

INTERVIEW I

DATE: July 30, 1969

INTERVIEWEE: JOSEPH L. RAUH, JR.

INTERVIEWER: PAIGE MULHOLLAN

PLACE: Mr. Rauh's office in Washington, D.C.

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R: Obviously you've done some preparation for this, which is interesting.

M: Yes, we've been at this for a year. You're about my 110th interview.

R: Well, we'll try to do it as objectively as we can.

M: Right. Let's get your identification on here, sir. You're Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., an attorney in Washington, D.C., and you've been associated particularly, as far as the national administrations have been concerned, with the Americans for Democratic Action and the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, and UAW and other labor organizations at various times.

R: You did that better than I could, so we'll just take it that way. I am a founder, along with Hubert Humphrey and others, of the ADA. I was national chairman from '55 to '57, and I've been a vice chairman since then and still am. I'm the general counsel for the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, which consists of 135 organizations banded together for civil rights legislation and enforcement. I was general counsel of UAW for a few years and now I'm the Washington counsel for the UAW. I represent some other labor unions. I guess I'd also better go on the record, in case my credentials as a Democrat should be challenged, that I was either chairman or vice chairman of the Democratic Party of the District of Columbia for twenty years, so I guess I could stand up on the problem of credentials inside the Party.

M: I don't think anybody is ever going to mistake you for not being a Democrat, Mr. Rauh.

R: There's a good deal of thought that when you're too critical of the Party, your credentials are in some question. But today, actually, I guess I'm more for

holding the Party together than a lot of people. I think that we're in real trouble, but that's a matter for the future not the past.

M: Right. Did your first personal association with Mr. Johnson begin with the aid that you gave him in the 1948 contest of his primary election in Texas?

R: No. Actually, like most of the other young New Dealers around town, I met then-Congressman Lyndon Johnson in the early '40's, but it's not a clear recollection for me. I guess I remember him mostly as sort of one of FDR's young, bright guys on the Hill. He certainly had a tremendous reputation for liberal leanings in that period. But, as I say, in my mind it's rather blurred, it's now almost twenty-five or thirty years ago.

I came down here in '35 from the Harvard Law School. I was Justice [Benjamin N.] Cardozo's law clerk, and then Justice Frankfurter's law clerk and lived among the young New Deal people. While I never knew Lyndon Johnson in that period in any sense other than seeing him from time to time in a very limited way, there was definitely an impression around Washington that this was a young liberal from Texas. This was something very important. Maybe some of my reactions later on were kind of a disappointment, or an over-estimation of the earlier situation. But there's no question that Lyndon Johnson in the war period did have a reputation as a Texas liberal, and that was considered unique and hopeful and helpful and useful, so I guess in that respect I expected more than I feel has come.

M: By the time he got to the point of running for the Senate in 1948 I think Texas AF of L opposed him and the Texas CIO favored him, so at least it was divided sentiments by then.

R: I think it was something like that in '48. Coming to '48 now, I do remember that '48 fight. I would like to get this clear on the record. Can we stop for a minute from time to time?

M: Sure. [machine stopped]

R: I guess coming back now to '48, I remember the antagonisms that were felt toward Johnson in his race against Coke Stevenson. I think Coke Stevenson was the incumbent governor running against Johnson for the Senate. It was very close. I remember seeing Tom Corcoran one evening during the summer and his statement that "We've got to raise all the money we can for Lyndon Johnson. Stevenson is very bad." I was surprised after this to find the labor movement quite hostile to Johnson, at least parts of it. I'm not sure exactly how it came about but apparently Johnson had made some pretty rough anti-labor speeches.

M: Voted for Taft-Hartley.

R: That was later on. No, you're right. He had voted for Taft-Hartley in '47. But apparently he had also made some very rough anti-labor speeches in '48. I know that a lot of people have been trying to find those speeches, but they've been very difficult to locate. I have the feeling that there was a real split in the labor and liberal movements on this race.

I do remember a conversation with Tom when he said, "Don't you worry. Lyndon Johnson's a real liberal, the kind we want." So I think I made a small contribution in '48, although I'm not certain; I believe I contributed some money. We were old friends; Tom was my boss in the New Deal.

Then right after the election I got one of those, what you'd call hysterical Corcoran phone calls "Come right away" to the office of what was then--I don't remember whether it was Arnold, Fortas and Porter or whether it was Arnold and Fortas at that time. I went to this office and there were a lot of real good lawyers over there. They didn't need any more, but Tom's idea of how you handle a case like this was to get a million good lawyers and then something would come out of it. That's not my experience.

So I went over and we worked all afternoon, all night, on the case. It was related to an alleged fraud in the election. Johnson had won by eighty-seven

votes, I believe--is that the right figure?

M: Right.

R: He had won by eighty-seven votes. Obviously Coke Stevenson felt he had been counted out, and he brought a lawsuit. It looked like Johnson was dead for awhile. The question was the papers to be filed with Justice Black. We all worked like troopers on this. It never occurred to me that maybe this was the less liberal of the two guys, and until this day I wouldn't know. I don't even know if Mr. Stevenson is still alive.

M: He is.

R: He's still alive, I gather. But at any rate, Justice Black issued a most unusual stay in that case that has been much discussed. I don't really know anything about the stories about people talking to Justice Black. I wasn't in on that. I simply helped with the brief that was submitted. In later life I have had fun looking back at a telegram which my secretary just luckily found, dated October 1, 1948 from Austin, Texas, sent to me saying, "You are a great lawyer and a devoted friend. Signed, Lyndon B. Johnson." I think that's kind of funny on the record of our relationship, but that's what makes politics fun, because you can look back at funny things like this.

M: Had you had any personal contact with Mr. Johnson during the preparation of that brief?

R: No, I never saw him. I was really just another lawyer helping write and rewrite their document for Justice Black over in Arnold's law firm. As I say, it was a first-class group of lawyers. I remember one other who was there, who was a crackerjack, and that's Hugh Cox, who I think had been Assistant Solicitor General, and he was a great lawyer. They had a whole group of lawyers there, and it was a brilliant job; I'm sure it is available. As I say, Justice Black issued an unusual stay which ended the whole case and which made possible Lyndon Johnson's future career. But that really is the only thing I know about that.

M: You already then had established yourself as a "devoted friend," but what subsequently developed?

