DATE: November 16, 1968

INTERVIEWEE: STANLEY R. RESOR

INTERVIEWER: DOROTHY PIERCE

PLACE: Secretary Resor's office, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

Tape 1 of 2

P: This interview will be with Stanley Resor, Secretary of the Army. Today is Saturday, November 16, 1968. It is approximately 11:30 in the morning. This is Dorothy Pierce, and the interview is being conducted in the Secretary's office in the Pentagon.

Mr. Resor, you were nominated by President Johnson and confirmed by Congress as Secretary of the Army in June of 1965 to succeed Stephen Ailes. Earlier in 1965 you had been appointed Under Secretary of the Army and prior to that you were an attorney in New York and also active in Republican politics. Is this information correct?

R: Substantially correct. I assumed office as Under Secretary April 5 and was sworn in as Secretary on July 7. Perhaps active in Republican politics is something of an overstatement. I was a registered Republican, and I had done some work in Republican politics. I was particularly interested in Governor [William] Scranton's [of Pennsylvania] candidacy for the nomination and had gone to the Republican convention in connection with that.

P: Mr. Resor, when did you first meet Mr. Johnson and what were the circumstances?

R: My name was originally suggested to Mr. McNamara, I believe, by Mr. [Cyrus R.] Vance [Deputy Secretary of Defense]; and I came down here in January or February for an interview with Mr. McNamara. And later I was interviewed by Mr. [John] Macy [Chairman, Civil Service Commission]. I don't presently recollect meeting the President until the day that he

announced my appointment along with the appointment of five or six other Presidential appointees at the Ranch in the spring of 1965. I flew down to the Ranch on Saturday morning with the other appointees and Mrs. Johnson.

As we arrived the President was holding a press conference at which he announced our appointments and we spent the rest of the morning with the President, had lunch with him and Mrs. Johnson, and he personally drove us around the Ranch. We spent a good part of that day with the President.

P: How would you describe your present relationship with him? How well do you know him?

R: I see him really on, I guess, two kinds of occasions. One, I see him on periodic ceremonial occasions: the awards of the Medal of Honor to Army soldiers, or the awards of the Presidential Unit Citations to Army units, and at various bill-signings and other such functions at the White House.

I also have met with him on certain important decision occasions, such as a meeting he held of the service Secretaries and service Chiefs prior to the decision to send United States units to Viet Nam; a similar meeting in January of 1967 with respect to the decision as to whether or not to deploy the Anti-Ballistic Missile System; a similar meeting recently at the time of the decision to suspend bombing totally in North Viet Nam. And at the occasion of the using of Army forces in Detroit at the time of the civil disorders in Detroit, I met with him continually over a period of from late in the afternoon until culminating in his appearance on television at midnight that night. This included having dinner at

the White House. On all these occasions he has been most cordial to me and it has been a most satisfactory working relationship.

P: What are your impressions of Mr. Johnson? How would you characterize him?

R: I'd characterize him as an extremely able and forceful man; and I'm particularly impressed with his total devotion to the job of being President and his application of all his individual resources which are very great to this job all his waking hours. I'm also impressed with his ability to select personnel for key positions in his Administration and to persuade them to serve. In these regards I believe he has been a particularly effective President. I'm also impressed with the fact that he has conducted the presidency in a very active manner, proposing and accomplishing a large social program and at the same time, actively conducting personally the foreign policy aspects of the presidency.

He has, of course, had the burden of the war in Viet Nam which has been a very significant burden, and which has caused an amount of domestic dissent which I think was underestimated at the time the decision was made to deploy units to Viet Nam.

In the conduct of the war in Viet Nam, I think he has been basically sound in his decisions and his continued emphasis on the fact that this was a limited war for a limited purpose and should be conducted with limited means and in a carefully defined area. In other words, he has successfully resisted any proposals to expand the war territorially and to escalate the bombing; and now beginning in March of this year, has successfully de-escalated the bombing and brought about the starting of negotiations toward a settlement.

P: How would you describe him personally?

R: I think he's a man of great forcefulness, tremendous energy, and great charm.

P: Has Mr. Johnson appointed you to any study groups, task forces, or commissions other than your responsibilities as Secretary of the Army?

R: No, not any other than those that I would normally be a member of as Secretary of the Army.

P: Have you traveled with Mr. Johnson or been asked to travel anywhere by him?

R: On a few occasions I have been his representative or appeared for him at certain ceremonial occasions, such as the dedication in Chicago of a park in memory of a soldier killed in Viet Nam who received the Medal of Honor. I also represented the President recently at the Pulaski Day Parade in New York City.

P: From your three years of service in the Department of Army, what is your judgment of this Administration's attitude toward Defense?

R: The period that I've been here has, of course, been the period of the use of American units in Viet Nam; and the President has actively supported in full all the requirements of the Department of the Army in every sense, particularly in a budgetary sense.

P: At the beginning of your appointment in 1965 you mentioned we were in the process of building up our Viet Nam commitments. Did you participate in the assessment of the Viet Nam situation that led to our major troop increase in order to hold our position in Viet Nam?

R: The major participation on behalf of the department was Secretary McNamara's, and Secretary McNamara kept us apprised of his views and

planning at staff meetings. And my contribution essentially was advising Secretary McNamara with respect to the capability of the Army to deploy forces.

P: What was your advice as to our capability?

R: That we had the capability to deploy the forces that were under consideration at the time over a stated phased time schedule. I did not participate in the discussions with the President with respect to the decision other than the one meeting which I referred to earlier which was a meeting of all the service Secretaries and service Chiefs of Staff, at which he asked each of us for our views after first receiving Mr. McNamara's and Mr. Vance's recommendations.

P: Did you feel that the Army was prepared to meet this demand on it?

R: Yes, and one thing we did find in deploying units to an underdeveloped country, it required a large number of support units, more than we had in the active Army. When the decision was made not to call the reserve forces, it was necessary to newly activate these units and that took a period of time.

P: You've mentioned the support services. Were there other very heavy requirements or changes that were necessary to meet this type of war of insurgency during this buildup period--equipment or skill mix?

R: We had activated, shortly before we deployed units in Viet Nam, the first air mobile division; and this was the first full division that we deployed to Viet Nam and it proved to be most fortunate that the air mobility concept had been developed by the Army just prior to the Viet Nam War, because it, as the war developed, turned out to be a most useful concept and we continually expanded our number of helicopter units in our force structure as the war continued.

P: What problems occurred in this period and what resistance was met both within the military and outside?

R: One of the major decisions in the summer of 1965, at the time the decision was made to commit U. S. units to Viet Nam, was the decision of whether to mobilize some part of the reserves. And here the decision was reached not to mobilize the reserves, and this meant that a greater burden was put on the active Army and as I said earlier, it was necessary to activate additional active Army units, support units, and in the fall of 1965, we were authorized to activate a division and three brigades as well.

P: And what resistance did you meet in these problems?

R: We didn't meet resistance. The Joint Chiefs-of-Staff recommended that the reserves be mobilized; the President, on the basis of advice from the Secretary of Defense, decided that for a variety of reasons it was better to meet the requirements by expanding the active Army rather than adopting that recommendation.

P: Has the Viet Nam conflictchanged our basic training programs very much?

R: For the first time in any war we have slightly increased the training time of the individual soldier. We have, of course, emphasized training oriented toward the environment in Viet Nam by adding an extra week's training which is oriented solely to the environment in Viet Nam and attempts to incorporate many of the lessons learned with respect to small unit tactics in Viet Nam. But basically Viet Nam has confirmed basic Army training and policies and basic Army doctrine. There has been, throughout the period we've been there in Viet Nam, a growing effectiveness in the use of the mobility that is afforded to ground forces by the helicopter.

P: Have you had to include courses in basic training programs to counteract the propaganda or dissent that is currently so strong in this country?

