the Kennedy organization of which Ken O'Donnell was then the leader, even though he was working in the national committee, and me--or possibly not anxious for us to be close together. I never really understood it. I was certainly upset, though, I'll tell you.

M: Then you did go back and meet him.

P: I went back, and we came to Boston. The President found out about it. Valenti was on the plane, and he asked Valenti to find out what the cause was. Of course, I didn't go into names. I didn't think that was helpful to the campaign, and actually the matter dropped.

M: That brings up a point. A number of the books written about Johnson indicate friction between the Kennedy and Johnson people. Do you have any insight into that?

P: If there was, that's a good illustration. And undoubtedly if there wasn't then, it certainly developed thereafter, and Viet Nam was the occasion for it. I don't believe it was the cause. But I think that a lot of the Kennedy supporters just couldn't get used to the fact that John F. Kennedy was dead and that Johnson had taken his place. They didn't like Johnson particularly when he was Vice President. They felt he was sort of a usurper when he did become President.

M: Did you have much contact with Robert Kennedy through this time? Was he a personal friend of yours, or a political companion?

P: No, Bobby and I were never close. He had a way of turning on and turning off. I remember when I was a young lawyer in '49 or '50, he was at Virginia Law School at the time, and he came to Goodwin, Proctor and Hoar, just dropped into my office, and he couldn't have been more friendly.

Then later, he came in in 1952 when he ran the JFK campaign for the Senate, and he didn't make too many friends with Massachusetts political leaders. I was just a volunteer at that time.

But we were not close then. Moreover I did not agree with his policies when he was a member of the Government Operations Committee, which was the McCarthy Committee. I was surprised to see him in the Stevenson entourage in 1956, when he came up to Worcester. But I remember I loaned him some money for a taxi fare, which he thanked me for later. But he had a way of looking at you as if you weren't there. That's why I always had my troubles with Robert.

M: How about Teddy?

P: I recall again on the plus side, being in his office after President Kennedy was assassinated and expressing my sorrow, and I really felt he appreciated what I had to say.

As far as Teddy's concerned, I've always been close to Teddy since we ran for office together in 1962. I think he's very human, and he remembers his political debts. He's gone out of his way on occasion to take an interest in me and others and I would classify myself as one of his supporters.

M: Are you in a position, do you think, to compare the political style or technique of Lyndon Johnson and John F. Kennedy? Or is it something that can't be compared?

P: It's the easiest thing to compare in the world. There were no two different-type campaigners than JFK and LBJ. LBJ is a Populist--

M: In the old tradition?

P: In the old tradition. A meat and potatoes politician who knows how to get down in the street and be folksy and so forth, whereas JFK, I'd say, was

more of a blue-blood type of campaigner. I'm not sure I'm expressing myself with those words. He was a little standoffish, a little distant.

Actually he came in with television, he knew how to adapt television and image-making to his type of campaign, and he did it extremely successfully. He was a very poor stump speaker. As late as 1958, which was fourteen or twelve years after he started his political career, he could not make a stump speech. And he only learned to begin in this campaign in 1958 to make a stump speech, which he did increasingly well. By the end of his presidential campaign he was able to bring wit into it, which made him an extremely attractive type of campaigner.

LBJ was a very good stump speaker, but lousy--and I don't want to call him down but I think he would agree--as I was on the television. The chemistry of people being in front of him enabled him to communicate, whereas the television camera made it difficult for him to communicate. I enjoyed so much after the formal speech was over on the stump, the time when he got to talking in his Populist method to the people of the country. He'd talk about the Pedernales River, and he'd talk about "come to the speak-in," as he did in Atlanta Georgia, and diving out of the automobile to shake hands with everyone. I enjoyed him immensely in that kind of a campaign.

M: You hear a lot of talk about Johnson alienating the so-called "Eastern Establishment." Is there such a thing as an Eastern Establishment, and if so, did Johnson alienate them?

P: Well, look at the election results in 1964. That tells pretty well whether he alienated the Eastern Establishment or not.

M: Is it possible that the alienation developed in the years after that?

P: Yes, I think the years after they did, and I think that perhaps the Viet

Nam war was more the cause of it than anything else. The Viet Nam war was LBJ's tragedy. It drove him out of the presidency and back to the Pedernales River and out of favor with the American public and with the world. But while it did that, it will be the basis for his position in history which will be excellent, I think.

M: You eventually ran a campaign against Edward Brooke for the Senate, did you not?

P: I did.

M: Did the President--did Lyndon Johnson, take sides in that, one way or another?

P: He was certainly friendly to me and from his position in Washington tried to help me with the political resources he had. He was slated to cover Massachusetts during the last week of the campaign, as he was slated to go many other places, but when he returned from Asia the polls were running so much against him and against Democrats everywhere that I think he decided not to take on what he thought was hopeless, so he cancelled the trip. So as to his playing personally a part in Massachusetts to help me, I don't think he was able to do much.

I will also say that the Viet Nam war was one of two major issues when I campaigned against Brooke which contributed to my defeat and his victory. The other, of course, was his color which aided him substantially. It was to his credit that he was able to use what was thought to be a political weakness as a political strength, which it certainly was. People were voting guilty consciences right and left.

M: In such a campaign in a state, would the support of the President be a help?

P: Under such circumstances, would his support be a help?

M: Yes.

