

INTERVIEW I

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INTERVIEWEE: ROBERT E. SHORT

INTERVIEWER: Joe B. Frantz

PLACE: Mr. Short's office, Minneapolis, Minnesota

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S: --the majority leader of the Senate.

F: Yes. You don't look old enough for that.

S: Oh, yes, I am old enough.

But he [Lyndon Johnson] was the chairman of the Space Committee of the Senate,
I think.

F: Yes, right.

S: And that's basically when I first met him. I know something about him earlier than that,
you know, in terms of his congressional career and--

F: How did you get involved in politics?

S: Well, my father was interested, and I just sort of grew into it. But for the war, I probably
would have been a candidate for Congress at age twenty-five.

F: Yes.

S: The war interrupted that, and then my marriage and all of that sort of thing.

F: Had other things to do.

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S: Right, right. But I knew him personally from the time that he was the majority leader of the Senate. Kennedy was by this time--no, I'm sorry, Kennedy was not yet president; Eisenhower was. I knew him as a candidate for president then against Teddy [John] Kennedy. I knew him as the chairman of the Space Committee, and I had visited with him about problems I can't even remember, about space problems. We were interested in a--

F: Well, were you in space hardware and--

S: No, but I was in the transportation business, and we organized what we called the Minnesota Committee in Rocketry. It was organized about the time that the Sputnik put the man in space. Our slogan--if you can think of it as a slogan for a group of business people: Control Data [Corporation], General Mills, myself as a transportation executive, and others. I can't remember all of them, but I do remember those few--was that when they got to the moon, they'd find that the man in the moon was a Minnesotan. That was the concept. And we just believed that we had the technology here to really contribute to the catch-up thing in terms of that space program. So I think it was in that connection that we were down for a presentation to [Hubert] Humphrey when he was in the Senate and before he was vice president, obviously, and [to] Johnson, who was then chairman of the Space Committee. And [it was] in that connection I got to know Lyndon Johnson. Now, it was quite obvious when Kennedy became a candidate for president and Humphrey became a candidate for president and Johnson became a candidate for president, and I can't remember all of them--

F: [Adlai] Stevenson was in it that year.

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S: Stevenson was in it.

F: [Stuart] Symington on the outside.

S: Right. And of course I had gone through the 1956 convention with [Estes] Kefauver, so this would be in that era. So I suppose I met Johnson probably even in 1956. And that's basic--

F: He was a non-candidate candidate.

S: A non-candidate candidate, right, in those days, but certainly a very powerful man. Then I knew the Speaker of the House [Sam Rayburn], who was a close friend of Johnson's. That's, though, basically the background in terms of how do I know Johnson. Now, I don't remember everything, in terms of what happened while--I know that he got to be Kennedy's running mate. I knew that he had turned it down when they first offered it to him.

F: Were you a delegate to the Los Angeles [convention]?

S: No, I didn't go to Los Angeles, but I had been to the one before, and I was in the one afterwards. But I knew enough about what was going on out there to know that President John Kennedy did offer him the vice presidency. He turned it down, and Bobby Kennedy was so joyful that he had turned it down that he went to [Orville] Freeman to make a deal making Freeman vice president. And while he was putting that together, the Speaker went to Johnson and said, "What do you mean, turning that down? Of course you're going to tell him yes. You're not only going to tell him yes, but you're going upstairs and tell him yes now." So he got him out of bed and took him up to the Kennedy suite, and

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before Bobby could come in and tell him, "Well, we made the deal with Freeman," Johnson had gone in and made the deal with Jack Kennedy to become vice president.

F: Now, you knew Freeman pretty well.

S: Very well.

F: Did this kind of sour Freeman's future relationship with Johnson, or did Freeman take it in stride?

S: No, I think Freeman took it in stride, but I think probably why he wound up as secretary of agriculture is that the Kennedys owed him something, or thought that they did.

Certainly, Johnson was vice president because he acted quicker than Freeman, so that Johnson wouldn't have objected if Freeman got beat for governor in the state that year when Kennedy carried the state by a small majority. So I think that's really what did ensure his being a secretary of agriculture with the blessing of both Bobby Kennedy and Johnson and the President. In fact, I'm sure that must have happened, because he had no other qualifications for secretary of agriculture other than he came--

F: He came from the state--

S: He came from Minnesota, right.

Now then, of course the assassination's in here. You jump pretty fast but--

F: Before we jump, Johnson had [only] two assignments as vice president that had any substance to them. One was civil rights, which I suppose was outside your [inaudible].

S: No, you see, I had made the minority speech in the 1956 convention. I was on the platform committee and presented the minority plank.

F: Yes.

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S: If you can remember that year--as a matter of fact, George Wallace was on the platform committee, and I was on the platform committee, and he was taking the position against the civil rights plank that we tried to incorporate. Humphrey had made the speech in Philadelphia when Truman [was nominated] in 1948, I guess it would be.

F: Right.

S: This was 1956. We're now with the next big push on that sort of thing, voting rights and equality and the whole bit. You know, with Wallace I didn't have to have too much more than him to counterbalance what my point of view was. I had known Wallace from the time we were both in college. He was a delegate to the National Student Congress in Topeka in 1938; I was a delegate from Minnesota, and he was a delegate from Alabama. So we did jest back and forth on this plank in that convention, so that when Johnson moved into the civil rights field, because I had made the speech in that convention and I identified with that part of it, I think I tended to gravitate to him a little bit. So I had some contact with him as vice president before the assassination. He was out here for a fundraiser; I saw him in Washington.

F: The other thing was that he was the head of the Space Committee.

S: He was on the Space Committee, and while this local committee of ours never really did all that much good; we did have some contact. [William] Norris of Control Data, who's now the chairman of that, was a member of that committee. I can't remember who represented General Mills, but this was a committee of Minnesota businessmen that were actively seeking contracts in the space field. My interest obviously was that if you get contracts with the space field here, then quite obviously there'll be trucking business back

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and forth. I had one movement at that time in which--I think it was the Polaris missile--we moved the missile case from some place in New York in here for heat treating. That was just dipping it in one of the big nuclear [?] urns, putting it back in the truck and bringing it back, round-trip every day. So it was that interest I had had--you know, it was a business interest, but [it was] also, I suppose, because I was attached to an aircraft during the war and I had an interest in aviation. Now, it's true as vice president he did head up that program, and it's true also that everything he could put into Houston, he put there. (Laughter) Everything that Kennedy didn't take to Massachusetts, he took to Texas, and there wasn't much left over for Humphrey in charge of Minnesota [inaudible].

F: Did Johnson seem to know what he was talking about whenever you visited with him on space?

S: Oh, Johnson was probably as knowledgeable a politician as ever sat in the presidency or in the vice presidency, in my view. He had been in or about the Congress since 1932. He knew how government functioned. He was a liberal in terms of civil rights so that he had an alliance with Humphrey on civil rights problems, but he was a conservative in terms of most other approaches of the Democrats; in other words, the southern Democrats had a lot of other approaches. But I think Johnson was--he was a schoolteacher; he was bright; he was knowledgeable; and he was articulate in that, you know, he was less fluent than Humphrey, but he was certainly--

F: Who isn't?

