

## INTERVIEW I

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INTERVIEWEE: TERRY SANFORD  
INTERVIEWER: JOE B. FRANTZ  
PLACE: Sid Richardson Hall, Austin, Texas

### Tape 1 of 1

F: This is an interview with former Governor Terry Sanford of North Carolina.

Governor, let's talk a little bit informally at first. How did you emerge as a politician? I know your FBI background way back there and your service record.

S: I suppose when I was in college, if not perhaps before that, I had an inclination to be interested in politics. In fact, I think that I actually thought in terms of running for political office when I was in high school, and so one step led to another and it turned out that I did manage to win a couple of offices. A great many other people, especially when I was in college, had ambitions. I one time thought that every freshman that came to Chapel Hill aspired to be governor, but most of them were lucky and they got into some other field.

F: They got educated. You've always been known by any standard as a moderate, and by southern standards as rather liberal. Did that pursue you much in your run for the flag?

S: I think that it helped a great deal. I think that we're now seeing across the South a more moderate or, in context, the more liberal governor winning. I think a great many of our people in North Carolina have made the mistake of being too cautious and too conservative in terms of what was good for the people of the state and the future

of the state. But I don't even think it was good politics. And while you don't stir up as many enemies, you don't develop as many enthusiastic friends by taking that cautious, middle-of-the-road thing, and it has just never suited my nature. I've always been a 51 percent man, and thought that if we could move as far as we could and still carry 51 percent, that that was the responsibility of leadership. And so, far from thinking it was a drag, I think that I probably would not have won had I not been standing for some positive things in the future.

F: I've been on the other end of the South here in Texas, and I've had the feeling, and I'd be interested in whether you agree, and that is that the more moderate people have just been waiting for some kind of spokesman who could articulate what they feel but what they themselves don't ever get up and do until the leadership presents itself.

S: That's true. Of course that's an interesting theory, as to whether or not the people develop the leader or the leader attracts the people, and I suppose it's some of both.

F: Where did you first get acquainted with Lyndon Johnson? Is there any moment?

S: I can't think of any great moment.

F: It's not like Saul on the road to Damascus.

S: Not like the moment on the road to Damascus at all. I managed Kerr Scott's campaign for the United States Senate. I didn't go to Washington with him in any paid capacity. I was practicing law. But I would go up there about every two weeks to sort of be sure that he was keeping in line. It fell to me to put together the political organization that helped him win, and I had already been working on it. Obviously I had ambitions to run for governor at that time, so I did go to Washington right often, not really for any professional business, not for anything, except it was close to Fayetteville and easy to get up there. So I kept in

pretty close touch. I met Lyndon during that period, and knew him fairly well. In any event, I knew him much better than I knew Jack Kennedy by 1960.

F: Did you ever consider backing him for the nomination in '60?

S: I was one of the earlier people to talk about Lyndon Johnson, but I of course didn't back him. Probably a year or so before when the question would come up, by that time Kennedy really had not emerged, Humphrey was in the running but Humphrey had an inherent weakness as far as political strength in the South is concerned. I liked him. I liked Paul Douglas, I liked Symington. And I perhaps liked somebody else--I can't remember any other candidates at the moment of that time.

F: Stevenson was still around.

S: I had about done all I could do for Stevenson. I had supported Stevenson, as everybody else had, in '52, and in '56 I was one of his co-chairmen. But I think I might have gladly gone to Harriman on a second ballot because I didn't feel Stevenson could possibly beat Eisenhower. I didn't know that Harriman could, but Harriman was coming on, with Truman's backing. I even went so far as to make a statement that if Stevenson didn't make it on the first ballot that I was going for Harriman, which offended all my Stevenson friends needlessly, especially since I was one of the comangers in North Carolina for Stevenson. But I don't think by '60 I had any faith in him at all.

I had begun to say that I thought Lyndon Johnson, who had had a remarkable record of reconciling senators with difficult opinions in the Senate in his position, might very well be able to carry this talent into the international field, and I put most of my hopes at that time on a candidate that could do something in international affairs. I wasn't too concerned--obviously the domestic affairs were important, but at that

particular time the real challenge to America, and it still is and it really hasn't been met, was who could do something about international affairs. But the more I looked at it the more I became convinced in my own mind that Mr. Johnson would not inspire the kind of enthusiastic followers that I felt a person needed. He wouldn't really have the appeal that our national leadership should have provided for the world, at least that's what I thought. If you remember, I was engaged in a primary campaign, and one of the bitterest North Carolina has ever had, certainly the second bitterest in fifty or sixty years. I was not making any statements, though when asked the question, I'd put in a good word for Johnson and sometimes put in a good word for Symington, who was very popular in the state, and sometimes I'd have a kind word for Kennedy, though I, as much as I could, stayed out of it.

I did get caught in the second primary of almost having to face the issue, but I'll leave that until later in the conversation. I never did announce for Johnson. In fact, I came all around making up my mind, as the candidacy of the several people developed, of being for Johnson. It would have been very, very easy for me to have been for Johnson. It would have helped me politically, and it would have made it a lot easier for me in the fall to have been for Johnson even if Kennedy, as he would have been, been nominated.

F: You could sense in North Carolina that Johnson in a sense was the antidote to Kennedy?

S: Oh, yes, and he was certainly the candidate of the Old Guard. And not just the Old Guard, but he was the candidate of the cautious people, even among my friends. He was the safe candidate. It was almost disloyal to the South not to be for Johnson. And of course as soon as Johnson crossed the Mississippi River he was no longer a Southerner and didn't claim to be,

but in the South he was, and of course legitimately claimed to be a Southerner. At any rate, it would have been far easier to have been for Johnson.

F: How come you to switch over?

S: I didn't really switch, because during that time I hadn't made up my mind, but I had been pointing out Johnson's capabilities. North Carolina has this vicious second primary system, as a good many states do, and so you have the runoff, usually with the extremes. In this case we had the worst racist campaign in the modern history of the State; I suppose around 1900 there were a few where the race issue was more dominant, but this was very, very vicious and had been building up. And so we had a very intense, bitter campaign in the second primary--you only have twenty-eight days--when any little issue can get blown out of proportion and can kill you.

F: You don't have time to educate or counteract.

