

INTERVIEW IV

DATE: November 10, 1982
INTERVIEWEE: JAMES H. ROWE, JR.
INTERVIEWER: MICHAEL L. GILLETTE
PLACE: Mr. Rowe's office, Washington, D.C.

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G: Now, from the memos, at least, your work on the 1968 campaign began in 1967.

R: I think so. Yes.

G: You were operating apparently under the notion that LBJ was going to run again.

R: Yes.

G: How were you brought into the campaign organization? I know you had worked in 1964.

R: I can't remember exactly how it happened. I may have been pressing Johnson, you know, saying, "Look, you'd better get rolling here." I talked with [John] Criswell, who was pretty active. Marvin [Watson] was fairly active I thought. I remember we had one or two meetings. They had dinner at the White House, and then we had a couple of meetings. I remember [Clark] Clifford was there, I was there, [Abe] Fortas was there. He shouldn't have been there, and he finally got out. He said to me one day, "I shouldn't be at these meetings," and I said, "No, you shouldn't." But evidently any political advice he had after that he gave privately to Johnson;

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[he] just disappeared out of the meetings. Who else was there? Lady Bird, Watson, [Larry] O'Brien some of the time, about just how to organize and how to get started.

G: Was there a general strategy for 1968?

R: There was never a general strategy. If there was, Johnson would change it four or five times a day. He was a very difficult man to work with in a campaign, to work for or with. We had a bad row in the 1960 campaign. He didn't speak to me for about three years, so I was not too eager to get involved again in the-- this was after he had been picked. In the 1964 campaign itself, I said, "Well, I'll work as long as I can bite off a piece of this business and run it." So I picked all the citizens' committees. Johnson didn't really know much about them until after the campaign was almost over, and then it started hitting him in the face every time he turned around. Then he started getting into my business. We just didn't work well together, as he used to say and I used to say. If I could work off and do my own stuff, I was fine. But he was a capricious fellow.

John Hayes, who ran his radio and television--I think this was in 1964--had a big meeting in Texas. John had all the radio and television [people] at a big meeting in a tent someplace. He said he drove up in the car with Johnson. Johnson saw all the television equipment and said, "I'm not going in." Hayes said, "Well, why not?" He said, "You didn't tell me this was supposed to be on television." Hayes said he had a hell of a time with him.

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The whole purpose of the meeting, of course, was to get on television. He had a terrible time getting Johnson out of the car and into the meeting. He would do that sort of thing.

There was one time in 1960 I had scheduled him the first week of the campaign, and then I quit in despair. Who was it? It wasn't Cliff Carter, maybe it was Cliff who was doing the scheduling. Johnson was supposed to go to Indiana when he was running of course for vice president. They got right down to the gun the day before and Johnson said, "I won't go." Cliff said, "Well, what can I do? You've got to go. They're all waiting for you." He said, "Well, you just call them and tell them I'm not coming. Cliff talked him into it, and then Johnson changed his mind again. Finally--the whole day he was trying to get the thing done--at the end of the day he came up to me and said, "Would you like to know how we have settled this?" I said, "Yes." He said, "He's going into this town"--I've forgotten what it was, it wasn't Gary, it was one of the big towns in Indiana--"but only on the condition that I not tell the press or the politicians." [inaudible] He was a hard fellow to work for.

G: Did his relationship with Senator [Mike] Mansfield, which had become strained by 1968, do you think that that had any influence on his ultimate decision to withdraw?

R: No. You mean to withdraw from running for the campaign?

G: Right.

R: No. No.

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G: Did you try to neutralize Mansfield?

R: I don't think so. I don't know. They were temperamentally two different men. Hubert Humphrey, one of his greatest acts when he was vice president was to imitate Johnson and Mansfield at the breakfast meetings, you know. Johnson was putting the heat on Mansfield to do something. Hubert would first get on one side of the table and imitate Johnson perfectly, and then he would run around to the other side. After Johnson would say, "Now, Mike, you've got to do this, you've got to do that," then he would imitate Mansfield, the pipe, "No." Then he'd run back and do Johnson, run back to Mansfield, Mansfield said, "No." They knew they were temperamentally entirely two different people. No, they didn't like each other much, I think is the basic answer.

G: Do you think that LBJ was not emphasizing the Democratic Party enough in 1968?

