INTERVIEW IV

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INTERVIEWEE: SARGENT SHRIVER

INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette

PLACE: Mr. Shriver's office, Washington, D.C.

Tape 1 of 2, Side 1

G: In January 1968, BOB [Bureau of the Budget] reduced the Job Corps budget by about ten million dollars and forced the closing of sixteen centers. Do you recall how that decision was made to cut back on the Job Corps?

S: No, I'm sorry to say. Somebody like Charlie Schultze would have to be [asked]. I'm going to make a guess, though, in the sense that you know the Job Corps was both, in my judgment, a spectacular success and also a nationwide source of controversy. I'm guessing that there was a terrific amount of political pressure that probably was responsible for that.

You know something, I'm going to put a little aside in here. It's sometimes true that medicine hurts and people don't like to be cured even of what they've got because the medicine hurts. It's also true sometimes I think that if you're trying to build yourself up after you've allowed yourself to get into bad physical condition, there's an awful lot of what we all call aches and pains attendant to an effort to get yourself into shape. Not only with respect to the Job Corps therefore do I say this, but I think with respect to the problem of poverty in general I would say this, namely that most of us middle-class or upper-class, however you want to describe it, white Americans were shocked to find out that there was poverty in the United States back there in the sixties.

Secondly, we weren't quite prepared for the bitterness and the antagonism and the violence in some cases, you might say the emotional outbursts that accompanied an effort to alleviate poverty. There were an awful lot of people, both white and black, who had generations of pent-up feelings. I believe that when you take the cork out of a bottle like that, it's likely to burst forth because of a long period of compression. As a result, when we went into communities or when we took youngsters out of communities, like for the Job Corps, there was a lot of acrimony and wild activity, such that the placid life of most middle-class Americans was stunned, shocked, by all this social explosion. There was a lot of animosity revealed in the explosion, and then a lot of fear came into the hearts and minds of a lot of middle-class people, not only fear but then real hostility. So there was turmoil in those sixties, and I believe a cut of the type you've mentioned may well have been in part at least a reflection of the profound concern that many stable community leaders and good citizens felt at what was happening. That's a long-winded response, but it bears not just on the one question that you posed to me but on I'd almost say the psychological situation in the country and at least one of the effects of releasing people from poverty.

G: When you were faced with this cut, how did you decide which camps you were going to close, which Job Corps centers you were going to close?

S: When is the cut? When did the cut come that you referred to?

G: Well, the big one was in 1968, but you had--

S: When in 1968? Can you remember? Does your record show when in 1968 you are referring to?

G: January.

S: January of 1968?

G: Yes. You had to close sixteen centers.

S: Sixteen. My memory is very fragile or vague on this point, but allow me to say two things. One, I left the war against poverty in I think March of 1968. In January or February, certainly by February, I already knew that President Johnson wanted me to go to France, and so I was not as closely connected to every decision in those first months of 1968 as I think I was [in an] earlier period.

Secondly, my own memory would be along the following lines, that we would have closed down the smaller, less efficient--costwise--camps run by the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Interior rather than the larger, more cost-effective centers run by private business.

Third, there were some of the centers run by private business which the private businesses themselves had almost reached a decision to close because they weren't proving to be capable of running them. For example, IBM had a center up in Massachusetts, and it was a good idea, let's just say, but IBM I think found it pretty difficult if not impossible to manage the situation up there. There were a lot of factors involved there. So I think they were ready to throw in the towel anyhow, and there were probably some other contractors who were ready to throw in the towel. Whereas some of them, like General Electric and Westinghouse and a couple of others, IT&T, were making reasonable progress and they weren't ready.

So the standards on which we would have acted would be [to] close the least cost-effective ones first; second, try to retain those where we could do the most good for the most number of young people; and third, agree to close up the ones where the contractors themselves were just as willing to get out as to stay in.

G: There was one observation that these closings reflected good objectivity but bad politics, because you closed some in the states of friendly senators: one in New York, the one in Massachusetts that you mentioned, one in Gaylord Nelson's state of Wisconsin, and

[Philip] Hart's state of Michigan, and especially Fort Benoit in Oregon, which made Wayne Morse so furious. Do you recall any of these other than the Massachusetts one?

S: I seem to remember Gaylord Nelson being upset about closing the one in Wisconsin.

G: Why did you close that one, do you remember?

S: I don't really remember specifically. The only thing I could do would be to repeat the generalizations I already made. Obviously we would not be wanting purposefully to close them in the states of people who were friendly, as Wayne Morse or Gaylord Nelson were, to the Job Corps. That would have been just foolishness. So I'm morally certain that in each case we had a good cause or causes. I'm sorry to say, however, I don't remember them specifically. I had a habit of trying to get a very good person to run something like the Job Corps, and if they were proving capable of running it, I was delighted to let them run it because there were so many other things that were bothering me that I alone could work on that there was no point in my sticking my nose into the work of a very competent director like the director of VISTA or the director of the Job Corps, the director of Head Start. So at that time Bill Kelly would have been closing them up, and Bill Kelly was just terrifically good as a manager and thank God he was in charge. That's one reason why I don't remember the details.

G: Did the Job Corps have an evaluation system for gauging the effectiveness of these programs, the centers?

S: Well, I'm sure we did or it did, the Job Corps did, but I'm not familiar with their internal operation. I guess you know that we had an Office of Inspection at the OEO. It was run by Edgar May. His mandate included everything that we did, so he was out evaluating Community Action and Job Corps and Head Start and everything, and he did--or his evaluators did--make many studies or evaluations of Job Corps operations. In addition to that, we had the whole economic section run by a professor from Williams named Joseph

Kershaw, and his job, among other jobs he had, was the job of evaluating what we were doing from just strictly an economics point of view. I'm not sure that within the Job Corps structure itself that the director had an internal auditing or evaluating group working strictly within the Job Corps. Knowing Bill Kelly, however, I would not be at all surprised if he had one or at least an informal one, if not an actual bureaucratically structured evaluation system within the Job Corps.

G: I want to talk about the Office of Inspection in greater detail later on, but to what extent did you personally use these inspection reports of Edgar May's? Did they come to your attention?

S: Oh, yes. Oh, yes. I mean, they were a godsend. We couldn't have run OEO without them.

G: Did you have someone on your staff go through and read those and sift through them?

S: No, sir, I read them myself.

G: Did you?

S: Oh, yes. Oh, yes. I started that over in the Peace Corps. I found out that if you set up an evaluation system which was really an honest one, and if you got people into it who were not dependent for their livelihood on getting along with everybody else in the organization--sort of you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours--if you had truly independent evaluators, it was the best possible source of information on which to correct mistakes and build a better Peace Corps or a better Job Corps or a better Community Action. It was absolutely crucial. It was like an intelligence service in the army or the navy, or the cavalry used to be like that in a war; it was your eyes and your ears and you had to have scouts out there telling you what was really happening. You had to trust them and they had to be smart.

G: Did that office change from Bill Haddad to Edgar May?

S: Oh, I'm sure it changed some because those two fellows are quite different, but its mission didn't change. Some of the persons that worked in it probably changed because Haddad would have hired different guys than May would hire. But it's not surprising that both Haddad and May were extremely experienced journalists. They were both what now has come to be known as an investigative reporter. May, incidentally, won the Pulitzer Prize for investigative reporting, and Haddad won three prizes in New York City. They were named for Heywood Broun, who is a very famous journalist in New York, and he won three prizes in about five years for the most brilliant investigative reporting in New York City by anybody on any newspaper. He was just very, very gifted at that, and so was May. So they had the capacity to hire people like themselves who were also very good journalists and good investigative reporters. And to tell you the truth, the reports they prepared were terrific reading; they were better than the newspapers.

My mission to them was summarized really in a statement that I wanted to hear all the worst news that anybody could write about anything we were doing before they wrote it. In other words, I wanted to be ahead of the Birmingham newspaper or the Chicago newspaper or the Boston newspaper. I wanted to have the story of what was wrong in our operation before any external newspaper or district attorney or police chief found out about it. Because if you know what's wrong, you have a chance to fix it. The great danger I find in government operations, and maybe all operations, is that people like to bring good news to the boss. A lot of quote, "bosses," closed quote, really don't like people that keep coming in and telling them what's wrong. It's a psychological thing, you know.

I had just the reverse attitude, to tell you the truth. I used to have a sign on my door--on the inside of the door, not on the outside of the door--a quotation from a great famous vice president of General Motors called Charles Kettering. He had a nickname, "Boss,"

Boss Kettering. He was a great inventor and designer for General Motors in its heyday when it first got started. And the quote, which I hope is accurately attributed to him, at least I believe it was, said this: "Bring me only bad news. Good news weakens me." And that was really my whole outlook, particularly with respect to these inspection and evaluation departments, both at the Peace Corps and throughout OEO. Bring me bad news. I really wanted to hear it. I have a feeling that I'm being misinformed if I don't get bad news.

G: Did you, as a matter of actuality, receive only the negative reports rather than the--?

S: No, no.

G: You got both of them?

S: I got them all. And let me tell you, no matter where you are, there's a negative aspect to any report. Nobody is a total success at these things; that's an illusion. I used to play baseball and I'll use baseball analogies occasionally. You know, if somebody bats .300 or they bat .350, they're a genius, they're a great star of all times. That means they're getting three hits every ten times they come up, which proves that seven times they're flying out or fouling out or striking out, and I think that's what life is like. I think baseball is closer to life than somebody who makes a par on every hole. Human affairs are not susceptible, I'm afraid, of the kind of perfection we struggle for. My father-in-law used to say to me, Joseph P. Kennedy said, "Listen, Sarge, if you're right 55 per cent of the time, you're a genius." And look at our elections. If the president in an election campaign wins by 55 or 56 per cent of the vote, we call that a landslide. The opposite side is that 45 per cent of the people are against that person. That's what it was. That's my theory, anyhow, and that's the way we ran the evaluation decisions. You know, those journalists write so well, the reports they wrote were really excellent reading.