S: So this was all race issue. Before the end of the first primary, Ramsey Potts, who was working for Symington, had called me a couple of times and I had told him I didn't have time to talk with him. Somebody had called me about Hubert Humphrey, at the moment I don't remember--maybe it was a North Carolina person that was friendly to Humphrey. I dodged seeing any of them. A man that had worked for me in Kerr Scott's campaign named Redwine came to see me a month before the first primary election, and said that he was tied in with Senator Murray of Montana, working on a committee that Murray was then chairman of, or Murray, Jr. had something to do with. Anyhow, that was his tie, though Scott had put him there. By this time Scott was dead. He said he wanted to contribute to the campaign. He said, "You know, I've got somewhere between five and ten thousand dollars that I'd like to contribute to the campaign." I knew Redwine, and I knew very

well he had a gimmick or he wouldn't have been down there with five or ten thousand dollars; considering we initially had a budget of a hundred thousand, that wasn't peanuts though. As it turned out we had to get up a great deal more than that. But he said, "No, I don't want you to do anything except what you're going to do anyhow, and that's be for Lyndon Johnson. That's all you've got to tell them, that you're for Lyndon and I'll get you this contribution." I said, "Nothing doing. In the first place, I haven't taken any money so far based on any string. I even gave back two or three hundred dollars to an old classmate of mine, a doctor who, after he pressed it in my hand, said on the way out, "I want to be on the Medical Care Commission," so I sent it back to him. I later put him on the Medical Care Commission, but I didn't take his money.

So I didn't want it simply because it had strings attached to it, and then I told him that I wasn't ready to make a choice on the presidential thing; that I thought I ought to ultimately do what was best for the country, especially in the light of what was best for North Carolina's position in the country, and somehow harmonize the two interests; that I'd just like to wait. That he knew that I was very fond of Mr. Johnson and had had some very nice things to say, I thought, about him, but that I wasn't ready to make a commitment, so I appreciated it.

Later he was to give Jack Anderson this story, who then was writing under Drew Pearson's name, and Jack Anderson made that a basis of a column on the day of the nomination in Los Angeles, and his suggestion was that the Kennedys had given me money and the evidence was that, one, every candidate needs money; and, two, I had turned down Lyndon Johnson money, so I must have taken Kennedy money.

F: That's an A plus B course in logic, isn't it?

S: You know, you read it carefully, it wasn't libelous, but it looked like it was.

F: This then naturally suggests that.

S: Drew Pearson, incidentally, retracted that in the summer, obviously before the general election, but at that particular time it hurt a little within my own delegation. In any event, I was highly honored that Drew Pearson would pick me as the prime target on the day of the nomination. I thought that was a distinct honor somehow.

Now I fed that rumor a little bit, and I think this is in response to your question about how I decided to go for Kennedy. We had a man in North Carolina named Chick Riddle--Harry Riddle--who was a superior court judge later, a lawyer in Morganton. Bobby Kennedy's wife's family owned an industrial plant in Morganton, and that was maybe his original tie to the Kennedy family, but he nominated himself as the number one campaigner for Kennedy in North Carolina. He was a good friend and has been a good friend of mine all these years, so he was calling me and saying, "Now is the time to be for Kennedy." I was saying, "Don't worry about that, we'll get to that later. I don't know where I'll be." But he was pressing me.

And then Lou Harris was a student at Chapel Hill when I was, I had known him--

F: You're talking about the pollster?

S: Yes. I'd kept in touch with him. In fact, he had done a couple of polls for me, the first time anybody in our part of the country had ever used a political poll. But I'd kept in touch with him and he was a fairly close friend of mine, and he at that time was working for Jack Kennedy. He called me in the middle of the second primary and wanted to come to see me with Bobby Kennedy. I didn't want to see him, but on the other hand Wisconsin had already come off and it was pretty obvious that Jack Kennedy

was going to be the leading candidate. And it was also apparent that the time between our second primary, which was the last Saturday in June, and the beginning of the convention, there would not be very much time. I thought we ought to touch that base. I hadn't at all made up my mind to move there, but I thought we should touch that base, so we did. I told Harris that I would see him and Bobby and they flew down in a private plane, and I took Hugh Cannon, who was then an aide in the campaign, later my director of administration, now my law partner, with me. We had dinner in a little motel on the edge of town. Bobby Kennedy was so sick that all he could do was eat a little part of a bowl of soup. I also had Bert Bennett with me, who was my campaign manager and later party chairman, and Lou Harris.

We ate and Bobby sat there, and we ate in the room simply because it was more convenient to do that. I did not want to publicize the fact that Bobby Kennedy was there for obvious reasons. It really wasn't that big a secret, but it just would throw another side issue in there. As it turned out it was a terrible mistake to see him because in the mad rush of the second primary a couple of days later, a UPI reporter whom I had considered friendly asked me--and I was the only candidate that held regular press conferences--I held two a week, one for the morning press one for the afternoon press-- so I was in better communication but that also had its dangers.

F: You're also more exposed.

S: At any rate, he asked me first, "Is it true Luther Hodges is supporting you?" Well, Luther Hodges had not supported me in the first primary; I took this as a very unfriendly question because Luther Hodges was not popular. His attorney general and his candidate had gotten something like 15 percent of the vote, which is some indication, and Dr. Lake was



attempting to say I was the candidate of the Old Guard, which was of course obviously far from the truth, but there was no question that Luther Hodges was for me. He couldn't possibly have been for a racist.

He wanted to know if I'd seen Luther Hodges during the second primary. I said no, which was a lie in a way, but technically it was not because the second primary was not until Dr. Lake called one. I saw Luther Hodges Sunday morning after Saturday night when the first election took place. I ought to have said something else, but I told that little bit of a lie which was the first lie I told in the campaign, and technically it wasn't, but actually I was misleading him and shouldn't have done it.

Then he said, "Did you see Jack Kennedy when he was in town?" We were recording these press conferences, so it turned out when we tried to play that back the whole thing was blurred, but you could hear "Jack Kennedy." I ought to have said, "Oh, you mean Bobby Kennedy, just another one of the endless stream talking about the thing and I told them 'Wait.'" But I didn't. I said, "No, I didn't see Jack Kennedy," which of course I didn't. But that was the second little shading of the truth that I did, and that was a mistake. I since that time have never done that kind of thing, I don't think.

