

INTERVIEW I

DATE: April 5, 1983
INTERVIEWEE: JOHN M. STEADMAN
INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette
PLACE: Mr. Steadman's office, Washington, D.C.

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G: Let me begin, Mr. Steadman, by asking you to retrace your steps in joining the Justice Department to begin with.

S: You mean you want me to repeat--okay. Well, I got out of law school in 1955 and I went out to San Francisco with the firm of Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro. I had been there about six or seven years, and I was sitting fat, dumb and happy in my office one day when I got this call from Norb [Norbert] Schlei, who at the time was assistant attorney general in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel. This was maybe September of 1963, and he was looking for another person to work in the Office of Legal Counsel, more specifically a GS-16 position. He had three what we called supergrades then, a [GS-]16, a [GS-]17 and an [GS-]18. All three of them were sort of career guys in the Office of Legal Counsel. I don't know, I didn't know him directly, but we had mutual friends, so out of the blue I get this call. Well, I had sort of always thought it might be kind of interesting to be in Washington, so it just happened I was coming back East in a couple of weeks, so I saw him and one thing led to another. Like so many people, I figured I'd go to Washington for a couple of years and then come back.

It seemed to me the work was particularly interesting, at least the way Norb described it, because while the Office of Legal Counsel has

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always done this kind of work, I think with the Attorney General Robert Kennedy being the brother of the President that, even more than usual, the Office of Legal Counsel was called upon by White House folks in legal matters in which the White House cared about a very great deal. Therefore, it seemed to me it would be an office that would be really interesting to be involved in, and of course was quite different from most of the Department of Justice because it didn't do any litigation. It was more the office kind of legal advice that I was used to doing.

So in any event I decided to come back. Then of course President Kennedy was assassinated, but by that time all the wheels were in motion and I figured, "Well, sure, I'll come back anyhow." I got here about early December and started to work. Now I was really green behind the ears; I mean I was thirty-two years old, I'd never spent any time in Washington, I didn't know anything. But I caught the bus and I went down to the office every day.

But I suppose--I don't know, maybe since I've been around Washington now for twenty years I have a much better sense of how it operates so maybe I'm just looking at it after the fact but--I suppose the reason that they asked Norb to sort of head up the drafting process when they decided to do the war against poverty was that you had all these different governmental departments battling a little bit for turf and they wanted to have, somebody maybe like an impartial umpire to draft the statute so there weren't any hidden kickers in there which would give advantage to one department or the other or whatever it might happen to be. I also think--I don't know; you probably know from talking to Norb, but I think that [Sargent] Shriver knew Norb or had had some dealings with him in other contexts, and therefore he was acceptable to Shriver.

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Anyhow, I don't know. All I remember is that Norb called me in one day and he said, "Look, there's this thing going on"--or was about to go on; it was about to happen--"involving some presidential decision to do something about"--I doubt he used the words War on Poverty, but "to do something in the area of improving the lot of poor folks," or something, I don't know what it was. And he told me that there was this whole bunch of people over in Shriver's area in the Peace Corps building, which I'd never been to. [He said] to go on over there and see what's going on and give them a hand in whatever kind of drafting or whatever might have to be done.

So I went over. I don't know what day it was, but looking at the notes here, if the announcement was on February 1--you obviously know whether stuff was going on before this time or after. But the time frame seems right, right about the end of February; I remember it was cold, it was wintry, it looked to be about the right time. I went over to this place in the Peace Corps which was just absolutely chaotic, I mean as far as--people were just running all over. To me, being a guy from the sticks, to see all these people around like Pat [Daniel Patrick] Moynihan and Willard Wirtz and Charlie Schultze and these people you had heard of but didn't know, like Paul Jacobs and Michael Harrington, it was a very heady experience for me, because it sort of threw me. I sort of felt all of a sudden here I was involved in a process in which the whole domestic part of the government cared. So I saw all these people and I just remember it was an extraordinarily exciting time for me. I mean I was just sort of overwhelmed by the wow of it all--you know, "Wow, look at all these"--

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Now I think to the people who were participating, virtually all of them had been around here for the last couple of years; they knew each other, they knew I guess who was a real grabber of turf and who was a team player and all. But to me everybody was new, and it's remarkable how, looking down at that list of people who were on that task force, I remember almost every one of them as being involved there. Also, you know, you sort of kept following what they were doing. Take a guy like Lisle Carter, who you just telephoned; I mean that's when I first saw Lisle Carter, and here Lisle Carter goes on: he's at HEW, then he's president of the University of District of Columbia, and then he comes off of that and he's going to teach a course here at Georgetown University Law School. So twenty years later here I am talking to Lisle Carter again, except that from that experience I always sort of knew who he was. But of course I was just an absolute peasant in this process; I was there as Norb's representative with kind of instructions from him, "Do whatever has to be done. What they want you to do is to help write a bill."

