INTERVIEW II

DATE: September 26, 1984

INTERVIEWEE: JEAN ANDRE SAUVAGEOT

INTERVIEWER: Ted Gittinger

PLACE: Colonel Sauvageot's office, Arlington, Virginia

Tape 1 of 1

G: [Colonel] Sauvageot, how were you able to tell what kind of success you were having with the RD [Revolutionary Development] cadre when they got out in the field? Did you go out and see for yourself what kind of programs they were running, how they were performing?

S: I did do that to a considerable degree. That is, going out to the field and visiting RD cadre teams wherever they might be assigned. Of course, they would be assigned back to the provinces and the districts they came from, but, as a matter of fact, once they got back to the districts or the provinces, they were used very differently, either sometimes very well [or] sometimes very poorly by the province chiefs and/or the district chiefs that had sent them up to the National Training Center in the first place.

Of course, I wasn't the only one looking at RD cadre. Other people visited them, and, of course, Vietnamese officials visited them. Of course, General Nguyen Duc Thang, who was the head of the RD cadre at the Saigon level for much of that period of time, used to go out and look at the RD cadre teams. I did it, of course, primarily to provide feed-in to the American advisory system, that is, to the Military Assistance Command, and

specifically within that organization to the Civil Office--well, actually, before CORDS--now, I forget for a minute which it was, but it was the later--the Civil Office--let's see, the Civil Operations and Rural [Revolutionary] Development Support, CORDS, and then the--before that, the J-33 element that was concerned with pacification and development, and then there was, I think, OCO [Office of Civil Operations] after that, and later on, CORDS. But then I also used my own field trips to--the Vietnamese used them, too; the commandant was as interested as anyone else in what I saw when I went out there. So I was really feeding reports in Vietnamese to the Vietnamese, in English to the American system. I just wrote them in both languages--and the field trips.

But, anyway, we knew very well that it was a very mixed bag as far as how effective the RD cadre were. The instruction at the Training Center itself, as I think I indicated in the last interview, was greatly improved by Colonel [Nguyen] Be. First, when he came in, he was Major Be, then promoted to lieutenant colonel, and later on to full colonel. But--I know I talked extensively about how he changed the physical aspects of the training and everything, but he also--which I don't think I mentioned last time--taught them quite a sophisticated, integrated concept of hamlet defense, how to provide for hamlet security, what he called the "People's Self-Defense Force," or the In Zen Tu Ve [Nhan Dan Tu Ve?] in Vietnamese.

But Be taught them to live with the people and fight within a village and hamlet context, to get the people mobilized to provide for their own defense, and, of course, more fundamentally than that, to get them to have an economic and political stake in the community so they would want to defend it. It was a lot more than just, you know, drawing

out a perimeter like for a small unit, a defense perimeter, and being sure that people had weapons and ammunition. That, of course, is indispensable, but it's also even more fundamental to get people to want to defend their own hamlets and villages. Once they want to do it, then getting the means is relatively an easier part of the task.

But, as a practical matter, we had a lot of feedback to show that how they were actually used in the field once they got out was extremely variable. Some province chiefs, district chiefs, really did not know how to use them or weren't willing to use them in the way that they were trained to be used. So the cadre would go back after graduating and find that they were being used really as an auxiliary paramilitary force, that is, to guard bridges or to set up an outpost or just really as paramilitary people without the political and economic roles or without organizational roles in the villages or the hamlets. So it was a pretty mixed bag.

One feedback we got very much was that Colonel Be managed to inspire the students, at least inspire a significant enough percentage of the student body that when they went back to the villages and hamlets that they were going to work in, or back to the provinces and districts, and found out they were not being properly employed, they would write letters to the commandant and complain about it. I wish I could remember the numbers to give you, but Be got hundreds, and ultimately thousands, of letters from these people. They poured in every week into the training camp in great numbers, not all of them just complaining but simply letting the commandant know what they were doing, how they were being employed. But from this, he got quite a good sense of which ones were being properly used and which one were not. Unfortunately, though, the authority of the National

Training Center at Vung Tau, or even of the entire Ministry of Rural Development--Revolutionary Development as it was known in English--really didn't have the authority to correct the misuse of the cadre once they were back to their home units. They really couldn't go in and tell a province chief that they had to use the cadre differently.

