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Narrator Albert Harold Quie Address Dennison, MN 55018

Biographical information: Congressman; b. Dennison, Minn., Sept. 18, 1923; B. A., St. Olaf Coll., 1950; dairy farmer; rice company rep. Minn. Senate 1954-58; mem. 85th-93rd Congresses, 1st Dist. Minn.; mem. com. edn. and labor. Recipient Young Man of Year award Minn. Jr. CofC, 1957; Distinguished Service award N.E.A.; Legislative Statesmanship citation Council for Exceptional Children, 1969; Distinguished Service award vo-tech edn. Minn. Dept. Edn., 1970; Annual award Nat. Council Local Adminstrs., 1971; John Fogarty award Assn. Children Learning Disabilities, 1970; Am. Vocational Assn. citation, 1972; distinguished service awards Minn. State Coll. Bd. Minn. Council Exceptional Children, 1973.

Interviewer Stephen Goodell

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Narrator Albert Harold Quie

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INTERVIEWEE: ALBERT QUIE

INTERVIEWER: STEPHEN GOODELL

April 30, 1969

G: This is an interview with Mr. Albert Harold Quie, the Republican representative in the Congress from the First District of Minnesota. Today's date is April 30, 1969.

Mr. Quie, you were born near Dennison in September 1923.

Q: That's right.

G: And in World War II you were a Navy pilot. You attended St. Olaf College in Northfield, Minnesota, where in 1950 you received the Bachelor of Arts in political science. I have from your Who's Who biography that you were a farmer at one time.

Q: Right.

G: A former school board member and soil conservation district director, you received the Distinguished Service Award of the Northfield Junior Chamber of Commerce, and the Distinguished Alumnus Award of St. Olaf's College. In 1954 you were a state senator and in 1958 you were elected to the Eighty-fifth Congress in a special election. Since that time you have been a member of the United States House of Representatives.

Your committee memberships--I have you for committees on Education and Labor and the Committee on House Administration.

Q: For nine years I was a member of the House Agriculture Committee. That was the first committee I was assigned to in February 1958. Then in '59 I went on Education and Labor dropping off of the Select Committee on Small Business. In 1967, when so many new Republicans were elected to

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Congress,in the necessity of committee assignments anyone who had two major committees had to drop off one, so I chose to drop off Agriculture and stay on Education and Labor, and then for periods served on the House Administration Committee.

G: I'd like to begin by asking you about your personal contacts with Lyndon Baines Johnson and then move from there into more topical and chronological areas. What has been your personal contact--you can just repeat what you told me off the record.

Q: Well, personal contact would be when there'd be an opportunity, say, at a White House reception or a bill signing when Lyndon Johnson was the President. For the period when he was Vice President I doubt if I ever shook his hand. When he was the Leader of the Senate, there would be an occasion where I would meet him and say a few words to him but not enough so that he would ever remember back then, I think. He knew me very well after he became President.

G: Okay. In the 1958 to 1960-61 period when he was still in the Senate, what was his technique? A lot has been said, a lot has been written, about the Johnson technique or the Johnson treatment. What is your impression of the way in which he functioned as Senate Majority Leader?

Q: The way he would handle a member, as it was related to me by the members that were handled that way, is that he'd take both lapels on individuals and stare them right in the eyes and talk to them. If that treatment doesn't get somebody to start saying, "Yes," I don't know what else would. I think that was also indicated when he became President--a style of it--when he'd pick up the phone and call people. And as many members said, "What do you say when the President asks you to do it?" I mean, he'd pretty likely say yes. He didn't depend on his staff people the way

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Kennedy had, which developed the name "the Irish Mafia" for his supporters that were up on the Hill.

I thought that Lyndon Johnson, when he was in the Senate, and Sam Rayburn ran a very effective operation between both the House and the Senate with the Administration and the other party and my party, the Republican party. I thought that both of those men placed their country first when they handled the power they had in those two bodies. The extreme partisanship that you might expect, I never really saw. I've noticed sometimes that as much as he tries to follow in the footsteps of Sam Rayburn, there is an occasional time when John McCormack slips in to partisanship. Rayburn in my time observing him never permitted that to happen. Of course, I was a little farther off with Lyndon Johnson, but I thought the same was true of him. The effectiveness that Lyndon Johnson seemed to have was a quick grasp of the overall subject of legislation. I never felt he went into details very much, leaving that up to committee people. I think the same thing is true after he was President, that he never went into details of the operation of, let's say, the War on Poverty and OEO or the education bills that he pushed so hard because he wanted to be known as the Education President, or the Teachers' Corps either.

G: In this period, 1958 to 1961, did you form any opinions of Johnson in terms, for example, of his political stance? You said that he seemed to avoid partisan conflict more in the interests of national--

Q: Yes. It didn't mean that he didn't stick up for his party and that he wasn't an ardent Democrat and all, but I seemed to feel--and I think my colleagues do-- that it came through a real desire to do what is best for the country. Sometimes I felt that he led his party in a less

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partisan effort than he would easily have done if he succumbed to human and partisan traits, that he certainly had, which is evidenced at times, but was able to keep it under control. That's the kind of operation now. You know he had a reputation of being a wheeler-dealer, and I wouldn't say it came from intimate experience that would cause me to say that. I was pretty young and a freshman in '58 and new in the Congress, you know, for '59 and '60, so I wouldn't have had the opportunity to make those judgments as I would later on.

