INTERVIEW I

DATE: May 12, 1983

INTERVIEWEE: CARL D. PERKINS (with occasional comments by Donald Baker and an unidentified speaker)

INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette

PLACE: Congressman Perkins' office, Washington, D.C.

Tape 1 of 1

G: I wanted to start, Chairman Perkins, by asking you how you first became aware that there was legislation in the works or a program in the works to fight poverty.

P: Well, I happened to have one of the highest unemployment districts in the whole nation. For instance, when I was elected to Congress in 1948, I had thirty thousand coalminers within a radius of fifty miles around me. And during the fifties and early sixties about 60 per cent of those employees lost their jobs because the mines closed down. The residual oil being dumped on the Eastern Seaboard at fifty cents a barrel, and around Cleveland, closed a lot of mines down right close to home there in Hindman, Kentucky, over there at Garrett, Kentucky where the Elkhorn Coalworks furnished a lot of labor orders up there for the [inaudible] states. They laid off five or six hundred men, maybe a thousand, in 1953 and closed the mine down completely in 1955 or 1956. For instance, when I came to Congress they were employing four or five thousand men.

I knew that we had to do something to diversify the economy for the coal business was so bad. I tried to do something for the young

people when I came here. I'd get a bill to the Rules Committee similar to the old Civilian Conservation Corps to try to put the youth in the forests of the nation. And the people that were unemployed around the coal mines, most of them had a third or fourth grade education, some of them a fifth grade education. But there were a lot of those people who could not make out an application for employment. So I introduced an adult basic education bill, because I'd say a lot of our people at that time, if they didn't have a fifth grade education we called them functionally illiterate. I'd get that bill over to the Rules Committee and it would die. Same way about several other bills that I introduced. I'd get them as far as the Rules Committee and they would die, like the bill I had patterned after the Civilian Conservation Corps to put the youth at work.

When Lyndon came in as vice president with Kennedy in 1960, I thought it was time to move some legislation, but unfortunately President Kennedy had some bad luck because of the integration problems in the South, and we could not get some legislation through that he was very much for, like the Vocational Education Act of 1963 that I sponsored. When Johnson came in we had good representatives here on the Hill, the administration did. Larry O'Brien continued to represent Johnson. But Johnson was an expert insofar as parliamentary procedure and insofar as getting things done. He called us all down to the White House. I gave him, as I recall, a lot of names and I told him that if we could get these people for us I thought we could pass it. Larry O'Brien was a great asset. He was the chief man

really that got the people down there to the White House. We broke the logjam within a couple of months after Lyndon Johnson became president. For instance, we were over there, if I recall, early on the day before Christmas, and we got the Vocational Education Bill signed in 1963, maybe eight or ten days before Christmas or a few days thereafter in 1964. I really think it was before Christmas. [December 18, 1963]

Then President Johnson wanted to do something about the unemployment situation throughout the nation. He came up with the idea of what many people call the War on Poverty. We had, I don't know, millions of people, perhaps twenty million people with incomes less than two thousand dollars or fifteen hundred dollars at that time throughout the United States. Of course, money was worth more than it is now. He had an idea that we should do something for education and health, and he came up with the Head Start program. Then [Sargent] Shriver came to me and said, "Let's put these bills that you've got over there before the Rules Committee in this package also," like the adult basic education [bill] and the Job Corps bill, which was patterned more or less after the Civilian Conservation Corps. Then we put a lot of health programs in it. Then we put the work-study provision in it. That was really copied after the old workshops that were in existence during the Roosevelt days and Truman days just immediately prior to World War II. The law expired and it wasn't renewed.

G: All of these different elements seem to cut across the jurisdiction of a lot of different committees.

P: They did.

G: How did you decide to have it come up through the House Education and Labor Committee?

P: Well, that's where Johnson wanted it and that's where he got it. And we didn't have any problems with any other committees. We just went right on through, got the whole thing through without any problems.

G: Of course, Adam Clayton Powell was chairman of the committee at the time. What was--?

P: He was chairman of the committee at the time. He cooperated at times and at times he was away. When he was away I would operate the full committee at the request of Larry O'Brien. We didn't have any problems at all.

G: Did Powell have his own interests in a program? Did he have certain elements that he wanted included?

P: Yes, he had certain interests. Sometimes when the President and Larry O'Brien wanted him, we just couldn't get him, and sometimes he delayed the committee to a degree. But I always had the guts to pick it up and go ahead with it. I never had any problems with Adam Powell.