So that was really the breakdown there, and I went out in the field, and I saw with my own eyes the various modes of using the cadre, and some of them were very active with the villagers and were working hand-in-glove with hamlet chiefs and village chiefs and the village councils and trying to work hard on getting the governmental system--that is, the local government system--working better, all that kind of thing. But others were just really operating, as I say, as paramilitary forces or just under-employed, not being used effectively at all. Errand boys or something. So it was a very mixed bag.

G: Well, what recourse would you have when you discovered an abuse? Was there a recourse? Could you complain to somebody?

S: That was the problem. No, the correct answer is there wasn't much of a recourse. That was part of the problem although there was--once the Ministry of Revolutionary Development became a more important part of the national plan for pacification and development, there was more follow-up, more field visits, more moral suasion used, to the extent that was effective. But, nevertheless, it never had enough authority--that is, the minister never had enough authority--and the program for pacification and development, for all of its importance, really couldn't overcome the problems of a province chief, really, who didn't want to use the cadre or didn't trust them or had a much more superficial concept of their employment. They really couldn't be steamrollered by the Ministry of Rural Development

because that gets caught up in not only the politics at the Saigon level--that is, the central government--but also in honestly differing perceptions of what was important to win the war.

G: Who appointed province chiefs?

S: I don't remember exactly.

G: I was wondering how the political leverage worked.

S: I should remember that. I should remember that, but it was the central government. I don't know if it was the president personally, but I'm sure--I bet they were all cleared by the president, but you ought to ask somebody else that.

G: Right. Right. You mentioned that Pete Dawkins and yourself--

S: Oh, co-authored--

G: --worked on a study on hamlet security. How did that come to pass?

S: Well, the way that came to pass is that Komer--after Robert Komer took over as the deputy to General Westmoreland, COMUSMACV [Commander, United States Military Command, Vietnam] for Pacification and Development--I'm not sure that was the exact title, but that is what he was doing, among other things--Komer brought Pete Dawkins back out to Vietnam. Pete had already had a tour or so in Vietnam, but he was teaching social sciences, as I recall, at West Point, and Komer brought Pete out on a summer TDY [Temporary Duty] to do a study on hamlet security. Pete Dawkins requested that I be permitted to leave the National Training Center for a few weeks to assist him in preparing this study.

G: How had he known you before?

S: I don't even recall. We had met in Vietnam and got along very well together, and I have a very high regard for Pete Dawkins. He's a very quick mind and very fast. He's a quick study and, also, a very nice person in the way that he deals with people. And so, anyway, I was just very enthusiastic about the idea of helping him, and Komer let me, although he said, "Don't spend too much time on it. Just give Pete the help that he needs, but don't spend too much time on it. Get back to the National Training Center." But, in fact, I went with Pete throughout the study, and we operated this way.

We would go up--we got to choose ourselves as to which units we wanted to visit and where, which provinces and districts and villages we wanted to visit. So we covered quite a lot of south Vietnam, central Vietnam, south Vietnam, really looked at different programs, different kind of units to get as comprehensive a cross-section as we possibly could, and sometimes we would visit a unit or program together but more often we would split. We would go to one location together, that is, to a political sub-unit together such as a district or a province, but then we would often split, and, typically, if there were American units involved in the security of the area, as there often were, then Pete would go with the American units, and I would go with the Vietnamese units that were involved. It could have been regional forces, popular forces; it could have been RD cadre or combinations thereof. Then we'd spend maybe an afternoon [or] a whole night with the American or Vietnamese units we were targeting, and then Pete and I would get back together the next morning and compare notes and write up our reports. [Inaudible]

G: What kind of criteria did you use to evaluate--?

S: Well, let me get to that criteria.

G: Okay.

S: It will come out with the development of the way we worked. Oh, we had a third person with us, too, just to keep--make the record complete. We had a very good Vietnamese analyst with us, a guy named Tran Huu Tri. Tri--

G: Better spell that for my transcript.

S: Yes. Tran is T-R-A-N. Huu is H-U-U, and Tri is T-R-I. Anyway, he was a very good analyst, and I don't remember out of which specific office he came, but he was an employee of the United States government but a South Vietnamese and added good capability for us. Now, we tried to look, as I said, at a great number of programs, and we looked at American army units, marine units; we looked at Vietnamese RD cadre units, Vietnamese regional forces, popular forces, regular battalions, as I recall, a whole cross-section.