G: Did you feel that this was a man with presidential ambitions?

Q: I at least think I heard it enough and had enough related to me to have accepted this, that this was an individual with presidential ambitions. I would say most of this was stories or incidents that were related back to me from people who were with Johnson at a certain time rather than intimate experience of my own.

G: How did Johnson and Rayburn work together? You started to go into that a little bit. Did they have an intimate liaison going--they were vote-counting all the time?

Q: They must have had a good liaison between each other, whether it was individuals who contacted each of them back and forth. Being Texans, I think, helped because there's a tendency for Texans to feel that kinship that many people from other states laugh about, but it's still there. I also feel that kinship exists between members of the Texas delegation even if they are of a different party. I think Texas comes first amongst them, and I think that must have helped Johnson and Rayburn. But, of course, there were years of experience with Rayburn, and Johnson must have been a protégé of Rayburn and he learned his lessons well. It sounded to me that Rayburn quite well understood Johnson's ego, and this

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was effective in the way Rayburn used it, too.

G: What kind of an ego do you feel that Johnson had?

Q: I think the kind of ego that he had is what gave him the drive to be President, to be number one, to be running the show. He was running the show when he was in the Senate and there wasn't any question about that. I thought I could feel the chafing he had when he wasn't running the show as Vice President, and there's no question he was running the show when he was President. That was observable when you were in the White House, the way he gave directions to people--and this in details. This is why it was a surprise to me that he did not seem to interest himself in the details of legislation. But the details of the activity around the White House he certainly was in full control of, as well as the major decisions for the country.

G: There's been a good deal of comment that Johnson had to make a transition from a Texas Southern politician to a national politician. Do you see evidence of this or do you make that kind of interpretation yourself?

Q: I do on civil rights. When you look at his voting on civil rights questions when he was in the House and in the Senate, I thought he voted as a Southerner would. And he certainly made the full transition to being President of the whole nation when he supported so strongly a number of civil rights bills.

On liberal legislation, I don't think that's true. He had a liberal voting record. In fact when you look at that, Kennedy was the conservative and Johnson was the liberal. I think Johnson truly had Franklin Roosevelt as his pattern and tried to do as well as he had done. It's odd that Kennedy came across, you know, with a liberal image in the country and Johnson with a conservative image. I think his earlier civil

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rights voting was what gave Johnson the conservative image but it surely wasn't that in his voting pattern.

G: Personally, were you surprised when the Democratic national convention and John F. Kennedy selected Lyndon Baines Johnson to be Vice President?

Q: Yes, I certainly was. It seemed incongruous to me because I saw the two of them were competing so strenuously for the nomination, and they didn't seem to fit each other. It's the kind of combination that political strategists would put together, but say they'd never agree to do it--you know--with the different parts of the country, the different support from not only regional but it seemed also within the party, and the makeup of the men so completely different. It seemed to me that both of them had to swallow their pride pretty strongly in order to agree to the marriage.

G: How would you describe Johnson as Vice President? You made some earlier comments, you say you felt he was chafing--from the lack of power, I suppose!

Q: Yes, the lack of power and the lack of action. We always hear about the "new era" when Eisenhower gave Nixon more responsibility and more authority, and the same was supposedly true that Kennedy was to have added onto Johnson's responsibility from previous Vice Presidents. But I certainly didn't see it. I didn't think that Johnson was really carrying or working on the Kennedy program up here after those early days--you know, at first when he just stepped out of the Senate and Mansfield took over. Then there was enough action up there when he presided over the Senate so it looked like he was still the Majority Leader of the Senate. But it didn't take long for that to leave as far as a person over on the House side could observe. I just felt that he

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wasn't pulling on the reins at all as far as the national government was concerned.

G: Was there a significant difference in the operation of the House and Senate after Johnson and Rayburn had left--one who died and one who became Vice President?

Q: Yes. It was pretty big. Of course, a part of it was a fact that there was a change in administration--would be a cause of it--because the administration was in the same party as the Congress. But under Kennedy, the Congress really did nothing--virtually nothing--in passing a program of the President. President Kennedy got the Peace Corps through and that's about it. The Congress just wasn't moving in response to the President.

At that time, of course, Mansfield and McCormack were the leaders, and they both had a different method. I would say that Mansfield surely couldn't, by any means, be called a wheeler-dealer. He just didn't have the trust. I think Humphrey had more of that strength than Mansfield has. I think McCormack had to overcome the extreme partisanship that he had as Majority Leader and the natural way a person of his background would have in relating to the members. There was a complete change from Rayburn.

G: Is that you're saying a comment on the efficiency of Congress without leaders of the prestige, of the strength, of the capabilities of men like Johnson and Rayburn?

Q: I think so. The Congress, since it depends so completely on seniority, I think is dependent on the strength of the leaders that it has. Now, under the committee system you have men who are way past their peak. It isn't going to be a very active Congress if the elected leadership

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of the Congress, which turns out to be the leaders of the party in power, does not have the strength that both Rayburn and Johnson showed. I think the archaic Congress shows its wrinkles a lot more than good strong leadership permits it to do. I think we're more and more aware that Congress is ripe for reorganization because of this.

G: Was Johnson used to act as a legislative spokesman for Kennedy? Was he overseer of the legislative program for Kennedy?

