INTERVIEWEE: Emmette S. Redford (Tape 1)

INTERVIEWER: David G. McComb

DATE: October 2, 1968, University of Texas, Room 109, Waggoner Hall

M: According to the notes I have, you were born in 1904 and got a B.A. degree at the University of Texas in 1922.

R: '27.

M: Was it '27? Then a Master's Degree at the University of Texas in '28, a Ph.D. at Harvard in 1933. And you also hold an honorary Doctor of Law Degree from Austin College. In your career you worked as an instructor of government at the University of Texas from 1927 to 1929; an assistant professor of government at TCU in 1930 to 1931; then as a tutor and instructor at Harvard, 1931-1933. I assume this was while you were getting your degree. And then as a professor at the University of Texas in government 1933 to the present time.

R: With various titles.

M: With various titles, yes. You have served on a number of national boards and committees. You were also assistant director to the Office of Price Administration with Rationing from 1942 to 1945.

R: That should be stated more specifically. I was assistant regional price executive of the Dallas Regional Office from 1942 to '44, and then assistant deputy administrator for Rationing in the Washington office from 1944 until January, 1946.

M: Then the Office of Temporary Controls, 1947. Incidentally, what was that?

R: That was a consultantship offered to me for the purpose of writing a book, which had the title, Field Administration in Wartime Rationing.

M: Which you finally published?

R: Published in 1947.

M: You also served in the Economic Stablization Agency in 1951, the National Security Resources Board in 1950, and was consultant to divisions of the Executive Office of the President in 1960 and to the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress in 1959--

R: That's a consultantship for the purpose of developing a study for the Joint Economic Committee on economic controls.

M: And the National Council on Humanities from 1966 to the present.

R: I am a member of the National Council on Humanities.

M: And of the Administrative Conference of the U. S.?

R: Yes.

M: You are also the author of a number of books, including Ideal in Practice in Public Administration, 1958; American Government and the Economy, 1965, The Role of Government in the Economy, 1966. And as I recall, author of the rather famous political science textbook, which I think is called Politics and Government, is that correct?

R: In the United States.

M: In the United States.

R: I'm a joint author of that.

M: Well, is that essentially correct on your background?

R: That's essentially correct. There are numerous articles and several monographs. I have two books now in press.

M: What are these books in press?

R: One's with the Oxford Press, and the other's with the University of Texas Press.

M: Now, to ask you a sort of large theoretical question. There has been some talk that Lyndon Johnson's Administration--

R: I might also say in my career that the thing that I'm proudest of has been that I've been president of the national professional organization of which I am a member, the American Political Science Association.

M: And you've published numerous articles in that journal, as I recall.

R: I've published some in that journal and other journals.

M: Now, to ask you a large question. There has been some talk that Lyndon Johnson's Administration marks the end of a political era stretching from Franklin Delano Roosevelt to the present time. Do you agree with this?

R: I think it's quite likely that we are moving into a period in which the issues are going to be different, and there will be realignments in politics. These may be great enough that 1968 will turn out to be a year of demarcation similar to what 1928-1932 were.

M: What kind of changes do you foresee? Or to put it another way, what is significant about this era of politics?

R: Well, there are two overriding things that are significant in 1968. One is the challenge to this nation to develop its foreign policy positions for the future -- [interruption in tape]

M: You were going to tell me about the significance of the present era.

R: And the second problem is coming to grips with the discontents that exist internally in the country at the present time, partly from racial groups, partly from youth, partly from discontent of the poor in a period of plenty, partly from discontents over riots, breakdown of law and order in cities.

M: Has this political era from FDR to LBJ been one which stressed human needs and political response to people more than any other period?

R: I think this is definitely true. Since 1933 and extending through the great legislative reforms of the Johnson Administration, the national government has been responsive to individual needs of persons in a way that it was not prior to 1933. In fact, prior to 1933, the functions of the national government were small indeed compared to what they have been since. It was a government of limited functions, and thought to be a government which had an obligation under the Constitution to respond to very few of the human needs. But 1933 marks the date on which the national government began to try to respond to all types of needs of the people.

M: There is a change too, I believe, or perhaps, the role of government in the economy in this period of time. Do you agree with that?