R: No, we haven't. What we do have in our basic training program is hours of instruction which educate the soldier, the trainee, in his mission and the mission of the Army. And that has, I believe, effectively dealt with the attitudes of the trainee. We've had, I think, a surprisingly small number of trainees or soldiers who have presented disciplinary problems rising out of dissent as to the wisdom of the Viet Nam war. We have the cases of those who allege to be conscientious objectors, and some of these of course are close cases and are difficult ones. But we have had relatively few cases of the so-called selective conscientious objector, the man who objects to this particular war but not to war in general and accordingly doesn't qualify under the statutory definition of conscientious objector.

P: Do the rather dramatic desertions to Sweden and other countries represent a particular low in morale of our forces, or belief in our commitment in Viet Nam?

R: Actually, the numbers of soldiers in Sweden are really quite small and declining. It has received a fair amount of press coverage, but it has not been a significant practical problem as far as the Army is concerned.

P: Are there comparisons with this type of very strong demonstration and dissent in prior commitments of our troops? For instance, now we have some of these coffee house organizations outside of our Army posts.

R: I think the coffee houses are something I am not aware of the Army having had before. But from an overall point of view, I think the number of deserters and people AWOL in this war are probably significantly less than in World War II and Korea.

P: You mentioned air mobility in Viet Nam and the helicopters. How has army aviation changed and evolved, and why is this new emphasis there?

R: The major change in army aviation throughout the war has been a great expansion in the number of helicopters and a relinquishing of the use of fixed-wing airplanes for transport purposes. The Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force entered into an agreement to this general effect. The most significant thing has been the great growth in the use of the helicopters and the great mobility advantage this gives to the American and Allied ground forces as compared to the enemy forces.

P: Did you say that we had relinquished units in the fixed-wing? Have we experienced a build-up in our cargo plans--the Caribou?

R: The Caribou planes were turned over to the Air Force by the Army.

P: Has this been a very significant part of this type of war--the evolution into air mobility for the Army?

R: Yes, it has been a very significant element of this particular war. We've added, in addition to the first air cavalry air mobile division which we had at the start of the war--we are now converting the 101st Airborne into an air mobile division. And we plan to keep both of these divisions in our postwar overall army force structure. It still remains to be seen the scope and effectiveness of these units in a theater such as Europe, where the enemy would have greater air defenses and higher concentrations of mechanized forces. However, our present view is that the helicopter and the air mobile units will also have a significant utility there, too.

P: There has been a lot of controversy over the M-16 rifle in Viet Nam. How would you evaluate the effectiveness of this weapon? The M-14 prototype.

R: At the time the Vietnamese War--when we started to deploy army units to Viet Nam, the airborne and air cavalry units and special forces units in the Army used the M-16. In the fall of 1965 particularly in the battles in the Ia Drang Valley, the enemy had the AK-47 in significant numbers. General Westmoreland came to the conclusion at that time that it was necessary that all our combat forces in Viet Nam have the M-16 because of the success of the First Air Cavalry with the M-16 when opposed by enemy forces armed with the AK-47.

P: When was this?

R: This was in the fall of 1965, particularly in the battles in the Ia Drang Valley. So we, at that time, entered into the program of converting all the units in Viet Nam to M-16's. And so the effect of the war really was to accelerate and broaden the use of the M-16 by the Army. We now have a program under which all of the units in the Army, which are not oriented primarily to NATO, will be equipped with the M-16 and we have under study the question of whether we shouldn't equip the whole army with the M-16. And my personal estimate is that that is what we will come to, because of the fact that the Warsaw Pact countries are beginning to use the AK-47 in the NATO area.

P: How does the M-16 compare with the Air Force rifle--the AR-15, which is lighter and of higher velocity?

R: No, it's substantially the same rifle. The Air Force actually developed, [Fairchild developed AR-15] it's my recollection, the M-16, but the M-16 today that the Army has is substantially the same rifle as the Air Force. It's basically the same

rifle. There's a bolt-closing device on the army version that the air force doesn't use; otherwise, it's the same rifle.

P: Did you get any Congressional pressure on converting the Army over completely to the M-16, or, I should say, to the use of it in Viet Nam and the ultimate conversion of the Army?

R: No. What the issue in Congress was was when units were issued the M-16 in-country, that is, in Viet Nam, units that hadn't had the opportunity to train with the M-16 before they got there, some of these units didn't realize the necessity for cleaning carefully the rifle at least once a day. The M-16 rifle probably requires more cleaning, at least in a theater like Viet Nam where weather conditions and terrain such as you have in Viet Nam require more cleaning than the M-14, and because of that there were instances where the rifles jammed and that led to the Congressional inquiries and Congressional complaints. However, that has been fully overcome by emphasis on care and cleaning of the weapon; also, certain modifications were made to the weapon--the chamber is now made of chrome and the buffer was made slightly heavier to reduce the cyclical rate of the weapon. The cumulative effect of these changes and use of ammunition that works best with the rifle as changed, has wholely eliminated the problem of jamming, and it's interesting to note that now that we are issuing the rifle in very large quantities to the Vietnamese, we have had none of these problems, even with Vietnamese units getting the rifle the first time.

P: Is there any resistance to this changeover?

R: No.

P: The concept of special forces and elite troops has grown considerably in the Viet Nam conflict and has been more publicized during this Administration

and in Mr. Kennedy's Administration--has the force expanded too much and are we returning to smaller deployment of special forces groups?

R: I don't think there has been a significant change in the level--in the number of special forces and their part in the overall army force structure. We're currently turning back a few of the special forces camps in the interior to the Vietnamese; however, the American special forces released from these camps are setting up additional camps in other areas.

P: Has it proven its effectiveness in counter-insurgency?

R: Yes, I would say they have proven very effective; however, when the enemy introduced, as they did beginning in the Ia Drang Valley, significant sized units, of course we had to respond also with units of significant size, that is, beyond special forces and advisers.

P: Is it now considered that this type of force is a necessary part of limited wars despite its controversiality?

R: I don't really believe that it is currently very controversial. I think it will be probably a continuing part of the Army force structure. They also are useful in theaters other than underdeveloped theaters. We have special forces in Europe today. These forces also were useful in civil action programs which we are currently conducting in South America.

P: How much did the Tet Offensive set us back in our progress, and why could we not prevent it?

R: The Tet Offensive, I think, set us back in the sense that it had its major impact on the domestic U. S. population. From a strictly military point of view, I believe that the Tet Offensive, on balance we can now see, was a severe--or to state it another way--the enemy took heavy losses

in the Tet Offensive. Because he was on the offensive and attacked in large numbers, it enabled the free world forces to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy. A concurrent effect was that he targeted his attacks to a large measure against the Vietnamese forces, and they performed well. As a result of that, the morale of the Vietnamese forces was improved; their self-confidence was improved. He also targeted the cities, and it then became clear to the people in the cities that they were part of the war and couldn't sit it out on the sidelines. The cumulative overall effect on the government was to permit it to move forward with certain programs which had been held up prior to the offensive. From a military point of view, the most significant program was the mobilization law and the strict enforcement of it. This came about a month or so after the Tet offensive, and has made possible the significant increase in the size of the Vietnamese forces since last spring.

The Tet Offensive also brought to a head the question of the size of the United States' forces in Viet Nam. As a result of the enemy effort in Tet, MACV [Military Assistance Command, Viet Nam] and General Westmoreland asked for additional troops. And after a long debate here in the Administration as to the proper response to this request, the decision was made to set a ceiling on the forces in Viet Nam at 549,500. So in a sense it led to a final decision as to our total commitment in Viet Nam and when this ceiling was set, it of course was accompanied by a setting of an objective to turn over the war progressively to the Vietnamese armed forces. And to do this, it was decided to emphasize the improvement of the Vietnamese armed forces, a large part of which would

be the improved equipping of the Vietnamese forces. We've concentrated a great deal of effort on that since April 1 and have made significant progress.

