INTERVIEW II

DATE: August 1, 1969

INTERVIEWEE: JOSEPH L. RAUH, JR.

INTERVIEWER: PAIGE MULHOLLAN

PLACE: Mr. Rauh's office in Washington, D.C.

Tape 1 of 1

M: We had agreed this time to start with 1960, and perhaps a good way to do that would be to ask first was there any really overt attempt by Lyndon Johnson to get the nomination in '56?

R: I will discuss that a little bit, but let me go back to this letter of ours, the ADA letter in '60, just to refresh my recollection.

M: I want to take that one this time and get it xeroxed.

You said last time something about the exploitation that the Johnson people were clearly making of the Stevenson people in the campaign for that nomination.

R: I think that's right, but I'd like to go back a little if I may on the '60 campaign. In January of '59 the Humphrey campaign started. It wasn't a "declaration" because he declared in January of '60, but we started back in '59 and set up our organization and went to work. The reason it's relevant to Johnson is that there were two Humphrey camps rolled into one. One Humphrey camp was for Johnson and was "Stop Kennedy," and the other Humphrey camp was for Humphrey and against Johnson.

The ADA people in the Humphrey camp included Jim Loeb, who had been an ADA founder, Marvin Rosenberg, a businessman in New York, myself, Bob Nathan--we were all for Humphrey 100%. We were I guess more idealistic than practical. It was unlikely that Humphrey could get it, but we thought he could get it and it was a fun thing to try and do. I was in fact the speech coordinator of the Humphrey campaign.

The others in there were really for Johnson with Humphrey taking the

Vice Presidency or whatever crumbs he could get. Included in this group were Jim Rowe, who was Johnson's close friend and who came into the Humphrey camp obviously to stop Kennedy, and Kampleman and Herb Waters and that oil fellow, Pat O'Connor, and a number of others--all anti-ADA.

So the Humphrey camp was not one camp but two, and quite bitter and unpleasant. It wasn't a very happy time.

M: Even in 1959?

R: Even back in '59. I guess my worst experiences in there were early in '60. I guess it didn't show so much in '59. I think the implication of the question is probably right, that these differences didn't surface quite as much in '59 as they did in '60. But I remember early in 1960--if you'd like to shut the recorder off for a minute I want to look for a date if there's any chance I can find it.

[pause]

R: Where were we?

M: That there were two Humphrey camps and the fact that there was this division but that it became more apparent as you got into 1960.

R: On looking back at my appointments calendar, I see where I saw John Kennedy on February 23, 1960. Now the reason I was rather close to Kennedy in this period was that he was the liberal on the McClellan Rackets Committee, which had investigated Hoffa and was investigating the UAW Kohler strike. He couldn't have been more helpful to the UAW and I would see him many times in connection with this investigation. Of course his brother Bobby was the counsel to the committee, and I would see him more, but Bobby couldn't do the things that a Senator could do. I see here on the calendar I had this appointment with Senator Kennedy on February 23, 1960. This was a typical example of what I'm trying to say.

When I was about to leave Kennedy, after discussing some matter

concerning the McClellan Rackets Committee, he said, "Before you go, I'd like to ask you a question." I said, "What's the question?" He said, "How can a guy for whom I've done as much as I've done for you be in a 'stop Kennedy' movement?" I said: "That surprises me. I'm not in any 'stop Kennedy' movement." He said, "Well, everybody in town knows that the Humphrey camp is just a front for Johnson and is a 'stop Kennedy' operation." I said, "Well, everybody in town may know that, but I don't see how you can say that of me. I'm devoted to Hubert," and I explained our background. "Jim Loeb, Marvin Rosenberg, Bob Nathan--we're not in any Johnson thing; in fact we're opposed to Johnson."

He said, "Well, you guys don't run it." He knew a lot more about our camp than I did, I guess. He said, "You guys don't run it. It's being run by Rowe and Kampelman and Waters and O'Conner, and they're all connected with Johnson in some way--Kampleman's with Bobby Baker, O'Connor's in the oil lobby, Rowe is Johnson's close political adviser. You guys don't even know what's going on in your own camp."

I said, "Well, I don't know how else I can say this to prove to you that I'm not in any 'stop Kennedy' camp. If Hubert ever gets out of the race, I'm for you." That I think ended the discussion as far as he and I were concerned.

So the question arises, who was right? Was Kennedy right? The answer is that Kennedy was half right; that Humphrey played both groups here. Humphrey was aware that there were two camps; that there was one that was for him for President and there was one that was for stopping Kennedy and not believing that Humphrey could get it. Let's say Kampelman and Waters would have preferred Humphrey, but they didn't think he could get it and their motivation was one of support for Johnson, thinking Humphrey would come out as the second biggest guy, whether Vice President or not, in the

Johnson Administration. Others like O'Connor and Rowe, I think were really for Johnson. But some, to give them their due, were for Humphrey but just didn't think he could get it.

