INTERVIEW I

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INTERVIEWEE: FRED SCHMIDT

INTERVIEWER: MICHAEL L. GILLETTE

PLACE: Mr. Schmidt's residence, Tehachapi, California

Tape 1 of 1

G: Let me just ask you to recount how you became active in Texas politics.

S: Through my work in the labor unions. If you want me to enlarge on that, why. . . .

G: Trace the history of your involvement.

S: Well, I graduated from The University of Texas in 1939; then I took a year of graduate work. At that time, of course, the war clouds were building, and I think most of us were a little confused about what line of work we wanted to go into. I was very attracted to the trade union movement, because I had a deep belief in what the CIO stood for and represented. So, leaving Austin, I went to Louisville, Kentucky. I went to work in a cotton mill there, the Louisville Textile Company, and was elected a shop steward and worked my way up to become a business representative, then an international representative for the Textile Workers Union of America, which was a CIO affiliate.

Then I was drafted and had three and a half years in the army, a good part of it in the Pacific. When I came back I settled back in Austin, Texas. I was at first for some months there the southwest regional director of the American Veterans Committee. Then I was

offered a position with the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Workers Union, another CIO affiliate. I took that for a period of, oh, I guess almost a year, and then went to work for the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union, which at that time was known as the Oil Workers International Union and became an acting director for the Oil Workers, which was then, and I presume still is, the largest membership union in Texas. So when the executive secretary of the state CIO Industrial Union Council, which was the state organization of CIO affiliates, was killed in a railroad accident, I ran for the vacancy and was elected. So for six years I was either the executive secretary of the Texas State CIO, or the secretary-treasurer, after the merger with the AFL, for the Texas AFL-CIO, during which time Jerry Holleman and I were both in office.

G: Did you have any contact with LBJ before?

S: Nothing you would really call contact. My first memory of having met him was at an American Veterans Committee meeting in Austin when he came in and talked to our group. He was then a congressman and as I recall was running for re-election at the time. That was 1946.

G: I wish you would recall the story that you told before we turned on the machine about that.

S: My sole memory of what he said at that time?

G: Yes.

S: Well, Lyndon was courting the group for support and identifying himself as best he could with the liberal stance that the American Veterans Committee was taking on a wide range of public issues at that

time, one of the foremost of which was housing for veterans, because there wasn't much housing when we got out of the army and the war was over, and on the racial questions and trade union matters. The AVC was quite pro-labor. We had a number of people on our national board, of which I was a member, from the trade union movement. So I do recall Johnson saying that he had a very close association with that young redhead from Detroit, that fiery young labor leader who, when he couldn't get a room in Washington, would sleep on his wicker couch. He then referred to him, identified him as Walter Reuther. Well, that brought down the house so he had AVC at that time.

G: Were you involved at all in the formation of the Democratic Advisory Council?

S: Oh, yes.

G: Can you recall how your work there originated?

S: Yes, I can, because the DAC was heavily dependent upon our troops for what political muscle it could muster in a lot of the parts of the state. It was quite an amalgam of people, because we usually referred to them as the loyal Democrats, and the loyal Democrats were made up of brass collar Democrats from East Texas and faithful, loyal Democrats from West Texas and some of the South Texas counties and some of the black organizations and, of course, the trade unions. But we were not too welcome guests at the table initially, and at the various caucuses that the Democratic Advisory Council held.

I can remember the showdown that we had in Waco on this. It was my feeling--and that was before the merger; I was then speaking for the CIO unions--that they wanted our money, they wanted our organization, they wanted us to put people in the field to work, but whenever there was a public meeting or a public statement, we always had to come in the back door. I thought--in fact, my statement at the time in our labor caucus was that--all right, either they're going to let us sit at the table with them, or we're not going to sit. So we pulled a little walkout at one of the Waco caucuses and went up to our rooms. Ed Ball, if you've interviewed him, I'm pretty sure recalls this incident. We stayed up there until the emissaries came and assured us that henceforth our presence--that is Jerry Holleman and my presence--would be acknowledged, openly so, and that we wouldn't be sort of second cousins or something in the organization.

G: What was Rayburn's role in this group?

S: We looked to Rayburn all the time for support, because, of all the other things that you can say about Rayburn, he was a loyal Democrat. Of course, everything I'm saying here, everything that can be said about the period has to be cast against the background of what we thought was a real traitorous thing that Allan Shivers had done in having endorsed Eisenhower, of having taken the Democratic Party and trying to deliver it to the Republican Party. Rayburn was never party to that, so our position was that we were, of course, in support of the loyal Democrats and we wanted the Democratic Party not to be

delivered again to the Republicans. So we looked kindly on Mr. Sam all the time.

The only thing that we wanted from him that I suppose he never could see fit to give is that we wanted liberal speakers to come into Texas. In fact, for years and years it was our feeling that Rayburn and Johnson kept people like Hubert Humphrey from coming down to make political speeches and to lend some encouragement to the troops. I can remember the one time that Hubert Humphrey came to Dallas, when I was working there, it was under the auspices of the Americans for Democratic Action, of which I was a member and which George Lambert then was heading. I'm rambling on your question because I can't think of any specifics. I've had dealings with Rayburn, but not in those years in any personal sense.

G: Was there at all a cleavage in the DAC between the labor representatives on the one hand and just the liberals on the other?

S: Yes, I've just described one, the Waco meeting. Because labor was a dirty word in Texas, and if you recall some of the campaign rhetoric of that time, that Price Daniel used, Martin Dies used it, Shivers certainly used it, the CIO was equated as being sort of a quasi-communist outfit that was for racial integration in the schools and that it was going to lead to mongrelization of the race. They used the whole pitch against us.

G: But I mean, you had people like J. R. Parten and Byron Skelton, people who were not associated with labor necessarily but were quite heavily involved in this.

S: Oh, yes. That organization, that and the Democrats of Texas, the DOT that followed it, was very anxious to have what funds we could put into races, and we did have funds that we could put into races, and we did take a very active part in printing campaign literature and making contributions to Yarborough and to other people whom we favored. But the main thing we had is that we had local unions scattered all over Texas. So that if you needed to muster some people to do the legwork and precinct organizing, why, in the urban areas it was mainly labor that could field those people.

H: Did you have an alternative to Allan Shivers in 1956? Was there a candidate that labor favored, in terms of someone--?