R: Well, this is part of the whole change. The response of the national government to the problems of the nation included a response with respect to the economy, and also to problems of welfare, conservation. I would say the relation of the government to the economy was the thing that received most attention immediately in 1933. But by 1935, response in the welfare area, as evidenced by the Social Security Act of 1935 and the Housing Act and other acts about 1937, indicated that this new response of government to needs was much broader than what we would refer to as a relation of government to the economy.

M: In the future, do you think there can be any reversal of this?

R: No. I think there may be some changes made in the participation of the states in the development of programs in the future. But essentially

the main decisions of policy for this nation are going to be made in Washington. The change that occurred in the 1930's is a permanent change.

M: Then Lyndon Johnson followed in this trend that started with FDR.

R: President Johnson has definitely followed in the trend that started with President Roosevelt.

M: How long have you known President Johnson?

R: My family moved to Johnson City in 1912. I believe that Lyndon's family came in 1913 or 1914. In a town which had at that time some four to five hundred people, everybody knew everybody else. So I've known him since he was four or five years old.

M: Were you playmates?

R: Well, I'm four years older than he. I left to go to high school in San Antonio when I was sixteen years of age, and was never back in Johnson City during school terms afterwards, and frequently was away where I could make more money during the summers. Nevertheless, I did know Lyndon well and did play with him--baseball, swimming, and everything else that we did for amusement. The age difference was not enough to prevent us from participating together.

M: Do any events from that period of time stand out in your--

R: I must say that I had two younger brothers who were closer to Lyndon's age. They were with him in school and constant playmates of his; and we had back of our home some vacant lots on which we could set up a ball ground and other facilities for playing, and I would suppose that Lyndon spent more of his summer time, when he wasn't in school and between meals

in our backyard than he did his own home. So, I did know him well when he was a child.

M: Are your brothers still alive and in the area?

R: Oh, yes.

M: Can you give me their names?

R: My brother Cecil is an attorney in Corpus Christi, and my brother Clarence is a vice president of Uncle Ben's Corporation in Houston. They both knew Lyndon much better than I did.

M: Was he a good baseball player?

R: He played baseball on the town team, but by that time I was in college, working away from home in the summer, so I don't know how good a ball player he was.

M: What contact did you have with him next, do you recall?

R: I saw him from time to time when I would go back to visit my mother and brothers and other relatives in Johnson City, and when he would be back, so that over the years I saw him at Christmas vacations, summer time, other periods. We occasionally had some conversations together. I never had close contacts with him after those years. I saw him only occasionally when he was here with the National Youth Administration, and I've seen him only occasionally since he was elected to Congress in 1937.

M: From that early period, do you remember any personality traits that stand out? Or, was he just another--

R: Well, Lyndon was a distinctive person in the community. He was an enthusiastic person. He managed to be a part of everything that went on in the community. I used to think that if any incident

occurred in town that was unusual, Lyndon would be the first person there in the front row. He was particularly interested in politics from as far back as anybody can remember. I have here a draft of an article on his youth that I prepared, but it was never published, and I would be happy to supply you a copy of this.

M: That would be helpful.

R: It tells my impressions of his boyhood. It deals with the boyhood and youth of Lyndon Johnson. I think as early as the Ball-Ferguson [gubernatorial] election, which must have been in 1914 when Lyndon was six years old, I recall he was handing out folders for Ferguson, and that he was present at a Ferguson rally. He took some active part in other campaigns when he was a teenager, though I do not recall just what they were. But he always had his candidates, and he was always talking about his candidates to everybody he saw. This was not merely interest just in political campaigns; it was an interest also in political issues. This was a community in which the only things that were there that would attract anybody's attention were three churches and the courthouse. And the courthouse did attract a great deal of attention--periods when district court would be held, trials would be set, and all the other things that occur around a county courthouse. Lyndon had his interest in all of those things.

At school we had no laboratories, but we were fortunate enough to have a school superintendent who, in addition to being superintendent, taught fulltime, who had attended the University of Texas and had, I think, nearly completed his course in the Law School. But because of asthma,

for reasons of health, Mr. Scott Klett, the school superintendent, returned to Johnson City to his ranch and to teaching. He loved to teach civics and infused a great deal of interest into the study of this subject among all of his students. This interest was easily developed because, as I say, in a community of this kind and in a school of this kind science didn't have any attraction for the children. But history and government did have.