When we got back to Saigon, we co-authored the book in the sense that Pete wrote part one, which was the overview and the conclusions and things of that sort, and I wrote part two, which was the series of field observations, trip reports, upon which the overview and the conclusions and recommendations were based, and that's the way we divided the work. Now, of course, the criteria that we used were--well, we'd look to see first of all how the people--not first of all, but I would look to see how the people themselves perceived their security, what incident rates there had been in the hamlets or villages that we were visiting, and we would look then at the security measures that were taken by the relevant forces in the area. That is, whether it was a Vietnamese unit or an American unit, looking to see what kind of way they conducted themselves at night, I mean on patrolling. Did they go out and really patrol, or did they just go out and sleep or not go out at all? What were

their methods of operating? And this was all part of the picture, and then we'd try to think of how could it have been done better.

And one of the programs that we looked at which had been a very special program and all was the combined action platoons, that is, the CAP teams--that was a special marine program whereby, I believe--and my memory gets a little fuzzy here on the--but I think it was a platoon of marines, typically, would be married up to a platoon-size element of Vietnamese popular forces, and this marine unit and the Vietnamese unit would work together to secure a village or a hamlet, and they didn't relocate or get reassigned to other areas. They stayed with those people night and day, with the people of the village and the hamlet, got to know the people; the people knew them, and they did aggressive patrolling at night.

We thought they were, as I recall, the best of the programs that we saw, in terms of providing hamlet security. But, even then, we had some critical things to say. For example, the marine officer who briefed me, briefed both of us, on how they perceived the effectiveness of the CAP teams and how they perceived the people perceived them, felt that the CAP teams were making a deeper political pointer--were deeper into the political culture of the area than fit my observation. To put it another way, I had--incidentally, the area we were talking about was up in central Vietnam around Da Nang, Quang Nam [province], up in that area.

But, anyway, I remember people telling me--and I put this in the report--that when I asked the Vietnamese people about how they perceived the CAP teams, and were the CAP teams energetic in providing the security, the people generally told me that yes, they were

very energetic in providing security. They really went out and patrolled. At night, they were out protecting the hamlet, they treated the people well, had good relations with them, and that was the good news. The bad news was, though, that they said that security would be no problem if you didn't have these teams around, that by being there, the community became a target. If they weren't there, they wouldn't be a target.

Now, unfortunately--unfortunately from the standpoint of the interests that we had--this perception of this kind of a viewpoint implied that the people could live quite happily with the VC [Viet Cong], because they weren't saying the VC wouldn't be there if the CAP teams weren't there; they were saying they could and did, I guess, live with the VC. From their own standpoint, that would be all right. Well, you know, I remember putting this kind of observation in the report in an--and I felt obligated to put that in the report since it was true and since it showed--or should show our own leadership the limitations of even a very good program. But in another way, with the--I'll say this--with the benefit of many, many, many years hindsight--not that it would have made any difference, but I almost regret putting in those truthful but very sophisticated observations that most people without a very good Vietnamese-language capability and the interviewing techniques to get that kind of information couldn't get, and I say almost regret in this sense--in this sense. The CAP teams were the best program we saw.

G: Better than RD?

S: Well, gee, I hadn't even thought of that. Isn't that--it's kind of apples and oranges. The reason I didn't--I meant the best military or paramilitary operation as opposed to the kind of

political and economic and--political and economic activities that the RD cadre were primarily engaged in--

G: Right.

S: --the military being more of a supplement, or something of that sort. But these were avowedly military programs, but they were--actually, though, now that you challenge me on that, of course, really--we're really talking about just different parts on a continuum. The RD cadre couldn't do their job without the People's Self-Defense Force concept, and the CAP teams were out there to--we don't want to use that awful phrase "win hearts and minds," but they were there to do that, as well as to provide security. So the--but you could not expect a CAP team that--now, see, you've got me. You're going to make me define this thing more clearly, and I'm glad you did that. It's good--better for both of us.

Let's take a superior CAP team and a superior RD team, so we exclude the differences that come from ineptness. All right. A crackerjack, first-rate CAP team could not hope to get into the political and--the political fabric of a hamlet or a village to the degree that a good RD team could, because the RD team was--first of all it was all Vietnamese. It isn't targeted conspicuously and primarily on the military aspect. I mean, it's everything from showing people how to raise pigs better, to--you know, the agriculture, the developmental aspects, rationalization of administration, a whole number of things.

