INTERVIEW I

DATE: March 29, l982

INTERVIEWEE: DANIEL BOONE PORTER

INTERVIEWER: Ted Gittinger

PLACE: Colonel Boone's residence, Belton, Texas

Tape 1 of 1

G: The most important thing in the experience of America in the early sixties was the adviser relationship with the Vietnamese counterpart. Was that a crucial point of contact?

P: Yes. I feel that that's a very valid statement that you just made. I think that most all of us who served as advisers realize that the relationship that we had with our counterparts and with the Vietnamese associates was so important that it was absolutely mandatory to try to make friends with those people and to gain their respect and to not do things that antagonized them nor caused them to be unwilling to cooperate with us. I have always felt that this perhaps is one of the biggest virtues of having General Paul D. Harkins as our commander of MACV was that he felt that way also. He did everything he possibly could to try to gain the support of the Vietnamese, not only at his level, but at the subordinate level right on down to the troop level.

I felt that we, in most cases, had very good support from our Vietnamese counterparts, although that wasn't necessarily always too obvious to the news people nor to visitors who came there, because the Vietnamese were very, very proud people and it was clumsy for them, and sometimes [it was] almost as if they were rank beginners in some of

the work that they did.

(Interruption)

The statement that I just made, that I felt at times they did appear, especially in the presence of visitors and of high-ranking people, as being quite clumsy and perhaps had the appearance of rank beginners, there's no question but what that was true. Unfortunately, the news people discussed this a great deal in their publications, and it antagonized the Vietnamese a great deal to be classified as amateurs or as people who didn't know what they were doing, and it made it much more difficult for us.

I believe that almost all of us, though, would have to admit that the Vietnamese who accepted us as their advisers didn't necessarily accept us in a hundred per cent fashion. They accepted us as friends. They accepted us as people that they knew wanted to help them, but in so many instances they thought that we were far more inadequate in our knowledge of the situation and in our ability to cope with the situation than they were, even though they did feel that we were very knowledgeable in certain subjects that they were not. For example, in the use of combined fires or in the use of fire direction centers or in the employment of joint forces, they made no pretense of knowing a great deal about that because they'd had no experience in commanding such organizations. But at the same time they felt that they knew more about the characteristics of the Viet Cong, the manner in which they fought, the manner in which they should be opposed, the manner in which the South Vietnamese forces should be employed than we did.

They usually didn't say these things in the presence of higher-ranking officers, and in my own case, it wasn't evident in the presence of General Harkins or in the presence of Admiral [Harry] Felt. The Vietnamese who worked with me and my immediate

counterparts never criticized me in the presence of General Harkins nor in the presence of Admiral Felt nor in the presence of some visitor. But they didn't hesitate to tell me that they doubted very much, if I could possibly put myself in their shoes, that I would know as much as they knew because they had been there for years, and they had been concerned about guerrilla operations for years, and they felt they knew a great deal more about it than we did.

G: Did you think that was true?

P: I'll have to admit that initially I thought they were entirely wrong. I thought that if we were to employ our weapons, employ our forces--I say ours--if the Vietnamese were to employ their weapons and to employ their forces as I had always been taught in small-unit operations, I strongly felt that I knew a great deal more about it than they did. But after having been there a good long while, I found that it wasn't nearly as easy to accomplish this as I thought it was initially, because their forces were so fragmented by some being parts of the Vietnamese regular army establishment, parts were provincial forces, parts were village forces. We had political and military leaders striving to employ their forces in the same area, and yet they had conflicting interests and perhaps certain jealousies and perhaps certain diverse interests within that area. I sometimes marvel that there was as much cooperation as there was, although it was very poor initially.

By the time I left Vietnam it was improving somewhat, but it still was a very difficult thing because the militia, being largely under the control of the province chiefs or under the district chiefs or even, in some cases, under the village chiefs, were not immediately subject to orders from ARVN or from the commanders of the ARVN establishment. That is the Army of the Republic of Vietnam was a separate establishment

from those militia-type forces, the Self-Defense Corps being the village force. The Civil Guard was really the militia forces that were directly under the province chief and were employed by province chiefs or by their subordinate district chiefs.

The degree of cooperation varied from place to place, with one adviser having some great difficulty where others had very little difficulty in establishing rapport with their counterparts. I felt that perhaps John Vann came nearer living, thinking, and acting as the Vietnamese would than almost anyone. He seemed to relish eating their food. He didn't mind living under more or less the same conditions that they lived and quite frequently participated in extended activities with them where he ate nothing except the food that was prepared by the individual soldiers or by the soldiers who were acting as orderlies for the officers. For a long time he managed to get by without having any difficulty. He finally did develop hepatitis but not during my period there. I found that it was very difficult for me to not reveal the fact that their food was very distasteful to me, and frankly, I was always so concerned over the possibility of having dysentery or hepatitis that my appetite wasn't very good as I did eat with them.

But I tried my best to eat with them as much as I possibly could, and I tried to work with them in such a way that I never--in my own mind, I never--acted overbearing. I tried my utmost not to act as if I were a great military authority in comparison with them. I tried to reason with them as if they were my brothers rather than my subordinates or as an inferior group of people. Actually, they had lots of fine, fine principles about them that I admired a great deal even though it was so difficult for us to get them to accept our recommendations in so many cases.

G: Let me ask you something about that. Now, you had the dual responsibility of making

friends, gaining respect, and at the same time advising. This is an obviously difficult situation sometimes. Did you have any leverage at all when you thought that they were going off on the wrong track? Was there anything that you could do outside of friendly advice to change people's minds?

P: Hardly any. The United States, of course, was furnishing them all types of support. A great deal of that support came through the provision of weapons and ammunition and aircraft and the necessary materiel to support an army and to support the militia-like forces. But at the same time, there were probably almost equal amounts being provided by USOM in that day and time, which was the United States Operation Mission in Vietnam, and that was monitored through the embassy. In both cases, the President of Vietnam, President [Ngo Dinh] Diem, and his advisers, his cabinet, his parliament, recognized that this was true, that they were receiving all of this benefit. But by the time you got down to the regimental and battalion and lower commanders, it's doubtful that they recognized that truth quite as much as they did at the higher levels because they were not that familiar with government. I don't believe that any of us used that too much as a wedge. We felt that it was self-evident that that was true, and that if they didn't accept our advice that we would go home. I don't doubt but what some of them would have wished that we would go home, because I think they did find it very disagreeable at times for some of our people that were a little bit more brash than others, a little bit less diplomatic than others in striving to impose their will on the Vietnamese really against their will.