Now, I could tell you some of the ways in which this interest of Lyndon's was revealed in the early days if you'd like.

M: Sure.

R: The school had small classes and frequently two classes were combined for the same subject. This would throw one of my brothers into some of Lyndon's classes each year--one of my brothers one year, and then the next year the other one. My brother Cecil was particularly interested in governmental problems. And on one occasion when his very small class and Lyndon's small class were combined, they were discussing the League of Nations. And Mr. Klett allowed them to determine which side they wanted to be on with respect to the United States entering the League of Nations. This group of students did more study and research for this intra-class debate which went on for a considerable time on the League of Nations than most college members of debate teams would do on their subject. They studied it avidly and debated it very enthusiastically.

There was an occasion on which Lyndon thought that Mr. Klett ought to adjourn the class and let them go to a trial that was occurring

at the courthouse. Mr. Klett at first demurred, but Lyndon was so persistent that in the end they were allowed to adjourn their class sessions and attend this trial at the courthouse.

But I think this League of Nations episode is typical of what was going on in the school system, a school system that had no laboratories, but had a highly competent and inspirational teacher in the field of civics. And in the community where because it was a county seat and for other reasons, the political interest was always high. So, Lyndon developed his interest in politics quite naturally. Of course, he had the interest of his relatives, particularly his father. Somebody in the community got the Congressional Record, and this passed around among the students. I know that Lyndon and my brother Cecil constantly looked at the Congressional Record when they were ninth, tenth, or eleventh graders.

M: Was Lyndon's family relatively poor? In moderate circumstances, or what?

R: Oh, there were only a few people in the community that had much money. All of us lived in circumstances that don't compare at all with the way that we live today. Not many people had indoor plumbing; virtually nobody had electirc lights. What we now regard as the normal standards of good living just didn't exist in Johnson City at that time. So that if you had a home and food and clothes, had an automobile, you were a middle-class family. Lyndon's father worked at various things. He had been a farmer; he sold some real estate in Johnson City; for a time he had an administrative job for the

state. His income was never high, but they did live like most other people in the community.

M: Then you next ran into Lyndon Johnson as the National Youth Administrator for Texas?

R: I saw him occasionally when he was National Youth Administrator. Only occasionally.

M: You were teaching at the University of Texas at that time?

R: That's right.

M: Did you support the New Deal, promote it?

R: Oh, yes, as a citizen.

M: Did that get you into any trouble?

R: No. New Dealism wasn't unpopular in 1933, or in 1937 when Lyndon ran for Congress. I made a considerable number of speeches during those years, in general supporting the idea that the national government had to respond to problems that existed and in general supporting the lines of policy that were developed under the New Deal.

M: Your fellow Texans gave you little opposition on that?

R: I think the election of 1936 shows the nation's reaction to Roosevelt's first administration.

M: Did you have anything to do with Lyndon's 1937 campaign?

R: Yes. At that time the President's court reform proposal was before Congress. I had been making some speeches in Austin. In these speeches I had not advocated the particular method of reform that the President had suggested, but I had said that we were in a constitutional crisis and that some method would have been to be used to resolve this

constitutional crisis. I supplied to the Johnson headquarters what information I had about historical controversies between the Presidents and the Supreme Court and about the issues of 1937.

M: Let me get this straight. You were in favor of the court packing, or you were against it?

R: I was not favorable to that particular method of resolving the issue, but I did feel that some kind of reform needed to be made to prevent the Supreme Court from blocking the expansion of national powers as it was at that time. I did not anticipate, of course, that the Court itself would make the change that it made. Lyndon ran for Congress, giving full support to the President's plan. Since I was sympathetic to some kind of reform being made and was at that time really teaching constitutional law to a considerable extent, I was able to provide some information to his headquarters which he could use in his campaign.

M: Did any of the other candidates support President Roosevelt?

R: I'm not sure. I believe he was the only one that enthusiastically supported the President.

M: When did you cross tracks with Lyndon Johnson after that? Did you see him while he was a Congressman and later as a Senator? Did you have any close contact with him then?

