INTERVIEW I

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INTERVIEWEE: WILLIAM G. PHILLIPS

INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette

PLACE: Mr. Phillips' office, U.S. Capitol, Washington, D.C.

Tape 1 of 3

G: Let's start with your background briefly and how you ended up working on the Hill.

P: When I finished college in 1949, I went to work for the legislative department of the UAW--United Auto Workers union--here in Washington. My job was mostly research; I read the [Congressional] Record every day and I came to the Hill to get bills and attend hearings. I also wrote articles for the union's magazine and newspaper and did a little bit of speech writing. My boss was the lobbyist for the UAW on the Hill. His name is Paul Sifton. He was a real salty character, an old newspaperman from the [H. L.] Mencken days. He had worked for the old New York World and the National Farmers Union. [He was] really an interesting guy and knew a tremendous amount about Congress and the way things were done, not the textbook kind of legislative process, but the way things really happened. He taught me a great deal.

I worked there for five years. It was a small office and the opportunities were very limited. After three years or so, I was looking around for something on the Hill. By then I was really hooked on Congress and wanted to work up here. Paul was very helpful. He realized the possibility of my advancement was very limited there. He

lined up a couple of interviews which didn't work out, but in February 1955 I finally landed a job as administrative assistant to Congressman George M. Rhodes of Reading, Pennsylvania, which is my home state. He was a very able member who was then beginning his fourth term. He was first elected to Congress in 1948, the Truman year.

George was a former labor official, which fit in very nicely with my own philosophy and background and experience. He was a vice president of the Pennsylvania AFL, a printer who belonged to the typographical union. He worked as a printer for a Reading newspaper and then he became active in the labor movement and became editor of the weekly labor paper in Reading called The New Era. He was the editor, and I guess he did everything from write the columns to set the type. He was a good congressman and I have very high regard for him. He served through 1968, when he retired after ten terms. I became his AA in 1955 and served until May of 1960.

Starting in 1956 or 1957, we organized a small group of administrative assistants to Democratic congressmen as an informal luncheon group. We shared copies of research papers and newsletters we each prepared for our bosses. Of course, everybody had different committee assignments. Someone would do a paper on an issue involving a committee where his boss served and circulate it for the use of everyone else. We would exchange such information and work products.

G: Was it a formalization of a network that already existed?

P: No, this was new. Well, there were usually such informal arrangements within state delegations where you might do some of this. But this was on a national basis. We had people from all over the country in our little AA group. After a couple of years, it grew to seventy, eighty, or ninety offices. We organized luncheon meetings at a Capitol Hill restaurant and brought in speakers. It might be a member, a lobbyist, or someone else to speak to the group and answer questions about a pending bill or some other timely issue. This got to be quite a popular event. We called it the "Tuesday Luncheon Club." I was one of the organizers. It flourished and was really the staff level forerunner of the Democratic Study Group--DSG.

In the 1958 off-year election half a dozen House members got together and said, "Can't we do something to help liberal Democratic candidates who are running for the House?" They were my current boss, Frank Thompson, George Rhodes--my boss then--Chet Holifield of California, Lee Metcalf of Montana, John Blatnik of Minnesota, and Henry Reuss of Wisconsin. These were the people who later became leaders of the Democratic Study Group. Lee Metcalf of Montana was one of the prime movers when he was then in the House.

Our bosses gave us permission to assemble a variety of research materials--hearings, reports, fact sheets, that type of thing, which we sent to Democratic House candidates. The members had co-signed a letter to these candidates saying "Would some of this stuff be useful to you? If you want it, tell us where you want it sent." That was in the summer of 1958, after the primaries were mostly over. Several

nights a week, eight or ten of our luncheon group people would get together and stuff envelopes with this research material and mail it out to the candidates. And lo and behold, 1958 was a great year for Democrats. We picked up around forty-seven seats in that election. Many of those elected in 1958 went on to become committee chairmen and subcommittee chairmen. They included people like Dan Rostenkowski, Bob Kastenmeier, Neal Smith, Bob Giaimo, Bill Moorhead, Jim O'Hara and John Brademas, now the House Democratic whip. We sent our research materials to more than forty candidates that year, and all but two or three were elected. When they got to Congress most looked to our members who had helped them for legislative guidance.

To make a long story short, the following year the DSG was formally organized. A presidential election was coming up and there [was] a lot of frustration because of the tactics of Judge [Howard] Smith and the Rules Committee. There was also what some thought was a lack of aggressive leadership on the part of the established leaders of the House. There were real problems within the House with the Dixiecrat wing of the Democratic Party. Many conservative Democratic committee chairmen were consistently voting with the Republicans on much legislation important to the liberal Democratic wing.

That's what the situation was. There was an effective coalition of conservative Democrats and Republicans, all but a handful of whom were conservatives. They had the balance of power. They had an actual majority of the House. But the "paper" Democratic majority took a lot of political heat for failure to enact the kind of programs

which we advocated during the campaign--like a minimum wage increase, housing, federal aid to education, social security liberalization, area redevelopment, medicare, and similar issues that had been advocated in the 1958 campaign and which they couldn't deliver. Not only couldn't they deliver on them, but we couldn't even get House floor votes. Because of the Rules Committee's conservative coalition and a 6-6 vote deadlock, there was no way to get most of these bills to the floor for a vote. This was pretty hard to explain to the folks back home. This was really one of the reasons that the DSG was formed, to try to pry loose these liberal bills, at least to get them to the floor for a vote. We were able to do that on some bills the first year after DSG was organized.

G: Was there a feeling that the leadership had been cooperating too closely with the administration?

P: Well, in certain areas. I think basically the question was that Sam Rayburn and Lyndon Johnson, too, took the more traditional view of what the role of Congress should be--that it should react to a presidential program, but the executive really had the responsibility to initiate legislation and to send Congress a comprehensive legislative program. The Congress then had the right to deal with it as it saw fit. But when you have a divided government such as we had then, with different parties controlling the executive and legislative branches, there was a political and legislative inertia that was very frustrating.

In addition to the members I mentioned earlier, Gene McCarthy of Minnesota, who was then in the House, was one of the original liberal leaders. After the 1956 election, he and others tried to persuade the Democratic leadership, without success, that it should propose a Democratic alternative legislative program. So in late January 1957, eighty liberal House members--most of whom later were DSG leaders--associated themselves with a comprehensive legislative program of goals and specific policy objectives. In the 1956 election, voters chose a substantial Democratic "paper" majority in both the House and Senate. While millions of Americans were voting to re-elect a popular President Eisenhower, as far as philosophy and programs were concerned, vast numbers were also voting for Democratic alternatives as proposed by Adlai Stevenson. At least the northern liberal wing of the party felt this way. There was a very sharp philosophic split in those days between us and what we called the Dixiecrats; they called us the "left-wingers." There was a dichotomy that was very pronounced within the party. Sam Rayburn and the other House party leaders had a very difficult time of straddling the two conflicting interests within the party, and the same thing was true to some extent in the Senate.

G: What was Sam Rayburn's reaction to the formation of the study group?

P: Well, initially it was quite hostile.

G: Did he try to put pressure on members not to join?

P: Yes, as a matter of fact he did call some members into his office and tried to dissuade them. Representative Lee Metcalf of Montana, who was the first elected chairman of the DSG in September 1959, was a

very highly respected, articulate and gutsy guy. He had a long talk with Speaker Rayburn about what DSG was trying to do. He persuaded him pretty much that we were really his loyal Democratic friends, and that all we were trying to do was to help him deal from strength with Chairman Howard Smith of the Rules Committee and the other Dixiecrats within the party who were making his job more difficult as speaker. While he did not say anything publicly that gave us any credibility or assistance, in the early days he did some things that really helped us.

G: Really? Can you recall specifics?

P: For example, he arranged that our DSG office telephones would be hooked into the Capitol switchboard. We really didn't have an official office then and we had to go outside to get space. We worked out of the Library of Congress annex during part of the 1960 campaign year. We worked out of a couple of vacant congressional offices. We had to have his approval to be able to do that. He arranged to get a switchboard line put into the old Congressional Hotel when we rented a suite there because we couldn't find any other place to work. This meant stringing phone cable. Things like that he did personally but didn't want publicized for obvious reasons. He gradually took a very benevolent view toward DSG.

Of course, after the 1960 election when Jack Kennedy was elected president, the relationships became much more close. In fact, if there had not been a close working relationship between the Speaker and the DSG leaders, we could not have won the fight to expand the

Rules Committee from twelve to fifteen members in January 1961 at the beginning of the 87th Congress. This was one of the key reform efforts in which the DSG and the leadership cooperated; it also involved lobbyists for labor and other groups, the Kennedy staff in the White House and a small group of Republicans led by Representative Tom Curtis of Missouri.

G: Let me ask you about your association with Lyndon Johnson. How did you first come into contact with him?

P: After Dallas, and when Mr. Johnson became president, he began the push for the Great Society programs. The first major bills were civil rights and the anti-poverty program. DSG was much involved in both these legislative battles, working closely with the White House staff. At the beginning of the 89th [Congress], with the increase in numbers and strength of the party, the Democratic Party really had a working majority for the first time--a clear majority, a philosophic majority, not just numbers on paper, but votes.

In the 1964 campaign DSG had worked very closely with the Democratic National Committee and with people involved in the Johnson campaign. We provided them with copies of all our legislative research materials, which at first was our major claim to fame--the quality of our research. This is still true today. The DSG research material is among the finest. People give their eyeteeth [for it]. We started this system of legislative fact sheets in 1960. Today, of course, they are much more comprehensive than they were in those days

because we only had a couple of people on our staff. Now they've got twenty-five professionals.

But anyway, we did a very interesting little thing on [Barry] Goldwater, which I understand that he [LBJ] liked very much. We took the Republican Congressional Committee research materials--prepared for their candidates--and did a rebuttal document for our DSG members and candidates. If a Republican candidate was making a speech on some issue in a joint appearance or a debate, our candidates would have a document that they could refer to with facts and figures for rebuttal. This was very popular with Democratic candidates. We sent copies to the White House. It really was devastating, using some of Goldwater's own statements against the Republicans' candidates.

I guess that one of the things that led to my going downtown was the relationship that we had with the White House congressional liaison staff early in 1965. One of President Johnson's staff, David Bunn, was assigned to be the liaison with DSG on a regular basis. Dave and I became very close friends. He spent much time in my office during that year and we worked well together. We strengthened and expanded the DSG's support activity for the Johnson legislative program, which we really considered to be the DSG program. The Great Society, all the programs DSG was advocating in the late fifties, now had the chance to become law. Some of these LBJ programs had been in Democratic platforms back in the 1940s and we had never been able to [enact them]. Aid to education, health care for the elderly, and a comprehensive housing program are good examples.

The President was very anxious to generate visible support in Congress for his programs. We developed a system. Dave Bunn would bring from the White House anywhere on an average of fifteen to thirty clippings to my office each day--editorials, articles, columns that were positive expressions about the President's program. He would bring one-minute introductory speeches written by somebody in the White House for each of these items. We would sit down and identify the appropriate DSG member who represented the district where the item was published. I would maybe rewrite the speech to fit the member selected. This was all part of the agreement. If I didn't think the speech sounded like Bob Kastenmeier, for example, I would rewrite it or have someone on our staff [do it]. By then we had five staff people; we were growing. Then I'd send it with a buck slip to the member's AA, saying "Wouldn't Bob like to put this in the Record?"

We had a good batting average. I had the right of refusal; anything I didn't think was appropriate, or that I didn't think was politically wise for the member, I wouldn't send to him. Because I had a relationship with the members of DSG that I had spent six years in developing, I wasn't going to jeopardize those relationships.

G: Had this sort of thing been done before or was this a new precedent?

P: I had never heard of it before. It could have been done in the past.

G: Having worked for a congressman you don't have any experience with the White House sending speeches. . . ?

P: Nothing like this. Dave Bunn and I would go through the day's

selection of fifteen to thirty newspaper items. We would probably farm out about 60 per cent--or maybe 70-80 per cent on some days.

G: Why did the White House do this? What was their purpose?

P: They wanted the Record to show every day public opinion support at the local level. I'm sure Dave Bunn could give you more detail on this is you're interested. He'd call me or he'd come by and say, "The funniest thing happened." We had a Record maybe with ten or fifteen of these items in. The President took such an interest in this project that he read the Record every day. He said, "The President called me and told me what a good job we did yesterday. We got fifteen of our news items in." I remember one time particularly, he was chuckling, and said, "Guess where the President was when he called this morning? He was sitting on the john--with a phone in it--and he was reading the Record. He was so pleased that we got so many of these items in about his program, positive stuff."

We did this for months, every day, on and on and on. Once in a while a member would not want to put it in. That was his choice. There was no pressures. It was just a little buck slip that went through his staff. But a goodly portion of them did get into the Record, and this pleased him and helped build support in Congress for the Great Society program. Someday, a historian will go back through the Congressional Record for 1965, from about February through October, and he will see a tremendous amount of news material praising the administration and supporting specific pieces of legislation.

This was not a puff operation, or personal puff pieces, but was supporting LBJ legislation.

G: Was this a way to get the various congressmen committed to the bill or get them on record as supporting it?

P: I guess that was part of it, but most of these members had campaigned in favor of such legislation anyway, and it was something that was perfectly natural for them to do. But it helped them; many just would not think to clip their hometown paper and put it in the Record, with an introductory speech. Maybe he didn't have a staff person with time to write it. But this was a ready-made service for them and most members took advantage of it, and quite often.

G: Well, the White House later advanced from insertions in the Record to full-dress speeches they prepared.

P: Oh, yes, particularly in the Senate. I'm talking about the House only, but certainly there was some direct speech writing. This was in addition to that function and it was handled in another way.

G: In the House did that go through you, too?

P: No, not usually. I guess they probably had one of the other liaison people handle that directly. Dave and I still have lunch occasionally; we talk about those good old days when we used to load up the Record.

In August 1965 I received a telegram from the White House--that was the way they did it in those days--inviting me to a bill-signing ceremony on the Public Works and Economic Development Bill, which was one of I guess maybe thirty-five or forty bills that DSG had played

some role in helping to enact. I guess the most important bills that we worked on and contributed the most [on] were the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. We really had very intensive member operations on both those bills. Medicare was another. I figured the invitation was a courtesy thing that Dave Bunn had arranged. I'd never been to a bill-signing ceremony. I'd worked on the Hill at this point for over ten years, and I'd never been to a signing ceremony.

I was excited to get this invitation. I got on my best suit and went down to the White House. There was a nice ceremony. The President made some appropriate remarks. There were probably sixty or seventy people, most of whom I recognized having worked with from time to time--lobbyists from various organizations supporting the bill. After the ceremony--the President had just signed the bill--and I got up to leave. One of the fellows sitting next to me said, "Come on, let's hurry and get in the front of the line." I said, "What do you mean?" He said, "Oh, we're going to get pens." I said, "You mean, all of us? We're all going to get pens?" He said, "Yes, the President wants to show his appreciation." I thought I was just going to be there for the ceremony. I got in the line and when we got up to LBJ, Claude Desautels introduced me. In fact, he's in that picture up there on my wall behind you in the background. I had never actually met the President.

Claude introduced me and, much to my surprise, the President not only thanked me for the work I had done on the bill, but he initiated

a conversation with me about a phone talk I had had with one of the people on his staff the day before about votes on the D.C. Home Rule Bill. I can't remember who it was now; it was not Dave. It could have been Henry [Hall] Wilson. We were discussing the strategy, when would be the best time to bring the bill up, and what the nose count looked like. This was one of our primary roles at DSG. They don't do much of that anymore, but it was pretty important then. LBJ related to me part of that conversation as had been relayed to him by his staff. He asked me if I was sure we could get a particular delegation lined up to vote for the bill, and who were we working with, demonstrating his intimate knowledge of the conversation.