That wasn't really as great a problem as you might think it would be, though, because I think that really most of us recognized that it was going to be a long, tortuous-type endeavor in order to be able to come into an organization such as the

Vietnamese organizations were, with us having had a totally different educational background, a totally different environment, and almost no knowledge of the Vietnamese situation until we arrived there. I think most of us recognized that we couldn't walk in there and expect them to accept our recommendations initially until they did accept us as blood brothers, so to speak. I found that at the lower levels that it was not too uncommon for our lieutenants and our captains to be accepted far more readily than the field-grade officers were. The reason for that was because the young Vietnamese lieutenant or the young Vietnamese captain, in so many cases, was so ill-equipped and so immature and so uncertain of himself that he was really awfully glad in many instances to have the American adviser there, who more or less took over as the commander of that organization. Although we were not allowed to command an organization as an adviser, some of the more aggressive-type advisers almost accomplished that without really taking command. Their influence was so great and their leadership was so strong and their personal daring was so evident that the Vietnamese followed them just as if they had been informal commanders.

G: Did those Vietnamese units tend to outperform some others?

P: In those cases where I knew of advisers more or less acting as commanders, I thought that they were more successful. I thought that they performed more effectively than they did in many other cases where the Vietnamese would not allow the American adviser to act in such a role. But I can't say that we had too much success anywhere because in most instances we failed so miserably to achieve real great surprise, which was just essential, I felt. I felt it was just absolutely mandatory that if we ever expected to have real success against the Viet Cong, that we should be operating in exactly the same way that they operated. We didn't achieve that, and that, of course, is a different subject. It might be

studied for years as to why that the Vietnamese seemed to be so reluctant to set traps, to set ambushes, to have hundreds of listening posts and observation posts and strive to deal with the greatest degree of stealth and the greatest degree of secrecy. Where we had American advisers accompany units that did attempt to set up ambushes against the Viet Cong, it seemed that in every single case that someone within that organization, the ARVN organization or the militia organization, would inadvertently fire a round or inadvertently create some type of disturbance or make some sort of a noise that would alert the Viet Cong before they fell into the trap. Our advisers always felt that it was because of the fact that the Vietnamese [who were] friendly to our side had allowed themselves to become so obsessed with the idea that the Viet Cong were invincible, that they were apt to be impossible to whip, I think that they always felt that they would be massacred or that they would perhaps largely be wiped out if they were to entrap a Viet Cong organization in some sort of an ambush affair. I believe that one of the reasons for that was because of the disastrous experiences that most of the Vietnamese had had in going to the rescue of some unit that had been clobbered by the Viet Cong, and almost invariably the Viet Cong wiped the rescue organization out by setting a real skillful ambush for them. We had very, very poor success in conducting ambushes.

G: Now, this is basically in l962.

P: Yes, it was.

G: And yet, I have read several accounts, including communist sources, which say that 1962 was Diem's year, that was the government's year, that on balance the VC lost ground in 1962. Does that square with your observation?

P: This is a question that Mr. [Robert] McNamara was concerned about all the time in trying

to determine by some type of mathematical means how many weapons were being lost by the friendly Vietnamese forces, how many friendly troops were being killed, how many friendly casualties we were having as compared with the casualties and the losses of both materiel and people on the Viet Cong side. I always felt that it was a very, very difficult thing to make such an assessment. The Viet Cong were so skillful in retrieving their wounded and in concealing their losses, and the Vietnamese side had such a great tendency to exaggerate their victories and to minimize their losses that it was very difficult to really determine the truth of the matter. There is absolutely no question, though, but what our advisers could see that there was some progress being made during l962 in spite of the fact that most of the news people, the media, didn't accept that as being true. I have tried in recent years to tabulate a number of the achievements that we did make during that period of time, and I think it's surprising the things that can absolutely be established without question as being achievements that were not generally recognized by the media nor by most of the American people during that time.

As an example of what I am talking about, at the beginning of l962, the Vietnamese had very, very poor training facilities and they, in so many instances, were employing indirect fire weapons in the most indiscriminate manner without having fire control centers and without having any joint operation centers at all. Aircraft were being utilized in a very haphazard fashion. Communications were just almost hopeless because of the incompatibility of AM radios and FM radios and double-side band radios and single-side band radios and high frequency radios and low frequency radios. Even with the equipment that we received in the early part of l962, it was quite common to have an army-type aircraft fly by the side of an air force-type aircraft, or later a marine-type aircraft, and not be

able to communicate with one another or not being able to communicate with the ground forces that were participating in an operation. We worked constantly to arrive at some sort of a solution, and although it was largely improvised, before l962 was over we were able to communicate between most of these organizations that were being employed in what we would call a small joint operation. That in itself was just an enormous achievement.

The supply system and the maintenance system, the whole logistical system was a very, very poorly organized system when we first arrived. I can't say that it was enormously improved during that year, but it certainly was improved a great deal, largely due to the influence of the American advisers and largely through the logistical advisers in MACV and in MAAG. I think there was a mistake made in trying to cause corps commanders in the Vietnamese organization to accept responsibility for monitoring and supervising and commanding log commands as well as their own tactical commands because they were not that skillful. They were not that well-trained. They had never had such backgrounds, and this in effect overloaded them tremendously. So really they didn't do but very, very little toward establishing their logistical systems nor monitoring nor supervising those systems. They relied almost entirely on their subordinates, but their subordinates did a little bit better job than I ever dreamed that they would do, and I believe that accountability for materiel was much better before the year was over.

There is absolutely no question about it that before the year was over we did have Civil Guard organizations and Self-Defense Corps organizations and ARVN organizations, not only working together but in some cases working with the naval forces and with the air forces of different combinations. And although they were not too effective, they were enormously more effective than they were at the beginning of l962.

G: Did you ever have any contact with one organization that got a lot of press coverage way down south and that was Father Hoa's Sea Swallows, I think they were called?

P: I visited with Father Hoa quite a number of times. I don't doubt but that because of the fact that he was so colorful that he was given perhaps a little bit of a disproportionate amount of publicity for what he really did, but he apparently had developed a reputation that was pretty well known among the Viet Cong. They seemed to respect him a great deal, and when they ventured into his area, quite frequently small bands of Viet Cong were really clobbered. How that was possible is mysterious because Father Hoa had the most disreputable-looking group of people that you ever saw in your life. He had a pretty sizeable Chinese establishment with him, people who had come with him from China, and in many cases they were very old and very crippled, appeared to be malnourished, and yet they seemed to be extremely dedicated and extremely dedicated toward him.