R: I don't recall, except that I remember in 1940 that my wife and some other relatives were at Lyndon's headquarters helping mail out materials, and then I attended several of the meetings at which he made speeches. I may have been somewhat more active in 1948. I remember in 1948 I spent a couple of days--that was when he was running against Coke Stevenson--I spent a couple of days in Kerr County,

where I had taught two years, talking to people. I didn't make any speeches in either of those campaigns because at that time this was not thought to be an appropriate kind of thing for a university professor to do. I remember John Connally asking me in '48 if I could make some speeches, and I said I didn't think the University would accept it.

M: Coming on down to the present time, in his years as Vice President or President, have you had any close contact with Lyndon Johnson?

R: As Vice President or President?

M: Yes.

R: Only occasional contacts. Mrs. Johnson has been gracious to my wife and me, and had us to the White House on occasions. He has asked me to lunch on one occasion, and I've seen him on a few others. And the same things were true when he was Majority Leader. But I've always felt a reluctance, a great reluctance, to cause Lyndon Johnson, whether he was Majority Leader or Vice President or President, to have to give any attention to me. He's busy; lots of people go to Washington and call the White House. I was in Washington for three and a half months this summer. Larry Temple said to me, "You got me in trouble. The President found out you were in town, had been here three months, and nobody had told him." I said to Larry, "The President has got enough to do without people from Austin calling up and placing him under obligation by making the call." I've always been delighted, whenever I had the chance of course, to be with him or his great First Lady.

M: Did you have anything to do with the placing of the Johnson papers here, the founding of the Lyndon Johnson Library? Or this School of Public Affairs?

planning committee which developed the plans for the school and submitted a report to the Chancellor and Board of Regents. I was a member of that committee. Thereafter, a smaller committee of seven people was appointed to find a dean and to continue the planning for the school, and I've been a member of that committee. This is a natural thing for me because I teach public administration, and so it's almost unavoidable that the University would have me on the committee.

M: How did you persuade President Johnson to deposit his papers here rather than, say, at San Marcos?

R: I didn't have anything to do with that.

M: That was already done?

R: Oh, yes. The planning committee here was appointed after it had been decided that the archival library would be here and that there would be a school or institute of public affairs bearing his name.

M: With your background in the teaching of political science, and the study of it, can you assess the contribution of Lyndon Johnson to the art of politics? Is he unique in this at all?

R: Well, he's a master of the political art, perhaps unmatchable unless it would be by Franklin Roosevelt. Some people fail to recognize the significance of the political art in making democratic government work. The people who know how to practice the political art are necessary in order to make a democratic system of government operate successfully. And Lyndon Johnson's success in this area is quite notable--is very notable, and unusual. He has used this political art in a statesmanlike way. I would refer particularly to his period as Majority Leader in the Senate. Here was a period when we had a Republican President and a

Democratic Congress, and there were undoubtedly many pressures upon Johnson as Majority Leader to take advantage of his position as Majority Leader to help create issues against the Republican Administration. To his credit it must be said that he placed the needs of the nation above the immediate demands from some parts, and that he recognized, as he often said, this country couldn't have but one President. If this government was to function, the Congress would have to offer cooperation to the President. I think that the Johnson-Rayburn team in those years demonstrated that with this kind of leadership it is possible for Congress to compensate for weaknesses that may exist at a particular time in the Presidency.

M: Well, it gives a stronger role to Congress than for leadership.

R: As I say, this demonstrated that the nation does not have to depend entirely upon the resources of the Presidency and upon a party support for that President; it is possible that statesmanlike leadership can be supplied at the time it is needed out of the Congress itself. This, I think, is the large meaning of the Johnson leadership during the Eisenhower Administration.

M: This is based upon his political skill and his knowledge of the art of politics?

R: It is based on that partly. I think it is based also and more largely upon Johnson's recognition of the responsibility that rested upon the person holding the position he held under the circumstances that existed at that time.

Now, if I may back up a bit--Part of Johnson's political skill has been evidenced in his ability to look at problems, demand that people

around him help provide solutions to those problems, and then to seek the solutions to those problems without the limitation of labels and stereotypes. He has, of course, all of his life tried to say that he thought there were deficiencies in trying to face policy questions "if I label them liberal or conservative." But I think two things have been characteristic of Lyndon Johnson. Perhaps three things have been characteristic of him in his facing of policy issues. One is the heavy demands he makes on people to come up with realistic solutions. He has no patience with people who can talk glibly or talk superficially and cannot suggest solutions. And a second is the extent to which he has tried to look for solutions of public problems without trying to see whether this is something that can be called a liberal approach or a conservative approach or some other label. And third, it has been what I think is his view of what the function of government is. I think since boyhood, partly influenced by his father, Lyndon Johnson has thought of government as being something that was close to people, and that it was right and proper that government give attention to personal problems of people.