Obviously they knew I had seen Bobby Kennedy. I was then dashing out to catch a plane to the Western part of the State. As soon as I got there, I called back and told my campaign manager, "You'd better correct that and tell them about Bobby." He said, "It's too late. They've already charged that you saw him secretly and took \$100,000," and this kind of foolishness.

So it plagued me a little bit there for four or five days. I might as well finish this part of the story, I'm not a little off of your question. So I thought, well, I might as well go ahead and see the Johnson people. They'd been pushing me to see them, and I'll see them and

announce that and this will blunt that issue a little bit, which of course it did, though it later caused Bill Cochran, who was Everett Jordan's administrative assistant, to accuse me of using him for my own ends, and it was partially true.

F: You did want to set up that pattern of the endless stream.

S: Yes, I had to more or less by that time. "And besides," I told Cochran, "why do you mind helping me?" In any event, I arranged to see them, this would have been about the middle of the third week of the four weeks of campaigning. I met in a motel room in Greensboro Bill Cochran and the person he had brought with him. I made a practice of not taking a drink during the campaign. I don't mind taking a drink every now and then, but you need to be fresh, you need to conserve all of your energy, and I found that a Coca Cola, or a Pepsi Cola since they supported me and the Coca Cola people didn't, would give you just about as much boost and I conserved my energy that way. But that night they broke out a bottle of whiskey and we sat there and drank it. Bert Bennett I think was there and Bill Cochran and this man from Johnson's office.

F: Do you remember who it was?

S: Oh, yes. He started telling me what a terrible immoral person Jack Kennedy was, how they had these orgies up there with women all around. You know, this made him more appealing, the way he talked.

F: I was going to say, where do I join!

S: How the fellow was totally incompetent, and it just would absolutely wreck the country! I was pretty much convinced really that I was going for Johnson; in view of the political scene, that it really didn't make any difference to Kennedy's success or failure, and that I would probably go for Johnson in spite of the fact that I was more and more appealed to by Kennedy as I watched it. But that pretty well turned me off. I didn't

make up my mind that night, and maybe if they'd had another half a bottle of whiskey I might have in a moment of weakness pledged to Johnson, but I managed not to pledge to him. And the person that was really putting the bad mouth on Kennedy was Bobby Baker.

F: This was a case really of overkill, wasn't it?

S: It wasn't just that. No, I think I might have pledged to Johnson if we'd talked a little bit longer that night, because I had pretty well made up my mind that this was the easy political course.

F: It would help you in North Carolina, you wouldn't lose anything.

S: If I had come out the next day and said I was for Johnson, I think that would have wiped all that business about Kennedy out, but I wasn't going to do it. I hadn't made up my mind. But the next day I casually said, "Oh, yes, I saw Mr. Johnson's people last night, Bobby Baker and Bill Cochran, and I've already seen Ramsey Potts." I tried to blunt that issue some and did, I suppose, but the issue stayed alive; especially after Drew Pearson's charge it stayed alive all during the general election. In fact, they asked Jack Kennedy about it when he was there campaigning, and he flew into a rage and denied it, which I thought was pretty effective.

There we are. Then that's all I did up until the second primary election, when I won. Then I started thinking during that ten day or so period about how I would vote.

Now I was a delegate by virtue of having been elected in my congressional district. I wouldn't have even been a delegate if I had left it to Luther Hodges to put me on the list. I might have, but I was already a delegate, and they did have a blank spot, come to think of it, on the delegate list for the Democratic nominee. So I filled that and gave mine up to a man that promised to be for Kennedy and went out there and was for Stevenson.

Anyhow, to that point I had not made up my mind, though I was beginning to lean to Kennedy on principle and to Johnson on practical politics.

F: When you went to Los Angeles, had you declared yourself?

S: I had made up my mind. I talked to about three people, I really talked to a few more. I talked to Henry Hall Wilson, who is now the president of the Chicago Board of Trade and prior to that was administrative assistant to Mr. Johnson and to Mr. Kennedy. He was my assistant campaign manager. I particularly remember my conversation with him because I was pretty tired and I was staying at a Holiday Inn in Raleigh because they had a swimming pool. I was lying out by the swimming pool. We had a downtown hotel office, and in fact I had a room downtown but I was out there to get away from it. He was sitting out there with the sun beating down on him and he had his old preacher's suit on and was sweating. I said, "Well, I don't know." He said, "You don't have any choice. With what you stand for, you've got to be for Kennedy." That was a persuasive thing, and I won't go into all the details.

I talked to Bert Bennett, who was my campaign manager and a very successful young businessman; prior to get associated with me, he was never really associated with the liberal side of the party and never associated with the Young Democrats, but has turned out now to be one of the liberalizing forces in the State. He said, "Well, history knocks seldom and when it does, you'd better open up, and history is knocking in this opportunity to associate with Kennedy."

I talked to Ben Roney, who is administrative assistant to our present Governor Scott, Governor Robert Scott, and was secretary and later administrative assistant for Governor and then Senator Kerr Scott--a very practical, Eastern politician, very sensitive to the race issue,

wanting at all times to play that down because he had seen so much of the bloody effects of it; philosophically not really in tune with me but from a practical, political, and long established friendship, he had worked under me in the Scott campaign for the Senate and had worked hard for me and had kept in tune with the East and had pretty well handled that race issue for us in the East, which we had to handle and still stay honest. So he'd done a great job and is a very practical politician. He said, "you've got to be for Johnson. You can't be for Kennedy, it'll kill you." Then he said, being the practical politician that he is, "Unless you do have some obligation to Kennedy." And I said, "Well, Ben, I do." He thought I meant I'd gotten some financial help, and I meant I had the obligation to history. So he said, "Well, that's all right." So I had Roney's crowd saying we had to be for Kennedy. I might have mislead him, I didn't really intend to but he didn't ask any more questions.

F: He took the bait.

S: I had to tell him that I by that time had made up my mind to be for Kennedy, and I simply didn't want to get him too far away from me and too upset and irritated by it.