P: General [Creighton] Abrams has taken over from General Westmoreland early this spring--how would you compare these two men, and what changes have occurred?

R: I think there has been some overemphasis on the changes. I think General Westmoreland had underway a number of programs such as the strengthening of the Vietnamese forces which have made a good deal of progress since he left. A large part of that is, of course, due to the groundwork which he laid. General Abrams is a very effective officer and has been making very effective use of our total resources in Viet Nam. He has been building very successfully on the groundwork that General Westmoreland laid. He has a talent, I believe, for analyzing and determining the major issues and concentrating our effort and resources where they can be most effective.

A good example of that is his use of our air power, B-52's and tactical air. And here again is an example, I think, of how he benefits from the groundwork that General Westmoreland laid.

Beginning early this spring our intelligence of the enemy improved significantly and one might say even dramatically. This was a combination of the coming to fruition of a number of developments that had been under way for a long time. Intelligence is based on a large number of systems, some of them are sophisticated, scientific, target-acquisition systems; and all of these various systems that contribute to our intelligence have been improving and the overall integrated effect of this improvement

came really to fruition in the spring and early summer of this year. With this better intelligence, General Abrams has been able to make more effective use first, of the air power and then secondly, of the forces we have there. And we're seeing results of that plus the results of the very heavy losses that the enemy took first, in the Tet Offensive and then in his second offensive in May, and finally in these abortive third offensives in August and September.

P: We, of course, have called a complete halt of bombing over North Viet Nam. How would you assess our bombing in North Viet Nam as an effective deterrent and protection for our troops?

R: Well, first let me say I was completely in agreement with the President's decision on March 31st to cut back the bombing in effect to the 19th Parallel and his more recent decision to cease all bombing in North Viet Nam. I think these were both very wise decisions.

We started the bombing for three reasons. One was to improve the morale of the South Vietnamese at a time before we deployed our units in Viet Nam. Secondly, to put progressively growing pressure on the North Vietnamese, to make them bear some burden of the war and hopefully to gradually convince them to withdraw their forces from South Viet Nam, partly influenced by this pressure. And thirdly, to cut down on the infiltration and supplies coming from North Viet Nam.

The first reason--to improve the morale of the South Vietnamese, we no longer needed the bombing for that reason. In fact, once we committed significant forces in Viet Nam, that reason I think ceased to have any real significance. I think there's a real question as to whether the bombing did have the effect of forcing the North Vietnamese to fight

harder or to fight less hard. I'm inclined to think that it tended probably to solidify public opinion and to rally public opinion in North Viet Nam.

Finally, on the infiltration point, it has certainly made the infiltration more difficult and costly for the North Vietnamese; however, we have not to date been able to prevent their bringing enough supplies south to support their forces. We are getting progressively, I believe, better at countering their infiltration, but it still hasn't been proven that you can prevent them from bringing down these supplies that they need. We may be able to do this in the months ahead, but it's not clear.

So against all this, the bombing has, I think, been one of our greatest burdens domestically and internationally. It is one of the things that, I think, has exacerbated anti-war sentiment domestically and internationally. I think the President did the right thing when he began to cut back on it on March 31st and has now stopped it in North Viet Nam.

P: Do you think we could have done that sooner?

R: I think it's possible that we--I think it's a good question as to whether we might not have tried to do it sooner.

P: Has this been an effective means to bring back negotiations?

R: It apparently took away the major stumbling block to negotiations. Our negotiators became convinced that this was a real block to the negotiations and that we couldn't get negotiations started until we agreed to this. And so I think it was an essential first step to getting negotiations going. I don't think it's what has brought about the negotiations; I think the negotiations have come about because the North Vietnamese have felt that it was in their best interest to shift from the unsuccessful

military policy they were following to a policy of trying to get their objectives by political means. I think in short they tried the protracted war approach up through the summer of 1967 and they were losing on that ground. They then in the fall of 1967 through the Tet Offensive, the May offensive, tried a more all-out war approach--get it over quickly approach, hoping to force us to end the war by heavy casualties and through the route of domestic dissent, essentially the way they forced the French out. They took very heavy casualties here, and couldn't achieve their objective apparently in the time frame during which they could afford to continue this approach, so they've now given up on that approach and they may well, it remains to be seen for sure--but it looks not unlikely that they have abandoned both of these military approaches and are now trying to get the American forces out of Viet Nam.

P: Through domestic pressure?

R: No, by taking out their forces and then--

P: Through negotiations?

R: Through negotiations and probably in the future offering to take out more of their forces, provided that we do the same.

P: What do you see as the future of Viet Nam without American military presence?

R: The Vietnamese, while we have provided this military shield, have been able to institute a constitutional form of government. In this they made significant progress and now have a significantly more stable government. They've also--their regular armed forces and the regional and popular forces and the CIDG have all improved--are improving steadily and I believe significantly. And they have, of course, increased--. The total armed forces have increased in size where they

now have, including para-military, something over a million men under arms.

The thing I think that's hard to tell right now is whether they can get along without any American forces other than advisors. I think it is clear that we are at a point now where we could begin to in 1969 significantly phase down our forces and turn over to them the major share of the military problem. They today don't yet have a rounded force structure; they'll continue for an interim period to need our combat support, logistic support and communications support, but they, I think, are approaching the point where they should be able to handle--certainly to handle--the VC, to handle the VC units without significant American help, provided that all the North Vietnamese units and most of the North Vietnamese fillers in the VC units are removed from the country and are kept out of the country and remain out of the country.

P: In retrospect, do you think our commitment there was a mistake in either time or place, and was it within the sphere of our national interests?

R: I think we significantly underestimated the difficulty of what we were trying to do. We significantly underestimated the difficulty that arises from the fact that the Vietnamese, at the time we went in, didn't have a viable governmental structure, had no tradition of national unity, had many divisive factors--religious, ethnic groupings, and had no significant experience in self-government or in military leadership, because the French had not permitted them to have significant governmental and military responsibilities while the French were there.

And we inherited the image of a colonial war although, of course, our motive was entirely different from the French. Still we inherited some of the image of the colonial war because we followed in time so soon

after the French. These things, plus the fact that the North Vietnamese had the national hero and the only leader with any significant charisma. There was a significant element of civil war in the picture--it was not a clear case of only aggression as you had in Korea, but you had a mixed picture. These all made the job a much more difficult one than we realized, plus the terrain, and the ability of the enemy as guerrila fighter.

I think if we had known the price--how difficult it would be and the price we would have to pay in domestic dissent and in diversion of our resources from domestic problems and from the NATO area, we would not have made this large a commitment of forces in South Viet Nam. But it's much easier to say this in hindsight than to have known concurrently at what point we should have stopped. And I think it's very hard to see, because it was a very gradual involvement, at what point we should have stopped. I think the important thing is that we now learn from this experience not that we withdraw and abandon the policy of collective security, but we apply it in a more careful manner and we more carefully select those areas in which we will make a commitment to use our armed forces. And that we make as a condition that we have associated with us other industrial powers as allies.

P: I'd like to continue with some questions on our preparedness level. Senator Stennis' Subcommittee on Preparedness has said that we are stretched too thin and that we cannot be the "policeman of the world." Do we have the ability to gear up and react in other areas of the world at this time?

R: I think Senator Stennis undoubtedly was influencedin that statement somewhat by the conditions during certain periods of our buildup in

Viet Nam. What happened here in Viet Nam is that we consciously elected not to call reserves. This meant that the active Army had to furnish all the forces, substantially all the forces, that went to Viet Nam. We did finally call 20,000 men out of the Army reserves, reserve components--National Guard and U. S. Army Reserve--this May. But prior to that time the active Army furnished all the forces for the deployments to Viet Nam which now constitute the equivalent of eight and one-third Army division forces and an aggregate of 355,000-360,000 men.