M: Well, then, he could not really be labeled as a conservative or a liberal? He would face issues then on the basis of this philosophy that you've outlined.

R: I think he has eschewed these labels, and since he has himself done so, it may be inappropriate to use them with respect to him. And yet on the other hand, it seems to me that Lyndon Johnson has a high place in the history of liberal and progressive government in this country.

M: Do you think he has made a mistake, however, in the case of the Viet Nam War?

R: I do not know whether any other President would have acted differently, or at what point he would have acted differently in the Viet Nam war. I personally am not ready to return to isolationism and I hope that our nation will retain its position of world leadership. I'm not sure what the scope of our commitments will be in the future, but Lyndon Johnson was caught with the commitment and basically, he responded to it, I think, in the way he had to respond to it. There may have been mistakes along the way which led to a greater escalation of effort in this than was desirable. And the President's action in March of this year indicated, I suppose, his own realization that the time had come to see if we couldn't de-escalate. I think the circumstances demanded that the United States follow basically the line he followed, and that it was an unfortunate trap for whoever happened to be President at the time.

M: Do you look upon his decision to retire from the Presidency as an act of courage, or is it just realistic politics?

R: I don't know how he assessed this; whether it took more courage to do what he did or more courage to go on through an election, I don't know.

M: What do you think Lyndon Johnson's impact on the Democratic party has been? There is some talk at the present time that the Democratic party is in a period of crisis.

R: Well, I don't think the Democratic party is going to die. The Republican Party didn't die after '36 or after '64. The difficulties with the Democratic party at the present time may be due less to what Lyndon Johnson has done than to what his critics have done. I do not think that

even with division existing in the party that the critics of Humphrey and the President needed to accentuate and glamorize those divisions in the way that they did at the convention.

M: You mentioned some of the strong points of Lyndon Johnson as a politician, and his methods of operating. Do you see any weakness in the man as a politician that might lead him into traps like Viet Nam?

R: Well, this is a very broad question. Apparently some critical issues have been handled with very consummate skills and caution by the President, such as the Arab-Israel confrontations of 1967; the restraint which has also been shown in Korea. But I'm not a close enough student of the developments to know whether he over-reacted at certain points in Viet Nam, or whether he broadened his advice enough in that situation. But it may be that there was some over-reaction and that the President erred in not broadening the advice that he was depending on in that situation.

M: Have you had any close contact with other Presidents other than Lyndon Johnson, such as Truman and Franklin Roosevelt?

R: No.

M: Now, I want to get to that question that sort of turns this interview around. If you were running an oral history project and had the opportunity to interview current politicans and political figures, as a political scientist, what kind of questions would you want to ask?

R: Could I back up on that other question that you asked there a little bit ago?

M: Sure.

R: I think it's clear that for some reason or other Lyndon Johnson hasn't been able to build the image before the American people that would gain support for him in the way that Franklin Roosevelt was able to do.

M: And the reason he couldn't do this?

R: I think part of this may be due to personal deficiencies of the man, and I say this without criticism because it's a difficult problem for a person to have to run the United States government and solve problems, and at the same time win the support and affection of the people. On the other hand, I feel that the Eastern power establishment has never been willing to give this man his fair deal, and that that Eastern power establishment packs a lot of influence in this country. The Eastern power establishment never wanted Lyndon Johnson for the Presidency. They never trusted him. They never knew that he was at heart a progressive and liberal human person. And they didn't find it possible to give him a sympathetic hearing after he was President.

M: Do you suppose their connection with John F. Kennedy had something to do with that?

R: I think the fact that John F. Kennedy had been their idol and that they resented Johnson taking his place had something to do with it. This whole period deserves analysis from the standpoint of responsibility of the press. Part of this, of course, is a result of the fact that Johnson is a Texan, and because of certain policies which northeasterners think have unjustly favored financial interests in Texas they don't think well of Texas politicians. But it has been hard for liberals of the East to understand that Lyndon Johnson was as liberal as they were; and this misunderstanding extended not only to the common man, but to the intellectual community and the universitites and the communication medium.