P: I think that it would not have made the difference between my winning or losing the campaign. On the other hand, I think that if he had carried that campaign on Viet Nam around the country that he would have been able to strengthen the support of him by the American public and, subsequently, the candidates who were running.

M: Yes, I see. After this campaign in Massachusetts, is it correct that you were then nominated for the Office of Emergency Planning?

P: It certainly is--as Assistant Director.

M: Assistant Director. Did Johnson contact you about this appointment beforehand?

P: By that time I was pretty close to the White House, as I was all through my campaign for the Senate. Incidentally--a little vignette--in 1966 after I had made the decision to run for the Senate, I came down and told the President of my decision. He listened to me very pleasantly and very friendly, and I believe he had a conversation with Lawrence O'Brien, who was the Postmaster General at that time and who was formerly Kennedy's campaign chairman, or very active in his campaign. I also saw Senator Ted Kennedy who was friendly but recommended strongly that I see O'Brien.

At the President's earlier suggestion I'd set up an appointment with O'Brien, and I went around to see him. O'Brien suggested that I wait to run for United States Senator, that there were a number of people who had talked to him and that in a couple of weeks the situation might develop so that a clear decision could be made.

He was, of course, contemplating running for the Senate himself. At that time Mayor Collins was an avowed candidate for the Senate, although he had not formally announced. At an interview done, I think, the week before I was there, Mayor Collins had said,"Lawrence O'Brien knows more people on one block on Pennsylvania Avenue than he knows in the whole of Massachusetts."

But, at any rate, Larry was really anxious to run. I went back home and I called him and I said that my plans couldn't wait, and I announced the following week. His balloon blew up, so to speak, and that took him out of the race. But, I don't think he forgot it. It shows how we were all intermingled together, one way or another, even though we may have separate lines of alliance during a campaign.

I remember, to speed up, in the 1968 campaign I was a delegate. I asked Senator Kennedy to put me on. I wanted to work very hard for LBJ for re-election. I announced that I was working for him in Massachusetts, a declared supporter of his. Then, early in March, the New Hampshire primary was about to take place and LBJ had to make a decision as to whether he was going in the Massachusetts primary. He decided that he was not and notified Lester Hyman, the Democratic state chairman, that he wasn't.

Larry O'Brien still was Postmaster General and two years later decided that he was going to resign as a delegate and told the press to that effect. The next morning I got to my office and I was called not by O'Brien, but by one of his assistants to say that O'Brien was getting out and he assumed that I would. He was going to get out as a delegate because the delegation was going to go to McCarthy.

I said that I thought the decision was a silly one, I couldn't understand O'Brien's decision, and for him to report back to O'Brien that I had no intention of getting off. It wasn't clear at the time how much the President was behind O'Brien's decision. But, I had to go to Madison, Wisconsin, that day to give a speech and I couldn't get hold of Marvin Watson in the morning. So I called him again and couldn't get him and got hold of [James] Rowe--who was then--Jim Rowe was running the Citizens for Johnson campaign and he agreed with me that it didn't make sense. So

I let out a release to the newspapers that I was going to stay on, come-what-may.

At that time Johnson's secretary, Marvin Watson, got me on the telephone and I told him what had transpired and he said, "While the President isn't involved, I'm not sure you made the right decision." So he said, "get in touch with Larry O'Brien."

The next morning I decided that, well, if I had to get in touch with him I was going to see him. By the time I reached my office at 9:30--I'd got back at 1 o'clock--O'Brien had already called the office twice. I was glad to see that he thought it important enough to call me directly. At any rate, I had business on the Hill before a budget committee so I couldn't speak to him. I went up on the Hill. Then O'Brien did reach me on the telephone and I said, well, I wanted to come around to speak to him, so he said, "Okay. Come to my office at noon." So, this time I did go to his office but then I had to cool my heels for half an hour. So I went back to the Hill and told them that they could find me there. This time I got a chauffeur from his office, and I got a luncheon and a white table cloth.

O'Brien told me that while the President wasn't involved in this at all, nevertheless, he felt that he might be displeased if his appointees, which included me and Bob Wood over at HUD and Charlie Haar, didn't resign as delegates. I replied to O'Brien that if I saw a good reason for doing so I would but that I didn't see that our resigning would help LBJ any, that even though he was not a candidate,that we still might be useful to him on the floor of the convention on many another decision, and that I wasn't disposed to resign.

He said, "Well, these are tough decisions we have to make"--he said

poignantly, as I left and went back to my office.

That night I thought hard and deeply about the matter. If the President really did want me to resign as a delegate and I didn't, I knew he would consider this an act of disloyalty. But at the same time, I felt that no good purpose would be served in resigning as a delegate, that it was against LBJ's best interests. So, the next morning I brought in a letter of resignation of my post as Assistant Director, which I said the President could accept if he felt I was being disloyal, but that because of what I felt was my loyalty to him I was going to remain as a delegate. I didn't pull out.

In the meanwhile I heard from Speaker McCormack, who also resigned as a delegate, and many other people who were attached to him who resigned as delegates. It was interesting that Speaker McCormack later was put back on as a delegate to the convention when the full delegation had some vacancies.

At any rate, I subsequently found out I <u>was</u> in the doghouse with the President for two or three weeks afterwards until Robert Kennedy announced and Lawrence O'Brien went to work for Robert Kennedy. Then I was thought a little better of. Again, it illustrates the fact that--the entangling alliances that one has to one person or another--the fact that Lawrence O'Brien had never forgotten, that I should have waited for him to announce for the United States Senate two years earlier.