R: You know, when I got the telegram I just put it away. I didn't pay much attention to it. It only becomes funny twenty-one years later, but at that particular moment it didn't seem like anything. I just assume he sent telegrams to all the people who had worked on his brief. So I have this. I used to think of "blackmailing" him with it, but I never took it too seriously!

M: Did you then establish a personal relationship with him after he then went to the Senate, based on the ruling that Justice Black made?

R: I guess the real answer is no, because I think there was a shift in feeling at some stage--I can't tell when it was. No, I never really had any close relationship with him there. After all, he spent four years between '49--he was sworn in, I guess, in early January '49--and '53 when he--we'll talk about that in a minute--got the Minority Leadership which was to make his later career possible. And in that period he just seemed to me to be another conservative senator. He was a senator from Texas, and that certainly was a conservative state in those days--I think there was some shift later that everybody saw, but I would have to say that Johnson acted in the period '49 to '53 as a conservative senator from a conservative southern state. There wasn't really any occasion for one to have much association in that period. I was, as I am now, an active, loyal, devoted, ADA-er; I would say that Johnson's record of support of ADA positions was very poor.

Now let me make one point, because it runs through the whole discussion. All Democrats in this period, in this twenty-one year period, have got much better voting records than more liberal Republicans. And so Johnson's ADA voting record in this period, you might guess at 50 percent, would be much better than a lot of Republicans who were really more liberal. This was because the normal Democratic position of the Administration and of the

majority of Democrats would be more liberal, and one might go along as a matter of party loyalty.

M: It didn't cost anything.

R: You could explain it away as that. In other words, if Johnson went along with the Democrats as a party operation, he'd get a plus on the ADA voting record; if a moderate or liberal Republican went along with his party he would ordinarily get a minus. So the strange thing that happened--when I used to criticize Johnson's position in the Senate in the '50's--the strange thing that happened is that people would come up and say, "Well, he has got as good a voting record as Javits," to give an example. And there was one year when that was in fact true, but that wasn't the result of really their basic liberal positions being equal--it was more the result of the fact that they accepted Party discipline on enough votes so that Johnson went up on the liberal side and Javits would go down.

So in the period of '49 to '53, that four year period where he was just another senator from Texas, I don't think there was much liberal attention focused on him or by him on them. So I guess I couldn't claim much knowledge there.

M: You mentioned Evans and Novak awhile ago as a reference on the whole relationship you had. They seem to make a case that on the Leland Olds affair in 1949, that sort of a feud developed, but as you described it there wouldn't have been any personal relationship to really go into a feud.

R: That was the one exception that I could give where I really did deal with Johnson, that was the Leland Olds affair, but there was nothing that would warrant the term feud. In other words, I couldn't claim enough friendship with him in '49 to warrant a feud.

But that was a sad thing. Leland Olds was a great American who had offended the power companies by his strong regulation and they didn't want

him reappointed to the Federal Power Commission. Leland Olds was a kind of hero. When I came down here in '35--as I say, I had been Justice Cardozo's and Justice Frankfurter's law clerk, but in the interim periods before and afterwards I worked for Ben Cohen and Tom Corcoran. Part of what we were doing was working on power, and we were public power advocates, and Leland Olds was a hero of mine. We worked on getting him confirmed. This was one of the dirtiest campaigns ever. It was a pre-Joe McCarthy campaign, but it was really vicious. The power and oil and gas companies were spending a lot of money; it's a sad fact, but Fortas' firm was in on this thing with Johnson, and they really went after Olds. They quoted stuff he'd said twenty-five years earlier, which sounded pretty terrible. I'm not defending the language he used then, but that's a different story than after he'd become a leading figure in power regulation. So there was a real confrontation between the liberals and Johnson on the other side on the Leland Olds issue.

Paul Douglas is writing his autobiography. The other day when I was talking to Paul we were reminiscing about things to help him, we discussed that. Paul was sort of the floor leader for Leland Olds. He feels as I do--that that was one of the dirtiest pieces of work ever done. And of course it killed Olds. I don't know how many years he lived after that, but he never really recovered himself.

I don't know who you'd describe today as the foremost public power man in America, but that was what Olds was at the time that Johnson knocked him off in 1949.

M: Johnson was the leader of that?

R: I don't think there's any question about it. I don't have this clearly in mind, but I just remember seeing things--there are pictures in my mind--that there's a Harvard Law Review article on either just the Olds thing or a lot of Senate things in which Johnson's role is played up. It would be something worth

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looking at, it seems to me, because I would think it would be within a year or so of the event. The law reviews are notoriously slow in the way they pick up--

M: So are historical journals, you're not alone.

R: So are historical journals, that's right. But I would think that this piece has the detail that I don't have in my head. But all one has to do is to look at the Congressional Record. Johnson read into the Record some of the worst ancient stuff that Olds had said. And, as I said, it wasn't very pretty stuff, but a lot of things were said in the Depression, a lot of things were said in that period that the people wouldn't want to say later. God knows, I'll challenge anybody to repeat everything he has ever said, because in a long and full life you say some pretty stupid things. I'm not saying that Olds didn't. I'm saying the using of those things in the McCarthy way in which they used them to end the career of the number one public power advocate in America was a shocking thing, and it must be on Johnson's conscience. I don't know when we're going to get a chance to see the Oral History's questioning of Johnson, but it would be very interesting to ask him how he feels today and whether his conscience really doesn't bother him about what he did to Mr. Olds, who, as I say, was one of my heroes.

M: You've sort of anticipated one of the points I was leading to. Was he simply serving, do you think the Texas power interests in this, or did he really have a philosophical position of his own?

R: I think it was the former. Motivations are hard to get at, but I don't think the Johnson of the National Youth Administration and the Johnson of the early '40's could have really been anti-public-power. Whatever anyone else says about Johnson, there's a certain Populism in Johnson's makeup that I would think would have been pro-public-power. But the Texas people weren't pro-public-power. I mean, I can't believe that Johnson wouldn't ordinarily have

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had the exact same reaction that all of the rest of us would have, which would be that there's something good about public power. So I think it must be the former. But motivations are hard at best, and while my life has crossed Johnson's in a lot of ways, I couldn't say that I was ever intimate enough that I'm much of a psychiatrist in that respect.

M: How did he get to the position of Minority Leader so rapidly? Is there a story behind that?

R: There sure is, but you must have that from a number of people. Johnson's a genius politically, and I don't think anybody challenges that--the only reason he's not President of the United States today is because he never had any training in foreign policy and the Viet wa brought him down. But God knows, he is a political genius as will come out over the period we discuss here.