G: Was the Job Corps educational program sound, do you think?

S: Well, first of all, it was experimental. Secondly, it was developed by educators. And third, since it was, how shall I say, probing into new territory, it certainly must have had a lot of weaknesses which I hope were eliminated or strengthened in the course of operations. I was so keen about it being sound educationally that I asked Otis Singletary to be the first head of it, because fundamentally he was an educator and [I] always wanted to have educators involved in it. If you say to me, was it sound? That's a rather big word.

G: Do you think the Job Corps encouraged kids to drop out of school?

S: No. No. First of all, the Job Corps didn't even start until somebody was sixteen. Secondly, we almost had a requirement that they must have already left school. I used to say the Job Corps had the craziest qualifications for admission of any enterprise I ever heard of. You had to be out of school, out of work, you had to have flunked some subjects, and you had to have no prospects for a good future in order even to get in the Job Corps. So instead of looking for the positives in people's personalities or record, we looked for the negative because we were going for the people who were poor and out of school and out of work and, you know, standing on a corner looking vacantly into the wild blue yonder with no idea what to do with themselves.

G: Did the Job Corps raise too many false expectations, do you think?

S: Well, they said that about everything we did, and I guess it's true, to a point. To what point? Well, to the point where we never were able to get enough money to make the Job Corps big enough to really profoundly change American society. Today, for example, Republicans and Democrats, educators and economists, et cetera, all seem to agree that the Job Corps is successful. They say it's successful in terms of cost benefit: it returns a lot more to the taxpayers of the United States than it takes from the taxpayers; it actually advances people educationally; third, it changes their attitudes, et cetera. So from a

whole variety of different studies, the Job Corps is a success. My judgment is that when something is as great a success as that, we ought to put billions of dollars into it.

If you're the commanding general, you're Robert E. Lee or you're Dwight Eisenhower or some overall director of a huge enterprise, and suddenly you find that you have made a breakthrough on your right flank, you have achieved a huge success, or on your left flank, wherever you make a big breakthrough, you don't sit back and say, "Well, now I wonder how I made that breakthrough?" What you do is you immediately send increased forces to help expand the breakthrough, to burst ahead and make huge progress. You don't worry as much about the other efforts you might have been making, you exploit the great breakthrough.

Well, the Job Corps, to my way of thinking, is a great breakthrough showing how to deal with the large, large population of poor teenagers who are out of work, badly educated, and with little or no prospect for joining the mainstream of American economic, political or social life. Since that's one of the continuing existing problems today, I believe that instead of fussing around with thirty or forty thousand people in the Job Corps, we ought to be talking about having a hundred or two hundred [thousand] or a million people in it. Why? Because that is one of the biggest problems our country faces right now, and we're doing practically nothing that is successful with respect to that problem. I shouldn't say practically nothing, we're doing very little or much less than we ought to be doing with respect to that problem.

G: In retrospect, do you think the Job Corps should be more like the Neighborhood Youth Corps?

S: No, not at all. I went along with the Neighborhood Youth Corps because the Secretary of Labor was very keen about it, but knowing poor kids from my experience as president of the board of education in Chicago--I was president there for five years--I never believed that summer employment, six, eight, nine weeks like that, was a solution to the problems

of the kids who were in the Neighborhood Youth Corps. I felt it was good. There was nothing morally wrong with it or wasteful about it, but it was not profound enough nor long enough in duration to effectuate the change in outlook and culture, personality, ambition, et cetera, that was actually needed for those kids.

G: The question of having the programs more localized, closer to the large urban cores where a lot of the unemployed youth were coming from, would this have been preferable, do you think, to transporting them to more remote centers?

S: Well, I don't think so. I realize there's a vast body of opinion that does think so, so I may as well just say why I don't think so. First of all, the Job Corps was a national program, and the problem of poor, unemployed, badly educated young men and women was a national problem, and I didn't think that it was fair to just concentrate the effort where those people lived. I thought it was a national effort, and to take everybody on a national basis and treat them as citizens of the United States was an exemplification of that. If you join the marine corps or you join the army, you just don't stay where you are in Arkansas, let's say. You become a part of the army and you go into the army and you go wherever the army wants you to go. I had the same attitude about the Job Corps: it was not a little local effort; it was a national effort to deal with a national problem.

The second thing is the mere traveling perhaps quite a long ways away from your previous existence is an educational activity and it has an emotional and cultural impact on the people who experience that kind of travel.

Third, it was my belief, still is my belief, that a large number of the poor, unemployed teenagers in America are to some extent victims of their surroundings. They grow up in a certain social environment which is almost conducive to keeping them the way they are. I felt it was important to extract them out of that environment and to put them in a different environment, twenty-four hours a day, three hundred and sixty-five days a year, two

years, a totally new environment, a new culture. Expose them to a new culture: a culture of work, a culture of discipline, a culture of responsibility, personal responsibility. I thought that to take them away from where they were and to put them into this new culture, the culture of the Job Corps, would be profoundly transforming to them and beneficial to them.

I used to say, and I still say, that I was always impressed by the army, navy, air force decision that if they get a very good high school student and take him to Annapolis or West Point, it will take them four years to make that young man into a genuine army or navy officer. I don't argue with that. I think it takes that long to take even a well-prepared, well-motivated, psychologically adjusted young man--or woman--and turn them into a qualified, competent, dedicated, motivated military officer. I don't have any argument about that; I believe it. People join an order of religious people like the Jesuits or the Benedictines or whatever, we all know that it takes a period of time for that person's character to be formed to the point where they become a good Benedictine or a good Jesuit or a committed Franciscan or whatever. These kids we're talking about, the Job Corps kids, have a comparable problem, only worse. They need to be formed so that they can become employable, so that they can become well motivated, so that they can be structured into a competent member of this society, and that cannot be done in the summer in the afternoons like with the Neighborhood Youth Corps. Nor can it be done, I think, if those kids are left right in the center of the environment which is helping to turn them in the wrong direction.

Now, if they had good families, which can exist in bad places, that's another matter. But what we were faced with and are still faced with in this country is literally hundreds of thousands, maybe millions, of young men and young women between sixteen and twenty-one--I'll repeat it--they're out of work, they've got no possibility for a job, they're poor, a

significant portion of them are illiterate, a significant proportion of them are not healthy in the sense that they don't know anything about what to eat or what not to eat, what to drink or what not to drink. They, some of them, don't know what it is to make a schedule or adhere to a schedule. Some of them were not even able to tell time on a clock. Some of them had never kept an appointment with anybody for anything because nobody had ever made an appointment for them ever to be anyplace. So they had no sense of discipline over their activities or over their time or over their heads or their bodies. There are hundreds of thousands of young men and women like that in the United States, right this minute while we're talking. And I'll go to my grave believing that if they were all in a thing like the Job Corps, not only them but our country would be a much more productive place economically, it would be a much more stable place socially, and it would be a much more unified place patriotically speaking than it is.

That's a huge answer to such a simple question that you gave me, but you can see I've thought about it a lot and I had to face it when I was president of the board of education in Chicago. I mentioned that occasionally, here twice already because a lot of people don't even know that I was president of the board of education in Chicago, and I think I learned something out there about inner city kids. I tried to do my best to learn. And if you're five years in there every day watching that, you can't come away without having some ideas. And the Job Corps actually came out of my experience in Chicago. I tried to get a Job Corps-type school started under the aegis of the board of education in Chicago. By that I mean a twenty-four hours a day, three hundred and sixty-five days a year, total boarding school but for inner city kids. I couldn't sell it out there when I was on the board, but when I got down here and had a chance, that's where the Job Corps came from.

G: Were you satisfied with the placement component of the Job Corps? Were you able to place the kids adequately after they completed the program?

S: Adequately, no. No.

G: What was wrong with it?

S: I don't know. I would say that the placement program for Harvard and Yale University is not adequate, that they have youngsters that graduate from Harvard and Yale that they can't get placed properly, and so there's no way that you could have a placement program for the Job Corps that would satisfy me or any other I think responsible person running the Job Corps. The best you can do is that, namely, the best you can do. There's always going to be a significant component of failure in a placement program like that.

G: If you were doing it over again today, is there anything in terms of placement that you would institute that did not occur to you or you couldn't put into place at the time?

S: Well, truthfully, you know I'm not an expert on placement. But one of the reasons we had private corporations running the Job Corps was the hope that those corporations, knowing where jobs are in America, would train the young men for openings that existed, not theoretical openings but practical openings. Therefore the placement task would be facilitated--not solved, but facilitated--by having persons in industry helping both to train and to place. Now, frankly I didn't do anything personally about the placement program. I'm more than willing to confess that I don't know about placement; I'm no expert on placement. But I figured that the people in industry who had to find good employees and place them--that's their job--would do it better than a person like myself or some governmental employee, some employment guy who worked for the government that I might recruit off the street. Why not give that job of placement to people who are experts in placement? So that's what we attempted to do. But despite the fact that they were experts in placement, I'm only saying that there's no such thing as batting a thousand in placement, at least I don't know of anybody that has a total success in placement and we

certainly didn't. It would have been foolish to expect that we would have a great placement record.

G: Let's move to Head Start. Let me ask you to describe the genesis of Head Start as far as you yourself are concerned. How did you first become acquainted with the concept?