This meant that, in large measure, these forces had to come from our strategic reserves located here in the United States, and gradually we built back those forces. So that there was a period when these forces were drawn down below the level at which we would like to maintain them. However, we turned the corner this spring when we stopped further deployment of units to Viet Nam and when we called in from the reserve components some units with a total strength of about 20,000. Since then, we have been increasing the manning level of the strategic army reserve units here in the continental United States and we have started to attack our other difficult problem and that is the problem of turbulence. And it's this problem of turbulence that has been one of the factors that has adversely affected our readiness position in the Army, particularly here in the continental United States.

P: By turbulence, do you mean civil disorders?

R: No, by turbulence I mean the fact that we now have today deployed to South Viet Nam 355,000 men and to Korea 52,000 which means that over 400,000 of the active army are in short tour areas; that is, areas where most of the personnel stay for only one year. That means that those people have to be replaced by individual replacements annually. And to

the extent we can, all the lower skilled spots are filled with new accessions to the active army; that is, they're filled by people coming out of the training centers or second lieutenants coming out of ROTC or OCS. However, all the higher skills and higher ranking NCO's and officers have to be filled from the career population of the army, and it means that the forces here in the continental United States which furnish or comprise the rotation base for the short tour areas and Europe, which we have thrown into the rotation base, have a high degree of turbulence in the units in those areas. It means that the units in those areas, if they are drawn down to a lower state of training, have a hard time building back because the soldiers rotate through the units at a high rate.

What we are trying to do is to stabilize that rate of rotation through these base units--rotation base units--at no higher than a hundred to a hundred and twenty percent annually. And if we can achieve this, as we think we can, by our new policy of extended early releases--it means we release people coming out of Viet Nam and Korea if they are within five months of the expiration of their term of service, then we can--by releasing these so-called short-termers, we can decrease the level of turbulence in the rotation base and I believe we can, in fact we already have, started to increase the level of training of the units in the forces in the continental United States.

Today the 82nd Airborne has reached its desired level of readiness, the 5th Mechanized Division will reach its objective level by the end of December this year, the 2nd Armored Division is programmed to reach it by the end of March, and the 1st Armored by the end of June. So we have been drawn down during the period of the buildup in Viet Nam. We now are

building back the readiness of our strategic reserves and our forces are spread worldwide. I think that we should try to reach a condition in Viet Nam where we can redeploy forces and build back our strategic reserve. We are spread too thin in the sense of carrying on this situation permanently, but we don't intend to and one can already see the situation developing where we will, hopefully, in 1969 be able to redeploy.

P: With more mobility, it has been speculated that we can eventually withdraw troops and bases from abroad. In your judgment is this an eventuality and a practicality, and also how has the Czechoslovakian invasion affected your thinking on this?

R: Before answering that, let me say one more thing about the prior question. I'd like to answer the implication that we should withdraw units from Viet Nam because we're spread too thin. We should try to, as promptly as we can, negotiate a good settlement of Viet Nam so that we can withdraw units. However, much more important is the kind of settlement we get, and if we have to take a little longer and stay a little longer to get the right kind of settlement, I believe we should have the persistence and will to stay that last extra piece of time. Because we have a heavy investment in what we've done in Viet Nam, and the result of Viet Nam will be, I think, overall beneficial if we get a good result; however, if we withdraw in too much of a hurry, then I'm afraid that the effect on the American public as a whole will be a tendency toward neo-isolationism--a stronger tendency toward disengagement. So I think the kind of result we get in Viet Nam is extremely important.

P: Are you saying that we can, due to circumstances--some sort of an emergency, respond immediately in any sort of strength to another conflict in another part of the world?

R: We have our strategic reserve in the active Army here in the United States, which is ready on the schedule I just outlined to be available for commitment, for example, in the NATO area. And of course we always have our reserve components still available to be mobilized. In fact, that's one of the advantages of not having mobilized them for Viet Nam. If we had mobilized them, by now the units that would have been used in Viet Nam would have been returned home demobilized and we would have had to start from scratch to form new units. That's one of the considerations that entered into the decision not to mobilize them, because in essence reserve forces are wasting assets. When you use them, you can only use them for the period of time that Congress authorizes, which in this case it looked like would have been only a year. And once they've been used--you have to rebuild them from scratch and a long, slow building process is required.

Today we have our reserve components, we have those assets because we haven't yet used them, and if we had such contingency in another area we would have them to call on.

Now, you were asking me if our increased mobility will permit us to withdraw some of our units that are forward deployed overseas.

P: And close bases possibly--?

R: Yes. I think one can best deal with that by looking at specific areas. In Korea we now have two army divisions and supporting forces, comprising roughly 52,000 men. I would hope that when the South Korean units redeploy from South Viet Nam to Korea that it would be possible for us, gradually, to phase down the size of our force there. I think we probably should continue to leave there a significant force, say for example, a division force. But I think it would be possible to phase

back there when the South Korean units, now in South Viet Nam, return, or as they return.

P: This is part of the other question too that was brought up that we cannot be the policemen of the world. It appears that we are going to have to maintain commitments in such places as Korea for many years to come.

R: Well, I think, of course, our whole Far Eastern policy--and the level of commitment--depends a lot on the role the Japanese play in the next ten years. One would hope that the Japanese would gradually move toward a more active assumption of responsibility for the security of the free world nations in the Pacific.

Turning to the NATO area, I think it's extremely important that NATO continue to maintain strong conventional forces, that is, strong ground forces, so as to have a credible deterrent to actions by the Warsaw Pact which they might feel would not be of such a size as to justify our responding with nuclear weapons. In other words, I think it's extremely important that we continue the flexible response strategy to which we turned at the beginning of the Kennedy Administration. That means that we should continue, I believe, to contribute to the level of conventional forces in NATO, contribute significantly. We now have four and one-third division forces minus, that is, four and one-third division forces not fully rounded in Europe. One can't say, I think, today exactly whether we have to maintain that precise level of force; it might be possible, as our mobility increases, to somewhat reduce that level of force. I think we must resurvey the situation as it develops, but we must be sure at all times to have adequate conventional forces--make an adequate

contribution to NATO's conventional forces so as to deter those Warsaw Pact actions that wouldn't to them clearly invoke a nuclear retaliation.

P: Has your thinking been influenced by the Czechoslovakian invasion?

R: Yes, I think Czechoslovakia has made it clear that the Soviet Union will use force when they believe it's in their interest to, and this makes it clear that we have to continue to have conventional forces in Europe to deter the use of conventional forces against Western Germany and the NATO countries.

P: This was sort of a timely reminder for us. Weren't we in the process of considering very strongly reducing it due to NATO internal problems?

R: Yes. In fact, one of the salutary results of the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Russians was the ending, or at least for an interim period--at least for now, the pressure to make further withdrawals of U. S. forces from NATO. However, I think we have to get the help of our Allies in dealing with the balance of payments problems, or we will have a recurrence of this pressure to take out forces from NATO.

There tends to be among some Americans a feeling of frustration that today, twenty-three years after the end of World War II, we still have 300,000 men in Europe. However, I think one should always view that against the background of the really great success of our policy of collective security since World War II. By this commitment to Europe, we have in effect prevented another world war or a significant war in Europe during this period. And if the continuing deployment of forces in this general order of magnitude is necessary to achieve that result, I think it's a burden that we should all be willing to carry.

P: During this previous campaign, a security gap was broughtup. Have we lost our power superiority, or has it been reduced much during your tenure as Secretary of Army?

R: The alleged security gap, I believe, related primarily to our strategic missiles and to the relative posture of the U. S. and the Soviet Union with respect to strategic nuclear weapons. I think Mr. Clifford answered that very well with the statistics he gave. We still have considerably greater nuclear power than do the Soviets, and I think the security gap that was alleged was--let's put it this way--I think Mr. Clifford's description of the situation was entirely accurate and is a much clearer presentation of what the true picture is.