The night that Eisenhower swept Stevenson off the boards most everybody did what I did--they got drunk! I had a hangover for a couple of days. But Johnson was too smart for that. Starting within hours--it was clear at 8 o'clock in the evening when Bridgeport, Connecticut, home of Democratic Catholics, came in for Eisenhower, and Louisville, Kentucky came in Republican, too, it was clear that it was a landslide. Anybody would have known it--well, Johnson, realizing that--who was it that was beaten that night--Lucas?

M: Yes.

R: It was Lucas that was beaten. There were two--I'm trying to get it clear now. It was Lucas and--.

M: McFarland.

R: McFarland. One of them had been the Majority Leader, one of them was beaten that night, but I can't remember whether Lucas had already been beaten in '50.

M: McFarland was beaten that night.

R: I think that's right. McFarland, the Majority Leader, was beaten that night, so Johnson had two things going for him. The party was demoralized under the Eisenhower landslide and its Senate Leader was gone. We were going to be the minority that night, as appeared clear, although it was barely a minority. It was very close because Eisenhower didn't carry a congressional landslide with him, but he did carry enough so that it was going to be a Republican Senate. Of course Taft became the Majority Leader and Knowland became next after Taft when Taft died.

But Johnson didn't wait a minute. Seeing the possibility that the Minority Leader was later going to be the Majority Leader, he jumped for the former. And before morning he had called a majority of the Democratic Senators. A lot of senators at that time said he had called them. He was careful not to call some of the guys who would have let the cat out of the bag. He didn't call Paul Douglas that night. But he did call Hubert, among others. By morning he had enough commitments so he was in. It was a brilliant thing to have pulled off--he was only four years a Senator and he was a first term. He'd never done anything of any distinction in the Senate as of that moment. But he was smart. He got Russell--

M: I was going to say, didn't he have the sponsorship of Russell?

R: He got Russell. He was careful with the Northerners to avoid any suggestion that he was a Southern candidate, but Russell quietly took care of getting him the Southern votes. There was really no chance for the labor movement to fight. The ADA did try in December of '52 to see if there wasn't some way to get a rival candidate and defeat Johnson, but there was no chance. He had it tied up before dawn on that landslide night. It was a brilliant job, and I think it made his future possible, because, of course, he went on from the Minority Leadership, as is customary, to the Majority Leadership when the Senate went back Democratic either in '54 or '56.

M: '54. January of '55.

R: As quick as a whip he picked this thing up, and there was just never a chance from that minute on of his not being the Leader of the Senate Democrats.

M: You said that your group, the ADA and unions, so on, made an attempt to find an opposing candidate. After you failed in that, was there a period during which you tried to work with the Johnson leadership in the Senate?

R: Johnson made that a little bit difficult. In the 1952 convention the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, consisting of the groups I mentioned before, including the labor movement, got into the Democratic platform a provision for majority rule in the Senate, namely a rule to cut off Senate filibusters. I was on the platform committee in '52, and we got it in there, and it's actually been in there ever since--a provision that the Senate should have majority rule so that the filibuster can't prevail.

In that December a group was assembled--it was Paul Douglas, Hubert Humphrey, Wayne Morse, Herbert Lehman--that all agreed to a proposal that I had made some time back. The proposal was this: it was impossible to change the filibuster rule by amending the filibuster rule because they could filibuster the amendment in the filibuster rule. So some time back I got the idea, together with the wisest man I've met--Ben Cohen--and we developed the idea that while it is true you can filibuster a change in the filibuster rule during a congressional session, you can't do it at the opening of a new congressional session. Therefore, at the opening of the Senate of a new Congress, a majority can work its will. Usually when a Senate met at the opening of a new Congress, it didn't do anything about rules. They just assumed the old rules were in effect by acquiescence, and therefore you never had a chance against the filibuster rule.

At this lunch in Paul Douglas' office that day in December of '52, I explained this point, and they all agreed to try it. By that time we had

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done some research, the United Automobile Workers had paid for the research, and we found that we were not as smart as we thought we were. Like everything else, there was a historical precedent for it. In 1917 when Wilson was trying to arm the Merchantmen, there was a filibuster against that--

M: "A little group of willful men."

R: That's right. There was then no filibuster rule at all. You didn't even have the two-thirds rule in 1917. Obviously if you got a two-thirds rule you could have closed off debate, because the Senate was 90 percent or 97 percent for arming--whatever it was--so you didn't really have the problem of reaching two-thirds. You had no filibuster rule.

When the new Congress met--and then it met in March, if you'll recall, before the Lame Duck Amendment--when the new Congress met, Tom Walsh arose and said that there were no rules for the Senate of a new Congress, and he wanted a filibuster rule. The debate is absolutely brilliant! You always think you thought of something, and then you find that Tom Walsh had made a speech on the floor of the Senate anticipating everything we had thought of--it was a most magnificent thing.

M: It's no disgrace to be his descendant incidentally.

R: That's right, I don't think it is. The young lawyer who was doing the research for me came across this and brought the thing in breathless. It was exactly what we were trying to do. I read some of this stuff to Paul Douglas and the other people, and of course they were taken by it just as I had been, and they decided to go ahead and make the fight.

So we filed quite a brief. It's in the Record for the first few days of the Senate of the Congress that met in January of '53, making this point in detail and proving that the Senate of a new Congress could work its own will and a majority of them could set the rules and they could have a majority cut-off filibuster rule.

What happened in Tom Walsh's case is interesting. They had a debate for about a day or a few days, and the opposition to Walsh caved; they offered him a new rule for two-thirds to close debate, and he took it. They closed debate on arming the Merchantmen in almost no time at all. In other words, Walsh won exactly what he asked for through this device.

M: But that became the precedent that had to be later overthrown.

R: That's right. Because two-thirds was--and this is the real point about it--two-thirds was adequate cut-off except for a regional problem, and civil rights was a regional problem. You couldn't get two-thirds on a civil rights bill in those days, even though you could have gotten two-thirds to declare war. Suppose in '41 somebody had tried to filibuster Roosevelt's declaration of war against Japan and Germany. It would have taken about thirty-six seconds to get the two-thirds.

When you came to civil rights in '53, you had a very, very serious problem of getting the two-thirds--in fact you couldn't get it. So there we are, coming up to January, the opening of the Congress in '53. We had meetings. I mentioned one in Paul Douglas' office where this hard core of liberals agreed to go ahead.