Of course, it was very flattering that the President of the United States would think enough of what I was saying to one of his staff to want to discuss it further. It seemed like we talked for ten or fifteen minutes; I'm sure it was only two or three. But that was the first [encounter I had with him]. It was a very detailed discussion. I was very much impressed with his knowledge of the fine details of the legislative proposal. This was an important bill, but it wasn't the most important on his program. It just amazed me.

G: Do you think he was doing it more because he had certain things he wanted to find out from you or because he wanted to display how intimate his knowledge of the thing was?

P: I just don't know. The only thing I know is that it held the line up, and there were a lot of people behind me who were unhappy, standing, waiting so long. (Laughter)

Then in the next two months--that was the end of August--but in September and October, I was invited back to five more bill signings. Every time I came up for my pen, the President was extremely cordial. He began to call me by my first name. I guess the last one was in October and Congress adjourned soon thereafter and I didn't give it another thought.

G: Anything in particular on the Public Words and Economic Development Bill that you did that is worth going over?

P: I would say that our role in that was less [than in others]. That's what surprised me a little bit. The other bills [that were signed] were the bill to create the Department of Housing and Urban Development and another one was the highway beautification bill. These were bills that we did the normal things on. They were not really unusual measures and certainly not much that I did personally. The DSG had worked on all of them. Representative John Blatnik of Minnesota, who was then chairman of DSG, was the floor manager for the Public Works bill. [It] came out of his committee. He was chairman of the committee. And we worked a little harder on that bill perhaps because he was the chairman [of DSG] and we didn't want it to go down the drain. That wouldn't look good. But no, I don't really know precisely why.

Early in January 1966, I had a call from Sarge Shriver, whom I had met over four years earlier when he was lobbying on the original Peace Corps bill in 1961. He had spent some time in my office. This bill was high on DSG's agenda. In fact, Representative Henry Reuss--

one of DSG's founders--was the original sponsor of the Peace Corps bill in the House, and [Hubert] Humphrey in the Senate. I worked very closely with Shriver in 1961 and DSG helped to line up the votes that eventually passed it. He asked me if I would come down to his office to talk with him. I did and he asked me if I would consider being the director of congressional relations for the anti-poverty program at OEO. Knowing how the White House operated, I suddenly realized that all those invitations I got a few months earlier were perhaps to take a look at me, to see how I reacted to certain situations.

I told Shriver no, I wasn't interested. At this point DSG was just starting to bear fruit after six years of work and I thought I ought to stay at least through the end of the 89th Congress. We had enacted a lot of good legislation in 1965, but there was still a lot of unfinished business to carry over into 1966. I had brought in a staff person to be my deputy early in 1964--John Morgan, who was an American Political Science Fellow, a former reporter from Wisconsin and a very bright, able guy. I had been delegating more and more of my responsibilities to him as we got busier and busier into 1965. I considered John to be perfectly capable of taking over the job if I left.

But Shriver was persistent and he called me a couple more times. I said, "You have such a can of worms down there. I don't see how possibly you can get your authorization bill passed in the next session unless you make a lot of changes." Gillis [Long] had left; I had worked with Gillis on the original anti-poverty bill and in the

first year authorization appropriation fight. He said, "Well, tell me what you think ought to be done." I had another detailed conversation with him. He said, "Well--

G: Excuse me, what did you recommend? Do you recall?

P: Among other things was a complete restructuring of the administrative and clerical operations of congressional relations to guarantee to answer a letter from a congressional office promptly. OEO had a terrible reputation on the Hill when it was initially set up because it never answered its mail. Government agencies are expected to get [information] to Congress, even if they don't have all the answers. OEO had complex programs; it was almost impossible sometimes because you were dealing in programs at the local level, into the neighborhoods in some programs. You couldn't expect to answer all the questions overnight. But at least there should have been a system of interim responses and some way to get OEO's image projected more positively on the Hill.

One of the most serious problems of all was the fact that individual program people, VISTA and Job Corps in particular, were anxious in protecting their own programs' existence, more than the totality of the anti-poverty program as a whole. They were playing both ends against the middle in some cases with individual members. I saw this from where I was sitting on the Hill--the other end of the pipeline from the agency. I told Shriver some of the things that needed to be done. He said, "Well, if you agree to take this job I'll give you full authority, I'll back you up completely. You can bring in your

own people if you want." He really led me off the deep end. He said, "You know, I really want you to do this." I guessed that LBJ did too.

I had talked with the members of the DSG executive committee. I also had a call from Senator Mansfield, who was then majority leader of the Senate, urging me to accept. My old DSG mentor, then Senator Lee Metcalf, urged me to take it. Representative Jim O'Hara of Michigan, then DSG chairman, and Representative Frank Thompson, the outgoing chairman, did likewise. A couple of members were not all that enthusiastic, but the majority said, "Well, this is a good opportunity. We all support this program and we're afraid that it could go down the drain if something isn't done. Maybe you can help bail it out, and we'll work with you."

So I agreed to go to OEO. But I told Shriver that I only wanted to stay one year and as I put it, "I've been working on the Hill for ten years and have earned chips with many members. I anticipate that I'll have to cash in every chip if we're going to pass this bill. If I expend all my chips in the first year, there won't be any use in my staying any longer. And if we're successful I'm going to have to spend them all, and I'm willing to do it." He backed me up every step of the way. There were a lot of internal frictions along the way, but that's how I got to OEO in the first place.

Perhaps the most interesting thing of all, the second day I was on the job I got a call from Marvin Watson's office. He asked me to come over to the White House that afternoon to meet with him. I had never met Marvin Watson; I knew of course who he was and the key role

he played in the Johnson White House. I was waiting in the Fish Room for him and he came in and shook my hand. His first words were, "How does it feel to be on only one payroll?" The remark really startled me, because at DSG in order to pay our staff salaries, members put me on their own payroll for a small amount each month. It changed every month. When I first went to work for DSG and resigned my job as AA to George Rhodes, I was on thirteen members' payrolls. They changed from month to month. I never knew from one month to the next how much money I was going to make or whose payroll I was going to be on. It was perfectly legal under the House clerk-hire system. The Republican conference financed their operation the same way and there was no danger of anybody ever putting an end to it. And it's still [done] to this day. This is how various House caucuses are financed today.

I realized that as part of my background security check the previous month that they knew everybody whose payroll I was on, what I had earned, et cetera. I laughed and said, "Well, gee, it's a strange feeling. This is the first time in six years that I've been on only one payroll." It was a very brief meeting. He said, "You were very carefully selected for this job. OEO is in a very crucial stage and the President is very concerned about the reauthorization." It was an annual authorization bill, of course, in those days.

G: Did he give you the impression that the White House rather than OEO had engineered your appointment?

P: Yes.

G: Really?

P: Very definitely.

G: Did he say this in so many words or did he just infer?

P: Well, this is what I'm referring to. OEO was the very first major program that President Johnson initiated after he became president. Watson indicated that it was very close to LBJ's heart because of his work in the old NYA back in the mid-thirties, before he came to Congress. He said that the President had a very deep personal commitment to seeing that the anti-poverty program was successful. It was a keystone of the Great Society program and he was very much concerned. He said that the White House would do anything possible to help, and if I needed some additional political muscle on an individual member or a group of members, or whatever it took, I was to call him personally. He wished me well.

G: This was rather than going through, say, Henry Wilson?

P: Yes. Which I thought was interesting. I think only maybe on one occasion that I really had to call for anything special during that year.

G: Did Marvin Watson at that meeting indicate specifically what the President's concerns about the program were? Sore points?

P: No, not in any detail. I think what he was trying to convey was that the White House realized that the program was in political trouble. If you recall in the early days, some of the various community action programs really alienated some local officials--mayors, city councilmen, as well as some congressmen. Some funded programs were pretty way-out, from the Saul Alinsky school. The first year or two when I

was there, there were a lot of controversial demonstration projects that created political problems with individual members. But I think there was a feeling that some of these programs were a bit too much to expect, where there was an adversarial relationship created between the community action agency and the established elected leadership of a community. The frictions that resulted could have all kind of political repercussions in the next election.

G: The White House seems to have regarded OEO as an agency that did not have total loyalty to Lyndon Johnson. Did they ever express this concern to you or indicate that they wanted you to be their man or report to them?

P: Well, no. But I think this was probably true to some extent, however, because of individuals who were in leadership positions. Certainly, Shriver was Jack Kennedy's brother-in-law and Bobby Kennedy's brother-in-law. But I don't think there was anybody who was more loyal or more dedicated to the success of the program than Shriver. It could have been that there were these doubts that you mention, although if that were the case I don't think that they would have put a person like myself into that job at that particular time. Recall that Shriver also ran the Peace Corps and it was later that winter of 1966 before Shriver came over as full-time director of OEO. I think that some individual program directors probably--put it this way--were not Johnson Democrats in the sense that they had a personal loyalty. But I don't think any president can expect that type of loyalty down to the working level. I'm talking about GS-15s, GS-14s, and lower.

G: As an overal impression, were you surprised at the degree of, shall we say, independence or political estrangement from the White House that people at OEO felt?

P: I don't think there was an estrangement so much as a lack of understanding of the political process. OEO was a unique federal agency because of the people it recruited; it was a great socio-economic melting pot. There were a relatively few hard-core bureaucrats, mostly centralized in the management functions of the agency, management service and in the personnel office. These were career civil service people. But by and large most of the people that worked in the various program levels were out of totally different walks of life than you would find in any agency in government. At the time I was there, we had about twenty-eight hundred employees. Of course, OEO was in the Executive Office of the President, too, which gave it a status that other agencies didn't have. OEO had everything from social workers to college officials, administrators, professors, economists, local government officials, trade unionists, you name it.

G: More social scientists as a rule than you would find in other agencies?

P: Of course, I never worked in another agency, but I had enough dealings with them over the years to know that this was not a typical line agency or departmental structure. It just did not operate that way. Anybody that worked for Shriver learned that was the most unstructured, informal kind of person that you could possibly find in government. He had that reputation in the Peace Corps. In fact, one of

the internal problems in the beginning was that there was just no discipline.

G: How do you mean? In terms of organization or what?

P: No. As far as organization, the structural management area, Shriver had made some reputation of being an efficient manager, in a sense. I mean in dealing with agency people and in coordinating and controlling what they did. One of the favorite ploys Shriver used to use--he was noted for it--took place at his senior staff meetings, attended by about fifteen people--his special assistants, the assistant directors, the program directors--Community Action, Job Corps, VISTA--the director of the Office of Inspection, and his general counsel. These were senior staff. He would play one person off against the other. He'd set up a premise and call on one of his senior staff to expound upon his views in that area and then encourage others to take him apart in the dialogue. I've never been in such stimulating staff meetings; no one ever went to sleep because you were always guarding your flank against somebody else. But there was a purpose to all this--

G: Was it productive?

P: --in the decision-making process. Shriver would say, "Well, how do you think we ought to handle this grant?"--a controversial grant. He would call on the person who was most familiar in the program area administering the grant. He would make the pitch why it ought to be refunded, say, at the level of two million dollars. Then he would call on his public affairs director and say, "How is the press going to handle this? Are we going to get any bad press if we refund?

What's the local paper going to [report]? What's their reaction going to be? Have they supported any parts of our program?"--the Elmira News or whatever town it was in. And he'd ask me, "What would be the political repercussions? What would the senators from that state [say]? How would they feel toward OEO? What about the congressman? Have you talked to him about it?"

Everyone would have an input and quite often there would be a strong difference of opinion. In fact, most of the time there was some difference of opinion. Shriver would let us argue it out, however long it took, and he would make a decision based largely on that discussion plus whatever input he might have had from other sources either before or after the final decision. But once a decision was made that was it. We were all expected to do our best to implement it fully.

G: Were there predictable lines of disagreement? For example, would general counsel normally side with the legislative or something like that?

P: Yes.

G: Would you describe how the office would be broken down on those? I've got a copy of the organization chart.

P: Well, this is oversimplification, but on most things I think the ultimate decision came down to a difference of opinion among the "politicians" versus the "non-politicians." There were people in the agency who looked at politics as a dirty business. The fact that there had to be political accommodations in certain program areas was

abhorrent to them. I mean, they just couldn't accept this, even though some of the people, like Ted Berry, who was head of Community Action then, was an old politician himself. He came out of Cincinnati city government and had made quite a positive reputation for himself. He was very articulate and an able guy. But we had some basic differences of opinion on the political implications of certain of his programs.

It came down pretty much [to] myself, General Counsel Don Baker and Bill Kelly, who had been in the Job Corps before [Otis] Singletary and then became assistant director for management. But he was more of a politician than he was a manager, I think, and had some insights on the Hill because of his personal contacts and experiences previously. And Shriver, of course, had more of a political orientation than most. But many times around the table when we'd get down to the crunch it would be the three of us on one side and everybody else on the other. Quite often Herb Kramer, who was the public affairs director, would see where the PR implications coincided with the political implications and he would be on our side. But not always. Quite often he would be on the program people's side.

G: He was a swing vote. What about Edgar May?

P: Ed, of all people, had an opportunity to be perhaps the most pragmatic guy of the whole agency. He directed and saw all the program inspection reports, knew all the political problems that some programs were causing in certain areas. But he had a very personal, deep-seated philosophic commitment to the point of view which felt--"I know their

political problems but the hell with it. These poor people need help, and even if it costs us votes in the Congress we should not sacrifice our principles."

G: Do you think that some of the department heads or assistant directors took delight in saying no to congressmen just to prove that they were resistant to this kind of thing?

P: Yes. This led to one of the most controversial policy changes that I had recommended and which Shriver had approved. I mentioned earlier that one of OEO's most serious problems was that aggressive program people, particularly the top people like Bennetta Washington of the Women's Job Corps Program, and Pat Ferguson, VISTA, all had their own little Hill constituencies. Ted Berry of Community Action did, too. Even the deputy and in lower levels in each of the three major program areas had cultivated certain members from the beginning, when the anti-poverty bill was first enacted in 1964. It got to a point where the congressional liaison office would be regularly by-passed by some members. If a member was really interested in a program and wanted something funded in his area, he wouldn't call congressional liaison, but would call Ted Berry or Pat Ferguson to discuss the project in their district.

By doing this, programs were being played off against others. This splintered the unity that the overall OEO program as a whole could have. For example, what was happening was that one OEO official was coming to the Hill to make deals with Representative Edith Green for an increased women's enrollment in Job Corps centers. Mrs. Green

figured Sarge Shriver kept her from becoming secretary of HEW in the Kennedy Administration. Abe Ribicoff got the cabinet post and Edith Green wanted it very badly and had made tremendous efforts to get it. She blamed Sarge Shriver because he was Jack Kennedy's talent search director and he screened all the applicants for cabinet positions as well as further on down the ladder.

This kind of thing [was] going on. I knew it because I had seen it when I was at DSG. I told Shriver, "If you don't do something to stop this individual gamesmanship that's going on, we're going to get the hell beat out of us on the floor. Members will offer amendments to increase VISTA or increase Job Corps, cut CAP"--which was more controversial--"increase Head Start"--which is very popular--"but take it out of the hide of other OEO programs. There will be only so many dollars to go around." The Vietnam War was escalating. We knew there were going to be some OEO budget cuts from the Bureau of the Budget. I said, "If we don't deal with this issue right in the very beginning we're going to have serious problems. And it's not going to be easy because these are relationships that have built up in the last two years. It's going to mean that we've got to take some pretty drastic action."

He said, "You're right. I know what you mean, and I don't know any way to deal with it. I've talked to Pat Ferguson. I've talked to Ted Berry. I asked them to advise Gillis Long in the past, to let him know when they have a Hill contact so Gillis can be kept fully informed." Thus, when the congressional relations director later

talks with that congressman, and the conversation turns to a commitment on some program made by Ted Berry or some other program head, he'd at least know about it. There's nothing worse than an agency's congressional liaison director who doesn't know what's going on in his own agency. He loses all his credibility very quickly. The way that was structured--nobody could know about all these self-serving games, and I wasn't going to be in that position if I could help it. I knew I couldn't do an effective congressional job unless this problem was corrected.