S: Well, I can say from the first time Ralph Yarborough ran for office, we in the CIO were in his camp. Now at one point there when Ralph was making one of his several races for the governorship, why, Jerry Holleman of the AFL was not for Ralph. Their hand was almost forced by it, because we in the CIO were contributing the only money Ralph was getting at that point, that I know about. And when I talk about money, I'm not talking about big money, I'm talking about buying him a ticket to Amarillo so he can go to a meeting, a bus ticket. (Laughter)

G: Now, as politics shaped up in 1956 Rayburn more or less drafted LBJ to run against Shivers, run as favorite son to attempt to take the party control away from Shivers. Did you favor Johnson's candidacy here?

S: I didn't favor it. We were between a rock and a hard place there. Our objective, our political objective, was party loyalty, to have

electors and to have a national committeeman and a committeewoman and a state executive committee we knew was not in November going to switch over to the Republicans. That was our objective. Now if the only way to get that was to make some kind of an alliance with the favorite son candidacy of Johnson, yes, we went along with that. But we saw it as a commitment of just that, as the favorite son. Jerry and I were both delegates to the 1956 Democratic Convention in Chicago and our understanding was that we were to vote for him on the first ballot. But nothing beyond that. Then of course we felt, too, that Lyndon and Rayburn broke what we understood was an agreement between us.

G: I would like for you to go into that in great detail. I guess the first thing that comes up is the convention in May, is that right? Well, actually you had the--

S: Well, you had the May convention and the September convention.

G: But even before that, the precinct conventions and county conventions had been held and that's where the Johnson candidacy defeated Shivers, is that right, for control of the party machinery?

S: Yes, it had to start with the precinct.

G: Yes. I want to ask you what role labor played in that and how you organized the precinct, how you beat Shivers, in other words, at the precinct conventions.

S: Well, from where we sat--and of course there were other efforts being made besides our own. But like in a county like Dallas, where you had no really strong liberal organization like you had in the Harris County Democrats, there the precinct workers you could almost say were

preponderantly labor representatives, active labor people. We had in the CIO from almost its inception an organization called the Political Action Committee, which is where I guess the present PAC's come from. We'd raise money through voluntary contributions targeted really for a dollar a year per member, and those were the funds we operated with. This was because of the Taft-Hartley Act, that we can't use dues money in a political race, plus the fact that Texas law is quite strict on the issue. You can't mingle the funds of the regular dues money and your political money.

So we were in a position where we could print literature, we could field people into the precincts to do that kind of door-to-door walking. That's what it amounts to, that and telephoning. That requires a great deal of organization and schooling of people, and among the people we schooled in 1956 was John Connally.

G: Is that right?

S: Oh, yes. I'm sure Ed Ball must have recounted that, because he was one of our principal instructors. The Harris County Democrats were an example to the rest of the state of what could be done through careful precinct work. Of course Frankie Randolph, Mrs. Randolph, was a big mover and shaker in that.

G: Let me ask you where labor concentrated its efforts, which counties?

S: Where we had membership. There was no other way we could.

G: Were these largely urban areas?

S: Yes, with a few exceptions. They were all urban areas actually, but I mean there were smaller towns. Like you take a town like, say, Waco

where you've got the big rubber plant there. Well, that's just a fraction of the population, but out of that plant you could get quite a few precinct workers. So you had a few other examples like that where you had maybe one big industry in a town and so the only actual political organization that was there was what was clustered around the trade union movement. You take a town like Dumas, Texas or Cactus, Texas up in the Panhandle. Well, shoot, the oil workers, you know, they could always deliver those counties, because we had the active people. Now, we couldn't deliver Potter County where Amarillo is, because we didn't have any membership there. It was negligible.

G: Did Johnson also have an organization of his own in the field during this?

S: No. If he did, I saw no evidence of it then and I have no recall of any being there. I'll tell you what Johnson's statement to me was out at the Ranch one time when we were recounting what had transpired during that convention. We were sitting around drinking bourbon. He was drinking Cutty Sark himself. His statement was: "I got on that goddamn telephone. I called a hundred people, and I broke his goddamned back," talking about Allan Shivers. Johnson's method of organization was to call key people that he knew, county judges, people that were in the local political establishment of an area, and called his chips in and saying, "I need you on this one." So his view of that whole thing was "I'm the one that broke Allan Shivers. I made one hundred telephone calls and I did it that way." Our view was that--well, we helped by being able to elect delegates from Harris

County and Orange County and down in the whole Sabine area, Galveston, Bexar County, El Paso, and to a good extent in Fort Worth, never much in Dallas.

G: Was Shivers relatively weak by this point?

S: I think he was weakened by the scandals of his administration, as I recall. What were they? The insurance scandal, the big land scandal--Bascom Giles. The lid of that was blown off by one of my townsmen, you remember, from Cuero?

G: Bob Trotti, wasn't it? No, it wasn't. What's his name?

S: No. A newspaper man on the Cuero Record. I know his name well. Well, skip that one.

G: I'll come up with it.

S: May I add a comment on that, because I think there's a historical reference that's of interest. I don't think this violates anything that might have been under oath when I was on the grand jury in Travis County. I was on the grand jury in Travis County. Bascom Giles was down at Huntsville in the penitentiary. There were three or four of us from the grand jury who went down to interview him in the hopes that maybe he would be willing to throw a little bit more light on who else might have been involved in that. I can, I think, quote him quite accurately. I recall his saying that "I feel like a man who was speeding on the highway, and there was a long string of cars and my car was the one that got stopped." And that's all he would say, and all he ever did say about that. But apparently when he got out of

the penitentiary he was well taken care of. I never heard him being in poverty after that.

G: Did you have any other evidence of who else was involved in that?

S: No. I was not close to it at all.

G: I'm trying to think of the name of the reporter.

S: Kenneth something. Ken [Towery].

G: We'll think of it.

S: Isn't that funny?

G: What about the race issue? Did Shivers use that in the campaign?

S: Oh, yes. Oh, yes. A lot of times just by innuendo, but of course you know enough about Texas politics that that was the touchy question. It's one that even Ralph Yarborough would waffle on, much to our chagrin. Let me give you a fuller reply to this, because this was not only an issue in Texas politics, it was an issue in labor politics. Now, the CIO, from its very start in the 1930s, was committed to a policy of nondiscrimination. In my view, the first civil rights movement in the South of the United States was the CIO. We held the first integrated meetings. We were the ones who were trying to take people by the hand and take them like into the State Democratic Convention. In fact, we literally did that. Our Dallas delegation, the year we won it, the Brownsville convention, we had some black delegates there and it was sort of a fearsome thing to anyone who's grown up in Texas. You know you're breaking new ground. We literally held hands and walked those blacks into that convention.