Looking at this thing here, I was looking at all these people who attended this day-long meeting on February 2. Didn't that meeting take place in the Peace Corps building rather than in his home or his office?

G: There was one at the Peace Corps building and one at his home.

S: Okay. I never went to the one at the home, but I remember that there was a very large meeting, at least one and probably more, very, very early on at the Peace Corps building in which--I mean, Adam Yarmolinsky was there; Moynihan was there, Jacobs was there, [James] Sundquist was there, [Frank] Mankiewicz was there, [Andrew] Brimmer was there. These are just the ones I remember very clearly being there, because they were

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all names I had heard of. Wilbur Cohen was there; [Vernon] Alden I don't remember, [Hyman] Bookbinder was hanging around. Willard Wirtz was there; Schultze was there. And is this Richard Lee the mayor of New Haven? Yes, he was there or hanging around. But whether it was this meeting or another meeting I don't know, because there were a number of meetings like this. But there were two or three very early on that I remember that I went to and I was one of the spear carriers there in the background.

I remember writing down a whole lot of things because they were throwing all these ideas out, and what I was thinking in my mind is, "Well, if I've got to write a statute which authorizes all of these things, I better have a pretty good idea what it is that they want to do." And probably [Harold] Horowitz was there doing the same sort of thing. But it was so unclear what at least I was supposed to do. I mean I wasn't supposed to participate in [it], I didn't think. I mean I didn't know anything about any of these programs that they kept talking about and so on. My idea was to make sure that whatever they wanted to do, this bill would let them do.

And either then or at some point I remember Shriver getting together with--maybe Norb was there and I know I was there, and maybe like Horowitz and others of us that were cutting and pasting. And the exhortation was, "Make the language as general as possible, because we want to be able to do anything that we think of that will lead to an improvement in the economic condition of people." And so I know at least our early drafts were written in extraordinarily general language; that is to say, I remember we wrote the preamble kind of to say we're going to do all kinds of good things. Even when we were sort of

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describing the program, we always put in sort of "and do anything else that might kind of cope with this general sort of situation." I'm trying to remember if we went from the general to the specific. It seems to me as the bill went along it kept getting more specific. But I remember so clearly Shriver's sort of exhortation to us that we didn't know how we were really going to fight this war and that it was very important that he have maximum ability to try new things and to experiment because I guess it was no more clear to him then than it is now exactly how you cope with all these problems. But as a drafter, that was the general message that I got.

Now somewhere between the very earliest time when I showed up there, when all this activity was going on and people were running in and out and I was just sort of sitting around, there must have been a team--other people must remember better. Was there a small group of us? The next thing I remember is that there was a meeting at which we had a draft of the statute. And my impression is that it was no more than four or five days later after the first time that I was over there, and maybe less. Because I mean I was working around the clock; I remember I'd go home and get and get a few things and go on down again. I have the impression that there were four or five parts to this bill, all of which were very badly typed and scraggly with an enormous staple through them, and enough copies so that I know Shriver had a copy and I know Norb had a copy. But it was the first time when Norb Schlei really went over there and was at one of these command meetings.

You have him down as attending this meeting of February 2 and if he was there, then I must have gone over a few days before that, because I remember the meeting at which he was at; he really didn't know what

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was in that damn bill. I mean I had in effect--I didn't have any time to talk to him about it, most of these things. The meeting was suddenly called.

So Shriver says, "All right, I want to go over this draft bill," or "We want to talk about what's in this bill." And Norb really didn't know what was in there. I know at that time we had some sort of a draft. I know that Norb really didn't know what was in there.

G: How do you know that he didn't know what was in there?

S: Because I just know he didn't know. He knew in general what was in there, but he didn't really understand it. And that's the point at which I think he began getting much more involved in the actual process of it. You know, this could have been a matter of three or four days from the beginning to the time Norb got involved, but somehow when your superior is indicating--because you know what's in the bill--that he doesn't really know what's in the bill, you kind of feel bad. I remember thinking to myself, I've been at fault or we've been at fault, or "Gee, it's sort of embarrassing to have Norb, who's supposed to be the guy who's drafting the statute, not really understand what's in it. Probably Shriver understands better than Norb does." Because I think after that Norb sort of came to us or something and said, "Okay, let's see what we can do with this thing." God, it's hard to remember.

G: Were you involved at all in the substance of the programs and developing that aspect in addition to framing the language?