Q: If he was it wasn't observable to me. I thought that the overseer of the legislative proposals of Kennedy were the staff people which gained the name of the Irish Mafia.

G: I'd like to shift now to Johnson as President and I'd like your comment, if you could, on that rather traumatic transition period immediately after the assassination. What were your impressions at the time of Johnson's becoming President--how he handled that transition?

Q: I think the Kennedys made it difficult for him because they seemed to rebel against the idea that Johnson now should be the President. It just seemed as though they couldn't stomach it. And the ones who were the closest to him seemed to be ready to move out and leave him to his own devices. I thought the kind of humbling effect and the bringing out of greatness in a person that is there, whether it be latent or not, was happening to him as it did to Truman when he became President. I was flying in the Navy at that time and, for some reason or other, it sticks in my mind as though it had just happened--the kind of humility that caused Truman to ask for the help of everyone, and Johnson also, and add the words "and God." I think Johnson had that strong feeling and a recognition that the buck stopped at him and he had to make decisions, and he <u>did it</u> from then on. That doesn't mean that people

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make the right decisions, and in many cases he didn't. But I thought that he always was a decisive President, and in those early days I thought that the lack of training while he was Vice President was apparent. He hadn't had a chance to have the schooling in assuming the reins. It seemed to me that they must have kept him quite a ways away from the reins while President Kennedy was living.

So he had to learn on the job as well. But he didn't let that slow him down at all because he moved ahead and made some substantial progress even that first year before he was elected for a term as President. For instance, he took the Kennedy programs and refashioned them into his own.

When you talk about the War on Poverty or the Office of Economic Opportunity, these were Kennedy proposals that had other names but

--interruption--

But what Johnson did was to develop an effective means, or through his own prestige, or power, or wheeling-and-dealing, or however you want to put it--was able to pass legislation under his name. He felt he had to have it going into the campaign, which he did. So passing legislation he was able to do. Of course, this was just a forerunner of the kind of avalanche of proposals that came up and were passed without scrutiny in the Congress. That shows again that he was using the ability that he developed as leader of the Senate when he became President in order to pass legislation. The effectiveness in which he passed legislation while he was leader of the Senate was proven again then.

To show you how really ridiculously haphazard Congress was in this haste to pass his legislation, I can use the Elementary and Secondary Education Act as an example. What the House tends to do is to provide

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equally to people, because a majority of the House members come from the about eighteen wealthiest states--above the average. The Senate, on the other hand, tends to give the poorer states more money because a majority of the senators come from the states that are poorer than average. So we'd compromise--we'd tend to work out the difference some place between the equalization, giving poor states more or giving everybody the same from the House. But when the Elementary and Secondary Education Act went through the House, there was put in there a formula to give the richest the most and the poorest the least, and it went through the Senate without a change. In fact, they didn't even change some typographical errors, they were in such haste to pass it. Now, to me that shows that the 89th Congress was a "Rubber-Stamp Congress" and rushed things through.

G: Let's take the '63-'64 session when, as you've suggested, a good deal of the Kennedy legislation had been blocked in the Congress. Then Johnson took some of this and added some of his own to it. Would the Kennedy legislation, do you think, have passed had Kennedy lived?

Q: No.

G: Or do you think it would have continued in that stalemate situation?

Q: I think it would have continued in the stalemate, that it would have gotten worse as time went on, and the 1964 campaign would have had the worst expression of hate that we have seen in this country. We see hate expressed on the campuses now. We saw some people expressing hate when Goldwater ran against Johnson in '64. But that was nothing compared with what was building up in the country while Kennedy was there. I doubt that legislation would be passed. I felt that it was completely stymied.

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G: If it was the same legislation, then why was it that Kennedy couldn't get it passed but Johnson could?

Q: Of course, you have to give credit to the fact that Kennedy was killed and the country felt guilty for it--not just people in the country but you could say that the country felt guilty for it and remorse for the hatred that it was building up within itself. That has to be a part of it, it's true. But the capability of Lyndon Johnson of passing legislation showed itself. I think it proves that he was given no part of the reins when he was Vice President but when he took the reins, that his ability that he learned in the Senate, he put into full use. I'd put the credit more with Johnson than anything else.

G: In the 1964 congressional session with the Civil Rights Bill, with the Office of Economic Opportunity being established, with the tax cut, a whole host of other measures, was there any conscious recognition on your part or other members' part that this might have been designed as a campaign platform? In other words, was the campaign of '64 omnipresent? Was that a consideration in your minds or was it a consideration in the Democratic administration's mind?

Q: You mean after--

G: During the summer before the campaign.

Q: Yes. Oh yes. I thought it was, and as we talked we thought it was clear too that this would be the legislation that would be used as the issues in the campaign in order to bring in a Congress with him, as well as himself. You know, Republicans tend to delude themselves by talking to themselves so much they don't realize when they're in trouble, and they've been in trouble in some elections. I thought that that year they perhaps deluded themselves less than most any other time. Now I'm not talking

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about the Republicans in the Congress.

G: I'm not sure I understand what you mean by that.