So a good CAP team could not go as far into the political culture of a locality as could a good RD team, maybe even to the point of organizing elections in a hamlet, things of that sort, if there was a dearth of--if they didn't have that institution developed yet in the area. But then a good RD team--I know of no RD teams, even good RD teams, that

actually killed the number of VC that a good CAP team did. In other words, a good RD team isn't going to go as--isn't going to become as effective militarily as a good CAP team. After all, a platoon of United States marines and of Vietnamese Popular Forces oriented professionally on the military mission is just going--was, at least, more effective. I guess theoretically, if an RD cadre team could have organized an entire village to participate in the People's Self-Defense Force with the hundred per cent enthusiasm and discipline that they were--well, that the commandant had in his training exercises of the People's Self-Defense Force back in the training camp or that was apparently accomplished in a very few villages or hamlets on the Saigon side, or was accomplished by the communists themselves in the organization of villages and hamlets to oppose government intrusion--incidentally, those, I think were pretty--were very much Be's model. After all, he came out of the Viet Minh during his opposition to the French up until 1951.

So I really can't say that the CAP teams were better than the RD teams. I think you needed both. But I think they were doing a much better job than--operating more effectively than the United States Army, which is my parent organization, but I don't--but the army had no conquerable [comparable?] programs. Army programs varied, too, but--you know, of course, there were MECAPs [Medical Civic Action Programs], going out to distribute medicine to people, and everything like that, but those kinds of things don't have really any potential to change the political dynamics and the security--to enhance the security in the countryside fundamentally over time, because you're in and out, and it's more of a superficial operation, good will, PR sort of thing.

The CAP teams stayed, and I know Colonel [William] Corson, who is the author of the book *The Betrayal* and was at that time a lieutenant colonel in charge of the CAP team operation--I say in charge of; there might have been, and I guess, a marine senior to him, who had an overall view on it or an overall responsibility, but Colonel Corson was directly responsible for it and the most enthusiastic proponent of the CAP teams. He's the one who briefed us when we came in, and he told me after he'd read our reports and everything that he felt that the army or MACV had sent us up there to do a hatchet job on the CAP teams. He was very disappointed in the report.

Well, I told him that, first of all, nobody even told us to look at the CAP teams. We'd picked the CAP teams ourselves. Nobody said, "Go out and look at the CAP teams." And, second of all, we certainly weren't given any instructions on what to write about them, and, of course, thirdly, we were so much more critical of some of the United States Army units. Pete Dawkins reported on one where the people were supposed to be out on patrol at night and went out to ambush positions and went to sleep, and just really raked them over the coals, even though we came from the army, and we were both army officers, and we really called it like we saw it.

I guess the thing that really disappointed him, though, was that I put the kind of information in the report that I'd already explained--which, as I say, was true, was valid, and it was something that should have been understood as far as keeping us from deceiving ourselves as to how much of a permanent impact they might be making. But now, looking back, I think--you never can see the future. That was clear back in 1967, but the fact is that they were really about the best way to go that had been found. When the CAP teams killed

people in an ambush, they generally had captured as many weapons as they had bodies to account for, which means they were killing the people they were supposed to kill, not civilian non-combatants, and, unfortunately, you can't say that for a lot of the other military units in Vietnam that had all kinds of body counts but not too many weapons to go with them in many regrettable cases.

So, you know, you never have it to do over again, but I think since things turned out so poorly and everything, that I would be tempted now, if I was doing the reports over--I'd take the best thing around, even if it was half-baked or three-quarters baked, and plug it as being better than it was, which would, I guess, be bad in the sense it would be dissembling, but, in a way--or at least omitting certain things, but . . . But anyway, it didn't make any practical difference because, in fact, the CAP teams continued, but the only thing that I would want to do differently if I'd had more authority or anything would have been to not only omit any negative stuff about the CAP teams but really make a strong plug to expand the concept to a lot more of South Vietnam.

G: It sounds as though you are saying that the ideal combination would have been a good RD team and a good CAP team in the same place, conceivably, if that could have been coordinated.

S: Yes, yes. To the extent that you could get that, that would be it. Now, as I started to mention, Pete and I did have some specific recommendations, a number. We didn't want to write just a report that stated the problem [and] analyzed the situation, but we also wanted to have recommendations as to what could be done, and--I don't even have a copy of the report anymore. Originally, it was classified confidential. It was declassified some time

after that, and then, neither Pete nor I could find a copy in the bureaucracy. I don't think either of us knows where it is now.

G: Where did it go? Who were you writing for?