R: I don't think he understood the Democratic Party ever, which I think is because he grew up in Texas and you only had one party. If there were any fights they were within the party itself. He, in my opinion, never understood the United States in that sense. You know, he thought senators were important; they never are important in getting delegates, which I used to tell him with no effect.

Humphrey didn't understand too well. The fellow who understood it was [John] Kennedy; he understood it perfectly. Johnson never really understood how the party worked. He didn't like the bosses; he thought they were crooked, the big New York bosses or the

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northern bosses. He never really put it together how it worked, in my opinion.

G: Did this explain his failure to utilize the DNC?

R: I think so, although presidents don't do much with it. When Kennedy was president he had Kenny O'Donnell run the party. John Bailey was sort of standing around doing nothing, and Johnson never had anybody in there. I can't even remember who his chairman was of the committee. I guess it was Bailey, still Bailey, yes, yes.

G: You had urged Johnson to put in a strong chairman in the memos.

R: I did, yes.

G: How did he respond to that?

R: He listened. He just wasn't interested in the party and he didn't understand it. He understood the party in Texas. I think he understood the southern party, but you get him north of the Mason-Dixon line, and west, and he was gone.

G: Do you think he felt that he didn't control the party machinery, in other words?

R: No, I don't think he ever thought about it much. He knew it was no good and it didn't do much, didn't even get money, that sort of thing. And in a sense he was right, it fell apart.

G: Now, you also suggested that he put Larry O'Brien in charge of the campaign.

R: Yes. That's right.

G: Why didn't he do that?

R: I don't think he trusted Larry.

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G: Really?

R: He remembered where Larry came from, he was a Kennedy man. After Johnson bowed out and Bobby announced, Larry quit and went to work for Kennedy. But it was perfectly clear he would do that. But I don't think Larry would have double-crossed him. But he didn't trust any Kennedy man very far.

G: The press accounts indicate that there was a great deal of pressure on O'Brien to resign and join the Kennedy campaign.

R: Well, he did.

G: Do you recall the--?

R: No, but I wasn't surprised when he did it. I think he felt he didn't have any conflict of loyalty. Johnson had announced he wasn't going to run, so Larry went to campaign for Bobby.

G: Another theme that seems to run through a lot of your memos here is that Johnson was preoccupied with Robert Kennedy.

R: Yes, he was.

G: How did this manifest itself?

R: Well, he just didn't like him, made it perfectly clear. I can remember before he bounced everybody in 1964, I was talking to Cliff Carter about something and mentioned the possibility you know that Bobby might be the vice presidential candidate. Cliff said, "You know damn well Johnson is not going to pick him." And I said, yes, I guess I did. It was pretty clear. They really hated each other.

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G: Really? But the question about Kennedy and his plans in 1968 and Johnson's plans in 1968, do you think that Johnson was paying too much attention to him?

R: Yes. I think Johnson had an obsession about Bobby. Yes, I always did. I think he liked Jack Kennedy; he couldn't stand Bobby. And Bobby and his people were always cutting in, and Jack Kennedy's staff were always cutting at Johnson, making cracks at him. Johnson knew that.

G: Now, another theme in your memos was that Johnson needed to get moving, that he needed to put the organization together, needed to enter some primaries, you know.

R: Yes.

G: Did you make any appeals to him in person?

R: I think so, yes. I can't remember.

G: How did he respond?

R: He listened.

G: Did you have a feeling that he hadn't decided whether or not he was going to run?

R: No, never had that feeling until the night Marvin Watson called me and said he wasn't.

G: This was just before the speech?

R: Yes. Yes. No, I never had the feeling he wasn't going to run. I had the feeling he was in a lot of trouble and I wasn't sure he knew about it.

G: One of these memos, if I can find it--

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- R: Yes, I read this last night. I didn't even remember it until I read it.
- G: That memo dated--
- R: March 28, yes.
- G: --three days beforehand seems to indicate that you at least had doubts or had heard others express doubts.
- R: Yes, I did.
- G: The memo is entitled "Is the President running?"
- R: Evidently I did. I can't remember it. I never really thought he wasn't. But I must say, he didn't act like an active, driving--he didn't act the way Franklin Roosevelt would have in the same situation. But, oh, you know, I had heard all this talk he was going to quit and go home, but I'd been hearing that all my life and I just didn't believe him. I just ignored it.
- G: Now, also that March you and Teddy White met with Johnson in the Oval Office.
- R: Yes.
- G: Do you recall the substance of that meeting?
- R: Yes. Teddy wanted to see him, and he would never see Teddy. He would never see Teddy because Teddy had written some mean things in his first book about Johnson. Teddy couldn't get in. He's an old friend of mine, and I said to Johnson, "Look, the only nasty things Teddy said about anybody are you and Nixon. You two never would see him. Now Nixon sees him, and he thinks he's a great hero. You can take Teddy into camp in fifteen minutes." Johnson said,

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"Well. . . ." Finally he said, "I'll see him for you." This old business of I'm going to do this for you and then you're going to have to do something for me.