Q: The fact that I think in 1964 the Republicans were aware of the issues, they were aware of the opportunity this gave Johnson in the campaign and realized that effect this would have in the House races and Senate races, as well. Now, this is members of Congress. I think they could kind of feel the debacle coming. We talked of it a lot before we ever left Congress, that this was on its way. I don't think people back home or delegates to the convention felt this, or they might have picked somebody else to be our standard bearer--at that time when they might have picked some younger people to be the Republican candidates against incumbent Democrats at that time because in 1964, if I recall right, the average of the Republican candidates against incumbent Democrats was something over sixty years of age. It was kind of weird that we would ever field old people like that.

In 1966, we had such a great victory and then the average age was something like forty-seven.

G: You were at the 1964 convention.

Q: That's right.

G: Did you support Goldwater that year?

Q: No. No, we tried to stay out of the mainstream by supporting Walter Judd and voted for him on the first ballot. So you could say that the State of Minnesota was "chicken" that year and didn't make its stand at all.

G: Would you like to comment on what you think in retrospect were the significant bills of 1964? I've mentioned a few of them but they're sort of the conventional ones. I know that you've been in opposition to a number of these. What do you think have been the most constructive?

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Q: Oh, the constructive legislation--I think the work in water pollution and air pollution have been extremely good. The programs in agriculture legislation I think made the changes that were necessary then to get away from the old traditional laws that had been on the books since 1933 in one form or another, that caused so much controversy in the rural area. Specifically I mean that we now had agricultural legislation that commodities could move at world prices in the world market and a method where farmers could at least be protected on their income even though they weren't assisted in getting better income. You know, they have still a low income and low percentage of parity. But at least they had the protection, with the possibility of moving commodities. We got rid of surpluses. I think that was good. I think we made some steps in educational legislation that were necessary. There were some bad mistakes in the legislation and if the Congress had actually done its work and studied the legislation and made its input, we would have fared much better. An example of where it had done its work--and I should add this for another piece of legislation on to the time when Kennedy was President--was the Manpower Development and Training Act. There was a good cooperative venture between Republicans and Democrats, the Congress and the administration, and a far superior bill was passed than was sent up by the Administration, than was recommended by Democratic members of Congress, than was recommended by Republican members of Congress. But the composite I think was good legislation. Of course, we have the other ones, the Poverty legislation and so forth that ran into all kinds of controversy.

G: Maybe we can turn to OEO and the '64 session. If you like we don't have to stick to 1964. We can talk about the topic.

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Q: Through 1965, yes.

G: I have read comments to the effect that in 1964 the administration ramrodded the bill through the committee. People have made these statements. I think some committee members made this statement--that the committee really didn't have the opportunity to study the bill as it should have been and to examine it as closely as it should have been. Are you in agreement with this interpretation?

Q: Yes. That's right. I can't cite right now the number of witnesses and the days of hearings and so forth but that surely was the case then. It was rammed through with little time to make much change.

G: What would you have liked to have seen in terms of a poverty program in 1964? I am aware that you have proposed certain alternatives subsequent to that time. But in 1964 did you feel this was inadequate, that this wasn't what was needed? Did you take issue with specific parts of the bill? Were you willing to make or to commit yourself to an anti-poverty effort if it was altered?

Q: On the general picture of it, I felt that there were two things that were failing, that would cause it to fail. One was that the states were completely bypassed. As I have observed federal assistance, I've felt that the programs are stronger and they're accepted better by the people when the states share in the administration. Now, this can be in a number of ways--one, turning over some administration to them as we do in education or where there is a share by both of them--for instance, some of the Labor department programs or where the federal government appoints a state official as in the case of agriculture. But in each case I feel the states should have been involved.

The second one was, I felt that they hadn't gone far enough in

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ensuring to the poor who were to be beneficiaries of the program a part of the action to participate in developing policy. That's why, of course, I've pushed to make sure that one third of every Community Action Agency have to be representative of the poor.

Looking at the Job Corps, I felt that they had just made a mistake there of trying, one, to recapture CCC days; secondly, not having the machinery to identify where the jobs were and the kind of people that needed residential facilities. But, you know, they just wanted to get some great program going without the kind of development in it--for instance, as they did in MDTA where you move slow, were sure of the ground, and then move faster as soon as you knew the right road to take.

G: One of the points that interests me personally is that for all of the controversy that has erupted since 1964 over the Community Action Program and maximum feasible participation, is that during 1964 there really was very little discussion about this issue or this topic.

Q: That's right.

G: What's the reason for that?

Q: I don't think most people were aware of the fact that they were going to fund the revolution. When it got into operation they found individuals in control who--they were shocked.

--interruption--

If this was back in the days of Senator Joe McCarthy, you know, he would have had all the names you wanted to point out, groups who were unsavory to the so-called American Way. But we've gone 'way past the McCarthy Era so that many extremely militant individuals who share philosophy that has been foreign to the United States have gotten strong prominence.

Now, I don't feel that this has come from the individuals who have

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been selected by the poor to represent them, or the agencies that help the poor, or the public officials who have served on local Community Action agencies. These are more professionals who have been funded by the federal government, and that comes from just the attitude in the U.S. office and the Office of Economic Opportunity.

It comes from what I call a "Peace Corps Concept." You put people in charge who don't know anything about the programs so they won't be hampered by old traditional views that just aren't accepted. In the early days of OEO, social workers were an anathema. Traditional educators were--anybody who had had training and years of experience just wasn't accepted. They wanted new people who had never worked in that area. I think that's why they got off on the wrong track. When we talked about maximum feasible participation, I brought it up and talked of it in the committee but nobody really interested themselves in it. You couldn't get in a discussion to discuss what maximum feasible participation really meant--who they intended. The next year, of course, that was a pretty big subject.