S: Well, I've said this I think before for your records, but I'm more than happy to repeat it. From 1950 to 1960, my wife and I ran the Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr. Foundation, which was focused on trying to help persons who were mentally retarded. One of the places we worked with is called the George Peabody School of Education at Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee. One of the faculty members there was a professor, a woman named Susan Gray. On one occasion I was down there and heard Susan Gray give a description of an experimental program that she had run under the auspices of that College of Education in which she had found out or she had proven that you could actually change the IQ of a mentally retarded person if you intervened in that person's life early enough in childhood. Now, I was laboring under the impression in those days, a long time ago, that if you had an IQ of 20 or you had an IQ of 200, that came to you like blue eyes or brown hair, it was just a given and you couldn't do anything about it. You were stamped with that IQ. So I can remember being astonished when Professor Gray described how the IQ of mentally retarded people could be elevated, could be raised. And it made a terrific impression on me. I can remember it to this instant. That went into the back of my consciousness, not the front of my consciousness, and then suddenly I found myself in charge of something called the war against poverty.

The second thing that happened was that in truth in the early days in the war against poverty, people did not know the demographics of poverty in the United States. There was a great deal of ignorance then, as there is now, about poverty, but more so then than now. So one of the first things I asked the experts to prepare for me was a pie chart

which would just show me where the poor people were, how many were old, how many were young, how many were black, how many were white, et cetera.

So one day these demographic charts were brought in to me, and my eyes popped out when I suddenly realized and saw that 50 per cent of all the poor people in America were children. We think about unemployed men or unemployed women and so on as being poor, but it was a shock to me back there in 19--whatever it was--66 to find out that 50 per cent of the people who were poor were children. So I said to myself, "How can you be conducting an intelligent war against poverty if you don't focus a great deal of your effort on children? That's 50 per cent of your target." And at that time we didn't have anything in the war against poverty for children. We had the Job Corps, we had Community Action, we had VISTA volunteers, et cetera, but we didn't have anything for children. And I thought, isn't it incredible that we don't have anything for children and what could you do for children? I had had that question going back and forth in my mind a lot and I never really had a solution. I asked a lot of people and nobody knew what to do about children.

Suddenly one day I recalled that study by Susan Gray, namely that you could improve the IQ of mentally retarded children if you intervened in early childhood. And I said to myself, well, if you can do that with mentally retarded children, why couldn't you improve the IQ of normal, non-mentally retarded children if you intervened early? So then I started to go around asking experts, as we all called them, you know, what they thought about a program under the war against poverty which would be an early intervention program, the purpose of which would be to do for normal children what Susan Gray proved you could do for mentally retarded children down there at Peabody College in Tennessee. Well, nobody said it was stupid and nobody said it couldn't be

done, but the question kept coming up, you know, how do you do it and when do you do it and where do you do it? How do you get to the children?

So we were lucky in that we started the whole war against poverty in January and February and March, and suddenly I realized that in summertime nearly all the schools of the United States are empty, but they're all waiting for the kids to come in and start first grade in the fall. So I said to myself, well, my God, why don't we try to give the kids who are going to come to school in the fall, especially the poor kids, give them a head start? In other words, bring them into school in let's say June or July before everybody else comes to school so that they can get up to the starting line almost equal to the other kids. In other words, in the poverty population, the children don't have books to read; their parents are not encouraging them to read. They don't have pencils, they don't have pads, they don't see people reading, they don't see people writing, they don't know about science. Unfortunately a lot of the time if they're lucky the only thing they get to see is the TV. Their parents frequently are not persons of an intellectual bent or background. Their parents frequently are not highly educated people themselves. So this little child in poverty, with parents sometimes that are not highly educated and sometimes unfortunately not highly motivated, comes to a school you might almost say a year behind the other kids through no fault of the child. So I said what these kids need is at least a start, they need a head start to even participate, let alone to compete in first grade.

Then the question arose, well, if you tried to give them a head start that summer--remember, we're now talking about February and March--what kind of a thing could we give them? I can remember vividly talking to some professors of education. One of the best in the country told me that if we could put on a program that had twenty-five hundred children in it and we worked hard with them, we could stand a pretty good chance of helping them to be ready for school. Well, twenty-five hundred was nothing.

If 50 per cent of the total population was children, twenty-five hundred would be about a millionth of that, you know. So I said, "We can't do that, we have to have something that's sufficiently large to prove whether this will help with the problem of poverty." Well, I just couldn't sit there and think about this myself. Obviously I didn't have enough experience to do it singlehandedly. So I talked to the head of the scientific advisory committee of the Kennedy Foundation, a great pediatrician named Dr. Robert Cooke. I said to him, "What about this?" And he said, "Well, I think it might work." And I said, "Well, would you get together a committee and make an analysis of this thing and come in with some recommendations to me?" So Bob Cooke and I, but I think principally Bob Cooke, went out and put together a committee, I think it had as many as somewhere around fourteen to eighteen people on it, men and women, medical doctors, sociologists, educators and so on, and I just threw this problem and this approach, which I've just described, at them.

Tape 1 of 1, Side 2

S: God, they were an extraordinarily competent committee. And from that committee came forth a program which was quite diversified and was not only focused, as Susan had focused hers, on the IQ, it was focused on the health aspects of the child because we found out subsequently that there were many deficiencies in health that prevented the kids from even reading, much less learning. There were nutritional deficiencies, et cetera. So that Head Start became not just an effort to improve people's IQ--it could have been that--but it was not just that, it was a comprehensive program.

G: Did this health component come in on the basis of experimentation and feedback or was this something that was originally cranked into the program?

S: It was originally cranked in.

G: Who thought of that? Who came up with that?

S: Well, it was probably Cooke or Julius Richmond or some other doctor.

G: Was Susan Gray consulted or brought in at all to this process?

S: No, no, strangely enough she wasn't. Isn't that funny? Why not, you might say. Well, I don't know. I really can't remember. Isn't that funny?

G: Did she ever realize that she was--

S: --the progenitor of all this? Oh, yes. I told her personally a number of times and I've talked about her a lot. There's no question about the fact that if I hadn't heard that down there and it hadn't lodged somewhere in the back of my mind, this Head Start would never have come off.

G: How did the name Head Start appear, do you recall?

S: It came just about the way I described.

G: Who thought of it, do you know?

S: Well, I don't know. The truth of the matter is I don't know of anybody who thought of it unless I thought of it myself. I don't want to just arrogantly say that I thought of it. Herb Kramer might have a better memory on that than I do. But when we talk about giving kids--which is what we were talking about--a better start for kindergarten, I can almost hear myself saying--if I didn't say it, I can hear myself saying--"Well, that's a head start for school." And that's what it originally was, you see. The original idea was to get them in June or July, get them into school or into this environment in July and have July and August to work on them and then they would be ready to go into the school. So it was, so to speak, obviously a head start on school. That's where the word came from, and I think frankly I probably thought of it myself, but I can't remember.

G: There had been the year before a program in West Virginia called Even Start. Were you familiar with that program? The objective was similar.

S: No, as a matter of fact, I hadn't heard it until just this minute.

G: Really?

S: Even Start?

G: Yes.

S: Who was doing that? I had never heard of that.

G: I think it evolved from some of the civil rights work that was being done down there.

S: Is that right?

G: Yes. How about Julius Richmond's work in Syracuse? Were you familiar with that and their efforts?

S: Not in depth. But you see, a doctor like Dr. Cooke probably would have known about that. That's probably the reason why Julius Richmond, himself a pediatrician--a damned good one, too--was brought into the work.

G: As I understand it, you had a very short period of time to gear up for this summer program.

S: We had no time at all, that's right.

G: How did you arrive at the decision to go ahead and do it then or to wait perhaps another year?

S: I mentioned a minute ago that I thought a program that involved twenty-five hundred people was worthless in view of the magnitude of the problem we were trying to tackle. Secondly, I suspect, although I'm not certain of this, that after a couple of meetings with that advisory committee which was put together to formulate Head Start, that it was clear that if we were going to try to do what that advisory committee said we ought to do, for a couple of hundred thousand kids, it was going to cost X amount. My memory is that presented with computations like that, I first decided that we could go ahead and I would put ten million dollars into the program--and there's a little story behind that--but that I would commit ten million dollars to the program. And that's when we went to the White House and announced the program and Mrs. Johnson agreed to become the sponsor of it.

Incidentally, Mrs. Johnson had talked to me because she wanted to be the sponsor of the Job Corps--we were talking about the Job Corps a minute ago--and she wanted to be the sponsor of the Job Corps because Lyndon Johnson was so much interested in the CCC camps and had participated in them back in the 1930s. So when the Job Corps came along and it seemed to be very much like the CCCs, Mrs. Johnson thought it would be nifty for her to be identified with the resurgence, you might almost say, of the CCC idea. I, of course, was delighted that she was interested, but in the meeting with her I remember vividly saying to her, "Mrs. Johnson, I want you to know something. I think it's terrific and we're delighted and honored that you would take an interest in the Job Corps. But I want to tell you about something else," and she said, "What's that?" I said, "I want to tell you about something that we're putting on called Head Start. Head Start will be for this generation, in my judgment, the equivalent or maybe more than the CCC camps were in the thirties. There's never been anything done in the United States like the Head Start, but there have been the CCCs. So that if you were interested in and became the sponsor of Head Start, you'd be sponsoring something totally new. The Johnson Administration would be starting something totally new and you'd be the sponsor of it."

She said, "Well, tell me about it," and I said, "Well, it involves these children," and I explained to her how it worked--how it was theorized, how we wanted it to work. Not how it worked, but how we wanted it to work. And she said, "Well, Sargent, that's very interesting. Let me think about it." I think the next day, very quickly anyhow, she called and she said she thought it was a marvelous thing and she'd like to get involved. So then she had a meeting at the White House to which she invited a lot of people who wouldn't have come if they hadn't been asked by the President's wife.