M: Television, radio?

R: The communication medium, yes.

M: Johnson was unable to overcome this?

R: He has been unable to overcome it and--

M: His personality has something to do with this?

R: Well, part of this is due to his personality. Establishing a link with the Eastern intellectual community, however hard he would have worked at it, would not have come easy to him like it did for Kennedy. And there are certain personal qualities of the man which could be played up by the press. Anybody who practices the political art and does it successfully will create opportunities for praise and criticism.

M: If he had gained the support of the Eastern establishment, would he have gained more popular support for, say, such things as Viet Nam?

R: I think so. As I said, this Eastern establishment had got lots of power, lots of influence.

M: So this would be one of his major failures?

R: I think he has failed to carry the American people along with him, and one lesson of the Johnson Presidency over the last few years is the lesson that the American President has power only to the extent that the people have confidence in him and believe what he is doing is correct. We over-emphasize the power that exists in the Presidency. Actually, it is not a strong office after the first few years of a man's term. It may be reinvigorated a bit after a second election, but the Johnson period has demonstrated clearly that this office has power only to the extent

that its occupant can maintain the confidence of the people and their belief that his policies are correct. And this task of retaining this confidence and belief becomes progressively harder the longer the President is in office.

M: Why is that?

R: Well, there are a number of things. One is the accumulation of dissatisfactions with things that have been done by him in the past. Another is the expenditure of his political capital. The political capital that the President has at his command tends to wither away as time passes.

M: You speak of political capital, does this mean the prestige of the office?

R: The prestige of the office, the bargaining power of the office, the patronage that the office has.

M: The longer he's in office, this dribbles away.

R: Tends to dwindle away. The bargaining and patronage tend to dwindle. Presidents tend to use up the demands that he is able to make on other people for their support in Congress. Also, I think the American people like new faces. The American people fundamentally are fickle. Whoever is President next year, well, this nation will get highly excited about it, even if he wins by 43 percent of the vote, or less. But they'll get tired of him in a few years.

M: Do you think that Lyndon Johnson has expended his political capital at this point?

R: Yes.

M: So it would be wise for him to retire now as he is doing?

R: I think it was a wise decision. Frankly, Roosevelt's influence had practically expired until the war gave him a new lease on political

capital--restored his political power, which is political capital.

M: This would be due to the demands of the war, the necessity for strong leadership?

R: That's right.

M: The expenditure of money?

R: That's right. And Pearl Harbor helped a great deal to restore the leadership of Franklin Roosevelt.

M: Conversely, if Lyndon Johnson had gained peace in Viet Nam, do you think it would have restored his political capital?

R: Oh, yes. I think if he had been able to gain peace in Viet Nam, then I think he could have gone into this election and come out with the re-establishment of his political capital, though not on the plane after '64. A second-term president in my opinion cannot be what a first-time president is. And this ties back to the reasons I've given earlier.

M: Well, back to this other question. If you had the power to ask questions of current politicans, what would you ask? What kind of general questions would you ask, as a political scientist?

R: Well, I think you've been asking the right kind of questions; I was just thinking about this.

M: You've got a different slant on these things than I do.

R: I think your approach on this has been correct. I don't see any other that could be used. I think what you have to try to do is just dig as deeply with people as you can. When you're talking to people that have been with Johnson in his Administration, dig as deeply as you can into what were the influences that operated on them.

M: You mean by influences, events or motivation, or--

R: Events and personal pressures and--I've just read a dissertation a boy

wrote under me dealing with a decision made in Washington. It's a good dissertation, but leaves you wondering at times why certain Congressmen acted as they did. The President expended some of his political capital on them; did he use his bargaining power? did he promise something? or did he threaten them?

M: And to what extent, I suppose.

R: And to what extent. I wouldn't criticize a President for trying to get a civil rights act passed through use of his bargaining power. I am no purist in the sense that I think democratic government can be run without some strong bargaining power being used by the chief executive to get through large measures. I am also not expecting politicians to reveal a great deal about this. But all I'm saying is, and I used this only as an example, just probe a politician as deeply as you can about all the kinds of factors that influenced him when he made his decision.

M: Are there any questions about the development of government or the development of administrative power, any structural changes that you would be curious about as a political scientist?