G: Yes, I think that Jack Conway, who headed the Community Action Agency at the beginning stages, set up a three-legged stool concept, and then that subsequently became law.

Q: That's right.

G: And that was your amendment.

Q: That's right. That was my amendment. I put it in because some had three-legged stool and others didn't. They had to fight to get their way in, and then they constantly had a battle on how they were going to select them. Most people in OEO didn't think the election process was advisable.

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G: Let's take 1964 to the present. In your opposition to certain aspects of the bill, or the Office of Economic Opportunity, have you ever been contacted because of this opposition by members of the administration? And secondly, have you been contacted by people in OEO?

Q: Very little. It's surprising how little the OEO would work up here. In fact, since the Economic Opportunity Act was passed in such a partisan way, it seems that people in OEO looked at the Republicans as the enemy, not as something that they could work out a compromise with to get them on their side. Their liaison just wouldn't come here and work with them when they developed the new legislation, to come up and say, "Well, how can we alleviate some of the criticism that you have made of us?" Other departments did. I had a great rapport with HEW and the Department of Labor but not with OEO.

G: Do you think this might have had something to do with the fact that Adam Clayton Powell was the chairman of the committee at the time?

Q: No. I didn't see it change after Adam left as chairman of the committee.

G: There's been a good deal of comment made about the so-called Yarmolinsky affair in 1964. Do you have any knowledge of this?

Q: I recall it, and I would say that the Yarmolinsky affair was used by those who were opposed to OEO to gain some more support from individuals, especially Southerners. That's what I observed.

G: Do you think that the Office of Economic Opportunity in the War on Poverty, subsequent to its passage in 1964, has conducted the kind of operation that has been effective? Or do you think that its demise, or seeming demise, during this administration now is warranted?

Q: I think its demise was in the works for some time. I felt that this had been happening ever since Shriver went to Paris. It's been on the wane

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ever since. There are some programs that started out good that were well accepted, like the Head Start, but they slowed down and made little progress in the last couple of years. They kind of stayed the same in that period. In fact, I feel confident about it that in this Administration Head Start is going to expand. Pre-school child development programs are going to come into their own and this is going to look like pretty small stuff compared to what it will be doing two and three years from now.

The Job Corps still has to find itself. OEO wanted to keep the Job Corps rather than send it over to Labor because they wanted to make some early successes to point to with pride and it ended up that nobody wanted the Job Corps because it ran into so much difficulty. I think the Department of Labor is on the right track now--that is, after this transition phase is over--to move people into day programs close to home where they can benefit from them and not send them away to residential facilities--and only use residential facilities when individuals cannot reach their training program from home or need the change in environment in a residential atmosphere as what is necessary to make the correction. I think now we'll make some strides and improvements. There's a tendency to move from one administration to another and make those kind of improvements, especially when you change parties,and I think it's going to happen here.

G: I don't want to sound facetious but the Quie-Goodell dissent almost resembles the Holmes-Brandeis dissenting in the Supreme Court. There was a good deal of Quie-Goodell[Sen. NY] teamwork before he came to be Senator and after Senator Kennedy's assassination. Were you deliberately doing this? Were you operating as a team?

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Q: Yes, we were operating as a team, and doing it deliberately, yes. We felt that one could assist the other and get farther than if we just did it all by ourselves.

G: You seemed to be in opposition to members of your own party a considerable amount of time, especially with regard to this maximum feasible participation. I'm thinking especially back to 1967 and the so-called Green amendment. I think you were in opposition to that.

Q: That's right. Yes, I found opposition of my views in my own party a number of times as Congressman Goodell did, but I can't understand why this should be with members of our party if they think that the real philosophy of the Republican party is to involve individuals, and the equality of all individuals in here to give an opportunity to poor individuals seems to be the philosophy that I surely learned as a Republican. I always thought of the Democratic party as one of centralized power, direction out of Washington. So now that the federal government is assisting and writing programs, it just seems to me that the natural Republican philosophy ought to be to give some power and responsibility to people locally and especially those who are to benefit from the program. That's why I think it had appealed to so many Republicans even though in our own party there were some--and in the House--who opposed it. It was interesting in the 1966 election how many of those new Republicans came in and said, if there's any one issue that helped them most, it was the opportunity crusade that Goodell and I had done in the poverty field.

G: Of course, OEO maintains that the Opportunity Crusade would demolish the whole War on Poverty.

Q: Yes, they did that, as others use the expression, gut the bill or, as a number of the Southerners use the analogy, like a fellow saying,

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"Hold still little fish, I won't hurt you. I'm just going to gut you." But anybody who reads the Opportunity Crusade can see that that was not the case. We would have given some more responsibility to the states, substantially more responsibility to people who were to benefit from the program, get into the kind of skills centers ideas that now the Department of Labor is moving into that proved out in the trial basis under the previous administration. So a number of the ideas we have are now being put into practice, like in VISTA, instead of sending him a long way from home, you know--the old definition of an expert--we talk about hometown VISTA, people doing their volunteer effort where they know something about the community. So these are the changes, I think, we're moving into, and from what I can see we're going to be proven right in the end becuase that seems to be the direction that the Poverty Program has been tending. I felt that this could not be true because a number of the individuals who helped us in our development of the Opportunity Crusade were people who had had a great deal of experience in the War on Poverty and could see from their experience the new directions it ought to go.