S: Well, it was for Komer at first, but--then Komer, once we'd briefed Komer, he was very enthusiastic about it and had us brief General [William] Westmoreland and his staff, or some of his staff, and Westmoreland liked it, and so he had us brief his deputy, General [Creighton] Abrams. Abrams liked it so much that he had me brief the Vietnamese general staff in Vietnamese--in the Vietnamese language, and that was a challenge, then, because this was only 1967, and I'd only been in country since 1964, so I had about three years, if that, even, of Vietnamese language development at that time. So it was more difficult than--I did it, but it was more difficult than it would have been a few years later. It was like any language development.

But, anyway, one of the principal recommendations that I do remember--sort of the theme of the recommendations--was to turn almost the entire Vietnamese army into a night army, because--you know, a very well-known pattern of security in the hamlets and villages was the change-over as the sun set from control of the area by the Saigon government to control by the Vietnamese communists. Exit one, enter the other. And the night and the day made the difference, so our idea was, why not--and come to think of it, whether we said so or not, part of this borrowed from the CAP teams since the CAP teams did operate very well at night.

So to that extent, I think we were saying, "Let's universalize." We weren't saying universalize the CAP concept of marrying an American platoon with a Vietnamese Popular

Force, but we were saying, "Let's take the entire ARVN [Army of the Republic of Vietnam] that's operating in the countryside and change it into a night army, become a night army." And we even got into the details of, you know, how you would get soldiers to re-adjust their lives to working mostly at night and sleeping in the day, when you would have mail call or eat. You know, all the psychological and logistical considerations of changing gears for the duration of the war. And the idea being to take the night away from the VC, render them unable to operate at night because of a ubiquitous, pervasive, effective GVN [Government of Vietnam] presence in the countryside that the people could count on seven days a week or seven nights out of the week. And, of course, the daytime would be easier to take care of even with a greatly reduced, awake, manning force. And, of course, the United States military involvement would be--as it was doing, would be able to handle big engagements, seek the enemy out in the daytime or at night, and engage them.

But that was our principal recommendation and--funny how this thing evolved. At first, Komer and Westmoreland and Abrams all seemed very enthusiastic about it, and people said that Komer was going around MACV talking about "Night army! Night army!" And then they staffed it, and then it died, and, you know, I'll never know why. I mean, I went back to the Training Center, and I didn't follow up on that anymore. Komer thought I had been out in the field too long, anyway, and needed to get back. So I did. I got back. He had been very nice to let me spend that much time with Pete Dawkins, anyway. It was very, very interesting for me. But I really don't know why it died except that when you have a formal staffing of something, people discover or see all kinds of obstacles or reasons

why something is infeasible, impractical, or whatever, or maybe the Vietnamese told them to take a flying leap. I don't know, but whatever it was, it never went anywhere.

G: Somebody said that a council of war never fights.

S: That's right. [There's] a lot of truth in that.

G: Yes. Did you observe anything that the marines were doing in the way of "county fairs," I think they were called, where they would send a big team out and secure a hostile or doubtful village?

S: I evaluated--was part of a team to evaluate one of these. It was not conducted by the marines. The one I looked at, I think was conducted by the First Division, the Big Red One, and it was called Lam Son, L-A-M S-O-N, and we reported to George Dickenson on that, on that project. This was earlier. This was maybe early 1967 or 1966 even. It was very early. But it was sort of a county fair thing--the sweeping operation, and then they came in, and they had MEDCAPs, and they screened out the able-bodied males and put them on a truck and took them someplace to be screened for--security-screening, and bring them back if they're okay. If they weren't, why they'd go on for more interrogation and all of that. Those operations were traumatic for the people.

Another thing was that--I remember that there were some Vietnamese prisoners picked up--suspects, became prisoners--picked up by the American unit, by the First Division. And I went in to look at them, watch some of the interrogation, and what I saw was just fine. It was all very humane, very scientific; they had some kind of chemical or something they put on their hands to see if they'd been holding a gun, if they'd been in contact with metal, things of that sort. The interrogators were American, but there were

Vietnamese interpreters. I was pretty satisfied with what I saw and thought it was okay. But then the next day, though, I didn't see any more interrogations, but I heard from some other Americans that after I had left and everything the interrogation got a lot less humane and that they used electric shock on people and things like that. I thought then, as I do now, that that was a mistake and that it's wrong. It's wrong morally, and it's also a mistake in trying to operate effectively in a country that's at--in which the main conflict is, in fact, a civil war between different Vietnamese, that is, between the communists and the anti-communists. Partly it's a North-South war, but it's also more fundamentally a communist-anti-communist war. Each of the Vietnamese elements has its foreign supporters. It's an old theme throughout Vietnamese history.