And I talked to a few other people. I went down to Myrtle Beach for three or four days and Dick Phillips, who is the dean of the law school at Chapel Hill now, was my law partner. He came down. I told him that I had made up my mind to be for Kennedy, I thought, but I wanted to find out what he and Don McCoy, my other senior law partner, thought. Both of them were boyhood friends of mine and I relied a good deal for testing out my judgment on things. So Dick thought that we ought to be for Kennedy; Don McCoy thought I should be for Kennedy, though McCoy saw the tremendous risk in it politically more than I saw it. I thought that I could ride out anything by that time; that whatever I wanted North Carolina would go with. It finally did by a hair, but it was tough.

F: You needed that 51 percent, didn't you?

S: So while I was in South Carolina at this friend's house that had been turned over to us, and while Dick Phillips were there, I called Bobby Kennedy and told him that I had made up my mind to be for Jack, which is the first time I told him that. He said, "Terrific." That was a favorite word, and that's what he said. He called me back in a little while and said that Jack was just so delighted and thought it was terrific, and that he'd like me to second his nomination. I said, "Well, I don't know about that." I said, "Don't do me any favors. You know, this is not a plum that you're giving me." He said, "He really needs you." And I said, "All right, when I get back to Raleigh (Whenever it was, three or four days from now), I'm going to have a press conference and I'm going to say I've made up my mind to be for Kennedy."

He either then, or I believe later, called me back and said, "Please don't but wait until you get to California, because it'll have a much greater impact and we're trying to break Bob Minor and the governor of Pennsylvania--."

F: That was David Lawrence?

S: Governor Lawrence. "And one or two others. For a prominent Democrat from the South to come out for Jack would be a tremendous help at the proper time." I said, "Well, let me let you know about that." I talked to Bennett and he and I agreed that if we were going to help him, we might as well help him in the way that would help him the most. I did not at that time realize the problems that this would create for me.

I then had a press conference and said, "I'll make my announcement when I get to California," implying I'd make up my mind but not really putting it that way, at least I don't recall that I did. I was trying to look all right after I got out there. So I said, "The ticket is either

going to be Johnson and Kennedy or Kennedy and Johnson, and I'm for both of them and I'll let you know which order when I get there. Because what I want to do (and this, again, everything you say can be misinterpreted and I was beginning to learn that--I've since learned it). I said I want to go with the person that's going to put North Carolina in the best position; therefore I don't want to waste my vote. I want to vote for the person who's going to be the winner." Then it looked like I was saying that "I'm voting for the winner," which I wasn't saying at all. I was saying, "I don't want to throw my vote away on a person that's not going to win anyhow just for the sake of keeping faith with the Old South." Now I couldn't spell all of that out; that I was moving away from Johnson because I considered it a futile vote and a tip of the hat to the Old South and a wasted opportunity to join in more important things for the future of the state.

I did agree to do that. And then Don McCoy told me, "Under no circumstances should you second his nomination." He sent me word to California after we got out there. He said, "It's going to be bad enough to be for him, and you can't imagine how bad, but you'd better not second his nomination." This was after the first reaction to my first announcement in California.

I caught Bobby on the floor with all the crowds that followed him around when he walked through the convention hall and said, "Look don't do me any favors. I appreciate this high honor, but I just don't want to second his nomination. It just may very well cause us to lose the state, and I just don't want to do it. It might cause me to lose and it's just too big a burden. It looks like I'm out here trying to gain a little glory and position and that's not my purpose at all. I appreciate it, but get somebody else. "

He said, "You really don't want to do it, do you?" And I said, "I certainly don't." He came back later and he said, "I talked to Jack and he said he really needs you, he has got to have this balance and this voice, and so we really do need you."

I tried to get McCoy by phone. You simply couldn't get a connection from Los Angeles East, and so I never did talk to him. He had to read in the paper that I'd done it anyhow.

But the main trouble was, had I had a press conference in North Carolina I could have answered the questions and explained it all. You simply can't communicate from the West Coast to the North Carolina papers. I didn't realize the difficulty of that communication, and so I got badly misinterpreted. By the time I got back and the telegrams that I got would fill a suitcase condemning me for what I had done--.

F: You had sold out the party, hadn't you?

S: A traitor. I could tell by looking at the telegram, if it was addressed to Terry Sanford I wouldn't open the damned thing, I'd just throw it in a pile, and every fifteenth or twentieth would be addressed to the Honorable Terry Sanford, or something like that, so I'd open that and there would be a word of comfort in it. But most of them were very vicious. I threw away the first hundred or so, and then I decided, you know, these will be remarkable things in the future so I brought them back and put them in the collection at Chapel Hill, in the campaign collection. I take it under seal, not that it would bother me, but some of those people would now be embarrassed.

I think we've touched that pretty well.

F: Yes. In Los Angeles, did the Johnson people try to put any pressure on you to hold you in line?

S: I'm sure that they--



F: I'm sure they talked to you.

S: We must have had a meeting of the delegation in Raleigh when we elected the chairman, and though I had two-thirds or three-fourths of the votes--that is, they were my supporters and friends, and I had a precedent for not electing Hodges as chairman of the delegation--he had joined in in the Philadelphia convention of not electing the outgoing governor who was Kerr Scott. They did it to embarrass Kerr Scott, and it was the first time that the outgoing governor had not been elected chairman. So Hodges sent me word that he knew that I could beat him, but he really would appreciate it, and I thought we might as well start putting the party back together, so we elected him. At that meeting I said to Jordan and to Sam Ervin, and possibly to Hodges, I can't recall talking to him, that I thought it would be good if Jack Kennedy got about ten of our votes--we had something like thirty-six. I said ten or twelve votes. "Because I think it would help us in the future, you know he's going to win." They didn't acknowledge that.

I did have a conversation with Hodges. Hodges was with Johnson but not really for Johnson. He was for Johnson, and told me this in so many words, because he thought Johnson would knock Kennedy off; then Stevenson would come in and that he, Hodges, was a natural vice Presidential candidate with Stevenson; that he wouldn't fit Johnson at all. He wasn't the least bit interested in Johnson. Really, I think he's very callused about that thing, but that's his business.