G: Let me present to you an interpretation and I'd like your comment on it--that in 1967 people in OEO foresaw a very bad session coming up from their point of view. It looked as if opposition to the War on Poverty as it was structured at that time would succeed in either spinning off OEO programs or eliminating OEO altogether. I think Shriver's opening testimony was directed to that issue. I think I asked you earlier whether you saw any evidence of the Johnson Administration's support of this program--but is it fair to say that up to 1967, through 1964, 1965, 1966, that the Johnson Administration had supported OEO as it existed in terms of increasing its appropriations, maybe tightening

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up some of the legislative aspects of it, but during the 1967 session and after 1967 that this support was lacking?

Q: That was pretty evident. And even though the Office of Economic Opportunity was in the Office of the President it was being run as though the President had forgotten it had existed. It surely didn't have the prominence which would enable the Director to be able to coordinate anything with Cabinet-level departments. It was a sub-agency and very much below Cabinet-level departments.

G: Do you have any explanation for this?

Q: I imagine it fell out of favor because of all the controversy that developed in communities over Community Action and over the opposition to Job Corps programs; that the local elected officials who were extremely unhappy, and being so many of the big cities were controlled by Democrats, that they had an open channel to the President to express their unhappiness about it. I think that must be the reason why they fell from favor with President Johnson.

G: I want to turn now to another topic away from the War on Poverty. The 1965 89th Congress, according to some, is the "fabulous 89th" and can point with some pride to the great number of significant legislative acts that were passed. You were involved in the Higher Education Act with reference to the Teacher Corps. I'd like your comments on that.

Q: Yes. The Teacher Corps was another proposal that somebody had sold to President Johnson, and he made a speech in favor of it. As far as the work in the Congress was concerned, there was very little development of a Teacher Corps. In face, over in the House side, there was one day of hearings and one witness. That was Senator Nelson of Wisconsin, who was an author of the bill and definitely could be called biased about it. It

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was not included in the House language. When we went to conference, the Senate was quite willing to set it aside, and we'd take it up another year and try and develop a Teacher Corps so it was more acceptable to more people. After the agreement--and then they went to HEW and they said, "Oh, no, this is the President's pet and you've got to keep it in." So they decided, "Well, we'd better try and keep it in."

After marked controversy and debate about it, they again decided to drop it, and they called Bethesda where the President was recuperating from his operation. The report supposedly came back--it was reported to us--that we'd better keep it in or he'd have a relapse. And the Democrats went and put it in. This is kind of ridiculous, passing legislation with as little thought as that and just that kind of a reaction to why it ought to remain in the legislation. This got it off to a bad partisan reaction, too.

One of the reasons why it was questioned so much--anyway this was my [idea] and I heard it enough from enough of my other colleagues, so I think this is strong reason why there was opposition--is that this was a program, as it said in the bill, that would be directed from the federal level--selected, recruited, and enrolled in the federal level. They'd take the names of the people who wanted to go into the Teacher Corps, feed them into the machine which would evaluate them, and out would come the names that were acceptable. Then they'd send them to the universities for their training. It wasn't until we gave it a local flavor, that is the prospective Teacher Corps enrollees would choose the part of the country they wanted to live in and work in and train in and then an agreement would be developed between the university and the schools in its community for Teacher Corps members, that it really got a

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stability to it and acceptability by Congress. But the partisanship that it engendered in its early days in its first passage has carried over to where it hasn't been funded at the level it would have otherwise. It's been funded at a very low level to get rolling. I think the Teacher Corps now is operating well, and ought to be continued and expanded some but there doesn't seem to be that kind of support around Congress for it.

G: You mentioned the partisanship that accompanied so much of this legislation. What do you think the reason for this is? If Johnson as a Senator or Senate Majority Leader could avoid this kind of partisanship and yet as President seems to impel it, what is the reason for it?

Q: I imagine it may go back to his ego again, and as President it has to have a Democratic flavor to it to really be sure it's his so that Republicans can't get too much credit for it. Maybe it was after the '64 campaign where it looked like he had a mandate, and this may have given him urge to move harder than otherwise he would have done to alienate Republicans--and he never was quite aware of the necessity of Republicans his last two years as he should have been.

I think it also has to do with some members in the Congress in the leadership there, the tendency to be more partisan than Rayburn or Johnson were, and therefore it might feed the flames and he, not knowing how to smoothe out the waters as he was able to do as actual Leader of the Senate and have his ally Rayburn in the House. So this could be a reason for its extreme partisanship. Of course, I think I'd have to admit that partisanship is not caused by only one side, you know. We were mighty partisan on it, too, but there were enough instances where we were permitted to write bipartisan legislation where we didn't have that difficulty. For instance in higher education, the rest of it was

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done in a bipartisan way, but nobody got exactly what they wanted and we put it together and agreed on it. In the last Congress, the Vocational Educational Act is another example where we developed excellent legislation, I thought, and where neither side got all that it wanted but it was done in such a way that there could be total agreement in the end.

G: In 1967 you did sponsor some amendments to the--was it the Elementary and Secondary Education Act?

Q: That's right.

G: Would you like to explain?