Well now, the CIO was doing this in little towns all over the state and had been doing it for a number of years. Our views on that were not shared particularly by a large number of not only our own members, you know, in the sense that CIO members weren't any different from any other Texans, they were rednecks that grew up in the same background. We were all rednecks in that sense. But some of us had sort of a sense of a commitment, an idealism, on it. I repeat what I said, that I feel that there are thousands of people not only in Texas but throughout the South, the first time in their life they ever sat down with a black man or black woman as an equal was at a union meeting, and they called each other brother and sister just like they do at church, and that was an accepted thing. It was a piece of social engineering.

So we went into the game with that kind of commitment. When I say we, I'm not saying all our members. I'm saying the leadership of the CIO. We tried very hard when we talked to candidates and screened them, those who were seeking our support. "Well, how do you stand on this?" And it was a touchy thing. Like Ralph Yarborough, you may remember his famous phrase that he was against "the forced commingling of the races." Well, nobody knew what commingling was, and they had to go to the dictionary and you couldn't tell for sure where Yarborough stood on that issue. But he was hedging. Although I think his personal belief was that--

G: Well, a lot of blacks were indignant about that statement.

S: Yes, of course.

G: I think he made it in Henderson.

S: I believe you're right, Henderson. I think you're right.

G: Did Mrs. Randolph take a position on the race question here?

S: From all I know about Frankie, she was forthright and outspoken on the question. She recognized there was no possibility for us to build a coalition in Texas unless the blacks were included. And that was my feeling.

G: Let me ask you to describe for a little bit and just tell what she was like.

S: Frankie Randolph was a--everybody knows what a gentleman is, well, she was a gentlewoman in every sense. You'd meet her, you'd go into her home, you get the feeling that here is a genteel southern lady. She talked with sort of a gravelly voice like a whiskey voice, you know, it had that kind of a--which was an asset to her because she was dealing with a diverse group of people. She could talk to labor people, I mean just ordinary working people, and they would accept her as one of their own. And she had a very keen sense of politics and an absolute commitment to "Don't give me anything about what you believe or what you say; you are what you do, not what you say. Don't tell me that you believe, for instance, in racial equality if you don't practice racial equality. Don't tell me that you're against Shivers, if you're not a precinct captain or you're not out there walking those precincts." Her belief was that we were never going to win in Texas until we got enough people walking precincts. It had to be a grassroots thing.

G: Where did she learn her politics, do you know?

S: She probably learned it just through experience. I don't think she had been particularly active before somebody tapped her to become the angel of the Texas Observer. The Texas Observer, of course, is very much a part of this picture because when Ronnie Dugger got back from Oxford, 1953 or 1954, it seems to me the first Observer came out in 1954, and it was necessary to buy up the--what do you call it?--the postal permit plus the subscription lists of two other sort of Democrat papers, they weren't really liberal papers but loyal Democrat papers that had been operating in Texas before. And the Observer started with that, a real shoestring kind of an operation. And Frankie Randolph was the principal in putting up what monies were needed for that operation to get off the ground. She then became publisher of it and Ronnie was editor.

G: Where do you think her social commitment came from?

S: That's like asking somebody "Well, why are you liberal?" I don't know how to answer that question.

G: Was there anything in her background or anything in her education or anyone that might have influenced her?

S: There must have been, but I'm not aware of it.

G: She came from a relatively well-off family, didn't she?

S: That's right, that's right. From East Texas timber money, as I recall. Her husband was never active. I think she was just drawn into it and found it fascinating. But the fact that before she ever became politically active, she made this commitment to the Texas Observer

with the understanding that Ronnie Dugger would take it on only one condition, and that was that the editor ran the paper, that the publisher was not to have one single word to say about the editorial content. "You can fire me anytime you want to, but you're never going to tell me what to print." Well, of course, Dugger being the way he is, why, he was printing the liberal view and the liberal stance on every issue that came up. Plus being a durn good investigative reporter who contributed a lot to maybe the demise of the Shivers administration.

G: Now, you won at the precinct level, which automatically I guess meant that you would win at the county level as well.

S: If you win enough of the precincts, you do, yes. I say that, I've got to backtrack, because it is common knowledge in Texas how to steal a precinct or a county convention. A precinct convention is easy to steal. There are certain legal forms you have to go through, of calling the meeting to order, and there were some of those meetings didn't last thirty seconds. In other words, you could be locked out and if you weren't there right on time, the precinct meeting may be over already. The man who had the gavel is the man who had the hammer, and the meeting could be adjourned before your troops ever got there or you got a vote or say on anything, you might be locked out entirely. So some of them ended in fisticuffs. It was a matter of elbowing your way in a lot of times.

G: Do you recall any specific examples of this?

S: Oh, yes. A number of them. I can't give you, out of my memory, the numbers of the precincts, but like for instance when I worked in Dallas. I lived out at Carrollton, Texas, a little town. Well, that was an easy one, because you know how many people came to the precinct convention? Five people. I got one CIO guy and me and my wife went, so we outnumbered them three to two. And so we had that precinct vote.

Before all this political activity started, you see, that labor got into, nobody went to precinct meetings. They were something you could do at the drugstore. The county judge could call them and in his chambers with five or six people. And then suddenly, you know, when it became a contest, why, like in the next year in Carrollton, you had maybe fifty people on one side and sixty people on the other, and it kept escalating that way. Some of those little precinct meetings you had hundreds of people turning out, and they got pretty raucous.

G: Then you had the state convention in May. I guess this was the first sign of a split between the liberals and the moderates or more conservatives.

S: A split between the liberals and conservatives? They were always split. I never knew when they weren't.

G: Well, but there had been an alliance to defeat Shivers. Is that not correct?

S: That's right. And of course every party to that alliance was looking for other allies. But as far as the conservatives, you've got to name me some names here.

G: Well, Price Daniel.

S: Price Daniel, we had nothing in common with Price Daniel, no. Later when he became governor, why, we courted him on state legislation and gained a measure of acceptance from him.

G: Now let me ask you to recall in as much detail as you can that May convention, that state convention.

S: Well, the issue there, as I recall, was the election of the national committeeman and committeewoman. At that time the old Allan Shivers state executive committee was the one to organize the convention. So it was touch and go as to whether our delegations, that in our eyes had won legally, were they going to be seated. And so there were contests on this all the way through. The fact that Mr. Rayburn and Lyndon Johnson had exerted themselves at the convention, they had their own choice of who they wanted to be national committeeman and committeewoman.