When I would go there, I always, of course, was interested in operations that he had conducted and whether or not that they had actually in fact killed some Viet Cong or had they driven Viet Cong out of their area, and there was never a time that he didn't have a story to tell us about having encountered a small group of Viet Cong. He didn't claim that he was driving great numbers out of his area, but he did claim that they had annihilated small bands from time to time. And I had to believe that because most of the Ca Mau Peninsula was looked on as being a very hazardous place to go because the Viet Cong did have a pretty great stranglehold, I felt, on most of that area. But when you were in Father Hoa's area, it was pretty evident that they weren't too worried about the Viet Cong, right in the immediate vicinity where his little headquarters was, and they maintained a degree of protection for the great charcoal kilns that were in that area. That was the area where most

of the charcoal for Vietnam apparently was produced at one time, and even during that time that I was there, they were still in operation. To prove that they were in operation, as you approached Father Hoa's headquarters, if you were two or three thousand feet in the air, you could smell the charcoal kilns for miles at a pretty great elevation. So they were still being used, and the Viet Cong did everything they possibly could to stop the flow of charcoal. All of it, of course, was moved by *sampan* or by ship from the location of where those kilns were. They were very close to the coast, and as I understood it, they used mangrove trees and roots to produce their charcoal. But Father Hoa took it upon himself to offer a degree of protection for those charcoal kilns as well as for his little empire.

G: What was the secret? Did you ever figure him out?

P: He was the only priest I ever saw with a pistol around his robe, but he did wear one, and he seemed to have been the type of man that I would think had always been a very positive, very outgoing person, perhaps when he was a younger person back in China. But I believe that in talking with him, and talking with a few of his others through an interpreter, that most of them felt that they had reached the end of the world as far as they were concerned and that if they didn't defend themselves, if they didn't stand up for what they had there--which was very meager--that this was the end of life for them. I felt that they were a little bit like cornered dogs, that it was pretty dangerous to consider going in there to try to destroy them unless you had a pretty sizeable force, and apparently the Viet Cong never had that large a force in that area during the time I was there.

G: Whatever became of him, do you know?

P: I have not heard in recent years whatever may have happened to him.

G: Would you talk a little bit about the impact of the new weapons that came in 1962, the

helicopters and the armored personnel carriers? Did that change the picture in any direction?

P: I thought that it would be a tremendous advantage to have both the helicopter and the armored personnel carrier. As it turned out, even if we had been more efficient as advisers and if the friendly Vietnamese had been more effective as soldiers, I don't think that they would have been quite as effective though--and I'm speaking of the helicopter and the armored personnel carrier--as most of us anticipated that they would be. One of the reasons for that was that the Viet Cong used an intelligence system that was most effective. Since they lived largely in the hamlets throughout the Delta, and as I understood it, we had some six or seven thousand hamlets in all in the Delta country, and the Viet Cong had established such a reign of terror that they had made almost every villager believe that he would be executed if he didn't inform the Viet Cong of the approach or the presence of anything that was hostile, any hostile vehicles or any hostile personnel. For that reason, they established some very primitive means of detecting our helicopters pretty early. As early as they did detect them, they beat drums, or they beat pieces of metal as an alarm system, much the same as we used to think we would use that system for gas attacks back in World War II days. But they even scooped out the earth in such a way that they would form a saucer-type reflector that would pick up the noise of a helicopter engine for quite some distance away.

I think also that we were our own worst enemy in some cases. In reconnoitering an area where we intended to make an attack in that area, we sometimes flew over that area for too many times and in such a way that it became pretty obvious that there was to be an operation somewhere in that vicinity. This enabled the Viet Cong to be a little bit more alert in that area than they might have been otherwise. I think also the fact that the

helicopter was so short-legged that we had to pre-position our fuels and usually had to also establish a separate, or an extra, amount of security around that fuel whenever we did have pre-positioned fuel supplies in an area, and this again was a tip-off to the Viet Cong that there was to be an operation somewhere within the range of those helicopters that we were employing.

As you remember, the initial helicopters that were brought into Vietnam were the old banana-shaped helicopters that I believe were H-2ls, and they were even shorter-legged than the H-34s and later on the Hueys. The power unit for those old banana-shaped helicopters was the same engine that was used in the H-34, but because of the fuselage being heavier and a more clumsy-type aircraft, the aircraft was more clumsy and was shorter-legged. And then our reconnaissance helicopters were awfully short-legged, the little bubble-type helicopters that we used.

For all these reasons, the Viet Cong had some advantages in being able to detect the possibility at least that we intended to use helicopters in a heliborne raid. We had hoped that that might not be true, but the noise of the helicopter in an area that is largely a farming-type area can be heard for miles, and that was true with the armored personnel carriers. They were very much like the LCVPs that we used on the waterways. The LCVPs and the other type landing craft that we used proved to be almost a detriment except for just cargo-type movements that were not being utilized as a part of an immediate tactical operation. But those engines throbbed in such a way that I'm sure that you could say truthfully that they could be heard four or five miles, and being relatively slow machines it was very easy to be in a position to await our arrival. I rode the APCs several times and found that they could hardly negotiate the rice paddies at all. When we came to a

dike, quite frequently the dike was strong enough that it couldn't be broken by the approach of the armored personnel carrier, and it was so slippery that it couldn't climb that thing. In several cases, particularly at Ap Bac, we had, as well as I remember, nine or ten gunners that were manning .50 caliber machine guns that were killed during that operation. And the biggest reason they were killed--two big reasons--one is that there was no shield to protect the gunner, and the other thing was that they would get hung up on these dikes and couldn't go backwards or forwards. The Viet Cong soon discovered that, and it turned out to be not nearly as good a combat-type vehicle as we thought it would be. If the dikes had been smaller and if the canal banks had not been so steep, it might have been better, but in our area it was not very good.

G: You mention Ap Bac? Can we talk about that a little bit? Some people think that the battle of Ap Bac summed up an awful lot of the problems that we were encountering in South Vietnam. Would you say that's true?