So Shriver said, "What do you recommend?" I said, "Well, it's going to take some very drastic action." I then drafted an internal memo of the highest priority to all program directors and deputy directors, stating in effect that all communications with Congress concerning the substance of OEO programs had to be directed through the congressional liaison office--through me personally or my deputy, George McCarthy. This did not mean that they couldn't have lunch with a member of Congress and talk about a program in their area, but if they did there was to be a written report on the discussion within twenty-four hours sent to me in congressional liaison, so we would know about it. It was a pretty strongly worded directive, signed by Shriver, and as you would expect, it was not well received within the agency.

G: Who objected the most?

P: Every single program guy all the way down to about the third level. Because they were all playing games; they were all doing it. I was

not surprised therefore to read the substance of the story in Novak and Evans' column. It was leaked by one of the program people, I'm sure. I don't know who leaked it to the press. It was a nasty story about how dictatorial Phillips, the new guy, was--trying to tell these people they couldn't talk to congressmen or senators, they had to go through him. It quoted verbatim from the gut part of the memo, which I had written with the expectation that it would be leaked. This was the greatest publicity in the world. People on the Hill that I had known over the years saw the Novak-Evans article and a strange thing started to happen. When people from OEO--despite the mandate against it--began calling members to lobby them for their own pet program, they found that Hill people wouldn't talk to them in some cases--not all cases, but in some cases--because I had feedback from some of these offices. Some of them said, "We're only going to talk to you now." That's the way it should work.

There were cases where this became very difficult. One GS-16 program manager had breakfast with Senator [Wayne] Morse of Oregon. They had discussed a grant application.

G: Was this a Job Corps grant?

P: No, this was Community Action. The GS-16 was in Community Action. He did not comply with Shriver's administrative order that I initiated. He did not write the required memo to let me know of the substance of his conversation with Senator Morse. The next day I had a call from Senator Morse's office inquiring about details of the pending grant. The conversation, the breakfast meeting, was mentioned, and the name

of the GS-16, which was the only way I knew. This happened about a week after Shriver's order was issued. I called Shriver and I said, "Look, this is a good guy"--as a matter of fact, he'd been very cooperative on many other things--"but here's the first time that this order has been violated, and we got to make an example of him. I wish it were somebody else. But if we're going to make this policy stick we're going to have to reprimand him publicly, we're going to have to put it in his personnel jacket and it's got to be known in the agency. Because otherwise it's going to happen again and again and we're right back where we started."

Well, we did it and Shriver backed me up. It was one of the most distasteful things I had to do, because I liked the guy personally.

G: Did that curb the incidents?

P: It helped. The next day the news of the reprimand was all through the agency. As a matter of fact, there was some hostility. During the next several weeks, I sent down some routine personnel actions for an in-step pay increase, which people were entitled to. All I had to do was sign off that they were performing their jobs in a satisfactory manner. Nancy Sunshine, my administrative assistant, said, "I just had a call from personnel. Those forms that you sent down were not in proper order." I had to redo them, so I signed them again. Nothing happened for several weeks. I asked her to again contact personnel. They lost them. Well, this was the way the bureaucracy had of retaliating. From then on, the whole time I was there, I had nothing but problems in the personnel office, because the head of the personnel

department--Tom McKenna--was an old bureaucrat who was friendly with some of the career people who worked in CAP and other program areas.

There was a senior staff meeting with Shriver a few days after this disciplinary action case and this issue came up. Some program people present protested this new policy, saying that it was diminishing their role. I remember being uncharacteristically mean at that meeting. I told them, "Look, I want to preserve this program and make it work just as much as you do, but you do not understand the facts of life as to what our opponents on the Hill are doing up there." We did a nose count early on as to what the chances are. Fraser [Barron] on our congressional staff did most of the work on it. As I recall, we had only a little over a hundred and fifty votes for the authorization bill at a level of that that had been recommended in the President's budget--almost 70 votes short. It was a very closely guarded secret. We updated the count every day when we got new reports. Barron kept all those records.

I told the senior staff at this meeting--"You don't realize how much difficulty we're going to have in passing this bill. You don't have to deal with that. That's my job. But damn it, if you talk to a member of Congress and you don't report within twenty-four hours--and it's important that I know, because you don't know what kind of deals we have cooking with that same member for his vote. If that happens I'm going to find out about it and I'm going to blow the whistle on every one of you sons of bitches. I don't care who you are, where you come from. This is my job." Shriver was sitting at the table and

backing me up, or I couldn't have gotten away with it. I said, "I'll find out within twenty-four hours if you don't give me that memo. Because there isn't anybody up there on the Hill I don't have a contact with and that's why I'm here." I stretched it a little. But I know people in almost every office that I could trust. People I had worked with for years. George McCarthy had similar contacts in the Senate.

And our plan worked. But it was hostile, it was hostile as hell. I must say the ten months, three weeks and one day I spent there was very difficult.

G: Was McKenna especially hostile to congressmen in their requests for personnel?

P: He was a typical personnel officer. He resented political appointees. We had more than our share of Schedule C's, Schedule A's. We had summer interns that we hired on recommendation from members. All this is par for the course. I guess a typical career personnel officer doesn't like to think that anything but his system, the civil service system, will work or should be followed.

G: I wonder to what extent the staffing, particularly the higher level staffing of OEO, was based on close congressional ties and efforts to please members, thus increasing this constituency that, say, Ferguson or someone, Berry, would have. Do you think that rather than the quality of the individual or the reliance that Shriver could place on them, that people were selected because chairman so-and-so was a good friend of theirs?

P: Some summer interns maybe, for a couple of months, yes.

G: But no, I mean--

P: But permanent employees, no. No. I think probably person-for-person we had the best qualified group of congressional liaison officers, professionals, of any agency of government.

G: But I'm talking about the overall OEO, particularly--

P: In other program areas?

G: --at the program level, the assistant directors. Were these people chosen with regard to their congressmen or their senator?

P: I don't think so. That question [would] best be asked of somebody who was there longer and who was more privy to that kind of decision, which I was not. Obviously the program directors were subject to Senate confirmation; I was not. But Ted Berry, Ferguson and whoever headed the Job Corps--there were several--Otis Singletary, Bill Kelly, were subject to Senate confirmation. So obviously there had to be some consideration, but just based on my own experience, I don't think that that was a primary concern. These people were qualified.

G: Let me ask you a couple more questions about the senior staff meetings that you discussed. One person gave the impression that the meetings would just degenerate into personal attacks.

P: Sometimes they did. Of course, if you had thin skin, that was not the place to work. If you let these things bother you or get to you, it was not the place to work. I guess maybe Shriver pushed people harder than anyone I've ever known. I know I worked longer hours under more intense pressure there than even I could possibly have imagined. At

DSG I was used to long hours; a twelve-hour day for me was nothing. At OEO it was not unusual to work sixteen, seventeen hours a day.

G: Did you feel that this process, though, of free fire in the meetings was productive?

P: I enjoyed it. Some people don't. But after the initial shock, I found myself being embarrassed for someone else at the meeting. Maybe I didn't even know him, or maybe I had just met him the day before or didn't have any real dealings with him, but I found myself being embarrassed because he was being subjected to this kind of pressure. But after a while I began to see some purpose to this technique. It's not a psychological kick that Shriver has to get in order to survive. I mean, there was a purpose to it. He was trying to bring out the best in everybody, the most creative thoughts and ideas and approaches. He was prodding; he was provoking in a very unusual, but quite often effective way. I don't mean to say that it always turned out the way any of us would have liked. Many times it created additional frictions.

G: Bernard Boutin's tenure was so brief. I wonder if it was perhaps this process that he just didn't fit into.

P: I think someone like Don Baker, who was there for better than five years, seeing it in a broader context over a period of time could probably give a better perspective.

G: Another criticism that I've seen of the meetings was that there was no agenda.

P: Well, that's partly true. There would be someone on the agenda from a particular program area, announced in advance. For example, after the congressional liaison reorganization, Shriver scheduled me to give a presentation on how it would work. I had organization charts, diagrams, and a written description. That was the primary item of business on the agenda for that senior staff meeting that day. At another meeting he might ask Ted Berry to give a summary on CAP grants over five million dollars that would expire that month and what the prospects were for refunding. Or he might ask for a report on Job Corps enrollment, or whatever the issue. There was usually a major subject. But then the meeting would take off and go in other directions, pretty much freewheeling. If someone wanted to bring something else up, [that was] perfectly permissible.

G: These meetings were held where?

P: Either in Shriver's office or in an adjoining boardroom, depending on how many people. There were two levels. The senior staff was a larger group which would include deputies, directors, and sometimes guests who were more familiar with some program detail. The Director's staff meeting was smaller, only the assistant directors, plus the general counsel and director of the Office of Inspection.

G: They were once a week, on Friday?

P: Well, it would depend. Sometimes, yes. More on an ad hoc basis. The Director's staff meetings were where the hot spot problems were discussed, as I mentioned earlier. Shriver might lead off with: "Ed May, where do you anticipate next week's riots are going to be? Which

cities?" And Ed would have a report. In the summer of 1966 these kinds of meetings were held each week. That was not the only thing that was ever brought up at these Director's meetings, but that was one of the main things on the agenda every week from about May through September.

G: What could be done in this short span of time to prevent a riot?

P: There was certain discretionary money that Shriver had in our appropriation bill. He could, for example, expand a recreational component of a community action program in a city where we had a reliable report that there might be some trouble. He could announce such grants in a matter of hours by calling the city's newspaper that he was providing enough additional funds for a local CAP to keep the swimming pool open in the evenings or to light the tennis courts and the playground areas at night. I'm not talking about a lot of money, but an additional supplemental grant that could be processed in a matter of hours.

G: Perhaps a psychological boost that might [deter a riot]. Were any of these, do you think, designed to steal the thunder of local leaders who were opposing a particular program or something like that?

P: I think in most all these cases there was discussion with the local leaders, community leaders; if it was significant enough, probably the mayor.

G: But in addition to the problem with the neighborhood resident leaders versus city hall that we'll go into in more detail, I gather there was also considerable friction among a number of the neighborhood leaders

themselves and some who thought they could make hay out of attacking the community action program.

P: Well, this was one of the real problems. After a while, it used to be common knowledge that in order to get more money all you had to do was to stage a riot. We used to have violent arguments about "Where is this policy leading?" You can only get away with it for so long to put out a fire, and after a while these people are street smart and they catch on to it and they job you. "What's going to happen when the money runs out and it's still the middle of August?" These kinds of discussions. Here again, it was almost impossible to know if something was a manufactured crisis or a real one. You were relying on police informants, or on information that Ed May picked up from a variety of sources, from newspapers, contacts that he might have in a city or police contacts or some other community contacts, the local people who would pass on information. But you never really knew exactly how reliable it was in any given situation.

G: Sure. During the Johnson presidency it was, I guess, rather common for him to have someone in each agency or department who he really felt was particularly reliable or responsible to him. Was there anyone do you think in OEO that Lyndon Johnson could really rely on as sort of a personal representative?

P: I think when Bernie Boutin was there, he was such a person. Bernie was replaced by Bert Harding in 1966, a transfer from IRS who was a career management specialist. That's another story. In all modesty, at least the period of time I was there, I would have to think that I

was that person after Boutin left. I saw that based on a number of things that happened.

For example, in April--I don't remember the day--I was the duty officer for the agency on a Sunday and I got a call from the White House switchboard requesting that I get word to Bernard Boutin and Bill Phillips to come to a meeting with Larry O'Brien at the White House the next morning. I got Bernie at home and told him and he said, "Okay. Do you want to meet at the agency and get a car or what?" I said, "Well, why don't we just meet there? I would probably be easier. We'll both be coming from home." So we did.

That morning before leaving home I picked up the newspaper and on the front page is the story, "Boutin Appointed Small Business Administrator." It was announced over the weekend. This was in the Monday morning paper. I said, "What the hell? What's going on here? Why should Larry want to see Bernie and me? Boutin isn't even going to be in the agency anymore." There were about six or seven congressional liaison people at the meeting. I can't remember all the agencies and departments who were represented. There were two from OEO; it was the only agency with two representatives. And of course Boutin was leaving.

The meeting concerned how to get the House votes needed to pass the Model Cities legislation, which is coming up on the floor on Wednesday. The White House nose count showed them a few votes short. The agencies at the meeting were those which worked on short lead time grant situations, OEO being one of the shortest. Each of us was to go

back to our agencies--they gave us a list of about fifteen names of members who were doubtfuls--to find out what was in the grant pipeline in those districts that could be expedited to announcement in a matter of forty-eight hours so that the White House could make calls to those [members], and tell them that "Here's something that's coming up in your district. We need your vote on the Model Cities bill."

G: A little horse-trading.

P: A little horse-trading. That's what the meeting was all about. I'm not sure why Bernie was there. I remember meeting him at the gate; we got there about the same time and we went in the White House. I said, "Congratulations. This is a real surprise. I picked the paper up this morning. I don't know why the two of us have been invited here. I don't know what it's all about." He said, "Well, I don't either." I said, "Well, best of luck in SBA." He said, "Gee, I've never been so happy to get away from a place." He said, "This zoo--" He was not happy at OEO at all. He must have been trying to get out for a long time.

But anyway, we went back to OEO and called the program people and ran through the regional offices by phone. The program people each called to find out what was in the pipeline. We had pending grant applications in about six of the fifteen districts. I got the details on each of the expedited grants and advised the White House. To make a long story short, we got those six votes. Rather, the White House got those six votes, we helped. The bill passed on Wednesday by a 186 to 184 vote.

G: Do you recall which six they were?

P: I remember one in Wisconsin, Lynn Stalbaum, in the First District of Wisconsin. I can't remember the others. Some other agencies like HEW were deeply involved in the effort. They had a number of volatile grants and they helped pick up some votes. I don't know how many of the fifteen doubtfuls actually, but a goodly number, enough to pass the bill.

Well, that's a little example of how the Johnson White House operated. I remember three years ago--in 1977--when I first came here to this House Administration committee, I had a call from a gentleman who said, "I have a consultant contract with the White House or OMB to make recommendations about how to improve the congressional liaison operation of the Carter White House." My predecessor here at the [House Administration] committee was Bill Cable, who became a deputy assistant to the President for congressional liaison for the House earlier that year. I called Bill and asked, "Is this legit--? I'm not going to talk to this guy if you don't--" I had no way of knowing. He said, "Yes. Absolutely. He's been hired to see what can be done to shape up the department and agency liaison operations."

The consultant made an appointment a few days later and sat in that chair. For three hours I talked to him about how we did things back in the Johnson Administration to round up votes for the President's program, and how appalled I was being up here on the Hill now and seeing how many Carter programs were taking a drubbing because

I didn't see anything being done. I gave him a couple of these examples of how he operated at OEO.

The sad thing is that this was the second time that story had been relayed to Carter people. I had done volunteer work in the Carter campaign in 1976. The Democratic National Committee had sent me to work in the Pittsburgh headquarters and to coordinate the get-out-the-vote effort on election day for western Pennsylvania. That's my home area. I knew people up there. Immediately after the election, I had been asked to come in and talk to some of the Carter staff people who were going to be working in the White House liaison operation. I had met Frank Moore on a previous occasion. I know they also interviewed Larry O'Brien, Claude Desautels, Dave Bunn and others who had worked in congressional liaison in the Johnson White House. I spent a couple of hours talking to them--this was probably early December of 1976--and said, "When you set up your White House congressional operation, here are some things that will work." A year later, I'm talking to their consultant, saying the same things. They didn't pay any attention the first time. But that's another problem.