Now, our commitment was to Frankie Randolph for national committeewoman, and Lyndon was furious at that whole idea and I do rather vividly recall when he called Jerry Holleman and me up to a hotel room. He sat on one single bed in the room and we sat on the other, knees touching, and he was talking to us, pleading with us about "you've got to back off of this support." And he was talking then about a man I had never heard of before in my life, Lloyd Bentsen. He wanted, as I recall, Bentsen's wife to be the national committeewoman. Well, I didn't know who Lloyd Bentsen was, but Lyndon gave us sort of a thumbnail sketch that here's a man who's going to be a comer. He's

got all the credentials and background and he's a loyal Democrat. But Jerry and I told him that we were absolutely committed to Frankie Randolph, both personally and our own supporters in our own organization wouldn't go for anyone else. It would be unheard of. So we had a showdown fight on that, and we won it. That was the big issue. But we thought at the outset that Johnson and Rayburn both would honor our wishes on the national committeeman and committeewoman.

G: Was there some sort of agreement that one faction would select the national committeeman, Byron Skelton, and the other would select the woman, committeewoman?

S: I'm quite hazy on that. But I think that there probably--certainly was in the minds of some. We did not feel a close kinship with Byron Skelton as we did Frankie Randolph. But we were quite willing to accept him because he had a record as a loyal Democrat and was willing to--as we say--take the pledge, the pledge being that I'll support the party come November come hell or high water. So Byron Skelton was quite acceptable, as I recall, to all the labor people.

G: Why do you think LBJ didn't want Frankie Randolph as national committeewoman?

S: I think he saw her as an indication of a new kind of politics that was not only foreign to him but foreign to Texas, the idea of political organizations built up from the precinct level. Texas politics has always sort of gone by charisma, by just the hoopla of a campaign. But the idea of having party organizational political organization is something that Johnson by his own statement I think acknowledged when

he said that "all I had to do is call a hundred people and I can turn this state around." Well, that wasn't our view of how you build political strength.

G: Was there anything else between LBJ and Mrs. Randolph that might have been a source of friction?

S: If I can skip ahead for a few years, why, I can think of something that I think in retrospect must have lingered in Johnson's mind and colored a lot of his thinking of that time. This was an occasion when Jerry Holleman and myself and Andy Biemiller were in his office, and he called a secretary, said, "Bring me that file." Well, she brought in a manila file that was stacked full of Texas Observers which had been red-penciled, of remarks that the Texas Observer, people writing in had said about Lyndon Johnson.

He took great umbrage to that, and he said, "And you guys"--pointing to me and Jerry--"have been financing that operation all these years." In other words, that we were financing the Texas Observer. And gosh, that sort of shocked me because I thought everybody knew better than that. We subscribed to it, and in fact we'd take out a block subscription for our executive board members, stuff like that, but as far as ever writing a check to finance the Observer, we'd never done it. I can recall, and I think I'm accurately quoting him, that what he said on that occasion, "Here's this paper down there snapping at my ass all the time. And you guys letting him do it." He was holding us responsible for the Texas Observer.

Now back to your question. Frankie Randolph having been the financial angel of the Texas Observer, openly so, I'm sure that sort of teed him off about her, that the Observer was a thorn in his side.

G: At the eleventh hour he seemed to support the candidacy of Kathleen Voigt for committeewoman.

S: You're talking now about the May convention or what?

G: Yes.

S: You mean as a party organizer? What?

G: No, as an alternative to Frankie Randolph.

S: I have no recollection of that. No. My memory was that what he wanted was Mrs. Bentsen.

G: Well, first, yes.

S: Yes. That would have been an impossible situation, I think. That would have shattered our alliance, you see. And if he did make any overtures to Kathleen on that, I'm not aware of it. But I would not think that Kathleen would ever be drawn into anything of that kind. She would have busted up our state organization, unless Frankie herself endorsed the idea.

G: As you recall the vote itself, was any of it a question of timing, the fact that the liberals were in the hall at the time the vote was taken and perhaps some of the other factions were not?

S: My memory of it is that the convention was prolonged, and here after all these years I've got to plead a great deal of haziness about, well, did this incident happen at the May convention or did it happen at the September one. But I can't point to anything and answer your

question of any--like a parliamentary maneuver about the timing of the thing, no, I can't. So many hours in both conventions, as you know, are just spent idly visiting and chatting while the committees were working backstage, most notably the credentials committee. Well, who's going to get seated? How are these contests going to be settled?

G: Was there a deal between LBJ and the liberals with regard to replacing the State Democratic Executive Committee?

S: We wanted the State Democratic Executive Committee replaced, as I recall, at the May convention. I can't remember just how that issue resolved itself. I'm just too fuzzy in my memory on it. But I do know that was one of our goals, yes, because we felt that we would be dealt some more low blows come September if the state executive committee was left as it was.

G: Was there any sort of proposal that if LBJ and Rayburn would agree to replacing the state executive committee, that the liberal factions would let them have their national committeeman and committeewoman?

S: That, in other words, if Rayburn and Johnson would agree to replacing the state committee that they could have their choice for national committee?

G: Yes.

S: I'm really not clear on that. I think not. Everything polarized around Frankie.

G: Now, do you have any recollection of why Johnson and Rayburn didn't want to replace the Shivers committee in May? Was it a legal question?

S: There were legal questions involved I guess in all of these issues, most particularly on the legality of contested delegations voting on their own seating, things of this kind. State that question again. I'm not sure I. . . .

G: Well, I'm sorry, I was moving on to the next. . . . Do you know why LBJ and Rayburn did not replace the Shivers-controlled State Democratic Executive Committee?

S: No. I can only speculate on that, and I have no basis in fact for saying. . . . I would presume that Johnson, by his very nature and being the political animal he was, didn't want to make any more waves than he had to make, and he didn't want to antagonize any pro-Shivers people any more than he had to. But I can't point to any conversation or anything that would confirm that.

G: Now, do you think that LBJ took his favorite son candidacy seriously? Do you think he regarded himself as more than a favorite son?

S: I think he knew the odds, but--yes, I do. I think he regarded it quite seriously, and I think he aspired to being president at that point.

G: What evidence do you have of this? Are there any episodes or recollections that you have, say, at the national convention and his behavior there?

S: The vigor with which people who were really supporting his favorite son candidacy worked among our people. Now, I can recall this specifically, that most of our guys and gals went up on a special train out of Texas to the Chicago convention. For one reason or another that

train got sidetracked for a bunch of hours along the way that was never explained to us. We got into Chicago quite late after a lot of other people had been there for two or three days, and we were met down at the station by these people who knew the train was coming in right at that time, and these were the strong, gung ho Johnson people. Their hands were full of badges, and here we were getting off the train with suitcases. "If you're not wearing an 'All the Way with LBJ' badge"--and they would pin it on us without our consent and this kind of thing. That's normal campaigning, but yes, they were quite serious in trying to mount as big a demonstration as they could at the Chicago convention. And so many of our people were so half-hearted about it.