P: I almost hesitate to talk about Ap Bac because we received a real bloody nose from the media because of Ap Bac. We also received a bloody nose from the Viet Cong there, but in my opinion, the media had not had the opportunity to observe the ARVN operations and the provincial-forces operations and the militia-type operations. Up until that time, the media had had very, very little opportunity to observe an operation, and even in this case, they didn't actually observe the operation itself, but they were very close by, and they did observe the area after the action was over.

There is no question about it, the Viet Cong gave us a real good bloody nose there and caused us to have, I think, considerably more casualties than they had. There are still debates over the total number of casualties. But the thing that was evident to most of us

was that at least the Vietnamese engaged a pretty strong Viet Cong force; they did their best to use combined-type forces, where we had representatives from the Civil Guard, we had representatives from several provincial organizations, and we had ARVN organizations. I believe that was from the 11th Regiment of the 7th Division, although there were only about three or four companies that were actually used. But these were regular army units that were engaged along with provincial forces, and this was one of the very first times that this was ever done where there was a willing cooperation between the province chief and the army commanders.

We also utilized, or tried to utilize, armored personnel carriers, and we tried to utilize artillery, and we tried to utilize the helicopters. We tried to utilize some supporting aircraft; we tried to utilize the airborne brigade, and there were some other forces that were utilized in that operation. All of this was really about the first time that this had ever occurred in what you might call a small joint operation. This was a real achievement to most of us because it had not been possible before. We also had a little bit greater chance to participate in the planning for that activity. The planning for Ap Bac was done largely by the advisers of the 7th Division along with the 7th Division commander and, to a certain extent, the IV Corps commander, Colonel [Huynh Van] Cao, who had been the VII Corps commander. By that time, I guess he was General Cao. But at least we had an opportunity to assist in the planning for this operation.

As it turned out, the intelligence was not too good. There was a clandestine radio that had been discovered not too far from the little place called Ap Bac, and this clandestine radio was pretty well--well, it was exactly spotted. As well as I remember, it was about one kilometer north of the little, tiny settlement of Ap Bac, all of this being several kilometers

west of the town of My Tho. The initial concept of this operation was that they would attack in an encircling-type operation, using helicopters for heliborne assault forces, and capture that radio and perhaps a Viet Cong headquarters there at the site of the radio. As it turned out, some of the forces that were supposed to be sealing off the south approaches to this area where the radio was happened to be in the vicinity of the little settlement of Ap Bac. It was at this time that it was discovered that the Viet Cong were apparently living in this hamlet along with the villagers at Ap Bac, and they attacked pretty shortly after these blocking forces moved into that region. Before they moved all the helicopters into the area, the fog and the weather conditions had made it almost impossible to bring in the second and the third and the fourth lifts as they had hoped they would. We didn't have enough helicopters to bring them all in at one time; it had to be done in relays. So there were some great delays in bringing these people in as we had planned initially, but it was caused because of the weather.

The stories that you've read and heard about the helicopters being shot down made it appear that it was because of the selection of the landing site being so poor. There has even been a study made by someone at West Point about the Ap Bac operation, and I believe it's alleged in there that due to the poor planning by the advisers, in combination with the Vietnamese commanders, that they selected a landing site that was wholly improper and that was just a disastrous area. This wasn't true. Actually, the troops that landed there could have landed with a very, very small number of casualties and did. But one of the helicopters, as well as I remember, turned over as it was hit, and the blades beat some of the troops to death and tore the helicopter up, but the other helicopter pilots were so loyal toward one another that they continued trying to come back to that helicopter and

pick up the crew from that helicopter. As a result, there were about three or four helicopters shot up that wouldn't have been under normal circumstances. This was not due to the selection of the landing site nearly as much as it was due to the fact that the helicopter pilots were loyal to one another and were, I think, quite heroic in going back, striving to help those other pilots, trying to rescue the pilots and their crew members.

The media, though, had been able to drive from Saigon down the highway to My Tho, and they descended on us like a bunch of locusts. They apparently had heard some of the briefings by eavesdropping. They were so appalled when they finally did see the after-action site to see these helicopters destroyed, or partially destroyed, that the news in the States, I suppose, made it appear that this was a colossal, disastrous defeat for us in Vietnam. It really wasn't. In my opinion, if they had seen some of the earlier actions, they would have thought that this was somewhat of a victory.

I have always been very, very much disturbed over the fact that some of the more prominent media representatives interrogated General Harkins about this affair, and because of the fact that General Harkins said that he thought it was a victory, they made quite a to-do over this as if he were making a statement that wasn't true. I think that there were several reasons that General Harkins made the statement that he made. I think one was that he looked on himself pretty much the same as any other military commander over a great organization. He hadn't been in Vietnam too long at that time, perhaps about a year, and I think that he felt that it would be highly improper for him to start talking about defeats, and especially to make it look as if this was a great strategic defeat when he looked on it as nothing more than just an incident, just a very—

(Interruption)

I can't say how he looked on himself--but I think that those of us that knew him well think that General Harkins was thinking of himself pretty much the same as Vince Lombardi or Knute Rockne or one of the great football players. That it would be highly improper for him, in the presence of his subordinate commanders and his staff, to say that we had suffered a defeat over something that was as trivial as Ap Bac was. And when I say trivial, I certainly don't mean to imply that the loss of our American forces and the loss of the Vietnamese forces was a trivial thing. I look on it as being a very disastrous thing, because if a man is killed in battle and he's the only one killed and there's only one bullet fired, he's just as dead as if he had been killed in a great battle, and I regret that tremendously. I regret the loss of any person.

But the overall number of people that were killed was not really very great as far as the Americans were concerned. And even from the standpoint of the Vietnamese losses, the friendly side, our losses were reasonably great but not nearly as bad as they had been lots of times where they had tried their best to go to the rescue of some organization that had been clobbered during the night and then in turn the rescue force was ambushed. And in several cases we had convoys that had been ambushed, and the total number of people who were killed in those ambushes was considerably greater than the total number who were killed at Ap Bac. I think we learned lots of lessons at Ap Bac, and if it hadn't been for many other circumstances, I really believe that that could very well have been a stepping stone toward improvements in lots of ways because we all recognized the deficiencies. We recognized the errors. We recognized the blunders that we made. But unfortunately, the news people made that sound as if we were a bunch of stumblebums and that the Vietnamese were worse than that, and this hurt the Vietnamese a great deal to be criticized

as much as they were.

G: Were there repercussions because of the press coverage of Ap Bac?