S: Quite right. He could say as much in fewer words than Humphrey, too. I was enamored of Johnson as a skillful, knowledgeable leader in the country, not just another politician

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from Texas. And I do think that he elected John Kennedy; as a matter of fact I know he did. Without him, I don't think Kennedy would have been elected. Of course, without Mayor [Richard] Daley, he wouldn't have been elected either. (Laughter) But Johnson lent some balance to that ticket. Kennedy was young and inexperienced, and Johnson was older-appearing, and older as well, and with a tremendous ability to campaign. He loved to campaign, you know, Johnson. He did a lot of whistle-stopping in that election year. I did some speaking myself for the ticket.

F: Where, up in here?

S: Well, wherever I could do it. I think I went to Wisconsin and someplace in Minnesota, and I think I made appearances beyond that, but, you know, you've got--I know I did in 1956. I know I did in 1960. I'm sure I did in 1960, and I did it as early as 1948 for Truman. So I go back a long ways in terms of doing these things.

F: A lot of things run together.

S: Right, they run together, particularly as you get older.

F: Okay, now, from what I know of Johnson, which is considerable, I'd say you'd be his kind of man.

S: Well, I--

F: Do you get that feeling?

S: Yes, I think so. Let me tell you what I always thought. You know, Humphrey had an awful lot of what we would call flaky people around him.

F: Yes.

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S: Typical government people and then some dreaming-type people, you know, professorial or university types. He had very few practical business, legal scholars around him, and I think I fit that mold. So when Johnson wanted something from Humphrey's staff, you know, particularly as it related to--well, the campaign that they made together or even before that time, hell, [Jack] Valenti would call me. Or Johnson himself would pick up the phone and call me, and I had that kind of a relationship with them. I always think that he did trust me, and I trusted him.

F: He had a preference and a saying for "can-do" men.

S: Yes, he would tell you he wanted something done and, baby, then you'd better have it done, and I never had any sympathy in my own business, in the navy, or in politics, but if you've got an assignment, get it done, no matter what the hell it takes to get it done. Then it's done, it's over with. And I think that might have attracted him to my way of thinking. Now, some things are impossible, but if it was possible at all, it was done. If he asked for it, you'd better believe I got it done.

Valenti was his man even more than [Bill] Moyers, but Moyers did have obviously a very decided influence on him. But the big liaison man of the Johnson staff in my years was Valenti, and I think for Humphrey's staff [it] was Short, particularly as it related to the campaign of 1964. And I've been to the Ranch. I stayed overnight at the Ranch.

F: What did you do at the Ranch? Did you get that tour?

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- S: Well, no. I didn't get a personally-conducted tour, but I was down there post-Atlantic City. There were five of us on Humphrey's staff and a comparable number on the Johnson staff that stayed in the bungalow or the little cottage--
- F: Yes, the Guest House.
- S: --and we put together the schedule for the 1964 campaign: where the President was going, where Humphrey was going, what the missions were and all that kind of thing. Because I was the coordinator of the campaign in a Democratic committee level. In other words, Humphrey didn't go anyplace where I didn't send him, and Valenti, for all practical purposes, did that with the President, and we had sort of an interlocking [arrangement]. Then a guy by the name of Carter--
- F: Yes, Cliff Carter--
- S: --who was a Coca-Cola--
- F: He's dead.
- S: Yes, he's dead. He was a Pepsi-Cola or Coca-Cola bottler.
- F: Seven-Up.
- S: Seven-Up, right. [He was] a very close friend of mine and then very key to Johnson.
- F: An old-time politician.
- S: And then there was Larry--not O'Brien but--
- F: Before Temple.
- S: The guy was Jack Kennedy's top guy, that's dead now, too, who ran for governor of Massachusetts.
- F: I don't remember him.

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S: He was the political genius of the Democrats. And of course [John] Bailey from the Kennedy Administration was chairman--Kenny O'Donnell [was the one I was thinking of], who was the only seasoned, knowledgeable, skillful ward-county-type politician in the whole damn Democratic national campaign.

F: We interviewed him.

S: Did you? Before he died? Tremendous guy.

F: Yes. Good interview.

S: Right.

F: He didn't always give you something [?] with public statements either.

S: No, no, but he was knowledgeable.

F: No, no, it was an honest interview, right.

S: Did you ever get a chance to talk to Carter before he died?

F: Oh, yes. Good interview.

Okay, you put together a schedule. Now, did you go back to the candidates with it and get their okay?

S: No. Humphrey always wanted to be every place at one time. Of course, we would have, from time to time, meetings, but many times we sent him places he didn't know where he was going, and many times we kept him from going places that he thought he was going. And only once, if you can believe this, I got a call once from *Air Force One*--and this means they're in the air--it was Valenti on the line, and he said, "Hey, Short." I said, "Yes." He said, "What are you doing with Humphrey in Omaha"--and I use this [as an example]; it may not be the one, but some town--"at noon today?" And I said, "Well, he's

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going to be there because there are people on the main street, and he's going to make a little speech and so forth." And he says, "Well, scrub it. The President is going to be there." (Laughter) So we had Humphrey in the air going there, and Johnson was coming from California, Humphrey from Washington. They were almost there at the same time, and we had to bypass it and move Humphrey someplace else, and the President went in and took it. Obviously, he had the priority. And literally, that was what governed the campaign, is that Johnson took the dates that were offered that he wanted. What was left over, Humphrey was supposed to take care of.

F: Humphrey took that role in stride?

S: Very well. As a matter of fact, Humphrey was, I think, the best vice president ever in terms of really being loyal to the top man, going to his death, basically, with the top man in terms of policy. He was a very, very loyal guy. He didn't agree always with the President, but he did always try to implement what Johnson wanted. And what other role is there?

F: Yes. It's not the best job in the world.

S: No, it's not a good job.

F: Where were you at the time of the assassination?

S: I was at a meeting in the Minneapolis Athletic Club, a Democratic meeting of some type, I think planning a Johnson appearance here. I'm almost positive it was a fund-raising dinner, with local Democratic types like George Farr and Freddie Gates, who was Humphrey's man, and others and--

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- F: There wasn't any big movement in Minnesota to dump Johnson as vice president, was there?
- S: You mean in terms of Kennedy?
- F: Yes, while Kennedy was still president. There was a lot of talk about it through the press.
- S: Oh, no. No, no. Johnson was very popular in Minnesota because Johnson was more of a farmer than was Kennedy. Kennedy was popular because he was young and articulate and had image and leadership and spoke well. I think Johnson helped Kennedy carry Minnesota. As I said, I don't think Kennedy would have carried it without Johnson. Farmers, schoolteachers, practical politicians, labor.
- F: Here's a man they can understand.
- S: Yes, sure, and they could talk to him, and of course, the only thing that Minnesotans would hold against Johnson was that he wouldn't be liberal enough, and here was Humphrey saying, hell, he was as liberal as anybody in the Senate, of course, Humphrey having in mind rights as distinguished from, let's say, economic programs. So I think that Johnson was probably more popular at the time of the election than was Kennedy, and into the term was a popular vice president here because he would come out here and help raise money.
- F: He did not know the meat-and-potato things--
- S: Right, you'd better believe it. Of course, that's part of the role of the vice president, too, and he did obviously help Humphrey. When it was available not to Kennedy for some reason, or not to Johnson for some reason, then I think that Humphrey was next in line.
- F: Right. Do you have clear memory of that tragic day in Dallas?