Like when it came time after the nominations were made to march around the hall, well, it's crucial, how many times do you march around? How big a show can you make? How much noise can you make? Well, so many of our people were doing it very perfunctorily. Our commitment was the first ballot. Lyndon wanted it to be more than the first ballot, and there were caucuses held and Mr. Rayburn, [who] chaired at that convention, arguing the point, "All right, we're committed until Johnson releases us." Well, we didn't see it that way; our commitment was the first ballot. And I don't know anyone in the liberal-labor coalition that we had--I can't name anyone at this time--that was for Johnson. They had their commitments to Adlai Stevenson, they were looking to other people, Estes Kefauver and others, at that convention.

G: Well, Johnson didn't release you after the first ballot, did he?

S: No, as I recall, he didn't.

G: Did you talk to him about that, or did the liberals request to be released?

S: We did in the caucus. I had no personal confrontation with him on the question. If Jerry Holleman had, that could have been, but I don't recall Jerry saying that he had.

G: What was Rayburn's position during all of this? Do you think he took the LBJ candidacy seriously?

S: No.

G: He was just doing it for LBJ?

S: I think, as you indicated in one of your questions, I think he used Johnson there to knock off Shivers, get him off his back and put him down. As a matter of fact, I recall one dramatic scene during the convention when John Connally was the spokesman of the Texas delegation, which you've got to remember now, wasn't just a liberal-labor delegation. It was Wright Patman, it was congressmen, it was just a lot of people. When the roll call was going like for Stevenson, hell, John Connally at one point was trying to get the floor when Mr. Rayburn had the gavel, and I know Rayburn saw Connally trying to get the floor, but he wouldn't give it to him. And Texas never was recorded as casting their vote for Stevenson, as I recall.

G: Why wouldn't Rayburn give it to him?

S: I think he was a little bit mad about Johnson taking it seriously. I

could be wrong about that. Or maybe he was mad at John Connally at that point.

G: There was some suggestion that perhaps since Shivers had accused Johnson of being just a fall guy for Stevenson, that Johnson held out to prove his independence from Stevenson.

S: Well, again, I would have no information on that.

G: Now there was also a good deal of caucusing about the vice presidential nomination, is that correct?

S: Yes.

G: What do you remember about that?

S: I think Johnson seriously wanted it.

G: Did he?

S: I think so.

G: Well now, he seems to have supported a variety of vice presidential candidates, [Albert] Gore and Humphrey and Kennedy.

S: Johnson did?

G: Yes. Everybody but Kefauver.

S: Well, I guess it could be argued that maybe his effort there was to try to head off Kefauver. Am I not correct that he let his own name be bantered around there as a vice presidential candidate? I know he wanted our votes on it.

G: Did he? Anything else on the national convention that you recall?

S: Nothing of any moment at all.

G: Did you yourself have a favorite for vice president?

S: Kefauver.

G: Now during this period, you and, I think, Kathleen Voigt and perhaps Jerry Holleman went out to the LBJ Ranch and met with Johnson. Do you recall that?

S: Yes. More than once.

G: Let me ask you to describe the--

S: There was a fourth person there, too, Al Peery. Al Peery drove Kathleen up. The meeting was at night, and they drove up from San Antonio on those back roads out of San Antonio. Jerry and I drove down together out of Austin, and we met there.

G: What do you remember about that? What was the purpose of the meeting?

S: Well, Johnson had an interesting way of calling you into a meeting. You didn't know whether it was going to be a social occasion or a scolding or just get worked over with the treatment or what. On many occasions later, why, we would go out there and do nothing but drive around the place and look at the deer and go over to--what was that adjoining place?--Scharnhorst I believe it was, and drink whiskey and watch the TV news out of the Austin station, his station.

But on that particular occasion, when Kathleen and Al Peery were there, I can't give you the particulars out of my memory of what were the issues, but it seems to me it centered on this whole business of what stance we were going to take at the state convention and at the national convention. We were drinking. The meeting went quite late. The only other person that came into the room, if I remember her name right, was Mary Margaret Rather, was it?

G: Well, there were two. Mary Rather and Mary Margaret Wiley, I guess.

S: It must have been Mary Rather then. She's the only other one that came in. But we sat in that front room around the fireplace. He was on that lounge and did most of the talking. If I'm not badly mistaken, that was the occasion on which he said, "I picked up that telephone and I made a hundred phone calls and I broke his back." I'm clear enough about that to say that's an accurate quote of what the President said, what Johnson said.

G: How would you describe his relationship with Shivers during this period, particularly after the state convention?

S: I have no knowledge of that. All I would have would be what would be on the public record. We never had any real association with Shivers to where we had any information from that camp. Interestingly enough, when we first merged the AFL-CIO, we had offices in the Veterans Building there in Austin, and Shivers was on the floor below us. The only conversation that I recall out of that was that Jerry told Shivers one day, "Okay, let's make a deal. We won't 'bug' your office, you won't 'bug' ours." Shivers at that time was an officer in a pipeline company or some kind of oil company, and they had the office below us.

G: Now, of course, you had the fall convention, the governor's convention, also. Let me ask you to recall that in as much detail--

S: Well, the issue there was whether the delegations elected from the county were going to be seated, and we had some hot contests like, as I recall, the El Paso delegation, the Harris County delegation, and a few smaller counties in West Texas. I'm not clear about Tarrant

County, whether that was contested or not. But we were holding our breath on that one, and there was the same old atmosphere, that they were going to steal us blind unless we get big numbers there and unless we make a lot of noise and unless we act like we mean business. So we got the biggest crowd out we could to try to emphasize that point.

G: The liberals had a lot of representatives in the galleries, I understand at that convention.

S: Yes. And before we started taping you mentioned Bob Oliver. As I recall he was walking the gallery back there in that convention.

Another issue there, incidentally, if I might interject it, was little things about what hotel were you going to be assigned to, you know, where could you even get a room in Fort Worth. Some of our people as I recall had to stay in Dallas because they couldn't get a room. We felt that there were forces moving behind the scene that were blocking us out there.

G: The conservatives controlled the hotel rooms in that.

S: That was our view of it. Now, we had no evidence of that.

G: Well now, it seems that the El Paso delegation of, say, Woodrow Bean was seated and then unseated. Do you recall that?

S: No, if you hadn't mentioned it I wouldn't recall it. I have a vague memory of something like that, but I can't say I recall that, no.