G: Who were they? Were they people in the private sector?

S: Oh, yes, they were people in the private sector and there were some political people, rather famous wives of particular people. For example, I'll never forget, Mrs. Orval Faubus, whose husband was the governor of Arkansas and who, so to speak, stood for a lot of things that Lyndon Johnson was on the opposite side of those things, she was there. I can't remember everybody, but she had people like her, and senators' wives and congressmen's wives I'm sure. Then there were all the doctors involved and others. Obviously the White House keeps lists of all those things; I can't remember it all. But her sponsorship gave us a big kickoff, so we announced it right there--I think it was in what they used to call the Gold Room, it was a big press conference thing--at the White House. That got us off to a flying start.

To revert just for a moment to what you were talking about, it was at that point that I had said we'll put ten million dollars behind it. By the time the program was finished, it seems to me, let's say about the thirty-first of August, we had put in I think it was some where more than fifty million, somewhere between fifty and seventy million dollars into that program. Now, that is an incredible story in recent government; I believe it's an incredible story. Just let me make these points: we never had to ask Congress for permission to start Head Start; we never had to ask the Bureau of the Budget for permission to start Head Start; we never had to ask anybody for any money to start Head Start, not even the President; we didn't have to go to any external cabinet officer to start Head Start. We were able, under the Community Action title of the war against poverty legislation, to do that by ourselves. I don't know of many other instances in the recent history of the United States, especially in the civilian side, where anybody, anybody, anybody--I even include the president almost--was ever able to start a program of national magnitude involving let's say seventy million dollars without asking anybody for permission to do any of it.

It came about because of the fortuitous circumstance that the Congress had appropriated a bloc of money that was available for that Community Action section, and there was no way to spend that money in Community Action programs as conceived of--namely the structure of these committees in the communities in organizing the poor, et cetera--effectively. We couldn't spend the money effectively on just Community Action effort. So having a difference between what was authorized and what we could intelligently spend gave us the opportunity--gave me the opportunity--to try some initiatives which had never been presented to Congress or anybody else. And among those initiatives were Head Start, Upward Bound--another program similar to Head Start--and other programs in the Community Action title.

We ultimately called all those programs which we started national emphasis programs, as compared to the local originated programs which originally everybody thought Community Action would consist of exclusively. And it was a continual struggle within the organization of OEO against those national emphasis programs, or for them, because they were taking money that otherwise would have gone straight into Community Action and would have been spent on locally developed programs. I struggled with that all the time I was at OEO.

But because of that extra amount of money which was not usable efficiently in the first year, I, as director of OEO, had this incredible opportunity literally to spend the taxpayers' money without asking anybody. I don't know where there's been many chances like that for any human being, except in a war. In a war, in a fighting war, a general makes decisions like that all the time without thinking about what the cost of it's going to be. But in the civilian side, that rarely, if ever, happens. So I look upon Head Start as one of those providential developments that occurred in a moment in history where there was a coming together of a lot of unusual and hard-to-replicate factors.

G: Since they were coming out of Title II of Community Action, did you have to get approval for Head Start programs from the local Community Action agencies or boards?

S: No.

G: You didn't?

S: No. You see, there were a lot of communities that didn't even have Community Action boards. And those that did were purely in a formative stage really. It's hard to believe, but we didn't have to get approval from anybody--in fact, I mean President Johnson, Mrs. Johnson, the director of the Bureau of the Budget, chairmen of the committees in the House and Senate, nobody.

I'll tell you one thing that I was very pleased with when we came back up for the next appropriation. I appeared in the House and one of the great opponents of the war against poverty was a congressman named Charles Goodell of--

G: New York, I believe.

S: --New York, you're right. He subsequently became a senator. When we went up to go for the second go-round for authorization, by that time we had started Head Start, we had started other programs which had never been presented to Congress. And Charlie Goodell, who was an arch-opponent, right there in the hearing room of the House said to me, "Listen, Mr. Shriver, I want to congratulate you on this program Head Start. I have tried over here in the Congress for five years to get the Congress to adopt a piece of legislation that I have drawn up on early childhood education. I couldn't get anywhere with it. Nobody in the executive branch and nobody over here was interested in it. We would have waited fifty more years to get a program like Head Start going if we had had to process it through the congressional process or wait for the president of the United States to propose it. I think it's a godsend you started it; it's a great program." I'll never forget him saying that because he, as I said a minute ago, was one of the two people the Republican Party picked

out to be the guys who watched what we were doing and criticized it and put out press releases all the time in opposition to what we were doing. So I was infinitely grateful to him for backing that program.

G: Who was the other one, by the way? Was it Quie?

S: Yes. Who subsequently went on and had a very--you know, he was a very good congressman, Albert Quie. And then he went on to be mayor of Minneapolis for a couple of terms. He was a fine person. He--well, he and we just looked at the role of government, the possibilities of government doing things, from a different point of view. But he was a fine man.

G: Do you recall informing the President about the Head Start idea and how he reacted to it?

S: No. But then you see--

G: You must have told him at some point that you were going to do this.

S: If so, it probably came up in connection with Mrs. Johnson doing what I said a minute ago. That might leave you or somebody else with a feeling that we were not properly respectful to the President or some negative kind of a feeling. I'd like to just comment about that in order to get rid of anything of that nature. When Jack Kennedy asked me to run the Peace Corps, I had the same attitude about running that as I did about Lyndon Johnson asking me to run the war against poverty or Lyndon Johnson sending me to France or Joseph Kennedy hiring me and sending me to Chicago. My belief was this--it still is, I'm sorry to say--if you are the president of the United States and you asked me to do something and you give me the authority to do it, the greatest service I can render to you is to go do it and not bother you. I feel that the president of the United States has got about, I don't know, three hundred people who have the right to report to him on some chart. They have the access to the president, they have the right. I feel also that there are certain kinds of people who love to be over bugging the president about something or

telling the president about all the wonderful things they're doing. I also think that the president's got problems of infinite magnitude bigger than the problem that I happen to be working on at a given moment, you know. Consequently I've always had the concept that the best kind of an assistant to the president, the best kind of a person working for the president in the executive branch, is the person who goes and does the job they've been given to do and doesn't bother the president. My theory always was that if I could run whatever I had in such a way that it brought glory on the administration or the secretary of state or the country and didn't have to bother the president or the secretary of state, that that was the best thing I could possibly do for them.

I followed the same principle with respect to my own people. I said earlier in this little interview that if I hired somebody, like say Bill Kelly to run the Job Corps, I did not call up Bill Kelly all the time asking, "What are you doing today?" or "What did you do last week?" or "Send me a report on what you did." Bill Kelly knew, or Otis Singletary knew, that if they had a problem they could walk in my office in five minutes. There was no protocol keeping them out or a whole list of people waiting that they couldn't get in; they could get in, they were priority people. But they also knew that I was struggling with something else that I alone was able to do, being the director, and that they were helping me if they kept stuff off of my desk.

Now, the result of that was that we could have Community Action running all over the United States in two thousand different localities, and the Job Corps running in five hundred localities, and Upward Bound running in three hundred localities, and Head Start running in five hundred localities, et cetera, because the people who were given the jobs knew how to do the job and they did not have to be supervised every twenty-five minutes by a bureaucrat let's say like me. So, for example, when I got Julius Richmond to run Head Start--and Joe English was involved in there, too--I didn't have to go over there

every week or two weeks or every month and ask, "Well, how are you doing?" You know what I mean? They didn't feel they had to come over and butter me up and tell me what they were doing. Again, that "bring me bad news" theory of mine applies. If Julius Richmond was running Head Start for me and it was running fantastically well, he doesn't have to send me a bulletin every twenty-five minutes about everything he's doing or request permission. So my feeling about working for the president is the same way as I feel about having somebody work for me. I want them to have maximum opportunity to show, to perform, without a whole lot of second guessing or coming in and requesting permission.

So with respect to Head Start--that's the most long-winded answer you ever had to a question--in starting Head Start I didn't feel it was either necessary, or I would put it the other way, that it was even desirable for me to bother the President with it. I didn't bother the President with starting Upward Bound, I didn't bother the President with starting any of the other programs, like the program for Indians that we had or the program for migrant laborers that we had, or the Foster Grandparents program, I never bothered the President to start with requesting permission about those things.

G: Well, the President did become aware of it. What was his reaction to it? What did he think of Head Start?

S: Oh, I think he liked it. I believe that he was pleased that Mrs. Johnson was the national chairperson or sponsor, whatever the right word was.

G: There was a point where you had a film called *Pancho*, and Pancho the Head Start poster child, or whomever, was there. Reportedly LBJ, when he saw this, turned to you and said something to the effect that he had seen this sort of experience when he had been a teacher of Mexican-American poor children as a young man. Do you recall this? Is this accurate?

S: Oh, yes. Oh, yes.

G: What did he say? Tell me.

S: Oh! That I don't recall. I don't like to quote people, especially people like the President of the United States, when I don't really remember the precise words, and I don't. But I do know that President Johnson was very favorably disposed toward Head Start. He was favorably disposed toward the Job Corps, he was favorably disposed toward Foster Grandparents and those programs to a significant extent because of his own life history. I've said this many times publicly and I'm glad to say it here on the record that his experience in Cotulla was an important life experience for him that he never forgot. And I've said this to my own sons, and I've asked them to look among their acquaintances to see how many young men that they've gone to college with have left college, graduated from college and then gone to teach in a primary school. The answer is there's not one in a million right today. Of all the young men graduating from all the fancy colleges around the United States, very, very, very few young men decide to go to teach in elementary school. Some do, but mostly women do. So retrospectively it's a very interesting thing to me that Lyndon Johnson left school and went to teach, in a one-room schoolhouse, elementary [school] kids in Cotulla, Texas. That shows something about him as a human being which I don't think anybody talks about every much, but which to me is damned indicative of the compassionate nature that he had with respect to young people.