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S: Oh, yes. Oh, yes.

F: Was the feeling over there that, "my God, the country is going to hell now"?

S: No, as a matter of fact, there was actual concern that this was only the first of a series of real bad acts.

F: Yes. We didn't know what we had then.

S: We had concern for Johnson. We had concern for President Kennedy's wife. We had concern for Humphrey. We had concern for the government, any of us that were knowledgeable. As a matter of fact, it was the end of the day. They had just served us lunch. Nobody had lunch. You know, I mean, it just killed everybody, because it was a tearful announcement. The first announcement we got was that the President had been shot in Dallas, and of course nobody thought in terms of death at that moment, and before we could get out of there, over the shock, he had died, and that was just--as a matter of fact, I left and went home. I think that there was honest concern, with anybody who could think about the welfare of the country. Did this mean that there was some more sinister force that was going to blow up the Capitol or whatever? It could have been--

F: Part of a general conspiracy.

S: Right, right.

F: Okay. Now, Johnson is president. Does this change your relationship in any way or do things go on pretty much as it is?

S: No. I think that once a man walks through the 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue door as president that it changes him. So yes, I do think the relationship changed somewhat, although he knew me when he would see me, and we would meet occasionally by chance.

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I don't think that I ever tried to have conferences with him while he was president. I could always get it handled with Moyers or Valenti or someone like that, although I brought in committees and that kind of thing that he sat with. He appointed me as the national chairman of Discover America. I organized that, and I can remember being down in the Oval Office room with him.

F: Did he give you a little pep talk before he--

S: Oh, yes. As a matter of fact, it was that day that when I left--and this must have been a year before he withdrew--I talked to one of my associates on that board and said, "He's not going to run for reelection." Because he told us then about how tough it was for him to bid goodbye to the troops going to Vietnam. He'd just been out on that West Coast trip, and he'd been aboard a transport and he'd talked to the men, and he said he knew that when he was talking to them that many of them would never return to this country, and how emotional that was for him because he knew that he was the instrument sending them there. And on the way back, he stopped at Palm Springs and talked to General Eisenhower, and he thought about his own life in relationship to Eisenhower's. Here is Eisenhower, playing golf and living the life of Riley and relaxed and normal, and he, Johnson--and you know Johnson is fashioned as a very tough man--almost emotionally distraught over what he had just had to do. He thought of the different positions and how lucky he, Eisenhower, was that he was a former president instead of president.

F: Eisenhower was probably saying, "Lyndon, this is the best job in the world. Now you ought to take it."

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S: Well, you know, let me tell you something. All I can [inaudible]--you must remember now, this is Johnson talking.

F: Yes, I know.

S: He envied--as a matter of fact he said, "I envy Dwight Eisenhower his status as a former president of these United States." Now, this is before he had ever announced publicly he was not going to run.

F: Yes.

S: And Humphrey was there. I've got a picture of that meeting, and hell, I can remember walking back to the Mayflower Hotel from Pennsylvania Avenue and talking to other members of that board and saying, "I think the guy said he was not going to run."

F: No one believed him.

S: No one did. No one believed him the day he said it on the radio, on the TV. Shock.

F: Let's talk about Discover America a minute.

S: Right.

F: What did he give you in the way of a charge? What did he want?

S: Well, basically, if you think about it, we had the balance of payments problems then like we have now, although they were not quite as dramatic because of the oil thing. And it was thought that people should travel within the four corners of our country, as distinguished from traveling to Europe or to Southeast Asia or wherever they were going to go, and spend their money at home. It would help to balance payments; it would make better citizens out of our own people to get them to know our own country. So we were organized to keep our own people traveling within our own boundaries and to encourage

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travel within our boundaries from overseas travelers. That charter was given to me, and I was appointed national chairman, and then we named the organization Discover America and [created] the logo and the whole business. The strange thing about that is that that was a nonprofit corporation with no federal funds at all. All contributed funds by the railroads, the airlines, the Petroleum Institute, the automobile industry--

F: Travel agencies?

S: Travel agencies, bus lines and so forth, and we really did, I think, what was a pretty good job of articulating it. It was the year in which the World's Fair opened in New York; it was the year in which I was going to take my family to Europe, and of course, obviously, I had to knock that off. As a matter of fact, it kept me from going to Europe, where I had really not been for almost seven or eight years, because of that appointment.

So I think that his charge was, "This is needed in terms of stabilizing the dollar. It is needed in terms of minimizing the imbalance in terms of balance of payments, and if we can get these people to really push this concept, it will be helpful."

F: And it won't hurt the country.

S: And it won't hurt the country. Think of this, if you will. More people from the East Coast had seen Europe than had seen California. More people from California had seen the Far East than had seen New York, and more people from the South had been to Mexico than had ever been to the northern states, and more people from the northern states to Canada than ever to the southern states. So you had four separate sections of our country, and still have. And of course, if you think about it in terms of media and air travel, this was a little bit ahead of the big push in jets. My God, the old adage that "you

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were born here, you lived here, and you died here," that's about what we had. We had that kind of a country, four separate parts. And Johnson did believe that once you became a nation of people who fashioned themselves really together with a common purpose, much like [Jimmy] Carter's talking now, that that was the way to sell programs. In other words, you had to have a consensus. He used to say--

F: Mix them up a little.

S: He used to say, "Let's reason together." He meant, "Let's reason together in terms of the whole country." Where up until his time, you had a New England point of view, a New York point of view, an East Coast point of view, a southern states-eastern point of view, a southern states--i.e. Texas, sort of a half-western, half-South [point of view], midwestern, and then Rocky Mountains--

F: Pacific Northwest.

S: Pacific Northwest, right, and California and those states. So I think that the idea was correct, and we did--we didn't--

F: Did he intrude any on it, or did he just say, "Here it is, Bob. Go after it"?

S: "There is your charter. Do the best you can. And if you need help, come back to see me from time to time," and I did visit with him a couple of times. After all, we had almost eight hundred thousand [dollars] in our annual budget, contributed and spent, and it was visible. A lot of the advertising was donated and that kind of thing, so I figured, well, the only things that these fellows can get is a visit with the President, so I arranged two of those meetings in the White House in the Oval Office. He was very kind and all, and outlined--

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F: [He was] very pleased with it?

S: Very pleased with it, yes, particularly because we didn't have any federal money.

Anybody can do a job if you give them ten million dollars, but we never had any money, and we had to coordinate the Department of Interior program with the national parks and everybody. The Agriculture Department had a piece of the action because of some of the things that they had in terms of forest lands and rivers.