Then there were us guys who were against Johnson. Hubert just rode with the two groups. For the good that the liberals could do him, fine; for the good that the 'stop Kennedy' people could do him, fine. In West Virginia we had such obvious 'stop Kennedy' people as that bigot Robert Byrd helping us.

M: Helping in quotation marks almost there.

R: "Helping," yes. But his sole motivation was to stop Kennedy for Johnson; he didn't have any motivation at all for Humphrey, but he wanted to stop Kennedy.

Anyway I did leave Kennedy that day without breaking up our friendship; my interest, as I say, was Humphrey, and I think I convinced him that it was an honorable thing.

At any rate through the early part of '60 these two Humphrey camps went forward. The difference between the two camps was illustrated by things that happened. For example, Humphrey had some control of the way that delegate votes were to be allocated in Wisconsin. I can't remember the exact details, but the Humphrey camp took the illiberal position of dividing the votes as much as possible. Those of us, what I call the "Humphrey for President" crowd, not the 'stop Kennedy' crowd, didn't care about any division of votes. What we wanted to do was win a referendum in Wisconsin to show Humphrey was viable. But what the others wanted to do was to get enough votes away from Kennedy to slow him down. It was a real division between the two camps.

And the division kept coming up on issues.

Anyway, we got to Wisconsin and there was a difference in tactics there. For example, the question arose of whether Humphrey should attack Kennedy

or whether he should really try to show his own liberalism. We split on that. We were obviously for Humphrey's showing his own liberalism and not attacking Kennedy. The others were just for discrediting Kennedy and didn't care much about anything else.

I had control of the prepared speeches though, so they never said a word against Kennedy. However, they had Humphrey's ear. So the relationship between the prepared text and what Humphrey delivered was very coincidental. But there was a running battle.

I remember one thing that happened that I'm looking for right now. It's a very interesting thing that occurred, if you'll give me just a second. Here it is. On Saturday, February 13, I notice from my calendar there was an emergency meeting of the Humphrey people. It was snowing. The meeting was called of all of the two Humphrey crowds--all the people working for Hubert. We usually had strategy meetings of about seven, eight, ten people. When we got there Rowe proposed that we pull out of the District of Columbia and give it to Morse, in return for which Morse would announce the next day--Sunday, February 14, where he was on one of those "Face the Nation" or "Meet the Press" programs--that he was going to campaign for Humphrey in Wisconsin. In other words we would give him the District of Columbia and he would help us. Now this was obviously against Kennedy, because we'd have Morse helping us in Wisconsin, but it was obviously against Humphrey too, because we would give up what turned out to be the only primary he won.

You wouldn't have needed a loud speaker to have heard me four blocks away when that 'stop Kennedy' proposal was made. The proposal was promptly killed. There was one thing about a proposal like that. It had to be unanimous, because if it wasn't unanimous the group that disagreed would have the best of it with the press. In other words, a deal had to have everybody's concurrence to work. So I had a veto and that proposal was dropped.

The next day on television Morse denounced Humphrey in rough terms. Obviously what happened was that the 'stop Kennedy' group had made the deal with Morse and they had to go back to him that night and tell him no soap--that there were elements in the Humphrey camp that wouldn't buy the deal.

This was great Johnson politics. Get Morse to help Humphrey beat Kennedy in Wisconsin and then give up practically sure votes that Humphrey had in the District of Columbia.

M: Did Johnson play any role in this personally that you ever detected?

R: You'd have to ask Jim Rowe whether he was seeing Johnson regularly or not. It's not something that I would be aware of. I would have been the last one to have ever known what was going on with Johnson.

It was really very unpleasant, probably the most unpleasant type of activity I ever got into. This was an idealistic venture for me working for Hubert but every place I turned things like this were coming up and you never knew when something would happen even worse. As I say, that snowy February day when they pulled this idea that we should give up the one place Humphrey could win in return for knocking Kennedy off through Morse in Wisconsin, where Morse was very popular, that was too much for me. I must say, give the devil his due. The Johnson crowd was smart. It was a hell of a deal for Johnson. They just had a little trouble with me. They just coudn't clear the deal because any one person could veto it. At first I was the only one in the room who was opposed to it. Some of the others came around later. Phil Stern sided with me on this particular issue, although he didn't generally feel as strong as I did. Phil was the editor of a lot of Hubert's speeches and the most marvelous editor and most wonderful guy. He did side with me that afternoon. But it didn't matter. That was something they--

M: It just took one.

R: It just took a veto in there because they wouldn't dare make a deal that anyone could point out publicly. All Kennedy had to do was to suggest a deal and then have a Humphrey supporter say that's what happened. So it was easy enough to kill the deal, but it showed the kind of thing that was going on.