In any event, the three of them were my chief opponents. Hodges is a very vicious man, as I've pointed out before, politically. He has got a reputation for being a great reformer and an honest businessman, and he is all of that. But he is a very vicious person in a political situation. I saw him browbeat a little insurance salesman who was half a vote for

Harriman in '56, and you would have thought he'd turned on the Christian religion, the way Hodges put the pressure on him and whipped him and ostracized him and did everything he could. He then was governor of course. And he was trying to do that to me except I was a little more accustomed to it, and furthermore I had more friends.

I went into the convention with the clear majority. I ended up with twelve of seventy-two delegates with half votes--seventy, whatever it was--because of this tremendous pressure they were putting on everybody else. My western North Carolina campaign manager even turned away from me. He didn't turn on me, but he turned to Johnson because he said, "We'll all get defeated, forever, if we go against Johnson."

Bill Brawley, who was later assistant postmaster general, was at that time working for President Johnson. He and Bill Cochran came out to Los Angeles--I reckon Bill was there anyhow. They got me up in a suite that night after the morning after I had announced this thing, and Cochran, my old friend and roommate--I said, "Why don't you just tell them? I'm not the kind of fellow that's going to change, it's just too bad. I've done this, and that's all there is to it. Don't waste any time." He said, "I told them that, but they wanted me to fly out here anyhow, and as soon as I get through talking to you I'm going back to Washington." So I got up there with Bill Cochran and Bill Brawley--is that his name? You'd better check that out, it's something like that. At any rate they talked to me two or three hours there, and finally with tears which I am sure were mock tears, Brawley sort of threw down his head and said, "You have just denied the presidency of the United States to Lyndon Johnson!" Well, I laughed, because it was just absolutely ridiculous any way you looked at it. I appreciated the compliment in a way.

So we parted and from then on the pressure came from Sam Ervin and Luther Hodges. When this Drew Pearson story came out, they really hopped on that and cut me to pieces. Here I am, the nominee of their party for governor--they ought to have been helping me.

This little incident is amusing, I suppose, but I thought I was too harsh on Luther Hodges before because he is a friend of mine and has been very helpful in later years, but he was just as mean and vicious there, and really for his own purposes I thought. Some members of the delegation moved after that article came out that they pass a resolution of censure against Drew Pearson for slandering their nominee, which would have made reasonable sense. Hodges maneuvered around and got that resolution tabled.

So I went over to the hotel and I saw Kennedy, and I told him about that. I said, "You know, if I ever recommend old Hodges for anything, I hope you'll throw me out of your office." He said, "He is a bastard, isn't he!" Later of course I went to see him to recommend him as Secretary of Commerce.

F: I was going to ask, was he your candidate for that post?

S: Oh, yes, and would not have gotten it had we not turned in some green stamps for him. You know, we clearly got that job for Hodges. It was to the benefit of the state; I said facetiously, although there's some truth to it, it got him out of my hair. It got him out of North Carolina.

F: And it was a Southern reassurance too.

S: Now I must say that he pitched in and really did help in the campaign, and, as Bert Bennett said, such as in the Lake campaign, "He always works hard to help get us out of the trouble he got us into."

Now Hodges came to me after Kennedy was nominated. He was sitting there, bitter, you know, and I was sitting there more or less relaxed and

delighted. I had seconded the nomination anyhow, and I was sitting right behind old Hodges. He was just as grim as he could be, and figuring out this thing. I didn't have a paper or pencil, I knew we had the votes, I heard them call the roll that morning in the hotel. So when it got down there and he'd won, Hodges just tore up his paper. He had really been sweating that thing out. He just didn't need to do it, it was all there before you. So within a short time, he came to me and he said, "Do you think you can put in a word with Kennedy for me for Vice President?" I said, "No, sir. I've already strongly put in a word for Lyndon Johnson; in fact, the first conversation I had with Kennedy, I talked to him about Lyndon Johnson for Vice President, how it would help the ticket, and it would help us in North Carolina and in the South. I am the chief advocate in the Kennedy circle (I don't think I was, but I was telling Hodges this) for Lyndon Johnson." Certainly I was as strong as anybody he had in there. I think it was Kennedy's own wise intuition that picked Johnson, but I did plug him from the first time. But I thought it was so typical of Hodges, that he still was grabbing for this thing, after all he had done to me and after all he had done to Kennedy. At that stage of the game I wouldn't have lifted a finger to have gotten him out of a sinkhole.

Everett Jordan of course had let Bill Cochran to talk to me, or gotten him to come, but Everett Jordan was a perfect gentleman, never did anything vicious, never put any pressure though he was for Johnson; Sam Ervin and Hodges were just the opposite. Sam Ervin to this day has never gotten over it, and he keeps telling people that I'm a liar because when I told him that we ought to have a dozen people for Kennedy, that I didn't tell him that I might be one of them. And from that day to this he has been very vicious in his comments about me, but I don't care.

And Jordan, for all of his lack of color and charisma and political charm, is basically a real gentleman. He felt this thing as strongly as they did. He was affected more. He was running for office, and it would have meant more to him to have had Johnson as a candidate for President, or even Stevenson, and Kennedy could have defeated him. But in any event, he played it properly, and that's the primary reason that I never had run for his Senate seat, when logically this would have been a path for me to pursue. It didn't mean that much to me to do something to an old friend. Though he and I had been terrible political enemies because he had turned out to be a very vicious, anti-Scott man.

F: By the time you got to Los Angeles, had you decided that Johnson could not take the nomination?

S: I decided that months ahead of time. I never thought Johnson could win after the campaign shaped up. I was throwing his name out because I thought we ought to have a Southerner for President. This has been something on my mind for thirty years or so, that it's time for the South to get back in the Union. I would like to have voted for Richard Russell earlier, but Richard Russell never had a chance because of the stance he had to take on the race issue. You know how every real leader in the South was held back. All of a sudden, really all of a sudden we'd reached a point in history where that wasn't so. Lyndon's record on the race issue was all right, partially because he wasn't from the South.

F: And his own state was enough on the edge of things that it wasn't identified in the public mind like Alabama and Georgia.

S: In any event, I never though, as it shaped up, thought that Lyndon had any chance, so the only reason I kept sidling up toward the Johnson forces was

I knew that would make my road a lot easier, but I never thought he could win. I mean, I never thought he could win the nomination.