S: No, I really wasn't. I really felt that my job was to find out what people wanted to do and then make a statute so that we could be sure they could do that and anything else they could think of to do. I mean that sort of was the role that I--I was very interested in all the other

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parts, but I was totally unqualified. All these people came, I mean, God, these people with this background of having struggled with all these problems. I remember being so impressed by how clearly they seemed to sort of be able to talk about what it is they wanted to do and this hadn't worked but this might work. They were all people who for the last couple of years, if not their whole lives had been involved in efforts to improve conditions of people who were really in terrible poverty sorts of situations.

G: Was there much disagreement among them with regard to what was needed?

S: Yes, you sort of had the impression that everybody was throwing in their two cents' worth. And it was a wonderful opportunity, I gather, for people like Harrington and Jacobs and [Paul] Ylvisaker--is there some guy named that? All these people who are a little bit on the outside, because I don't think any of them were involved in the government. Chris Weeks--what in the hell was Chris Weeks doing? Was he on the outside or inside?

G: He was, I think, BOB [Bureau of the Budget].

S: I guess you're right; I guess you're right. But everything was so free-for-all and everybody could just throw in any ideas they wanted to. My impression was it was sort of a classic brainstorming session that was going on in the very early part. What Shriver wanted was anybody with any kind of an idea on anything that could be done, throw it in the hopper; let's play around with it a little bit. And whether it was a cabinet officer or someone at BOB--I suppose if I had had any ideas I could have thrown them out. It would have been--

G: How did the drafting committee get the product that they were drafting?

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S: You know, that's what I can't remember. I don't know how it came about. I think maybe what we did was perhaps to get draft memos on ideas; someone would come up with saying, "Well, here's an idea for a community action program," for instance. They'd say, "Well, stick this stuff in the statute." Everyone was writing memos right and left; I don't know how many of them you have. There must be some kicking around. Everyone was talking all the time; they were coming up with ideas, there were position papers. And somebody must have--or maybe we sat in some of these meetings and Shriver would say, "Okay, you drafters, stick that in the statute," or "Let's put this in." I just can't remember. All I remember is just working all the time and rewriting things. All the way up to--I remember there was one point at which we were up all night at the Justice Department just getting these things reproduced. Now would that have been--? See, my time frame was really from late January or early February to the first or second week in March. Because as it moved into the White House--we're going to draft the message and all--didn't it go up about the middle of March?

G: Yes.

S: Okay. Several weeks before that, at least I--I don't know about Norb--was pretty much phasing out. In other words, our job was the rough hewing of the statute as all these ideas were floating around, because I mean obviously I think what Shriver was interested in, and Yarmolinsky and these other people, was what are we going to do? And it was an incidental what are we going to put in the statute so that we can do what we want to do? So our instructions were, "We're getting all these ideas of what we want to do. You guys make sure that we can do them."

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But then as the program began taking shape, someone at the White House maybe along with Norb must have taken it over, because I remember receding out of the process, probably in early March. I think it went on for about a month, because the next thing that I got involved in was working on the immigration reform bill, and that I think was going on in March, April and May, if I remember correctly. Then I never really got back in the process, except I have a recollection of going up with Norb to the Senate. It must have been in summer. We sat in the Senate gallery and we had done some work because we were very concerned about something that might happen in the Senate. I think that was the War on Poverty.

Was Humphrey involved in something? There was some legal problem that Norb had gotten involved in--or we, Norb and I--or maybe our whole office had gotten involved with, which affected some sort of amendment or something that somebody wanted to do. For reasons that I don't remember, Norb felt that he should be up there just in case the thing involved various kinds of difficulties, so that he could scoot on down to the Senate Cloakroom and whatever. But my recollection is that we never were called on to do anything. It was just kind of a fun couple of hours watching the Senate debate the bill. I don't know what that could have been; I just can't remember.

G: Some of the issues that came out were church-state and to what extent could church-affiliated organizations receive grants for, say, Community Action programs or things of this nature, educational programs. Hugh Carey was very interested in this.

S: Yes.

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G: Another one was the question of segregation. For example, would Job Corps centers in the South be segregated? Do either of these issues ring a bell?

S: Yes, they both ring a bell, but I don't remember what, if any, role I had in it. Did this come up in the drafting of the bill before it went up to the Hill, or did it happen up on the Hill?

G: I think they were principally concerned on the Hill, after the time of the--of course, another one was whether the Job Corps program would be reserved for men or whether women would be in it also.

S: It's interesting. Yes, those are big issues.