So we went down there, the White House, made a date, and we sat around for hours. And, you know, Teddy got a little impatient. It was about three hours. Later it turned out that's when [Dean] Acheson, [McGeorge] Bundy and that crowd were in telling him give up the Vietnam War. But we didn't know it.

We got in and he was writing something at his desk. He looked absolutely exhausted, tired and exhausted. He came over, we all sat down. Teddy started to ask him questions and he just grunted at him, he wouldn't answer him. I finally said, "Look, Mr. President, this fellow is writing history. I think you ought to talk with him." Johnson said, "All right." Then he got going on his own. I forgot, Teddy asked some question. He made this comparison between himself and Roosevelt, what Roosevelt had done, not Kennedy, not anybody else. How much he'd done, how much Roosevelt had done, and he said maybe he'd done almost as much as Roosevelt. It was a very interesting comparison. He talked about everything he'd done as president and so forth. It was a tired voice, sad voice, exhausted voice. Then when we left I said, "Teddy, don't pay any attention to that valedictory." It sounded like a valedictory speech, "I've had it, goodbye." I said, "I've seen him that way many times and he'll be over it in a couple of days. Don't pay any attention." A week later, he quit.

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You might take a look--I sent it to Lady Bird as a matter of fact. I've forgotten how we got on the subject. She said she never read anything about Johnson. I said there were about three or four pages in Teddy White's 1968 book about the meeting and a summary of what Johnson had said, and I said, "You ought to read it. It's quite good. I'll photostat it and send it to you," which I did. The only comment she made about it was--Johnson had said the one mistake he made was cutting taxes; he said once you cut taxes they never give it back to you. Lady Bird said that was absolutely right, he never should have cut taxes.

G: He did say that in the meeting, is that right?

R: Yes, he said that in the meeting. So she read it. I had forgotten where I saw it. That was the only thing she referred to in it. It's rather interesting, Johnson's comparison there.

G: And White's account is accurate?

R: Yes. Yes. He took notes. He sent me a copy of his notes and I remember thinking it was accurate.

G: And White did not ask him whether or not he intended to stay in the race?

R: Oh, no. No, there wasn't any talk like that. I think everybody really assumed he was going to run. But you know, we had just brought up Terry Sanford to be the front manager. The day that Johnson quit I was over at the White House with Sanford, Larry O'Brien and Marvin Watson, working on what we were going to do after Wisconsin. I thought we were going to get beaten in Wisconsin.

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We all sort of did. Therefore it would be tough and we'd better get going. So we spent the whole day talking about what we were going to do next.

G: What was the conclusion that you reached?

R: I can't remember. It died that night, whatever it was. But Terry was going to come up with a couple of--he had a couple of his young lawyers with him that were going to work in the campaign.

G: One of the memos proposes that you meet with Bobby Kennedy and in effect talk him out of the race.

R: Yes.

G: Did you ever do that?

R: No, I did not and I don't think I ever got an answer on it either. We should have done it.

G: Do you think it would have worked in retrospect?

R: It might have, you know, what do you lose?

G: Now, you also felt that something had to happen on Vietnam before the Wisconsin primary.

R: Yes. I didn't know what though. The great flaw in that suggestion was what.

G: Let me ask you about some of the party leaders, like Mayor [Richard] Daley.

R: Yes.

G: What do you think Daley would have done if Johnson had stayed in the race? Would he have supported Johnson or would he have supported--?

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R: I think he would have supported Johnson, yes.

G: Did you have anything tangible on which to base--?

R: No, except that he and Johnson had a good relationship and got along well. I don't think he liked Bobby. You know, what was his choice? [Eugene] McCarthy or Bobby. I don't think he liked either of them very much. I think he liked Teddy as against Humphrey. He would have gone for Teddy is my guess.