M: To back up a little bit--there's more to that 1968 campaign, of course to be told--but to back up, were you contacted by the White House staff or by Lyndon Johnson to be Assistant Director?

P: I think the President called me. No, that's not so. The Vice President called me to give me his consolation after I lost. Then a week or two

later I said I'd like to see the President and he invited me to go to visit him in Texas. That picture on the wall there is taken at the Texas White House. I think that was only the second day that that office was used. It's in the Federal Building, which he is now using as his offices down there. And in the background is the Texas State House.

I was extremely interested in federal-state relations and had been while I was Governor. During the 1964 campaign I had talked to the President and told him I thought it would be an issue. It wasn't because Goldwater became a big issue in that campaign. But I felt it was going to become one in the future, and I felt that the President could do a great deal to strengthen federal-state relations and I wanted to be active in that effort. And, so, he told me that he would have to clear it with Governor [Farris] Bryant when he came back from overseas, who was on his staff. Governor Bryant subsequently contacted me in January 1967. By March of '67 it had ripened to the point where the President had determined he was going to make my appointment as the Assistant Director to Bryant. I came down March 18th to the Governors' Conference which President Johnson held in the White House on that occasion.

M: And, in your nomination--

P: He nominated me that day before the other governors.

M: In your nomination you were supported both by Teddy Kennedy and by Edward Brooke. Is that right?

P: That's right.

M: The hearings--

P: In my hearings I ran into some trouble with Senator [Margaret Chase] Smith of Maine because I carried a deficit of some $150,000 out of my campaign for the Senate. I still had the deficit dinner which I was scheduled to

run, and she raised questions about it. I said I had to run the dinner to pay my debtors and she had spent $500 in her last campaign for the Senate so, she really didn't quite understand the problems of getting elected--particularly in an industrial state, such as Massachusetts. But, notwithstanding that, but with some publicity about it. I had earlier told the President and the Armed Services Committee that the dinner was more important than my appointment itself. So, following the hearing that the President was on his way to Australia, I think for the Prime Minister's funeral, he recommended to Ramsey Clark that my appointment be held up until after the dinner. I served as consultant on particular State visits then on one or two days a week, until after June.

M: The objection to the hearings was apparently that there was an ethical question involved. I don't understand where the ethical question is in something like that. Can you explain that to me?

P: I don't think the objection in the hearings came out so much in that fashion.

M: Why would they object to this dinner?

P: As a matter of fact, I have the transcript in front of me. Let me read some of this. Senator Russell raised the question, "Governor, I believe you informed the committee through the staff that you would be the recipient of a testimonial dinner in your home state." Then he asked me to give the committee an account of it. He asked me who would handle what funds.

I said the committee which the Registrar of Motor Vehicles was chairman of would take charge of the funds and I would not participate, nor would they be deposited in my name.

At this point, Senator Smith said, "Mr. Chairman, I shall not oppose the nomination, but I do feel that I must express my personal opinion

about the post-election testimonial fund-raising dinner. I am opposed to them. I do not particularly like fund-raising dinners, and I particularly disapprove of fund-raising dinners after election. Frankly, Mr. Chairman, I think the proposed fund-raising dinner which you and Governor Peabody referred to is extremely unfortunate,I would think it would be embarrassing to the President and I certainly don't relish the thought of the committee's acting on the nomination. However, I shall not oppose it."

However, the solution that was worked out by the President was perfectly satisfactory to me because it, in effect, gave me the time I needed to raise those funds in Massachusetts. One press reporter tried to compare my dinner to the Dodd's dinner which were entirely different in purpose because the allegation of the Dodd's dinner was that it was used for his personal benefit, whereas mine was used solely to pay off the debtors of the last campaign.

M: Moreover, you didn't handle the money.

P: Nor did I handle the money, correct!

M: Then as Assistant Director did you get into civil defense programs with the Office of Emergency Planning?

P: That wasn't the purpose I was there for. The reason I was named as Assistant Director was to assist Governor Bryant in the handling of federal-state relations.

M: I see.

P: The Assistant Director carries with it, I found, no staff duties at all--no line duties at all. He's solely a consultant and adviser to the Director.

M: So you worked with state governors?

P: During that busy 1967, we had task forces that went to every state in the union, and they were very interesting and effective. I think that I played

a part both in the inspiration of them, because I had a lot to say on it, and in the success of them. But I'm afraid that I never did gain the active confidence of the President, possibly because of the Senate hearing. While Governor Bryant and I were and are friends, we come from different parts of the country and look at things differently. And he and the President together were not disposed to give me the kind of authority or job which I should like to have done for the President and for the country in this area.

However, I made the most of what I thought was a poor situation. I became involved on the Interagency Emergency Planning Committee. I was the chairman of that and, I think, pepped that up to a great degree. Emergency planning was not high on the list of the President and, for that reason it wasn't high on the list of the members of the cabinet. We weren't, and didn't, do the job that I would have liked to have seen done. I recognize, however, that there were other priorities involved and why we might not have received the strong support that was necessary to make that agency an effective one.

M: Does emergency planning have to do with stockpiles of essential materials?

P: It does.

M: As I recall, in that hearing one of the senators said something about the use of stockpiles to control the economy. Do you recall anything about that?