G: That's a book in itself.

P: Yes. I can go on forever on this. Tell me if there are some things that you really want to zero in on, because I'll just ramble otherwise.

G: No, no. You're covering exactly the areas I want. I think if there's anything else on the administrative aspects of OEO before we get into

the legislative battles of 1967 and your particular role, if you have any other impressions of the [administrative] role.

P: Yes, there is something on the administrative end. I mentioned the backlog of congressional mail, which was really one of the stickiest problems at OEO when I began in January 1966. Members were getting tremendous volumes of mail from back home--pro and con--on various anti-poverty programs in their district. But members were not getting prompt response from OEO when they sought information to respond. It was not because Shriver had not set up a mechanism to permit that to happen. [He instituted] the executive secretariat concept which he had put into operation in the Peace Corps, where all mail that comes in the agency goes through an executive secretary. It's channeled depending on the addressee and the subject matter with a route slip that provided a brief one-or-two-sentence summary of the letter, where it was sent, the date, what the suspension date on it [was], and the due date for the response. People at the executive secretariat's office bird-dogged each such letter whether it was mail for the Director's signature, or the Deputy Director, or any of the program areas.

Tape 2 of 3

P: To summarize, it was a very sophisticated mail control flow operation that OEO had. Every day we would receive congressional mail briefs. Some days there would maybe be a quarter of an inch of them, or two-thirds of an inch, some days three-quarters of an inch, single sheets, every one being a letter that had been referred to our congressional

liaison office. They were parceled out, depending on the subject matter, to a staff employee to research. To respond to these letters, first they had to be researched; sometimes it would involve calling a regional office to get a status report, or calling the program area to get information about the program in order to be able to draft a response to the member or the senator who had sent the inquiry to OEO.

As I said, such mail was backlogged two or three months when I arrived at OEO. One of the first things we had to do was to catch up on the backlog. I asked Shriver to authorize part-time typists who worked in the evenings at OEO after finishing their jobs at other agencies. These were people who wanted to make a little extra money. They had to have very good typing skills; it was just grinding out letters. Shriver authorized the necessary administrative action that other government agencies circulated, and we got eight, ten, or twelve people--depending on how many would show up--to come in at six o'clock and work until ten or sometimes later. We had some from the Department of Agriculture, the Commerce Department, the Defense Department, and others. They were hard-working people.

During the day then we used all of our capabilities to research and draft responses. We had about forty-three people on the congressional liaison staff. They would grind out as many drafts as possible in the day and then the night shift typed them in final form.

In addition to that, I requested some modern--in those days--memory tape equipment, and we got two IBM high-speed memory typewriter consoles. They were the latest thing. It took several weeks to get

them. People trained on our regular staff on their operation. Several people who had good aptitude were assigned to these two machines on a full-time basis. We programmed eighty or ninety separate paragraphs. Instead of sitting down and drafting a letter, we had numerical codes assigned to each of the paragraphs. Our drafters would take an incoming letter and say, "Okay, this letter is an eight, a twenty, a forty, and a sixty," or whatever it was. They would just write the numbers on the top of the incoming, and the person who operated the console would take those numbered paragraphs and plug them into the reply. It was great for interim responses. Of course, every letter couldn't be handled this way. You'd have to use one paragraph for specific numbers for a particular grant or whatever it was, but it speeded things up.

In six weeks we were able to catch up with not only the backlog, but to keep current, and we were current from then on. OEO kept a mail chart. The amount of mail we got, the number of letters that went into our agency as a whole was exceeded only by the State Department and the Department of Defense. OEO then had only twenty-eight hundred and fifty people total in the whole agency. If we had not found a way to handle our heavy volume of mail on an efficient basis, we'd never have got any credibility on the Hill.

For the first two or three months that I was there I was signing mail that had been written in September of the previous year, or in October, November, December. We were catching up. I would start to sign the mail at ten or eleven o'clock at night. It would usually

take me two or three hours, because every letter I signed going to a member I knew, I would write longhand, "P.S.: I know this is delayed. Give us a chance; we're going to improve and we'll get more current. Best wishes." You know, a personal note. The reason it took so long was that I was writing longhand P.S.'s on perhaps 60 per cent of the mail. This was to get people on the Hill to give us the benefit of the doubt. I had absolutely no problem on the Hill for the first three months. Anything that happened, my standard response was, "Well, you know, that's something that happened before I got here. We'll improve it. Give me a few months to improve it." And they usually did, and we were able to deliver.

We had two kinds of mail: with certain members, certain senators, and in certain situations, responses were drafted for Shriver's signature. This decision was made in the executive secretariart on the basis of correspondence guidelines. Any letter that Shriver ever signed while I was there was first reviewed by me, approved, and my initials went on the folder. Every piece of mail came in a file folder. I would initial having read and approved a letter before he would sign it, and he would get that mail the next morning to sign.

That was the procedure that we followed. It helped gain some time and credibility and kept us current after that. I never could have done it without Shriver's approval and support. Bill Kelly provided needed funds out of his management operation to hire these part-time people. Bill and I got to be pretty good friends--we still

are--because of this type of thing. If he needed something I'd scratch his back; if I needed something he'd usually scratch mine. (Interruption)

G: Why don't you start with the general set-up?

P: You mean the make-up of the regions?

G: Yes, and then go from there and trace the Frank Sloan situation.

P: The regional set-up of OEO was rather unusual. It followed the normal regional lines of other agencies and the regional directors, of course, were all political appointees. They had congressional relations and public affairs officers in each region. It usually was the same person wearing two hats. Some of these people had newspaper, public affairs, or public relations backgrounds; others were local pols of one type or another, local or state levels, some even with congressional sponsorship. These people were our contacts in the regions--in dealing with local, state, and congressional district office levels.

As I indicated in one of our earlier discussions, many of the grants were processed completely at the regional level. If they involved grants of under a hundred thousand, or under seventy-five [thousand dollars], in that range, they were processed and announced at the regional level. Many of the complaints and much of the case-work involving OEO programs went through regional offices, because OEO programs were the kind of local program that local congressional district offices often handled rather than sending such cases to Washington to be handled. During this period there was a growing

decentralization of congressional functions to their local district offices. It's even more so today.

The casework sometimes involved only a phone call. If the congressional district was in Chicago, their district office could call the OEO Chicago region. It was much quicker to get a direct response that way than sending the inquiry letter to the congressional office in Washington and then having them contact our office here. So there was someone in each region to deal with congressional and public inquiries.

Obviously it was very important that the Washington and regional congressional people work closely together. Technically, these people were under my supervision, but in practice, they took their orders from the regional director. We worked diligently to get the kind of cooperation that was needed from the regions. For example, if there was a major flap about an OEO program, they would often hear about it first, because of a call from a congressional district office, rather than a Washington office. They would often call me and say, "Hey, we got a real problem out here. Don't be surprised if you get a call from Congressman So-and-so raising hell about such-and-such. Here's what's involved." We encouraged this kind of communication and that kind of rapport; we needed it.

To facilitate cooperation, we had regular meetings every two or three months; the regional congressional/PA people would meet with Washington congressional staff in one of the regional offices. We had one in San Francisco, we had one in Chicago, we had one in New York,

in the different regions. The sessions would last two or three days. We would discuss pending issues and procedures, bend a few elbows together, have dinner, get to know each other better. They were very useful for that purpose. Some of these people are still among my best friends. Jack Reardon from Chicago, for example, was a top-notch congressional/public affairs officer. After OEO, he went back in his PR business and now represents a number of clients in Chicago. When he comes to Washington on business we'll usually have lunch or dinner.

One guy that we had a very difficult time with was the regional congressional/PA officer in Atlanta whose name was Dupree Jordan. He fancied himself as a real pol, I mean a real shrewd politician. His boss, the regional director, was Frank Sloan. Frank Sloan was from South Carolina and he had quite a lot of personal political ambition when he was appointed.

Dupree was probably the most difficult guy we had to deal with in terms of not cooperating with some of our requests for information. He took his orders directly, of course, from Frank Sloan, who had hired him for this job with Shriver's approval. We ran into situations where South Carolina grants were being announced by Sloan as regional director, rather than by the state's congressional delegation. As it turned out, Sloan was trying to build a base to run for governor from South Carolina, which I think he did the next election. He lost in the primary.

This gave us real problems with a senator like [Ernest] Fritz Hollings, who was one of the few southern conservatives who supported

the OEO program and voted for it. He had the political courage to do so, despite all the anti-civil rights sentiment in his state and the fact that many OEO programs, particularly in the South, had racial overtones. This was a time when black power movements were emerging and there was a strong reaction among White Citizens Councils. There was a great cleavage of sentiment and public opinion over almost anything OEO did and in a state like South Carolina this was really tough. Senator Hollings didn't appreciate the regional director, who was in another political faction in his own party, announcing grants in his state. We had problems with that kind of thing.

G: How did you deal with it?

P: It was clear that as long as Dupree was there, he was going to take his orders from Sloan because he had to. We first tried to do something from the top down with the regional director, but that didn't work because he was a hard-headed guy and played a tough political game. He had considerable support for that job. So we figured the only way was to somehow put our own person down in Atlanta in that job. We had a candidate who would have transferred into that job. But it's difficult to get any regional director to sign off on someone who was not his own person, and particularly in this situation. Unfortunately, the civil service requirements for transfer or for any kind of disciplinary action were impossible to deal with. We tried every way to get his job reclassified, or his job description changed--anything to get rid of him. We finally decided the only thing that was viable at all under civil service regulations was to

get him transferred, so I remember calling him one day and said, "Dupree, we think we'd like to transfer you to the New York region." His reaction, of course, was very negative.

I was never able to move him while I was there. We tried every possible way. But I understand that after I left, a transfer finally did materialize. I'm not sure how it happened, but maybe somebody else can shed some light on it. But Sloan and Dupree posed a very difficult situation to deal with. He's the only congressional/public affairs officer in any of the regions that I didn't have some positive type of rapport with, although the New York region also was difficult. After this other incident that I had mentioned about holding up the grant announcement, they learned a lesson.

G: Massachusetts, was this the northeast region?

P: Yes, in Massachusetts. They learned a lesson and played ball pretty well after then. But it was often difficult.

G: This case that you described earlier essentially was a situation where a strong supporter's Republican opponent for the fall was announcing--

P: Announced a grant approval by the New York regional office that the incumbent Democrat that was supporting us had worked on very diligently. He was upset, naturally, and we held up the award to destroy the credibility of his opponent who had announced the regional approval leak and then let the incumbent announce it later and he took the credit. That pretty much ended the thing.

G: Were there any special problems with Texas since you had the

President's home state, a senator with whom the President was not always on close terms and a governor who had--?

P: We probably had fewer problems with the Austin regional office than almost any other. I'm guessing that [was due to] the selection of Bill Crook as the regional director, a very strong Johnson friend and supporter, who later became U.S. ambassador to Australia after he left OEO. Bill was extremely cooperative. He understood the political nuances. I never really understood what his political connection was with President Johnson, but it was close, I knew that much. He was perhaps the most politically sophisticated regional director we had in any of the regions, because you never really had to draw Bill a picture.

I remember one vivid case. We had engaged in laborious efforts and fights with Chairman Adam Powell and his staff, who opposed an extension of the OEO program. Powell spent months during the session in Bimini and refused to convene the committee. Finally Representatives Carl Perkins, Sam Gibbons, Frank Thompson, Bill Ford of Michigan, and other supporters of the OEO program came to the rescue. They held the hearings and got the bill through the committee despite Powell's intransigences. But we had a very ticklish situation on the Rules Committee. There were three or four undecided votes for different reasons. They were members that you just had to work on constantly. One of them, of course, was Judge Howard Smith, the chairman. He was a leader of conservative southern Democratic forces in the House. We had one person on our staff assigned to Mr. Smith.

In fact, two of our people dealt with him at different times on different issues; both knew him well personally and had worked with him on other issues in past years.

We were able to establish considerable credibility in the Head Start program and it became the most politically popular program we had. I'll never forget my shock and amazement one day, shortly before we were to go up before the Rules Committee. Judge Smith had actually talked to one of our congressional liaison people about getting the advance opportunity to announce the approval of a Head Start grant in his district. This was like the millenium! Smith had a very difficult primary that year against an aggressive young liberal Democrat, who was a very outspoken supporter of OEO. We arranged for Judge Smith to announce this very popular Head Start program in his district, in one of the Washington suburbs that was part of his district. He announced it and took credit.

I'll never forget running into Judge Smith's opponent at lunch that day. There was a story in the Washington Post, "Judge Smith Announces--" His name was George Rawlings. He said, "That was a great favor you did, letting the Judge announce that grant. He'll be a popular guy in the black community," where this program was particularly effective and working well in his district. He was laughing about it and I was laughing, too. Of course, he understood that we were doing this to help our program in the Rules Committee. There were no hard feelings. As it turned out, he defeated Judge Smith in the 1966 primary. That was the end of Judge Smith's long House

career. But Rawlings was defeated by a Republican, because Smith's people were so outraged that they turned around and voted for the Republican rather than support the Democrat in the November election.

Anyway, that was one of the crucial votes. Another one was Representative Jim Delaney from New York, from Queens. He kind of reminds me, in retrospect, of Archie Bunker--out of that same environment--a strict practicing Catholic, close to the Roman Catholic hierachy in his distrct and here in Washington. Shriver and I went to see him in his office. We had been getting some rumblings that he was unhappy about a couple of community action programs in his district, and we did a little research on them to try to find out what the problems were. He was unhappy about what was being funded, he wasn't being consulted, and his local people weren't being [consulted]. It was the same old syndrome, the establishment versus the outs, the basis community advocacy concepts that were involved here. The political repercussions in Queens, at least, were negative as far as Mr. Delaney was concerned. Both Shriver and the Kennedy family had been very close to Delaney personally over the years. But he told Shriver, "I don't see how I can vote for your rule." He was the number-three guy on the Rules Committee, on the Democratic side. So obviously we had some important work to do there.

We contacted a fine gentleman by the name of Jim Robinson. Robinson was the head lobbyist for the National Catholic Welfare Conference here in Washington, a very able operator and a strong supporter of the OEO programs. Maybe you've already talked to Hy

Bookbinder. Hyman Bookbinder was the assistant director at OEO for coordinating outside organizations' support for the anti-poverty program. Booky also came out of the labor movement and I had known him for many years. He arranged to have Jim Robinson work almost exclusively for weeks on Jim Delaney, to try to win him over, to persuade him that the OEO program was worthwhile. Jim Robinson almost lived in Delaney's office for the week before the Rules Committee vote--saw him every day, several times a day. He mobilized church people in his district to call him and to write letters. Jim did a beautiful job. We never could have gotten Delaney's vote ourselves; that was clear from our meeting with him. But Robinson did.

Another Rules Committee member who was really difficult--and this is where I'm getting back to Bill Crook in a roundabout way--[was] Judge Trimble--Representative Jim Trimble of Arkansas--a fine old gentleman. I guess the best way to describe him is that he comes out of the old populist tradition, the populism born in East Texas, in Senator Ralph Yarborough's area. Populism moved through Louisiana, Arkansas, and Mississippi, up the Mississippi River and into the Dakotas. This is where the Populist Movement in the 1880s had flourished. Judge Trimble was of the old populist tradition. He was one of the few members from that part of the country who could be counted on to vote for the Great Society programs. He had consistently supported the anti-poverty program both in appropriations and authorization measures and on the Rules Committee.

The Rules Committee vote was to take place on a day when we figured to get as many people there on our side as possible, hopefully to have the eight votes needed lined up by then. Judge Trimble had a very difficult primary fight that year. He had a testimonial dinner, a fund-raiser, in his hometown in Arkansas the night before the vote was scheduled on our rule. There was no way we could get the Rules Committee vote postponed, and it really looked kind of grim.