G: Well, he threatened to just before the convention, didn't he?

R: Did he? Well, he and Humphrey didn't get along. I remember I was out with Humphrey in Chicago after the nomination. In fact, it was toward the end of the campaign and Daley had the big rally he always had with a torchlight parade. We were all in the suite together and Humphrey, I don't know what the hell he was doing, getting a massage or taking a nap, but there was Daley and Mrs. Daley and Kenny O'Donnell and me sitting around waiting for Humphrey. He just didn't turn up. Which I thought was a little silly, because Daley was a rather touchy fellow.

G: How about [Jesse] Unruh?

R: Unruh was always for Kennedy, for some Kennedy. He was always against Johnson, yes, which we always knew.

G: Did you have any way of undercutting him in California?

R: Well, I think if we went into it we'd have to undercut him, and I think could have, somewhat. He was good though, very good.

G: Were there any overtures made toward McCarthy?

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R: None that I can remember. Maybe Walter did and maybe [John] Connally did, and maybe Johnson himself did. I certainly didn't.

G: Now, did you have any contact with Johnson after the March 31 speech, after his withdrawal?

R: On politics I think I may have seen him once or twice. The only political contact I remember is that--and I remember it well, it was Terry Sanford's idea. He had switched; he was working for Humphrey. We all were working for Humphrey. Terry said, "You know, you really ought to get the President into this campaign and we ought to get him to do a border train ride. That's where his strength was. You start in Delaware, you go through Maryland, I guess Virginia, West Virginia, down to Tennessee, Kentucky, and finally Missouri and wander down into Texas. So he said, "Why don't you and I go and talk to the President about it?" So I said, "Well, all right." So I guess I did. This is after Humphrey's Salt Lake [City] speech on Vietnam.

So we went over. I got the appointment. I sat down comfortably waiting for Terry to speak, and he just looked at me and Johnson looked at me, so I finally talked. I said, "Mr. President, this is what we think you should do." Johnson said, "Nixon is more for my foreign policy than Humphrey is." I said, "Mr. President, if you read Humphrey's speech in Salt Lake, you can't find any differences between your policy and his." And Johnson said, "I know that, but I also know about the deep backgrounder that George Ball

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gave the newspapermen the next morning. There are lots of differences." And he said, "I'm not going to do it."

I think two reasons Humphrey was beaten were, one, Johnson wouldn't do enough, and McCarthy wouldn't do enough. Johnson finally appeared in that big rally in Texas. Connally worked hard for Humphrey. A lot of people thought he was out for Nixon; he wasn't. I went down there with Humphrey, and both Connally and [Ralph] Yarborough were working hard. They went all through Texas, competing with each other, getting on the same platform. They put on a hell of a show, and Humphrey at the time was thirty points behind.

Then the last time, the meeting on, and Johnson was there, Connally wasn't for some odd reason. He was off on his ranch. I don't know whether he was sulking or he thought he had done his share. You know, he's quite an independent fellow the way he operates. Johnson turned up at the big rally. It was quite successful, and I think it's probably what carried Texas.

G: Do you think that Johnson helped Humphrey with fund raising as much as he could have?

R: No. I don't think Johnson did much of anything really. As a matter of fact, I think one of the last times I saw Johnson as president, on Christmas Day, 1968, I was home. I remember Bill and Mary Bundy were there, the Peter Strauses were there, my children were there, and all of a sudden in came Johnson in the house with the Secret Service men, sat down, started drinking my whiskey. And we had a very pleasant visit. And Bill White, he had been looking for,

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because Bill had been there and had left. Finally, when he left, I walked to the gate with him, and the last thing he said as he went out the gate, "If your friend Humphrey had followed me on Vietnam he'd be president today." I just sort of passed it by, because I know if Humphrey had followed him on Vietnam he would have got a real shellacking. He brought that up right at the moment, "If your friend Humphrey had supported me to the hilt, he'd be president today."

G: Do you think that Johnson ever regretted his withdrawal?

R: Yes, I do. I think if you give up power, you wish you had it back.

G: You were in the Humphrey campaign. Did you ever sense that Johnson was trying to get back in the campaign?