Did Shriver sort of get himself a general counsel of some sort around the time the bill went up to the Hill? I mean, I don't know who continued forward on the various amendments and changes. Because weren't there a number of amendments that were made as it went through the Congress? I sort of have the impression that--[Steve] Pollak wasn't involved yet, was he?

G: No.

S: Because I have the impression that Steve Pollak kind of began to play a pretty important role as the months went along, and I had thought that it preceded the time before the bill actually passed. Wasn't Pollak over in the Solicitor General's Office? I have the impression that Pollak began getting--you have him here very early; I didn't remember him that early. I thought that he began really getting involved in the drafting process when VISTA [Volunteers in Service to America]--I don't know why, but I have the impression that--I remember we added the whole VISTA business. I don't think VISTA was in the very early drafts, was it?

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- G: Well, it was there when the legislation was submitted. I don't know--
- S: Oh, yes, but it seems to me that we'd been going a couple of weeks and then Pollak kind of showed up and began writing this big, long section on VISTA. Because it was a new thing to me, I said, "What the hell is this VISTA?" I don't know what Steve had done before. Why he came out of the Solicitor General's Office or had he been there all the time, I don't know. But my recollection is that all of a sudden Pollak appears in writing this thing and that he is working on this section that had to do with VISTA. Maybe I'm completely wrong; maybe it was somebody else. Maybe Horowitz' stuff will show it much more clearly.
- G: Did you have any insights or information on the Justice Department's experimental program that they had worked with, programs that worked with youth in urban areas?
- S: No. I remember that it was kicking around, but I did not get involved with bringing substantive Justice experience on that. I was just a craftsman, you know.
- G: Were you aware of the Ford Foundation programs, the Grey Areas program or anything of that?
- S: Yes, I guess sort of. You never know how much you found out afterwards and how much you actually knew at the time you were doing it. I mean I hit the project, as I mentioned to you, as a totally green pea; I'd never done anything in any of these areas. And it just happened that I was over there at the Office of Legal Counsel and this process was going on, that I kind of got swept up, really, in the experience. I mean, Shriver was very nice. After the bill was signed, he sent me over a letter and one of these pens. I've still got that thing because I [had] it framed. I was very proud of my participation in it. But I guess he

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sent the pens to everybody, but he sent it to me saying, "Thanks a whole lot for helping draft the statute which has just come into law," or whatever it was.

I'm sorry, I went through my--I had a daily file from the Department of Justice which somebody kept or I kept or something. And I'd hoped that there might be some stuff from that time, but there's not a shred. I mean, we just did it right off the back of envelopes; we must have. And of course it was before xerox machines were really very well developed.

G: To what extent was Shriver involved in the day-to-day process where you were concerned?

S: Well, of course he and I--it was like a private and a general. But in the early part, like the first few days, it seemed to me that Shriver would tell us, me and Horowitz, or at these meetings he would sort of turn to the people and say, "Put this in the bill." I was very aware at that time that he was there running the thing. Then as the days went along I think he talked really to Norb, to the extent that he dealt with him, because things began getting, very relatively speaking, organized. Certain chains of authority were set up, and I think it was easier for him just to talk to Norb. I can't remember how much Norb worked on the statute and how much he told us what to do. I mean he obviously remembers; I don't, though. I just can't recall exactly how it worked.

G: Did the Justice Department have a particular interest in how the legislation developed? Did it have its own perspective, do you think?

S: Maybe they did, but they never told me what it was.

G: How about the Attorney General's involvement with the task force?

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S: I don't ever remember him having anything to do with it, but again you know it was during that period when I gather--I don't know but I gather he was awfully depressed. I don't ever remember him really--you know, there was once there while he was still the attorney general, you gathered he was just really absolutely heartbroken and kind of receded. Because to the extent I had any dealings with him, it was later on when the immigration bill was involved and it happened that I was working--at least I think this came afterwards--we sort of split up various things and it was another of those things where we were supposed to draft something, although that tied in much more of course with Justice because the Immigration and Naturalization Service was in Justice.

Norb had me working the whole area of exclusions on account of physical and mental defects, and the Attorney General was particularly interested in that section because there had been this exclusion of mental defectives, so-called. And from his family history, he had always been very opposed to treating mentally defective people as somehow kind of inferior beings. So I think he took a particular interest in this section. And I remember at that time going into his office a couple of times and talking about various parts of the immigration bill, including that. But I'm quite sure that came quite a bit later, in the spring. In this whole business here in the poverty bill, I don't recall him being mentioned or talked about, but I don't know, maybe Norb was seeing him every day. I don't have any idea.

G: What was the attitude of the task force members toward LBJ?