P: Repercussions from the standpoint of the Vietnamese. The people like General Cao and Colonel [Bui Dinh] Dam--Colonel Dam commanded the 7th Division and General Cao was commander of the IV Corps--they felt that the press coverage was unmerciful, and they really thought that the press was not on their side. The American advisers, of course, were very severely criticized, too, and particularly General Harkins. I have always felt very, very bad about that because I think he was a very great man. I think he was a man of great stature and am confident that he didn't misrepresent a thing in the world at the time that he was being interviewed about this battle.

G: I have heard stories that there were inquiries made from higher headquarters to learn who leaked to the press, who had talked, who had provided all this information, and that John Paul Vann was implicated.

P: General Harkins was, I think, very well convinced that John Vann had either inadvertently, or even perhaps deliberately, leaked some information to the press. I felt at that time that John Vann could not have done such a thing. I have never known a person that seemed to have been so dedicated as John Vann was, and I know from my personal experience that John Vann worked day and night. He came to my quarters sometimes at two o'clock in the morning and would wake me up and want me to go with him to do something because he was so fired up about trying to do something that would improve the situation and that could attain a victory there. There is no question but what John Vann was very impulsive, and I think that he made statements sometimes that proved later on to be somewhat inaccurate. But generally speaking, I thought he was the most outstanding young field

grade officer that I ever worked with. He could always be depended on in turning out the very finest product every time, no matter what it might be. If it wasn't anything more than a volleyball game or if it was an efficiency report or if it was a supply system or if it were a plan for an operation, it was always so thoroughly done and so well done and so accurately done. And he always supervised in such a thorough way, and his subordinates were so loyal to him, and I thought he was loyal to me, and I think he liked General Harkins very much.

I think that he was awfully prone, though, to criticize President Diem in perhaps an invalid way sometimes, or at least an unjustified way. And when I say that, I think that if you will read some of the things that John Vann said, that the press reported that he said--I've read in recent times where General Cao would tell John Vann that the reason that he didn't attack more aggressively in some cases was because that he didn't dare sustain too many casualties for fear that the President would fire him or that he would be severely penalized for having too many casualties. John Vann accepted that as being absolute fact, and then he would criticize President Diem for not being willing to allow his subordinates to take casualties. I don't think that was true. I think that there may have been a certain reluctance on the part of those commanders to have great numbers of casualties the same as there would be in our forces. We know that in American operations and campaigns that where a commander has lots of casualties, that due to the pressure of his superior commanders he has got to pretty well justify why he had that many casualties, and I think that might have been true in Vietnam, too. But I talked with President Diem a few times myself, and if he felt that way about casualties, he didn't reveal it to me, and I have always felt that John was a little bit prone to be willing to accept the statements that Colonel Cao or

Colonel Dam gave him as being absolutely valid when I doubt very much the validity of some of those statements.

G: Let me ask you to explain something about this casualty business. I have before me a summary that you gave me of the subjects that you covered in your final report before you left Vietnam. On the second page under point 3, "Characteristics of the Vietnamese Military Leaders," I go down to subnote G, and you note, and I quote, "Plans to Prevent Friendly Losses" unquote. Was this a problem? Were they too cautious many times?

P: Let me see what that [says]. I can't recall just exactly what my discussion was in that final report concerning that, but I suppose I was really talking about the fact that we had so many casualties on the Vietnamese side from having those little forts all throughout our area. We knew that that was just almost sure opportunity for the Viet Cong to kill great numbers of people. Those little forts were designed apparently by the French originally, and if they had been manned properly and if they were always alert and always had listening posts and had observation posts and people were awake at night, it might have not been quite so bad. But the Viet Cong were smart and they would allow a fort to go for months without being harassed at all, and it got to the point where the people in the little fort would bring their wives and their kinsmen and even their ducks and their chickens and their pigs inside the little fort. It wasn't too long until it was very obvious that they were sleeping, because when they were attacked, quite frequently the entire force was annihilated. The weapons would be taken, the ammunition was taken, and the ducks and chickens and pigs had disappeared.

I don't know for sure that that's what I discussed in that particular part or not, but the other part was the problem of so many of the Vietnamese on our side being killed in

ambushes, and we knew that if they would operate like the Viet Cong operated, if they would move by stealth, if they moved as much by foot as possible, and if they used any degree of security measures, that they could reduce their losses that way a great deal. These were the two greatest reasons why we had a large number of casualties in the area where I operated was through the ambushes that the Viet Cong established along the highways, and in ambushing these relief forces, rescue forces, and the attacks that they made against those little forts, as well as against the district towns and other towns that might have provisions, some types of supplies that made it desirable for them to steal or secure those supplies. That, of course, also pertained to boats along the canals and waterways because they did steal--they ambushed the *sampans* in some cases or the supply vessels that were being used. I think that's what I discussed in there.

G: You've touched on a point twice that I'd like to go back to, and that is that if we could have gotten the ARVN to operate more like the Viet Cong operated that we would have had more success. Am I correct in saying that you are something of a specialist in small unit tactics?

P: Other than the fact that when I was in Europe in World War II days I served in a number of different capacities. I was commissioned initially as an artilleryman, and back before I actually entered combat, I had a cannon company at one time. I did command a machine gun company, or what we called a heavy weapons company in that day and time, that was the caliber .30 machine gun and the 8l mm. mortar, and I had served at the infantry school for a number of years. But in Europe in World War II days, we had the opportunity ahead of time to practice time after time after time the operation of an infantry battalion in the breaching of massive fortifications. And at one time I was a rifle company commander. I

was later a battalion commander in those types of operations. And in Europe, that's exactly what we did. We breached the Siegfried line and did it in exactly the same way that we practiced doing these things. But as you would know, during all of those times, we were very, very much concerned about the individual [inaudible] with rifle squads and rifle platoons, and they played such a great, great part in the breaching of the Siegfried line, in the carrying of Bangalore torpedoes and satchel charges and the use of machine guns, both the .30 caliber machine guns and the .50 caliber machine guns, and firing at the embrasures of these pill boxes. All of these things, I suppose, makes you somewhat of an authority. I certainly wasn't a great authority, and I don't pretend to be.

G: Did you retire as an artilleryman or an infantryman?