In the meantime, of course, I was working in the District as well as being national speech coordinator because we had a primary coming up on May 3. April 5 was the primary in Wisconsin; we'd been campaigning out there and we thought things looked fairly good. It went very badly. Catholic trade unionists forgot all about Humphrey's labor record, and just went in droves for Kennedy. We got badly beaten. We carried three districts, two votes each, I guess. It didn't look so bad on districts; we held back some votes from Kennedy because the 'stop Kennedy' people had gotten more votes into the districts and less statewide where we lost badly. We did hold three districts, two farm districts right beside Minnesota where Humphrey was popular; and the other one we carried was Dane County--that covers the University of Wisconsin at Madison. I have to smile at our carrying that district because the director of our campaign up there was Jim Loeb, who was in it for Humphrey. In other words, with all of the talk of the 'stop Kennedy' people, they didn't carry a district. Two of them were carried by Minnesotans coming across the line and working, and third one was carried by a good ADA-er, Jim Loeb.

The beating that day was bad. In the meeting in Humphrey's suite that night, there was a question whether to go on. We didn't have any money and so forth. There was a real question. One could have made an argument against going on, but I guess everybody in the end was for going on, figuring we'd recoup in West Virginia.

We did go on. Actually, I had to fly back in the middle of the night to arrange a homecoming for Humphrey in the District of Columbia, sort of a

demand that he go on. We wanted it to look like there was real support for him. We had our hands full on that point.

In the meantime there was a new move to get out of the District of Columbia primary, the same point I mentioned before. For some reason the 'stop Kennedy' crowd had gotten the idea we were going to get beat in the District. I don't know where they got that idea. Or else they didn't really care. I knew we were going to win; it was perfectly clear what was going to happen in the District. There were three tickets--a Stevenson draft; a Humphrey; and a Morse ticket. I knew exactly what was going to happen. We were going to run a close second to Stevenson in the white areas and a close second to Morse in the black areas, and we were going to win by a large margin. It was perfectly clear what was going to happen.

We did even better than that. We ran about even with Morse for the black vote; we ran a close second to Stevenson in the white vote. It was a cinch from the beginning. Stevenson ran third, Morse ran second, and we carried everything. Hubert had a great deal of affectionate support around here and so we really didn't have any trouble. Hubert was ecstatic. It got me some credentials back with Humphrey, which I was pretty sadly lacking because the 'stop Kennedy' crowd was trying to make us look like wild-eyed amateurs. It's funny to relate that the amateurs were the ones who always seemed to produce the bacon; us in the District here and Jim Loeb in Madison etc. But anyway we did win here and it gave Humphrey a terrific boost. He was campaigning in West Virginia, and he bawled all over the telephone about how I'd been right and thank goodness he'd listened and we went on in the District. He said it was giving him a big boost in West Virginia.

The trouble was that it didn't give him a big boost in West Virginia; apparently nothing could have given him a big boost in West Virginia. West Virginia was just a disaster. Kennedy won by a landslide. That night

another real fight between the 'stop Kennedy' boys and the Humphrey boys occurred in Hubert's bedroom. I think some of this is in either Arthur Schlesinger's Thousand Days or in Evans and Novak, because I did tell one of them the story.

The 'stop Kennedy' boys wanted to go on.

M: They had to have a candidate anyway.

R: They had to have a candidate until Johnson was ready, and Johnson wasn't ready yet. He wanted to hold off right through the congressional session. The Humphrey people wanted Hubert to get out and be generous. Our theory was--it was Jim Loeb's and Marvin Rosenberg's as well as mine--the three of us were in the room against Rowe and the others. We had a perfectly simple theory--that Hubert could never be President of the United States through the primary route. He should be generous here to Kennedy, and he should be Kennedy's vice presidential candidate.

The theory on the other side was that Hubert still had some strength to stop Kennedy, and that Johnson might some day get it and take Hubert with him.

We won. Jim Loeb was at the typewriter and Hubert issued our statement. It was very generous to Kennedy. As Jim said to me about 4 that morning, "Well, isn't it sad that practically the only argument you and I have won in this camp is the argument on how we remove ourselves!" It didn't matter. We did win that argument and Hubert did get out.

An interesting thing happened that night. I read the statement to Bobby Kennedy at the other Charleston hotel over the telephone, and he thanked us. About five minutes later the hotel clerk called our suite to say that Mr. Kennedy was on his way up. So everybody thought it was going to be Jack, except that Jack was on television live claiming victory. So I knew what was going to happen. I knew it was going to be Bobby, and I knew it was

going to be terrible because a lot of the Humphrey crowd really hated him. So when Bobby walked in the room, I thought I was going to die. Hubert and Muriel were at the other end of the room, and it was like the movie of the "Ten Commandments," when the Red Sea opens. A sea of people opened so Bobby could walk through. He walked over to Hubert and Muriel and he leaned down and kissed Muriel on the cheek. I swear to God I thought she was going to hit him. This is not irrelevant because it's one of the reasons Hubert wasn't President after John Kennedy died. Humphrey's family and many of his supporters literally hated the Kennedys and they urged Hubert not to run for Vice President with Jack Kennedy. At any rate that was some night and Hubert was out of the race on May 10th.