Then they had another one about the 1st of January because the Congress met shortly thereafter, and Clinton Anderson joined the fray and became the leader. We were all happy to have him because he had standing and seniority more than our people.

There is something, if I were doing this history, I would try to get. Howard Bray, Clinton Anderson's assistant through this period, has written a book about this thing and I don't know whether it's ever going to be published. But there is a manuscript on this whole fight and Johnson's role against Anderson's role, and it's quite a confrontation. Whatever the public image may appear, Johnson and Anderson were really at each other's throats

through the whole '50's over Anderson's lead of the anti-filibuster thing and Johnson's support of the filibuster.

You know, just to anticipate myself, one of the greatest ironies in American life is that Abe Fortas lost the chief justiceship on a filibuster which only occurred because Lyndon Johnson had saved it from us in the '50's. As I say, I got ahead of myself there.

But at any rate, on the opening day of the session, with Taft the Majority Leader and Lyndon Johnson the Minority Leader, Clint Anderson arose and said, "I move that we take up the rules of the Senate." Of course the eggs hit the fan--

M: This wasn't a surprise now to Johnson?

R: It wasn't a surprise at that time, but it was really a public unveiling. We were only about twenty at the most at that time. Later we've gotten up as high as forty-eight or forty-nine--we've never quite gotten a majority but we had about twenty then. Taft and Johnson worked like a harmonious machine to give us the business and we lost. They tabled our motion.

The 1953 tabling of our motion to take up rules for the new Congress was obviously a decision that the old rules were in effect and the filibuster was saved. So when you ask in that '53 period of Johnson's taking over, was there some real rapprochement there, I guess my answer is "no." I don't think anything was more dear to the hearts of the liberals than the civil rights legislation being blocked by the filibuster; and here Johnson's first act was to protect the filibuster in violation of the Democratic platform. Johnson's first act as Minority Leader was to help Taft wreck a proposal made in support of the Democratic platform of 1952. So I think he got off on the wrong foot and I don't think he ever had a chance of getting back on the right foot. There was never any substantial liberal support for Johnson until '63 when he became President of the United States. I think if you look at

the period from '53 to '63, you'll generally find the feelings of liberals very hostile and there never was a real return there. I don't see in that whole period of '53 to '63 any rapprochement, and I think it got off and stayed off on the wrong foot.

M: Did that become his technique? You said he cooperated with Mr. Taft to give you the business there. Did that become his technique of more or less surrendering to the Republican leadership?

R: I don't think this was a surrender. In this particular instance of, say, '53, and later, I think Johnson favored the filibuster. I think in the '64-'68 period Johnson overcame the filibuster.

Johnson told me from time to time, "The trouble with you guys is you don't realize you can beat the filibuster." I'll come to some of the things on which we could and couldn't beat the filibuster. But he said, "You can always beat a filibuster if you've got fifty-one strong enough people." His theory was you wear them out. The "wear them out" theory was nonsense. I hope when the next question is put to Johnson on that, that there is some real cross examination on Johnson's theory of wearing the filibusterers. There's no way you can wear them out. He says you've got to have fifty-one strong people. Well, why should you have to have fifty-one strong people for a bill instead of fifty-one people? It's true, for example, that on some of these bills, we had Senator Green of Rhode Island, then in his 80's; why should the fact that although he would always vote with us, why should the fact that he couldn't get up in the middle of the night to answer a quorum call have any significance? Johnson, in other words, had a sort of trial by combat idea about the filibuster that I think really was a kind of rationalization and couldn't work.

In '55 we were going to try the anti-filibuster fight again. If you're right, that's the period when he becomes Majority Leader. He didn't want

this fight. He didn't want to be the guy to kill the liberals in '55, so he persuaded Hubert Humphrey to persuade the liberals not to make the fight. And if you'll look at the Record of the opening of the Senate in Congress in January '55, it is the only time since '53 that the liberals have not sought to do something about the filibuster at the opening of the Senate.

M: And that was directly Johnson's--?

R: Johnson went to Humphrey and persuaded him and he went to the other liberals. There was a lot of feeling against Humphrey at that particular moment for having done that. If one looks at the Record there, The Congressional Record, you will find that Lehman made a speech that he went along with this very reluctantly and gave all the reasons why there should have been a filibuster fight, but then said he wasn't going to bring it up all by himself.

But the only year in which there wasn't a filibuster fight at the opening was '55.

M: That anticipates sort of a general line of thought that I think might be important. How thoroughly in your opinion did Johnson dominate, as Leader, the Senate? The press made him out to be the great dominant figure through this period. Was it really that great, really that total?

R: Yes, I believe it was. I think he had several things that he did that related to this. First, he nursed these senators along with the greatest of care. Hubert Humphrey once said--I can't remember when, I was criticizing Johnson and he was defending him, it must be mid-'50's or the early '50's--and he said: "You know why Johnson is a good Leader," and I can't remember whether it was Minority of Majority. I said, "No, why?" He said, "Well, the difference between Johnson and Scott Lucas is this. When Scott Lucas wanted to talk to me, some secretary would call up and say, 'Senator Humphrey, can you come around this afternoon to Senator Lucas' office at such-and-such-a-time?' When Lyndon Johnson wanted to see me, he'd call up and he'd say,

'Hubert, can I come around and see you?'"

I think this is illustrative of Johnson's real knack. He nursed all the senators. He wasn't then in what you might call his period of obsessive power where he was telling people what to do. As the Majority or Minority Leader, he was really cajoling and flattering and working on these senators. I think Humphrey's reaction to Johnson was typical of the feeling that one gets of how Johnson was able to do it. He did it by hard work--that's number one--going around to see people. Number two, and equally important, was that Johnson had a kind of built-in political computer. He could find that point at which he could build a majority; then he would build it. I don't believe Johnson was ever a particularly ideological guy. He was a guy who wanted always to have his bill or his amendment passed. And he had a genius for finding that point where you'd get the most people and then rounding them up. That was our complaint. That's the basis of the ADA attack on the Johnson-Rayburn leadership in the '50's, and especially it was true as to Johnson. To a degree it was true as to Rayburn, too.

M: How much was Rayburn the senior or junior partner of those two? Did you have an opportunity to have a view on that?

R: Johnson, with his usual political genius, always said that Rayburn was tops, as he proved the opposite. "Anything for Mr. Sam. He was always the boss." But that wasn't in fact true, and we might as well come to that right now. Take the Landrum-Griffin law in '59, which Johnson supported; there is that letter--I suppose you have that letter he wrote, a form letter to his constituents supporting Landrum-Griffin. This story I think may be recorded in Dick Bolling's book, but anyway, you ought to get the story from Dick. I don't know if you plan to interview Dick.