P: Yes, Senator Dominick and Senator Symington, I think, voiced some opinion about stockpiles. At that time they were having a particularly difficult time because the President was interested in reducing the stockpile in order to reduce the imbalance in the budget. The senators, some from metals states were interested in increasing the stockpile to help the economy in their states. Other senators were interested in increasing the

stockpile to make sure that an adequate supply, in their opinion, was available should a war start.

M: Yes.

P: And, so that was a subject of some controversy. But so far as it had anything to do with my activities in the Office of Emergency Preparedness, it had very little to do with it. I sat in on one conference with the budget directors, and Deusenbury of the Board of Economic Advisers came over to see what part of the stockpile was surplus and what could be sold without any damage to the nation or to the purpose of the Defense Production Act.

M: But you were really not directly involved in setting what a stockpile should be or selling off any or things of that nature?

P: That was Bryant's charge, and later it was taken over by [Price] Daniel who came in to succeed Mr. Bryant.

M: Therefore, your job was mainly to work with state governments and hopefully--

P: During the spring of '67, we were taking these field trips to the states and that's all I did. I came on in the summer of 1967. I was confirmed on July 11th, and I stayed on with OEP for a year and a quarter. I resigned as Assistant Director after the Democratic convention in Los Angeles in September 1968. During that time I spent my time on federal-state relations to the extent I was able. In 1968 the effort was reduced as a result of the presidential campaign which made it more difficult to carry on such an effort--and,also, because of Governor Daniel's different approach from Governor Bryant's in handling federal-state relations. I became involved at that time with the Commission for Development of Friendship along the Mexican border, which I became interested in as a result of Hurricane Beulah, which was a disaster which brought me to Texas

in conjunction with the OEP.

M: Let me ask you then, does the phrase "creative federalism" mean anything to you? Is it simply an empty phrase that Lyndon Johnson uses?

P: Far from that. I think that Lyndon Johnson ended up by doing more for state-federal partnership than any President heretofore. This was recognized by Governor Volpe, the chairman of the Governors' Conference, who said just that. He really worked at it as he worked at most anything. I think that Lyndon Johnson probably knew more about his job than 90 percent of the Presidents we've had. John McCloy once told me that if you were asked to come to see Johnson that you had to do your homework before you went there, otherwise he'd catch you napping, that this was the large difference in going in to see Johnson or Kennedy or Eisenhower for whom he had worked before.

M: Well, does it--

P: So we're back to "creative federalism! Johnson's idea was that certainly you should open up the communications. And certainly you should develop all means possible to develop federal-state relations.

When we were in office a short while we put out a pamphlet which I helped to draft--I haven't got it here, unfortunately--called Nine Months of Federal-State Relations, in which we talked of the great strides forward which have been made in that area. We had all of the departments working on these problems that were brought up by the states. We had the Bureau of the Budget working on putting out regulations that would make some of these federal grants more easily administrative, which would be of help to the states. We had these catalogs going out to the states which would make it clear to the states and to the communities what was available to them. And, all in all, the federal-state relations was on the upbeat.

I can't say too much for it in the year 1968 for the reasons aforementioned. I really wish that I had a chance to be his lieutenant in charge of directing further, because I think we could have moved strongly in this direction. But notwithstanding that, he still made giant strides forward in this area. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations became a real instrument for this, and it had strong appointments and support for President Johnson. This is going to go down to his credit when the history writers get going.

M: To pick up the political events of 1968, were you surprised when Lyndon Johnson announced in March that he would not run for the presidency again?

P: After September of 1968 I became involved in the Commission for the Development of Friendship on the Mexican Border. Ambassador Raymond Telles asked me to take over the chairmanship of the Sports Committee for this commission. I also did some further work in disaster relief and rehabilitation assisting Governor Daniel, who was the Director of the OEP. I had some initial success because I moved out, and I had been working on Spanish at the Foreign Service Institute and could speak a little and went down to the border on two or three occasions.

I recall going to the White House--I think it was in February of 1968 because the TET Offensive had just taken place and the President was even then getting reports from General Westmoreland at the front. As a matter of fact, when we went into his office for a meeting with them, and there were about fifteen or sixteen representatives of the commission there, to make a progress report on what we had been doing he had a throat mike on and was getting ready to make a filmed statement with regard to the TET Offensive. He had just finished, as I say, talking to Westmoreland for some forty-five minutes, so that he was pretty tense and he looked absolutely exhausted.

When we filed into the room I well recalled similar occasions when I'd been Governor, when I'd been working on a matter of A-1 priority and some delegation would come in to talk with me on something in which I was not in the slightest interested. He wanted to make it a short conference so he asked us to make a stand-up report to him. I recall his head was down; he looked a picture of a man who was completely exhausted with the duties of office. Then the first man made his report. Ambassador Telles described briefly the work of the commission, then Russ Davis started to talk on the National Park problem. The President was listening, in amongst the other individuals who were standing there, with his head down sort of waiting for time to expire. Suddenly he came to life when Schushano reported that they were working on the Big Bend National Park and they weren't making the progress that they would have liked.

The President, as I say, came to life and went over and sat on his desk, and he said, "That reminds me of a story." And then he said, "A long time ago when FDR was elected President and I happened to be the secretary of Congressman Dick Kleberg of Texas, when Roosevelt won, Willie Flores of Floresville wrote to Dick Kleberg the next day and said, 'Now that I've contributed to FDR's election as President of the United States I'd like to be the postmaster of Floresville.