R: No. The only thing that came close to it was at the convention when Humphrey was trying to get away from the Johnson thing, Johnson policy, and Johnson sent out, I think, Hale Boggs--or, no, Hale was chairman of the committee, I guess. He sent somebody out--who was it? Charlie Murphy, I think--to keep the platform pro-Vietnam or however you'd describe it. And at one time he told me on the phone--and I think during the convention--that he could pull the plug on Humphrey. He could get Connally to go somewhere else and get the southerners to come. He never said for himself.

G: Johnson said that?

R: Yes.

G: But Connally at the convention threatened to nominate Johnson.

R: He might have, yes. I think that was Connally operating.

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G: You do?

R: Yes.

G: Humphrey made a couple of misstatements on Vietnam during the campaign. This is before the nomination, before the Salt Lake City speech. Things involving, say, Viet Cong being included in the negotiations, and then would reverse himself quickly on that.

R: Yes. Yes.

G: Was there a problem in communication between Humphrey and the White House on Vietnam?

R: I would think so. Then Humphrey was under terrific pressure, you know, to break with Johnson on Vietnam. I remember seeing somewhere, Humphrey showed me a letter from John Loeb, who was a great Johnson backer, you know, raised a lot of money for him. After Humphrey was nominated, he wrote Humphrey a letter saying "you've got to break publicly with Johnson." And then all of the people around Humphrey, or most of them, were in favor of his breaking with him, which I said to Humphrey would be terrible politics, among other things. I argued that [Averell] Harriman was then negotiating abroad. I said you can't do this to our negotiator. We had a hell of a row in Salt Lake City about it.

G: Did you?

R: Yes. I was back here and Bill Connell, who was quite a hawk, called me and said, "You'd better get out here. We're having real trouble." I flew to Salt Lake. Larry O'Brien. George Ball was supposed to be there; he didn't get there until the next day. But Larry was a

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dove. They were all putting pressure on Humphrey to break with Johnson. This went on most of the night. Connell and I on one side, O'Brien, I think Ted Van Dyk, I've forgotten who else, all on the other side pressing the break. And then that nutty doctor, Berman, was always with Humphrey, he had been pressing for a break right from the beginning. I used to tell Humphrey, "The mere fact he wants a break proves I'm right." Finally Humphrey wrote the Salt Lake speech himself after we had all gone to bed. I remember Bill Connell woke me up in the morning. I said, "What does it look like?" He said, "It's all right. We can live with it." It was all right even from Johnson's point of view. But for some odd reason which I never have understood, everybody from then on thought Humphrey was great on the Vietnam issue. Students had picketed the hell out of him I guess it was in Salt Lake, and he had been heckled in Seattle and Portland. He made this speech on television. It all disappeared, and I've never understood why. I've gone back and read the text.

G: But Johnson was not happy with the Salt Lake speech.

R: Oh, not a bit, no. No, he wasn't. And I could see why he might not be, but it was pretty close to what Johnson was in favor of. Humphrey sort of went right down the middle. Johnson didn't like it, the students did like it.

G: But you're describing a difference between the speech itself and the press backgrounder on the speech, is that right?

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- R: Yes. I didn't hear the press backgrounder and Johnson knew all about it. I didn't even know there had been one. But I think Ball said this is Humphrey's break with Johnson.
- G: During the convention there were two sources of disagreement I gather between Humphrey and the Johnson forces. One was the Vietnam plank.
- R: Yes. Which I think [David] Ginsburg had written. It was a pretty good plank but Johnson wouldn't buy it. That's when he sent Charlie Murphy--I think it was Charlie Murphy he sent out to kill it.
- G: Did Humphrey consider not going along with the administration on that plank?
- R: Oh, yes. Everybody was pushing him to do it, to break. [There were] no votes in that, Vietnam, by then.
- G: Was there a fear that he wouldn't get the nomination if he did not support the pro-administration [plank]?
- R: I think he was afraid to break with Johnson. [inaudible]. And it may have been fatal. You can't dump your president right in the middle of a campaign.
- G: The other thing was the unit rule.
- R: Yes.
- G: And this was something that was of particular interest to John Connally and the Texas delegation.
- R: Yes, I remember the fight and I can't even remember what it was about.

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G: Well, my impression is that Humphrey really didn't take a hard stand either way.

R: Yes, I think he was a little on both sides. Hubert always had it up a little on both sides, you know. I remember Connally being mad about it.

G: Did you participate in any of the discussions on this?