M: I've interviewed him.

R: Then you probably know more about it than I do. But it's my recollection that about that time Dick was at our swimming pool one Sunday afternoon, and he told the story of how mad Rayburn was at Johnson's actions in getting Landrum-Griffin through. Rayburn was supporting the liberal bill. I want you to let Dick describe it for himself, but according to Dick, Rayburn was violently angry about what Johnson had done on Landrum-Griffin. That's the kind of example that I have in my mind. I don't know what Dick said to you, but he did tell the story concurrently about how sore Mr. Sam was about Johnson's performance on Landrum-Griffin.

M: It's relevant to the question of--you know, Mr. Johnson was a master in the Senate but did he ever understand the House? And is there that significant a difference between--?

R: I don't know. I guess I'm not the right guy to ask that. Bolling and some of the House people would be much, much better. Dick is a tremendous guy and commentator and critic of the House. He was very close to Mr. Sam. I honestly believe if Mr. Sam had lived and could have passed the Speakership on, he'd have passed it on to Dick. When he died, without passing it on, Dick was rather weakened by that in the House.

So I really don't know terribly much about the Rayburn-Johnson relationship, but it's my impression that Johnson pretended to take the leadership of Mr. Sam, but that in fact he rather manipulated it himself, as the Landrum-Griffin example would indicate.

M: And this technique he used to develop his own leadership that you describe really involves building up a kind of a personal loyalty rather than a philosophical or issue oriented loyalty.

R: I think that's right. If he had an issue-orientation at all, it was to find the method of presenting whatever would get the most votes. He really had a knack in this regard. One should be careful before they criticize this

knack too much. We only have federal aid to education because he found a formula which satisfied nearly everybody. It was a most unprincipled formula in the sense of trying to propitiate those who believed in parochial and private schools as well as those who believed in public schools. He had a knack for finding that middle formula that pleases no one but satisfies everyone. That was, I think, what he really did in the Senate -- find some middle ground where he could get some right-winger and Humbert Humphrey to agree. A lot of what he did in finding that middle ground was very painful to us who were fighting for issues. That's why the confrontation got worse between the liberals and Johnson.

For example, it's hard to recollect this, but the lobbyist for the CIO, one of the most radical or liberal groups of its time, was one of Johnson's associates--Bob Oliver, a first-class lobbyist and a first-class spokesman for CIO. But Bob accepted the Johnson theory of the half-way position. So Johnson's political ability included using people who should have been lobbying him, using them to go the other way. Bob was more Lyndon Johnson's lobbyist back to the labor movement than he was ever the labor movement's lobbyist to Lyndon Johnson. But you've got to give the guy credit! That's a mighty good business if you can get away with it, to have the people who are supposed to tell you to go farther, go back and tell the other side that they really don't want to go that far and that he's getting them the best deal possible. This was a piece of real genius.

M: But a lot of your group of people finally decided that you had to do something--?

R: We didn't agree with Bob. Bob and I had some very friendly but bitter debates on whether Johnson was right in the '50's in always trying to go just an inch further than the other side.

M: The Democratic Advisory Council was your attempt to make him go--?

R: As against the other side, that's right.

M: What was the background of that? What was Mr. Johnson's reaction to this sort of thing?

R: I'm not as familiar with this as I am to his reaction to ADA things. This was Paul Butler's effort to give the Democratic Party the image of all-out liberalism and take the leadership away from what he considered the Johnson-Rayburn image of the national Party, and I think that he did an absolutely beautiful job.

Truman never liked it either. Truman, I think, in that period rather sympathized more with the Johnson-Rayburn leadership than with the Democratic Advisory Council leadership. There was a real confrontation there between Johnson and Butler. Johnson never paid much attention to Butler or to the council. He was running for President in his own way. I think that the middle of the road was what he wanted and the Butler advisory council wanted a more liberal position. They just had a different philosophy.

I saw something in the paper the other night that made me smile. It was an article in the Star by a fellow named Paul Hope, a reporter for the Star, and he said, "South and West Hope of GOP."

M: That's the subject of this new book.

R: But my interest is that through the whole '50's Johnson believed that the South and West were the hope of the Democratic Party! He was building a Democratic Party based on the South and West, and the Eastern liberals were the opposition. And it is strange now that Republicans really take the same line. There's some correspondence between our group and Jim Rowe in which Rowe took this position, that the South and the West were the hope of the Democratic Party. But the party that Johnson wanted to build, even he couldn't build. Indeed, it's ironic that the only states he lost in '64 to Goldwater were in the South and the West. But his '50 position, as articulated by his political strategist Jim Rowe, was that the Democratic Party future was in the South and the West. Whoever's going to be the conservative at the moment says that his future is in the South and the West because the

industrial East is obviously the more liberal area. But I had to smile at that headline because it was so clearly the Johnson position of the '50's.

M: What about specific instances of legislation? I know, for example, the 1957 Civil Rights Act, I've seen you and Mr. Wilkins together listed as being decisive in accepting for the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights the compromise.

R: That's right. Before then, we'd had many fights with Johnson on education, housing, everything. As he watered everything down, it seemed to us meaningless.

I became chairman of the ADA in the spring of '55. My acceptance speech was an attack on Johnson's leadership in the Senate. That's on the front page of the Times that day, "ADA Breaks With Conservative Democratic Leadership." We really did go after him, so some people were surprised by the '57 compromise.

Here's what happened on the '57 fight, as I can recall it. Could we cut off for one second?

M: Sure. [machine off]. Go ahead now with the '57--.

R: The '57 fight actually starts a good ways back. We had been for civil rights legislation 'way back. In 1948 Hubert Humphrey tied civil rights to the masthead of the Democratic Party with the minority plank. But each year the legislation would die in the Senate because you just couldn't get a bill through the Senate at all.

But in '56 we tried again. In '56 the House passed a bill that gave injunctive power to the federal government to enforce voting rights. But the House also passed what became the very famous "part three," which gave injunctive power to the government to enforce all constitutional rights, not just voting rights. This of course meant injunctive power to enforce

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school desegregation. This bill passed the House a very few weeks before the end of the session. Paul Douglas made a fight to get it up in the Senate.