"And Kleberg said to Willie, 'hold up, now--hold up, Willie. This is only November and the President doesn't get inaugurated until March. Meanwhile we've got a lot of work to do.' So he was able to put him off for awhile but immediately after the inauguration Willie called Kleberg's office again and he wanted to know why he hadn't been made postmaster." So the President, as he recited this, you began to see his color coming up in his face, and he began to take genuine interest

in telling this story and to relax a little and to lean back on his desk. Then he said Kleberg didn't know what to do but meanwhile he went to a conference after the inauguration and Jim Farley was there with 150 other congressmen. He spoke to Farley on his way out of the room and said he would like to come and talk to him. Farley waved him off and said they could take care of that matter another time; they'd work it out.

Following this meeting Willie Flores called him again and Kleberg said, "Now, look," he said, "I've just had a conference with the Postmaster General and we've worked over your problem, we've analyzed it and we're working out a modus operandi to develop that position for you, Willie." A day or so later Kleberg got a letter from Willie Flores saying that he appreciated all the work that had been put in by the congressman but he didn't give a goddam about the modus operandi but he wanted a job! So the President turned to Schushand and he said, "Look, I don't give a damn about the modus operandi but I want results down here on the border."

I thought it was a wonderful vignette of the President. Not only were his shoulders braced and his color back in his face and his drive there, but he listened to us for forty-five minutes giving a report on Texas, including our sports program. I got a personal note of thanks from him because I sent him a little scrapbook of what we'd been doing down there.

He strolled out of the conference to his delayed television conference, a new man, and the meeting was over.

M: Well, it was shortly after that I guess that he announced that he would not run--a month later?

P: Yes. It was on March 31. On that occasion I was in the company of Vice President Humphrey. We went to Mexico City where he went to sign the

Treaty of [Nuclear Arms Control Pact] and where he also went to look at the Olympic sports developments in that area, which was becoming an international problem--which Mexico was very proud of. They were very much concerned about the reports that some of our black athletes might not participate. Because of my involvement with sports along the border and with Mexican leaders and a knowledge of their feelings, I suggested to the Vice President that it would be helpful if I accompanied him so he put me on the plane. As it developed I had a luncheon for all the Mexican sports leaders there on behalf of the Vice President, who had to be at the President's palace for luncheon. I believe that I was able to help him on that trip.

However, it was very interesting, this whole procedure, because in the plane on our way down, the Vice President had a meeting in the forward room there in Air Force Two which we were using. He remarked that he had been to see the President--or vice versa. The President had come to his apartment just before he had left for Mexico City and had reviewed with him the speech that he was making that night. Humphrey reported talking with the President and saying, "Mr. President, what's in that speech is not you at all."

The President remarked,"I know. It is always so frustrating. After the speech gets through with the State department and the Defense department you never say what you want to say."

The Vice President didn't betray in any way that the President had talked with him of the possibility of his withdrawing in his television speech that night, although it subsequently developed that he'd discussed with him two versions that he might use.

When we got to Mexico City we had a very simple schedule in the

afternoon, and we were supposed to go to the American Embassy in Mexico that night for a state dinner with President Diaz-Ordaz and his wife and his full cabinet and their wives. I was very privileged to be there. I had a seat that night at a table of ten at which the Vice President was sitting next to Mrs. Diaz-Ordaz and I was sitting next to Mrs. Carillo-Flores, who was the Foreign Minister's wife, and she was sitting next to Mr. Humphrey. We were told to arrive at, let's say, 7:30 at night, that there would be one cocktail and then we'd go in for dinner. We arrived a little late, about twenty minutes to eight, and President Diaz-Ordaz arrived right after we did. So I anticipated that we would be going directly in to dinner. Instead we had one cocktail, and then we had two cocktails, and then we had three cocktails, and then we had four cocktails! And we were waiting for what we knew not! I was talking with Carillo-Flores, the Foreign Minister of Mexico, when someone came dashing out of a room with the news that the President had withdrawn from the presidential race in 1968. Well, everyone was thunderstruck. Carillo-Flores said that he wasn't entirely surprised.

But then the Vice President came out of the room which he had closeted himself in to hear the radio address--I don't think it came through on television--where it resulted that he had been talking with the President himself after the telecast, and he gave a very moving talk to the television cameras which were brought in to take pictures of the Vice President and his reaction to the speech. He was visibly moved. There were tears in his eyes as he expressed himself on the fact that the President had withdrawn from this campaign and that he would no longer continue the coming year.

Following that, there was a reception line and I went through. As a

delegate--still a delegate, may I say--I pledged myself to assist Mr. Humphrey to the maximum degree in the campaign.

We then went in to dinner and I had a chance to observe Mr. Humphrey. There was an interpreter sitting behind him, and he was about as charming a dinner guest as could possibly be. There was not anything to betray at that dinner that he was concerned about his own political future and the President's withdrawal.

M: Yes.

P: He was charming to Mrs. Diaz-Ordaz and to Mrs. Carrillo-Flores, and he appeared as though he had not a care in the world. Meanwhile, however, his staff was a picture of bewilderment and crestfalleness, because, here they were in Mexico with the presidential fight opening up and the last place that they really needed to be if they wanted to galvanize his organization and others into effect to help them in the presidential campaign. Meanwhile they had visages of Bobby Kennedy, who had then been in the campaign for about two weeks, just grabbing up everyone and cinching the fight before they got back to Washington.