Judge Trimble was such a fine gentleman. He was in his seventies then--no youngster. He called me and said, "You know, I've never asked for anything. I've always supported your program because I think it's right. But it would mean a great deal to me if I could announce the award of an anti-poverty grant in my district at my testimonial." This was several days before the dinner. He said, "Here is the grant application and here's why it's important to me politically. The application has been pending in the regional office in Austin for some time and I don't know where it stands, but can you do anything to help me? I sure would appreciate it."

I called Bill Crook and explained the situation. Of course, he knew Judge Trimble. He found the application sitting on somebody's desk and he moved it through the pipeline and sent it to Washington. Shriver approved it and Judge Trimble announced it at his testimonial dinner two nights later. Bill understood perfectly; you don't have to draw him a picture, he just moved it.

G: How about the regional director in California?

P: Luevano, Danny Luevano.

Let me just finish the Trimble story. So we arranged with the White House to fly the Judge back to Washington from Arkansas. There was no commercial flight available after the testimonial, so they sent an air force plane into a neighboring airport. He got on the plane abuot eleven-thirty that night, flew to Washington, got in at eight o'clock--little or no sleep--but showed up on time, ten o'clock, at the Rules Committee for our vote. And he was the key vote. It was eight to seven. He was the deciding vote. And so was Delaney.

Luevano was difficult in a sense that, much like Sloan, he had his own political ambitions. He ran for lieutenant governor of California the next year and lost in the primary. Luevano had been an assistant secretary of the army the previous year. The reason that he left the Pentagon, according to hearsay, is that he made a decision to permit the Union Camp Bag Company to cut on some federal timberland in Georgia that was part of a military base, I think Fort Benning, Georgia. He wasn't prosecuted for the action, although there were all kinds of nasty stories going around about it, what led up to the decision and why he made it.

He resigned shortly thereafter and the story we got was that they let him resign so that no further action would be taken against him for this decision. He was big in the Mexican-American community and politically the administration didn't want to cut him loose to the wolves completely. He wanted to get back to California, so they made him the regional director.

I had very limited dealings [with him]. About the only thing that I recall offhand was that we had a regional congressional public affairs meeting in San Francisco where the regional office was located. It was in February 1966. One of the members of the House, who called Shriver personally, wanted to help his press aide in his congressional office obtain a job in San Francisco. The aide was nearing retirement age and he had a girl friend he planned to marry in San Francisco. He wanted a job, not any job, but the public affairs/congressional position in the regional office for which he was certainly qualified.

Shriver said okay, without mentioning it to Luevano. Luevano was a congressional/PA guy that he inherited. This other fellow could be his deputy. It was strictly an add-on position, he wouldn't replace the man already there. It was my unhappy task to deliver the Shriver ultimatum to Luevano at this regional meeting in San Francisco. Shriver had not cleared it with him or talked to him about it. I just told him this was the way it was going to be. Oh, he raised hell! "You can't dictate who I'm going to hire in these jobs!" I said, "Well, if you have any questions, call the Director in Washington. Those are my orders. Here's the new guy." And he did. Dan picked up the phone and called Shriver. Shriver said, "Well, that's the way it's going to be, Danny." The two days out there were living hell, because Dan never got over it. We didn't ever get along too well after that. But the Hill guy went out to San Francisco and finished his career in the federal service there at OEO and married the gal.

G: Happily ever after.

P: And then moved.

G: Really? Well, let's talk about the legislation in 1966. As you want to draw in other things that are relevant, for example the fate of a program that is troubling a particular congressman as the vote is needed, feel free to.

I gather in 1966 that the two main problems on the Hill were the Job Corps and the Community Action Program. Is that correct?

P: Yes. VISTA we didn't have that much problem [with]. The domestic peace corps concept was one that was readily identified in a lot of people's minds. The Peace Corps was highly visible and generally successful, at least thought of as successful around the world. This idea of a domestic peace corps was very easy to sell conceptually, and it didn't cause major problems. But we didn't have near the kind of problems we did with Job Corps or with individual community action programs.

The only community action programs that we really remember are the ones involved in controversy. We don't think much about all the hundreds and hundreds of programs that there was never a peep of a financial scandal, or never a peep of controversy, or conflict between the people who participated in the programs and the local community. Many, many of them had 100 per cent support from the local governments. We only think of the relatively small percentage where there were problems, and some of those problems were, I think, deliberately caused by people on both sides of the ideological fence who wanted to use it as a springboard for their own political ambition or to advance

their own philosophic goals in the community. I think that these facts must be kept in perspective in assessing the social impact of the War on Poverty.

Many of the programs were popular here on Capitol Hill. But there was an overall concerted attack on OEO by the Republican task force of the House Republican conference [caucus]. Two Republican members were named in 1966 to co-chair the anti-poverty task force--Congressman Al Quie of Minnesota and Charles Goodell of New York. Today, you mention Quie and Goodell and they are considered the left-wing fringe of the Republican Party. Charlie Goodell, I guess you might even say he went over and became a Democrat in the sense of a political office seeker. Al Quie is now governor of Minnesota.

G: Do you think the fact that they have different constituencies [influenced this]? Goodell did run for the Senate.

P: I think that perhaps made a difference, but in those days they were hard-nose OEO opponents. They were taking a hard-nose Republican policy line which was to terminate most and to spin off some OEO programs like Head Start into established departments. Of course, our counter-argument was that if you spin off the programs into the old bureaucracy, the innovative quality will be lost and they would be absorbed into the old bureaucracy, never to see the light of day and never to be effective. We argued that the reason OEO could be effective was that it could be creative, innovative, and dared to do something differently than the old bureaucracy chose to do it. This

is what attracted so many people to work for OEO, because it was an exciting time. This was the showcase program of the Great Society.

G: If the programs were spun off, presumably Community Action would remain by itself and would be phased out.

P: As it turned out, this is exactly what Nixon did.

G: Do you think that Goodell and Quie opposed Community Action because they regarded it as a program that would naturally enhance the opposite party?

P: No. I think it was basically a philosophical difference. Of course, in Republican districts where you had Republican mayors and states with Republican governors, and even in many Democratic states where you had Democratic officeholders at that level, you had a lot of antipathy against the program politically because of its aggressive nature and its tendency sometimes to pit one group against another, one establishment against another. There were significant political considerations involved.

I think a lot of people genuinely thought that it was a waste of money. I remember one of the arguments that we heard all the time against the Job Corps: you could put a kid through Harvard for a year for what you pay for a Job Corps enrollee for a year, and it doesn't make any economic sense. The bureaucracy is costing the difference between the four thousand dollars tuition and room and board and whatever it was in those days to go through Harvard--a lot more now. To keep one enrollee in Camp Breckenridge, Atterbury, or one of the other Job Corps Centers would cost that much money, and that this was

a terrible waste of taspayers' dollars. Opponents argued that most of the funds for salaries and other money being spent by bureaucracy went to people who were using the poverty program as a vehicle to enhance their own prestige or to line their own pocket. That's the kind of argument that you would hear, and there were a whole series of similar arguments against Community Action Programs. The only thing that really could sell easily was Head Start; people wanted more and more Head Start programs.

G: In this session Congress did earmark a larger funding level for Head Start.

P: Yes. This was against the opposition of OEO, however. What we were trying to do was to balance a program in a community among various components. In other words, the whole essence of community action was to let the local elected board of community leaders, including a percentage of representatives of the poor who served on that community action agency, or whatever you called it, decide for themselves. They would have the right to choose the program their community needed and wanted. They might want a Head Start program that would serve fifty kids or a consumer education program. Incidentally, consumer programs were usually very controversial; banks, insurance companies, and finance companies and a lot of other business people were opposed to them. No matter what type of programs, it was to be tailor-made to the needs of that individual community. The people in the community were the ones that would decide what they wanted to request in their application. That doesn't mean that OEO would fund every part of it.

Certainly it couldn't fund at a level that anybody wanted. But at least they had the chance to participate in devising the program. And most everybody wanted some Head Start.

But OEO's position was, once you start earmarking and telling people that they have to have this much Head Start, you're destroying the concept, the philosophy of community action. The people who were proposing these approaches didn't really understand what community action was all about.

G: Were there rumors in 1966 that the administration was considering spinning off some of these programs? Marianne Means, for example, did a column that--

P: Yes. I remember I had lunch with Marianne a number of times when she was writing those articles. She did quite a few pieces on the OEO. Aside from being a very attractive young lady--I had known her from my days on the Hill--I enjoyed talking to her and trying to do a little propagandizing at the same time. And yes, there were some discussions of spin-offs. All kinds of rumors circulate in any administration, particularly when you get further down the road in the authorization and appropriation process, that the administration really was not all that hot on it. But I had no evidence that supported that rumor.

G: Well, let's go through the legislative process on this particular year. I guess we might as well start with Adam Clayton Powell, because I suppose he was the starting point there.

P: Yes. That was a very difficult [year]. I think we had almost everything go wrong that could happen. We had a "Murphy's Law" situation

in 1966. Basically it got down to a situation where Powell wanted more and more of a personal say into what programs went into Harlem. The initial community action program that was funded early in the game before I came to OEO was HARYOU-ACT; Harlem Youth Action I think was the acronym. He wanted a very significant increase in the size of the program and a lot more personal control over all OEO programs that went into not just his district, but Spanish Harlem as well. He was looking to broaden his political base and as chairman of our OEO authorizing committee in the House, he was sitting in a beautiful spot to be able to do it.

A lot of this I can't document. Other people might have different viewpoints. During this period or immediately before, he hired a staff person by the name of Chuck Stone, who's now, or most recently that I know of, a newspaper columnist in Philadelphia. He worked for Educational Testing Service for several years after he left Powell. ETS is located in Princeton, New Jersey. Stone was a very smooth, articulate black leader. I think he fancied himself as another Martin Luther Kind but he didn't really have the inner motivation, charisma, or whatever it takes. But more and more I think Chairman Powell began to listen to Chuck Stone's advice on a lot of things.

One day Shriver called me in his office and said, "We have a very difficult problem with Powell. He wants grant approval, an extension of HARYOU-ACT and other grant sign-off authority at a level and with stipulations that are just impossible. We would abrogate almost total responsibility over a lot of public funds." HARYOU-ACT was one of the

first anti-poverty programs that came under national scandal. There were a number of investigations of funds that were missing and skimmed off the top. Whatever you can think of, it undoubtedly happened with that program. Ed May can probably give you a much better fill-in on all of that because that was his area. But the quid pro quo very simply was that Powell said to Shriver, "If you don't give me what I want on these programs, you're not going to get your bill out of committee. I'm not going to hold any hearings, I'm not going to do anything." This happened not too long after I came to OEO. So he [Shriver] said, "I want you to contact Chuck Stone and find out if Powell is willing to bargain, what will we bargain on, how far will he go? Is he really serious about this program, or that program?"

Chuck Stone didn't trust me very much, no more than I trusted him. But I managed to get word to him what I wanted to talk about, through a third party. He would not talk to me in the committee office. He didn't want to talk to me in person either. But we arranged through a series of cloak-and-dagger exchanges that we would talk to each other from two phone booths in different buildings. I'm serious. He was afraid the wires would be tapped.

G: He didn't want Powell's people or whose people to know?

P: I don't know what his motivations or his thought processes [were]. He probably thought we were going to try to trick him into making some statement that would appear there was a bribe solicitation or something like that, and that we would get the FBI to tap the line if we knew in advance where he was going to call from. But I remember he

said, "You go to"--we prearranged a phone, a pay phone! He said, "I will call you on this number at a certain time." It was done in such a way that there couldn't be any prearranged way to tap the phone. I didn't know that much in advance.

The phone booth I talked out of was in a Senate committee [room]; it was one of those glass-enclosed doors. I remember going in the booth and the phone rang and it was Chuck Stone. I didn't know where he was. He was in a pay phone somewhere. Then he said, "Adam [Powell] wants this and this and this," and I said, "In view of the fact that we've had these problems with the program Shriver doesn't want to go that far. This particular program we think we can fund at this level, because it's been doing well in the opinion of our evaluation people." He said, "Well, he wants that one but he wants it at a much higher level." We [went] back and forth and finally it was very clear there was just no area of clear agreement that could be reached. He said, "Well, I'll go back and I'll talk to the Chairman."

A couple of days later the word came back. He said, "Well, Adam [Powell] wants this and that's it." I reported to Shriver after the first conversation and after the second conversation. Shriver said, "No way he's going to get it. There's no way as director of this program that I can justify giving this kind of money for these kinds of programs that are dictated by Adam Powell."

G: Did it bypass the institutions at a local level or what was the problem?

P: Well, he just wanted total control, and the people who were hired to a point where he could name who's going to be the executive director, who's going to have the jobs, how much money was going to be involved, what they would do to be hired. And Shriver said, "No way! I'm not going to deal at that level. We just can't do it." So that was it, boom, crunch. Everything came to a screeching halt and we were stalemated for several months before Powell finally left for Bimini for reasons of his own, personal reasons I understood.

G: He went to Geneva during the middle of this, I guess.

P: Yes, well, that was later when the Rules Committee was considering the authoritization bill.

G: Okay, well, don't let me get out of the chronology.

P: Meanwhile, key members on the House committee who supported the OEO program arranged hearings in his absence and went ahead and marked the bill up, and reported it favorably. There were disruptions during the mark-up sessions. I remember a Black Power group came in and disrupted the committee meeting and were thrown out by police. There were some ugly racial overtones throughout all this. I've always thought Chuck Stone was responsible for planting some nasty stories in the press that had racial overtones. Of course, various Black Power groups that were being organized at this time were competing for militancy and for the ability to outprovoke each other.

G: What was his name, Wingate Hamilton or Lewis or something?

P: Lucas.

G: Lucas.

P: Was it Lucas?

G: Something like that, or Lewis or Livingston who was evidently leading a rival faction.

P: Yes, I'm sure there were some political--

G: Was this connected to him?

P: I'm sure it was but I don't know how.

G: Did Bill Haddad play a role here? I gather he was getting into politics in New York in some way.

P: Yes.

G: He was hiring a lot of people from that area for one thing.

P: I'm not familiar with that. Don Baker probably is. I know Haddad was somewhere involved, but I can't recall exactly how.

One of the things that Powell did was really unprecedented. The situation got acrimonious after a while when the pro-OEO faction within the committee and the staff took over to move our bill. Of course, the relationship between the congressional liaison office and the committee staff preparing for the hearings and mark up has to be very close. The committee staff must rely on the agency for tremendous amounts of statistical and financial data that they need, particularly in the report-writing stage. Chairman Powell had given orders that no one from OEO was to set foot in the committee office. I never heard of that before or since. Absolutely no one! The committee staff that we had been working with, with whom we maintained a cordial relationship and had worked with before in previous years, was desperate to get the kind of information and statistics that only our

program people could supply. So we arranged a drop and we would leave packages of data requested. We honored the Chairman's order; we were afraid he'd fire anybody on the staff that he caught associating with our OEO staff. So we had a drop; we'd leave envelopes in other offices and they'd come pick them up. That went on for several months. I'd never heard of anything like that where an executive agency had such a strong adversary position with a chairman that he would order a thing like that.

After the bill was reported and all the jockeying went on, we were doing continuing updates of nose counts in the House and Senate on our bill. Every time we did a favor for somebody, every time we expedited a grant, or talked to a member and got a vote commitment, that went into our master count book that Fraser [Barron] kept. He can elaborate on some of the techniques that we used to keep those records accurate and updated as much as we could, either through correspondence or personal conversations. I spent a great deal of my time on the Hill during that period. I spent most of the day up here and went back to my OEO office in time to return phone calls maybe until six or seven o'clock, and then I signed mail until eleven or twelve o'clock that night, and that was my day. There was an intensive effort to woo over wavering members. Other people on our liaison staff also spent long hours on Capitol Hill seeing members assigned to them. We felt we were making some headway by early June.