Now Lyndon Johnson and Paul Douglas were not what you'd call the best of friends. Sometimes ironies keep coming up. Paul was probably the liberal most valuable to Lyndon Johnson during the Vietnam war because Paul was as much for the Vietnam war as Lyndon Johnson--

M: About the only one he had left.

R: About the only one he had left. But this story goes back to a period of real bitterness between Douglas and Johnson. Of course we were working with Douglas in 1956 to get the bill up. We were desperate for a bill. It had been 86 years, I believe, since there had been a civil rights bill and we desperately wanted to do something that summer--the summer of '56 before the convention.

Johnson, however, was not prepared to let any civil rights legislation come up. He was a candidate for President then. I guess that was the first time he was a serious candidate, hoping that Stevenson might falter and he would get it. One night Douglas moved to bring the House bill up. I can't remember the entire parliamentary procedure, but it's easy enough to find. Johnson could have shelved it, but he decided to give Douglas the bum's rush. So he forced a roll call on Douglas' motion, which Douglas didn't want because he had no chance. Six senators voted with Douglas, and it was a most humiliating thing. There was Douglas, and I believe [Thomas] Hennings and Lehman--I'm not sure--and Duff and Bender and Langer, it was a pretty motley crowd. And Lyndon Johnson just rubbed Paul's nose in the dirt.

There's a cute story about that. Paul Douglas said to Howard Schuman, his assistant, as they walked out and got in front of the elevator that said "For Senators Only," Paul said, "Ring this bell, won't you, Howard. Let's show them we're senators." I'm sure that's in Paul's autobiography.

But it was a terrible fight. Hubert went with Lyndon against Paul, and there were some pretty sharp words said in the cloakroom that night between the civil rights lobbyists and Hubert about that.

But at any rate, at the convention in '56 that issue of whether we were going to enforce the Supreme Court decision by federal legislation was ducked. That's a separate story, and I don't know Johnson really was a major part of that.

At any rate, in '57 the same bill passed the House and it came over to the Senate. There were two fights in the Senate, and Johnson essentially won them both. First, they took out part three. When Johnson took part three out of the House bill, he set back integration in the South for seven years. Part three passed in '64--the part three that was taken out in 1957 in essence became a title of the '64 law. But for seven years there was no federal power to bring injunction suits to integrate schools. It was the Anderson-Aiken Amendment to the '57 law which took part three out, but it was Johnson's amendment. And Johnson's argument was that "Otherwise you'll have a filibuster."

But here, you see, is Johnson's inconsistency. In January of '57 he had beaten us down when we had a good chance to change the filibuster rule. We had over forty votes. We'd come up from less than twenty in '53 to over forty senators for changing the filibuster rule. So he beats us down on the filibuster rule, and then he says, "You can't have part three because you can't beat a filibuster." This was pretty shabby stuff.

He also put the so-called "jury trial" amendment on the voting rights part of the bill. We fought that, but for me the jury trial amendment was not the big thing. It was part three that was the big thing. And of course John Kennedy was with us on part three and against us on the jury trial. But I always felt when people jumped Kennedy for voting for the jury trial

amendment after having voted for part three, I always felt that the other wasn't really that important. The important vote was part three, whether the government would have the right to sue to force the integration of schools in accordance with the Supreme Court decision, and Johnson clearly defeated that.

M: Did the Johnson people offer a substitute for that, watered down substitute?

R: Oh, no, they just took it out.

M: There wasn't a point in there--?

R: The Anderson-Aiken Amendment was to delete part three.

M: And they never offered you anything in the way of a substitute that might have been something half-way?

R: We were never offered anything on part three. Whatever we were offered was in connection with compromises on the jury trial amendment to the voting rights part.

M: But part three was just going to be out, period?

R: It was taken out. And of course it was in the House bill. I remember the night that Johnson passed his Jury Trial Amendment. You see, what Johnson was doing was passing both amendments; then he had to deal with Russell and avoid a filibuster. I saw then Vice President Nixon and then Attorney General Bill Rogers right outside the Senate Chamber. Paul Sifton was with me; he was the lobbyist for the UAW, and I was there in my capacity with the Leadership Conference and the ADA. They stopped us and we compared notes on how the votes were going to go, and it was going to go very badly. It was clear that Johnson had the votes.

You see, the Eisenhower Administration was largely with us, although Eisenhower was rather mixed up on part three. But Eisenhower was clearly with us on the Jury Trial Amendment, and most Republicans, too. Knowland, the Majority Leader, was with us on part three. So we were in pretty good

shape with the Republicans. We got the majority of them on both, but Johnson had the Democrats.

Nixon said to Paul Sifton and myself: "Boys"--I always have to smile at this since I'm older than he is, and Paul's five years older than I-- he said, "Boys, I think we ought to let the civil rights bill die, and we'll get you a better one next year." We said, "Yes, sir," and thought about that.

Then Paul and I went up in the gallery and we lost the jury-trial vote. That was, I think, a Friday, although I'm not sure. We were walking out, going home, and I felt angry and I said to myself, "Well, let's kill the bill, maybe Nixon's right."

But there's always the morning after, and I decided that I thought we ought to save the bill. This resulted in some strange events. What we did was to call a meeting of the Leadership Conference, and Roy Wilkins had the decision to make, whether to save the bill or let it die. If we'd said the bill's worse than nothing, there would have been no '57 bill. It was perfectly clear that we had a big decision to make. I argued for saving the bill. I guess I was the proponent of the bill. My theory was this: that you've got to have some progress; that you've got to pass a civil rights bill so you can then pass some other civil rights bills; that you can't wait until you've got enough strength to get the best possible bill. You had to have movement. You had to have a bill. Besides, in the voting rights area, the bill was of some value. Even though there was the jury trial amendment for big offenses, you still could get the injunction, and there could be smaller penalties that you could get without a jury trial. The jury trial obviously made the thing hopeless where you had to have it, but there was still a real chance of progress. It was an all-day meeting. Actually it was held in my office--it's a different office from what I have now--and all day long we argued and struggled. There was a lot of pressure

on Roy against accepting it; even in those days you had the split between the moderates and the more radicals who wanted to say, "this bill's no good and we won't take it."

But Roy, with that characteristic wisdom, at the end of the day announced that the NAACP, and therefore the Leadership Conference, if we agreed, would support the bill. We would try to get changes, improvements as much as possible, but the changes then possible were very, very limited. What you had to do was pass the bill in the House more or less as was. When Roy announced we would take the bill, it then passed the Senate quickly. Some minor improvements were made in the House and the bill passed the House, went back to the Senate and passed again, and we had a bill.