From my own personal point of view, it was a strange night. Loeb and Rosenberg and I persuaded Hubert to go over and congratulate Jack Kennedy. We said, "Look, you've issued the statement, now, goddamit let's be good sports." Muriel didn't go along, but Hubert and the rest of us walked over. Hubert congratulated Jack. The strange thing that happened to me was Jack Kennedy said, "Joe, don't forget that promise." He had the most remarkable shelf of pieces of information. You know, at the moment of his important victory, that he should have thought about the promise of some little squirt--.

M: A comment that you'd made three months earlier to him.

R: That's right. Let's see, it was February 13th--March, April, May--three months almost to the day. It was really interesting that he should have remembered it at all, but anyway he did and I said that I would live up to it.

I did endorse Kennedy a couple of days later. That was a Tuesday, of course, and the endorsement was in the Sunday Times along with all the other Humphrey people who were for Kennedy. Of course a lot of the liberals who were for Humphrey went for Stevenson later, as we'll get into, and then some

of course went for Johnson. It was sort of split up between Johnson, Stevenson, and Kennedy.

I was commited to Kennedy, but I was even more commited to helping make Hubert the Vice President of the United States. During May and June I walked back and forth between the Kennedy group and the Humphrey group. I really thought that Kennedy made an offer to Humphrey at one stage in June, and I really thought that Humphrey had accepted it. As I look back on it now, I guess I take things as offers and acceptances that are a little too loose to be binding in politics. Jack Kennedy subsequently said he'd never made an offer to Humphrey and Humphrey subsequently said he never accepted an offer from Kennedy. So I guess it never really took place. All I can say is, it was damned close.

At any rate I do have one thing on my calendar that's probably worth mentioning in relation to the ultimate debacle of Johnson being chosen as Vice President. On June 9, 1960, there was a fund raising for George McGovern for the Senate. Jack Kennedy came as one of the speakers. I was helping to run the McGovern luncheon and raise some money for him. As Kennedy went out, he motioned to me to come along with him, so I did so. He was then the leading candidate for President and I was flattered that in front of this whole audience he asked me to accompany him. We got in a taxi cab. He said, "There's something I want to talk to you about."

I said, "What is it?"

He said, "Your friends on the New York Post are going to print a story tomorrow that I have an incurable disease and this will hurt me badly in the campaign. I think you ought to tell them that it isn't fair, that I am not using any suppressant drugs, and that I really am wholly healthy and able to do the job."

So I said I would relay the message. Then I said, "I'd like to ask you

a question. Who is it going to be on the vice presidency, because this means a great deal to me." He said, and I happened to come back and write this down because I thought it was important--it was important to me, anyway--he said, "It will be--and this I wrote down in quotes--Hubert Humphrey or another Midwestern liberal." And then I simply said, "Well, I guess that relieves my fears about Johnson." He said, "There's no need for fears." That was June 9. I really was hoping for the Humphrey thing as of that moment.

Well, the Stevenson thing seemed to be boiling up, and in my judgment it was the result, at least in part, of the anti-Kennedy, pro-Johnson movement. I want to make it perfectly clear, however, that those were only a few of the people working on the Stevenson campaign. The bulk of the people were for Stevenson hook, line and sinker.

To go back a minute, at the ADA convention on May 3 when Hubert was still in the race--no, the ADA convention was on May 6,7, and 8, that was after Hubert had lost in Wisconsin and won in the District of Columbia and before the debacle in West Virginia--the ADA split up about this way: 50 percent for Humphrey, 40 percent for Stevenson, and about 10 percent or less for Kennedy. Kennedy had a very light support at this stage among liberals. Indeed you'll recall that Arthur Schlesinger had to write a book Is There A Difference, or something like that, in order to highlight the difference between Kennedy and Nixon. Kennedy's weakness among liberals was really evident there. But there was tremendous support for Stevenson in the liberal movement. I don't mean in any way to imply the contrary--I'm only saying that I think that a lot of the direction and the manipulation of the Stevenson movement was on a 'stop Kennedy' basis.

Anyway, the ADA got very frightened at the Johnson rise, and we wrote every delegate under date of June 30, 1960, a detailed letter on Johnson's

record. I can loan that to you and maybe you'll want to insert it at this point and then send it back to me. This letter had some very extensive notice. It went to every delegate. But the Stevenson thing did roll on.