The Vice President, I remember, after dinner had a long, standing talk with Diaz-Ordaz and Ambassador Freeman, Carrillo-Flores and the interpreter from the State department. They all enjoyed one another hugely, and the dinner broke up very late at night.

The next day was a very busy one for the Vice President. He was busy from breakfast on through luncheon, through his observations of the Olympic stadiums and so forth, and didn't have a minute to rest until we got back on the plane bound for the United States. I anticipated that he would immediately bring his political cohorts together and that they would start planning a political campaign and the question would be whether or

not he'd announce after he got off the plane at Andrews Air Force Base.

[Interruption]

M: You're now on the plane back.

P: On the plane back I was anticipating that the Vice President would be hatching plans for a presidential campaign, which would now open up before him. I was up in his cabin, sitting at the table across the aisle, and having my dinner with the Ambassador to the OAS from Xerox. What's his name--formerly president of Xerox, and he's still the Ambassador to the OAS. We were talking about the campaign and what Humphrey ought to do and so forth. It was his opinion that he ought to announce crack out of the box.

But on the trip home Humphrey had very little to say to anyone, including his staff. I remember being hustled out of the rear of the plane instead of out of the front when we got there, and there was a welcoming party and television cameras there to greet him. I went up on the television stand to watch Humphrey emerge from the plane, and he gave a very low-key speech, saying that it was nice for people to turn out, including Secretary Orville Freeman, that events had certainly changed since he left the country and maybe he would have something to say about that in due course. "Now go on home and get a good sleep and we'll see you in the morning."

So, it was really quite a letdown. And in retrospect, Humphrey himself did not think that his chances for the nomination were very good, that the nomination would probably automatically go to Kennedy, and that there was nothing really that he could do about it at that time.

That was the 31st of March. He announced the 27th of April, and his decision was really probably made around the 20th because I think that's when they decided they were going to have that big meeting in Washington. And I recall going to Dallastown, Pennsylvania, as I'd agreed to do, as a

speaker for the Democratic National Committee and endorsing Humphrey probably at that time. Everyone was amazed that they were all clapping so much which indicated already that there was a groundswell of feeling for Humphrey which was not appreciated, even by the individuals. So everyone found themselves clapping at the same time. And it was because of this groundswell for him, which was reported by the weekly news magazines and others--part of it was genuine appreciation of Hubert Humphrey's efforts which got him back into the campaign which he thought that he was out of when he landed on April 1st, April Fool's Day, at Andrews Air Force Base.

M: Did you go ahead then and help Humphrey with his campaign?

P: After I announced on the 18th of April for Humphrey and after he announced on the 27th, the President put an embargo down on presidential appointees actively campaigning for Humphrey. But a lot of my supporters were active for him in Vermont, at the convention that they held there, the majority of which went to Humphrey. Since I'd already endorsed him, it was plain where I was and that I was, on a man-to-man basis, very helpful, I think, during the course of the pre-convention campaign.

M: Yes. Then in September '68 you resigned the--

P: We came home from the convention, and I had to go to Tampico, Mexico, for a conference on disaster rehabilitation with this Commission for the Development of Friendship business and OEP business--and then to the West Coast on a trip for the government.

INTERVIEWEE: ENDICOTT PEABODY (Tape #2)

INTERVIEWER: DAVID McComb

March 4, 1969

P: Where should we start?

M: Well, you supported Humphrey. You also attended the convention; you resigned in September. You might make some comment about the convention that you went to.

P: During the pre-convention, on occasion, I worked very hard on some of the governors trying to bring them into the camp. I worked very closely with both Governor Curtis of Maine and Governor Hoff of Vermont. I arranged a conference with them for the Vice President and was present during the conference. We were successful in getting Governor Curtis to support the Vice President, and Governor Hoff went off for Senator McCarthy. My wife earlier got started in the Humphrey Pharmacy, a political boutique for Humphrey, which was opened on July 24th in Washington in Georgetown. They decided to take that boutique to the convention and to put it in the Humphrey reception room in the ballroom of the Hilton Hotel. As a result, instead of staying at the Palmer House with the Massachusetts delegation, we stayed at the Hilton Hotel. We were there for ten days, and through the bloodiest of the battles that took place outside of the Hilton there on Michigan Avenue and outside Grant Park.

M: That must have been rather unpleasant in the lobby of the Hilton.

P: It began to stink when the teargas bombs seeped in there. I was slow going out to the convention on Wednesday evening. We went out to dinner and as we came back to the hotel, we had trouble getting into the hotel because

there was a ring of policemen around the hotel. At the same time there were buses--police buses--full of policemen dressed with helmets and billy sticks who were coming into the general area. So we went into the hotel and we stayed there and we saw the beatings that took place. A lot of people were pushed right into the hotel, some through the windows of the bar, and the police came right after them and gave them a terrific belting. I went out to the convention hall after that.

It was a sad night. It was the night that Humphrey got the nomination. It was also the night he lost the election. I could feel that as I watched him accept the news that he had been nominated. It was sort of hard to be cheerful on such an occasion.

M: From that statement I would conclude then that you feel the police reaction to the protestors at Chicago was a major factor in the campaign and the election?

