INTERVIEW I

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INTERVIEWEE: JAMES J. REYNOLDS

INTERVIEWER: JOE B. FRANTZ

PLACE: Mr. Reynolds' office, Washington, D.C.

Tape 1 of 1

F: Mr. Secretary, let's tell how you first come to be an assistant secretary under President Kennedy and get you up to the point at which, in effect, our story starts.

R: Okay, fine. I was appointed assistant secretary by President John F. Kennedy, and the way that came about, briefly was this. Arthur Goldberg had been named secretary of labor-designate by Mr. Kennedy, I believe in December of 1960. Shortly after his having been named the secretary of labor-designate, he called me in Schenectady, New York. I had been the vice president of operations of a fairly sizable corporation, which was then known as the American Locomotive Company, and I had been in frequent professional contact with Mr. Goldberg through the years because some eight of our plants around the country were organized, for the most part, by the steel workers. Whenever there was any real difficult labor problem, I usually ended up dealing with David MacDonald, the president of the union, and when you dealt with Mr. MacDonald you dealt with Arthur Goldberg.

F: So you two had been sort of worthy adversaries?

R: Yes, we had indeed. But through that period we had developed,

I think it's fair to say, a measure of mutual respect and, indeed, mutual affection.

Some years before that period I'm speaking of now, which was through the 1950s, I had been a member of the National Labor Relations Board, appointed by President Truman in 1946, right after I left the Navy. In those days the Wagner Act was the labor law of the land, and I was regarded as the conservative member of the three-man board. I had dissented a great many times with respect to what I regarded as a too liberal interpretation of the Wagner Act in favor of labor unions. I didn't think it properly reflected the congressional intent, and this aroused the displeasure of the unions. My first contact with Mr. Goldberg arose out of that. He was the individual, I found out later, who drafted a resolution which was presented and unanimously passed at the annual convention of the United Steelworkers asking President Truman to remove me because I was too conservative. Through the period of my term as a member of the National Labor Relations Board, however--

F: How did Mr. Truman happen to find you?

R: He heard about me, I guess, through the Navy. I was a commander in the Navy, and my responsibilities were to advise the Secretary and Under Secretary, Mr. Forrestal and Mr. Gates, on all labor matters. Whenever there was a difficult labor situation involving a major contractor of the Navy, or indeed maybe one of the Navy shipyards--the civilian employees were restive--it would be my responsibility to advise and guide and move in and try to straighten

it out. Apparently President Truman heard about me in that way. I, myself, had never been politically active, had never been involved in politics except as an informed and interested citizen of my communities. But my older brother was a somewhat well-known war correspondent in the war, Quentin Reynolds, and Quentin was devoted to President Roosevelt during those years.

F: I used to listen to his broadcasts from--

R: London, possibly.

F: From London, yes.

R: Well, he was a very wonderful and dear man. I think, possibly, that it was because of that association that President Truman heard of me.

I was called from the Navy Department one day by his secretary. He merely walked out in the Rose Garden with me and said, "Reynolds, I've heard a lot about you. I'd like to talk to you. I think we need some better balance on that National Labor Relations Board, and I think you're the man who can give it. I'd like you to consider an appointment to the National Labor Relations Board." I asked him if I could have twenty-four hours. I was about to go back to a very lucrative and attractive position in industry, but I decided not to, and I went on the National Labor Relations Board. So that brings us to Goldberg.

But as time went on my views were possibly not quite as liberal and quite so sympathetically disposed to certain of the matters that labor unions were involved in under the Wagner Act, and,

subsequently, Taft-Hartley, which came in in 1947. I'm thinking of such fundamental things as the right of employers to utilize free speech, the question of whether supervisors and rank-and-file people should be in the same unions, the question of whether guards, security people, should be in the same union with workers. These things I found offensive in terms of previous interpretations and so stated. But I found to my gratification that although I consistently followed what I regarded as that line which best reflected the congressional intent, and when there was no congressional intent, what I regarded as was sound for the country, that it gradually developed and encouraged the respect of these labor people that resulted and developed into many friendships which I enjoy and cherish to this day.

So we come up now to 1960. Goldberg called me, and I came down to see him. He said, "I've been named by President Kennedy as secretary. It seems to me since my whole orientation, although it is legal, is associated with the labor movement, I think it would be very good for the President if he had a balanced team at the top. I'd like to suggest to the President-elect that he name you under secretary as a 'liberal industrialist'." I said I'd be very proud and gratified to serve. I assumed that I was going to be under secretary at that time.

A few weeks later Mr. Goldberg called me and said, "Jim, I find that the President wants to appoint Mr. [Willard] Wirtz under secretary." I understood this thoroughly. I knew Secretary Wirtz by reputation,

although not personally, through his work on the War Stabilization Board and other means, and his reputation was superb.

I said, "Arthur, I understand thoroughly." I'm sure that there was an association with Adlai Stevenson, and that political world was something I didn't know too much about but respected, so I said, "I'll go along." I went with Secretary Goldberg and served with him very proudly, and I think quite fruitfully, under President Kennedy.

F: What was your particular realm?

R: My area was to handle, really, a very sensitive area. I had the Landrum-Griffin Act under my immediate responsibility. It had been passed by the Congress in late 1959, and the Eisenhower Administration had really dragged its feet in implementing it because it was a sensitive matter. So it came really to us to put the law into high and to full speed and to administer it. Now again, here I was right in a position of great sensitivity, because the law was, and unfortunately to a considerable extent still is, anathema to labor. I tried desperately to convince labor that this was no different than the Security Exchange Act back in the thirties, which the Wall Street community, of which I was then a member, hated and regarded as an effrontery to it. They had regarded it as an attempt to get the federal government into an area which was none of its business, but which as years developed turned out to be the best thing that ever happened to the financial community. It gave it not only the image of integrity, but it gave it real integrity. I said, "This,

the Landrum-Griffin Act, will do for you people in the long run, so try to work with me." So we went through that period.

I also had under my general supervision the Labor Standards Division, which establishes standards and works with the states for bettering the conditions of working people. I had the Welfare Disclosure Act under my responsiblity. I also was given at the threshold of our administration the problem of handling all appointments and patronage. Agajn, I think Secretary Goldberg very wisely decided that he wanted to put that in the hands of someone who was completely lacking in any political motivation, except the dedication to the basic ideals.

F: No one could claim that you were ambitious for higher office.