I'm looking for the date of the Democratic convention. Do you have the date of the convention that year?

M: No, it's usually in August. You mentioned awhile ago the Ziffren committee. Where does this fall in here?

R: Back early in the year '60, Paul Ziffren spoke to Walter Reuther about setting up a committee which would represent the liberal candidates, which would try to avoid trouble and differences that might make it possible for a conservative candidate, especially Johnson, to work his way into the nomination, either at the top or bottom. I represented Humphrey on that committee. Mike Feldman and Ted Sorensen represented Kennedy. Millie Jeffrey and Tom Quimby represented Soapy Williams. Ziffren was there and Butler was in and out of it. The Committee did such things as discuss who'd be the permanent chairman, what we'd do on platform--it was a rather useful vehicle for trying to hold the liberal candidates together. It was a little hard in some respects because as Humphrey and Kennedy got to attacking each other more and more, the thing did fragment a good deal--but it did meet quite regularly. I notice the meetings on my calendar here, and I think the Committee was of some unifying value.

M: It was mainly concerned with stopping Johnson.

R: Yes, I guess so, although I don't want to say just stopping Johnson. It dealt with things like "let's get liberals in every convention capacity." It was sort of an operating liberal coordinating group.

Now we're trying to find the convention date.

M: Did Johnson use, prior to the convention, his position in the Senate fairly overtly to further his own ambition? Did he take advantage of Kennedy's

absence, for example, campaigning, and this type of thing to push his own chances along?

R: I'd say that is an understatement, and I'll come to that in a second. I'm having a hell of a time finding the convention date.

M: August 14, something like that?

R: I can't find that many clear days on my calendar. Just give me a second here, and then I'll come back to Johnson's use of his Senate position.

M: It could be later than that, I guess. Certainly it wouldn't have been any earlier than, say, the 10th of August, would it?

R: I believe it was. I believe it was in July that year.

M: They didn't have to have it on Johnson's birthday that year, so you had it earlier I guess.

R: Here it is. American Flight 77 to Los Angeles, 12 o'clock, July 5.

M: That early?

R: That was the week before the convention, but I think I've got it right at last. But you asked me a question while I was fiddling for this date, and I ought to answer it. How did Johnson go about doing this, using his power! I'll give you one example of the use of his power.

A lot of people were trying to get through Congress what later became Medicare. We were fighting like mad for Medicare. The leader of the fight for Medicare was the UAW. When Johnson heard that Soapy had a press conference coming up at Mackinac Island to throw Michigan's fifty-one votes to Kennedy, he hit the ceiling and told everyone to tell the UAW that unless they stopped that, there'd be no Medicare. Of course, there wasn't any that year; it came later. Poor Millie Jeffrey had to go from the UAW headquarters to Mackinac Island and try to stop Soapy from doing what she and everybody else wanted Soapy to do, namely come out for Kennedy. She had to tell Soapy not to do it for that reason. That was the most flagrant use of Johnson's power. The

UAW was leading the fight for Medicare. It was called something else, then; it didn't get the name Medicare that early. But whatever called, it was the forerunner of what finally passed later. I think he finally got the bill through in '64, I guess it was. We needed his strength in order to get it in 1960 and he used that strength to keep us from getting it.

So the answer to your question is "yes." I only have that one really hot example, but I am sure there are others.

M: That's a pretty good example.

R: I went to Los Angeles on the 5th; the convention, I believe from that fact, must have opened on Monday, the 11th. I still thought Hubert had a chance.

M: To be Vice President.

R: To be Vice President. I thought Kennedy was going to get the Presidential nomination. The Stevenson movement was powerful in the galleries and in the human ring around the convention, but not powerful in the delegations. I worked for Kennedy very, very hard there, helping get liberal delegates. I was part of the corraling group. Whizzer White, Esther Peterson, all of us were working together in getting liberal delegates over to Kennedy. It looked like he had it pretty well sewed up.

I was on the platform committee. There had been an argument about how best to support Kennedy. Jock Saltonstall up in Boston--John Saltonstall--had the idea of a public letter to liberals signed by a number of liberals for Kennedy. Henry Steele Commager had written a first draft of such a letter, but I didn't like it. In all honesty it was filled with Kennedy's great civil liberties record, whereas I thought it had not been that good, especially not voting against McCarthy. So I went to see Kennedy and said, "I think this letter ought to be on civil rights, and I'd like your promise that you'll support a civil rights platform that backs the Supreme Court decision on desegregation all the way." So he said, "All right." I said,

"Is this draft of the letter all right?" He read it and, although I'm sure it was the strongest civil rights statement he'd ever seen, he said, "Yes, it's all right."