G: How about the Harris County delegation? Do you recall what happened to them?

S: It seems to me the Harris County delegation was sort of locked out of the thing, wasn't it? I know it was hard as heck to get into the hall.

I remember one other incident, if we can go back to the May convention. One of the interesting things that happened at the May convention was the appearance of about a hundred and fifty or so tickets all for the same seat that someone had printed up overnight and got into the convention hall with. Now, these were delegates from Travis County that were locked out of the convention, but they got a ticket because one delegate turned over his ticket for reproduction and it was duplicated--I say a hundred and fifty, it may have been more. But suddenly we had a crowd in there for the Travis County caucus that came as a surprise to some of the people in Travis County.

G: Did this group reflect one philosophy as opposed to another? Were they Johnson people?

S: The people with the multiple tickets?

G: Yes.

S: They were liberal-labor people.

G: Were they? Okay. Well now, did the Harris County convention also lead a rump group after they were voted out?

S: I'm quite hazy on that, but I think they did. And that was traditional, too. Anytime you lost a convention, you held a rump convention. That predates 1956. One of my early memories was Maury Maverick, Sr. when he was appealing to the national credentials committee at the national convention in 1952. He was protesting the fact

that the legal delegations, as he saw it, from Texas was not being seated. I recall seeing him on television making his presentation. So that was in the tradition of Texas politics of that era, that if you could hammer down your opposition or lock them out, well, that was fair play. If that happened to you, then you went and held a rump convention and appealed to the next higher authority, which would either be the state convention, in this case, or the national convention.

G: Did you feel that Johnson and Rayburn had broken any agreement that they'd had with labor?

S: I did on Mrs. Randolph, yes. Oh, you're talking about the September convention? Yes, I understand he was. I thought it was a damn outrage that there was a contest on delegations like El Paso. I mean, that was just muscling a legal delegation aside. That was my view of it.

G: Did the liberals talk with LBJ and Rayburn about this and attempt to work out any agreement?

S: Oh, I'm sure we did. I can't recall particulars on it though, the sequence. For one thing, at that point, you see, our principal spokesman was not me or Jerry or anyone like that. As far as the coalition was concerned it was Frankie Randolph. Everything came to a point with her. Now, I'm sure she had her conversations, must have, with Johnson and Rayburn on this.

G: Do you think that Johnson feared that if they allowed the liberals to

have too much power Ralph Yarborough might gain control of the machinery?

S: Yes. I don't think Lyndon wasted any love on Ralph Yarborough. Ralph had been too critical of some of the political--not so much on issues probably, but on just the political stance that Johnson had taken in party loyalty things.

G: What did Johnson do that fall to help the national ticket, the Stevenson-Kefauver ticket in Texas?

S: My recollection is that he campaigned rather well for Adlai Stevenson. I can't put an adjective there and say was it vigorous or not vigorous. But he made public appearances, and to his credit, he did take an early stand that he was going to stick with the party and he only wanted to support people who would stick with the party.

G: Did Johnson, to your knowledge, do anything to ensure that Price Daniel would also support the ticket?

S: Yes, I think he tried to extract a commitment from him, and if I remember rightly he got sort of a half-assed commitment out of Daniel.

G: Now, evidently after the September convention there was a good deal of bitterness between the Johnson forces and the liberal-labor forces. Did Johnson make any attempt to mitigate some of the ill feeling and get the labor-liberal group back into his circle? Did he approach you, for example, or Jerry Holleman?

S: The approach, initially to me--this was before the merger--let me clarify here that the AFL-CIO merged in 1955 on the national level. It took us two years to negotiate a merger in Texas--came through George

Reedy. He was the first one who approached me where I had--in other words, I wanted to get something to Johnson. The only way I could do it--I couldn't pick up the phone and get Johnson to talk to me, but I could get something to George Reedy and George Reedy would carry it to him. Reedy and I became quite friendly over the years, particularly during our stints in Washington. A good man, much humiliated by Johnson.

G: Would it be fair to say that the labor people reached a rapprochement with Johnson more quickly than the other liberal groups, like the Observer group?

S: I think that's a fair statement for this reason, a pragmatic reason: In all the whirlpool of Texas politics, we had other objectives that we had to serve our membership on, and that was on legislative issues. And so it was customary for us to make frequent trips to Washington. We always were able to get an audience with Lyndon Johnson, and he always would meet us friendly, and I'm talking not just about sitting down in his office.

As an example, once a year we would take a large delegation of Texas labor people up from various unions, and we would hold our own conference on legislative issues so that they could go back and inform their membership about them. But while they were in Washington they were to lobby their congressmen. And of course then we would make our stop with Johnson. Then in the evening, where we would have a dinner or something, Johnson always showed up. A number of the congressmen did, but Johnson was always there. And he would wade right

into the crowd. I recall some times, like for instance where we'd have a group of blacks there, black trade union leaders. Johnson would zero in on them and he would tell them stories about how they handled race relations back in Johnson City. He got one story about a guy was beating another man's head on the ground, which you've probably heard a hundred times. So it was that kind of thing. Johnson was very much aware of--let me restate that--I think he was very desirous of a rapprochement.

The kind of banter that we had, the only time that I can recall him actually threatening us on something in a political sense--and here again I believe this is a pretty accurate quote of it. We had about ten or twelve of us that were around his desk in his office. He said, "Let me tell you something. One of these days you're going to be going down the road feeling fine, and there's going to be a big tree in the middle of that road. You're going to wonder who put that tree there." And then he reminded us, he said, "About a year or so ago you wanted those amendments in Taft-Hartley, and you wanted that bill off the floor when you saw you couldn't get them, so I went down there and I picked that bill up in my two hands and I took it off that floor! Now you guys, I don't get the support I want from you." That's when he recounted, "That tree is going to be in that road one of these days. You're going to wonder who put it there." I took that as a direct threat.

But yes, we dealt with him on legislative matters and we wanted

rapprochement on it. We wanted his influence and anything he could give us.

G: Did he try to get you to do missionary work with other elements of, say, the DOT?

S: I told you about the Texas Observer thing. He wanted us to get the Texas Observer off his back and Ronnie Dugger in particular. I can't name names here because I just don't have any memory of it, of where he said would you go talk to so-and-so about this or that, no.

G: Did you ever have an opportunity to observe him as majority leader and particularly advancing legislation that you were interested in?