R: That's right. He knew perfectly well that the only yardstick that I was going to apply to people was, "Are they going to be an asset to this department to serve the people better? I must say that it worked out that way. There were very few instances where we were requested and given some substantial pressure to appoint someone who was not really up-to-snuff. It became known that the Labor Department was only interested in competent people, so, "don't send anybody who isn't."

As time went on we developed into a happy and, I think, a reasonably efficient team. I became then also deeply involved in the operations of the President's Labor-Management Advisory Committee, which President Kennedy utilized a great deal. Of course, as time went on and we came then to November of 1963 and the tragedy of Mr.

Kennedy's death and then the transition.

I became frequently involved also in major labor disputes as mediator. So my area really was the Landrum-Griffin Act, the wage and hour act, the Fair Labor Standards Administration and patronage and the President's Labor Management Advisory Committee. When I got into difficult labor disputes, because I had considerable background and knowledge of this field, I frequently came in contact with President Kennedy and, to a lesser degree, with Vice President Johnson. So that's how my first contacts with Lyndon Johnson came about.

F: You hadn't really known him previously to when he was vice president?

R: No, I had never met him. But when we would get into really difficult problems that required the personal interest of the President, the Vice President was more often than not in the room. Now, my consciousness of him in those days, 1962, early 1963, encompassed primarily, however, an awareness of a man who was there and was quietly leaned on by the President with respect to his acute sensitivity to the political realities on the Hill.

For instance, when in 1963 the President felt it necessary to seek legislation in a major labor dispute involving railroads--a public law which became known as 88-108--I recall vividly when we got to the point of deciding whether or not we were going forward with this, Secretary Wirtz and I, Mr. Sorensen, President Kennedy, and the Vice President were alone in the Oval Room discussing the matter and President Kennedy

turned to me and asked, "Jim, is this approach fair to management? I'm concerned about that." He said, "Throughout this difficulty they've been completely fair and honorable with me. I want this to be fair to labor and I'm quite sure it is. But I'm more concerned--is it fair to management? Is it going to give them the right answer." Then he turned to Mr. Johnson, and he said, "Will it sell on the Hill?" The Vice President said, "At this particular time, with this dispute dragging on since late in the Eisenhower days, the Congress will be ready to move on this, Mr. President." And it was that advice, in my opinion, that tripped the decision for President Kennedy to seek the passage of a law which was distasteful to labor because it came awfully close to compulsory arbitration. It was something that labor historically opposed and opposed again in testimony. It was a distasteful thing for a Democratic president, in the political sense, to propose. But President Johnson's antenna, was again thoroughly reliable, and his advice to the then-President was valid and followed.

Now there are a number of occasions, somewhat similar occasions, the details of which I don't recall, where this occurred. Vice President Johnson always in my presence--and I don't want to sound as though I was present a great deal during matters of crisis for I certainly was not--but on those occasions when I was there, the Vice President showed the utmost deference and respect to the President. He reflected

a relationship which was called upon frequently and was reliable. It seemed that Kennedy knew that here was a man of incredible sensitivity to the political realities, and, "I need his judgment of that."

F: He was a tactician of sorts.

R: That's right. When we'd meet in the Cabinet Room with congressional leaders to discuss a measure that was going up to the Hill it was then that President Kennedy would lean over and ask, "Lyndon, what do you think?" And then "Lyndon"--I don't mean to display disrespect by that, but merely following the manner in which the President addressed him--would then address a remark to John McCormack or Carl Albert, or to the Senate leadership of the Republicans or Democrats. The obvious rapport that he enjoyed with these men was something that was exquisite in terms of usefulness for the country.

All right, so we come to November, 1963 and we have the tragedy. All of us who were so deeply devoted to President Kennedy were crushed. It was an incredible blow. I recall going to the White House on the Saturday morning after the assassination early in the morning, and it was pouring rain, and going into the White House through the West Wing. I found my way into the East Room before the state visitors came. I was able to be in there alone for a few minutes. The President's body had just been brought in during the early morning hours. I remember just kneeling down there and feeling how crushed I was. I thought, "My God! What's

the country going to do?" And I walked out, sadly, down through the passageway in the basement and through the West Wing. Things were in such disarray! [Pierre] Salinger came through and put his head on my shoulder and cried. As I passed the President's office Mrs. Kennedy, believe it or not, was in there directing the staff as to what to do with "this chair" and "that desk." The office was being renovated, as you may or may not know, while they were away, and things were still in pretty much disarray.

Then I remember walking out in the rain and seeing Bill Bundy, who was assistant secretary of state, and saying to Bill, "Bill, what are we going to do? What are we going to do?" And he said, "Jim, don't worry. You're going to find that you're going to have a very wonderful president in Mr. Johnson." I said, "But I don't know how. We were attuned to this young man who had given us such spirit." He said, "You don't know Johnson, but you will. He's going to be a great president." I'll always remember that. As far as I'm concerned, Bundy's forecast turned out to be a very valid one. It soon became apparent that there was a different atmosphere. It was a different cup of tea, but a great cup of tea for the country.

F: Were you at your office on Friday when the assassination occurred?

R: Yes. By the strangest coincidence I believe, I had called George Shultz, who was then the dean of the Business School at Chicago, and asked him to come in to see me to discuss helping us on a project that we were taking on for the Labor-Management Advisory

Committee. I was sitting with George in my office with my assistant and one other man, whose name at the moment escapes me, and we were talking of this. My future wife, who was the secretary to Mr. Wirtz--my first wife having passed away back in 1961--called me and told me that President Kennedy had been shot. I said, "Well, I think, gentlemen, the best thing we can do is to go on working and see if we can't keep our thoughts focused on our project here."

She called me back possibly forty-five minutes later to tell me the President had died. I just said to George Shultz, "George, in the light of this I just can't go on. I don't think any of us can, nor is it appropriate that we do so." And George left and went back to Chicago. I went about my business, and it wasn't until 1969 that our paths really crossed again, when George came in to be secretary of labor under Richard Nixon.

F: Did the employees in the building just sort of spill out in the halls, head for the nearest TV set? Could you sense the grief throughout the building?

R: I could sense the grief throughout the building. There were people who cried.

F: Almost a terror, I imagine.

R: The degree to which President Kennedy, in the relatively brief period he was president, had sort of given a lift to all people in the government as far as I could see, and more particularly to the Department of Labor, was remarkable. I think that they had been, quite frankly, accustomed to a somewhat more lethargic existence.