Then they did substitute my draft for Commager's. It was put out about a month before the convention. It was an appeal to liberals--anti-Stevenson without saying so--it was an appeal to liberals to back Kennedy. It said that Kennedy's the only liberal who can be nominated and implied at least the Johnson ploy that was going on even if Stevenson's campagn wasn't intended that way.

I was on the platform committee. We got the strongest possible civil rights plank. The Kennedy's were wonderful in helping us get it. At any rate, the plank was so all-out on civil rights that it was pretty hard for Johnson to have to run on it, but it never occurred to us that he would.

Late on July 8 Hubert arrived, that was the Friday before the convention. I wanted to talk to him. I still had hopes for him for the vice presidency and so did Reuther. It was an open thing at that particular moment. I was still to a degree part of the Humphrey camp, so I went to the Humphrey headquarters. They had a headquarters even though he wasn't a candidate. This was Friday night. When I went in the headquarters, it was perfectly clear that there was something wrong. The people were obviously embarrassed because I was there. When I said to the girls, "Where is the Senator," they giggled, or they said they didn't know in that funny way that makes you feel you're the skunk at a garden party. So I didn't know what to do. I sat around for awhile and said, "Is he coming back," and they said they didn't know. So I left. By a strange coincidence I just walked down the hall--I really wasn't thinking. All of a sudden I heard this raucous laughter; it was Hubert in a room about twenty rooms away from the headquarters. Being a guy that doesn't think much about such things, I knocked on the door.

A guy comes out of the door and it's Pat O'Connor, who is an oil lobbyist and a Lyndon supporter in Hubert's camp. So I said, "Hi, Pat," and started to walk in. And he lays a fist across my jaw. I had a briefcase with me. I dropped it and started to take aim at Pat when Jim Rowe opened the door, saw me and slammed and locked the door. You'd think any guy in politics as long as I'd been would have known what was going on, but I didn't. It was at least forty-eight hours later that I learned this was a secret meeting between Johnson and Humphrey that I had come across by total accident.

At any rate I picked up my little briefcase with my papers in it and walked away because even I knew I wasn't welcome there!

M: That was very clear!

R: It was perfectly clear I wasn't welcome, but I didn't realize what was in fact going on.

M: That doesn't sound very smart, though, of them, even if it was secret. It was bound to get you to wondering.

R: I didn't know anything about it until days later. I subsequently found out that what happened was that the Kennedy people wanted to be first to talk to Humphrey about Minnesota coming out for him and the Johnson people wanted to be first to talk to Humphrey, too. The Johnson people won because the Kennedy people didn't have anybody really inside the Humphrey camp and close enough. I guess I was as close as anybody, and I wasn't as close as I should have been.

M: You couldn't get it.

R: At any rate, the purpose and the decision of the Johnson-Humphrey meeting was that Humphrey would get the Minnesota people to come out either for Humphrey or for Stevenson. The unit rule would clearly keep it away from Kennedy. It was a Johnson maneuver, and it was the end of Humphrey as a vice presidential possibility. Humphrey then did come out for Stevenson, he did help block

Kennedy, although, of course, Kennedy got it on the first ballot. But, in my judgment, Hubert threw away the vice presidency and the presidency, which he would have succeeded to after Kennedy's assassination.

As far as the Johnson nomination was concerned, this was of particular bitterness to me for several reasons. Reason number one was that I had that promise from Kennedy back on June 9, which I mentioned. Reason number two was that I was the leader of the District of Columbia delegation and relied on that and other Kennedy promises. We had on the delegation a number of Negroes opposed to Johnson. Phil Graham was running the Johnson-Kennedy amalgamation--

M: Was he a delegate?

R: Phil was not a delegate, but he was far more important because he could walk into either of their rooms without anybody stopping him. Every morning the Washington Post would be delivered to the entire delegation from the District. And every morning the Negroes would come up to me and scream, "You're for Kennedy, Kennedy's going to take Johnson," because the Post was always predicting that Kennedy was going to take Johnson. Graham was keeping it alive. I would say, "All right, I'll go back again."

So I'd go to Bobby and Bobby would say, "It is not Johnson. You can tell them officially, it is not Johnson."

So I'd go back and say, "I have been assured it is not Johnson."

We were also permitted to say the same thing when we were corraling Stevenson delegates. You see, Stevenson delegates were the most liberal people there, and we were allowed to say that it wouldn't be Johnson to a Stevenson delegate we were urging to go for Kennedy.

So when on July--I guess that was Thursday--the 14th, it comes out that it is Johnson, I felt like I'd been slapped in the face. I was just blind with the feeling of having been made into a liar. I'd never had that

experience of feeling how unfair it all was. Having been assured not just once but over and over and over again that it wouldn't be Johnson, the thing hurt. To this day I don't know whether Jack Kennedy did it hoping Johnson wouldn't take it, hoping Johnson would take it to strengthen him politically, or hoping he would take it because he thought he'd make a good President.