Lyndon Johnson was a very complicated human being and he had a lot of other aspects to his personality besides the one I'm talking about, and I'm not trying to, so to speak, make an idol of or give an idyllic picture of Lyndon Johnson. That's not my point. But it's not right I believe to fail to take into account those qualities of his character which didn't show up in the political world but which were there, as indicated by the fact that when he left school he went to teach in an elementary school of Mexican-Americans. You know,

in Texas today, and God knows in Johnson's youth, Mexican-Americans were at the bottom of the economic, social, et cetera, ladder. If you wanted to make a bundle or become governor or something of Texas, you didn't start off teaching in an elementary school to little Mexican-American kids in a place called Cotulla, Texas, brother. That's not the way up the ladder of success. And it's not the way up the ladder of success today for most men regardless of their background, right now, in college today. So there's something interesting I think about Lyndon Johnson that got him to go out there to teach young kids in Cotulla, Texas, and that interest, that quality in his character stayed with him so that when Head Start got started he was delighted. He was enthusiastic. He was pleased that Mrs. Johnson was the national chairperson and so on.

G: Did he ever have an input on ideas that came from his experience?

S: In Cotulla?

G: Yes.

S: I don't think he ever told me specifically things to do that he related back there to Cotulla.

G: How else did Mrs. Johnson help? You mentioned that meeting and the fact that she was the national chairman or whatever. In what other ways did she help Head Start?

S: Well, I'm sure she helped in a lot of ways, truthfully, and I'm not the best person in the world to ask that question. Now, a person who would give you a better informed answer is Dr. Julius Richmond, who ran Head Start and who was in day-to-day contact with her. You see, I told you a minute ago that if I found a guy who could run it, then I let him run it. So Julius and Joe English and a couple of other fellows in whom I had terrific confidence, they ran Head Start. Before the summer ran out there were three or four hundred people working at Head Start, a lot of them volunteers, and they were in a different building. They were over in an old hotel that had been condemned; it was falling down. The files of Head Start were in bathtubs. They were working in a

condemned piece of hotel property because there was no place for them to go, and the files, the letters were pouring in, they were filing them literally in bathtubs. There were some people around here in Washington still, women, who volunteered and came over there and worked and maintained the files in the bathtub. So you can get the real story from them better than you can get it from me.

G: Anyone in particular that you--?

S: Well, I can't remember the names right now, but maybe when this is all finished, this interview, we can try to recall some of them. But those people were fantastic.

G: Did Mrs. Johnson visit Head Start centers?

S: I'm sure she did. I'm sure she did. You know, like she'd go on a campaign trail, you know, and she'd do that kind of thing. But, honestly, I wish I could tell you from my own experience exactly what she did and where she went and all that, but I can't. A person who could help also on that would be Lynda Bird Johnson, Governor [Charles] Robb of Virginia, his wife. She's terrific, Lynda Bird Johnson, you know, and she would have a lot of personal, I'm sure, information about what Mrs. Johnson did. I'm sorry I'm so bad in recalling those things.

G: Now, there was a big meeting at the White House of some of the mayors of large cities, and I believe you had a program related to Head Start for the wives of those mayors. Do you recall that, was that an important step in explaining Head Start to people in urban areas?

S: I don't recall it, but it could easily have taken place, probably did take place. And once again, I can assure you that it was probably put on by Dr. Julius Richmond or Dr. Joe English or Dr. Bob Cooke or Jules Sugarman. Jules Sugarman was in there. He was a real administrative genius, Jules Sugarman was, and he was in there helping the medicos from outside the government to organize it well in the government. Now that I've mentioned Jules Sugarman's name, I know something like that happened, but Jules could tell you.

G: Okay. Did you have as much of a problem in terms of lobbying to get the annual support for Head Start that you did for some of the other programs on the Hill, Community Action and Job Corps? Or was it easier to persuade congressmen to go along with it? You mentioned that you--

S: Well, it's easier to persuade them.

G: Was it?

S: Yes.

G: Did you see Head Start as a way to protect Community Action?

S: Sure.

G: Did you?

S: I thought all those national emphasis programs were ways in which to protect Community Action, because a lot of people liked Head Start, a lot of people liked Foster Grandparents, a lot of people liked Upward Bound--okay?--and they don't like Community Action. The reason I believe is this: Head Start, Upward Bound and so on, are in the philanthropic tradition of western society. That is, people who have things like money give them away--do you know what I mean?--to the people who don't have things. You give instruction and you have volunteers, and all of that fits into the psychology of, how shall I say, the western oriented culture in which we live. Community Action gives something away which most people don't want to give away, and that's power. Community Action gives political power to people that don't have political power. In a sense it enfranchises them and also gives them power. It gives them power in the community and power over some money, and that's what people in politics don't like to divide. In other words, if you're the mayor of a city, you don't like to have somebody else in the city with power over public money in that city. If there's going to be public money

spent in your jurisdiction and you're the head fellow elected, you want to control what happens to that money. That's just human nature.

So when we started the Community Action Program and created an entity, let's just say we created an entity in Baltimore which was outside the power and control of the mayor of Baltimore, an entity which got money from Washington without even going through the governor, let alone the mayor, that entity constituted a diversion of power, prestige, public attention, and money. Nobody in politics liked that.

G: Did this relate to the effort to spin off Head Start to HEW and your resistance of that?

S: Sure.

G: Would you elaborate on that?

S: Well, I'd go back to it again. It's a question of power and control, and the normal approach in Washington historically was the approach that Reagan is talking about now. You give money to the states and then the states give it to the municipalities and then the municipalities give it to the districts, et cetera. Right? Except in wartime. In wartime all that's off and everybody goes together to defeat the enemy. The army money doesn't go to the governor of New York to then be dispensed through the militia of New York. We got rid of that back in the days of the Articles of Confederation. We found out that you couldn't run a country that way or defend it if the militia of Maryland, New York, Virginia, et cetera, New Jersey, are all independent little armies. It doesn't work. So the United States Army or Navy or Air Force, they operate as an entity, right? So in wartime all the stuff I'm talking about we forget about. But in peacetime we say, as a part of the idea of indissoluble states, this is a union of fifty independent states. I was brought up on that--I'm from the South--states' rights, that the federal government should do as little as possible, and when it does it, it always ought to try to do it through the states. The states

in turn are supposed to go around and do it through the cities or the counties and right on down the local level.

I've got nothing against that theory; I was weaned on that theory. In philosophy they called it the subsidiarity principle: always do it at the local level if you can. I'm for it. The problem, however, was that I was given a job of running, quote, "a war on poverty." It was to be a national effort, and we were supposed to institute new ways of combating poverty, because we wouldn't have had poor people if the old ways had been successful. So I read that mandate literally. And I also drew an analogy to boards of education, because every city of any size in America has got a board of education, and a large proportion of those boards of education are independent entities. The one in Chicago, for example, is a separate municipal corporation; it levies its own taxes and gets its money from taxes. So I said if we start Community Action agencies or a Community Action board in Chicago, it ought to have an independent existence like the school board. But that was a totally new thing, to start two thousand Community Action agencies in the United States, which would be, so to speak, the equivalent of two thousand boards of education, from scratch. That was a terrifically difficult thing to do.

To get public approval and support for the idea of such a board was difficult. And then if you said poor people had to be on the board, that was not a heresy, that was an absurdity. Mayor [Richard] Daley made a wonderful comment. He was a brilliant man and a great friend of mine. We didn't agree on everything, but nevertheless he was a terrific fellow. He made the most succinct, powerful statement against what I'm talking about I ever heard, which was "Well, why should these poor people be on these boards? If they knew anything about how to get out of poverty, they wouldn't be in it. So why should you put a poor person on a board the purpose of which is to eliminate poverty?" As he said, "Hell, if they knew how to get out of poverty, they wouldn't be poor!" You know, that has a

terrific ring of authenticity and down-to-earth sort of practical wisdom about it, you know.

So when we said poor people had to be on the board, and we were empowering them, we were saying that these people have to feel responsible for their own destiny and the destiny of the people they were with. That we had to ennoble them, if you will, with a feeling that they, too, like everybody else, were responsible people, that they had the knowledge, they had the power to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps.

We did the same thing with the Indians out in the Indian reservations, to jump to a totally different thing. For example, on the Indian reservations, schools run by the Bureau of Indian Affairs here in Washington suffer a huge percentage of kids running away from school--truancy. In any given year, 50 per cent of the kids would run away. Well, we went out to the Indian reservations in the war against poverty and said, "We're going to start a school out here on the reservation where the Indians are the board of directors," and everybody laughed and hollered. Because on that reservation there were very few Indians that ever even got to the third grade in school. So the transparent statement or objection is that "How can anybody work effectively on a board of education who's never gotten beyond the third grade? Shriver, you've got to be nuts to put the school that you're going to start under the jurisdiction of people who don't know a damn thing about schools." And I mean, it has a lot of plausibility, doesn't it? I think it does. But we took the position that the Indians would never actually believe in the school or trust the school or attend the school or support the school if it wasn't their school. And so we said, "We're going to try this," and we created schools out there on the reservations where the Indians actually had charge.