Secretary [James P.] Mitchell, who was Goldberg's immediate predecessor, had begun to get the department into the stream of the world rather than just being the proprietary little department of the labor unions and the laboring people and more particularly the unions. I think the period from early 1961 until November 1963, when the department was charging into manpower development, into the problems of the ghettos, into the problem of the unemployed, into many areas where it had not tread before, had raised everyone up. At least that's the impression I had, and I think it's a valid one. I think that the civil servants, whether they were Democrats or Republicans, it didn't matter, felt that this was an exciting period, and now something was gone, There was a terrible letdown. I think, also, there's no question that there was an unfortunate peripheral effect because the tragedy occurred in Texas. It's obvious, you know. So there was not a great deal of spontaneous discussion of the new president and "how great he is"--not at all. Lyndon Johnson had to win that as far as the people in government were concerned.

F: Etiquette, of course, demands that everyone submit his resignation to the new president, but it is etiquette, pure and simple. Did anyone seriously, at this time, in the higher echelons in Labor consider getting out, or were they going to stay on to help the new administration?

R: I think at that point all of us were so deeply dedicated to what we were trying to do, which we interpreted as important to the nation,

that there wasn't any serious thought on the part of any of us to get out at that time if the new president wanted us.

F: You had programs underway, and you wanted to see them to completion?

R: That is right. But I would be less than candid if I didn't say that, on my own part, I felt, "Well, it would be wrong to get out now. You'd be deserting your ship! You should stay on and see how things go."

F: You're probably needed more right now than you will be before or after, in a way.

R: I don't know whether I could attribute any such noble process of thinking to myself, but I think I just felt that, "This is a hell of a time to get out." Even if it's a relatively lower level position, as an assistant secretary, you don't desert the ship. You stay around.

But it wasn't too long before it became apparent that we had a man in the White House who was just as dedicated and just as active and just as much a fighter as was Jack Kennedy, but with a completely different style, a different way of doing things. But it was a fantastic leader who emerged. When you went to the White House and ultimately would see him, it wasn't the man standing quietly in the corner of the room with his hands in his pockets waiting to be asked something. He was now in charge, and there was no question about it. And when I say in charge, I don't mean "in charge" in any outward unmannerly manifestation of posturing or anything of this sort. Quite the contrary. I never saw a man who was so

courteous, so quiet, so ready to listen to all those around him, than was Lyndon Johnson.

This came as a complete surprise to a great many people. I think they felt that, "Here's the man who wanted to be president, who has had a long political career, is a political animal. Boy, he's going to start pushing things around." Quite the contrary. He would sit quietly in a cabinet meeting listening to various views and then also quietly make and voice a decision. I was the one who would be frequently assigned by Mr. Wirtz to go to meetings when he was away from Washington so I did have a chance to see a good deal of President Johnson and to develop a fantastic admiration and affection for him. If it's appropriate to say it, and I hope it is--I'll say it anyway--as far as I was concerned, as I'd see more and more of him and get to know him quite well, he'd be to me a man who 95 per cent of the time somehow I'd want to put my arms around and just say, "What can I do to help you?" And the other 5 per cent, I'd want to shake him! It was an amazing combination of reactions he seemed to inspire in many of us who worked for him.

As time went on, for some reason or other, I do think I'm truthful in this, there developed some affection on the part of the President for me. I know on one occasion he said to me, "Jim I wonder if you know what you really mean to me?" Now maybe he said this to a lot of people, but he said, "You could fill any position

in my administration. I want you to know how much you mean to me, how proud I am of some of the things you're doing properly and intelligently that reflect credit on my administration."

I remember an occasion the night he flew back from Adenauer's funeral in Germany. I had been asked to a White House diplomatic reception. Probably they needed extra men, and I was still a bachelor! Standing in the State Dining Room talking to some of the diplomats I suddenly felt someone holding my hand, which kind of shocked me, because it was a big hand; it wasn't a nice little soft hand. I just stood there and continued to talk without making a move, not knowing what I was up against. Finally I looked around at the hand and up the arm to the shoulder, and it was the President. He was holding my hand!

I was deeply moved, and finally he said, "Jim, I want to talk to you." We went over into the room immediately next to the State Dining Room. He asked one of the butlers to get us a couple of chairs, and we sat down there and he just wanted to talk. He said, "God, I'm so tired. I just came back from Germany." I said, "Mr. President, I hope you can get up to bed soon." He said, "Well, I will when I can but now tell me about this and this and this while I was away." There were a number of little things that he wanted to know about. He had an insatiable need to soak up everything that was going on. He never stopped working, as you well know. So we sat there quietly talking while the party went on.

F: There was no detail that you ever really felt you ought to skip,

that he wouldn't be interested in.

R: None whatsoever. I'm skipping around here, and I hope it's all right, but it reflects at least some little bit about this fantastic man.

I recall another occasion when we were involved in a difficult airlines dispute. He had a secretary call me and tell me that he wanted me down at the White House. It was after midnight, and I went down and was ushered upstairs to the President's bedroom. The President was lying naked on a rubbing table getting a rubdown. He was covered with oil and this fellow was kneading the great muscles of his big hairy chest. He just wanted to talk about this dispute. I recall he said, "Well, who's the key to this?" I said, "I think Tillinghast, president of TWA, could be helpful." He said, "Give me that phone." Well, it was now one o'clock but he just called Tillinghast on the phone and talked to him about this matter. I don't know, outside of the time he slept, when he wasn't devoted either to his country or his family every minute.

Well, there it is, November, 1963 and we have a new president. Some changes took place as far as my work was concerned because of a different attitude of the new president than the previous one. I'm speaking particularly now of his Labor-Management Advisory Committee. President Kennedy had established that committee on Mr. Goldberg's recommendation. It was a rather prestigious committee, and President Kennedy used it. He used it very effectively, and he used it very frequently.

For instance, in1963 when we were very much interested in stimulating the economy, when Walter Heller was recommending the application of the Keynesian philosophy of the tax cut in the face of a deficit, we called that committee together. President Kennedy told them that he was being advised to advocate a tax cut of eleven billion dollars. He was told it would generate about thirty-three billion in GNP; it would mean "x" number of jobs; it would bring unemployment down, and ultimately would generate tax revenue which would buy it back. He said, "I want to know what you think about it."