R: Yes. I talked to Connally occasionally and talked to Humphrey occasionally. I can't really remember what the fight was about; it's a long time ago. I think Humphrey's group had the votes on it either way. Humphrey didn't want to antagonize the southerners too much, and Connally was sort of the spokesman of the southerners.

G: Anything on the question of whether LBJ would attend that convention?

R: No, I don't think so. It was a very hostile group to Johnson. you know, he had lost the party completely by then. In fact, the only fellow who ever mentioned his name was Hubert Humphrey in his acceptance speech on the floor. Nobody ever mentioned his name. You talked about Roosevelt, Truman, but it was blank on Johnson until Humphrey mentioned it.

G: Did he show a preference for Humphrey over Nixon during the campaign?

R: Well, he went to Texas. Yes, he was a regular in that sense. Anything he said publicly was pro-Humphrey.

Oh, and then Nixon, as you probably know, kept fooling around with Anna Chennault on Johnson's Paris peace negotiations. Nixon denied it, but I think he was in it without question.

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G: Did Johnson attempt to get Nixon out of that posture?

R: I've heard he did, yes. It was one of those famous stories I've heard. You know Johnson's habit of pretending he didn't get the name right. "Hoopies." He said, "There's a fellow named Hoopies around here." He knew perfectly well his name was [Townsend] Hoopes. Or, he said, "You know that damn fellow around Kennedy, Monahan, Monahan, he's always off in a corner taking notes every time he's in a meeting with me." He meant Pat Moynihan. And the other one, when I was on this incident, he called Nixon. He said, "You've got a fellow working for you named Fink." And he put this together. Nixon said, "Mr. President, I haven't got anybody named Fink." "Yes, you have. His name is Fink." I think Nixon finally said, "Oh, you mean [Robert] Finch?" who had been a very prominent assistant. He said, "Well, if that's his name." He said, "He was in it and Anna Chennault was in it." He had the Vietnam embassy tapped, and he called me out in, I think, Peoria or some damn place when I was traveling with Humphrey. It was an open-air speech. I was in the crowd listening to Humphrey, and the Secret Service tapped me on the shoulder and said, "The President wants to talk with you." I said, "How can he want to talk with me when he's up there." This fellow said, "I said 'the President'" "Oh," I said. He said, "Come over to the hotel." The Secret Service had a room. I went over there and they said, "The President wants to talk with you. Do you want us to get out?" I said, "When the President talks to me I just listen. You can stay here if you want." Johnson

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got on the phone. He told me about Anna and fiddled around with this thing, and that therefore the negotiations, he couldn't press through on it. He said, "I'm going to work on it." As a matter of fact, he got it a few days before the election. It didn't do us any good by then. He said, "I just want Humphrey to know about it. Tell him about it, and tell him I don't think he ought to do anything about it, but that's his problem." I told Humphrey, and Humphrey didn't ever say anything about it, which he probably should have.

G: Well, you all had ties with Anna Chennault, I understand.

R: Right. Well, I said to the President, "Do you want me to get Tommy [Corcoran] to pull her off?" He said, "It's too late." I didn't ever have any ties to Anna; Tommy did, not me.

G: My impression is that he was pretty upset with Nixon about this.

R: Oh, yes, he was. He was upset with Nixon. He was upset with Anna. And he was upset with whoever the ambassador was. Anna told the ambassador--I assume what they got out of the taps was the cable the ambassador sent back to Vietnam about hold off because Nixon will give you a better deal. Johnson, he was quite mad about it. And he told me later he had given Nixon hell with this fellow Fink.

G: Anything else on the 1968 campaign?

R: I don't think so. It was an unsettling campaign. Criswell announced once that I was going to run it, and I was on the front page of the New York Times. Johnson never said a word, and I never said a word, so I knew there was something wrong with this. Criswell said,

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"You know, I thought I had an absolutely clear signal from Johnson that you were going to run it. Then he gave me hell the day it appeared in the press."

G: Is that right?

R: Yes. He couldn't--Johnson--well, one, he wouldn't let anybody else do anything, and second, he didn't ever really trust anybody, including me, that much. And he certainly didn't trust O'Brien. O'Brien was known to all the politicians, that's why I pushed him. He's a pretty good one, too. And Johnson liked him somewhat. Of that Kennedy crowd, he liked O'Brien, and Dick Maguire was always for Johnson, against Bobby. He didn't like Bobby. But the rest of them he didn't trust a bit.

G: Well, I certainly appreciate it.

[End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview IV]

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