One funny thing happened. Phil Graham called me up during the midst of this and said, "I was talking to Lyndon about 6 o'clock this morning and he said, 'Phil, of all the strange things that happened, who the hell do you think is saving that bill for me?'" Phil said, "I don't know." And he said, "That crazy, god-damned friend of yours, Joe Rauh, is saving that bill for me." I wasn't saving it for him, because I hated his guts for what he was doing to school desegregation. That was a crime against the Negroes when Lyndon Johnson knocked out part three and--

M: You had the votes otherwise?

R: We had the majority, but we didn't have two-thirds. But you had to fight for it. You had to do what Lyndon Johnson did in '64, but what he wouldn't do in '57. You see, what he was willing to do as President he wasn't willing to do as a senator from Texas. It was perfectly simple, it seems to me. If Lyndon Johnson had said what he told Clarence Mitchell and me in '64 to tell Mansfield for him, which was "Put that bill on the floor and tell those guys it's going to stay there until it passes, I don't care if it takes four-six-eight months, it doesn't matter, it's going to pass--if he'd said that in '57

when he was the Majority Leader, we'd have had the right bill then. But he wouldn't say it then because he was a senator from Texas, and it wouldn't have been good politics in Texas. So he killed school desegregation for seven years with that act of deleting part three.

As a matter of fact, there was a story in Newsweek at that time written by Sam Schaefer that was, what seems to me, one of the most irresponsible pieces of journalism I ever read. You really ought to get it because it's a joke about how this whole 1957 compromise happened.

M: At the time?

R: At the time. This would have been the summer of '57. It has got a picture there of all of the guys who were working to get the bill through, which was the Leadership Conference group, and it said roughly: "Hubert Humphrey kissed his wife Muriel goodbye in Waverly, Minnesota and flew down to Washington to persuade the Leadership Conference to yield to Lyndon Johnson and accept this watered down bill. Arriving in Washington at the airport he hurried in a taxi to the Congressional Hotel, Room 201, where he met with the group and insisted that they had to take this bill to save the Democratic Party."

A) Humphrey never spoke to any one of us; B) we had moved out of the Congressional Hotel a week before because the big lobbying operation was over; and, C) not one of us ever thought of the Democratic Party but were thinking of the importance of getting some civil rights legislation. A lot of people did interpret it as a kind of Democratic Party maneuver, as Sam Schaefer did, but that wasn't correct. We wanted a bill. I think we were right. I think the '64 law could not have gone through if you hadn't had some movement towards a law prior to that. We did get a bill and it was an exciting thing to have it. The Justice Department did do some good with voting rights under that bill.

M: But Lyndon Johnson didn't build up any credit with the civil rights groups on that particular bill?

R: I don't believe he did. No, I wouldn't think that there was any credit in the bank for him on that. I think it was, again, what you could say for Johnson, this was where the computer landed as the middle of the road. When he got Russell to say, "If you put those two amendments through, I won't filibuster," then his job was to put those two amendments through and he did so. So what you got was a watered down bill, but one that the civil rights groups did finally accept.

M: I'd like for you to do the same type of thing as you did on that bill with the Landrum-Griffin, and perhaps others. Do you have time to go on with that this afternoon, or do you prefer to wait?

R: Before we do Landrum-Griffin, I'd like to do the '58 Supreme Court bills, but I can't remember enough about it, that's the difficulty. I wrote that article in the Progressive that I mentioned earlier, and if you want to look that up and put that in here it may tell the whole story. But after you look at it yourself, if there are any questions that the article raises, you can ask me.

M: I'm not familiar enough with that to do any good at all, on that Supreme Court bill.

R: You're not familiar with that?

M: No.

R: That's a very important battle that Johnson was in. In the summer of '58, after all the liberal decisions of the Warren Supreme Court, there was a lot of bills to reverse Supreme Court rulings, especially in the civil liberties field. I had been active against these bills and I had argued some of the cases in the Supreme Court. We were trying to get Johnson not to bring the bills up. But at the close of the '58 session he did bring up

these bills. There was a terrific hassle and ultimately we worked our way out of all of them. We did have quite a liberal victory for which he took the credit. But the fact of the matter is, he didn't have to bring them up in the first place and cause all the trouble. But, as I say, my memory of that isn't good, and since I wrote that article in the Progressive contemporaneously I'd rather you either put that in here or bring it around and we'll look at it together and see what we have.

M: We'll have to do that.

R: I'm not a great expert on the Landrum-Griffin fight in '59. I had worked somewhat with the people opposing it and was lobbying against it to a degree. But I really don't know too much about it. I do know that sometime in '59 a letter surfaced that Johnson must have sent out by the thousands to constituents who were pounding him on Landrum-Griffin. You must have that letter somewhere because it was published at the time. I would have thought it would have forever affected labor's relationship with Johnson, but I was surprised that it didn't. It had a short-term effect but it didn't have any long-term effect.

Of course the bill that finally passed, that Kennedy finally put through, wasn't such a terrible bill.

M: Maybe that's why it didn't have all that much effect.

R: I think that may be quite right, that the bill itself didn't turn out nearly as bad as it seemed.

And this takes us to the '60 fight. I hope maybe we could take the '60 fight up when we start next time if that's all right with you.

M: Okay, that will be great.

R: Do you have anything before '60 in your notes?

M: Are there any other legislative measures on which you worked directly with or against Mr. Johnson, any that are of minor importance actually?

R: It's always hard to remember all of them. But Johnson was awful on Joe McCarthy, he was absolutely dreadful. To take an example, when Lee, a McCarthy assistant, was appointed to the Federal Communications Commission, we tried to get Johnson to vote "no" on confirmation. I think if one looks up the record, and if my memory is not incorrect, he never voted at all. He just hid. I guess he was the Minority Leader when the Lee nomination came up. Hiding was a cowardly thing to do.

Johnson never said a word on McCarthy until the censure came through. Of course the Senate censured McCarthy when he was politically dead; they didn't censure him when the fight was going on. Furthermore this was part of the struggle between Johnson and Adlai Stevenson. If Adlai Stevenson did nothing else, he voiced the sentiments of the anti-McCarthy people in that period. Johnson was always trying to shut him up. He didn't want the Democrats in the position of criticizing the McCarthy performance. Of course all of us felt that you just had to get in there and fight McCarthy. And so Johnson's role in the McCarthy period, I think, was despicable.