He'd go around the table and get the views of Henry Ford and George Meany and Joseph Block of Inland Steel and Tom Watson of IBM and then the public members. He had Arthur Burns, who was subsequently made the chief economic adviser to President Nixon and now chairman of the Federal Reserve Board. I remember the only individual in that room who opposed what President Kennedy wanted to do was Arthur Burns. He sat back with his pipe in his mouth and went on in a long, boring Adam Smith lecture; "there was no assurance that this was going to do what it was supposed to do, et cetera," until it reached almost the point of embarrassment. Not that he hadn't a perfect right to state his views, but the manner in which he did them was quite unfortunate, we all thought.

F: He gave a classroom lecture.

R: Right. But the point that I'm trying to make is that President Kennedy, as witness this incident, used that committee, and the committee felt very useful to President Kennedy. The labor men,

particularly Walter Reuther, were very useful, as was Mr. Meany.

But the new President didn't feel so disposed. He preferred to use a different technique, and that was to have small groups of businessmen or labor people in for lunch or dinner, as you know, and have informal discussions with them. The result of this was that the committee, when we did convene it to meet with President Johnson, unfortunately found a president who did not seek their information and advice. It was more of his sitting down for twenty minutes and indulging in a monologue, in which he would tell them what his problems were, what was going on and so forth, and, "I hope you'll think about these things." But there was no inflow, so the committee members gradually became quite disenchanted with their role. I can recall Walter Reuther, when we were going over after lunch one day to the White House, saying to me and also Joe Block of Inland--a management man and labor man separately and distinctly--"Jim, I question whether this committee ought to continue. The President doesn't use us. He doesn't want us. We appreciate the fact that he uses different techniques to get the views of labor and management privately." So as time went on that committee did indeed become less and less useful.

I think one dramatic and very timely example, however, of the sense of rejection, possibly, that this advisory committee felt as a clearly identifiable mechanism--not as individuals, because many of them still maintained their personal contacts with the President--arose when many of us in the administration became increasingly concerned late in 1965 with the manifestations of

inflation. Until this time, President Johnson and his economic council had kept things in beautiful shape. But now the Labor-Management Committee could see what was beginning to happen. It came up with a suggestion that either it, or a similar group if the President preferred, be named to sort of be the ombudsman of the economy. It would use the White House as a launching pad and no less frequently than once a quarter would meet with the Council of Economic Advisors to go over the economy and to focus public attention at the conclusion of their meeting on those areas of serious disquiet. If it were the building trades unions that were demanding outlandish increases--as they were--it would be exposed. If it was the steel industry raising prices more than were warranted by added costs, they would say so--automobile, aluminum, labor or management, no matter who, would be named if guilty. This would be short of price and wage controls in a free society but would focus public attention on the areas of concern. Well, the President didn't accept that. The idea never emerged. But today, as we note in the paper this morning, this is exactly what President Nixon has decided to do in 1970, five years later. Hopefully, had we done this back then the economy might now be in better shape.

F: It might at least have made it easier for Nixon!

R: It might have, yes.

F: You were asked pretty early in Mr. Johnson's new administration

to participate in a study in the depth of the effects of automation on labor. Did that ever really get into an effective study?

R: Yes. This, too, centered around the President's Labor-Management Advisory Committee. We set up a series of seminars around the country on the West Coast, the Midwest and the East, at such places as the Wharton School in Philadelphia, the University of Chicago, and on the West Coast I just don't recall at the moment where. We brought a few top people in like young Derek Bok, who's presently the Dean of the Harvard Business School, to really focus in on this problem and to develop as much data as we could as to whether or not there was an erosion of jobs of any serious dimensions by reason of the explosion of technology that was going on. Out of those deliberations came a paper of the Labor-Management Committee which pointed out the responsibilities of labor, of management, and the government in meeting the problem and many excellent governmental and private initiatives resulted.

One must keep in mind that this also gave, by a process of osmosis possibly, a greater concern throughout the nation with respect to the retraining of workers, and this became a part of the manpower program of the Department of Labor. I would say that while the project itself certainly wasn't directly responsible for what occurred, it certainly was related to it. The Manpower Act was structured in a way to reflect that we just weren't concerned with taking the hard-core unemployed and cleaning them up, so to speak, for at

least entry jobs, but we also were concerned with the retraining of people who were displaced by reason of automation.

F: Now in February of 1964 you had that very highly sensitive program to ship grain to Russia, and Gus Hall's longshoremen refused to load it. Did you get involved in that?

R: Oh, very much so. But just let me very kindly and respectfully correct you. Gus Hall is not the man. Teddy Gleason is the president of the International Longshoremen's Association.

That program began under President Kennedy. Back in October of 1963, I believe it was, the President announced that he was approving and encouraging the consummation of a strictly commercial deal with the Soviets for the sale of a very vast quantity of grain. He directed me to go up and to meet with the longshoremen because he was concerned that they would probably resist this and would refuse to load it aboard ships. They had and still have a long-standing policy on the East Coast and the Gulf, where the International Longshoremen's Union are the bargaining agents--as opposed to the West Coast, where Harry Bridges' union is--of not unloading or loading any vessel either coming from or going to the Soviet.

I met with the executive council of the Longshoremen's Union in New York City, and in long sessions convinced them that what President Kennedy wanted to do was the right thing to do and that they should support this. They agreed to do so, providing that

at least half of it was shipped in American flag vessels. I conveyed this to the President through Secretary Wirtz, and, as a result, the President supplemented his original announcement by saying that at least half the grain would be shipped in American bottoms to the extent that they were available. It was a rather sensitive and touchy situation for a while, and right in the midst of it, of course, President Kennedy died. The ability to get 50 per cent of this grain on American bottoms became more and more difficult.

As a result, early in President Johnson's Administration I had discussed the possibility of sending a small delegation to the Soviet to clear up some areas of concern that I had, which arose from the fact that we were being told by the two big grain dealer companies which consummated this transaction that the Soviet would not permit vessels into Odessa, in the Black Sea, with a draft greater than thirty-one feet. This immediately eliminated the larger American vessels, which conceivably could have carried a great deal of this grain and made possible attainment of President Kennedy's "at least half on American ships" policy.

F: Did you get the feeling that this was due to harbor facilities in Odessa, or that this was a studied means of cutting down those larger ocean-going vessels?