P: With our very massive buildup in Viet Nam and the increase in spending for defense purposes, are charges well founded of profiteering on defense contracts?

R: No, I don't believe they are. The Defense Department has made several studies of the level of profits on defense contracts and they have all indicated that the really serious long-range problem is not that defense contractors overall make too much money, but that they make too little money. And that the fact that they make too little money is resulting in defense contractors tending to wish to diversify and to build up the non-defense element of their business so that they aren't dependent on defense business. The really important objective which we must always keep in sight is to give defense contractors an adequate and proper level of profits so that we will continue to have strong contractors to meet the needs of the defense industry. There will, of course, always be examples in a procurement, which is as large as the Defense Department's procurement, of situations where individual contractors make excessive profits. But the Renegotiations Act and other systems we have are designed to prevent that to the extent that it can be prevented. And one should

be careful not to let those few examples, where the system doesn't work properly, mislead us into trying to make the business of defense contracting less profitable, when in fact our studies indicate that it is in our national interest to make it actually more profitable.

P: Mr. Resor, what new weapons for the future are now on the drawing boards? And along this line also, is there some equipment that has sort of been reinstated due to the concept of a limited war?

R: For limited war purposes, in fact, for all purposes, the Army is currently proceeding successfully in the development of an advanced aerial fire support platform called the "Cheyenne Helicopter--compound helicopter" and it should prove very effective--not only in limited war but hopefully as an anti-tank weapons platform. If it is successful as we hope it may be in the latter case, it could well prove to be a decisive, or at least a very important weapon system in the NATO area.

We are also working, of course, on the main battle tank for the 1970's and this will be a significant advance over the tanks currently in our forces and in the Warsaw Pact army forces.

P: The last part of the question--has there sort of been a reinstatement of some equipment that was considered outmoded?

R: I can't think of any right now, other than there has been some emphasis on improved individual equipment, particularly for the individual soldier and long-range patrols--clothing, canteens, food, small, light rubber boats, shoes--the jungle boot was developed on a large scale in this war and has been particularly successful.

P: In your judgment what should our posture be on an anti-ballistic missile system?

R: I think the decision that was made a year ago September was the correct decision, mainly to proceed with the deployment of an anti-ballistic missile defense system oriented to provide protection through the 1970's against the Chinese threat and to protect against an accidental launch. And also to give us the option to protect the minuteman sites against the Soviet threat.

I think one has to watch this program carefully to be sure that it doesn't develop a momentum of its own and expand toward an urban defense at a time when it is unlikely that such an urban defense would significantly limit damage to our cities.

P: Do you consider this an effective system?

R: I think it's effective for the three purposes which I outlined. It would not be effective to limit damage to the cities today; I don't think we have the capability to do that for today and to try to do so has certain inherent destabilizing tendencies in it, which would be disadvantageous.

P: I did want to ask you some questions regarding selective service. You've indicated to me, of course, that this is handled by the Selective Service Board. I would like to ask you if student demonstrations have affected recruiting on our campuses and what is your opinion on graduate student deferment?

R: Let me take the latter one first. I believe that the decision to eliminate graduate student deferment except for dentists and doctors was the correct decision, so as to spread more equitably the burden of the war today.

With respect to recruiting on campus, it has not come to my attention that these student demonstrations have caused us a significant problem. I think it has probably made it a little harder to maintain ROTC units in some of the liberal arts colleges.

P: Mr. Resor, it has been said that Selective Service is an unfair and an unjust system of drafting men into our armed services. Do you feel that this has validity and would random selection or a lottery system be preferable or even workable?

R: I myself agree with the recommendations of the President's Committee on Selective Service, otherwise known as the Marshall Committee, headed by Burke Marshall which did recommend random selection. And a majority of that commission came to the conclusion, as did a year-long Department of Defense study, that the draft is necessary primarily because it is only through the draft that you can meet surge requirements for large increases in accession, such as we had at the time of the build-up of the active army to meet the requirements of the war in South Viet Nam. During this period the active army has increased by 55 percent, and this kind of an increase can only be achieved by the draft.

I also believe that the concept of an Army supported by the draft which makes the burden of military service one that is spread throughout our country, and has historically been the system that we have followed, is the correct policy for us to pursue. I think it would be unwise to rely wholly on a solely professional army which was recruited solely by voluntary enlistment.

P: And you do think that the random selection method of drafting would be preferable to the Selective Service System of today?

R: Yes. I think that the Selective Service System, as suggested by the Marshall Commission, could be administered in a way to make it more uniform and to put in additional appeal procedures so as to eliminate some of the inequities we have today which are subjected to criticism.

I also think it would be advisable to have the Selective Service System manned solely by civilians. Today it's manned by a retired general officer and it creates the public impression in many areas that it's run by the Army, which of course is not correct. Also, many of the administrators are retired army officers recalled to active duty, and I think it would be better if these administrators were civilians so that the impression is not created that it is an Army-run or Army-administered organization.

P: In speaking about the idea of a volunteer army, would one of the prohibiting factors be possibly that this could lead to a racially unbalanced service?

R: I think the criticism is probably a little broader than that, and that is that it would tend to make those persons in our society who have less other options for a career solely bear the burden of military service.

P: With our increased social posture in the service now--I'm speaking of our social programs--is there a question there of over-deployment of a minority group in combative situations?

R: Perhaps you're referring to integration in the Army which of course started in 1948 or 1949 when President Truman, by Executive Order, directed the armed forces to integrate. The Army has made, I believe, remarkable progress and has really taken the leadership in our society as a whole in the field of integration. And this, I think, is something the Army can justifiably be very proud of. This is evidenced by the fact of the high reenlistment rate among Negroes, which evidences the attitude, I believe, among the Negroes that in the Army they can get a less discriminatory treatment than they do in the civilian community.

You asked whether this has resulted in an undue proportion of Negroes serving in combat areas, by which I take it you mean Viet Nam. I don't believe that is significantly the case today. There is a slightly higher proportion of Negroes in Viet Nam than there is in the Army as a whole, not significantly so; there is a higher proportion in the airborne units in Viet Nam, but there is a higher proportion of Negroes, I believe around 35 percent roughly, in airborne units throughout the Army. These are volunteer units, units in which the Negro serves by free choice. So I think that's the explanation of it, and that's an entirely proper situation.

P: Since the order to integrate our services in the late 1940's which would give us almost a twenty-year period, why are there so few Negro officers?

R: As you will recollect, the Army selected a Negro General officer this year. The reason there are few is because to be a candidate for selection as a General officer, the average officer has to have served over twenty-five years. Accordingly, the number of Negro officers who are today candidates for General officer depends on the number that were taken into the Army twenty-five years ago today. And accordingly the number of candidates is disproportionately small.

P: Have you had any problems in the integration of the military academy?

R: No, the military academy, I believe, has had more Negro cadets than the other two services. It had 1.8 percent in its entering class in 1965, if my memory serves me correctly, and since then the Air Force has gone out quite successfully to recruit Negroes and we are currently undertaking to step up our recruiting efforts in this field. Because the Air Force put on this added activity, its entering class has had more Negroes than ours in the last year or so. But I believe the program we presently have

underway will be reflected in a higher intake at the academy. The academy is freely open to any qualified Negro. The problem today is simply that so many of the good colleges today are out recruiting Negroes. In order to get a significant number of Negroes, you have to have a much more active recruiting campaign for Negroes than was necessary up till the last few years.

P: I didn't mean to bypass some questions here before we got on the integration of the Armed Services on the reserve activities. And I wanted to ask you, because of a recent controversy in this area, if you consider that the reservists that are called up for duty are well enough trained and have access to up-to-date equipment in their training?