I don't believe the latter, because I just don't believe Kennedy really thought that. I think it's between the first and the second, and I don't know which it is. There are many stories. Many historians think Kennedy hoped he wouldn't take it at all. There are many who feel he thought Johnson would help him carry the South. At any rate Johnson got it and we made our little tempest in a teapot on the floor. None of us, Soapy Williams nor I nor any of the others ever thought there was any possible chance; we just thought we would register our complaint. And register it we did.

Strangely enough we got a tremendous voice vote against Johnson when John McCormack made his motion to suspend the rules and nominate Johnson. In fact I remember one funny thing. I was standing near Sam Rayburn on the floor. When the voice vote was over, Collins, the permanent chairman, hesitated. He was standing there and he hesitated to call the vote. The reason why he could legitimately hesitate was that it took two-thirds to carry the motion. It was a motion to suspend the rules and nominate Johnson, and that took two-thirds. Collins could legitimately have worried about the decibel count. We didn't have fifty votes on a roll call. We had all the galleries--

M: And they vote on those.

R: They vote on these things, and we had a lot of people on the floor who wouldn't have stood up in a roll call. So it sounded like a voluminous "no" vote, and he hesitated. Collins hesitated because he was a very fair guy.

He'd been everybody's choice for Convention Chairman; he was a very decent guy, and he hesitated. I'm standing there within voice range of Sam Rayburn, and you could hear him shout, "Aye, you damn fool, aye, call it aye!"

I was relieved because a roll call would have murdered us. We'd have been made to look like idiots on a roll call. Adopting the motion was the best thing that could have happened to us.

Collins announced that the McCormack motion was carried with the necessary two-thirds majority and Johnson had been nominated. It was a great relief because we were obviously going to be slaughtered on a roll call, and it was much better this way. A lot of people were saying it was a bad count, and I said, "Oh God, don't change it!"

M: Don't count it!

R: That was roughly the story of Johnson's vice presidency as I knew it.

M: Did Bobby ever say anything to you?

R: Yes. There's no question Bobby opposed it. Going on, on the floor that night the Kennedy people were trying to shut our little minority up. They had a list. Kennedy made a list, when they decided to go for Johnson around noontime, of who would talk to all the likely objectors.

M: Robert Kennedy?

R: No, John Kennedy. Different people were assigned different anti-Johnson people to talk to. Phil Graham took me. I have a wonderful picture at home of Phil--he must have had a photographer following him because obviously the Post photographer wasn't following me--I have a wonderful picture on my wall at home of Phil Graham looking at me in the kind of sorrowful way you pity stupid oafs who are doing things they shouldn't. He wrote my wife a letter and said roughly, "In days when Mr. Rauh is doing particularly badly, look at my martyred face and draw some comfort from it." Phil is gone now, but he was an absolutely lovable guy. His job that day was to shut me up,

and they had somebody for everybody. They did a pretty good job. They couldn't get Soapy; Michigan would have voted against Johnson. So would the District of Columbia, although I must say that Kennedy's machinery was going pretty well and we had a lot of erosion there. When we started, everybody was against Johnson. But by the time the Kennedy machine had worked us over for awhile, the anti-Johnson margin was cut down rather close. Indeed, when it came to the question whether our banner would go into the Johnson parade, some Oklahoma guys tried to get it away and we just barely held on to it. Actually it was held by my son. But there was a majority against Johnson in just those two delegations--the District of Columbia and Michigan. All of the rest had a majority for him. Of course, that was never tested.

The only other thing about the Johnson event was when Roy Wilkins and Arnold Aronson and I saw John Kennedy. You know they had that rump session of Congress in August after the convention. We saw John Kennedy about the question of civil rights legislation, trying to get him to back it, actually trying to get both Nixon and Kennedy to back it. As I was leaving the meeting with Kennedy, he was then the candidate, he said: "That was some statement you made on the convention floor against Johnson when you appealed to me against him." I said, "Yes." He said, "A pretty persuasive statement." And I said, "Not persuasive enough." It was all in good spirit; he was a very easy guy in that respect. He didn't seem to be sore about the fight we'd made against Johnson. I have a feeling maybe he thought it was a good idea. I never thought he was at all sore about it.

M: You had some trouble getting the ADA to endorse the ticket.

R: Oh, yes. If you'll hold for a second, we'll get the date of the ADA board meeting. Of course we had to wait for the Nixon nomination, you see, and it was after that--I think it's late August or early September--

M: It's a matter of record.

R: If you'll give me a second here, I'll tell you about the ADA endorsement and my own feelings about that subject.

Well, I'm not exactly certain what day it was, but it's a matter of record. The question of endorsement was the subject of the ADA meeting. My position is always to have the ADA tell the truth; that the only way you can save an organization is by candor when you have a real problem. I've got the date, it's Saturday, August 27. It was an all-day board meeting.