Well, one of the things that happened in the first year, there was no truancy. It just disappeared like washing the window would take the dirt off! It was miraculous. I'm not

saying those schools turned out to be infinitely superior to any other schools, but they exemplified what I'm talking about in these Community Action agencies. I believe you have to treat people, even if they're uneducated like the Indians were, as human beings capable of being educated, capable of understanding what their role was, in charge of the school, capable of taking an interest in their kids. And I think the same thing is true about the poor people; we started those Community Action agencies with the poor people on it because we wanted--I'll use the phrase again--to ennoble the poor people, to say there's nothing the matter with you, you are a human being, you've got the capacity to do this, you don't have to have a Ph.D. from Harvard to be on this Community Action agency. You know the problem in the poverty area better than Sarge Shriver or Lyndon Johnson knows it. You're in it, and we want your advice; we're treating you as a grown-up human being with emotions and convictions and an intelligence which can contribute to this thing.

Now, I'll tell you one thing, we've got thousands of graduates from those Community Action agencies, poor people, whose whole lives have been transformed by that. The problem, however, is that when you do that the way we did it, by putting money into their hands to spend in the community, you are by-passing the state bureaucracy and the municipal bureaucracy and all the politicians. It doesn't make any difference whether the politicians were Democrats or Republicans or whether they were governors or mayors, a huge proportion of them were against OEO for doing that. I don't blame them, I understand it completely. The interesting thing is--to me it always was--that some of the places which were most enthusiastically for Community Action were rock-ribbed Republican places, like Dallas. The mayor of Dallas--I can't remember his name for thirty seconds, I don't remember [J. Erik Jonsson]--was a big booster, and Dallas ran the program perfectly. Cincinnati, the home of the Taft family, perfect. They had a

communal kind of a pride or background in those places, you know, that just made it work. Now, you could go to another place where the culture and political atmosphere was poisoned, and when you brought Community Action in there the whole thing exploded, the whole town exploded. The hostilities between classes, the hostilities between rich and poor--which were there, we didn't create them--they would just explode. I used to say that Community Action was like a doctor coming in and putting a thermometer in your mouth to find out what your temperature is, you know, and then the temperature comes out 110 and you curse the doctor. That's what happened in a lot of communities; the community leaders cursed us for revealing how lousy the community situation was. It was terrible. It wasn't our fault. Our activity brought it into the open.

G: Aside from protecting Community Action, did you have other reasons for resisting the spin-off of Head Start?

S: Yes.

G: What were they?

S: The second big reason was I didn't want to spin it off until there was somebody there qualified to catch it. I used to use the analogy, you can have the best quarterback in the world and you can throw beautiful passes, but if you don't have an end that can catch it, you don't have a winning play. And I was not at all convinced that the bureaucrats in any department, Labor, HEW or anyplace else, were sufficiently enthusiastic or understanding of Head Start to handle it correctly. They had all been opposed to it, you understand. They didn't want to start it. And they behaved like bureaucrats normally do. They didn't want to start, they didn't want to risk anything, but when it proved to be a success they wanted to run it, which is sort of natural for bureaucrats. And I refused to send it over to HEW until Jules Sugarman, who was the deputy director of Head Start, got appointed over there in HEW and the secretary of HEW said if I sent it over there that Sugarman

would run it. So I said okay, if we've got a guy over there who knows how to run it and I can trust him, namely Jules Sugarman, we'll transfer it. It never really did better in HEW as a result of being in HEW than it did being run over there by this crazy little Office of Economic Opportunity.

G: Do you think also there may have been simply a personal factor, that this was a program that you had originated and not wanting to turn loose of something that had been created in your shop?

S: I don't really think so, because we turned off a lot of things. For example, the first legislation, I incorporated into there a thing called work-study.

Tape 2 of 2, Side 1

S: Frank Keppel was the head of the Office of Education. I can't remember in thirty seconds what the title was. The Office of Education, you know, was not a department the way it is now and it was in HEW, and he was the head of it.

G: Commissioner of Education.

S: Commissioner of Education. He was a terrific fellow, still is. He came to me when we were putting the so-called war against poverty together administratively, and he said, "Listen, Sarge, I've been trying to get a program through Congress for the last"--whatever it was--"three years and I haven't been able to get it through. If we could get it through, it would help poor kids a great deal. Would you put it into your legislation, that is this war against poverty, and see if you can get it through?" And I said, "Well, what is it, Frank?" He said, "Well, I call it work-study. The idea is that we would give federal money to kids who would work and study, poor kids, so that they could work their way through college studying and working, and we would finance it into the schools." I said, "I'm all for it." I went through college myself that way at Yale. I worked and I studied and they paid a

large part of my tuition. So I said, "I'm all for it. What do you want me to do?" He said, "Well, here's our plan for it. Would you put that into your legislation? That's the OEO legislation." And I said, "Sure, but when it goes through, you will run it, won't you?" and he said, "Fine."

So I took the plan that he had for work-study, put it into the OEO legislation, got the legislation passed, got the appropriation for it and gave it to Frank Keppel to run. I only bring that up because it deals, I believe, with the implication of your question, namely, were we trying to keep Head Start simply because it was our baby? I think the fact that we were perfectly willing to spin-off that program, work-study, and put it back into HEW proves that we were not interested primarily in self--what do you call it?--aggrandizement. We were interested--I certainly was interested--in making sure that whoever got their hands on Head Start would run it competently.

The same thing was true about the Job Corps. The Department of Labor and Bill Wirtz was not interested in the Job Corps. He was interested in Neighborhood Youth Corps; he was not interested in the Job Corps. As soon as the Job Corps got to be successful, then the Department of Labor wanted to run it. I'm not criticizing that, I'm just saying that's a fact of life. I don't care whether you work in the United States government or the Soviet government or the Chinese government, if you have jurisdiction over a certain area or place, it's natural for you not to want somebody else mucking into your business. That's the way we all are.

G: How did you move from a summertime program that first summer to a year-round program for Head Start?

S: Well, we moved, in truth, slowly but I would say inexorably, because the experts continually said that for Head Start to achieve its fullest potential it needed to go longer than for just the summer months, that these youngsters' condition, intellectually and physically and

psychologically, was much more negative than we had suspected and their difficulties couldn't be overcome in three months, and therefore the program should become an annual program. I was a little negative about that, surely at the beginning, because we only had X amount of money and if we went to a year-round program it meant that instead of having a half a million kids in Head Start, it was going to go down let's say to three hundred thousand, because we wouldn't have enough money to run it all year long for a half a million. I felt a terrific desire to have the benefits of Head Start brought to as many young kids as possible. If somebody told me that you can run it year-round and we'll increase your budget to run it year-round for the same number of people you run it for in the summer, I wouldn't have hesitated thirty seconds.

G: How did you make the decision to concentrate on the children whose ages were the year before they started the first grade?

S: Well, first of all, we wanted to get them as early as we could. Secondly, we wanted to get the children at a time in their life when their parents and everybody knew that they should be getting ready for school. They were not still in a crib, for example. And when it would be socially, I guess you could say, acceptable to a large number of people. That's why we started it a year before school.

G: How about the involvement of parents in Head Start programs?

S: Oh, well, you see, I thought that was a stroke of genius, because what we found out, of course, was that a lot of the parents of Head Start kids were not educated themselves. Many of them were illiterate. And when we saw the parents bring their kids to school, it was obvious that the parents needed help as much as the kids, maybe more. The facile way to begin to educate the parent was to invite the parent to stay at the school with the child. Under those circumstances the parent would not be placed in an invidious role, that is a grown-up person having to start A-B-C-D, as if they were ignorant like a little child. That

is a terrible blow to a person's ego, frequently; it's a terrible blow. So the easy way to start parent education was to educate, bring the parent into the room where the child was, and then the parent could sit there watching the child learn. We found out right away that the parents learned with the child, and then the parent and the child would do it together, and it was a bond between the parent and the child. And the parent, on the other hand, was not made to feel inferior. So it was a terrific, how shall I say, discovery you almost might say, a psychological discovery which we should have been smart enough intuitively to know, but we weren't. But we saw it, and then, God, it was just transparent that who would be more interested in the child than the parent.

G: Do you recall who observed this for the first time or who brought it to your attention?

S: Actually I don't really, I'm sorry to say. I suppose a lot of people at different places observed it.

G: How important do you think Head Start was in the whole preschool educational movement?

S: Oh, I think it was a big thing, a very big thing. I think it was the single biggest thing. There had been people like Professor Jacob [Jerome] Bruner up at Harvard and other experts in schools of education who had written books on early childhood education. Jean Piaget, the great French educator, had written fantastic seminal books on the subject of childhood education, as well as other forms of education. But those theoretical studies had never been adopted on a mass scale. The Head Start program did on a mass scale dramatically prove that these theoreticians of early childhood learning and education had been in fact right and got the whole concept of early childhood education accepted across the board--I believe accepted across the board by nearly everybody in education. So I think Head Start had a profound effect.

As I was talking then it reminds me of the effect that the Manhattan Project had on nuclear physics. There were a lot of people in Italy, Germany, Denmark, some here, who were able to speculate that it was possible to split that atom. It was in the air; [Albert]

Einstein wasn't the only person who thought about that. I'm sure sooner or later it would have been done, but I would say the Manhattan bomb project accelerated the scientific advance in the splitting of the atom and the development of nuclear power and explosives by maybe a generation. I think this Head Start had the effect in education of the nuclear bomb in physics, a similar kind of a thing.

G: Speaking of explosions, I want to ask you about the Child Development Group in Mississippi, the Head Start program there.

S: Oh, yes, that was great. (Laughter)

G: You had a lot of flak from a lot of different sides on it.

S: Oh, yes, everybody.

G: Tell me about that program and how you evaluated it and how you decided to take the course of action that you did.

S: Well, that's such a big subject, I'll talk about it for just a few minutes, but then I think we ought to really talk about it in a subsequent interview.