F: I've been on the National Parks Advisory Board for fifteen years and I'm very aware of what you were up to.

S: We worked with whoever the hell that guy was in terms of that national park. I can't remember his name.

F: [George] Hartzog, probably.

S: Hartzog, Hartzog. I had three or four conferences with Hartzog. And with the Secretary. Three secretaries: Agriculture, Commerce, and Treasury, I think, were involved in what we were doing. [Henry] Fowler was Treasury, and I can't remember who was--whether it was Freeman then or not. I don't think it was Freeman.

F: You must have commuted a lot to Washington.

S: I was in Washington as often as I was here, back and forth. That was before the baseball team.

F: Yes. That's another reason.

S: That's right. That's [inaudible].

F: Had no federal money.

S: Right.

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F: Okay, back in Minnesota in 1964.

S: Right.

F: Did you ever have any doubt that Humphrey would be chosen? Did you look on the [Eugene] McCarthy flirtation as more than that?

S: I did. I was Humphrey's treasurer, and I was McCarthy's treasurer.

F: Same time?

S: Same time. Of course, these two people were very close friends. They were next-door neighbors, as a matter of fact, weren't they? I'm sure they were. I think they were either next-door--no, [George] McGovern and Humphrey lived next door, but McCarthy lived in the same area, in walking distance.

F: Yes.

S: So they were close personal friends, and McCarthy, to some extent, owed to Humphrey his start in politics as a congressman from the Fourth District and then [as] senator. I knew both very well, and both were close personal friends. They continued to be close personal friends even after the 1968 debacle, [friends] of mine, but I do think their own relationship was strained. Back in 1968 when Humphrey almost beat [Nixon], if McCarthy had been for him, he might have won. It was true he didn't need much help, but he could have won, and he didn't. So [in 1964], as a matter of fact, I had to listen to McCarthy say why Lyndon Johnson would pick him. I had to listen--and I was working obviously for Humphrey--as to why Lyndon Johnson would pick him, and we didn't honestly know.

F: What can you do in a case like that except just sit tight?

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S: That's all I did. I told McCarthy, "Look, I've been with Humphrey longer than with you. I'm going to declare myself for Humphrey; he wants me to do some of these things. You don't need any help anyway. If he's going to pick you, he'll pick you. If he's not, he's not." So I went to Atlantic City as a Humphrey delegate. That was hotly contested between how many should go for McCarthy and how many should go for Humphrey, and I had to call McCarthy and raise hell with him because his people were trying to knock me off the slate. "Well," he said, "you're for Humphrey." I said, "I told you I was for Humphrey. Besides, I'm your treasurer," and I was, up until that time. And I think I was his treasurer even after that. I had to set up his accounts and books.

F: Did you get a feeling that this really seared McCarthy? Is that one reason he turned against Johnson?

S: I think this: I think that he thought Johnson was going to pick him. I think that he was led to believe that either by Mrs. Johnson or by Valenti or by someone on the staff, and he may even have been led to believe that by Johnson himself. I kind of think that the staff around Johnson was for Humphrey. I think maybe that there was an inclination of Johnson to go with McCarthy. McCarthy--you see, let me tell you, Johnson--

F: He was more than just stage managing.

S: Oh, I know. I think that Johnson really seriously entertained him because he--I can't remember who these people were. Was there a Dobbs?

F: He picked Dodd from Connecticut, Thomas Dodd.

S: Dodd, yes, and then McCarthy, and I can't remember, but there was this problem that he had, that he had succeeded a Catholic president, and the Catholic president was

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assassinated in Dallas while the Catholic president was *his* guest as vice president of the United States, and I think that this was a hang-up to some extent. As a matter of fact, he said one day, the day we were down there after the so-called 1964 Atlantic City convention, "You know, there will come a time when people will say that Johnson lured that nice, young Catholic boy down here to Texas in order to assassinate him." He actually said that. So I think that bothered him some, and I think that he might very well have entertained the idea of a McCarthy or a Dodd or a Catholic on the second place on the ticket to be sure that he didn't lose that constituency. But as it turned out, he didn't have to worry about constituency; the guy that was against Johnson didn't vote, almost, in that election.

F: Minnesota has a reputation for maverick delegations.

S: Right.

F: In 1964, there wasn't any problem in holding them in line?

S: Yes, there was. There was because there was a big, big fight between the so-called McCarthy faction and the Humphrey faction for the state control. And Humphrey won, and McCarthy complained that we trampled on his delegates' rights, [that] we didn't give him what he was entitled to in proportion and so forth, and there may be some truth to that. I know I was picked as a delegate at large, and I had support from both groups. There were very few people picked as delegates at large that had McCarthy's and Humphrey's joint support; I was one that did.

But there was bitter feeling. There still is bitter feeling. As a matter of fact, you'll find some of those same McCarthy people today who are now organizing for [Edward]

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Kennedy against Carter. The Connallys [?] in St. Paul, and I can't remember who else, but usually they're--[Donald] Fraser, Fraser was probably a McCarthy man in that convention. It is the extreme liberal, the real antiwar, Vietnam-type person, and some of them active only for the first time in that election year, that were for McCarthy, the young, the women. The hard-nosed politician that had any seasoning was going to go with Humphrey because he was the titular head. If you get your choice of one of the two, you're going to go with the man with the whiskers or something, and whiskers weren't with McCarthy.

F: Did Johnson's staff ever get in touch with you directly on fund raising? You're a good fund raiser.

S: Yes, right. I was the co-chairman with [Walter] Mondale for the largest--still the largest--Democratic fund raiser ever in Minnesota, and Lyndon Johnson was the speaker. He was now president. President Kennedy had been assassinated, and that whole fund raiser--it was a thousand-dollar, President's-Club type thing in which you could meet him and shake hands with him for a thousand dollars and a cocktail, and then you adjourned to the Minneapolis auditorium for a hundred-dollar-a-plate dinner. So if you wanted to shake his hand and still go to dinner with your wife, it would cost you twelve hundred dollars. That whole thing was done out of my office before I owned this hotel. [It was done] from the First National Bank Building. I had an office on the top floor of the First National Bank Building. Now, Mondale was [Minnesota] attorney general; he and I were co-chairmen of that. And when I sat alongside Johnson at that dinner--I'll tell you how his mind worked--he said, "How come you didn't sell more tickets?" (Laughter) You

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see, we had the floor with the dinner tables full, but he said, "You could have let them in for ten dollars and filled up all those seats." Pretty good idea.

F: Well, I had him as a speaker once, and it was a--

S: We raised about eight hundred thousand dollars. In that one night. In one function. That was unheard of in those days. As a matter of fact, it's never been done since, here.

F: I had the same experience that you had, except that he forewarned me. It was a limited group of about five hundred. He got in touch with me, and he said, "How big is the crowd going to be?" And I said, "Mr. Vice President, it can't be over five hundred." He says, "Get an auditorium for three hundred. I want them standing."