G: Is that right?

P: Yes. Got along fine, because I didn't travel with him or anything like that. I just went ahead about my business and got along with Adam.

G: How did he affect the outcome of the legislation, though? Did he influence it in any way? Were there any projects that resulted--?

P: I would say that in the final result that Adam Powell supported the legislation. Adam was shrewd in one respect; he knew if he was against something and seeing that he was going to lose, if it was something constructive that would help his area, he would always be for it. We got the thing headed in the right direction and I think we would have enacted it whether he had been around or not. But when he saw the programs were going, he always supported them.

G: Where did the strategy come from of combining rural as well as urban components of a program?

P: It came from Lyndon Johnson. He was the fellow that suggested we package everything. It was his leadership, and he removed the road-blocks in the Congress and in the Rules Committee. He had a big job of doing that.

G: Do you know how he did it?

P: Well, he'd call them down there through persuasion and he could-- Howard Smith was chairman of the Rules at the time. Bill Colmer and all these southern boys that were on there that were very conservative, he just managed to get it around them and go through. A lot of times they would support it reluctantly.

G: Was there any horse trading that you're aware of that was absolutely critical in getting the legislation?

P: I would not say so. I do not know of any. But Lyndon knew how to move things, and I don't know that he promised a member of the Rules

Committee anything. Perhaps he had been more cooperative. If they asked him for something, I'm sure that he would try to accommodate them. I wouldn't say there were no deals any time, but he knew how to accommodate people and get things done.

G: I wanted to ask you about the Community Action Program and how you yourself--

P: That was one of the main bulwarks of the poverty program that was much broader at the time we enacted it. We didn't get the governmental agencies involved too much the first year. But Lyndon came back and he wanted the governmental agencies, the cities involved and the counties involved, and he got his way over there when we renewed the act. I know, I was in charge of it at that time, and he called me personally and I said, "We'll get that amendment in."

There had been some people that had made some mistakes in several states, as I recall. Maybe some mistakes were made in New Jersey. [There were] a lot of complaints here and there throughout the country and from the city people [about] the administration. They were claiming that they were being ignored and a lot of money being wasted in the Community Action Program and they wanted to get more constructive programs into operation, more employment and so forth. We amended the bill to let the cities have a great say-so, and the rural areas of the country, too, and the local elected public officials. And it worked out well.

G: Did you see it initially as something that would work in cooperation

with local government or by-pass local government, when the legislation was first passed?

P: There was so much discussion about it, and I thought we should let local governments get involved more. But the legislation was so important we kind of by-passed that aspect of it at the time. There were those on the committee who thought we should by-pass, and others who thought we should include, and others who thought the local governments should just more or less act in an advisory capacity. That may have been the original idea, but it didn't work out that way. I know they'd hold some meetings and run meetings all night to get rid of the local elected officials in some areas of the country behind the local elected officials' backs and so forth. We knew there had to be greater coordination, and that's the reason we tied it together.

G: Do you think it was too broad?

P: No, it wasn't too broad. I mean we gave the Community Action agencies themselves broad authority in by-passing city governments. But it was broad legislation and it should have been broad legislation. We let them establish employment and training programs and everything of that nature. The work experience and training program was an aftermath which employed thousands and hundreds of thousands of local people. I remember one time in the little county that I had, it served a good purpose. We had several hundred people working, several thousand in my congressional district, where we had all those people laid off from coal mining and so forth. They took adult basic education in the

classrooms in connection with vocational education and training programs, a lot of them, and they got certificates.

It was a great program. Some of them even got a certificate equivalent to a high school graduate. They learned some different trades. I know, I was down at the White House one day and Lyndon Johnson had Henry Ford II down there. I told him about all this unemployment that we had up there, and he came up there in Perry County. We had a meeting up there, and there were several hundred, four or five hundred of these people assembled. And he designated somebody to come down there and hire several hundred of them and they went to Detroit. Many of them are just now retiring or retired a few years ago.

So the work experience and training program was not a failure. Today they may consider it a failure, but it was not then. We had so much unemployment in the country. They would do everything that needed to be done in the county, clean the creek banks and work for the local governments. They even would go and clean off and beautify public graveyards and things of that nature. They were trained, some of them, in automobile mechanics and they'd work on county equipment and city equipment, work on the water and sewer systems within the city and county where they needed to make repairs. I thought it worked out well for that day and age.

G: Someone was quoted as saying that if Congress understands what Community Action really is, the legislation will never pass, will

never get through the Congress. Do you think that Congress understood the implications--?