R: It became manifest to me that this was an effort to cut down the amount of the grain that went on American bottoms. It developed

that the sale had been consummated with the Soviet for a fixed dollar price, delivered at Odessa. To the extent that that grain could be shipped on foreign bottoms at a lower shipping price, the profit to the dealers would be greater. It was as blatant and as crass and as matter-of-fact as that.

When I went to Moscow with the Under Secretary of Commerce for Transportation and a chap from the Maritime Administration and a man who I had suggested we bring along, a fellow names Joseph Kahn who was both a U.S. ship operator and a man who speaks Russian fluently, the first person we found in our hotel was a representative of the grain companies and the man responsible for the fictitious report of draft limitations in Odessa. It was apparent that he was in utter disarray when he found what we were there for, namely to check the true depth of the port. We went down to Odessa and met there with Mr. Bakayev, the minister of shipping and he took us to the magnificent docks that were rebuilt after the devastation of the port by the Germans.

To my question as to channel depth he said, "Oh, heavens, we can bring ships right against the pier here at better than thirty-three feet. If you wish you can bring a ship of sixty or seventy feet draft to the roadstead out here, and we can lighter the grain off until we get it down to thirty-three feet and bring her in to the dock. No problem at all, no problem at all!" We negotiated

with him as to the price of lighterage and got it down as low as possible. Then, by reason of this, we were able to use two or three of the biggest ships under the American flag and consummate the deal. Otherwise it would have been a real problem. This was, I'm very much afraid, a rather awkward example of corporate avarice that was revealed by reason of our mission to the Soviet. But the entire shipment was consummated, and the longshoremen handled it all. We got it over there, and it helped the Soviets out of a bad time.

F: You know, this was quite controversial at the time, and a lot of the more conservative people in the country felt that this was an aid-to-the-enemy sort of transaction. Did this ease off as time went by? While there are some people you'll never convince, did most of the opposition become convinced that this was the humanitarian, as well as the practical, deal?

R: I don't think I can make any comment worthwhile on that, Mr. Frantz. I was just devoted to concluding the deal for the administration. President Johnson had inherited this. It would be most unseemly if it blew up during his administration in the midst of the carriage of this fantastic quantity of grain. We had a big surplus far beyond our needs. It was useful to the Department of Agriculture; it was useful to the nation in terms of balance of payments; and it was useful, terribly useful, to the Soviets, because Khrushchev's

grain lands had been visited by a devastating negative series of acts of God. There was a drought, then there was a freeze, then there were great winds, and they were in real trouble. The Soviet diet is made up so much by bread and it was important to them.

I think that it would be possibly useful here to say that during the visit to Moscow it was arranged for our little delegation to meet with Mr. Kosygin. Kosygin then was, together with Mr. Mikoyan, a deputy minister of the Council of Ministers. We spent about two hours with him, and in the light of his subsequent ascendancy to the top position, I think his comments then were very important. At the time I reported them back to Secretary Wirtz and to Commerce Secretary Hodges, I felt they were very significant and possibly should have been seized upon, since Kosygin made it very apparent that the Soviet was hungry to develop commercial relationships with us.

He said, "We tried to buy a great quantity of steel pipe from your country to bring natural gas from our natural gas fields up to the north, and we were refused a license by the Department of Commerce because it has declared to be potentially strategic in terms of building our war potential." He said, "Nonsense. All we did was then turn around and buy it from the Belgians and from the British and from, to some extent I believe, the French. We had to buy it somewhere." "Now," he said, "If you don't deal with us commercially on the basis of goods, then I would like to urge that your big corporations,"

and he named specifically General Electric and General Motors, "license us to build their products here for a royalty payment. We will cross-license to them some of the things that we can do. There must be something we can do better than you. For instance, our continuous casting process of steel. We're giving it to the Chinese. We'd like to sell it to you on an exchange of licenses."

Now this was very significant, because heretofore the Russians had been disdainful of any respect for licensing and proprietary interest. They would, you know, just take what they wanted. But here was a man urging that we indulge in an eye-to-eye deal on royalties based on cross-licensing. He also was very anxious to have some of the Russian cruise ships, of which they were then building two or three, take citizens of the Soviet "to your great ports, like New York, San Francisco, and let them visit your cultural centers and your universities. Let some of your big ocean liners come here in the spring," he said. "It's beautiful in the Black Sea. Bring them in there and let them live on the ship, as our people would live on our ship. Then we would see to it that they see all of our beautiful cultural assets and at least get us started on an exchange of people to a greater extent that we do." I thought it was rather revealing, without going into it any further.

F: Yes. Did you get any reaction from above?

R: No, I didn't, not one bit.

F: It's one of those dreams that you get. You had during 1964 and 1965

not a continuous, but a frequent problem with the maritime industry, and particularly with stevedores, with strikes all the way from Maine to Texas. Would you care to go into your role in this?

R: My role, unfortunately, was one of deep involvement. We had always hoped that the established agency for the purpose of mediating these disputes would be able to handle these effectively, and very often it did.

F: Basically you had three elements in this, didn't you, that is, the Department of Labor, the maritime representatives and the Seaman's Union?

R: Yes. But the government agency really that is set up to handle these things, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, would get in these disputes early in the game and attempt to resolve them. But frequently, through no fault of their own, they were unsuccessful, and the strike would occur in spite of the use of the Taft-Hartley injunction. When the period of restraint was over they'd strike again, so that at a time when we were deeply concerned about keeping the economy rolling, the President and his advisers obviously just couldn't permit this to go on without doing everything possible to resolve it in a fair and objective way. So I would unfortunately be the individual who'd be thrown into these disputes.

I had developed a very good communication with both management and labor in the industry, which I still enjoy to this day, and I'd be the one who'd have to resolve the darned thing. The longshoremen are a singularly difficult union. They're almost

institutionally incapable of making a settlement without a strike. One almost has the feeling in this day and age that they would prefer to strike for five cents than to settle peacefully for ten. It's sort of a way of life that happens once every--

F: It's a technique to them.

R: It happens ever two or three years, whenever the contract is up. I had been deeply involved with them under President Kennedy's Administration, and then again under President Johnson's Administration. I'd go from one port to another and live with this thing day and night to work it out. You felt like the boy with his finger in the dike, because you'd get New York settled, and then you'd run down to New Orleans and get New Orleans settled and New York would come apart. You'd run to Galveston and get that settled, and Philadelphia would be a problem, or Baltimore.