The morning was just talk. My position was that we should tell the truth, that we should say we were disappointed in the Johnson nomination, but still endorse the whole ticket. I felt we couldn't endorse part of the ticket. This was the view of many of the people who don't ordinarily come to board meetings, but who have real strength. Humphrey, Herbert Lehman, Joe Clark--they all wrote letters to the board urging the endorsement of the whole ticket. It's lucky, because it turned out to be very necessary. It was very close, very, very close. I think it finally was a two vote margin. The endorsement of Kennedy was agreed to early, but on a motion to strike the endorsement of Johnson, I think it was something like thirty-two to thirty--in other words, the motion to strike any endorsement of Johnson lost by two votes.

Arthur Schlesinger wrote a letter to Kennedy on the meeting. You might want to include it here because it's a much better record of that board meeting than I can give you now ten years later. The point Arthur made to Kennedy in that letter was that "this Johnson thing is very bad, and you've got to offset it with the liberals." I think Kennedy mentioned that he was really shaken by Arthur's letter. I don't think he had any idea of the hatred of the liberals for Johnson as evidenced by that board meeting. I think he was really shaken by Arthur's letter. It pushed him toward

the total liberalism of his campaign.

I was surprised. I guess I get over things faster than most. I mean nobody was any angrier about the Johnson nomination than I was, but it was over now. The board meeting was over a month later and we were for Kennedy. The only thing I wouldn't have wanted done was to pretend that we hadn't been against Johnson, to sweep it under the rug. What I wanted to do was say what we thought of Kennedy, say what we thought of Johnson, and endorse the whole ticket. That is ultimately, I think, roughly what was done.

Arthur Schlesinger wrote the statement. We'd argued all morning. Then Arthur wrote a statement at the noon break and we held that statement against any change in the afternoon. But the efforts to change it, to weaken it, were tremendous. Of course Kennedy himself had not had tremendous support inside the ADA at that particular time. Arthur's book "Is There a Difference," was necessary; that the question had to be asked and answered is a rather surprising thing as one looks back. I think the Johnson thing was probably the worst thing on the Kennedy record at that moment. The letter I gave you which the ADA sent out in June showed very strong anti-Johnson feelings. I was surprised, when I looked at it just before this interview, at the degree to which we had documented what I said on the floor of the convention--that the Democratic party shouldn't have for Vice President a gas and oil, anti-civil rights senator. That's very well documented in that letter.

I often tell the story that for some period after my performance on the floor of the convention that night fighting Johnson, a lot of Kennedy people used to come up and say, "Rauh, you sure made a fool of yourself on the floor that night." Then a few years later the Kennedy people used to come up and say, "Joe, how did you know so much." But I didn't know any more then than anybody else; I just had a feeling that this man was an arrogant

guy who ought not be President.

I also had a deep feeling that he knew nothing about foreign affairs and that he would get the nation into trouble. One of the things that had given me that feeling was a piece that I clipped out of the papers at the time because it absolutely flabbergasted me. It was a piece by Donald Grant from the United Nations on Johnson's visit there in 1958. It is the most murderous piece I ever read. It showed Johnson without his clothes on at the United Nations. If you want to take it and give it back to me, you can.

M: Fine, I do.

R: I've never seen Johnson as beautifully done in. Grant exposed the fakery of this guy knowing anything about the world. One of the feelings I had then was not only that here was the gas and oil, anti-civil rights senator, but this guy was not qualified for the presidency. I suppose that feeling has been more vindicated than the other, because on civil rights Johnson made his turn, and on gas and oil he didn't do very much. The thing that was really vindicated was the feeling that he had no capacity on the world front, and that piece of Donald Grant's was ultimately vindicated in the foreign policy area. It had a profound effect on my thinking. I don't know where Mr. Grant is, or even who he is, but he sure had a profound effect. I think if you'll read that, you'll understand why.

M: What about after the election? Did Kennedy submerge Johnson pretty thoroughly during the vice presidency?

R: Oh, yes. Long before Kennedy died, I think the Kennedy people were violently anti-Johnson. There was no love lost there on either side.

M: Was that particularly Bobby?

R: Everybody was saying it was Bobby. I know when the Liberal Party in New York had that big rally for Johnson in '63 to save him from dumping, that was an anti-dump Johnson thing. This was the opposite of the dump Johnson

in '68 by Al [Allard] Lowenstein. This was dump Johnson in '63 by the Kennedys. It obviously was under consideration by the Kennedys. I think one of the things that lessened the consideration of dumping Johnson was when they got the feeling that Johnson had allies here that were going to cause real trouble. This was Johnson's open warfare against the consideration by Kennedy of dumping him. There certainly wasn't any love lost there, but it's not a subject on which I have particular expertise.

[End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview II]

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