P: I do. I think we understood it. The thing was to get the local communities involved for putting people to work and educating and training people, and that was the purpose of it. They were to elect their leaders. They started off, we had some leaders that got far afield, I think, from the local communities and from the local governments, and that was what brought about the subsequent legislation to tie it to local governments.

G: Did you foresee a measure of conflict with the established local governments in some of these places?

P: No, not when we enacted it. I thought there could be some, because they went off on their own. I felt that way, but I didn't think it would vary as much as it did or that we would have as much dissension as we did have.

G: Did it create problems for you in your district?

P: Some, yes. Some, but they were not insurmountable. It was the Community Action--the fellow that was the director felt that they were in a position that they ought to be on their own, that the city hadn't done these things, or the county hadn't done these things and we are going to do them. Sometimes they would duplicate, and that was one of the things that wasted money that we wanted to make sure did not reoccur.

G: One of the issues that had to be settled in the initial legislation was the church-state issue.

(Interruption)

P: What was it?

G: The church-state issue. How did you resolve this?

P: Well, we had that issue, it had been hanging around here for years in the education bill that really killed the first federal aid bill that I sponsored and Hugo Sims from South Carolina--I think he's on the federal bench now--back in 1949 and 1950. We finally got the different people together. We got the leaders of all the churches and talked it over with them. This is no church matter, this accommodates everybody, private organizations, public organizations, and you're not going to be ostracized. And we did not have as much trouble with that as we had with our education; that haunted our educational bills, until resolved, for years. I would say after we passed the National Defense Education Act in 1958, then the next bill we passed of any magnitude--of course we passed in 1949 or 1950, the first time I was in Congress, the Impact Aid legislation around military installations. We brought about Impact Aid; we gave the schools money in defense installations. But it haunted us even in the Vocational Education Act, and in the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act it was a great problem. But we got all the church leaders together throughout the country and we didn't ostracize anybody. For instance, private schools, they were entitled to books. We'd lease them or loan them in the name of a public agency and we just finally worked the whole thing out. It was a delicate situation, but it required a lot of perseverance or we would not have succeeded.

G: Were there any key people? I assume that a lot of this was within that committee, House Education and Labor?

P: Yes, a lot of key people I would say. Several, I forget just how many. I know I worked all the time.

G: I guess Hugh Carey would have had a very different--

P: Yes, Hugh Carey--is that who you mentioned?

G: Yes.

P: Yes, he worked with us all the time, too. He was a great asset to us and he was a great asset with the parochial people. It was just a continuous thing, we stayed on the job and we accomplished it.

G: Now early on when OEO was being created, there was I think a shifting of funds from other programs, including I think thirty-five million dollars that was scheduled for the Appalachian program.

P: Yes.

G: Did this create a problem for you?

P: No, it didn't, because no one received more benefits than the area I had because there was so much unemployment. But we really did not re-enact the--we enacted the Appalachian program I guess in 1964 and 1965 or one of those years, and the act provided for rural roads. It was a great asset in my area for rural roads. And we wrote in that act, for instance, for vocational schools, the building of vocational schools and so forth. And where they took that thirty-five million, it was hardly noticed at the time, because in my area we built dozens of vocational schools and other public buildings. The Appalachian act was different from any other act. It was an act that the Congress

had enacted in the past, you could spend money for it provided that the governor of that state or his designee first sponsored the project or approved it and sent it up to the Appalachian [Regional] Commission for approval. All proposals had to come from the governor or his designee, and it did not pose any problems at all.

G: Do you recall the compromise with regard to the Job Corps to have a certain number of corpsmen or centers allocated for conservation projects?

P: I do. There was much discussion along that line, and we compromised. Whether in the field of the trades, the Job Corps, or in the forest. Many of us did not know how the Job Corps would work in training for various trades of the country or something like that. We felt it would work, but there was discussion on it and that was the Labor Department's argument at the time, that they wanted to get away from the forest with a lot of it and get involved with things in the local community, like teaching them carpentry, different trades, to lay brick and that type of program. That program has worked out wonderfully well. We have the big Job Corps centers at Breckinridge, Kentucky, the Earle C. Clements one. I named that after [Senator Clements], he was a close friend of Lyndon. He was his whip one time in the United States Senate. And you could just go down there at Morganfield, Kentucky and see the good effects of it, and the one at [Camp] Gary, down in Texas. Lyndon was very interested in those aspects of the Job Corps and he made sure that everything functioned right. And we've managed to keep them intact there. We've had a lot

of problems. Under Nixon, he tried to tear them all down, and we were able through hearings and so forth to hold on to them. They tried to tear them down here just a few years ago under Ford, they wanted to cut them all back. And under Carter they cut them back some. But just as soon as people realize the good effects of the Job Corps, they left them alone. And President Reagan is leaving them alone, and we are faring very well with the Job Corps appropriations today.