But in any event, my chief concern was always to keep the President thoroughly insulated from this bunch of rascals. I had seen President Kennedy outrageously rejected by them when, in 1961, we were on the verge of a strike at a time when unemployment was high. We were desperately trying to generate activity in the economy, and here we were faced with a strike. The President called Mr. Gleason at the suggestion of Secretary Goldberg and got him late at night in his home, and he was rebuffed. I certainly didn't want, and neither did Secretary Wirtz, to see President Johnson rebuffed by the longshoremen. You just don't put a president in that position.

So I desperately kept fighting, fighting, fighting, and the President was always grateful and so kind about it. He knew that I was expending myself on the damned thing and trying to get it resolved, and I ultimately would get it resolved. You have to keep thinking of ideas that arise from your experience in the business of labor relations, and you try to provoke the parties to a greater sense of of responsibility. You try to know all the nuances of the political relationships internally in the union. Unfortunately, in the South the question of the black and white locals and their relationship to one another was a singularly difficult area. But we ultimately got them resolved and I think were able to invoke into the whole way of life there some measures which are gradually asserting themselves as very constructive.

F: Incidentally, did you try to bring any pressure to integrate unions, or did you look on that as somebody else's problem?

R: I did not attempt to do that. In New Orleans, for instance, there was a black union headed by a man by the name of Henry. He's an extremely able labor leader; he serves his people well. His relationship with management is, I think, a better one than is that of the head of the white local. There were policies that had to be implemented in this area, and subsequently they have, I believe, to some extent been implemented. But not to the the extent that ultimately, I guess, they have to be. Along the docks this has been a way of life. Certainly I wasn't going to complicate and make more abrasive

and exacerbate a very difficult situation by getting too much into that during a serious economic strike.

F: In the August-September stevedore dispute of 1964, a federal injunction was brought. Who actually seeks injunction? Is that done in the name of the President?

R: What we did in that regard, Mr. Frantz, was always this: when it became apparent that a strike was likely to take place and we would so advise the President, Mr. Wirtz would also inform him that we were seeking all the necessary data as to how serious an impact of a strike would be. Doing this we would work with the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense, the Department of Agriculture and any other department or agency which might have jurisdiction over a part of American interests that involved foreign trade. We would gather from all of these sources appropriate documented information as to what the impact of the strike would be if it lasted a week or a month or three months, and so forth. All of that material then would be presented in a brief synopsis to the President. The Secretary then would recommend to the President that he direct the Attorney General to go into court and get a Taft-Hartley eighty-day injunction on the basis of this. We never utilized the injunction lightly, I can assure you.

F: And the President wasn't quick to recommend injunction procedure?

R: Oh, no. He, to the maximum extent possible, wanted the free exchange of ideas and the freedom of bargaining to go on. If there was no damage to the basic interests of the nation in a broader sense, fine, let them go ahead and strike or shut down.

F: Work it out, however long it might take.

R: Work it out. The only times we sought an injunction were after a most careful and searching analysis by the Council of Economic Advisers and every department that had any interest in this. This was never an artificial exercise to build up a case to seek an injunction, it was always a valid, scholarly appraisal of what it would mean to the public and the nation with businesses shut down. I recall on one occasion we had a strike of six major airlines and it was very inconvenient to a lot of people, a great many people, but we could find no basis for saying this was a national emergency, so there was no extraordinary messure taken.

F: Also, early in that Johnson Administration in 1964, you had a railroad strike that affected Cape Kennedy that got a little messy.

R: Yes, it certainly did.

F: What was your role in there?

R: I'm afraid again I was the villain, or whatever you call it. I was the man involved. That was in Florida.

F: You're our man to take the rap?

R: As Secretary Wirtz, I think, one time said, I developed the same familiarity with the parties and the issues as a shuttlecock develops with two rackets. But that particular situation was extremely awkward. The Florida East Coast Railroad which--

F: You should look a lot older than you do.

R: Oh well, I have at times. But Florida East Coast had a prolonged dispute with the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, by reason of the fact that management had declined to accept a settlement which all the other major railroads in the nation had accepted in terms of a wage adjustment. Since the Florida East Coast had declined it, there had been a long strike of the Florida East Coast, which back in1964 became extremely ugly. There were incidents of sabotage of the railroad, a number of train crashes. It was a pretty horrendous situation.

I had a number of meetings with the dominant figure of the railroad, Mr. Edward Ball, and his associates on the railroad, and endeavored to find some way to resolve this, any reasonable way to submit it to a board to make further recommendations or any compromise of it. I frankly met a stone wall. Mr. Ball, it was quite apparent, had made his decision, and a decision he had a perfect right to make, that he was not going to settle or really deal with this union any further than he already had; that as far as he was concerned, the issue was concluded: "All strikes don't necessarily have to be won, and this is one the union isn't going to win." And he proceeded to hire strike replacements and so forth.

In the midst of this it became known that at Cape Kennedy they were building a spur from the Florida East Coast into what is now known as the Vertical Assembly Building, which is the largest single building in terms of cubage in the world, and that over the spur was going to come a major amount of supplies that were going into

that building. The Florida East Coast was geographically located advantageously. It was closer to the east coast of Florida than was the Atlantic Coast Railroad which was further inland toward Orlando. It was the logical thing for NASA to do, but it was also a matter which the railroad brotherhoods were just not going to permit without making every effort to stop it. So they put pickets up at the main entrance to the Cape, and those pickets were respected by many of the craftsmen coming in not only to the Vertical Assembly Building but to the other vast assemblage of construction ventures there, the launching pads and everything else. So it was a pretty nitty-gritty situation. It required a good deal of working and tact and diplomacy and cajoling and persuasion to finally get the situation resolved, which we did.

F: Did Ben Heineman get mixed up in this?

R: Not to my knowledge. I don't recall Mr. Heineman being involved. Maybe he was, but I don't recall that at the time. No, I don't.

F: As 1964 goes on, you had this initial sort of recession, I suppose you'd say, in momentum, or restraint on momentum that you picked up during the Kennedy years. Did you begin to feel the surge in the department again, that things could happen and were going to happen?