As I explained, the Rules Committee was a difficult situation. Chuck Stone came to the Rules Committee and testified on behalf of the

Chairman against the rule. Powell was in Geneva at the time. This was really an unprecedented thing, to have the special assistant to the Chairman in effect playing the role of the congressman. There was no letter, there was no telegram, there was nothing that indicated that Powell himself had authorized this position. Stone was testifying for him and said that was his position. I remember the current House Speaker, Tip O'Neill, was then a member of the Rules Committee. He castigated Powell for dilatory tactics in not moving the OEO bill and for not being present to testify.

G: Gibbons had a confrontation with him.

P: Yes, Sam Gibbons did, oh, yes, several. This was one of the few times that the Rules Committee had ever filed a printed report on its hearings on a rule. The 1966 OEO report is a collector's item. I don't think you'll find another [instance], at least in my recollection, where the Rules Committee actually felt it necessary to issue a printed report to make its position clear. It was very wary of not wanting to make it appear as though we were persecuting Powell as an individual, or that they were racist, or anything like that.

G: Did you go into Powell's behavior?

P: Oh, yes. The transcript of that hearing would shed light and fill a lot of holes that are missing in my memory on the details and timing of some actions. It was a very antagonistic session. I was there; I remember it clearly.

G: Apparently Powell sent word to the committee that he was going to

testify the next day and then didn't show up or something. Was that the case?

P: Yes, it was something like that. Stone showed up instead and they tried to accommodate him. That was one of the reasons Representative O'Neill was so angry, this type of behavior by Powell. Plus the fact that he was deliberately trying to torpedo the authorization bill; it was clear to everybody by then. And we were getting relatively late in the session by then.

G: And I guess you wanted to clear the House version before the Senate version.

P: Right. We didn't know how exactly we were going to do in the House; we knew we were better off in the Senate.

G: Let's talk about particular objections to various aspects of the bill. For example, any amendments that came up. This was the year that a third of the people on boards had to be representatives of the poor.

P: Yes. That was really a controversial issue, like the spin-off issue was.

G: How did this come up?

P: I can't answer that. Don Baker or Don Radler, who was on the congressional liaison staff, or some other people can probably address that better.

G: There were some new programs that were introduced before the bill was submitted.

P: Perhaps this is just an afterthought, but I had the feeling that some people who opposed OEO programs--community action programs specifically--

were hoping that by requiring this precise number of representatives that it would make administration of the program itself impossible. That it would generate so much controversy among the various factions of people who made up the one-third that it would destroy the program as a whole. I have that kind of feeling about it, but somebody else can probably shed a lot more light on that.

G: Well, it came from people who were normally opposed to the concept it seems.

P: But this one-third concept had a lot of support, too, among the vociferous, vocal, community activists. They could see that it would provide greater opportunity for participation, and philosophically that's something that they all wanted. But I don't think they foresaw the possibility that it might destroy the program itself because of failure to reach any kind of consensus.

G: There was also the transfer of the small business loan program from OEO to SBA and adult basic ed to HEW. Was this Edith Green in any capacity or can you recall who was responsible for this?

P: I think there was a feeling on the part of some of the program people that since Bernie Boutin was now at SBA, this was something he was pushing for. Also, I think there was a feeling that the loan program probably could very well go there. In the concept of spin-off, if there was something to be gained from a program sense, program efficiency, without killing off the program, I don't think there was any real opposition to that. But where opponents were pushing spin-off in order to bury, or to kill a program, that was a different matter. The

most common example, I guess, was if the old Office of Education bureaucrats ever got hold of Head Start it wouldn't last two years, because they would strangle it to death.

G: How about reduction of the federal share of community action programs from 90 to 80 per cent?

P: This was a way to try to spread the dollars more. By this time it was clear that there was going to be a cutback in the amount of money requested under the authorization. As I recall, the administration's original OEO budget called for one and three-quarter or two billion dollars for that fiscal year.

G: One and three-quarters.

P: As it became clear that our military commitment in Vietnam was going to be greater than originally estimated, there was a scaling down of the appropriation requested under the authorization bill that was finally passed. The 80 per cent would spread it out and permit more community action programs that were in operation to be refunded, even if it were at a lower level. We were always concerned about getting hopes aroused for a magic formula to solve poverty problems in every community when there just was not enough money available--even if money alone would have solved the problems. There never would be enough money to be able to do the job. If you get people's hopes up to a point where they cannot even be partially fulfilled, all you're doing is fueling the fires of racial unrest, unrest over the Vietnam War, and causing more and more community unrest, sometimes of a violent nature. We were all very much concerned about the level of

funding possible in 1966. Nobody really thought it was adequate but there were other competing demands. This is what every agency had to go through. This is what is happening today with the budget cuts that are being proposed by President Carter.

G: Did you feel that you were losing support from the White House?

P: No. I'm sure other people did though. But I didn't because my relationships were much different. I never had that feeling, no.

G: Did you feel that any of this delay period, I guess almost four months, was due in part by a lack of pressure by the administration?

P: No. We were doing everything possible that could be done with Adam Powell. Anything the White House might have done would just have probably exacerbated the situation.

G: Now was Powell using the legislation in addition to his own projects? Was he using it as leverage on other pieces of legislation that he was interested in? Not just pork-barreling but. . . .

P: I had no understanding that was the case. Of course, a district like Powell's there wouldn't be much else he could bargain with.

G: I get the impression from reading the weekly legislative reports that there was a fear that the close margin on the rent supplement vote was going to spill over and cost you a lot of votes here. How did you deal with that problem?

P: That was the best test vote of a similar kind of issue that we had up to that point in that session. In other words, the Democrats that would vote for anti-poverty programs were voting for rent supplements, and it would reflect to at least some reasonable degree the constitu-

ency that each represented. So it was useful to compare the votes; it was so close. I think it was a two or a four-vote margin.

Yes, there was concern over some spill-over effect. This is the problem that you always have when you get into a legislative scheduling crunch. Obviously, if you have your choice you want your bill brought up at the most opportune time, particularly when someone isn't trying to balance off their voting record. If they vote for a bill that benefits this particular segment of their population in their district, they can sometimes balance it off by voting more conservatively on another. The worst thing in the world is to come up immediately after a vote that's on a similar type issue. You might hear members come out in the corridor and say, "Well, today we gave one for the chamber of commerce." If you're in a scheduling situation where the juxtaposition of issues is wrong, you can have problems with your votes.

G: Well, did you work with the leadership to time it in this way?

P: Yes, very much so. At the point where we finally were able to get the rule, the bill was not immediately called up. I can't remember whether it was a week or two weeks.

Speaker John McCormack was very wary of our OEO legislation because of the obvious schism in the party that it was going to dramatize. Number two, he didn't want to lose our bill on the House floor because it would be a reflection on his leadership. The White House was very [insistent] that this legislation was a priority matter. He wanted to make really sure that the votes were there and

that our nose count was good. Of course, we had been working it over continuously over the months through our contacts from the hundred and fifty-five votes that we estimated in January of 1966, to our most recent September estimate, which showed that we now had a majority. It was not all that strong, but we thought we had a pretty solid majority and we would have a better vote on final passage than we would on some of the tough amendments.

G: Was there a process of getting the Republicans to vote with you on roll call votes for Head Start and things, and getting the Democrats, the conservatives, to vote with you on teller votes?

P: Yes, there was some of that. Of course, we were working closely with Larry O'Brien and his White House congressional staff. We arranged a meeting--Larry set it up--with the Speaker and some of his staff to go over the strategy before the bill was scheduled for House floor action. We had Barron's nose count book with the names of each state delegation and how we estimated they were going to vote on our bill--whether if was firm yes, no, probably yes, probably no, or question mark. We went over the count with Larry first. He asked some questions about some individual members--how did he know this, and how did he know that. He seemed to be fairly satisfied with it. We then went into McCormack's office for our meeting. The Speaker said, "I'm reluctant to schedule this bill. I know you have a rule on it, but I'm reluctant to schedule it even though it's getting late in the session. I don't think you have the votes, and I'm afraid it will go down." O'Brien said, "Mr. Speaker, I think we have the votes." And

the Speaker said, "Anybody got a book?" I pulled it out of my pocket and said, "Here's our count as of today." He said, "Let me see it." He took it and paged through it for about five minutes. Then he said, "Well, let's see." He called in one of his staff people and said, "Get these members on the phone in this order," and he gave him about eight or ten names. These were the real tough ones. He picked out the toughest votes to predict, usually on any bill, but particularly on ours, including a couple of people that could have gone either way.

G: You had them as doubtful or maybe?

P: No, no. We had them either way. He also selected some of the firm yeses and a few of the probable yeses just to doublecheck. So Speaker McCormack talked to each of these people on the phone. It took about ten or fifteen minutes, one after the other, he'd say, "Joe, this is John. How are you going to vote on the OEO bill that's going to be coming up soon?" There was a little conversation. "Yes, yes. Okay. Sure appreciate it." By then, the next member was waiting on the line; he took the calls one after the other. When he finally finished, he looked at us and said, "That's a pretty good count. We'll schedule your bill next week." The members he picked to check, they all came out right.

One of the interesting things was that by then Adam Powell was back in Washington. Once we got over the hurdle and beat him in the Rules Committee, he came back for his share of the glory. He was there when the bill came to the floor. We got very solid votes on

most of the tough amendments and the bill passed by almost a hundred votes once the bandwagon started to roll.

We got a big break just before the bill came on the House floor. We knew that the Republican opposition would be led by Representatives Quie and Goodell, who had led the fight in the committee. But Representative Mel Laird of Wisconsin was to be the floor lieutenant in rounding up the votes. He was a very formidable tactician. A couple of days before the bill came up he had to go home. His brother--

G: His brother was killed in a car--

P: --was killed in an accident, yes. Representative Jerry Ford took Laird's assignment. I think we would have won even if Mel Laird had been there, but I don't think we would have won by as much a margin. Jerry Ford had the disadvantage of stepping in at the last minute; he was not all that familiar with what was involved and he hadn't really had that much time to do his homework; nor was he the skillful legislative operator that Mel Laird was, at least in my opinion. Jerry Ford was a nice guy and a lot of people liked him, but as a floor lieutenant he left much to be desired. When we heard that Jerry Ford was going to move in and do this job, we figured it would be worth votes for us. One thing that persuaded everybody that we were going to win was Ford's role on the floor--if there was any way to bungle the thing, Jerry would find a way to bungle it.

G: Was there any ineptitude as it turned out that you can recall?

P: No, I don't really--it's hard to tell.

G: Maybe a psychological factor.

P: There's just no way to tell.

G: I think you were getting ready to describe Adam Clayton Powell at the night of the [final vote].

P: Yes. Powell did a very nice floor job on the bill. He cooperated fully even though he and Representative Sam Gibbons had differences. Gibbons had a big role in it and had filled in admirably during Powell's intransigence. He was the member that I worked with most closely on admendments and strategy, both in the committee and after the bill was reported, before Powell had changed his mind and decided to support it. Sam had really exceptional relationships with the President and at the staff level at the White House. There were a few times when I thought certain things could be done to help us from the White House level that I didn't want to use a chip on myself. I talked to Gibbons about these ideas and Sam contacted the White House himself. There were a few members who I was sure would come over and vote for our bill if they got a personal call from the White House. It didn't necessarily have to be from the President--it would be great if it were but he's busy--but from either Marvin [Watson] or Larry [O'Brien] or somebody else to call him to say, "The President certainly hopes that you can be with us on this bill," something like that and it could make the difference. We had done as much as we could from our end. And in every case Sam was willing to do that, and as far as I know the calls were made.

G: Is there anything else on Powell now?

P: At the very end after the bill passed. Of course, I and others had been out in the corridor working the doors [as] members came to the chamber to vote. It was in the evening, eight-thirty or nine o'clock as I recall, when the bill finally passed. Everybody headed for the Speaker's office for a little celebration and here's Adam [Powell] walking along just like he'd been there the whole time, a big smile. He shook Shriver's [hand]--Shriver was there, of course--and the Speaker was beaming--the biggest vote he had had on a major bill for a long time--just as happy as a lark. Everyone was congratulating everyone else, and Powell got more of his share of congratulations than were deserved, in my opinion. But the Speaker looked around, and he congratulated Shriver, and he congratulated Powell, and said, "Just a marvelous job, marvelous job. Adam, your floor management was superb on this." I said, "Mr. Speaker, the count wasn't bad either, was it?" He laughed. (Laughter)

G: I noticed that you seemed to have picked up some southern Democrats on this.

P: Yes. Here's the way that happened. Charlie Holm would be able to give you more detail on this, but he was our resident southerner on the liaison staff. He had worked for Congressman [Elliott] Hagan of Georgia and he had worked at the Agriculture Department in the liaison office. He was one of four people [I brought in] to OEO when I came. I had known and worked with Charlie here in the House. We didn't agree on many things philosophically, and in many ways still don't, but he had exceptional rapport with many key southern members. I knew

that in cases where I couldn't get in their door because of my DSG stigma, Charlie could.

Another person I hired at OEO was Sherman [Ellis S.] Perlman. Sherm Perlman is a Republican from Ohio. He had great contacts with people like Representative Clarence Brown of Ohio, who was on the Rules Committee, Sam Devine, and a lot of other conservative Republicans. He worked at the Mass Transit Administration [National Capitol Transportation Agency], but he wanted to move for reasons of his own. I didn't know him really that well, but had met him a few times. Charlie [Holm] knew him better than I did and vouched for him and we hired him. He's now the congressional liaison officer for the Metro system here in Washington and has been ever since Metro was planned and even before it was operating.

I hired a personal secretary, and Nancy Sunshine, my administrative assistant. Those are the four people I brought into OEO.

Charlie was able to talk to southerners who voted with us on some teller votes and then voted against us on roll calls. One reason we could defeat the Republican amendments to spin off and to cut programs, dollar cuts, or whatever the amendments, is that many of these conservative Democrats were voting with us on tellers. Under the House rules in those days, the tellers weren't recorded. You couldn't do it today because twenty-five members of the Committee of the Whole can demand a recorded vote. We couldn't have gotten away with it today under the current rules, but we could then. And that's exactly what happened. Even though they voted against the bill, they got

personal letters from Shriver thanking them for their support of the poverty program. And people may someday say, "Well, how can that be? They voted against the bill." It was to let them know that we appreciated it, because we had to do the same thing the following year; it was the same kind of fight.

G: Sure. What sort of a role did Philip Landrum play in this?

P: Representative Landrum was one of Charlie's Georgia contacts. He was one of the people that really helped. We had marginal situations where a member might support a Head Start program, but didn't want anything else. Or they might not want anything in their district at all. But whatever was already operating there, many would tolerate as long as it didn't cause them too many political problems.

G: I gather Carl Perkins was effective at getting borderline or doubtful votes.

P: Yes. Oh, he's effective at anything he does. Representative Perkins is an amazing man. When you meet him you'll see; he's such a home-spun, honest, sincere character that you'll just not believe it.

We used to have a standing joke at OEO about the way we were going to pass our bill. We'd just tell the opponents that if they didn't vote with us we would put a Job Corps center in their district; and we'd promise those that wanted to vote with us that we would give them another Head Start program in theirs.

(Laughter)

Tape 3 of 3

G: What about the Powell-Gibbons confrontation? Do you recall that?