S: Right. Oh, yes. Right.

F: [Inaudible]

S: He was a master politician. That first night that we were at the Ranch, we were all sitting there [talking about] this is where we were going to go, and this is where we were going to go. We were all the geniuses, fellows like myself or Valenti; we all had a pretty good opinion of ourselves. So we had the thing all worked out, and no, Johnson was not going to go there, and yes, Humphrey would go there, and no way, none of us would go there. We'll send somebody else there. So we did that for about four or five hours without a beer or without too much monkey-businessing around, and it was a tough assignment, when all of a sudden, the front door rattles. It was a screen porch. It was a little bit chilly, as I remember, and in comes Humphrey and Lyndon with the mackinaw shirt that he wore down at the Ranch, and he had given one to Humphrey.

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We sat down and we were talking, and he wanted to know what we were doing. Valenti explained what he was doing, and I explained what we were doing on behalf of Humphrey. And you know, unless you were talking to the President, who was asking questions, you were pretty guarded about what you were saying. He said, "Fellows, let me see what you're doing." So we showed him the schedules and the charts, and he said, "No, I don't like that. Sit down here. Now, that's pretty good work, but now I'm going to tell you how it's going to be." And he said, "If you think about it, we've got X number of states that we're certain of. They're over here. Okay? And then we've got X number of states that are marginal states. They could go either way. And that's X number here. The ones that we're certain of we want to be equal to the electoral votes of the election, whatever they are." He knew how many votes that was, and he named the states he thought that we would be certain of and [said] that we had better concentrate on getting those. "That's the election, the safe ones." Now, the others that are close and questionable, there are those that are more for him than for the other side, and we should concentrate on the half that are more for him than against him to get the little margin. Okay? Then after you got that certain victory, the easiest margin, then only [send him] in these that were questionable, where he might lose them, and only if there was time. And there were some, I think only four. He said, "Forget about them. You can't win them at all. We're not even going to monkey with them." And he won two of those four. The rest of it he was absolutely correct on. He won the whole country except two, if I remember right. Now, this was the day after Atlantic City.

F: When he should have been tired.

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S: Right. And he knew it all in his own mind. A master politician. He knew the issues. He knew where he could do himself some good as president. You know, where nobody could accuse him of politicking he would have to go anyway.

F: Did he ever try to get you to come to Washington full time?

S: It never got down to that because I was there for Humphrey in the--well, I can't remember when they were in seriousness [?] before the Atlantic City convention, but I was there full time for maybe six months in that 1964 year. And by the time the election was over, I tell you what, he could have made me vice president, and I wouldn't have come to Washington. My business was hurting, my family was hurting--

S: You were ready to go.

F: --I was living in a hotel room, which was not pleasant. But we never really got around to that. Plus there is this one fact: remember, this was quite a big thing, to put a guy on the ticket and find him elected, with a big majority, vice president. So we sat down with Humphrey and said, we'd like to have attorney general, and we'd like to have this, and a couple of judgeships, and a new secretaryship, and all these spoils that we were going to get, okay? So he studied a minute and [we] said, "We'd like to go and have a conference with you and with the President to see about implementing this."

So we went and we had a conference like that with Lyndon in which Humphrey was passing the pleasantries, but he had to do what we were asking him to do. And he got around to making the speech about how he'd like to have favorable consideration for Bob Sharkey [?] for this, and I can't remember who all these people were, but there were a lot of them. So [Lyndon said], "Now, just a minute here. Now, are you talking about

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the recent election?" "Yes." "In which I was elected as president?" "Yes." "Well," he said, "don't you realize that all those things you're talking about are mine? When you're elected president, then you can have some say." So to get to be national chairman of Discover America meant there wasn't a Johnsonite who wanted it, if the truth were known, and you really want to know what I think, although I think that had he known I wanted something personally, within reason, I think he would have given it to me.

F: Did you want anything?

S: Not really. No, I had a growing business, a growing family. I couldn't afford to take an ordinary-type job. I think the only thing that might have tempted me, if I could have done it and somehow got rid of the business, would have been a judgeship, and there would have been some question about that because I'd left the practice of law to go actively in business. But I was a prosecutor, and I was an active trial lawyer in my younger days, and that would have interested me, but it never got to that point. That would have interested me even in Washington, or here, because I did prosecute in Washington.

F: Did you get the feeling as you come down to 1968--now for a while, of course, you come with Johnson, but once you eliminate Johnson--that Johnson wants Humphrey, or that Johnson's just going to leave it open and let them find--

S: No, I'll tell you, I never figured he'd let it open, but I did figure that he might, because *he* was leaving for obvious reasons, that he thought he was so unpopular that what's the use of wasting time? I still think he broke his back with the Vietnam War. That he might have decided that the full ticket should go, that there should be a new face; I thought that he might do that. And then, of course, McCarthy had an outside chance, as did Senator

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[Thomas] Dodd, as did--I can't remember. There were two or three others at that time that were prominent in the figuring. But I think of all the ones that I looked at--

F: Of course, Bobby Kennedy--

S: Well, I'm sorry. Bobby Kennedy was making noise, and as a matter of fact that would have been a very easy thing for him to do.

(Interruption)

F: Oh yes, oh yes. It's 1968, and we've got what we're going to do with Hubert Humphrey. Johnson is going. How much maneuvering went on in Minnesota to try to--

S: A tremendous amount. The dinner, it was thought if we did a real good job that would be very helpful to Johnson. And this money all went to the Democratic National Committee, you know. So we gave them like a check for eight hundred thousand dollars. That was a lot of money. And then--

F: Would you take time to describe what it takes to put together a dinner like that? I think down a hundred years from now this will be worth something.

S: Basically what you have to do, you have to find--if you're going to try to raise eight hundred thousand dollars, you don't do it from eight hundred thousand people at a dollar apiece. You've got to figure out what percentage of that you have to get in big gifts and, of course, the more of it that you get in big gifts--you have to have a goal, and that's what we had. I think our goal was seven hundred [thousand dollars]; we went over it by a hundred [thousand]. So you had the goal. "Now then," you say, "okay, what percentage of that do you want to get from the thousand-dollar President's Club?" And I told them, "Oh, we would like to get half." That's very ambitious, because you've got to find people

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who can and will give a thousand dollars. That's pretty difficult. First of all, it's a rather select group that can. Now, you find those that can, most of them are Republicans, right?

F: I was going to say, I'd think your money here would be Republican.

S: You're right, but then I didn't rule them out, either, because to shake hands with the President, and particularly if there are three or four together to get him in, let's say, two or three minutes of conversation is a pretty big item. So I concentrated on the big givers, and we had a list, and we put them all down, the tried-and-true ones that we had had on some other occasions, and the new ones that should be in but hadn't been in. It was really a labor to--and then send someone to get the thousand that had already paid his own thousand. You know, misery loves company.

F: Yes.