R: Yes, I think so. But I think that most of our energies, outside of the times when mine were diverted to labor disputes, were in the direction of fundamental attacks on this hard-core unemployed. This is what we were all deeply dedicated to doing something about,

which again I think possibly is the cause of our great concern today, in 1970, as we see the rate of unemployment at 5 per cent and appearing to go higher. Because, you know, it is poverty that generates social unrest. That goes back to many wise men through the years, and again and again we could see this. The source of so much trouble was unemployment, the lack of a job, the lack of acceptance into the stream of the economy. So we were constantly concerned with the Fair Labor Standards Act. We were constantly concerned with the Manpower Administration. Although my responsibilities were not focused in that, certainly as a part of the team I was very much involved in discussions and formulation of approaches and attacks, along with Secretary Wirtz and Assistant Secretary Stanley Ruttenberg and others. But I think we were also concerned with the fact that possibly the labor relations situation was going to become more difficult to handle.

F: I don't understand--this has nothing to do with the broader Johnson strategy--when did you find time to get married? You must have done it the first day you had off.

R: No, in 1965, I was--

F: I don't really see where you got an hour in there to get it straightened out.

R: I really didn't have much time, but just in about thirty seconds let me tell you. But I recall very well, my wife had been Mr. Goldberg's secretary for eight years. She came to the department with him and then stayed on with Secretary Wirtz. When I went in

to see Secretary Wirtz, I said, "Bill, I want you to be the first one to know that Helen and I are going to be married. Of course, she'll give you an opportunity to train another girl before she resigns." He said, "Look, let me tell you one thing. I can't imagine two people I love more dearly and am happier about seeing get married, but if there's anybody going to resign around here, it's going to be you and not Helen!" So that was the degree of his admiration for her.

F: Good.

As 1965 went on, late in 1965 we had a New York City transit strike, with good old Mike Quill coming back for one more round. You were involved in this?

R: Yes, I was.

F: I judge Quill is kind of the old-fashioned labor leader type that doesn't really concede anything to modern mediation procedures.

R: Yes. He was a fantastically colorful man. John Lindsay had just taken office when Quill announced he was going to strike the transportation system, I think it was in December, and he appealed for some help from us. He appealed through the President, to my knowledge.

F: "He" being?

R: John Lindsay. He had known the President, of course, having been a congressman here. In effect, he said, "Look, I don't know anything about labor problems and labor relations. Here I am, and I'm suddenly confronted the first day of my administration with a strike."

So Secretary Wirtz and I went up and met him quietly and privately in his office. Then the Secretary told me to stay there to work with Mayor Lindsay to try and resolve this.

There was a committee of three appointed that was endeavoring to resolve the dispute: Dr. Nathan Feinsinger of the University of Wisconsin, Sylvester Garrett, the arbitrator, and Theodore Kheel, whose presence on the three-man committee had been a condition of his acceptance of it by Mr. Quill. He insisted that Mr. Kheel be a part of it.

Well, I think that this very fact made the Mayor suspicious that he was dealing with an awkward group. He didn't know much about it and so forth. But be that as it may, I stayed there and endeavored to advise the Mayor on what things to do. I did meet frequently with the three-man board and with the representatives of the labor union and did try to give a little assistance to putting the thing together, which we were able to do after a while. There isn't much more to say about it except that it was--

F: Did Kheel sort of cause the committee to seem to be stacked?

R: Well, the difficulty with Ted Kheel in not only this dispute, there are many others. Ted has a fantastic ambivalence in these matters. He's deeply wired in to various labor matters in New York, being a trustee of various labor pension funds and so forth. There's always been a certain measure of distrust on the part of management of Ted for this reason, but he's an astonishingly capable, adroit fellow. The problem with the three-man board was they could

never find him, because he'd be off trying to make a private deal while Sylvester Garrett and Feinsinger were locked in their hotel. This made things a little bit difficult, but not seriously so, because those of us who had worked with Ted appreciate this and know full well that he's a fantastically able--and I say this in admiration, not in any other sense--wheeler and dealer. But often the ultimate resolution that comes out of a Kheel settlement comes back to plague the parties. You get a settlement, but the first thing you know you find that your pocketbook is gone, or something else of great importance has been given up. Well, no further comment on that. Mr. Kheel helped us out on many disputes, and I have the greatest admiration for his ability. He's a real operator.

F: In 1966 the National Association of Broadcast Employees threatened to black out LBJ's speeches if the government didn't stop using the Army Signal Corps technicians.

R: I don't know how you know all these things, but it's fantastic. This happened in a very brusque way. It suddenly appeared on the front page of the Washington Post, a story that the union was about to black out the White House. I immediately was contacted, I guess, by the then-Press Secretary. No, not Bill Moyers, but Bob. . . . Was there a Bob Fleming?

F: Yes. Bob Fleming

R: In any event, this just couldn't take place, and he asked me what I could do.

F: This almost has a comic opera cast about it, except it's very serious.

R: I immediately met with these labor fellows to find out what was troubling them. I found out in short order that there had been a growing practice of utilizing the Signal Corps technicians, who were quartered in the basement of the White House in considerable numbers, for a number of very important purposes. But the President, I think, being a man who acts very quickly and occasionally without too much notice to people, found it sometimes rather awkward to give two or three days' notice to the networks that he was going to have something to say on television, so greater and greater reliance was being made on the Signal Corps technicians. The network technicians could see the gradual erosion of their importance in the scheme of things, and they were concerned about it. So after talking with them at some length I was convinced that they had a case. That was on a Friday.

The next morning I got a call from the President; he said he wanted to see me. I went over to the White House and I sat down with him, and he leaned over to me and he said, "Look, Jim, before you say anything, let em tell you something. I was elected to the Congress 'x' number of times. I was elected to the Senate and I was elected president. I don't need these fellows! As far as I'm concerned they can get out of here." He said, "Before I came here to the White House, we had an interest in a television communications system in Texas, and my trustees have been administering it. But damn it, within a month or two after I became president, these fellows were in there organizing it and trying to take over. I don't need

them, and as far as I'm concerned every one of them can get out of the White House." He said, "Now that I've told you that, what have you got to say?"

I said, "Well, Mr. President, I appreciate thoroughly your views, and I can't be more sympathetic to your sense of annoyance at this. This is scandalously impolite and rude and wrong, but the people of this nation have a right to see their President, hear their President and see him and hear him projected properly by technicians whose job it is to do it. This doesn't mean the emergency things that you need a Signal Corps for. But these fellows feel it's their life's work, it's their careers, and they feel that the increasing use of the Signal Corps people is a threat to their well-being. You have to have some understanding and sympathy for that." I said, "Let me work this out, and you'll still have the kind of lighting that you want, the kind of treatment that you like that the Signal Corps gives you and so forth." So he said, "Okay, but I wanted you to know how I feel about it."