P: Not in any great detail. I know that Gibbons probably had more reason to resent the way this was handled than most members, because he had become the "mother hen" on the anti-poverty program. I don't know whether he was asked to do it by the White House or whether it resulted from an informal agreement among Democratic members of the committee. Obviously, a member like Perkins or northern liberals on the committee could not be one-on-one in a confrontation against Powell because most have significant black populations in their districts and it would appear politically as though they were being racist. In the climate that existed back in 1966 it wouldn't take very much. Powell certainly had a big following in the black community and among black activist groups. No member from the northern district that had any black voters at all would want to risk alienating Powell to a point where he might trigger some opposition to them or send in some groups to speak against them in their district. But Sam Gibbons didn't really have these kinds of potential problems in his district. Whether that was the reason Sam took on this chore or not, I don't know. I never asked him. Whenever I sat down with Gibbons in his office there were always some immediate problems--some member that we needed to work on, or some amendment that we needed to discuss. There was some urgency in these discussions, and I never asked him how he happened to be the point man.

G: Apparently there were some problem spots within the administration as well. Willard Wirtz, for example, I gather was not as supportive as--

P: The Neighborhood Youth Corps program, of course, was one of the very popular anti-poverty programs and was administered through the Labor Department. Secretary Wirtz' special assistant for this program was Jack Howard, now a special assistant to Jerry Wurf at the State-County-Municipal Employees Union. Jack is an old friend of mine for many years. He had worked as a congressional fellow for the Moss Subcommittee on Government Information back in the late 1950s. He was a reporter for the San Francisco-Chronicle. I still see him occasionally, [he's] a very able guy. Jack had gone to the Labor Department during the Kennedy Administration, I believe, and had this responsibility with the NYC program.

When I went to OEO I called Jack Howard and arranged to get together with him, because I knew that there were "turf problems" with this program. Of course, it was an impossible administrative set-up where you had this bifurcated responsibility. NYC was a poverty program, yes, but it was a jobs program, too, and the Labor Department took a parochial interest in jobs programs and their relationship to overall manpower training activities that were under their jurisdiction.

As I say, NYC was popular, there were always more demands for slots than could ever be funded. It was a no-win situation. A typical member you'd go to see would say, "We want more NYC [Neighborhood Youth Corps] slots and we want more Head Start." We

had to say "no" in both cases because you just couldn't fund at the level people wanted. They would say, "Why don't you get rid of all this other crap"--other OEO programs--"and put all the money into this?"

G: Do you think that the Labor Department was responsible for these constant comparisons between NYC and Job Corps?

P: Yes, sure. There was a constant jockeying for support.

G: And since Wirtz was a cabinet officer you couldn't send a memo around to him saying, "Don't talk to Congressman X."

P: That's right, absolutely, and that was part of it. Jack and I came to some gentlemen's agreements. There were certain things that we tolerated with each other just because we were old friends. But that was not an easy situation. In a way, it reinforced our arguments that if you spun off everything, it would be total chaos.

G: Do you think part of this resulted from the bitterness that Wirtz felt when he didn't get Job Corps?

P: I don't know that.

G: You never heard it.

P: I never discussed that.

G: Any other problems--Office of Education--with programs that they felt they should have had?

P: It's hard to tell. If their liaison people were involved, and were clever enough to cover their tracks, I could never prove that they were lobbying on Capitol Hill for spin-off of Head Start. I could

never say that because I have no evidence. If they did any such lobbying, they were clever enough not to get caught.

I would seriously doubt that that happened. One thing you can say about the Johnson Administration is that most established bureaucracies feared him. They were not really certain--he kept them off guard. What they could get away with under another administration, I think they would be hesitant to try in the Johnson Administration. That's a very broad, sweeping statement, and I'm sure there are cases where you could say, "Well, it didn't happen here, or here, or here." But Johnson used to keep people guessing. [There's] a lot written about situations when he'd pick up the phone in the Oval Office and call somebody out of the blue in a department and ask them a tough question about something in their bailiwick. You know, there was a mystique about LBJ that he was an all-seeing eye that you didn't dare do this, or this, because if you did he would know about it or he would hear about it and catch you. I think some of that mystique goes a long way.

G: He evidently had massive ties all through the bureaucracy and Capitol Hill.

P: Oh, sure. This is the greatest advantage that any president could have. Unfortunately, there are very few administrations that can ever rely on this kind of a personal network to get facts and get the truth from the bureaucracy. I think this is a big problem Carter has. He ran against the establishment in the first place. Nobody trusts him, no one will talk to any of his people and tell them the straight dope,

and he doesn't get the facts that he needs. Putting a few Schedule C appointments in the bureaucracy and a few cabinet appointments at the top levels is not going to do it. Those people aren't going to find out any more than he is, unless the bureaucracy wants to let them in on it.

G: You had several things that you asked for White House help on during this, and one was help with Powell. Do you recall anything specifically that the White House did?

P: I don't think there was much they could do. The only thing I can think of would be maybe indirectly through Gibbons.

G: How about Powell's tax problems? Do you think that there was any pressure put on him there?

P: Not to my knowledge. My recollection is that Powell's tax problems first surfaced way back in 1956. This is the story that went around up here--that Powell agreed to endorse Eisenhower in the 1956 election in exchange for favorable treatment on his own personal tax situation. One of his office staff people was convicted in the case and went to the Federal Women's Prison in Alderson, West Virginia and served a term. I can't remember her name; I knew her. That to my recollection ended the tax question, unless you're talking about something later that I don't know about. But that is my recollection of that situation.

G: How about the effort to get Senator [Joseph] Clark to hold up the Senate mark-up until you had your House action out of the way? Here

you asked for White House and I guess Senate leadership help to hold that up.

P: Yes. Most of that negotiation was handled by my deputy, George McCarthy, because it was coming at a time when I was focusing pretty much on the House. George and I had a very nice agreement. His background, support, and roots were Senate-oriented; mine were House-oriented. I had never met George McCarthy until I took the job at OEO. I had two calls I mentioned earlier about George; one was from Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield and one was from Senator Lee Metcalf, our first DSG chairman in the House. Both of them said, "If you take this OEO job, do me a favor and interview George McCarthy as a deputy. Make up your own mind but at least interview him," and I did.

George was from Montana and worked at the Pentagon and with the Office of Emergency Management. He had strong administrative management experience in dealing with the career bureaucracy, which I knew was going to be a problem. He also had Senate [experience]. I knew that his relationships with Mike Mansfield and the establishment of the Senate was very close. Shriver had provided a small room that I could use before I came on board officially. I called George and he came in and we talked. From the first ten minutes on we got along famously. I liked his personality, down-to-earth, and a practical political animal, shrewd. We worked so well together and complimented each other in a way that I could always say, "George, you know these players. You handle it the way you think it ought to be handled."

And he never dropped the ball once. Shriver had a great deal of confidence in him, too, after he got to know him. George had also had brief Job Corps experience, as I recall, with Otis Singletary when he was director of the Job Corps and had been at OEO for maybe six months. He had some insights that I didn't have and contact with a number of key senators, so he handled a lot of those negotiations.

Barefoot Sanders got into the White House liaison support activity on OEO legislation on the Senate side at that stage and to a lesser extent, but greater the year after, Joe Califano also did. George could fill you in a lot more on their roles. I have just a rather sketchy. . . .

G: Did anyone have to deal with George Mahon here?

P: No. On the appropriations issues we pretty much put all our eggs, or a good many of our eggs, in John Fogarty's basket. John Fogarty was the chairman of the Labor-HEW subcommittee that handled our funds. He was an old friend of Sarge Shriver's for many years. They had a close personal relationship. John Fogarty and I had a close relationship, too, from DSG days. Fogarty is not the kind of a member that most would think of as a gung-ho DSG guy, but he was an active member. There were some issues that we worked on together when I was at DSG. When I went down to OEO, Shriver called him and we had lunch, the three of us, and talked about how things were shaping up on the bill, the timetable on the appropriation hearings, the mark-up and so forth. Shriver and Fogarty were great kidders; they just kidded the hell out

of each other. Shriver got to know him through the Kennedy presidential campaign and in the Peace Corps operations.

Fogarty never hesitated to call me about anti-poverty problems in his district or in Rhode Island. He sometimes became upset because of the role being played by the governor of his state. Governors had unique roles in the operation of the anti-poverty program because it was a federal-state-local program--even program veto power to some extent. The thing about congressional liaison at OEO was that you had vertical governmental liaison, as well as a liaison between the executive and legislative branch of the federal government. Not many people have really thought about that aspect or analyzed the unique nature. It would not be unusual for me to have a call from a state legislator saying, "We've got a bill up in the legislature to provide local funds for this anti-poverty program. Can you tell me something about how it functions in my district?" I once had a call from a county judge who was interested in a community action agency in his county. I've had calls from governors. I've worked with governors' staff. Of course, governors had initial veto power over individual programs in their state. If you want to discuss the CDGM [Child Development Group of Mississippi] and the Head Start program in Mississippi in which I was very much involved, recall that the Governor, John Bell Williams, vetoed the program. The thing about OEO was that you never knew from day to day at what level of government you were going to be involved--vertical down to the local-community-city-town level, or horizontally at the congressional level.

That was one of the things that was so fascinating about the anti-poverty program.

The governor of Rhode Island then was John Chaffee, a Republican, now a senator from Rhode Island. He hated Fogarty; Fogarty hated his guts. They tried to outdo each other on grant announcements. A couple of times Chaffee got leaks from somewhere and announced OEO approval of such and such a grant. It was the kind of thing from the New York region that I was telling you about earlier. It was awfully difficult to prevent a governor--or his staff--from using his political muscle to get that kind of information from the regional level. Fogarty would call me and say, "Hey, we got to figure a way to work this so I can get some credit out of this program. Hell, I'm doing all this work for you up here." He was such a marvelous person. He'd call me occasionally to come up to his office; he'd just want someone to talk to. He was a Scotch drinker and I'm a Scotch drinker, so he'd reach into his desk drawer and pull out a bottle of Scotch. We'd have a couple of drinks and talk, maybe not about OEO at all. Maybe about something else totally different.

He loved to play golf and was pretty good. Representative Hugh Carey, who was on the authorizing committee, Chuck Roche, who was on the White House liaison staff then, John Fogarty, and I were having lunch at the Democratic Club one day. It was a day the House wasn't in session, a beautiful day. Fogarty said to Carey, "Let's go out to Burning Tree and play some golf. Roche here has got the White House limousine, he can take us out." Roche says, "The hell with that! If

I'm going out, I'm going to play!" So they said to me, "Do you play?" I said, "Yes, Jeez, but I don't have my gear, I don't have my clubs, I don't have my shoes. I don't have anything here." Fogarty said, "Well, that's all right. We can borrow some out there." So we all got into the White House limousine and we went out to Burning Tree Country Club to play golf.

What makes the story so funny--it's a true story--is that a couple of days before Shriver was telling me about an experience he had with Fogarty when he was director of the Peace Corps. Fogarty was appointed to the conference committee on the Peace Corps appropriation that year. He said, "He [Fogarty] called me and I tried to return his call but there was no answer; it was in the evening. The next morning I had a speech to give somewhere and I didn't get back to him. The next afternoon he called me and said, 'Shriver, I tell you, not returning my phone call cost you one hundred million dollars in your appropriation because I wanted to discuss an amendment that was being offered to cut it. You didn't feel that it was important enough to call me back, so the hell with you!'" And he hung up on him. Sure enough, Fogarty cut a hundred million dollars out of the bill.

Fogarty was such a great kidder. We got out on the course and teed off. I hadn't played for a couple of years. I didn't have time; I was working all the time. Carey and I were a twosome and Chuck Roche and Fogarty were a twosome and we had a few bucks bet. Fogarty was a superb golfer; he used to shoot in the upper seventies or lower eighties consistently. I don't think I shot better than ninety-five

my whole life. This day, even with strange clubs, for some reason I was hitting them pretty good. I was having the best round I had for a long time. And the score was close; Carey and I were maybe one stroke up on them on the last hole and we chipped up onto the green. We were all on in two; it was a par four hole. I was about twenty feet away and the others were a bit closer. I putted about two feet short and had that for my par. Roche hit by the hole. In other words, one short putt to go. If I sink this putt, we keep our one-stroke lead and we've won. Maybe we would have won fifteen bucks. We had a dollar bet a hole, or something like that. As I'm lining the putt up, Fogarty says, "Just a minute, Bill. I tell you what, let's make a side bet on this putt. If you guys win, I'll see to it that you get an extra fifty million in your OEO appropriation. If you miss it, it's going to cost you fifty." Hell! I know he means it because of the story Shriver had told me about the missed phone call and the Peace Corps appropriation. I said, "Come on, John, you're kidding." He said, "No, I'm not kidding." I missed the putt. It lipped the cup. Just thinking about it, I start to shake. John laughed. We went back to the club house and had dinner, and went home. It was a very pleasant afternoon.

The next morning I went into Shriver's office and I said, "Sarge, I got some bad news." He said, "What's that?" I said, "I had a hell of a good day with Fogarty yesterday. We played some golf. I think they're going to mark-up the appropriations bill week after next. The bad news is he bet me fifty million dollars on our appropriation on

the last putt, and I missed it." It's one of the funniest things that ever happened to me. I told him the whole story. Sarge said, "Was he serious? Was he serious?" I said, "You know how serious he is. Of course he was serious." He said, "Well, hell, how could you miss a damn putt that short?" He was mad as hell.

(Laughter)

Fogarty and I spent a lot of time together in the next several weeks--this was coming toward the end of September and into October, when the Labor-HEW appropriation bill was coming up. One day he called me and said, "I've got a delegation of building trades people in town from my district. They're protesting one of the OEO grants at home--training young kids to be bricklayers--they feel is unfairly competing with the building trades apprenticeship program." It was very touchy because Fogarty was a bricklayer. This was his union. These were his people. He said, "They're mad at me. You've got to bail me out." So he set up a meeting on a Saturday morning in his office.

There were about twenty in the delegation. He asked me to talk to them and explain this program and why it was necessary. I got briefed on it and found out who was involved and what was going to happen to these kids that were going to be trained. They weren't to be trained for bricklayer jobs in that area, but trained in such skills so that they could be hired by corporations who were doing that kind of work in other areas. I explained the program at the meeting and said some nice things about John's valuable role in the OEO program

and what a great congressman he was. Everybody left happy, he smiled and everything was great. Once in a while I had those kind of requests, not just from Fogarty but from other members. Just to come in, talk to constituents, and bail them out.

G: Did you get your fifty million dollars back?

P: I'm getting to that. As I recall the figures, the House passed a 1.5 [billion dollar] authorization. There was a cutback from the original 1.75 billion dollars requested because of escalating costs. The Senate had voted a 1.7 billion dollar authorization. The conference committee was a very large committee--twenty-some members from the House and Senate. Out of that twenty-some--twenty-two I think is the number--only five members of the conference committee had voted for the authorization bill in the House or Senate. Seventeen of the people voted against the authorization bill who were on the conference committee for our OEO money. We had no control over that, that's just the way it happened.

We were all very much concerned. Shriver and I had discussed the problem with Fogarty, and McCarthy had some talks with Clark, Mansfield, and others on the Senate side. We did what we could. I remember waiting for Fogarty in the bar at the Democratic Club while the conference committee was meeting. He finally came in with a big smile on his face. I said, "How bad was it?" Just to split the difference between the two versions--$1.6 billion would have been a miracle because we didn't have the votes. But because of the controversial nature of the program, and the fact that seventeen out

of twenty-two House and Senate conferees had voted against the authorization, we could have ended up with a lot less than that. We could have ended up with the $1.5 billion House figure, which would have been a disaster. It would have required a tremendous series of cutbacks in almost every program area. Fogarty said, "Well, you got your fifty million back. I got you $1.625 billion." It was a miracle to do better than a split with those kinds of odds against you. I said, "Gosh, John, how did you do it? How in the hell could you get these guys to vote $250 million more than half the difference when most voted against the authorization bill?" He just said, "I traded a few things." But that's Fogarty. So I brought him a drink and that was it. He never told me what happened. Of course, conference committees in those days were closed, unlike current rules where most of them are open.

G: Well, now, the Senate initally had authorized something like two billion more than the administration requested in their version. I'm sure it was changed later on to scale down.