R: The reserves that were called last May, 20,000 from the National Guard and the United States Army Reserves, received as their units reported to duty all the modern equipment that they needed for training. And by the time they were ready to deploy to Viet Nam, those units that did deploy--some 7500 men in strength--had full allowances of equipment. They also had better training than has ever been the case when the reserves were called in prior wars. Also the units came on at a higher manning level than has ever been true before. They came on manned at roughly 85 percent of authorized strength in contrast to approximately 50 percent in the Korean War. As a result we were able to successfully deploy into a combat area these units at the end of about five months of training, after they had been called to active duty, as contrasted to the situation in the Korean War, when it took about a year and a half before the units were deployed into Korea.

P: What has led to the court fights of recent time?

R: I think the court fights are a reflection of the fact that the reserves today contain a significant number of personnel who joined the reserves in order not to be drafted. And then when they were called in the reserves, they were disappointed and tried to challenge the call in any way that they could legally. Unfortunately, Justice Douglas' decision encouraged suits of this nature, and a number of them developed before the Court as a whole reversed Justice Douglas.

P: Do you feel there is a legal challenge to the President's constitutional right to mobilize?

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P: Mr. Resor, I believe you answered my question on whether there was legal challenge to the President's constitutional right to mobilize without a declaration of a national emergency by citing the Supreme Court's denial to hear that case. In your opinion, is it within the rights of the Executive Branch to mobilize without a national emergency?

R: Congress, in the so-called Russell Amendment to the Defense Appropriation Act of 1967, delegated to the President the authority to call reserve units for use in Viet Nam. It was pursuant to this express authorization he acted. The Supreme Court, in its recent decision, ruled eight to one that units should not be held up from deployment to Viet Nam while the issue of the legality of the exercise of his power was tested out. I think the presumption is that the Court felt that the exercise of this power was probably legal or that there was not significant enough likelihood that it was illegal to justify holding up deployment. The case has not yet been decided on the merits.

P: What is your judgment on the value of a merger of reserve forces?

R: We have two reserve components, the National Guard and the United States Army Reserve. For a number of years different study groups have recommended

the combination of these two reserve components into one reserve component for more effective administration of the reserves. This was the original recommendation of the Gordon Gray Committee. At that time, an attempt was made to merge the National Guard into the U.S. Army Reserve. This proved to be unacceptable to Congress. Mr. McNamara proposed a reverse merger, namely a merger of the United States Army Reserves into the National Guard. This also proved unacceptable to Congress. Fortunately, we were able to work out a reserve reorganization plan which was acceptable to Congress. It did not achieve the objective of merging the two components into one, but it did achieve the more important objectives which we and Mr. McNamara had in mind, namely the elimination of unneeded units--some fifteen low-priority reserve National Guard divisions, and the addition of needed units. The resulting reorganized reserve force structure has been carefully designed to complement the active army force structure so that the two together comprise one total rounded and balanced force structure. A force structure made up solely of units for which we have a military requirement and accordingly, for which the Secretary of Defense has been willing to authorize the procurement of new equipment. Thus the reserve reorganization represents a very significant improvement in our total force structure.

P: Why was the merger unacceptable to Congress in your opinion?

R: The members of the USAR--the United States Army Reserves, primarily the Reserve Officers Association, was able to enlist the support of enough congressmen to preserve the USAR as a separate entity. A number of arguments were used. One was that the National Guard is, of course, subject to state control. I think the Congress was probably also influenced by the fact that there was certain history and tradition connected with USAR.

P: Were you involved in the decision to commit troops in the Dominican Republic?

R: No, I was not.

P: It, of course, would have to have your approval officially, wouldn't it, as Secretary of the Army?

R: No, the Secretary of the Army's responsibility is to organize, equip, train and support the forces which comprise the Army. The actual employment of those forces in theaters of operations is done by the President on the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense, who in turn receives a recommendation of the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff and the appropriate unified commander--theater commander. The Secretary of Army is not in that chain of command.

P: Do you concur in the decision to commit troops?

R: Yes.

P: Do you feel that we committed enough or too many troops for this type of a conflict or disturbance? Public opinion-wise abroad, we gained a little bit of a monster character only in that we appeared to commit so strongly in such a small engagement.

R: I think others could comment better on this issue. As I indicated, it didn't fall within my particular area of responsibility.

P: Were you involved in the decision of awarding combat infantry men's badges to men that went to the Dominican Republic?

R: I don't recall actually whether I was or not. We have certain standards and it would appear that they would clearly qualify. They were in combat in the sense of the term as used in that context.

P: What steps have been taken to prepare against more trouble in that area or another Cuba confrontation?

R: In view of the fact we have a limited time, I think it would probably be of more general interest for me to address questions that are more closely

related to the Army's responsibilities.

P: All right, I would like to discuss with you the role of the Army in social problems. What is your judgment of the use of the military service as an instrument in improving social conditions in this country?

R: The Army first has certain basic missions, and these it has to perform well first. However, where it is possible to perform its basic mission, either as part of it or as a by-product to have beneficial social effects, we should not, of course, miss the opportunity to have these effects.

P: Has this met much resistance in, say, instituting such ones as Project 100,000, Operation Transition, and in the off-base integration of housing?

R: No. Let's take Project 100,000 first. This, as I'm sure you're aware, is a project to deal with the problem that--before the date of the institution of the project which was in the fall of 1966, approximately one-third of the young men coming of draft age each year were rejected primarily because of inability to meet the mental standards required for entry into the armed services. And this was a project to work towards a full-year of operation in which 100,000 so-called "below standard;" personnel were permitted to enter the Armed Services. I think the Army recognized that this was a wise policy and it has actively participated in it; in fact, it has had the largest share of the Project 100,000 personnel. It did impose training burdens on the Army and, of course, training has had to be revised to accommodate the learning ability of the Project 100,000 personnel. And the costs of training this personnel are somewhat high. However, the Army has successfully administered the program and the dropout rate in basic combat training for these personnel is only insignificantly higher than the rate for the

normal trainee. The dropout rate is slightly higher in advanced individual training, but it is still low enough to make the program a success.

The Army's main concern is that the overall number of low mental aptitude personnel not exceed a reasonable figure, so that the overall competence of the Army will not be significantly affected. We are currently on the basis where approximately 15 percent, I believe it is, of our accessions are lower standard personnel; however, we have the right to use only the higher standard personnel for reenlistment. And the program operating at this level is one that is acceptable to the Army under current conditions.

P: What was your role in the development of these programs?

R: I was consulted by the Secretary of Defense on the number of personnel, lower standards personnel, which the Army would take, and the position I took was that if it was approximately in the range in which the program has been developed, it would be an acceptable program--more than that, it would be a program that the Army would enthusiastically participate in.

P: Do you consider that there is a definite point in which you can go no further, say, in lowering standards in something like Project 100,000?

R: I think that--Yes, there are certain people who are such slow learners as to not make good soldiers or to make good soldiers only after an excessive amount of training, which is not really justified.

P: And this in turn would jeopardize the quality of our Armed Forces?

R: If these people comprised too large a percentage of the Armed Forces.

P: Has the integration of off-base housing been an effective program?

R: Yes, we've made good progress in that program. And our objective is to see that no Negro soldier is discriminated against in the opportunity to obtain off-post housing. Today, of course, in on-post housing there is no discrimination. And we have made significant strides in the off-post housing area. We haven't eliminated discrimination, but we've made, I believe, real improvement in this area.

P: In your opinion what has brought about this social awareness in the military?

R: The program has been effective because we have been willing to apply sanctions to people who don't comply with the program. I'm referring now to landlords.

P: I was thinking in terms of the trend in taking on some of these projects. How has this come about in the military? Is it a product of the times, and why has it taken so long on something like the off-base housing? Would you like me to rephrase that?

R: Yes. I think the program has proceeded in good speed.

P: To what would you attribute the development of these programs--this social awareness within the military?