P: Well, it was the rioting, and it was the brutality of the police, and it was the inability to control the rioting that brought about Humphrey's defeat, because before the convention the major issue that was facing the American people was Viet Nam. And after the convention the major issue was law and order, which was brought about by the rioting in Chicago and the behavior of the police which was far in excess of what was needed. The National Guard, which was brought in from time-to-time there from Grant Park, behaved far better than the police did.

M: There was also the public charge that Lyndon Johnson tried to control the Chicago convention. Is there any truth in that?

P: Who knows?

M: I was hoping that you would.

P: All I can say is that someone has to run and prepare for the convention.

It was logical with Lyndon Johnson being President that the national committee would take its direction from the White House. It certainly did at Atlantic City four years earlier. And Crisswell was sent to Chicago to organize the convention and there's no question that he must have listened to the White House from time-to-time with regard to the plans for it.

It was sad that that convention was set up because it was anticipated naturally that Lyndon Johnson would be renominated. It was set in the last week of August, as close to the election as possible, so that there would be as short a period as possible wherein he would be a candidate, which made sense. But for Humphrey, or for any other nominee, that convention should have been moved up a couple of weeks, at least. One need only compare the convention of 1960 when there was a lot of ill-feeling by the Stevensonian supporters against Kennedy following that convention. But that convention was in July and by Labor Day most of that had worn away and Kennedy could only pick up speed, whereas after the convention in Chicago, the whole campaign went downhill for at least a full month after the convention was over and didn't really start to pick up until the first week in October. The fact that so much was done in such a short time is a credit to Hubert Humphrey and to Ed Muskie, but there really wasn't a long enough time after the convention to bandage the wounds that were created there.

M: After the nominations did Lyndon Johnson, in your opinion, adequately support Humphrey and Muskie? Should he have done more; should he have done less?

P: Again, I guess that's something people will write about. Lyndon Johnson was not in such public favor after the convention where he could have

helped Hubert Humphrey very much. I think also it's fair to say that anyone who'd been in the position of President Johnson would have been in a psychological bind. Viet Nam was the reason that he was getting out although he wanted to continue. He was doing his duty as he saw it. He was faced with the proposition of going ahead to support someone who had more or less adopted his position, and he was glad to do this. Nixon took pains not to separate himself too much from the position of Johnson on Viet Nam, and this made it difficult, I think, for the President.

I think that the facts are, however, that Texas was brought into the fold, and it wouldn't have been without LBJ's active support. He went down there and he was on the platform and that was the place--Texas and money were the things where LBJ could have done the most for Hubert Humphrey. Elsewhere he couldn't help him much in that campaign. I think that both LBJ and Humphrey knew it.

There were two damaging speeches as far as Humphrey's campaign was concerned that LBJ made. One was to the VFW and the other was to the American Legion. One was in New Orleans and the other in Detroit--I forget which was which--in which he took a very firm position on Viet Nam and re-enunciated his position. This gave Humphrey very little position for maneuver, which he really needed on the Viet Nam issue. Also the trip that the President took to Hawaii to see the leaders of Viet Nam I don't think helped the Humphrey campaign much either.

But I think these are the problems that you have when you have a retiring President and someone in his own party who naturally wants to cut a new course but can't stray too far from the course of his incumbent President. It certainly happened, it seems to me, in 1960 to Nixon when he was running for President, and it happened to Stevenson in 1952 when

Truman was President and he was running for President.

M: Then after you resigned did you go ahead and campaign for Humphrey?

P: After I resigned I went to Philadelphia, where I was Humphrey's liaison. My present partner, Lew Rivlin was his liaison in Harrisburg and for the rest of Pennsylvania. We worked for six weeks solidly in Pennsylvania for the Humphrey-Muskie ticket. It was, I may say, the only state that was credited to Nixon by the New York Times and the other polls that actually went to Humphrey. So I think our presence there did contribute something.

M: Then the next major step in your career is the setting-up of this law firm?

P: Correct.

M: Which you started February 10 this year?

P: Right.

M: Is that correct? And the name of it is--?

P: Peabody, Rivlin and Kelly.

M: Rivlin is R-i-v-l-i-n?

P: Kelly is K-e-l-l-y.

M: I have only one further question that you might have some insight on. It has been told to me by others that Lyndon Johnson was a failure in organizing the Democratic party on the state level. Is this true or false? or somewhere in between?

P: I won't answer that statement but I'll say this, that you will find in politics that every leader is very much tied to his early experiences in politics as to how he handles himself politically at later times. Lyndon Johnson was elected a congressman and a senator in a state where the election was won as soon as the primary was over, in a primary the Democratic party, as an organization of course, had no part to play. It was a question of personal alliances and personal support that one could get for one's self

in the course of one's campaign. Consequently, in his early and later experience the Democratic party had very little to do with the success of Lyndon Johnson in the election, because he had already won the election by the time he had won the primary. I think, as a result of that, party politics--as apart from, let's say, congressional politics--was something that was strange to his experience. Therefore, he never used the party to assist him in his campaign. His campaign of 1964 was a personal campaign for Lyndon Johnson. There was no Democratic organization in Massachusetts, for example, for Lyndon Johnson. There was a citizens' organization, and it was headed by Republicans, which perhaps was good strategy. But it illustrates again Lyndon Johnson's approach to politics.

M: Is there anything else that you care to add to the record--anything that I should have asked you that I didn't that you can think of?