Q: I have felt that we are proliferating federal efforts in education--in other places too--but in education where not many of the large school systems had to hire a person just to concern themselves with federal programs, hunt them up and see if they could qualify to receive money under them. You could greatly simplify all of the red tape and give more flexibility to the local schools if we consolidated programs, and we used the term "bloc grant." When we did, of course, we caused all the special interests in their specific protected program to oppose it because then they'd have to compete for the money. But I had as a rule of thumb that after a categorical program had been in operation for five years it ought to be then consolidated with other ones and give this great flexibility. ESEA hadn't gone that far--and I didn't want to push for it then--but the committee, instead of reporting out a one-year extension of the act and I told them, "Well, in that case, I'll have to wait all that time to make these changes that are necessary." I thought the formula just wasn't equitable enough to continue for that length of time so I said that "I'm going to try and consolidate it." For some reason or another, it caught fire down in the White House. They thought they were more endangered than I thought they were. You know, there

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weren't that many Republicans around. Then, the flames of the church-state issue were fanned, and we really got into hot water then.

G: That was subsequently defeated.

Q: Yes, it was defeated. There were two parts to my amendment. One is to make certain that every education program be administered through the state, and the second part is to consolidate some of them together. Mrs. [Edith] Green picked up a part of mine in her amendment so that all programs would be administered by the state which made it a much easier task this year to consolidate programs than it had before.

G: When you find yourself in opposition and you find that the White House is alarmed for some reason or another, do they contact you?

Q: No. I get the word when they start lobbying, and both Kennedy and Johnson had a strong lobbying force that would come up here. On the Education Bill, and in Poverty when I've convinced enough Democrats to where I thought I could win--and it looked like I was going to win when we go into House debate--you'd end up defeated because of the tremendous power that the White House exerted on the Democratic members of Congress. So it was a frustrating experience, although interesting and challenging. And I've certainly seen how it changed when a sympathetic administration is here, with the Congress made up about the same as it was in the previous Congress.

G: It was in 1967 that then-Representative Goodell made the charge with reference to OEO that they had been engaged in illegal lobbying activity. Do you have any knowledge of this and the outcome of it?

Q: No. I wasn't involved in making those charges. He did that. I don't recall how it was. I just think that if it was our administration, we'd probably have worked as hard as they did.

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G: You mentioned that they did use--maybe it's an euphemistic word, maybe it's an accurate word--a lobbying technique. What is meant by this? Does this mean that they bring in outside groups to talk to congressmen in favor of what they want, or does it mean that they work overtime in terms of their own legislative liaison people who are responsibile for the bills?

Q: I observed their own legislative people, those responsibile for the bills, where they would use a room off the House chambers and bring members in there one at a time or in groups, depending on how they would be most effective, and work them over. You'd see these fellows come out, sometimes red-faced, but they got to them. They used more than just rationale in support of their position on the legislation, because it had to with the favors that the administration can give to a member of Congress in his district.

G: How would you evaluate the Johnson White House staff, the people most immediately proximate to him?

Q: I know a number of them that were working on the legislation that was before the committees on which I served, and I thought they were very effective people.

G: Would you care to name names on some of these people?

Q: Yes. Should I?

G: Sure.

G: Okay. For instance, Doug Cater and Califano were two people that really were effective up here on the Hill. They knew members well, knew who was influential in their home district and knew how to get in touch with it. They had done their homework extremely well. They could get through to members.

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G: There has been some comment that the change of the quality in the White House staff was recognizably different after Jenkins and Moyers left. Could you make an observation of that sort?

Q: I don't know if it was the White House staff that did it or the mood of the country that had changed, because about this time there was the anti-Viet Nam feeling building up--a great animosity toward the President because people would use the term "credibility gap", you know saying they didn't believe him. And most of that lay on the members and they were responding to their districts in opposition to what the President stood for, or was it a less effective staff? It's the same way with teaching school. If a teacher has bright, well-motivated students, she looks like a great teacher. Another teacher may be actually much better but have students with little motivation and little cultural and social strengthening from home, and they look like they are doing a miserable job. But it's just not the teacher's fault, it may be the students'.

G: What is your own opinion about this so-called "credibility gap?" I think it began during the Dominican intervention in 1965. It was first coined at that time.

Q: Yes. I think it was primarily between the press and the President. For some reason or another they didn't get along well. I felt that if President Johnson would level with the American people over television as he had leveled with the members of Congress when we'd go down there for a White House briefing, he would have fared much better than he did. He was dependent on the press for bringing his story to the people, and I think many of them were just so disturbed with him and evidences of where he did not at least give them the information when he had it. They thought he should have given it. If he had used his own method as Roosevelt did, you know, with the famous fireside chats, I think he would

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have fared better.

G: You mentioned the White House briefing. Could you describe one of those briefings and what happened?

Q: The way a briefing would operate is President Johnson would get it started, and he would call in the supporting Cabinet officers to give the story. He'd ask them questions as much as we did and, boy, they had better have their answers right on the tip of their fingers or they were in trouble, it seemed to me! But when it came to Viet Nam, especially, he laid it out to us the way he saw it, and he usually got a very strong response from the Congress. So in the case of a Viet Nam briefing, he'd have Rusk in, McNamara talking to us, and then he'd end up pulling all the ends together and saying what the presidential decision was.

G: How extensively would he use McNamara in these briefings? There was some speculation that McNamara was, within the administration, somewhat less hawkish than other members.