M: He didn't really support McCarthy, he just didn't do anything to stop him?

R: I don't think anybody really supported McCarthy. I don't mean that.

M: I don't know, quite a few people did for awhile.

R: I mean in the top political arena. Take Eisenhower--he didn't really support McCarthy, but he avoided confrontation. I think maybe Johnson and Eisenhower were about the same on McCarthy, frightened by his bullying tactics. Bullies are always scared of other bullies, and I think that's what you had there with Johnson.

We didn't get the slightest bit of help from Johnson in the fight against McCarthy, and to a degree he hurt us because he was always counseling, "Don't attack him, leave him alone," etc. That just isn't the way a democracy can function. If a guy's trying to destroy it, other people have to stand up to

him. It was a lot harder to call Johnson a Communist for standing up to McCarthy than it was a lot of the people who did stand up to McCarthy, but Johnson wouldn't stand up to McCarthy.

When they finally put the censure thing through late in '54, McCarthy was a drunken discredited bum by then. He killed himself; that vote didn't do it. Every Democrat voted for censure except for John Kennedy, who was in the hospital, and who had special political problems including the fact that his father was one of McCarthy's real backers. I never got too angry about the Kennedy vote. I thought Johnson's position was really more despicable because there was no political reason why he couldn't have helped us. In the end, it came out all right, and I think the McCarthy inoculation probably has been good for the country. I think we have less McCarthyism today because of McCarthy than we might otherwise have.

M: We may need a booster shot here any day now.

R: Yes. Johnson in the '50's was a conservative Texan. There was another point about him in the '50's. I'm a long-time contributor to the Texas Observer, and very devoted to that paper. You see, that was really my only source about Texas politics because I don't read the Texas papers. It was perfectly clear that Johnson was trying to appear as an all-out conservative in Texas and as a moderate in national politics. The country is not that divided. That might have been possible when you didn't have television and radio and all of these other things. But to have a Majority Leader who was one thing one place and another elsewhere was pretty phony. It wasn't that he was a conservative or a radical or anything else; it was simply that he was trying to be all things to all people. He was trying to be a moderate nationally and a conservative in Texas and, as far as I can see, it didn't work. One can say, well, it did work because he became President, and I understand that point of view. But he didn't become President in the normal course. We can

talk the next time about the '60 convention etc. and the '60 campaign. But, after all, Johnson wasn't planning to become President by the assassination of someone. So it didn't work in the sense that he could ever have gotten to the top on his own. When I said it didn't work, I didn't mean that it isn't good to become President. I meant that the strategy of trying to be a national moderate and a local conservative and thereby get the nomination, that failed, in my judgment.

M: The only other thing before '60 is what about personal. Was Johnson able, when he was in the Senate, to separate his opposition to you in ADA and so on from a personal anger?

R: No, I don't think so. The meetings that we would have with him, when the Leadership Conference or the ADA would have a delegation there, I always felt the hostility. I felt the hostility, and I don't think I'm any more sensitive than anybody else. Of course he was very angry with me on another thing I did. He was very angry several times during this period.

In January '59, after the '58 Democratic Senate sweep, we had a majority committed to us on the filibuster fight. Johnson and Bobby Baker took the majority away from us. The way they would do that was this: When the new senators came in, they'd report to Bobby and he would then work through Russell and the other Southerners to get them on desirable committees if they would promise to shift their vote. The majority we had eroded very fast under Bobby's pressure. I said publicly that Johnson was stealing our election victory.

I was sitting out at Hubert's house on Coquelin Terrace, I guess it was New Year's Day or the day after because the filibuster rule fight always happened right at the start of Congress. Johnson called up. Johnson screamed to Humphrey about me and Humphrey didn't let on I was there because he didn't want Johnson to think that he was in bad company, I guess. He

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was screaming bloody murder about these guys who are saying that he's stealing the votes; he doesn't care how they vote on this thing. This was rubbish! And it was a very bitter fight on the filibuster in '59.

Another thing he was very angry about was this: I guess it was right after Case of South Dakota received those twenty-five \$100 bills and Johnson got eighty-five Senate signatures on an alleged clean politics bill. I wrote a memorandum blowing that bill up because it didn't do anything. And he never was able to put a bill through on which he had eighty-five signatures. It still hasn't passed even though there were eighty-five signatures on it. I think Gerry Siegel was the author of the bill and he's a wonderful guy. There were some minor good things in it, but there were some terrible things in it too, as Gerry agreed. I think we're good friends, Gerry and I, but we just didn't agree on that situation. Johnson always was sore at me personally because our memorandum did knock off that bill. Of course you can imagine how significant a bill would be if you could get eighty-five guys to introduce it. We always seemed to be in total opposition.

M: But he didn't take it out on you? He didn't call you up with personal abuses?

R: Oh, no, he never would call up. As a matter of fact, just to digress for a second, I always thought Johnson was a little lacking in personal courage in that respect. For example, in '64, when I was fighting for the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party--

M: '64.

R: '64. Johnson never would call up, but the girls in the office would always say, "it's the other one calling." That got to mean around our office that if he didn't like something I was doing in the Mississippi Freedom Party fight--because it was boiling up for a considerable time--I would get calls from Hubert Humphrey and Walter Reuther. They'd come in such direct succession that it was clear that Johnson had been on the telephone with

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both of them. So if one of them would call and I'd get my bawling out from one of them, then the girls would say, "it's the other one." It got to be kind of a joke around our office, the way Johnson worked.

It never appeared to me that he had much courage in that kind of situation--even as President, which he then was, where you could talk down to anybody. I never felt that he had the courage of confrontation, but maybe I'm wrong. Of course I think, too, Johnson had a little bit of the Robert Warwick, "every man has his price," theory. I guess he figured that I'd do what Hubert wanted for friendship, and I guess he figured that Walter was sort of my client and I'd do what he wanted. Johnson does have a kind of a theory that every man has his price; as when he told Frank Church, a dove, "You call Walter Lippmann on the wire and see if he can get a dam for you." Even if that was in jest, as I would very likely think it could have been because it's so crass, there's often a half truth in a jest. I got the feeling that he does have this idea that you can get anybody if you go at it hard enough. I think that was part of his downfall, this sort of "every man has his price" philosophy, because it ain't true.

M: It doesn't turn out to be true over the Vietnam thing.

Well, we'll start again in 1960 then, if it's all right, sir.

R: All right, fine.

[End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview I]

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