R: Well, I think it's just part of our total country's awareness of the serious problem we face in integrating the Negro fully into American society. I think that the Army actually, as I said earlier, has taken a lead in this field. It is organized so that it can take a lead by virtue of its being a military organization. And when a policy is decided upon, it is carried out throughout that organization so that you can make good progress, once a decision is made, to implement such a policy. And that's what you see.

P: The Army, both reserve and active forces, are becoming more and more involved in quelling civil disorders. What do you see as the Army's role in this area?

R: You are referring, I take it, to the use of the active army in the civil disturbances in Detroit and subsequent thereto. This was the first time since about 1943 when the active army has been used to quell civil disturbances. The Army's role here, the active Army's role--is that it will be used in those situations where the police, the local authorities, assisted by the National Guard employed in a state role, has been unsuccessful and is unable to quell the civil disturbance. In such a situation, legal authority exists for the local authorities to call on the President to use the active Army, and that is the circumstances under which the active Army was used in Detroit and in the civil disturbances following Martin Luther King's assassination.

P: Is there much of a consideration on the impact of committing armed troops in a civilian area?

R: I'm not sure I get the implication of the question.

P: Is it part of the consideration in the deployment of active troops that we are in effect putting armed federal troops into our cities. Is this a factor that has brought out resistance to their deployment?

R: I think it's fair to say that the active Army is not employed and no one wants to employ it until it becomes necessary. And it's only when the police and the state authorities using the National Guard which they have available aren't able to deal with the situation that you turn to the active Army. And it is desirable that it be used with restraint. I believe it has been used with restraint.

It's also desirable, however, that if it is necessary to use either the National Guard in the state role or the active Army that they be used in a timely fashion before a situation gets out of hand.

P: I believe that you played a major role in the deployment of troops in Detroit, and you were at the White House during the decision in commitment of the troops. Could you tell me a little bit about what went on and how the decision was reached and the activities involved in deploying of the troops in Detroit?

R: Detroit illustrated the situation where the police--local police--and the state National Guard were first used and the local authorities then felt that the situation could not be handled by these forces, and appealed to the President to use the active Army. One of the problems which faces the Army in this kind of a situation is that there is a significant lead time involved in getting active Army troops to the scene of such a civil disturbance. In this case, we used troops from Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Accordingly, we had to some extent anticipate that it might be necessary to use them, alert the troops, and provide the airlift in time. And because it takes a significant amount of time to move from a southern post such as Bragg to a northern city, in this case the President authorized the prepositioning of the troops at Selfridge Air Force Base outside of Detroit so that the troops would be ready for employment on short notice.

The troops moved, in my recollection--to Selfridge--they started to move about two o'clock in the afternoon. And Mr. Vance was sent as the President's special representative to Detroit to look over the situation and advise the President as to the necessity for the actual employment of the active Army troops.

P: When were you called to the White House?

R: I went to the White House late in the afternoon of Monday and at a time when it was thought that Mr. Vance might call in to report as to his findings. It developed that he wanted to make a further on-the-scene inspection, so the meeting was adjourned and we reconvened later, about seven o'clock as I recollect--Mr. Vance still had not--was not ready to make recommendations. It was, I believe, during the evening around ten o'clock or so when Mr. Vance did make his recommendation and the President acted immediately upon the recommendation and directed that the active Army forces be deployed, and that the state National Guard be federalized, so as to put both forces under one commander.

P: What was Mr. Vance's problem in making a recommendation?

R: He had to satisfy himself that the local forces, police and the National Guard, could not control the situation. In this kind of a situation, it is hard to reach a definite conclusion because it's hard to get reliable information as to how the situation is developing in an urban civil disturbance such as we had in Detroit.

P: Did Governor Romney's actual request delay commitment of the troops until such time as he gave it?

R: Yes, the law provides that--contemplates that there will be a request from the local authorities.

P: In other words, could they have been committed earlier than they were if he had made the decision earlier?

R: If he had made a request earlier and if the President had been satisfied that it was clear that it was necessary that the local police and the National Guard could not control the civil disturbance, then he would have acted sooner.

P: I was under the impression that Mr. Romney didn't make the request until after midnight, and you're saying that Mr. Vance reached his recommendation around ten--so was there a delay in there at which time they could have been committed?

R: I think we're talking about two different days. Governor Romney, in my recollection, and this was some time ago and I didn't look into this in preparation for our interview, made his request, I believe, in the morning of Monday. And Mr. Vance was dispatched immediately upon the request, and the President used the troops as soon as Mr. Vance was able to make a determination that they were necessary.

P: I was thinking that there was a further decision that Mr. Romney had to make, but I may be in error on that final commitment.

What activities were you involved in during that period in which you were in the White House?

R: My recollection is that one of the things that had to be done was to work up the documents by which the President federalizes the Guard and delegates authority in the matter first to the Secretary of Defense, and then the Secretary of Defense delegates it to the Secretary of the Army, and in turn the Secretary of the Army to the Chief of Staff.

P: Any other things?

R: If you recall, the President went on television at midnight that night and his statement for television was prepared during this period. I did not myself participate in the preparation of the statement.

P: But you were on a standby there in the White House during this time too?

R: Yes.

P: And stayed there for how long?

R: Well, until the President and the Attorney General and Mr. Hoover and

General Johnson, the Chief of Staff, to my recollection, and myself accompanied the President to the television room where he made his statement at midnight.

P: Did you see any evidence to lead you to believe that there was more than just a social disturbance in this riot? Were there any implications of there being any sort of conspiracy afoot that you were aware of?

R: It's my recollection that Mr. Hoover, who was at dinner that night at the White House, was asked that question and responded that the FBI at the time had no evidence that this was a result of an organized conspiracy.

P: In your opinion do you feel that the troops are well enough trained for this type of engagement?

R: One of the lessons learned from Detroit and from the prior disturbance in Newark earlier that summer was that there was a need for additional training in handling civil disturbances in urban areas. The Army, shortly after the Detroit civil disturbance, directed both the active Army and the reserve components to take additional training--to enter on a program of additional training in handling civil disturbances. And we developed a comprehensive program that was conducted on an expedited basis in August and September of that year, and then further work was done throughout the fall and winter. So that when the civil disturbances occurred after the assassination of Martin Luther King in April of the next year, this training had been substantially completed and the beneficial effects of it were quite noticeable in the case of the units that were deployed at the time of the Martin Luther King civil distrubance.

P: Mr. Resor, Mr. Clifford became Secretary of Defense early this year after almost seven years under Mr. McNamara--how would you compare these two men and their style, their pace, their approach, decision-making process?

R: I think they've both been unusually effective Secretaries of Defense. They do have a different style. I think that partly derives from the fact that when I came to be Secretary of the Army, Mr. McNamara had been Secretary of Defense for some four or five years; and he had developed a wealth of detailed background in the problems involved in the department as a whole. Accordingly, he dealt himself with a wider range of issues than Mr. Clifford does. Mr. Clifford, on the other hand, coming into the department in April in the midst of a period of serious decisions with respect to the war in Viet Nam, has devoted, I believe he said himself, some 70 percent of his time to the problems of the Viet Nam war; and he had to quickly assimilate what background he needed to make those decisions and other decisions which he felt he could not delegate. Accordingly, he has delegated to his deputy, Mr. Nitze, decisions with respect to a large number of areas, many of which affect the Army, such as the size of the strategic army reserves, the manning level questions, questions as to the level with ammunition procurement, and many other detailed matters.

Mr. Clifford has tended to concentrate his efforts on a more limited number of major issues and in the case of each of these, he goes into them with painstaking care and has been particularly successful also--. Another major characteristic is the emphasis he places on relationships with Congress and Congressional committees. He has a wide circle of acquaintances among the members of Congress, acquaintances often of long standing, and he has been particularly effective in the problem of Congressional relations--that is, relations of the Defense Department with Congress.