G: Okay.

S: Let's see. From the very first days of Head Start, I, as a person who grew up in the South whose family fought on the Confederate side and who lived close up with southern people and black people, knew of the tradition in the South that made white people very friendly with little black children. That phrase "pickaninny" used to be a common phrase in the South, and little black children were always looked upon as being very cute and attractive, and white people were very sort of paternalistic or maternalistic with respect to little black children. One of the things I had in the back of my mind when I started Head Start was that we could help poor black children in the South in a program which was nonthreatening to the white people in the South because the white people in the South had friendly feelings toward little black children. Even if a person was very prejudiced and

said that a black man at twenty-one or a black woman at twenty-one was worthless and stupid and ignorant and couldn't do this and couldn't do that and had to be so to speak treated as an inferior human being, they couldn't really say that about a five-year-old kid. So I thought, frankly, that by working with black children and white children, but particularly black children in the South, we could cut across a lot of the opposition which would otherwise exist in the South to anything we did to help poor people. We were not helping poor people, we were just dealing with pickaninnies.

Basically I thought that Head Start would be a terrific way to get into the South in a nonconfrontational mode and begin to do something very beneficial for the poor whites and the poor blacks who are a huge proportion of the poverty population in the South. So I was enthusiastic about--how shall I say?--the novelty and the cleverness, I almost hate to say, of using Head Start working with children as one of the ways to attack the poverty problem in the South. So we started all over the place and we started in Mississippi just the way we did everywhere else.

One of the groups that was most imaginative and quick to respond was a group called CDGM, which was brought into existence really to capitalize upon this opportunity. Much to my pleasure, they had terrific people in the program--dedicated, smart. A lot of them were white people who had gone down to Mississippi in the civil rights movement and who had stayed and were committed, just exemplary human beings. So we started giving grants to them because they were one of the groups that came in and made application. We didn't treat them any better or any worse than we treated anybody else. They had the capacity, they had the desire, they saw the value, and so we financed them. Nothing breeds opposition as much as success, and CDGM bred a lot of opposition because a lot of the people in CDGM were very keenly interested. As a matter of fact,

they were committing their lives to helping the black people rise up out of the rut or the muck in Mississippi.

A lot of white people in Mississippi didn't give a damn about Head Start. They never applied to run Head Start. But when Head Start began pumping a lot of money into Mississippi and it was proving to be very beneficial to black kids, they got mad, because, again, you had the feeling that it was not coming through the establishment--educationally speaking not through the establishment. Secondly, it was coming to people who were working very closely with black people in ways which violated, in some people's opinion at any rate, the traditions of the state. It was not going through boards of education. It wasn't going through the statehouse. It wasn't going through the mayors. It was going to these upstart new community centers and through these hard-to-define new entities called Community Action agencies.

So for the reasons I talked about before, coupled with the racial reasons, CDGM was a social threat. Therefore, there was immediate opposition. Then there was the usual hue and cry about misusing money and so on, the result of which was that CDGM became a focal point in that state for the opposition of whites to blacks. It became a focal point of opposition of political people to this emergence of this entity that was getting money from Washington without going through the bureaucracy. It became a focal point of agitation about whether this program was successful from an educational point of view, therefore educators, you know, were arguing about it. It, of course, was a racial issue. And these things just built up from one year to the next year to the next year.

As is always true when you're dealing with human institutions, and particularly when you're dealing with them in poverty areas, there isn't the kind of accounting that you have if you and I are hiring Arthur Anderson to take care of our accounts. There isn't the kind of keeping of chits about where you spent the night in a hotel or how many miles you

drove in the car that people who graduated from the Harvard Business School maintain as a matter of habit. And since we were dealing with people who in many cases were using their own cars and buying gas in the middle of the night, we didn't have all the kind of documentation that you'd have if you were dealing with a New York Stock Exchange company. So those kinds of weaknesses, fully understandable, and I don't think there was any real misuse of public money, nevertheless there were these glaring omissions in keeping of records.

So those things were used as a basis for trying to attack CDGM. We got into terrific fights with the authorities in Mississippi and that would spill over into the adjoining states, for reasons that were obvious, and there was a groundswell of both political and--how shall I say?--racial and economic opposition to what the hell was happening in Mississippi. Then it was happening in Georgia, then it was happening in Alabama, and, my God, it was a conflagration, you know, the point of which was CDGM.

At exactly that same time--no, not exactly, but at about that point, a group of really excellent southern Baptists under the leader ship of a businessman in Mississippi, Owen Cooper, who had been the head of the Southern Baptist Convention--I mean, this is the highest ranking guy in the Baptist church, a layman, big businessman--decided that the polarization which was developing was bad and that they would start another group, of which he agreed to be the head, and which would be multiracial and which would involve the, quote, "leadership," the good people, or whatever you want to say, of Mississippi, as well as black people. It would be integrated. And they would make sure that the accounts were kept correctly, et cetera, et cetera, all that kind of stuff. They got the support of Senator [John] Stennis because this fellow, Owen Cooper, was a great friend of Stennis'.

Owen Cooper was a member of, quote, "the establishment," but Owen Cooper was much more than that, in my book. Owen Cooper, as they used to say in the Bible, was a man of good will. He became the president of whatever that group was, I can't remember the group. And they applied to be financed by OEO just the way CDGM was financed. Well, I felt that they had every right to be given a hearing and if they had the credentials, to be financed. So we gave them a hearing, they had a damned good program proposal, and so we financed them. And then all hell broke loose, because the people who were with CDGM claimed that we were being co-opted by the establishment in Mississippi, that we didn't have any guts, that we were giving up the fight for racial equality and all the things that they were interested in in their own agenda, you know. So then I became the target of all of that. I was pilloried as being somebody who had sold out, et cetera.

G: It was grant money that would have gone to the Child Development Group that went to the other one? I think it was Mississippi Action for Progress or something like that.

S: I think that's right, you're right. MAP was the name, Mississippi Action for Progress, yes.

G: Was this part of the contention, that funds were shifted?

S: Without remembering for sure, I'm almost sure that you're right. I can't be sure. I guess that we had limitations on the amount that could go into particular states and probably that meant that some money that might have gone to CDGM went to this crowd. So there were terrific epithets hurled at Mississippi Action for Progress, MAP, by the CDGM people, and they were hurled at me for even permitting MAP to come into existence, even though MAP went into parts of Mississippi where CDGM was not actually operational. There were some places where they were both operational. It was almost like the Civil War all over again in Mississippi. We were at the point of the highest heat, you might say.

Well, I could go on for a long time talking about it, but after the initial year or so when the feelings were most intense and the rivalry was greatest, my belief is that MAP proved that it was able to run the program down there effectively and in a nondiscriminatory manner and fully in keeping with the ideals of Head Start. And I think that CDGM continued to do very well, too. Now, CDGM in my memory did not ever thereafter grow as much as they wanted to grow. It reached a sort of an apogee and then leveled off, and MAP came up and reached a certain level and sort of leveled off. I'm not certain precisely, but I have sort of the vague memory it was something like that.

G: Were some of the charges against CDGM involved with using these federal funds for Head Start to advance civil rights activities--

S: Oh, sure.

G: --organizing and things like that?

S: Oh, yes.

G: Was there substance to this, do you think?

S: No. It depends on how you define advancing civil rights. I've said this before, it has got nothing to do really with Mississippi, it's got to do with human nature. If we went into Syracuse and started helping people in a certain part of Syracuse with federal money over which the mayor of Syracuse didn't have any control, there would be a hullabaloo because allegations would be made of a comparable nature, that we were helping these people to the disadvantage of those people.

Let me give you another example in the Job Corps. Phil Landrum of Georgia was one of the principal exponents of the war against poverty at its beginning, and then the Job Corps got started and we had a system in the Job Corps, you may recall, where Job Corps enrollees were entitled to receive money less than what a private in the army gets, but they got, let's say, fifty dollars. They were not only entitled but urged to send that money

home, some of it anyhow. So down in Georgia black boys who had gone into the Job Corps started sending checks home to their parents in a town in Georgia. Now, their parents in the town in Georgia were busted, you know what I mean, and suddenly every month they would get a check for forty dollars.

Well, that didn't happen for two months before Phil Landrum up here in Washington heard about it, and he heard about it from white people in the same town whose kids were not in the Job Corps who resented the fact that these black people were getting checks from a black kid in the Job Corps. And black people who before had been penniless now had forty dollars. The fact that they had forty dollars and the white person down the street did not have forty dollars meant to some people that the federal government was showing favoritism to this black family over the white family. Phil Landrum had a terrible time in Georgia, because it looked as if there was a discrimination in favor of the blacks. Well, it wasn't a discrimination in favor of the blacks; if the white kid had gone--and a lot of white kids did go--the white family would have gotten the same thing, provided the kid sent it home.

But there is a terrific envy and rivalry and jealousy and bitterness when you get down to the level where everybody is poor and you're poor white and I'm poor black and neither one of us have got anything. Let's just say you're poor white and one of the few things you've got on me is the fact you're white. That's one of the few things you've got almost in the world to make you feel better than somebody else, namely the poor black bastard who's just as poor as you are but he's black, at least you're white. And suddenly if he starts getting money, your whole ego structure goes into a tailspin.

So the Job Corps did do those things; it did bring about that kind of a shock at the very, very low level, I mean, right at the grass-roots all over the country and in Georgia. The same thing happened with CDGM. When we started putting money in there and black

kids started going to school and black kids started to eat and black kids started to get their teeth fixed, there were a lot of white people that were mad as hell that that was happening. And look, I don't blame them. Don't misunderstand me. I'm not trying to sit up here like some I don't know what the hell you call it, but arrogant northern bastard who's insensitive. I think I understand it completely.