G: There was a rural program that did not stay in the legislation when it was passed, and that was one to allow a corporation to purchase land and divide it up and in effect resell farm land to the rural poor in smaller tracts. Do you remember that?

P: Yes, I remember the discussion. But a lot of people thought that may bring about fraud, and they just did not want to get involved in that, the majority of the committee. I don't think I was against it at the time, but I know there was considerable discussion on that subject at the time.

G: And that was the reason?

P: That was the reason they left it out.

G: Now, there was some watering down of Community Action the first year--

P: The second year.

G: Well, even the first year I think when the--

P: Yes, well, I guess we did, yes. Yes, from what it started out, the broad authority, yes.

G: Did Edith Green have a role in influencing the--?

P: Edith Green did have a role in it. She was very active in the legislation. She was more supportive at the outset than later on. In latter years she was very much opposed to the community action concept if I recall correctly. Maybe I may have to modify that later. I don't want to state anything about anyone that is not 100 per cent the truth.

G: Why do you think that was the case?

P: I'd like to modify that statement. She was supportive of the legislation. But later on, on the renewal of the programs, she opposed some of the legislation because she felt that it had not worked out in accordance with the desires of the Congress, I think that way.

G: There was one curious provision that was added and that was an indemnity payment to dairy farmers. Do you remember that?

P: Don't remember that right at the present.

G: Do you remember the circumstances of the Adam Yarmolinsky episode wherein I think there were a number of North Carolina members who had not committed one way or another and Shriver ended up excluding Yarmolinsky from the program?

P: Yes, I remember that.

G: Tell me what you know about that.

P: I don't know too much about it. Don Baker on my committee downstairs, who is the chief clerk of the committee, maybe he could tell you all about that. But I remember the incident. But I don't know just about the involvements at the present time, the emphasis of it at all. I don't know at this time. But I remember the incident.

G: Do you think that Congress was more supportive of the War on Poverty knowing that Shriver would be the head of it?

P: Yes, especially after Kennedy's death and the leadership of Lyndon Johnson. I don't think that anyone could have selected a better man than Sargent Shriver, being in the Kennedy family and everything. He was very aggressive in going to see and visiting with all the members and putting the entire package together. I don't know of a thing that he didn't talk over with all the members on the committee, or the ones he felt like he should talk to about the program. He was real dedicated to getting the bill through. But of course we had not had the big push from Lyndon then. I just [inaudible].

G: Really?

P: Yes. He [Johnson] was really the one that got us steered through the Rules Committee and everything. We had to have his support. He was really the basic author. Of course Shriver talked over all these programs and he went ahead with them. He knew everything that was in that bill. Well, practically everything, in general let me say. He didn't know the details about everything, but he knew generally. But he was very much interested in getting the cities in it the second or third year of the renewal, because he called me from the White House that day, and I'm sure he called Shriver over there. He wanted the cities involved with some voting powers that simply could not be overlooked. It wasn't too many instances in the country, but in a few instances those directors of Community Actions would just take the bull by the horns and run over people and not try to get along.

G: Conversely, did you ever have a feeling that in some cases local government was ignoring the poor?

P: Well, that was one of the issues back in that day, to ignore the local governments, when we first enacted the program, that they hadn't done any of these things for the poor, and that was the issue a couple of years thereafter. That was the defense of the directors, that the poor had always been neglected. We had a lot of hearings before the committee. I think the hearings will disclose that.

G: You are given credit in later years for in effect saving the program when it looked like it was not going to pass the Congress. I want to ask you what you recall about the years 1966 and 1967 when you really began to have opposition.