F: Right. You then weren't surprised when Kennedy picked him to be his running mate?

S: I wasn't surprised because I'd been told. I went to one of the meetings, and I know a good many people think that they were sitting in that historic meeting when Kennedy decided to go for Johnson, but in my opinion he'd already talked to Johnson and had already decided, but he was sitting there--Soapy Williams was in there, I remember, and Fritz Hollings, the governor of South Carolina, and a number of other people but I remember those two in particular. I was sitting on the edge of the bed, the way you would in a hotel conference. I think it was Larry O'Brien who said to me, "Now, you're for Johnson, aren't you?" I said, "Sure, you know I am. I've been for him." He said, "Well, go ahead and say it." In other words, throw this thing out with a little sales job so Kennedy can nod and then the other people will come along. They were just trying to get their team convinced. Somebody was for Jackson and somebody was for-- I don't remember.

F: Symington was still a possibility.

S: But there were a lot of people there who thought they were going to be Vice President.

F: I think every governor in the United States thought he was going to be.

S: Maybe Soapy thought he was. At any rate Fritz Hollings came on around to being with me, with Johnson. Now let me again emphasize that I wasn't carried away at all with the fact that I was making any decisions. I was satisfied it had been made, though I hadn't been told. But it was just

obvious that he wouldn't have gotten this little group together for advice, I didn't think he operated that way.

F: It helped him close the deal though.

S: No, the deal was closed. He was helping ease the pain. Soapy told Hollings, "I can't be for that fellow. I've got to object to it." Then he and Hollings got in a little exchange there, and he said, "Now on one side you can't be for somebody that's this way in the race issue and go back home; I can't be for him. I'll raise a little hell down there, and that'll be all there is to it." They didn't quite say it that bluntly, but I got that out of the conversation.

So that night when everybody else was--I think it was at night--was tense, day and night blend into one another in a situation such as that. I wasn't even at the convention hall. I was eating a steak in my hotel room and totally relaxed when Williams started raising cane, knowing that it would peter out.

F: You didn't have any concern about a floor fight?

S: None. Having heard that little exchange. I knew they thought it was not too bad an idea, but they just didn't want to be put in the position of being for it. I thought at the time that Williams wasn't very astute politically in any event, because Johnson could have been made out a bigger asset by their support of him, and he was entitled to their support, and it irritated me a little. But this lack of sincerity I suppose eased those rough edges somewhat, and it was purely a political ploy on his part.

Anyhow they came out of that thing; as I recall later accounts, he had seen Mr. Johnson early in the morning. In any event, I did not think that we were making the decision but I was not surprised.

F: Did you have the feeling that Bobby really was sincerely outraged, or was also just playing a role in this?

S: I never did get that impression at the time, but I know it has been promoted since. I would think not. I would think at that stage of the game that whatever Jack thought Bobby carried out.

F: He was the faithful executive officer.

S: I don't think so at all. He might have been trying to appease the Soapy Williams, but I don't even remember anything from Bobby at that time, one way or the other. I do remember that the Stevenson people were pretty upset all the way around.

F: Did you see Johnson at all?

S: As a matter of fact I did. The day that I announced, which was a morning press conference, that I'd be for Kennedy, it really started them bouncing around the North Carolina delegation. Some of them couldn't believe it; some of them were scared to death; my friends thought I'd lost my mind, and a half a dozen of them of course were very staunch and strong supporters and were sticking in there. And then all the telegrams started flowing in, and the North Carolina delegation immediately that night decided to have a reception for Lyndon Johnson. You can be sure I was the first one there, standing right in the middle of the floor. And Lyndon came in, and he came right to me and shook hands and said, "Terry, you and I've got one thing in common, we outmarried ourselves." I thought that was about as good a thing as a man could say under those circumstances.

F: Good opener.

S: But obviously I wasn't against Johnson. It just didn't suit the time and the, history and the place, and I think my judgment, as it not always is, but certainly in that case has been justified by events.



F: Okay. You come home. You've got a real whale of a campaign of your own, and you really weren't too free to help the national ticket, were you?

S: Just the contrary. But as a matter of fact, I started not to go home. Everett Jordan was staying out there for a few days, someone was having a party for him--a couple that had been on a trip with them somewhere in South America, one of these things. So he invited us and I thought, well, let's take a break and a rest. I'd just been going constantly for six or eight months. So we stayed a day or so and went out there one night with them and lolled around and came on back in and there was the press, including a representative of the major radio voice in eastern North Carolina who, it turned out, was a staunch Catholic and thought that I'd done the greatest thing that had ever been done in the world. And that got a little good play right initially. And it didn't look bad.

The press had fairly well come around to seeing the value of Jack Kennedy as President. I don't mean they were all supporting him, but it wasn't all anti. But the people. Gosh, my own Methodist preacher, a man named Jack Page, was furious. I'd run into other little Methodist preachers--

F: If you'd been a Baptist, he'd have churched you.

S: They almost did. I had already promised to make the layman's day speech, which comes in October, and he sort of squirmed and wormed around and got me to say that I thought it would be better if I didn't make it. I didn't intend to make it, but I really did resent that he agreed with that. He ought to have said, "That doesn't make any difference," but he didn't. Had he said, "That doesn't make any difference," I wouldn't have made the speech anyhow in the middle of a hot political campaign because I never do that, but it irritated me. Later when Kennedy was assassinated he was in another church, he brought me a little book of memory that he and his parish members had signed and wanted me to deliver it to Mrs. Kennedy. I'll not even put in the record what I did with that.

I went to the western part of the state to a house I'd rented at Lake Junaluska, which is, incidentally, a Methodist retreat. I took my family up there and I took a press aide that was an old buddy of mine, Roy Wilder, just to stay with us. I found out to my surprise that my key man in that county had just turned on me violently because I was supporting a Catholic, Lorenzo Smathers, whose daughter now is a loyal Democrat working for Senator Jordan. I began to feel that this thing was totally out of hand and that the tide was running against us and almost running over us. So I broke out of that vacation and during that whole two weeks I'd run out and have meetings and make speeches, and I started campaigning--

F: Is it kind of a case of putting out brush fires around, or do you start a slow, patient, uphill--?