I had a girl in Chicago tell me after we opened up a health center in Chicago. It was doing a great job for the black people in a certain part of Chicago--Lawndale. She said to me after the opening ceremony, "Well, Mr. Shriver, it's really terrific what you're doing here. When are you going to help us middle-class people?" Now, my answer to that was very simple, but it's no answer. I said, "Well, you know, Mrs. Whatever your name is"--I can't remember what her name was--"I would love to help you but unfortunately I only have a commission, I only have authority to do work for poor people, and I have to do that. Somebody else is supposed to be doing something about the middle class. I really can't do that because my appropriation from Congress is to work for the poor people, white or black, and that's what this is." She said, "Yes, but we ought to get help like that." And I said, "You're probably right." People then want to call that socialized medicine, you see. But when they could see it being done for these poor people, they immediately came to me and said when am I going to help them.

So it's not anything to do with the South or Georgia or Mississippi or Chicago or blacks and whites, it's just human nature. And in Mississippi we had this terrific clash based on race, based on money, based on education, based on a threat to the existing social order, which became epitomized in the struggle between CDGM and MAP.

G: Was the White House or the administration or OEO responsible for the creation of MAP in the beginning?

S: No. No.

G: You know, there's some speculation that--

S: Sure.

G: --the whole organization was formed.

S: Cooked up, yes.

G: Yes.

S: That's not true.

G: It was an indigenously created group that came to you, is that correct?

S: Yes, it was. And the fellow to talk about it--he may be still alive, I don't know, I hope he is--is this guy named Owen Cooper. He's well known, and even if he's not alive, his wife is well known, too, and she was involved in it. Owen Cooper.

G: Was he in Jackson or--?

S: I used to know so well. I'm sorry to say I can't remember. [Yazoo City] I even used to remember--I think his company was called Mississippi Lumber or something like that. Anyhow, truthfully he was a very well known man down there. And you see, as the head of the Southern Baptist Convention, you really couldn't hit him frontally. Even if you disapproved of helping black people, it was pretty tough in Mississippi to take on the head of the Southern Baptist Convention.

No, we got terrific criticism on that. John Stennis put about ten amendments on our bill to stop us from doing some things we were alleged to be doing, but we weren't doing them, it didn't make any difference. We had to effect an accord, an agreement, an understanding with John Stennis. Otherwise we could have maybe lost the whole bill. We could have lost the whole of OEO, we could have lost the whole of Head Start from a political point of view, if we hadn't been versatile enough to work with this group of Owen Cooper. But I never had any hang-up about it at all, because by nature I'm interested in reconciling rather than trying to create violence.

G: Was the President involved in this controversy at all? Did he get into the Child Development Group or with Stennis or anything here?

S: I don't remember it. I find it hard to believe that he wasn't knowledgeable about it, but I'm going to say something now, and that is that Lyndon Johnson never, never, never ever uttered a word of criticism to me about OEO, never. And let me tell you, he took heat! He took a lot of stuff from John Connally. John Connally would come up here when he was governor of Texas and spend the night at the White House, and he would pump Lyndon Johnson full of stuff about all the junk we were doing that was wrong. And he took a lot of heat from other politicians. But I know I would remember if the President ever called me; he never did. I was hesitating for a second to try to recall whether anybody on his staff ever called, and I can't remember anybody over there ever calling and complaining to me about what we did.

G: It's odd that Stennis would have been so active in this thing. I wonder about [James] Eastland. Was he--?

S: Well, Eastland was going, you know. I think Eastland left right about that time. When did Eastland leave? I can't remember exactly. Eastland would have been--yes, I mean, he would have been wild. But he left.

G: Did he?

S: I can't remember whether he retired in 1966 or 1968, but he didn't take this on, no. Listen, I want you to know, I got along well with Stennis. Stennis was not a wild-eyed radical on this. He was what I always liked about a lot of the southern senators; I guess you'd say they were sort of like very careful government I almost would say statesmen. You know, if you dealt with Herman Talmadge or Richard Russell or John Stennis, I could go on with a lot of names of southerners, you were dealing with men who had a traditional inborn respect for government, competence in dealing with complicated

situations, very close to their people, feet-on-the-ground, down-to-earth, solid guys. If they were against you, there was no difficulty, they never hesitated to tell you and why they were against you. They didn't get into mean personal business; it was a philosophical way they had. They had an outlook. Really, a lot of it in the South was like Carter Glass in Virginia, the Byrd family. It was a huge family tradition all over the South whereby a lot of those men were very patriotic, very loyal to the country in every way, very dedicated to the Democratic Party, to some extent very philosophical, like Sam Ervin of South Carolina. Fritz Hollings is an example--astute, clearheaded.

I never really had any dirty battles with Stennis. We had differences of opinion, sure, and he caused a lot of trouble, took up a lot of my time. But I never felt that he was a mean guy, and there are some who come from the South, or from the North, who are really mean. Mean, mean, mean, dirty players. These guys were never that way.

G: Do you recall the full-page ad, I guess it was in the ***New York Times***, "Say It Isn't So"? (Interruption)

S: I'm sorry.

Seeing it, I glanced at some of the names, but then I decided I wouldn't read it and I wouldn't look at the names, because I didn't want to see those names and then have some kind of a bad feeling about those people because they signed that ad. It was kind of funny, but I didn't want to--so I never really read it and I certainly didn't ever look at the names, ever, because I was certain that among the names there were people who were, quote, "friends" of mine, and I didn't want to have some sort of a grudge because they signed an ad.

End of Tape 2 of 2 and Interview IV

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Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of

SARGENT SHRIVER

I, Sargent Shriver, of Potomac, Maryland, or my authorized agent, William Josephson, do hereby, except as provided in paragraph two below, give to the United States of America for deposit in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, the content of the tape recordings and transcripts of the interviews conducted with me on August 20, and October 23, 1980, July 1, 1982, February 7, 1986, and November 29, 1990.

This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions:

(1) The tape recordings and transcripts shall be available for listening and researching, respectively, by researchers authorized by the Library.

(2) During my lifetime I retain all copyright in the tape recordings and transcripts.

(3) During my lifetime researchers wishing to copy the tape recordings or transcripts or any part thereof, other than for short "fair use" quotations from the transcript, must first obtain my express consent or that of my authorized agent, William Josephson, in each case.

(4) Copies of the transcripts and the tape recordings shall be deposited by the Library with my papers in the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library where they shall be subject to the terms and conditions as are applicable to those papers.

Sargent Shriver — 4/26/05

Sargent Shriver or Authorized Agent — Date

A. Ma Weinstein — 5/19/05

Archivist of the United States — Date

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April 29, 2005

Ms. Linda M. Seelke
Archivist
Lyndon Baines Johnson Library
2313 Red River Street
Austin, TX 78705-5702

Dear Ms. Seelke:

This is in partial response to your letter of March 29, 2005.

Please include this letter in the Shriver oral history. There are a number of errors in Sarge's recollection as recorded in his oral history that I know from my own knowledge. For example, on pages 15-20 of the August 20, 1980 transcript he describes conversations he had with President Kennedy and Vice President Johnson about the independence of the Peace Corps. I am quite certain that he never took part in those conversations, if only because at the relevant time he was out of the country in India. So far as I know, the meeting between President Kennedy and Vice President Johnson, where President Kennedy overruled the White House staff recommendation from Mr. Ralph Dungan and the position of Budget Director David Bell, Civil Service Commission Chair John Macy and International Cooperation Administration Administrator Henry Labouisse, was entirely between the President and the Vice President with no one else in attendance. The story is well told in Gerry Rice's *The Bold Experiment* pages 65-66 and Scott Stossel's *Sarge* pages 223 to 225.

The long descriptions on pages 23-28 of the August 20, 1980 transcript of Sarge's conversations with President Johnson about the beginnings of Sarge's War on Poverty are probably extremely exaggerated, if not entirely wrong. The story, from my point-of-view, is told in my July 12, 2003 letter to Scott, copy enclosed. Scott tells the story on pages 343-45 of *Sarge*.

In the August 20, 1980 transcript, page 81, I don't think that Sarge's statements are correct about some presidential contingency fund and the amount of money he got out of that for the OEO start-up, compared to the amount of money the President allocated out of the Mutual Security Act contingency fund for the Peace Corps start-up. But I do not remember what the facts were.

In the October 23, 1980 transcript, page 66, if the Steven Smith is Jean Kennedy Smith's husband, that he was in, or even considered for, the Agency for International Development, is certainly news to me. I am not saying it is wrong or right, but I do think it is highly unlikely.

In the July 1, 1982 transcript on page 14, there is a little bit of confusion at the outset about Bill Kelly and Community Action and Bill Kelly and the Job Corps, but I think it gets straightened out.

In the November 29, 1990 transcript on page 19, Sarge has the so-called five-year flush wrong. There was never a Civil Service Commission vote, let alone agreement. John Macy, then Chair of the Civil Service Commission, was opposed to the legislation, as was whoever was then Director of the Bureau of the Budget, probably Kermit Gordon, possibly Charles Schultze. What happened legislatively was that the Peace Corps was taken out of Civil Service, and its personnel system was based instead on the Foreign Service personnel system which was not inconsistent with the so-called five-year flush which was also specifically authorized.

Also in the November 29, 1990 transcript beginning on page 19 and continuing on page 20, there is a little initial confusion about Sarge staying on the Peace Corps and OEO until he went to France in 1968, but the confusion straightens itself out on page 20. Sarge gave up the Peace Corps directorship in the Spring of 1966, but continued as Director of OEO until 1968 when he left for France.

Sincerely,

William Josephson

/jl
Encls.