P: Well, I'll tell you what I did, and the burden was on me. Adam Powell had gone in 1967--Powell was denied his chairmanship and then his seat at the beginning of the 90th Congress. I guess I was elected chairman in January of 1967. It had to be renewed that year. And the education bill had to be renewed that year. As I studied the situation I knew that we did not have the votes to start out with. I took or kept the record of every Democrat in the House of Representatives that year and checked them off from time to time at nights, and I knew it wouldn't do to let those programs fail inasmuch as I was chairman that first year in 1967. For instance in North Carolina, I'd get them to get the delegation together. I first thought the liberals were [inaudible]. But I served a great deal with the Republicans and I knew we were not going to get too many Republican votes, I think if

you check the record, twenty or twenty-five, but I may have [inaudible] overcounted on the good side. But the state of Virginia, for instance, I'd get a fellow like Tom Downing--he's still living down here at Newport--to get his group together from Virginia. And then South Carolina would be [William Jennings] Bryan Dorn. I'd go down through the South and Georgia. Phil Landrum helped me an awful lot with that group. But the man that really helped me--he was about to leave, and I'm not sure whether he'd left--but he was very strong for me when he was here, was the old Admiral down there, Vinson.

G: Carl Vinson.

P: Yes, that was here so long. And Phil was for us. And then Florida. Don't know whether Bob Sikes will remember it, but I had him to get the Florida delegation together. And I just kept getting one delegation and picking these southern votes, and I didn't bring up that damn bill until I was confident that I was going to win it. In fact, hearings went on early in the session and I waited until November, I guess, before I brought that bill to the floor. I know it wasn't long, a few days before Christmas, when we had the conference and I brought the conference report on that bill and the education bill. I had to work on them both. We were in real deep trouble. It was a very tedious, tedious job, and it took just time, time, time. I don't know whether anybody else would spend time like I spent on those two bills that year.

G: What arguments would you use to persuade quite conservative southerners to support this?

P: Well, we were getting back and getting the cities on, and they had a lot of unemployment in their areas. And the fact that some of our Community Action directors had gone off half-cocked and failed to cooperate with everybody is the real reason that the program was as unpopular as it was. I talked to them about all those things, reasoned with them, worked with them on things that they were interested in, and we just got the votes. When I knew or when I thought that I had the votes, I went. I didn't waste any time.

G: Did you ever meet with Republicans such as [Albert] Quie and [Charles] Goodell to determine--?

P: Yes, I met with them a whole lot, talked to them a whole lot. I don't know that I went to Quie's office or talked to Goodell on the floor and other people. Of course, they were supportive to a great degree. Sometimes they were not.

G: Was there some degree of compromise in the legislation?

P: Yes. There was some degree of compromise there in 1967 and it worked out.

G: Let me ask you about the expression that I've heard that the southerners would often vote for OEO in the tellers, and the Republicans would often vote on recorded votes. Is that right, that you would get, one, southern Democrats if they weren't actually recorded as being for it and yet--?

P: I always would rather have the teller votes. On a teller vote in those days we got practically most all the members in the South. Some of them did not want to, but I pulled them and worked with them. I

didn't have any enemies that I know of, and it just worked out.

G: Did you ever persuade others just not to vote at all, to be gone?

P: Well, I have done that, yes. I have done that, especially on teller votes. If they couldn't go along, I'd ask them, I'd say, "If you can't help me, please don't hurt me."

G: Let me ask you about the concept of spinning off component programs to established agencies such as Head Start to Department of Education, HEW.

P: We spun off the Work-Study Program into the Higher Education Programs, you know, put it into the Higher Education Act. And we spun off the health programs, so many of them, and made permanent programs out of them with HEW. The health aspect was a great part of that program, more so than people realize today. They set up these rural health clinics, and in the inner cities, too, where they didn't have access to them, and they worked out well.

G: OEO seems to have felt at the time that if you spun off the popular programs like Head Start and Adult Education and things of this nature, that the only thing left would be Community Action and that it would make that much more vulnerable.

P: Well, that is correct, that logic is correct. However, the Community Action people, seeing that they had problems, we put Legal Services under it, if I recall, at the time. Do you recall if we put Legal Services in it? I think we put Legal Services in it the first time. I'm pretty sure we did. But they had some good outside counsel and they wanted us to establish the corporation. They were seeing that

they were going down the drain if we didn't get it in a corporation. And they had their own ideas. But we spun that off, and we spun off the health agencies of the country, Head Start, Adult Basic Education, Work-Study, and I don't know what else right at this time.

G: During that critical year of 1967 I know that there was a lot of opposition to continuing the program as it was from Edith Green. How did you deal with Edith Green?

P: Well, I got along generally entirely well with Edith all through the years. She would oppose me on a lot of those things, but if I recall correctly, she and I worked pretty well together. She was very much in bringing the cities in and making it a part, giving them, the cities, something in 1967. As I recall, Edith Green worked with me in renewing the program in 1967.