S: Well, my observation would be through newspaper accounts and how he voted, how he delivered. Of course, you know Johnson's what I might refer to as his labor record was an on-again, off-again kind of thing. He voted for Taft-Hartley, and some of the labor guys never forgave him for that. When we got into the Landrum-Griffin fight, why, I can't think of anything that comes out real clear cut of where he stood for and against. But we had other issues all the time on wage and hour legislation, the Fair Labor Standards Act, things of this kind, the Bacon-Davis Act. There were always efforts being made from both the left and the right to seek amendments.

I think when labor had some I'll say both power and respectability, then he was for labor. When we didn't have it, he wasn't. And that's why in my mind it was so crucial that we gain something of a better name in Texas. Labor, as I said earlier, was a dirty word, and I didn't see that we were ever going to gain acceptance unless we

insisted on it from our own allies, who wanted our money and wanted our support, but they didn't want us on the committee, you know. That would make a target, and we were a target because of our outspoken belief on a lot of things like the race issue. Me, in particular, because the AFL historically never had any such commitment. Johnson told me very plainly one time in Washington, he said, "You remind me so much of a man who used to work for Harry Hopkins. You're the kind that you stand over there on the side and you keep your mouth shut, but you're always thinking." In other words, like I wouldn't lay my cards on the table. I don't think Johnson was fond of me at all.

G: Really?

S: Never. He thought of me--I'm guessing at this because he never said it--I think he sort of saw me as maybe an egghead idealist, who had goals that you just didn't wrap up, because he voted for the wage and hour bill. No. To me every issue stood on its own. And as I say, labor was not of one mind on a lot of these things after the 1954 Supreme Court decision on schooling. You recall there were ten bills that were introduced in the Texas legislature to tighten up all the Jim Crow laws, the anti-NAACP law. Well, there were only two people in the state of Texas that appeared before the committee to testify against those laws. One was Kelly Barnett from the Episcopal Seminary, and the other was me. I'll tell you, I was a little bit shaky on the thing because then my own membership, that next day when that came out in the paper I was getting calls about "we're going to dump your ass,"

from unions that had always supported me, like the CWA, which was the second biggest union in Texas.

But I remember those calls I got about "who authorized you to do that?" Because the fever was so strong on the race question in Texas. In other words, "You stick to labor matters. Don't be putting CIO out there as being for all this pro-racial legislation." So that became an issue. I left the Texas labor movement at the time that we had the big Galveston convention in 1960. Not that the issue was fought on that, but I lost a lot of allegiance from people that I previously had had support from.

G: The interposition proposal came up in 1956 also, sponsored by the Shivers people.

S: Yes, that was an issue at the convention as I recall, wasn't it?

G: Well, do you think Johnson understood organized labor in Texas?

S: No, I don't. In the first place, as I indicated earlier, labor was no big monolith of one mind. We had to educate our own members, sometimes drag them along, and do a lot of engineering there. Some of it was populist, some of it wasn't. But the thing that I think is interesting about this period, if I can go back a few more years, is that in previous years the two branches of labor weren't even on the same side of the same gubernatorial candidate. I remember when the AFL endorsed Coke Stevenson. Well, to us that was a damn outrage. So yes, you had all these local union and central trade body officials, this was a whole new ball game we were playing now where, all right, labor is going to speak with one voice.

G: Did LBJ ever get national representatives of labor to put pressure on state labor organizations to get behind him?

S: Yes, I think he did, I think he did.

G: Can you recall any examples of where--?

S: Before the merger, I would identify Bob Oliver, who was very close to Johnson. Johnson would call on him as though, "All right, if I need something done in Texas labor, Bob, you take care of this." Bob was a feisty kind of a guy. I recall one incident--I wasn't there at the time it happened, but to illustrate the closeness of their association--He and Johnson were walking somewhere up on Capitol Hill when a photographer came out and took a picture of Oliver and Johnson together. Bob went over and seized the camera and took the film out of the camera and threw it to the floor, you know. So that little vignette there I'd say suggests that, well, Oliver was willing to serve Johnson in anything that he wanted done. He didn't register shit with me.

G: Let me ask you about your contact with Johnson in the 1960s. You mentioned that you went to Washington to work for Gonzalez.

S: All right. Yes. And interestingly enough, I did not support Henry Gonzalez when he ran for the Senate that time. Labor had endorsed Maury Maverick, Jr. The ticket was split all over the place, but Maury did get a few more votes than Henry Gonzalez. Now, ideologically I was very much for Henry. Referring again to the legislative battle zone on the race thing, Henry was the one, you remember, who led the filibuster in the state senate against those segregation

bills. I stayed up all night in the gallery, all during the filibuster, and I was feeding him material so he could keep reading [Thomas Babington] Macaulay or whatever else he needed to read, you know, to stay on his feet. So I had a very great fondness for Henry Gonzalez. He took some umbrage about the fact that we endorsed Maverick and both of them appeared before our committee on political education seeking the endorsement.

Incidentally, that was the first year, too, that we made an appearance at the Republican convention to state our platform and to seek their support. John Tower was head of the resolutions committee that time and was very gracious to us and recognized it as a forward-looking thing to do, that the Republicans ought to listen to labor, too, and that they should seek what votes they could from labor. I've talked so much I've lost the gist of your question again.

G: We're talking about your insights of Johnson while he was vice president. First, let me ask you, did you work in the 1960 campaign at all?

S: No. The arrangement that was made on the 1960 campaign was that Jerry would in effect just really take physical absence from the state AFL-CIO office. I believe it was over at the Littlefield Building where the state headquarters was set up, or labor's branch of it and Jerry managed that. I was secretary-treasurer of the state organization, so I stayed back and ran the store while Jerry devoted practically all his time to the Kennedy campaign.

Then after Kennedy won the campaign, I do recall this and I still have a copy of the letter. I wrote to Johnson a rather lengthy letter laying out what I thought was a damn good argument for why Jerry Holleman ought to be secretary of labor. At that point nobody had offered Jerry's name. I think I can also take credit for having first got Jerry's name plopped into print as a likely one being considered. John Herling, who was a national columnist, came into Austin and I had known Herling's wife, Mary Fox, some years before, back from the thirties as a matter of fact, when I worked in New York City on a settlement house project. I told Herling, "Didn't you know that Jerry Holleman is being considered for secretary of labor?" Well, Arthur Goldberg's name had appeared in print and I don't know who else, but suddenly here's a national columnist through Jerry Holleman. Well, I'm sure a lot of people [said], "Who the hell is Jerry Holleman?" You know, the head of a state labor body that didn't have a national name.