R: In the Johnson Administration?

M: In the period, say, back to Franklin D. Roosevelt. Our project will cover back to 1931 or something--

R: Structural changes in the American government insofar as they affected this man's career?

M: Not just Lyndon Johnson--the whole period.

R: Of course, the great change in American government has been the shift of responsibility that has occurred in American government--the change in the expectancies of the people. They expect the national government to

respond to problems. And, second, they expect the Presidency to be the center from which this response is made. These are great changes since 1933. People talked in 1896 as though the national government--and who was President--would have a great effect upon their lives, but it is only in this last thirty-five years that the people have really come to expect that for every kind of problem that exists some answer for it would be found in Washington, and the center of that response be the Presidency.

M: And this has other ramifications, such as an erosion of state power, growth of bureaucracy--is that correct?

R: I don't think it has meant an erosion of state power. A governor and legislature in a state has got a lot more capability of doing things that will influence people's welfare today than they had in 1920's.

M: Yet people look to Washington.

R: They look to Washington for basic solutions, but the administration of Governor Rockefeller has shown that there's still a lot that can be done in the state capital. As far as bureaucracy is concerned, when a centralized government over a large area sets up machinery, makes policies, there will inevitably be large bureaucracy developed to go with it. But one thing we've done in this change is that we have tried to minimize the development of a national bureaucracy by the use of state and local cooperation in the execution of national programs. We have not always done this in ways that might have resulted in decentralization. Well, we've had these particularized grants, and hence have cusioned ourselves sufficiently against the development of an excessively heavy national bureaucracy.

But there's nothing essentially wrong with bureaucracy--whether it's the bureaucracy of the University of Texas or whether it's the bureaucracy of NASA in Washington. Bureaucracies are carrying out tasks set down in policy, and they are also usually searching for answers to problems in the areas in which they're working on. Now, the American bureaucracy does not rule in my opinion. The Congress still sits. The President is still there. The press is still there. And the American people are not subservient. I am disturbed at the ability of our political institutions to adequately control an establishment as big as the military establishment, but on the whole I am still inclined to think that the political system will control the bureaucracy.

M: Is it a question worth probing about the growth of bureaucracy and the reasons for it in this period of time?

R: Yes, I think the kind of question you have raised, probing what have been the great basic changes in government during this period, are worth probing.

M: Do you see any other basic changes that might be worth talking about?

R: One I haven't given much thought to, but I think deserves inclusion is the position of the communications media.

M: Its influence?

R: The influence of the communications media.

M: Excuse me. This would include radio, television, newspapers--

R: Oh yes, what have been the effects on the American political system in the changes that have occurred in the communications media in this thirty-year period? I think this oral history project ought to extend to

members of the leaders of the communications media, and ought to probe pretty deeply into the effect of their position in American life.

M: In the case of the Viet Nam war, Johnson--

R: Well, that, and in general.

M: What about the position of the Supreme Court in this period of time? Are there any questions in that area that might be worth asking?

R: Well, you started by asking me what great changes in government and what had occurred. I should have started with the Supreme Court. At the beginning of Lyndon Johnson's career, we had great changes in constitutional interpretation which established the power of government to act, and second, the power of the national government to act; changes which some call a revolution and others would regard as a restoration of the Constitution. Then we moved into a new period in which the Court's decisions became more meaningful in the area of human rights and human dignity. They dealt with these questions instead of those questions of economic control which had been the issues of the '30's. But I suppose what we see is that the Court has remained creative. It has retained its ability to make high policy formulation; and not only to be creative itself, but to create issues for the rest of government. So the court still stands as a very strong policy-making instrument in our government. If you look back thirty years, you can see that we had a Congress and a President and a Court in the 30's, and we've still got them. And leadership may come from any of them. It certainly comes from the Warren court; it comes from the President; it may, as in the period when Johnson and Rayburn were Majority Leader and Speaker, come from within Congress; or, as in the Viet Nam affair when Fulbright and

others supplied some of the leadership. I don't see that over the thirty-year period that we've done anything more than enlarge the task of all of our political institutions--the President, Congress, Supreme Court, states and local governments.

M: Well, that's all the questions I have.

R: Of course, that's going beyond Lyndon Johnson.