S: No, I just started picking up the campaign the last of August instead of waiting until after Labor Day, what I'd intended, and by the time Labor Day came I'd already covered all the West. I decided that the best way I could run a campaign was to be all-out for Kennedy; that I wasn't going to apologize for it, I wasn't going to get on the defensive, I wasn't going to ignore him; that we were connected with him and that he had to carry North Carolina. The press sometimes, columnists later said that I said that "if you can't vote for Kennedy, don't vote for me." I didn't ever say anything that dumb, but my campaign really was on that theme; that we're for Kennedy, that Kennedy's a great hope for the country, and we're for education, which I carried on my there over the spring. So we did campaign for him, and partially we looked at Lou Harris' figures. I had 65 percent of the vote against Gavin, who was the Republican nominee and a good friend and classmate of mine--still a good friend. But he was playing the issues and giving me the devil for selling out to everybody,

including Soapy Williams and the NAACP and the Kennedys and all that crowd of subversives. We campaigned, knowing we could throw away some of that 15 percent and still maybe bring Kennedy out, who was down in the 40's. It turned out that that's what happened. I got just a little less than 55 percent, Kennedy got almost 51 percent, so it worked out all right. But I did make Kennedy's campaign our campaign. When he came to the state, I traveled with him. When Lyndon came to the state, I rode the train from border to border with him.

F: You went on that courthouse tour with him?

S: With Lyndon?

F: Yes.

S: This was the LBJ Special. You see, the train came through North Carolina. No, the courthouse, I think, started in South Carolina, where he went over to Bobby Baker's little place?

F: Right.

S: In any event, we made it our campaign and never flinched a bit from supporting the Kennedy-Johnson ticket.

F: When Johnson came through, did you have a feeling that it was reassuring to the parishioners?

S: I don't think there's any question, and I've said all along that I don't think we would have carried the South, and consequently Kennedy wouldn't have carried the election, had it not been for Johnson. This is my sound judgment. I don't think there's any question about it.

F: In your visit with Johnson on that swing through North Carolina, did you get the feeling that he was satisfied with the way the campaign was going and with his role in it?

S: He was moving it on and campaigning and being enthusiastic and determined to win. I think his disenchantment, if he had any, came later. I think he was caught up in the spirit of campaigning. I do recall that later he came and for some reason I was somewhere else, but he spoke in Winston-Salem, and Bert Bennett was on the stage and Sam Ervin and Luther Hodges and maybe Jordan--anyhow, that group of early Johnson supporters. He looked around to Hodges and Ervin and maybe somebody else, and he said, "And I remember what you did for me. I'll see that my children and my grandchildren remember it." And old Bert said, "And I could feel like and they'll also remember that I didn't."

But I never caught a note of that myself on the train. I stayed with him and made the most enthusiastic speeches that--I don't mean the most enthusiastic speeches--I was the most enthusiastic of all the little crowd of Hodges and Jordan and Ervin. They all touched base. They were on there for part of the time, but I stayed on there from border to border. I wanted to let him know that I was with him. I didn't catch any feeling at all at the time that he was anything but totally for the ticket, and indeed he wasn't. It would have been stupid for him to have done anything else.

F: Did you see much of him while he was Vice President?

S: So, not a great deal. We had him down as the Jackson-Jefferson Day speaker, it must have been in '63.

F: Was that Raleigh?

S: Yes. I introduced him as the next President of the United States. Of course I was really thinking about after Kennedy's two terms, but some of my people really did chide me about that that night, my more liberal friends that didn't really think Lyndon Johnson ought to be Vice President much less President. But I introduced him as the Vice President of the United States and the next President.

F: He didn't deny it.

S: I take it that it pleased him. In any event, I had seen him several times. In fact, I was a little surprised that not long after they had taken office he invited me up there for a luncheon for the leaders of the Taiwan government; invited Margaret Rose who went down on the yacht with Mrs. Johnson while we were at this luncheon. And he invited me to one or two other things, but I didn't really think that he considered me one of his staunch friends.

Mrs. Johnson, on the other hand, was extremely cordial. Every time she would see Margaret Rose she couldn't have been nicer, and Margaret Rose became very, very fond of her, and still is, but [was] immediately. On the other hand, I never did go to the White House to a social function until after President Johnson was in office. Partially I wouldn't let them put my name on the list. It might have been that if I'd been on the list it wouldn't have gotten to me, but I didn't because I was concerned with the re-election of Kennedy, and I didn't want us to be subject to the charge that we were just playing it up for the glory and the big deal. So we just never went. I regretted it later, but I had told Margaret Rose when she said, "Why don't we ever get invited," I said, "I told Henry Wilson to see that we didn't, and we'll have plenty of time to go in his second term." I just thought it was wise.

But then we did go to the White House a half dozen or so times to social things of one kind or another after Mr. Johnson was President, but he was slow in turning to me with much warmth, and I think he was totally justified in being cool toward me. After all, here I was, a Southerner; here I was, an assured supporter by what people had told him, not what I'd told him; here I was Kerr Scott's boy, and so on, and I turned on him in a way that I'm sure was--not that I was all that important, I certainly

wasn't, but I was kind of an unlikely person to leave the cause.

F: Did the change from the Kennedy to the Johnson administrations after the assassination make any difference really in North Carolina's relations with Washington?

S: I had been really bearing down on getting the environmental health center put in North Carolina. This was a whole new concept to get the government into environmental health business. They'd done a little water pollution stuff in Cincinnati and that kind of thing, but the new concept of the environmental concern was just coming on. In fact a very extensive report was done, and I think that Paul Gross of Duke invented the term "environmental health." In any event his committee recommended that this new center be established and that it be put in Washington, or near Washington. I got on it, and said, "It's great, but it ought to be in the Research Triangle." I won't go into this because it relates to Kennedy, not Johnson, but I had pushed this thing with Kennedy, and I had an absolutely firm commitment that it would go to us.

We first maneuvered around with Oscar Ewing and got the authorization changed so it couldn't be within fifty miles of Washington written into the appropriation. It meant it had to be in the Boston area or the North Carolina Triangle, really the only two places set up to receive it in the part of the country. You already had the space thing out here--.

F: For people in the future I think we ought to identify the Triangle.