But I still have a copy of that letter setting it out and from your files I noticed that you have a copy of his reply to me, saying "I don't have anything to do with the appointment of cabinet positions, but I'll be glad to lay Jerry's name on the President's mind." And of course Jerry had other things I'm sure working for him on that and did end up as assistant secretary of labor. I think probably George Meany had something to say about that, too. I know that Meany would favor the idea of having a guy from the ranks of labor rather than some labor lawyer or someone like that being in that office.

G: Was Johnson restive as vice president, do you think?

S: Yes, I think so. In fact, he did some things that gave him a bad public image because of that restiveness, I think. If I might give some examples that come from entirely different quarters, I had very close friends, most notably Don Ellinger, who's now dead, who worked on Bobby Kennedy's staff. Being a drinking man, I would join them quite frequently, the so-called Irish Mafia, when they were in their cups. We would go out after work. My entree to the group was through Don. Of course, there were other people that were in the group through the--what was it called?--the Fair Employment Practice Committee or the Equal Employment Practice Committee that Johnson was named to be chairman of by Kennedy.

G: Equal Employment Opportunity Committee.

S: Equal Employment Opportunity Committee. Well, if you go through the roster of that staff, you've got people like John McCully, who'd been our state public relations director. You had people like Ruth Graves, Azie Taylor Morton, and Mildred Hathcock, all of them out of the Texas AFL-CIO office, see. And of course, we were a tight little Texas group because we had worked so many years together. But what I'm leading up to is that I heard from the Larry O'Briens and the other--who was it?--Dave Hackett, most particularly, the really caustic, cutting, nasty remarks they made about Johnson, which I think were a pretty good reflection of what Bobby Kennedy's thinking was about Johnson.

But the things that they would laugh about--"Oh, have you heard about the time Johnson made some European trip; he went around and outraged people giving them ballpoint pens and neckties, things like this, with his own imprimatur on it." And Johnson, of course, was always doing that kind of thing. One of the first pieces of advice he gave Henry Gonzalez when Henry first came up to Washington--I preceded Henry in Washington because I had to open his office. We went over to a meeting with Johnson, and Johnson immediately gave a good long sound lecture on how to get re-elected, said you've got to do these things, you know, and you've got to pass out these little tokens and you've got to sign a lot of things and you've got to send birthday cards and you've got to stay in touch with your constituency. Well, that was not really the Kennedy pattern of operation apparently.

But the fact that Johnson, as vice president, was engaging in so much of really passing out campaign material would indicate to me--it's not persuasive, but it's an indication that, gosh, he still had further ambitions. He wasn't campaigning to hold his job, he was campaigning to keep his name in print and to have a role. I think the only real role he had was in that Employment Opportunity agency, where he could act independently. And there were contests going on that I would hear about as to what was the best approach to use, a voluntary persuasive thing on corporations, or are we going to have some teeth in it, some mandatory features about it. Jerry was, I think, for mandatory--I know he was. He had some role as an executive person in that agency because otherwise people like Azie Taylor, Mildred

Hathcock, Ruth Graves, and John McCully probably wouldn't have been hired. Jerry did the hiring. And so you had some real militants in there, and they wanted a mandatory kind of a program.

G: What was LBJ's posture here, do you recall?

S: I think his was more a conciliatory one, like not wanting to do anything such as like filing lawsuits or doing anything of that kind. I have a vague memory of--wasn't it the man from Coca-Cola or something that--oh, Plans for Progress, is that the name of the organization he started? Something of that character, where corporation executives voluntarily signed up for a voluntary program for equal employment opportunity and were to indicate what they were going to do and in what time period they were going to do it. It was a persuasive approach in other words.

G: Were you aware of any disputes between LBJ and Ralph Yarborough over appointments during this period, appointments in Texas?

S: Off the top of the head I can't think of any in particular.

G: Well, judgeships, for example. How many appointments Yarborough as senior senator would control and how many LBJ as vice president would control?

S: I don't have any information on that. I know the way it worked out, people like Billy Goldberg and Wayne Justice did get appointed eventually. So Ralph must have part of the pile and Johnson must have kept part himself. But I can't remember any--I wasn't in on any discussions on that, you know.

One other little story that might be of interest--because I know Henry Gonzalez is probably not on record on this, but I'm going to put him on record, because I think it's true and it reflects a little bit on Johnson's character--is that when Henry ran for Congress, he had run a good campaign. He thought he had it pretty much wired up, and Johnson came in on the last day and brought Cantinflas up from Mexico. The way Henry recited it to me is that he saw that as Johnson coming in to gain credit for something, that he had already won that campaign, that Cantinflas didn't get on the street until two o'clock in the afternoon and the polls close at what, eight o'clock, that they just couldn't have made the difference. But I think Johnson in his own mind felt that, "By gosh, Henry, I pulled you through. I won you that election." I think that's debatable.

G: Was it the last day that Cantinflas campaigned, election day?

S: I'm quoting Henry Gonzalez here, and that's my understanding of it. I was not there in the campaign, and so I can't testify.

G: Did Johnson then lean on Gonzalez to support things that he was interested in?

S: Gonzalez wanted to get along with Johnson. Our offices did have to work closely together on a number of things. I can't recall anything that there was any big static between our two offices. Gonzalez frequently called on Johnson for support on issues that were important to our district and could usually get it. I think the relationship there was a rather warm one, and I think Johnson was pleased--obviously he was pleased, he helped Henry get elected, he wanted to help him.

G: Is there anything else about LBJ that you recall that we haven't discussed?

S: No, not just like that, no. I read some of the literature that you sent me that other people have made comments that were new to me. I was particularly intrigued with Johnson's statement after Jerry and I would leave that he referred to us as those sons of bitches. So maybe that was a mutual admiration society.

G: This is George Green, the chapter from his book, The Establishment in Texas Politics.

S: Is that George Green from Arlington? Was that the one?

G: I think so. Was that account reasonably accurate of the visit to the Ranch?

S: What was very accurate about it is that, as I had said before, there were a number of occasions that Johnson had us out for dinner and just to drink whiskey, stuff like that. So the statement that we would go out there and eat his steaks and drink his whiskey and say no, more often than not, yes, we were saying no.

I can think of one other example that reflects on his personal attitude toward me. On one occasion, we were out there in the afternoon. Johnson called one of his men that worked there at the Ranch to make up two cement plaques. He was laying a walk. Everybody from heads of state and others would put their name there. Well, Jerry made one and I made one. I put on the bottom of mine, AFL-CIO. Jerry just wrote Jerry Holleman. The next time I was out at the Ranch, my plaque was gone! It wasn't in the walk anymore.

(Laughter)

G: Well, I really appreciate it, Mr. Schmidt. It's been a very helpful session.

[End of Tape 1 of 1 and Intervew I]

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