M: I know, but you're in a unique position and vital on questions like this, being able in political science and having some connection with the government. So I think maybe your suggestions are worthwhile.

R: You have just asked me to spell the name of Scott Klett, Lyndon Johnson's teacher in high school. This leads me to make a comment about the community in which Lyndon Johnson grew up. It was a typical rural community of its time, except that it was a low-income rural community. But it is a community that can be proud of the record made by its sons and daughters. The community has turned out no scientists that I know of, but it has turned out much more than its fair share of lawyers and professors. Scott Klett, for health reasons, did not finish the University of Texas, but a cousin of his, Professor Alton Wiley was for many years professor of economics at the University of Texas. Another cousin was an attorney in Lubbock; both of them grew up in Johnson City.

I believe that all of Lyndon's graudating class except one went to college, which was an unusual thing for the 1920's. And quite a list of people who have reached distinction in the fields of law and education, particularly, but also in some other areas, could be made from the graduates of the Johnson City High School.

INTERVIEWEE: Emmette S. Redford (Tape 2)

INTERVIEWER: David G. McComb

M: You were going to tell me about the '64 campaign.

R: The American Political Science Association meeting was in the first week of September, 1964. I ran into Professor Arthur N. Holcombe, Professor Emeritus from Harvard University, and he and I developed the idea that we might get all the ex-presidents of the American Political Science Association to sign an endorsement for the Johnson-Humphrey ticket. We spent many hours of conference with Republican ex-presidents, and we succeeded in getting a public statement supporting the Johnson-Humphrey ticket signed by every ex-president of the American Political Science Association, except two. One in Europe, whom I could not locate, the other a supporter of the ticket but who thought that this was an inappropriate thing for ex-presidents of the American Political Science Association to do. We had sixteen to eighteen names on the list.

As a result of these conversations, we came into contact with Max Kampelman. And at Max's suggestion or with his approval, Holcombe and I undertook the task of organizing the "Professors for Johnson-Humphrey." The same thing was already being done for scientists and some other citizen groups, but nobody had done this for nonscience groups. Kampelman cleared this with the national committee campaign organization, and Holcombe and I left the convention with this responsibility. He was to get a state director for "Professors for Johnson-Humphrey" in each of the six New England states, and I was to get a state director for the other forty-four states.

Within the next approximately ten days, Holcombe had his six New Englanders and I had about thirty-three or four other state chairmen selected. And I had also sent out letters to these chairmen outlining what we would try to do in the campaign. The "Professors for Johnson-

Humphrey" would sign statements in their states, and raise the money to get them printed in newspapers. They would make speeches, and they would engage in other activities.

The Washington organization of "Citizens for Johnson - Humphrey" quite naturally felt that it would be better to center this operation in Washington. I had understood this from the beginning and knew that at some stage the operation would move from Austin to Washington. It was moved, but continued on the basis of the approximately forty state chairmen that we had selected.

M: I might follow this up with a question about it. In this work, did you come into contact with Lyndon Johnson or Hubert Humphrey?

R: No.

M: Did they support you in this, or--

R: No. The idea for this grew out of the activities in the Kennedy-Johnson campaign in 1960, in which professors had played a large part. We had no contact with either Johnson or Humphrey, but Max Kampelman is a long-time close personal friend of Humphrey's and was working actively in the campaign. He served as the point of contact between Professor Holcombe and me and the national office of "Citizens for Johnson and Humphrey" organization.

M: Did the political scientists also organize like this in the 1960 campaign or was this the first time political science has ever been--

R: This wasn't political scientists only. The signed statement of ex-presidents was from political scientists. The development of the national organization was "Professors for Johnson and Humphrey." But I had to make arrangements with the "Scientists for Johnson-Humphrey" that we didn't

try to work with the professors in the science field. But we worked in all other areas, humanities and the social scientists.

M: In the 1960 campaign, did the professors organize like this?

R: Yes. They had done it in the 1960 campaign.

M: And the idea carried over, and you helped to generate it for this one. Do you think you did any good?

R: I didn't follow this through all the way, but I know that in some states there was a great deal of activity by the "Professors for Johnson-Humphrey" organization.

M: Well, it must have had some influence.

R: There were, of course, national lists of supporters from the professor groups published in some of the leading newspapers with wide circulations such as the New York Times.

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By Emmette S. Redford

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