P: No, I served as an infantryman throughout my entire military career. I had graduated from Texas A&M and was commissioned in the field artillery, but since there was a rifle company in the Texas National Guard, the 36th Division in my home town, after I graduated from A&M, I loved the military and so I joined the National Guard. But in order to be able to do that and to accept a commission in the National Guard, I had to resign my commission as an artilleryman and accept a commission as an infantryman. So I was an infantryman for several years in the National Guard before I ever went on active duty but served as an infantryman throughout the years in the service.

G: Would it be fair to say that you tended to look at the Vietnam picture through the eyes of a man who was used to thinking in terms of squads and platoons and companies and were interpreting the problem--?

P: I felt that way because of the experience I had at infantry school, too, because I served in the weapons department at the infantry school for four years, and there we were almost

entirely concerned--in fact, we were entirely concerned--about the weapons found in the infantry regiment. Since I served as a rifle company commander, a machine gun company commander, a heavy weapons company commander, as a battalion commander, and I served as a regimental executive officer at the end of World War II, I felt I knew about as much about infantry combat as most folks except for those that just had more prolonged experiences than I had at that type of work.

G: Well, let me ask you this. You've pointed out the terrific handicap under which an adviser had to try to impart his suggestions and ideas and recommendations and so forth, but if those had not existed, if you could have suggested almost anything to your counterpart with a pretty fair expectation that it would get done, could you have turned that situation around, do you think?

P: I'm almost afraid to answer that question because I really feel like not only a Monday morning quarterback, but I feel like a quarterback that's had an opportunity to think for twenty years of what I would have done, and I'm not sure now if I were to go back over there if I would have much better ideas than I had at that time about what to do about it. But since I've had twenty years to think about it, I've had lots and lots of feelings, and I really feel that the greatest reason of all that we didn't succeed any more than we did was that we not only went over there with preconceived notions based on our own experiences but we also had literally hundreds of so-called experts coming from not just the infantry school--but we did have people from the infantry school--[but] the artillery school, the engineer school, the transportation school, the aviation school, the air force, the navy, the Marine Corps, the State Department, every agency in government as well as scholars from great numbers of schools, all coming over. And it seemed that every single one had a

solution in their hip pocket for what we ought to be doing and it almost drove us mad. We could easily see that so many of the solutions that people offered, or suggested solutions, were impractical.

But I believe that if there was any one thing that was wrong in Vietnam during the time that I was there--and I certainly don't mean to try to extend this into the area where you had more or less conventional operations; I'm speaking of that period when we were almost entirely engaged against a guerrilla-type force--was that we were too sophisticated with weapons, with tactics, with equipment and with people, brains that were too sophisticated for the situation. I think that if we could have brought in people such as the Indian Gurkhas, if we could have fought like the Viet Cong, if we could have lived off the land ourselves--I don't think that American advisers were geared to that sort of thing--but I believe that if we could have, that we might have led our Vietnamese counterparts into fighting as the Viet Cong fought.

As I think over the years, this was the greatest handicap that we had was that we had taught the Vietnamese, through Leavenworth especially, what kind of operations that we expected to become involved in should we ever have to engage in tank battles in Europe. And in looking at the plans that the Vietnamese commanders had, a few of them had attended the associate courses at Leavenworth but had never attended a service school such as the artillery school or the infantry school, but they had attended Leavenworth and they had attended some French schools at about that level, so their operations looked almost as pretty. Their command posts had beautiful, wonderful-looking overlays and great spreads of maps and a sweeping operation to try to find the Viet Cong. It looked as if you were fixing to take off on a tank battle across the plains of Saxony in Europe, and this is

almost the way they operated. They would take a whole infantry regiment and stretch them across a mile or so of this rice paddy land in the Delta part of Vietnam, walking across the dikes of the rice paddies toward a hamlet two thousand meters in the distance, and then when they arrived there was no Viet Cong. Everybody welcomed. I am sure the Viet Cong was still there, but they offered them coffee, or they offered them whatever Vietnamese were drinking, *sake* or something else. They were almost entirely unsuccessful, and this is what I was talking about a minute ago, that I think that a good many of the Americans who had been there in the past were partly responsible for this, and it wasn't because anybody did anything that they thought was wrong.

But when I arrived in Vietnam--I can't remember for sure, and I wouldn't want to be held down to these figures--but I think that you would find that the number of tactical advisers that they had in Vietnam back in l96l amounted to some thirty or forty or something like that of tactical-type advisers, but I think that there were one hundred and forty logistical advisers at that time. They didn't go to the fields. They received information from Washington and from their counterparts in the United States at the appropriate levels about how that they thought that the Vietnamese forces should be equipped, what type of organizations that they should have, what kind of weapons they should have, what kind of ammunition they should have, and this is exactly what they did. The tactical advisers were so scarce, and they also didn't attempt to go any lower than about the division level, they really didn't know what was going on out in the field. It was just a strange situation in that I guess just after Ho Chi Minh allowed the South Vietnamese to establish a government under President Diem at the time of the Geneva Accords in l954, apparently we had that idea at that time that we should establish, or that we should assist the

Vietnamese in establishing divisions that would be very, very comparable to our infantry divisions and equip them pretty much the same way. And you'll find that the 7th Division, which was the division--the 21st Division, the 7th Division, and the 5th Divisions were in my III Corps Area, and the 7th and the 21st Divisions were in the Delta country. But they had a complement of tanks, they had heavy equipment almost exactly the same as if they had been an American-type division, where not only [were] these pieces of equipment not needed, but a great handicap because of the fact that they had to be maintained. And it was awfully hard to maintain equipment like that in that swampy wasteland.

When Colonel Cao started to have an operation when I first arrived there, he would assemble most all of the equipment he had in the vicinity of My Tho, for example, and this was a show of force. He didn't say that this was what it was for, but he brought this equipment in from various places, and it looked almost as if the Russians were fixing to have a parade on Red Square, and he told me that this would scare the Viet Cong pretty bad. When they'd see his assembled force, they'd realize that he was a pretty mighty man. So he would assemble this great amount of equipment, but it never did move. Those that did move, of course, the few trucks moved down a highway that might be open, but the greater amount of that equipment couldn't be used, and it was awfully hard to make some of our early American advisers realize that this was true.

G: It sounds as though you're saying that the 7th Division, for example, would have benefited greatly if someone had picked up all of the officers and noncoms and shipped them off to the swamp phase of the ranger school in North Florida and put them through a four-week course.

P: I don't doubt but what they might have been able to actually instruct us in the ranger school.