S: Well, the Research Triangle, I hope in the future will--

F: Will identify itself.

S: It's an area devoted to research, it's owned by the University of North Carolina, North Carolina State University, and Duke University. It was put together by Governor Hodges as a research park primarily, as well as a research institute within the park. There are now twenty or thirty

research establishments--Chemstrand and this Environmental Health Center of the United States. So I then wanted to get this commitment fulfilled. I did go to see Mr. Johnson two or three times for that purpose, and I did get his assurance, but I don't think he would have delivered if it had been difficult. By that time I had so many locks in other places, but I did get his assurance, I did take Sam Ervin and Everett Jordan over there one day and I got up there to go with them, I was still governor of course. They wanted us to come in the back door, and Sam Ervin said, "And President Johnson said he didn't want to hear anything about the Environmental Health Center. He said he didn't want to have to say he'd talked to us about it." I said, "Well, why are we going?" Well, we were going because Everett Jordan and Sam Ervin never had been in the President's office.

They were just as nervous as school boys. It was right amusing to me.

F: Just an old colleague they were going to go see, but this was different.

S: Anyhow, I already had the assurances, but this was clinching it. Sure enough, Sam Ervin said, "Well, Mr. President, we want (squirming around) want to talk to you about the Environmental Health Center." And Lyndon turned on him and said, "I told you I didn't want to talk about that," and lectured him there about it. And then he said in effect, "What about it?"

But anyhow we did get it. That's a long story in itself and not really related to this. I finally on the last day of office had to bluff it out of Celebrezze and did, but I don't think we'd have gotten it if I hadn't done that. I made the announcement two or three days before I went out of office to a casual question that had been planted by my press secretary to a little informal press conference at the Mansion. "Oh, yes, the decision has been made to put the Environmental Health Center in

North Carolina, and it's going to be announced within two weeks, which was literally the truth except that once I got out of office Celebrezze could ease it back into Cincinnati or somewhere else.

By nightfall Celebrezze had had to confirm that, and we had it. Furthermore, we had it while I was still in office. Luther Hodges, who was leaving as Secretary of Commerce and going to head up for a dollar year the Research Triangle Foundation, took credit a month later for getting IBM in there which obviously had been done during my administration. I never got invited even to the opening ceremonies.

So I called Henry Wilson and I said, "Now get Hodges on Celebrezze." Celebrezze called Henry back later, it all melds together now, but he called him back and said, "Well, Hodges said there wasn't any hurry in making this announcement."

But we did get it and Johnson did help us get it, and it's all I ever really wanted out of the administration. We had Henry Wilson in the White House all during my four years, and of course he stayed there some for several more years with Mr. Johnson and was totally loyal to both Presidents. But it was a big help. We didn't have to bother the President. When we wanted something at almost any other level Henry Wilson could take care of it.

F: What was his background?

S: He was a country lawyer. He went to Duke University, Duke University Law School, and the first I ever heard of him he came out for Frank Graham as a Young Democrat president just out of law school. That attracted me to him, then he became president of the Young Democrats--

F: I knew Frank Graham. I went on two or three trips with him.

S: You know, this was our great cause in my young days.



F: If I'd been a young man at North Carolina he would have been my beacon at one time.

S: Well, he was. Still is. He's still living of course, mighty feeble. In any event Henry then fell into our side of the party, I was already state president of the Young Democrats. He was elected several years later. He then went to the legislature three or four times. He was one of my early supporters and one of my close personal friends, became the assistant campaign manager and spent full time in my campaign; contributed sizeable sums--he wasn't real wealthy, but he is fairly well off; his father was. I had named a close personal friend of mine, Paul Thompson, national committeeman at the Los Angeles convention, but he just despised politics. He raised a good deal of money for me, in fact all of my money just about. One of my closest friends. But he came to me the day after the general election and said, "I want out now. I've done all I'm going to do." I said, "You have to stay as national committeeman until after the inauguration." He said, "I don't care a thing about the inauguration. I want to get out." I said, "Well, I'll think about it." He said, "I want to be out in the morning." I didn't let him. He stayed through my inauguration, but would not stay until Kennedy's. I thought this little honor of taking his folks up there and having special privileges--he didn't want any of it, just didn't like the thing, so I named Henry Wilson national committeeman.

He went up there during the inauguration. We'd been in and out to see Mr. Kennedy and to see Larry O'Brien, who was running the party more or less, and we were checking all of these things that we wanted from the Kennedy Administration, so Henry Wilson got to know O'Brien and at the inauguration he says, "O'Brien wants me to go to the White House." I never put a word in for him, had nothing to do with it, except I put him

in position. They saw his ability. But he was practicing law in Monroe, North Carolina, which is down on the South Carolina border and about as country a town as you can get.

F: Just north of Society Hills.

S: Yes.

F: We're coming about to the time when we ought to quit for your date. We have not begun to get into the federal-state relationship thing, so I'm going to have to see--

S: We really haven't gotten into my association with Mr. Johnson, which came much later.

F: But I like this.

S: And I'm sorry that I've filibustered.

F: I'm not. This is very good, because all of this is pertinent.

S: I don't know what he has had to say, and it would be very interesting twenty-five years from now for historians, but perhaps in due time when you get back around to it, I became more and more friendly. At one stage of the game a person in the White House reported to me that they recommended me to be put on the Intergovernmental Relations Committee. I'd been on it, gotten off of it because I didn't have time, and they really didn't dig into it anyhow, I was doing some other things. President Kennedy had put me on it, and I just couldn't get to it, so I resigned. Anyhow, it was kind of "Sanford sort of knows something about intergovernmental relations" and the report was that "I heard President Johnson say 'no, no, a thousand times no, I've told you not to mention Sanford's name to me again.'" But from that point on it changed considerably to the point where on the day he announced he wasn't running and I was sitting in the White House explaining his campaign and was to be his campaign manager--as I say, I never did put all that together after it was over and never will know,

but I ought to put my part of it in there just to be compared to what he and others say about it at the time. To me, it was a very interesting little episode.

F: Okay, I'll pick you up in Durham or some neutral spot or here to some time, whenever you've got the time and we can work it out. I thank you.

[End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview I]

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By TERRY SANFORD

to the

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