P: I thought it was 1.75 that they finally came up with, wasn't it?

G: I think it was, but initially--

P: Oh, initially, in committee. Oh, yes.

G: Do you recall how that happened?

P: I think Senator Clark offered the amendment to increase it, and it carried in committee much to our consternation because we knew we couldn't carry that much on the floor. What we were afraid of was that once they started chopping away from the two billion, we'd end up

much lower than we would if we would come out with the $1.75 billion budget figure to begin with. That might have made it easier to fight off amendments to cut program funds. Once you start losing on money amendments it's sometimes hard to stem the tide. That's what we were afraid of. But I think $1.75 billion funding level is what passed the Senate and we were able to hold the line at that point.

G: How did you use the mayors in helping lobby for the legislation?

P: This was part of Hy Bookbinder's role. Before the bill reached the floor, the lobbying had gone on with individual members as part of our nose-count operation. Mayors, county officials, labor, and many other outside groups were involved. We picked up some votes by expediting grants. Some people thought that was immoral, but I thought that's the only way that the game ought to be played. We picked up votes that were switches after we were able to do something that the member really wanted in his district or state, if it did not hurt the program in any way. We finally got to a point where we knew we had a majority on passage, but the votes on some key amendments were much more difficult to assess. We estimated that even if we broke even on the amendments, we could pass a decent bill. If it came out a little worse than we thought in the House, we could trade away some of the things in conference with the Senate where we thought we were in the stronger position. At this crucial stage, the one thing we didn't want to happen was uncontrolled delegations of people coming to Washington from around the country to lobby for the OEO bill that might upset the apple cart and open old political wounds.

I remember going to Bookbinder's office to talk with him about this potential problem. Of course, his job essentially was to mobilize outside support organizations. He was very articulate and diligent and had tremendous contacts throughout the country with all kinds of organizations that supported us, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, Jewish community groups, Catholic welfare groups, all kind of denominational church groups, civil rights groups, labor unions. But we were afraid that in the last few days before the vote, people and delegations would swarm into Washington to lobby their congressman and in some cases alienate him and lose votes we had already won over.

I remember talking to Booky about this and I said, "Who do you know is coming?" He said, "Gee, we've been encouraging these groups to come to town and lobby." I said, "Booky, that's the worst possible thing at this stage." He didn't see it my way. We had quite an argument about it. He said, "How can you possibly be so confident that you don't think that this would help?" I said, "I'm sure it would help in some cases, but we already have the votes. We're reasonably sure that we don't need any more help, and it could lose us some votes, particularly in cases where there was an unpleasant local incident, where a community action group got in a hassle with the mayor, council, or the congressman. If you bring these people in, or if the mayor comes in, and they go see their congressman, he'll probably remember the hassle and it could trigger an adverse effect."

We finally compromised. He refused to turn off any groups that had already planned to come. I remember a big meeting the day before

the House debate in the Statler Hotel. One of the ballrooms was filled with people who came to Washington from all over the country to lobby--busloads of them. I got from Bookbinder a list of cities they came from in advance of the meeting. He called on me to make the presentation as to which members we really needed help with and where they should best make their appointments. I made a very impassioned pitch about how important it was, the grass-roots lobbying effort. We sent them to see members from their hometown--they were mostly from the large cities where there were half a dozen or more congressmen. But we put priority on those congressmen we counted as lost irrevocably, those who were deadset against us. Or in some cases we suggested they see doubtfuls that we thought were going to go the other way. As much as possible, we tried to keep them away from votes that we thought we had for sure, because we couldn't afford to lose these kinds of members and we didn't know what the reaction would be to such hometown lobbying. I can't say that it worked 100 per cent because there's no way of knowing how many other people were involved. But when the vote was over, they all felt as though they had a role, they participated in helping the successful passage of our bill. They lobbied, as is their constitutional right to lobby. I don't know of a vote that we lost because of anything that these people did. They all celebrated that night. We all won together and they had a role in it; that's the way we handled it. Booky knew what I was [doing], because Booky knew the vote count. But he never said anything to me afterward.

G: How about Mayor [Richard] Daley? Did he help you out in 1966? I gather he issued a statement or something.

P: Indirectly. The OEO regional director was a Daley lieutenant in Chicago. My friend Jack Reardon, who was the congressional relations/public affairs officer, came out of the Daley organization. There were some problems with several of the members because of the city hall versus neighborhood fight. But we never really asked--to my knowledge--for anything specific that we didn't get through the channels. The Chicago [Midwest] regional director was Ted Jones. He was a very able guy and a real savvy pol who had good relationships with most of the delegation; I don't think we lost any of them.

I had a call one day from a big city member that I had known fairly well in DSG. He asked me to come to his office and talk about some anti-poverty programs in his district. So I boned up on what was going on in his district, what had been funded, how much, who was being served by the program, and so on. His opening line was, "I can't understand why you, as a Democrat and as a guy who has worked up here on the Hill and understands our problems, are trying to destroy the Democratic Party by the poverty programs?" I said, "What do you mean, Congressman? I don't understand." He said, "Well, let me just draw you a picture of what's going on in my district."

Perhaps this is the most profound political argument that I heard against an OEO program. He said, "We have a community action program, as you know, in my district, located here. It got this much money last year. It's got a Head Start component, it's got a health

component, it's got some NYC stuff in it. It's a nicely balanced program and it's funded at a fairly good level. The problem is that all the assistance that the community action agency is now giving the underprivileged people in my district, the Democratic alderman used to do. If Rosa needed a loan because her husband was ill and she couldn't afford to buy milk for the children, she would come to the alderman and he would loan her some money to tide her over until her husband got back on his feet. If her son got in trouble with the law, they'd come see the alderman. If they wanted to get into a school or whatever the situation they came. That is the type of personal service that built and held the Democratic Party together in my district and in the whole city. You're destroying it because these people are not coming to the alderman's office anymore, they are going to the community action agency office; they're doing the very things that the party has done and should be doing. Let me tell you how this is working. The head of the local community action agency is going to run against me in the primary next year!" (Laughter) "Because these people now are beholden to him instead of me or the alderman that supports me."

And yet this member voted down the line for the OEO program, every single vote, despite these misgivings. Because he was a loyal Democrat. He said, "I think the President is making a terrible mistake. Sarge Shriver is making a terrible mistake to support these programs. I can't afford not to vote for them, but they're going to destroy the party."

Looking back on it, I thought, gee, I never thought of it that way. But in a city like Chicago, Philadelphia, New York, Boston, almost any mainline city with an old political tradition of ward/alderman leader organization, I can see that it could cause real political concern. I've often thought back on that and wondered to what extent was he exaggerating and to what extent he really had a valid point. The community action director did not run against him. That member was re-elected in 1966, and served two more terms before he retired.

G: Was this Chicago?

P: No, this was New York City. But I've often thought how many members felt the same way that didn't express it, that didn't feel they could talk frankly enough to anybody to express it.

G: Sure. That's a good story. Well, was this dilemma discussed openly and thoroughly in the OEO staff meetings?

P: No. This is not the kind of thing that I would bring up at a staff meeting. Few would even understand the issue. I talked to Shriver about it and I talked to other staff people about it privately because I thought they should know. I figured Shriver would probably--if he hadn't before--have other members talk to him in the same terms. I wanted him to be aware of these concerns. It kind of fell in the same old slot of the establishment versus the underprivileged. Whether it's a political establishment or economic establishment, the impact of the poverty program in strengthening people who never had any role

in any establishment helped to trigger these kinds of conflicts. They're inevitable in our society.

G: Did you ever get heat from the White House on this widening of the process, generating competition to elected leaders or power structures?

P: No. I don't know whether they were fully aware of the problem; there were so many other problems of their own at the White House.

G: But OEO was certainly one that generated a lot of problems.

P: Yes, that is true. But as far as the political consequences, I mean beyond a congressional district level, I don't know whether there was even any discussion or any awareness of that aspect of it.

G: Just a small point. There was a threat of a march on Washington that Bayard Rustin was going to do.

P: Yes.

G: Was there any move to curb that? Or how did you deal with this prospect?

P: Well, there were several. There was an encampment out on the Lafayette Park, the poor people's convention I guess it was called. They pitched tents in the park and stayed. We had a sit-in in our OEO office for hours, a disgruntled group. I don't recall where they were from now. Fifteen or twenty people came into the building and camped in Shriver's office on the eighth floor, demanding additional funds. It was handled very, very low key. They were permitted to stay, and no one attempted to evict them. Bookbinder talked to the group. A

couple of other people talked to [them], Ted Berry [CAP director] and others. Finally three or four hours later they left, peacefully.

As far as I know there was no attempt to discourage such marches on Washington. I don't know how you could. About the only thing you could do would be to say you can't use community action funds to hire buses to come. I think that perhaps there was some legal ruling along that line.

G: Did you reach a point where congressmen whose votes you realized you had would try to use a little leverage close to the vote to get some project that they were interested in?

P: Oh, sure.

G: How would you play this?

P: Gingerly. It would depend on the situation. This is where our congressional liaison counterparts in the regional office were so valuable. You'd call a region and say, "Would you check out the status of this grant application and see what the chances are it's going to be funded, or how much it's going to be cut?" or whatever was the situation. So if you could get a horseback judgment call from the region you could deal. For example, if you knew it was going to be funded anyway, or maybe a percentage cut on all similar type programs meant that it's going to be cut 10 per cent to fall within the guideline, or whatever it might be in such cases, there was absolutely no problem, no hesitancy on my part in calling the member and saying, "You've been a great supporter of this program. There are problems in the region, but we're going to work them out. I can tell you off the

record that this grant will be funded within the next X weeks or X days, or whatever, and it will probably be at a level of such-and-such an amount." But I'm not going to do that unless I've got somebody in the region I can rely on. I did have a good relationship with most of our regional people--they were professionals and I could deal with them this way. They would never ask any questions and they didn't have to know the reason for my inquiry.

G: Were you ever forced to approve a program that you thought was sub-standard or below par?

P: I never made those kinds of decisions.

G: Well, did you ever see one being done simply because you needed the vote?

P: I never did. But you see, I wouldn't know, nor would most people that worked in the legislative area know whether a program was good or bad. Even the people who evaluated individual program grants, who monitored them, would disagree. How can you tell? A few programs are obvious. If you got a Head Start program and you've got thirty kids in it, they go to the doctor for their medical exam. Most of them never had been to a doctor in their life, and you would probably find a couple of things--a childhood disease that if it's not corrected by surgery the kid could be crippled for life, or kids with cavities in their teeth, and you're able to get them filled. As far as I'm concerned--I look at it very simplistically--that's a good program because it's been able to do something positive to help people.

But to say whether a community action program is successful because it's involved X number of people, for good or bad, I don't know. I didn't have time to make these kind of [judgments]. It was not my job to look at programmatic, quality-type issues. One of the most difficult things in all these programs was that there was no cost-benefit ratio that you could apply as you could to a public works project, or where you know if you put in X dollars you're going to get X kilowatts of power. The results of some of these anti-poverty programs would take generations for some of them to be realized. Knowing that, why bother?

There were some independent [studies], I think Westinghouse did an evaluation of Head Start and Head Start follow-through programs. Even the evaluation was very controversial among educators as to its effect. I think it is very difficult to really get a scientific, qualitative judgment on most anti-povery programs. We haven't talked much about Joe Corps. It was a very difficult kind of program to evaluate or to administer because of the people that enrolled, that it was designed to help.

(Interruption)

--finish up a little bit more and then maybe tomorrow we can conclude anything else that we haven't covered.

G: I think we've got at least another hour with the Mississippi--that's a long story.

Well, anyway, you were on Job Corps and the types of people that were there.

P: The type of people enrolled were the most difficult. Many were low grade school dropouts, some were social misfits, many of them had a petty crime record. You were trying to deal with the most difficult parts of society. If you put a kid through auto mechanic school, say, and he had an aptitude for it, graduated, and got a job thereafter, within a period of nine months, or a year, or a year and a half, you could see tremendous change for the job in that kid that you could measure in any number of ways. But there were a lot of OEO programs that did not have that short-term measurement capability. Who can tell if a kid with a little bit of Head Start before he gets into kindergarten or first grade might mean to him twenty years later in terms of his earning capacity, or his social status, or his educational level? You just can't measure those things for a generation.

G: You mentioned this as what the program actually meant in tangible results, in human terms and this sort of things. I look at this on the one hand, and the problems that such components as community action created for this particular congressman, who voted for it. One of the basic questions that has been asked over and over about OEO is, did Congress know what it was all about when they voted for it? That's the question I ask particularly about 1966 when you were there. Did these congressmen understand the implications of the components? You've given me one example of a guy who was very familiar with the implications and yet voted for it anyway. How general is this?

P: Let me put it this way. One of the most dramatic differences that I note today in the 96th Congress over the 89th is the make-up and

attitude and orientation of the members themselves. I think that probably you could make the case in a number of situations where the member really didn't take the trouble to understand what these programs meant in his district. Here again, it's hard to judge, and I'm talking about Democrats now because we had very few Republican votes for any of these programs. The traditional role and concern of the Democratic Party has been for people and particularly underprivileged people. This tradition goes all the way back through our history--this concern for people, ordinary people, in our generation and in previous generations, through the Depression of the 1930s and recovery, the concern throughout the Kennedy-Johnson years about the needs of people. This tradition was so strong there was enough party loyalty among most Democrats, at least urban-type Democrats from North and South, to support and vote for such people programs even if they didn't understand every precise reason. There was a greater degree of faith, and the leadership from the White House was there advocating it. People who were appointed to work in that administration were advocating it, people that members had confidence in. I think this is the basic reason.

To some extent I guess most members were taking a lot at face value without really knowing. Many people who were the beneficiaries of these programs were the least likely to be registered to vote and to be of any political help to an incumbent congressman or senator who supported the program. This was one of the very obvious facts about it, that you couldn't expect an automatic ballot box return by

supporting OEO programs. Consequently one of the reasons why some marginal members opposed the program was because they had everything to lose. If he represented a silk-stocking, or even a mixed type of district where there was hard-core anti-poverty program opposition, a pro-OEO position could make re-election difficult. There was some very concerted organizational opposition by the business community and others who represented the status quo in many such communities. Some of the opposition to consumer education programs, for example, was just unreal. It was paranoid what we came up against; some of the mail that these anti-OEO people wrote to their congressmen, which the congressmen sent to us for response. Many members would therefore go the other way because there was everything to lose by voting for a program when they represented a district where there was such violently concerted opposition to anti-poverty programs locally. Even if they had some good OEO programs in their district there's nothing with which to compensate. They couldn't be sure that those people against them for OEO would be balanced off by others who were being benefited by the programs who would vote for their re-election to show their appreciation. Many of them had never voted in their entire lives!

G: But do you think that the congressmen as a whole, particularly on the committee, and then the members of Congress as a whole were aware of, let's say, the implications of maximum feasible participation and the potential conflicts?

P: I don't [know]. Perhaps in some cases. I'm not sure if people who coined that phrase realized the implications either.

G: But I'm talking about by 1966. A lot of the trouble that community action was going to create had already been created by this time.

P: Yes, that's true, in 1965.

G: Let's look at the committee first.

P: There was a pull back. This is one of the reasons why there was an amendment in the 1966 law that applies the Hatch Act anti-political activity to anti-poverty employees. A few situations were very blatant; that gets to the roots of what we're talking about in terms of activist political campaigns against incumbent congressmen, against mayors and other city or county officials. Many were raising hell with their congressmen and senators about this political by-product of community action, and with us, and urging their governor to veto some of these grants. Looking back on it, it's remarkable that there weren't more such vetoes.

G: Well, I don't want to hold you up today, but I hope I can come back tomorrow.

P: Sure. I'll be looking forward to it, and we'll continue.

End of Tape 3 of 3 and Interview I

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