G: Right.

S: But I always thought it was bad enough when the Vietnamese mistreated their own people in interrogations, but I think it's even, in some ways, a bigger blunder for the foreigners because you start out as a foreigner with a couple of strikes against you, anyway--

G: Right.

S: --in psychological terms.

G: How well did you get to know William Corson? Was that your only contact with him?

S: No, I met him a couple of times after that, talked to him some--a couple of times on the phone, a couple of visits back and forth in the Washington area years ago. [I] haven't seen him for a long time now, so I can't say I know him very well, but I do like him. He's a very interesting person.

G: You've read his book, *The Betrayal*?

S: Read *The Betrayal*, right, years ago.

G: Do you recall any impressions from reading it as to its objectivity or accuracy?

S: Well, I'm not comfortable commenting now. I mean, I certainly had a lot of reactions then and could have detailed them--in some cases I could have. But I wouldn't be uncomfortable telling you my general reaction because I know if I went back over it I'd be able to substantiate it and that was that it was a polemic, in a lot of ways, that it was--but, nevertheless, in certain cases, [it] was for good reasons--it had a lot of truth in it and, in a lot of places, I'm sure he was right on and absolutely hit the nail on the head. But there are other places, I think, [where] it was overdrawn, and, really, he got very subjective in a lot of places.

G: Yes. What did--did Dawkins go back to the States after this survey?

S: Yes, he did. He went back. He had to go back to teaching at West Point.

G: This was the summer of 1967, is that right?

S: That' s right.

G: Okay. Did you see him again after this?

S: I have. I've seen him since he was over at the Pentagon before he retired from the army. He was a brigadier general. He was the deputy director for strategy, plans, and policy in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans on the Army staff, Headquarters, Department of the Army.

G: When he graduated from the academy, it was widely speculated that he was a future chief of staff of the army. Is it incorrect to say that his career was dead-ended? I mean, a brigadier--

S: I don't know. I would doubt it very much. I think he just saw another opportunity. I don't know, but he was really an excellent officer.

G: Okay. William Colby took a direct interest in RD, or CORDS.

S: Yes, he did. Very effectively.

G: I've seen pictures of him in black pajamas reviewing the cadre. Do you recall any of those instances? What--?

S: Yes, I do.

G: Someone said Colby is a populist in his approach to the war. That is, he was going to take on the VC on their own terms.

S: Well, that was exactly his psychology, his mind-set, to do that. He was a good combination of pragmatist and idealist, and I think he really did care a lot about the Vietnamese people and wanted to get them very involved in their own salvation.

G: How did this percolate down to you? What impact or radiation did you feel at the cadre center?

S: Well, it meant--it was very good because it gave us--we always had a good entree, good access to Colby because he wanted as much feedback as possible. He was very approachable. [It was] very easy to get in and tell him what the problems were. He encouraged it. He had that--very direct.

G: So you had a voice in high places through him?

S: Yes.

G: I see. What about Komer? Did he come down to see you very often? Was he as interested as Colby was?

S: I think they were both very interested. They had different personalities, but both of them backed up their people if you worked for them, and I would work for either one of them any time.

G: Were you still there when the Johnson Administration left in January of 1969?

S: Yes. Oh yes. I was there from 1964 until 1971, June 1971, non-stop, left Vietnam in June 1971, and returned to Vietnam in June 1972, and stayed until 31 March.

G: 1973?

S: Yes.

G: How would you describe the sea change that we experienced when the Nixon Administration came in? How did that impact on your organization, if I can use a Haig-ism, I think?

S: Right. Right. Well, there's--I don't remember any immediate impact because of the change of the American administration. There was something I could talk about, you know, later if you would like--

G: Sure.

S: --if we have a chance, but I'm going to have to start back to work, I'm afraid.

G: Okay. Let me cut us off here.

S: Yes, I'm afraid we have to, but--

End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview II

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(4) Copies of the transcripts and the tape recordings may be provided by the Library to researchers upon request.

(5) Copies of the transcripts and tape recordings may be deposited in or loaned to institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

Jean Andre' Sauvageot — 30 AUGUST 2007
Donor — Date

[signature] — 10-27-2007
Assistant Archivist for Presidential Libraries — Date