Q: This was toward the end of his term and I would say most of the time, though, he was very close and the President indicated great dependence on him. I think we quit having briefings about the time he was falling from favor with the President.

G: I see. If one were to look at the legislative record of Lyndon Baines Johnson from '64 until '68, I think you'd find it skewed toward the beginning of the period, that the greater bulk of legislation came in 1964 and 1965 and began to taper away as the years went on. Do you think this in any way reflected an increasing unpopularity of Johnson and the Great Society in the Congress and a relationship to the increased spending priority of Viet Nam?

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Q: I think a part of it was an unpopularity that was building up around the country when the Great Society programs which were over-promised didn't produce, as many people had been led to expect. Then this built around the country a dissatisfaction toward the federal government and what it was able to do. You know, the federal government was a great hope, of the liberal at least, to solve problems of the American people, and so the most liberal of the liberals then started shifting away from that and left. And I think this is a part of it, then, that has been reflected on the Congress.

Of course, the President also had number one in his thoughts the war in Viet Nam. They concentrated the money there more than they otherwise would have done, but the increases in the domestic programs were greater than the increases in the cost of the Defense department. He made some cutbacks in the Defense department to wage the war in Viet Nam as well, so I know that was a part of it. But I would say the unpopularity of the war in Viet Nam amongst the American people also had an effect on the Congress so that just as the American people have become more and more confused, I think the Congress has as well--less dependence on the federal government, less satisfaction with what they are doing; and we have the cost of the Viet Nam, and it's an extremely unpopular effort, too.

G: This is sort of a parenthetical question, but an answer would resolve something in my own mind. Why is it that if the war in Viet Nam is unpopular in the Congress, as you suggest, and others, that when the Tonkin Resolution came up, or when there was a potentiality for that coming up which gave the President the authority, Congress would renege--would back off? It wouldn't meet the issues thoroughly. What is the

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reason for that?

Q: You mean why did they not meet the issues squarely? Well, at the time of the Bay of Tonkin Resolution, the Congress was not in that frame of mine. They reacted because somebody had shot at our ships and therefore "give the President what he needed." Sort of what Nixon was doing when the EC-121 was shot down off North Korea, you know. "Let's send some ships out there; we're ready to shoot down anybody else who would try it." You know, it is kind of an expensive operation to sit there waiting for another year when you might get a shot at an airplane, and it won't last that long this way. Nixon indicated that this is just an interim decision. But why is it the Congress is that way? I think that they share in American reaction to what happened before World War II. Members of Congress were defeated because they voted against the fortifying of Guam. The draft survived by one vote, and it was kind of harrying to the American people what it would have been like when we went into World War II if we hadn't had a year before that--we moved into fairly effective Selective Service.

Also, there was a feeling by the American people that pretty well accepted that if we had moved when Hitler moved into the Lowlands, we could have saved Europe and the war would not have been as devastating as it was. I think President Johnson, in particular, and the country has followed him on that--have been moving into the Lowlands ever since. You know, anytime an aggressor raises his head, we move quick. Now, this was done by Truman very effectively in Greece and Turkey. Moved hard and fast there. He did it in Korea and the American People were behind him in that move. His popularity shot 'way up when he decided to move in Korea. It became more unpopular as time went on but not the unpopularity

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of the war in Viet Nam. I would say at the time of the Tonkin Resolution that the American people were still behind the President and the Congress was as well. You know, they thought they could move fast.

Some military people thought that's what he was going to do. Move fast, hit hard, and then pull back. Instead, we did this slow escalation, gradualism in Viet Nam that many people now point to as what got us into trouble.

G: I just want to ask you a few general questions that you can answer very quickly, if you like. Have you seen in Lyndon Baines Johnson since 1958 when you first came to the Congress, a change in the type of man that he is in his political attitudes and his recognition of political realities in the exercise of power and so forth? Are there discernible changes that you yourself have been able to see?

Q: I don't know if there's been the changes in the man. There's some surprises, for instance, that he weakened the Democratic party so much as he did. Now, maybe this is his desire to run everything, and he just can't run the country and the presidency and, you know, run the Democratic party, too. So that hurt. But whether this was a change in the individual or not, I can't tell. I haven't felt that his ego was reduced any while he was the President. I think the kind of drive that he had was there--seemed to be all the way through. It's much easier to show that that drive is effective while the American people were behind you than when many people--especially your own party--are barking at your heels saying you're making the wrong moves. But I don't see that he made significant changes at that time. Naturally he grew as everybody else does and grew on his job, but that would be expected of a person.

G: How would you describe him as President? What kind of a President do you

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interpret him?

Q: Well, I guess I'm undoubtedly biased as a person from the other party, and so I didn't think he did as well as I expected in the early days of the end of 1963 and in 1964 when I saw him take over. The mistake I think he made is the unwillingness to set priorities in the country and bring it to the American people so that they would feel his priorities. He was a decisive person, I thought, but yet on this he did not make the decisions. You know some people expressed it that he tried to have guns and butter, too. But I would sooner put it that he didn't decide what the priorities but tried to do a number of things at the same time which wasn't possible in the resources of our country or the will of the American people. We could do anything we have the will to do, but the American people didn't have that kind of will, evidently.

G: Is there anything you'd like to add to this?

Q: No, I guess not.

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By ALBERT H. QUIE

to the

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