P: You're not asking for conclusions; you're asking for facts on this matter.

M: I'll take conclusions too.

P: But I think that the United States was well served by Lyndon Johnson as President. I think that his career as President, between his takeover in November of 1963 and the following years of '64 and '65 and '66, were the most remarkable years in terms of accomplishments in the history of the country. This did more than weld me close to him. I admired him for it and I think the world will admire him for it as time goes by.

There's no question but that Viet Nam was the cause of his falling out of favor with the American public and with the world and the fact that he had to leave office. But he did it because it was his duty as a President. I yet have to find from someone of his many critics an alternative policy that would benefit this nation and benefit the world in terms of world peace in the long run.

See my letter to Mullen dated 7/1/77
(Letter Attached)

One might question whether in 1954 John Foster Dulles, who was running our foreign policy at that time, should emerge with the agreement that was made in Geneva and immediately set about on an independent course to invalidate any election which might have united that country under North Viet Nam and to protect South Viet Nam in that area. But it was done, and it was continued--the policies of Dulles were continued by Kennedy. He committed our troops there for that support. Johnson had very little room for maneuver by that time.

In going back to 1954 it is possible maybe that other means might have been taken to have preserved the interests of the free world in Southeastern Asia. But, Lyndon Johnson, in my opinion, had only one course and he took it because he's a great American.

M: Thank you very much.

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Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of Endicott Peabody

In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Endicott Peabody, of Washington, D.C., do hereby give, donate, and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title, and interest in the tape recording and transcript of a personal interview conducted on March 4, 1969 in Washington, D.C. and prepared for deposit in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions:

(1) The transcript shall be available for use by researchers as soon as it has been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

(2) The tape recording of the interview shall also be available for research use under the same conditions governing the transcript. If the interviewee has made substantive changes in the transcript, however, the reference copy of the tape shall be modified to conform to the edited version before the recording can be made available to researchers.

(3) During my lifetime, I retain all literary property rights in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the literary property rights in both the transcript and tape recording will pass to the United States Government. During my lifetime, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcript and tape recording without my express consent in each case.

(4) Copies of the transcript and the tape recording may be provided by the Library to researchers upon request.

(5) Copies of the transcript and tape recording may be deposited in or loaned to institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

Endicott Peabody

Donor

August 12, 1977

Date

James B. Rhoads

Archivist of the United States

August 25, 1977

Date

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July 1, 1977

Mr. Harry J. Middleton
Director
The Lyndon Baines Johnson Library
Austin, Texas 78705

Dear Mr. Middleton:

This is in response to your letter of June 14, 1974, to me, requesting use of my statement about my relationship with Lyndon Baines Johnson for the LBJ Library in Austin, Texas.

I am glad to make this material available for immediate use by those who wish to use the Library. I would, however, put one condition on it as follows:

I retain the right for myself during my lifetime of all literary property rights in the material donated herewith by the terms of this instrument to the United States of America. After my death, the aforesaid literary property rights will pass to the United States of America.

It is interesting to see how one's views change when one has a better perspective of what has happened. I dare say this has happened to a number of people, and perhaps was happening to LBJ during the closing years of his Administration. I refer particularly and specifically to Vietnam.

During the Johnson and Kenedy Administrations, I sincerely believed that Vietnam was the first effort of the Communist forces to take over Asia and then possibly to move on to the rest of the world. I felt that the move from North Vietnam to South Vietnam was comparable at least to

the crossing of the Rhine by Hitler in the early 1930's, and that not to stop it then might be to encourage a larger battle and a greater war at a later time. I fully subscribed to the domino theory and felt that the policies of President Kennedy followed by President Johnson were correct in trying to stave off the taking-over of Southeast Asia by Communist forces.

However, subsequently, my views changed. They changed, I think, as much as a result of President Nixon's visit to Russia and to China as for any other reason. How could it be that we were fighting Communism in Vietnam but having a detente in Moscow and Peking? Surely, if we could work out our problems at the Summit there should have been no reason why we had to fight at the lower level, in Vietnam. Moreover, at the time of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, it appeared that Moscow and Peking were a solid block together. This subsequently became quite the opposite, and indeed they nearly went to war with one another; so that fighting Vietnam really wasn't a fight against the Communist bloc, particularly when that Communist bloc was split. I think it was a tragedy that we did not permit the Nationalists in Vietnam and Indo-China to take over their country following World War II. We certainly would have been spared a great deal of grief - the lives lost and the money invested in Vietnam was certainly not worth it, in my opinion, and it is one of the tragedies of that war era with which we were involved.

I think, in retrospect too, that we were not getting proper information concerning what was actually happening in that area. I believe that the McCarthy ravages of our State Department, as a result of the fall of China to Communist forces shortly after World War II, resulted in all Government officials sending back to the State Department and to the Pentagon and to the President exactly what he wanted to hear, and that, subsequently, the American people were fed pap as to what was happening and not given the actual facts. Hopefully, we can learn a lesson from this sorrowful period so that such an event may not happen again.

If this is being critical of Lyndon Johnson, I must say it is almost equally critical of myself. It would have been difficult under the conditions available for the

non-intervention decision to have been made, but it certainly would have spared this country a lot of grief.

Would you be good enough to include this statement along with my tapes so that pages 6 and 7 of the second interview will be in perspective along with my present views on it. Thank you very much.

Sincerely yours,

Endicott Peabody

EP/ltl