I believe they have had a slightly different emphasis too on the question of the deployment of the anti-ballistic missile system and the relative strengths of our offensive missile forces and the Soviets, although in part this is a question of semantics. Mr. Clifford has stated that he believes we should maintain a position of superiority; Mr. McNamara seemed to avoid using that particular word to characterize our objectives.

P: How would you assess Mr. McNamara's cost effectiveness program to defense organization and problems?

R: The cost effectiveness analysis techniques, which were emphasized by Mr. McNamara through the Office of Systems Analysis, I believe are an effective and useful tool for the Secretary of Defense and for other elements of the department to use in analyzing problems and displaying facts on which to make decisions. I think these techniques have helped all the services better analyze their problems and get at the relevant facts in a more organized fashion.

A danger inherent in the system is an attempt to quantify things that aren't quantifiable, but I think there's a growing awareness of this problem and a growing awareness of the areas in which cost effectiveness analysis is useful and where it is not useful. But I think overall the techniques have been a real asset and I would hope that the substance of the systems and techniques are continued and I think they will be just because of their own inherent usefulness.

P: It has been charged that Mr. McNamara overcentralized the Department of Defense and overstaffed it. Do you believe that this charge has any validity?

R: I think that Mr. McNamara did something that was necessary and was very useful and it was really all based on his concept of the job of the Secretary of Defense. As he states so clearly in his recent book, he believed that the Secretary of Defense should act as a leader and not as merely a man who sits in judgment on groups within the Defense Department who have different points of view. To act as a leader and to make intelligent judgments on major defense issues, he had to have an adequate staff and an able staff, both of which he built up.

As in any large organization, there is a tendency to become overstaffed, and I think there are elements of overstaffing today in the office of the Secretary of Defense.

And if Mr. Clifford were to stay on, I would think that he would work with his assistant secretaries to try to eliminate this where it has grown up. However, another tendency--the tendency of centralization--there was an increase in centralization under Mr. McNamara. I think now it is possible that we can bring about some decentralization by virtue of the fact that the services, and I know this is true in the case of the Army, have in the last three or four years greatly enhanced their own management systems--greatly improved their own management systems, and particularly their management information systems, and are in a better position to make objective judgments on some of the issues that are now made at the level of the Secretary of Defense and his assistants. We already have discussions under way with the office of the Secretary of Defense to decentralize some of this decision-making.

And I should say that we have found agreement in the office of the Secretary of Defense to the idea that there can be decentralization at

this stage in the case of Army by virtue of the Army's enhanced capability in dealing with these decisions itself.

P: In your judgment, what do you consider is the role of the Service Secretary?

R: The overall role of the Service Secretary, of course, is to manage the Department of the Army and to work with and through the Chief of Staff to see that the Department of the Army is as effectively managed as is possible in an organization of the size it is. He also has to represent the Department of the Army to the Secretary of Defense and be the advocate for the Department of the Army with respect to proposals and points of view it has with respect to issues which will be decided by the Secretary of Defense.

And at the same time, he has to be a member of the team of the Secretary of Defense. In the capacity he is carrying out the concept of civilian control. So that he has a responsibility both to the Army, the Department of the Army as a whole, and to the military component part of the Army, and also to the Secretary of the Defense.

P: Do you feel that the position of the Secretary of the Services is a necessary component part to the line of command and authority in the Defense Department?

R: Yes, I think it's a most essential position in the structure of the Defense Department. The Service Secretaries are the persons who are the interface between the civilian control and the military management of the departments, and that's a very responsible and necessary position. I personally think it can be much more effectively carried out by a Service Secretary than by someon

who is merely characterized as an Assistant Secretary of Defense. You could, of course, have an Assistant Secretary of Defense for each of the military departments. But in order to provide the proper civilian leadership for the military department, I think the man is much better positioned if he holds the job of Service Secretary.

P: Have you had any resistance to civilian control, or is there any problem in getting along with the Chiefs of Staff in relation to civilian authority?

R: No, the whole concept of civilian control is a very old one historically here in the United States, and it's one that the Army and all military departments have a long history of living with and believing in. So that it's a concept which itself is not challenged, and is gladly and willingly supported by the military.

The method in which the civilian control is exercised varies, under different Secretaries of Defense. Mr. McNamara set the style and had the objective of active civilian managers, more active than was true in the case of some of his predecessors, but the basic concept that there will be civilian control is not at issue.

P: What has been brought up recently in the [1968 Presidential] campaign was civilian authority overriding or prevailing over seasoned military judgment. Do you think that this has occurred?

R: I personally feel that the way Secretary McNamara and Secretary Clifford have run the Department of Defense has been the correct way to run the department. There are instances inevitably where, in carrying out their kind of management, you get into a situation where it appears sometimes that a junior analyst on the staff of the Secretary of Defense is making decisions that could and possibly should better be

made in the military department; but that's the kind of problem that I think we can deal with by working with the office of the Secretary of Defense now to bring about some decentralization. But I think overall in the department this has not been a significant problem. In other words, while I've been in the Department of Defense anybody, whether he's a civilian or military, if he has had a clearly reasoned argument, has been able to get a hearing for it and to get mature consideration of it.

P: How is a service affected by a ceremonial or political type of appointment to the Office of the Secretary?

R: I'm not really familiar with what you refer to.

P: Would it weaken the service if you don't have a strong Secretary of the service?

R: Yes. I think it would. I think the Secretary has a real role to play, and if you have a weak Service Secretary, you would lose the benefit of a good and credible advocate of the department's interests at the level of the Secretary of Defense. In other words, someone talking with Mr. McNamara, who didn't well know the facts that related to the particular issue involved, would have no impact on Mr. McNamara's decisions.

P: Mr. Resor, how would you rate Mr. Johnson's popularity--is it due almost entirely to--

R: That's out of my competence as Secretary of the Army.

P: Do you feel that this has occurred because of the Viet Nam conflict? I think that it is considered that Mr. Johnson is unpopular at this moment as President. How much of this has occurred because of the unpopularity of the war?

R: I think a significant--fair amount of it has, but I don't really see that I have any particular competence to comment on that. Not that I'm reluctant to, but I just think--I'm just trying to think of things that will make the most effective use of our time. In other words, things that people would be interested in hearing from me. I don't know that they would on that particular score really.

P: I just want to ask you this one sort of concluding question. How would you rate this Administration, and how do you think of this in terms of defense matters--and how do you think that history will rate Mr. Johnson as President during this period?

R: I think I have more real confidence to comment on the administration of the Department of Defense. There, of course, probably I have a -- perhaps a biased point of view, because I'm a member of it. However, the thing that has impressed me most significantly about the time I've been here is that the department has been run on a basis where first President Kennedy and then President Johnson gave authority to the Secretary of Defense to select people in responsible positions that they, as Secretary of Defense, thought would perform that role best. And those people have been protected from interference in the effective performance of their roles by any outside pressures that might interfere and make their job more difficult. That doesn't mean that we haven't problems in dealing with Congress; we have. But the appointments in the Department of Defense have not been political and the recommendations and programs that we come up with have not been politically motivated or oriented. We have been able to recommend and propose those programs which we think have been in the best interests of our respective services. And this kind of a

professional atmosphere, an atmosphere that emphasizes effective management, I think has been the right kind of atmosphere to establish in the department and is one which I hope will be continued under the new Administration. It has made it possible to get good people into the department and people who are, I believe, effective managers.

P: Mr. Resor, we've covered a lot of subjects. Do you have any further areas that you would like to comment on, or any further comments?

R: No, I think we've covered the matter pretty comprehensively.

P: Thank you very much, Mr. Resor and Colonel Cooper.

R: Thank you.

[End of Tape 2 of 2 and Interview I]

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Gift of Personal Statement

By Stanley R. Resor

to the

Lyndon Baines Johnson Library

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