S: You don't send somebody out there that's put in a hundred, and you don't let anybody in that thousand-dollar room that didn't pay it. No freebies. Politicians, hell, if they wanted to get in, get somebody to pay a thousand dollars for them to go in. So we had some of that. Like take Mondale, I'm sure somebody paid his way in. He didn't have a thousand dollars, and he wouldn't have gotten in even though he was chairman of the dinner. Well, he might have been an exception; we probably would have let him in. But we kept the Governor out unless somebody paid his way in, and that was [Karl] Rolvaag at that time. So that's the first thing. Now we did, I think, a hundred and thirty-five or a hundred and forty thousand dollars, about. After that it was just a question of getting the old Jefferson-Jackson Day lists, and break it down and say, "Okay, John Smith, we want you to organize a table of ten. That's a thousand dollars." So we sold tables, and there was

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some maneuvering for position at those tables. I can remember one guy coming in a little bit late with five tables and he was in the back row, and he said, "Listen, five tables in the back row? To hell with you. I won't come." So I said, "Okay. Which one do you want in the front?"

F: Yes. (Laughter)

S: Which is what you've got to do. So I would say that we got almost six [hundred thousand dollars?] in that hundred-dollar kind of thing and the balance in the big givers. And it was pretty easy to say, "Okay, the guy's paying a thousand, I'm going to let him in the dinner." Oh, no. Two different functions. A thousand for the dinner [reception], and that meets Johnson for cocktails, and that was at the Sheraton-Ritz.

F: You get to press the flesh.

S: You get to press the flesh. Now, if you want to get in the dinner and listen to the speech, that's two hundred bucks if it's him and his wife, or if he has a group of associates and wants a table of ten, that's another thousand.

F: How much direction do you get out of Washington or intrusion or whatever here?

S: We had one fellow who I had worked with in the campaign--I can't think of his name. He was an auto worker from Kenosha [?]. I should remember his name, too, because he came in--he traveled.

F: He was an advance--

S: Sort of an advance man. He had just come out of a bust in Detroit and came into this one, and this one was a success. As a matter of fact, this was the biggest success fund-raising-wise of that pre-1964 nomination of Johnson. It was all right, no doubt about that.

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F: Okay, now back to 1968. We want to get Hubert nominated. We get him--

S: Right.

F: Was anything done from this end to try to persuade Johnson to come out for him?

S: Absolutely. Absolutely. We met in the Senate office of Humphrey. We had the types that you would expect there. [William] Connell was his top staff man. [Neal] Peterson was his lawyer. [Max] Kampelman was his friend on the outside in Washington, D.C. There were Humphrey-types: [John] Blatnick, the congressman, who was for him. I don't think Fraser was involved in that, but certainly I was there, and Fred Gates was there, and I would say probably thirty-five close Humphrey friends.

Now, what do you do to get Johnson to pick our man, particularly where McCarthy is also [inaudible] to be picked? Well, we had conversations with [George] Meany at the AFL-CIO and found out that they were for Humphrey. We had conversations with national farm groups, and they were for Humphrey. They talked to Valenti. All of our pushing went to the staff, and the staff was Moyers and Valenti, and I can't remember, there was one other guy who was very influential at that time. But that's who we would--the National Education Association, Teamsters, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the American Legion, whoever we could get on Humphrey's side, we would take them one-on-one and get the organization done, then push the organization in to help Johnson to be able to say to everybody else, "Well, hell, everybody's for Humphrey." And we were told by, I think, Valenti that that would be helpful. In other words, we couldn't do that if it were going to aggravate Johnson. But we were trying to build an atmosphere where it would be easy for him to pick Humphrey, and I think we did build it,

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and we put full time in Washington doing that for a couple of months before he made a decision.

F: Now, it's 1968. Johnson's out.

S: Right.

F: He's declared himself out. Humphrey is the--

S: Well, that was picking him as vice president, right?

F: Yes.

S: Now I'm sorry, you've got me [confused].

F: Now I'm picking--

S: I've made a mess on these dates, and I get off on the wrong date, and if you'll stop me--

F: That's all right. We'll straighten that out.

We get down to Chicago, and Johnson hasn't made a clear-cut commitment to Humphrey. He's dropped some intimations all along the way, and Minnesota has two favorite sons in Chicago.

S: Right. As they did before in 1964.

F: Oh, yes. But this time, it's a bigger prize.

S: It's a bigger prize. It's the top prize, plus the fact that you have McGovern, who is Humphrey's close friend, his next-door neighbor. So you had three, and I may--oh, and you had [John] Connally. Who else was there in that thing? There must have been someone else, too, that was bigger, but certainly those four.

F: These are the big ones. Bobby's dead.

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S: Right, Bobby was dead. By the way, it is my view that he would have beaten us if he'd lived.

F: Yes, I think you're right. I think it would have been an awfully hard time.

Was the Minnesota delegation in chaos over there, or were they pretty well down-the-line on Humphrey?

S: No, I think there were some bitter feelings in that convention.

F: You don't have a unit rule, do you?

S: No, we do not. But wait a minute, we may have had a unit rule. I think that we did cast in a unit in those days, but it since has been broken up. [Inaudible] the whole party is. The air in the party today is whether you're talking about the black question, and the women, and whoever. It's more of a general common meeting than an organized one. I think we had a unit rule in those days, but I'm not positive of that. See, you're getting into details that are too far back for me. And I do think this. I think we made it uncomfortable for the McCarthy unit, and there were very few of them. There were some that got in. They got elected at a precinct level or a ward level before they got to the state convention. There were some bitter feelings generated in that period, but we were not sympathetic to McCarthy, sort of trampled them, and I think--

F: You were a delegate in 1968?

S: I was a delegate in 1968, right.

F: Did you have the feeling that things had got out of hand?

S: I was a delegate in 1964. That our local. . . .

F: Or that you ran it as well as it could be run?

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S: Pardon me? Well, I think this; I'd been to the 1940 convention as the youngest delegate, and then I think the next one was 1956 [1948?], the first one after the war. 1964, 1968, and I wasn't a delegate in 1944, but I was around at that because I had just come back from sea at the time of that election. So I don't think that that was as disorderly a convention, 1968, as 1956 was or even as 1964. That 1964 [inaudible], you'd better believe that if Bobby Kennedy had come into that convention and made that speech and said, "I want to be president," after he made the speech with that [inaudible] about his brother's death, he might have been nominated by acclamation. It was a very loose affair. So I don't think 1968 was particularly disorganized because of the contest between Humphrey and McGovern and so forth. I think that the nuts in the park and the yippies or whatever they were, created a lot of problems there and a dangerous situation, and Humphrey could have been assassinated very, very easily, and some of those kids were hurt, by tough, rough cops and--

F: Did you feel that the sort of Chicago street scene handicapped Humphrey pretty badly?