They had lived in those swamps all their lives, and they knew much more about how to live in such an environment than we did. They also knew how to use a lot of equipment that they already had that we didn't use after we started giving them this equipment. A *sampan* is a remarkable piece of equipment. The Viet Cong used those things so skillfully that they would move a force into an area and sink the *sampans*. We could see them from flying in a helicopter lots of times. But that was a fine thing. Then all you have to do to retrieve it is just to lift it up out of the water, empty it out, and start rowing again. They were silent, but we couldn't get them to use those things. It was the same way in Korea. After we brought in helicopters, you couldn't get *chogi* boys to go up those mountains anymore with ammunition. Everybody wanted a helicopter or they wanted a jeep. The Koreans were marvelous in having *chogi* boys to take ammunition up those mountains initially. The same thing applied in Vietnam. As soon as you started providing vehicles or helicopters, everybody wanted to ride, and I think that we're partly responsible for that.

I didn't mean to belittle the ranger school nor any of our efforts. I don't doubt at all but what they could have profited somewhat, but I think though--I served at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, back there in World War II days, in preparation to go to Europe. At that time it looked as if we might invade the coast of Norway, and we had Sir Hubert Wilkins with us most all of the winter, who was a great explorer and had been to the North Pole, and he had lived with the Eskimos. He criticized us most all of that time that he was with us because we didn't look to the Eskimo, look to those people that live in an environment like that, and design our shoes and our clothing and everything else like those people lived.

Well, that's all I'm trying to say about the Vietnamese. I think that if we had have really stopped to think, the Vietnamese were pretty well equipped to live with a handful of

rice, but they weren't at all happy when the American soldier brought C-rations and brought all kinds of other stuff along with them. You'd be surprised. This was kind of a difficult thing for our soldiers to eat C-rations in front of the Vietnamese because the Vietnamese usually didn't have any meat or anything, and even though we kind of sneered about the "beanie-weinies," whenever the Vietnamese saw that, they were just somewhat envious that we were rich people in front of them. I really think that if there had been some way or other of us being able to live more like the Vietnamese and to live more of a primitive type life, and especially to have adopted the same traits that the Viet Cong had--I think that if we could have gotten the friendly Vietnamese soldiers, the ARVN soldiers and the provincial soldiers to live with the villagers just like the Viet Cong did, if we could have stopped them from stealing their chickens and pigs, but if we could have gotten them to have lived with the villagers, this would have been a real great thing. And if we could have gotten them to have operated with the greatest degree of stealth and to attain the greatest degree of surprise--this was just hardly ever done.

G: Did you ever have opportunity to watch any of the Special Forces?

P: No.

G: They were not in your areas?

P: No, we didn't have any when I was there. I don't doubt but what they were pretty well trained along that line. But even so, I wonder today, when you read about the guerrilla forces, the terrorist-type forces such as the Red Brigades in Italy, I wonder if we're training anybody to operate in that manner. Should we ever find ourselves engaged in a battle in a foreign country, in a city, would we have anybody that could operate like the guerrilla forces do in the cities of Italy or wherever they might be? Are we training anyone to think

and act like an American Indian?

G: It's hard to believe that the army is taking that on. Perhaps somebody else is.

P: I remember real well that we had--I think it was what we called the B-26 in World War II days--that was shot down in Vietnam in my area, and it killed the crew members. I don't believe that there were but two or three crew members in the plane. They were used as light bombers and they even had some means of strafing, I believe. But anyway, this plane was shot down in my area, and we had an opportunity to have a pretty thorough investigation as to what may have happened. It appeared that there was one bullet that hit the pilot right square-dab in the face or, as well as I remember, in the face or the forehead, and it appeared that that was the cause of this man crashing. They were very low anyway. But I remember so well that people said, "Well, one bullet bringing down a B-26?" That's all it takes, you know, and I wouldn't have been surprised if it was a homemade weapon at that.

This is the reason that the Viet Cong were so skillful. They made real good use of the single bullet, and if you happened to have an automatic weapon, you're not half as apt to try to be skillful in the use of a whole bunch of bullets as you are if you just have one. In a good many cases, when I first arrived there in Vietnam, it was said by the survivors of a good many of these attacks, particularly where the Viet Cong had attacked these little forts, that the attacking forces in many cases were not armed. They didn't have any arms except small homemade arms, but they were so dedicated they crawled half the night to achieve a real great degree of surprise, and then they just absolutely overwhelmed the little old fort by coming over the parapets just simultaneously. But in many cases, they didn't even have a weapon. You have to be real dedicated to do that, you know.

G: Now, that brings up another question, and maybe this is an unfair way to put it, but you used to see it that way in the media quite often. Why is it that their Vietnamese are so much better than our Vietnamese? Why is it that our Vietnamese don't want to fight and their Vietnamese are, as in your words, so dedicated? Can you point to anything useful in that comparison?

P: I think I can answer the question all right, but I sure don't know the solution. I think that in our own country we fail miserably to teach our youngsters in this day and time the advantages of freedom, the advantages of nationalism, the advantages of patriotism, the advantages of being truthful and honorable and decent and a man of integrity, a man whose word is his bond. We don't seem to be able to understand how to teach people anything like that anymore. If you were starving to death, or if you had always been so poor that you didn't know where the next meal was coming from and you were a very ill-educated person, and somebody comes along and tells you that they can establish a government where everybody has everything they need--I suppose that's the key to the communist success is that they're always telling somebody that they're going to provide them with a government where everybody has all they need and that they no longer will have to search for a doctor or they'll always be provided with medications and that they will have food and that they will have shelter and they will have clothes. And when you go into a country like Vietnam and try your best to impose our will on them--even today we're talking about human rights, we're talking about civil rights, we're talking about establishing a satisfactory economy, in countries like El Salvador and Nicaragua--I don't believe those people even understand what you're talking about. I think that if you talk to them about that we're going to provide you ducks and chickens and pigs and whatever it is that they would love to have, I think

that would mean something to them. And I bet that the communists are telling them that if you accept communism, you will have seven ducks and four pigs and something that they can understand.

G: Well, it doesn't seem that's a very difficult program to get hold of. Why wouldn't we be able to get the same sort of message across?