So I was able to work it out. As a result of that, as far as I know the thing has worked out beautifully. The Signal Corps does their job, and the commercial people have done their job.

F: How did you work it out, just sort of sweet reasonableness?

R: There were technical points of departure. There's a thing called a mult, that is the name they throw around. The mult is a device from which the sound and the picture, apparently, of the President, particularly the sound, is transferred to the different networks.

Now there was a breakoff point in there somewhere; the Signal Corps was operating the mult. The mult is not only a matter of automatically transferring the sound, but it's a matter of the quality of the sound and the volume of the sound. The question was, should the Signal Corps operate that? Should the Signal Corps operate the lights? The details of the settlement now I fear--there've been so many things that have occurred in the intervening years--I don't recall. But it was a question of sorting out, not only with respect to the formal appearances of the President in the East Room or elsewhere, but also a sorting out of the fact that if the President was suddenly going to appear at the Washington Hilton or at the Statler or anywhere for some particular reason, that there had to be a respect for the fact that the Signal Corps had to move in and do these things quickly. They couldn't round up all these fellows. The long and short of it was, we sorted it all out so the Signal Corps had their jurisdiction, the commercial people had their jurisdiction. And I have no reason to believe that it hasn't worked out to the credit of everyone.

F: Is this a written agreement?

R: It was subsequently put in writing, but not by me. It was by the press people, by Fleming or someone.

F: So they probably have that somewhere in the files?

R: I think so. I do know that everyone concerned in the White House was deeply appreciative to me for what I was able to do.

F: Otherwise, I presume your alternative would be for the broadcasters to keep a crew on hand at all times, particularly where you have a President who does things in a hurry.

R: Twenty-four hours a day, which of course these fellows would have loved, but that's equally ridiculous. One amusing aspect of that was that subsequently when I would go to the White House to the East Room for some occasion, when I was asked to be there and the President was going to be speaking, or when I was sworn in as under secretary some time later, as I would come in all these labor fellows would say, "Hi, Jim. Hi, Jim." They were all my pals. It was embarrassing, you know.

F: In the summer of 1966 you participated, as you've already mentioned, in the airlines wage settlement. By this time your jawboning technique and your guidelines are beginning to sort of fall down on you. I presume this is primarily just the war pressure?

R: Yes, they had. Basically, the fundamental, I think, influence was the war pressure. But the element that tripped off, in my opinion, the change in the rate of increase of the cost of living, the consumer price index, which had remained in great shape up to the fall of 1965 in terms of GNP and CPI, the basic ingredient for the change in that started with the demands of the building trades unions in various parts of the country. There was a controlled shortage of skilled craftsmen. There was a vast acceleration of commercial construction, principally, throughout the nation, and the building trades unions were disposed to make the best of it.

Secretary Wirtz and I met privately with the presidents of all of the major building trades unions and exhorted them to use their influence to stop this, because what was happening was that a building trades council in a major city would make demands that shut down the entire industry. The industry, in terms of the management side, was helpless to stop this. They had no place to turn for their skilled labor except to the unions. Their bank loans, which were outstanding to construct the building, were eating up interest at a fantastic rate. They were almost helpless in effectively opposing these demands, although they tried in many places unsuccessfully.

So we started to get settlements in the building trades and construction trades area of industry that were far, far, far greater than anything that was coming out of the industrial dialogue. In the major cities where there were industrial plants located--Detroit is the best example--when it came to negotiate the industrial contract for the automobile industry, the skilled craftsmen in the plants, who were the maintenance electricians and the maintenance sheet metal workers and the plumbers and so forth, demanded of Mr. Reuther that they, too, be given big increases as their fellow craftsmen were enjoying in the building trades. Any arguments made to them that the building craftsmen worked intermittently because of the vicissitudes of weather and the vicissitudes of the ups and downs of building fell on deaf ears. They said, "Look, these fellows are no more skilled than I, and I've gone through an apprenticeship. I've worked just as hard, and they're getting

this fantastic increase. Now I want it!"

So the influence slopped over onto the bargaining table of the industrial community, and, in my opinion, this was the single most damaging development in the whole question of labor relations as it impacted on the price rise. It would be unfair to say that this was the only factor; obviously this was not. But there was a sneaking, quiet increase in durable and expendable consumer products that was an insidious, irresponsible act, in my opinion, on the part of many entrepreneurs where things were getting in pretty good shape: "Let's charge more for this package of groceries or this shirt or those shoes or this suit." The industrial workers could see this, and he would say, "Look, who are you kidding? Don't ask me to make a settlement of 3.2 or 4 per cent. I can see what's happening. My wife goes to the grocery store and she's coming back with . . . . And how about those building trades guys?" So it's a combination, you see.

F: You recommended that there be some sort of a re-examination of the guidelines at this time?

R: Yes. We felt that the basic economic lesson that was inherent in the establishment of the guidelines was extremely valid, and that it had served a useful purpose. But to constantly exhort respect and observance of a rigid 3.2, we felt was a mistake, because we could see when you get into the bargaining dialogue, bargaining exercise, that management was constantly saying, "Well, how about the 3.2? You labor fellows are violating the national policy that

President Johnson is trying to pursue. This is wrong." They'd appeal to us to make them observe the 3.2 where they themselves were indulging in price increases of greater percentage.

So the 3.2 limit, which was at the time it was formulated so basic for that particular moment in history, namely the productivity and labor costs, et cetera, the combination and the juxtaposition justified a 3.2 increase as a general matter. Where productivity was greater, there could be a justification possibly for a little more. But more properly there was justification for a price decrease, you see, to pass on to the consumer the advantage of increased productivity. In the abstract this was a magnificent theory, but the price decreases didn't take place. Labor was saying, "Look, I'm sorry. Productivity is shooting up here," and it was, "And we're not going to stand for 3.2 if these fellows aren't going to reduce prices, let alone raise them." And so the rigidity of the 3.2 became very--

F: It was time to consign it to history?

R: Yes, and to come out in the department's annual report with more of a general statement of the importance of cuing increased labor costs to productivity as a general proposition, rather than as a mathematical slide rule number.

F: And, in subsequent settlements, this just became more and more evident until it was just, in a sense, right out in the open?

R: That's quite correct.

F: You could see it?

R: Yes, indeed, you could see it.

[End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview I]

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