S: I think it hurt. I think this: I think that Humphrey was defeated in 1968 during the Chicago convention. That the media was so bad in terms of depicting what was--when you had the keynote speaker making this speech, instead of that being on television, they were in the park listening to the yippies, and it was such a--the language was foul, the actions were foul, there were people getting their heads kicked in with nightsticks. It was such a foul deal in terms of its general media presentation that you could have had Jesus Christ on the Democratic ticket and I don't think you could have won in 1968 after that convention. I think that killed us, and I think Gallup showed that we had something like

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less than 20 per cent of the population vote at the time we came out of Chicago. No money in the treasury and a candidate that had been a former vice president, now he was a presidential candidate, and everybody loved him, but if this is his party, who the hell wants him?

F: Lyndon Johnson's gone, pick Hubert.

S: Johnson's gone, well, pick Hubert, right. And Johnson wasn't able to help that much except that he did insist that the convention be in Chicago. That was because of Daley, and I think that cost us the election. Now, we did recover remarkably from that to bring it as close as it was, but we never had a chance, I don't think.

F: Did Humphrey try to get Johnson to take a more forceful role, or did he think that--

S: Oh, yes, sure. I was after Valenti to get Johnson to help us financially, and Johnson, I think, did try, but never produced anything. We were all after Humphrey to tell Johnson that he had to do this and had to do that, and many of us were advising Humphrey that he had to have a break with the President in order to win. There were some that even believed that he should resign, that that would have been dramatic enough to have elected him. I think I sat there with Loeb--yes, Loeb, the broker. He was good for maybe five hundred thousand dollars in the campaign in those days. John Loeb said, "Mr. Vice President, if you want to be president, you'd better resign. I think that's the best course you could take." There were others in that room who didn't join in for that. But Humphrey said, "Mr. Loeb, you're my friend, and I want to say that I am Lyndon Johnson's vice president until our term is over. I was elected by the people, and I'm going

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to stay there. There isn't anything I can do with your request. Even if I were sympathetic to it, I couldn't do it." Loyal, but I do know that there was--then, of course, the famous--

F: They had that big deal down at the Astrodome.

S: Yes, now, that was late. Now, I arranged that.

F: You arranged that?

S: I arranged that.

F: Tell me about that.

S: I was with Hofheinz. [Roy] Hofheinz' son, who is now the new mayor--

F: Fred.

S: Fred, yes, right. Not the old man, but the kid. We only got the green light from the White House for that in the last couple of days when it looked like Humphrey was going to win. Other than that, I think if we had continued to look bad in the polls, I don't think it would have been done. So Hofheinz was pushing for this thing, and we gave him money, we gave him advance work, we gave him whatever the hell it took to fill up the building. Then once we announced that Johnson was going to come, it did fill up, and it was, in terms of that stage of the campaign, I think, the last week--

F: [Inaudible] John Connally.

S: Oh, I can tell you about Connally. Connally and I are very close friends. [Robert] Strauss and I are very close friends, and I was the Democratic treasurer, as you know, in 1968, so I had to get the money. So I made a trip with Strauss to Austin to the Governor's office and told him why I wanted a million dollars out of Texas, and he told me various ways that we might be able to get the million dollars out of Texas, but we never got any money.

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Strauss, who worked for me in that year in what we called the boiler-room operation, raised about a hundred thousand dollars by calling Texans from Washington and getting them in the President's Club. But that's about all the money from Texas we ever got, and then another time we went down with a--Carrucci [?], [Dwayne] Andreas, myself, I think Pat O'Connor. We had a conference in Houston with the so-called oil group, and we were laying out all the reasons why Johnson should be succeeded by Humphrey, and we walked out of there without ten cents, and we had the top Houston money there. Now, one word, it seems to me, from the White House, saying, "Do it," might have produced it.

F: Yes. John Connally could have done it. [Inaudible]

S: Connally could have, too. But you see, Johnson, I think, knew Humphrey personally and accepted him; I don't think Connally ever accepted Humphrey. Now, I accept Connally. He's a friend of mine today. They asked me the other day in a television station about Carter, and I told them I thought Carter would not run, that Kennedy would be nominated and that I could enthusiastically support him. But people say, "But you're more like John Connally than you are like Kennedy." I said, "That may be. We're both lawyers; we're both businessmen; we're both somewhat conservative, and I--" "Well, what do you think of Connally?" I said, "I think he is magnificent." "Well, would you support him?" I said, "Well, the only thing he ever did wrong, as far as I'm concerned, was join the Republican Party, and, yes, I would be very comfortable with John Connally as president." I would. I don't believe that he was a crook in the milk deal; I don't believe he is tainted with oil like people would say. I think he's probably today as bold and as articulate a leader as the Republican Party has got, and that's probably because he's a Democrat. If I ever have to

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go with Ford or Reagan or even what's-his-name from Tennessee, I've got to believe if I were a Republican I'd go with--

F: [Howard] Baker, yes.

S: Baker. I'd go with Connally. Now, Connally-Kennedy contest can be [inaudible], and I think maybe Connally might beat him, although you can't ever tell. There are so damn many more Democrats than Republicans.

F: Now, back to the Astrodome. It surprised a lot of people when Connally showed up. Any idea why he showed up?

S: Yes, because Johnson went. Connally--

F: Still enough of a Johnson man at that time?

S: Yes. Connally would do what the President asked him, and the President decided to go. I think he took his daughters with him or somebody with him, and I know Connally did go. Connally did whatever the President asked him to do, and I think the President would do anything that Connally asked him to do. They were very, very close friends. And Strauss today, if Carter decides to run and Connally is the Republican candidate, Strauss will be in a hell of a fix because he's a very, very close personal friend of Connally. And I consider myself that kind of a friend of Connally, although not as close as Strauss.

F: There are going to be a lot of Texans in a fix in a case like that.

S: Right. I think Connally has got one hell of a shot at it myself.

F: Okay. Is there anything else we ought to talk about?

S: No, I think I have given you everything I know. I know his wife--

F: Did Humphrey ever show any bitterness on account of Johnson's [inaudible]?

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- S: No, not until the day he died. I've heard people say, "Well, if Johnson had helped--"
Well, just a minute. Johnson was president; he was busy in Washington. By the way, there was one thing that happened in the late part of the campaign that if Humphrey had used it, I think that we might have won, and Humphrey wouldn't use it because of the security problems of the White House. And that was that Madame Chiang Kai-shek had been working with Nixon in terms of some kind of a deal in relation to the Vietnam War, and that Nixon had urged her to not let the war end in terms of the late campaign [inaudible].
- F: That was Anna Chennault, wasn't it?
- S: Anna Chennault. Right. Right. Chennault, yes. What did I call her, Madame Chiang Kai-shek? Isn't that the same woman?
- F: The same kind of woman.
- S: Are these two different people?
- F: No, they're two different people.
- S: Two different people. Oh, that's right. Chennault's wife. You're right.
- F: She married Claire [Chennault].
- S: You're right. Right. She was involved, but so was Chiang Kai-shek's wife, from Formosa. They were all involved in the thing. Now, we had the intelligence report, and everybody wanted him to use it, and he wouldn't do it, Humphrey.
- F: One thing I've wondered about, and you may know this. Why didn't they run that last press conference with Nixon on the West Coast when he was defeated for governor? My own feeling is I would have run it sixteen hours a day.