B: No, she was with Quie.

P: No, that was later, Don.

B: It was in 1967, that was the year of the "bosses and boll weevils."

G: The Green amendment, yes.

B: The Green amendment.

P: The Green amendment was the city--didn't she offer to bring the cities in?

U: Yes, they called it the bosses and boll weevil amendment.

P: Yes.

U: Bosses and boll weevils.

G: Others have recalled that you outmaneuvered her that year.

P: I don't know. If she was against me, I outmaneuvered her. But I was thinking that I got her for me in 1967.

B: Yes. She offered that amendment and thought she had more than she did. In that sense she was outmaneuvered. She wanted a hell of a lot more out of that, [out of the] hide of OEO in those days than she got.

P: Don was down with Shriver in those days as general counsel.

G: Yes, general counsel. Sure.

P: But I recall it all pretty well, except I could look at that record in 1967 in a few minutes and tell you the facts about it, if you want to come back to it. But we had some problems later on, I know, in the educational programs, tremendous problems. She and I differed.

G: Now, you were also instrumental I understand in blocking the [Peter] Dominick amendment. I think that was the one to mandate some spin-off, wasn't it?

P: I guess it was. I don't know.

U: You mean Senator Dominick?

G: Yes.

U: Yes. It came in on the Senate bill into conference to require that OEO spin off several of its programs, and then you faced it in Congress.

P: We did, we knocked that out in Congress though, as I recall.

U: That's my recollection, yes.

P: Yes. I don't know. I think I was chairman of that conference, where we knocked it out.

G: How did you do that?

P: Well, we just held fast and they knew that we were not going to capitulate.

G: Did LBJ's interest in the War on Poverty legislation diminish as the years went on?

P: I would not say that it did. He was here only through 1968. He supported it all the way. He was very much interested in 1967 in getting the cities involved, and outside of that, he always put money in the budget for it. I never could see where his interest diminished any.

G: Do you think that the program was underfunded? Could it have used more money?

P: Well, you could have utilized more money, but considering the state of affairs throughout the nation I think we fared very well. We hired hundreds of thousands of people at that time, didn't pay them too much, where we had the biggest unemployment in the country, the biggest unemployment in the whole country.

G: If you were going to enact such a program today, what would you do differently from that experience?

P: We wouldn't enact that program in the House of Representatives today, not by any sense of the imagination. The conditions of the country are different. We've got all the big indebtments hanging over us. A lot of that indebtedness was brought about by the Federal Reserve increasing the interest rates and things of that nature, but we have to bear the brunt of all that. There would be no way for us, even where we've got all the unemployment, simply because since that day

we've beefed up our training programs much better than they were at that time. We had just enacted the 1963 Vocational [Education] Act the year before we had enacted the Economic Opportunities Act, and it had not really got to functioning, the training. With the different conditions in the country today, unless we enacted an entirely different type of legislation, like we tried to enact, that we did enact--public service employment, it came along here and they had to cut that out under Reagan. We had an awful lot of public service employment in the OEO days. Most of the money was spent along that line. Try and enact that today, we just would not have the votes.

G: Do you think more emphasis should have been placed on manpower training?

P: We placed considerable interest, maybe not the first year. We picked people up and threw them in so many odd jobs. But the second, third and fourth years, we emphasized the training aspects and put them in vocational schools, and in the school systems for adult basic education for training. I think we emphasized training perhaps as much as we could. And a lot of them were working on some jobs, on-the-job training.

G: What is the most significant impact of the War on Poverty in your district?

P: Well, I would say working publicly in facilities, water systems, sanitation systems, and on roads, and from a public service angle with the cities and mechanics and things of that nature, they were trained. As a result, as I told you, Henry Ford took several hundred of them to

Michigan. We didn't throw the money away by any means, it was all spent, I think, very wisely. Now some of it was wasted in Community Action Programs, but not to any great degree.

G: Well, I certainly appreciate this, Mr. Chairman.

P: All right.

End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview I

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(2) The tape recording shall be available to those researchers who have access to the transcript.

(3) I hereby assign to the United States Government all copyright I may have in the interview transcript and tape.

(4) Copies of the transcript and the tape recording may be provided by the Library to researchers upon request.

(5) Copies of the transcript and tape recording may be deposited in or loaned to institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

Carl D. Perkins
Donor

May 1, 1984
Date

Robert M. Warner
Archivist of the United States

May 22, 1984
Date