P: I really can't answer the question. We discussed this a great deal as to why it was that an average Vietnamese--those that we worked with and those that were still at home--were peaceful, peace-loving people, people that we loved ourselves. They were really fine, and how could a brother come from that family and be as cold-blooded and as vicious as he was and a real skillful fighter, but particularly someone who had the initiative that they showed at the very lowest levels? Most of the instances that I knew about were these little forts that were being attacked. Usually it was just no more than an underscaled, undersized platoon, maybe even not that large a number of people, and yet if they killed the leader, apparently they always had some back-up leaders that were not educated people by any means, but they were so dedicated that they took over. And they even recovered their bodies. We had difficulty trying to get the Vietnamese that we worked with to help load wounded people on the helicopter to take them back to the aid station. They didn't have that much feeling for a wounded man.

G: That's a mysterious thing to understand.

P: Yes, it is. It sure is, and I'm just not sure. Perhaps you, with your experience in Vietnam, could answer some of those questions yourself better than I can. But at least during the time that I was there this was one of the primary things that we were concerned about was how can we possibly sell the Vietnamese on the idea that freedom is worth fighting for. I'm

afraid we didn't have much success in doing that.

G: We didn't have the ideology that would inspire people the way the Viet Cong had. We didn't have, I don't know, the common touch, or what--

P: Well, I think that's right, and I think there's another thing, too. I haven't gotten into it; I think maybe I did when I talked with you before. My counterpart that I worked with most of the time was General [Le Van?] Nghiem, who was the commander of the III--

G: Would you spell that for us?

P: N-G-H-I-E-M, I believe was his name, who was the commander of the III Corps. [He] was a man who absolutely never attempted to speak any English; I believe he was able to speak French. But he was a very quiet person and so he relied almost entirely on his deputy, whose name was Colonel Dhong [?], to work with me, and I appreciated that because Colonel Dhong could speak French [English]. He, of course spoke Vietnamese, but he spoke a pretty fair brand of English, and he talked with me at great length about my role as an adviser and his role as a Vietnamese commander. He told me that he had commanded a French *groupement* for a short time back during the time that the French were involved in their latter days of war there in Vietnam. Whether that is true or not, I do not know, but Colonel Dhong felt that the average American was so pampered, so well-fed, so well-housed, so well-equipped with vehicles and means of transportation and every single thing that we could possibly dream of in the way of comforts and conveniences that we couldn't begin to understand how a Vietnamese thought. He felt that we antagonized people a great deal, especially if they visited our country, that we always insisted on wining and dining them in the most royal fashion, that we loved to bring them into our homes. He said frankly that he had visited some American homes and that he felt that it was just like a

king showing his goodies to a beggar, and he couldn't help but be antagonistic toward the person who was showing him those things.

G: Exactly the opposite effect of what was intended.

P: Yes.

G: That's very interesting. How much politics entered into command decisions in the field?

P: Well, as far as I was concerned, I tried my utmost not to become involved in politics at all. I always felt that this was another thing that the media latched on to that very likely was not even true. They claimed all the time that I was in Vietnam that President Diem, being a Catholic, was favoring the Catholics and that he was brutal toward the Buddhists and perhaps some of the other lesser religious believers, those in those lesser sects over there. I don't think that was true because in my experience in the III Corps there were almost no Catholics in command of organizations. Colonel Cao was, and it may have been that one or two of his subordinates were. But Colonel Khiem [?] who commanded the 21st Division, and Colonel Thang [?], who commanded the 5th Division, were both Buddhists, and I never did really hear any of those people severely criticize the President for imposing on the Buddhists or being unfair. Colonel Dhong was a Buddhist. General Nghiem was a Buddhist. Colonel Dhong occasionally did say that he thought that old President Diem was favoring his brother and his brother-in-law and allowing them to have too much authority, Mr. [Ngo Dinh] Nhu, and I can't remember now what his priest brother's name was, but anyway, he more or less had command over a large number of provinces up there in the northern part around Hue. But Colonel Dhong used to make some snide remarks about that now and then.

The reason I say, though, that I don't really believe it was anywhere near as great a

problem as the press made it appear, you can't imagine the number of times Colonel Dhong, a Buddhist, called me at night and would say that he didn't know whether or not there was anything I should do about it, or that he didn't know whether or not the III Corps would be involved, but he believed that there were some efforts being made to stage a coup and that he just thought I ought to know about that. I usually would call, not General Harkins, but someone on his staff to advise them of that, and whether or not that was just something that was a put-on, I don't know. Now, a lot of folks felt, the press always said, that if there was a coup that Colonel Cao, the commander of the 7th Division at that time, would be the only one that would be advised. And I think that you will read where that the III Corps commander wasn't even advised at some time or another when Colonel Cao came to the rescue of the President. Well, I don't know that there's anything wrong about that, but I'm not even sure but what it might be the same in our own country. If President Reagan or President Carter or President Johnson were threatened with a coup, would it be wrong to think that they might want the most elite, the most loyal, the most faithful of the army or the navy or the Marine Corps units to come to their aid? I think that President Diem was forced to use those people that were available to try to establish a government, and if you think about it, when Ho Chi Minh left Vietnam, left South Vietnam, and President Diem was brought in from exile to establish a government, it's amazing to me that he could establish anything in the form of a government that worked as well as it did where there were so many disloyal people. Because you know that the Cao Dai sect and the Buddhists and others were vehemently against him when he came in.

So anyway, I really felt that he did a pretty noble job in being able to establish any form of a government or any form of a military organization, and I had lots of press people

asking me all the time about whether or not I would think that Big [Duong Van] Minh or Little [Tran Van] Minh or somebody else might not be a better president if they could get rid of this character--or not if they could get rid of him, but if he were to be disposed of. But as little as I knew about it, I couldn't really answer that question too well, but I think that anybody could see, now that twenty years have elapsed, that there probably were no better people than those that were in command at that time. I don't doubt at all but what President Diem and his brother-in-law, Mr. Nhu, and the others that he had in his immediate cabinet area, his advisers, I don't know that there was anybody any better than they were. Certainly when Big Minh came in he wasn't.

G: The thing that prompted my question was another point that you make in your summary of your final report. I think it's point J on page 3, and I quote, "Planning often influenced by secret directives from top government officials" unquote.

P: That's right.

G: Do you remember any instances of that?

P: No, but I think that's right, but I think there again that it was an unfair criticism necessarily. We as advisers didn't like it especially, but, yes, I think that President Diem frequently would give a secret directive to one of those people that he trusted the most, and Colonel Cao was one of them, there was no question about that, the 7th Division commander, and there were others. But I don't know that there was anything especially strange about that because we do that same thing in our own country to a certain extent. We always have--

End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview I

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