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S: Let me tell you. We had a money problem that many a time--let's say [we had] a million-dollar expenditure, and I had to have the money at two o'clock, and I had it finally all collected on my desk at five minutes to two.

F: Your media wanted the money in advance?

S: In advance.

F: They didn't trust you for an expense account?

S: No, no, not a nickel's worth. We had credit with the telephone company; we had credit with the airlines. Of course, when I left the treasurer's job, I left them with ten million dollars' worth of debts, but I want to tell you something. Somebody says, "Well, how come you didn't pay it off?" I said, "Don't worry about that. That's easy. What you ought to do is figure out how the hell I got the credit extended." It was just a miracle. It was miraculous. We had to have media in advance, and television in those days was very expensive, and today it's astronomical. But the guy would come down from New York, special--the account executive--and sit in my office and wait for me to get that money, and [he'd] say, "Okay, you've got five more minutes." And I would have somebody coming from someplace with a hundred thousand dollars and from someplace else, and finally just pull it off and barely make it.

F: That's sweating it.

S: Oh, boy! I never--that's the toughest financial job, including the Washington Senators and the truck line and the hotels, of anything that I've ever done.

F: Jimmy Hoffa.

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S: Hoffa, that was--Hoffa was just a tough negotiator. Now we could have picked up money there, and strangely enough, I wouldn't take money there from him--he was in jail--or from the Teamsters. And apparently Nixon did through what's-his-name, [Charles] Colson.

It was a tough, a tough thing, and to merchandise [?] Humphrey from where--you see, he had been part of the Johnson family. As a matter of fact, I think if Johnson had it to do over again, two months after Humphrey was nominated he would have picked someone else, because technically Humphrey was getting killed with the Johnson image for a long part of the campaign.

So that was bad, the Chicago convention was bad, the fact that the Democratic committee was broke--it was five hundred thousand dollars in debt when I took it over, and that's ridiculous with a sitting president. Then the whole pressure on Humphrey to make the speech saying there would be a new approach in Vietnam and so forth. We wrote a speech for him to give in Salt Lake City. Had he delivered that he might have been elected, [a speech] that was tougher, but he took out all the tough things. By the way, it was that Salt Lake City speech, however good or bad it was, when the money started to come in. Hell, I got more money in the mailbags then--

F: No, I had a feeling the day after. You could see--it was just like a ball club that's in a slump and suddenly--

S: Suddenly it started to move, see. And I think that the President thought, too, that he had a chance from that time on. But for a time there wasn't any use in talking to Humphrey,

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you might as well talk to Nixon. Nixon was elected for at least three months of that battle.

One other thing: in those days you could lend money, you could contribute as much as you wanted and that kind of thing in order to be legal. But in 1964 I had some money, and I lent [Richard] Maguire, who was then the Democratic treasurer, some money, a lot of it from me, a couple of hundred thousand dollars, on the theory that they didn't have it, they had to make this immediate payment, and I would get it back in a month or so. And that was the day that they caught Jenkins, and I figured that my two hundred was down the tube. And I knew Walter Jenkins--that was the other guy I was talking about [earlier]. I used to talk to Walter Jenkins, and I still think that--I don't know what happened there, but even if it did happen, he was entrapped.

F: I think he was set up.

S: He was set up, yes. Set up. He didn't drink well. He went someplace to a cocktail party which the press arranged. They fed him loaded martinis, and he had to walk by that YMCA on the way back to the White House. And you don't know what they put in the drink, but I do think he was victimized. Certainly, if the charge was true--

F: Police were right there standing around the place--

S: Of course, they were all there waiting for him. It was just like he walked in there, or they may have known that he had that weakness; at least, I don't know that he had that weakness. I never believed it. But anyway, whatever that affair was, [it] happened the day after I gave them the check.

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Now, let me tell you one other thing. This is what I wanted to tell you in terms of why Kenny O'Donnell was the smartest politician there. Now, that was tough to handle, and finally it looked like it was all right, but about that same time I got a call from one of the writers of *Time* or *Newsweek*. One of those, I think it was probably *Newsweek*. He said, "Say, are you Bob Short?" "Yes." "You're the coordinator for Humphrey and the Democratic ticket? I want you to deny or confirm this report that Humphrey was in Chicago on a particular night, and that he enjoyed the favors of a particular girl"--he gave me the name--"and that there was an argument over what the consideration should be." You know, it's not something that should be talked [about]. "But there was an argument over what the price was, and Humphrey was drinking, got mad, and beat the hell out of the girl and threw her out. True or false?" I said, "Don't you print that story. I don't know whether it's true or false, but I'll tell you what. You hold that story until I can get a chance to check it and get back to you. If it's true, I'm going to tell you. If it's false, you'd better not print it." "Okay," he said, "I'll wait an hour."

I didn't know what to do; this was right on the heels of Jenkins. I hustled down to Kenny O'Donnell's office and I said, "I've got to see you." And he sat down [inaudible]. He said, "What's the matter here?" You know, I'm white [with fear]. I said, "You know about Jenkins. Here's a story on Humphrey, and we've got either to affirm or deny it." He sat back and he laughed, and he said, "Jeez, I thought you had something serious. Hell, we need that kind of a story at this point in this campaign to show that we're normal." (Laughter) So he said, "You call that guy back and tell him that you're not going either to affirm or deny. He can make his own sources. If he wants to print it, go ahead and print

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it, but if he prints it, it will probably help us because we need something to counteract the Jenkins story." I called the guy back and told him that and--

F: If he didn't, he should have.

S: And that was the end of the story. He never printed it. And, of course, afterwards I checked on the story. I guess there was some argument about offending some girl and a complaint made, but it wasn't anything like this guy was making it to sound.

But let me tell you the funny--in a campaign you always have to have something to break the monotony, and we made up a story after that that went something like this. This was the vice president's campaign now, and Goldwater was running with [William] Miller, and we made up this story that was not true that somebody on the Goldwater staff came in, knocked on the door, and Goldwater was going over a speech. He said, "Barry, we've got something here," and of course, Humphrey was chasing Goldwater. He was the foil of Goldwater. "We've got something on Humphrey that really will blow this campaign wide open." "Okay, what is it?" I guess you know how Goldwater is; I knew him pretty well, too. But anyway, the guy told the story about the girl and the argument about the money, and [how] Humphrey beat the hell out of her, and she was going to complain. "What do you think? It's not printed yet. You think we should get our friend that is on one of the magazines to put it in?" And Goldwater said, "Oh, whatever you think. Go ahead and do it. I don't care." He's reading a speech, see. And just about the time the guy is going out of the door to shut the door, Goldwater said, "Just a minute. Come back here. Come back here." Puts the speech away. "What did you say her name was?" "Mary Johnson." "Mary Johnson! Don't you know that we don't engage in that

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kind of a campaign? Don't you dare let that story go out." As if not only Humphrey, but he was involved with her.

(Laughter)

F: Just don't open up any can of worms there.

S: Don't open up any can of worms. Right. That's about it. I don't have any more.

F: Right.

End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview I

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