S: You got me. I mean, he was the president. You mean, was there sort of resentment that there was this new guy? I don't know; I just don't know. From my own point of view, I remember being tremendously

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impressed by the way in which Johnson sort of took over and, in an extraordinary way, kind of continued the Kennedy spirit and ideals and yet indicated that life was going to go on. There's a new guy here, but I've come out of the same current. I think he talked a lot about keeping on a lot of the same people, and I think that people felt that the War on Poverty was kind of a commitment by the President to a continuation of the spirit of the Kennedy Administration. Looking back on it, I suppose it very clearly also represented his own stamp, but you know a lot of this was after the fact.

I remember myself after Kennedy was assassinated I thought real hard, should I still go back to Washington? After all, I agreed to go at a time when Kennedy was president, and there was this--you know, he really did kind of exalt public service; he really did, I think. I think I decided to go back in part because I liked the idea of working for the New Frontier. Who knows? If I hadn't told the firm I was leaving; if I hadn't lined up the movers and all this kind of stuff, I don't know if I would have gone back. But I remember being very gratified when I did come back that kind of the same spirit was going on. That was, of course, way before Vietnam or any of these other things. I felt, "Wow, this is really what I came back to Washington to do," was to do these sorts of things. As I say, the thing was so free-form in those early days and weeks, that it was just an amazing thing.

G: Who was in charge of these meetings?

S: Well, the two big figures were Shriver and Yarmolinsky. None of us, at least I never had the slightest doubt that they were the two people that were running the show to the extent it was being run. Everybody else was sort of there, but it was very plain. Now I was trying to remember

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how much Adam told us what to do as opposed to Shriver, and I may have my memory a little mixed up because of course as time went on--no, I think at the time it was pretty clear that Adam was the chief of staff. But I don't know.

G: Would people generally gather in one large room and talk about, say, position papers or memoranda or would they divide up into small groups?

S: Well, of course, the meetings that are memorable to me were those ones that involved everybody, all these famous faces around Washington. But it must be that in reality those were relatively rare. I just can't imagine they'd be occurring very often.

My impression is that Shriver somehow got people with similar interests working in smaller groups. Now maybe I'm just thinking this because that's the way I suppose logically it must have been done, but for example, it seems to me that in that VISTA stuff Pollak sort of would go over with the people who were interested in VISTA sorts of things and would kind of come back to us with a VISTA section that kind of represented what the VISTA-ish people were trying to do.

Now, what the hell was I doing all this time? See, I just don't remember. I just don't know. I must have been going to various meetings; they must have been smaller meetings.

G: Did you work at all on Community Action?

G: Yes, I remember the Community Action, but I don't remember any specifics. I remember there was a lot of discussion about Community Action.

G: Let me ask you a specific--

S: And the name came very late. The Office of Economic Opportunity, is that what it was called? It had some other kind of a name for a long

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time, didn't it? Wasn't that a very late addition? I remember being very surprised when suddenly someone said, "This thing is going to be called the Office of Economic Opportunity." It seems to me we had had another name or concept, but what it was, I don't know.

G: Do you recall the language, maximum feasible participation?

S: Yes, I've been asked about that. I don't know where it came from. But my impression is that it was just something we sort of stuck in. I mean, it was a draft, or my impression is that--I remember the section and everything and of course it became so sort of famous. But I just think it was one of those things that sounded nice and, what the hell, you know, we were putting all sorts of things in and we just threw it in. But where it came from, you've got me.

G: Did you at all foresee the potential for conflict that this part of the legislation would involve?

S: I think that to the extent I thought about it at all, I just thought of it as being kind of a nice idea which, what the hell, let's throw it in. Or maybe someone told us to put it in. Someone must have; I never would have thought of that on my own.

G: Do you think the task force members perceived Community Action as a way for the federal government to deal directly with the poor and bypass some of the traditional local, state power?

S: I don't have any idea. Anything like that would be ex post facto. I mean I was taking these ideas as I was told to put them in and just wrote them.

G: Was there a faction within the task force that wanted to spend more money and more of the resources on manpower, jobs, this sort of thing, rather than Community Action?

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S: Well, you are asking the worst person in the world to answer that. It is my impression that in the very earliest meetings that I remember being involved in, and maybe the very early statutory drafting, that there was more talk about manpower-type programs. It seems to me that-- I remember so clearly things like Moynihan being there and Wirtz--I mean kind of things that I guess labor people would be very concerned about. My impression is that the Community Action business came later on. Now later on is--everything is so relatively speaking a short time, like maybe three days later, five, or maybe it just came later on to me. But it seemed to me that at least when I first was getting involved, the job stuff, the manpower stuff was the one that people were talking about more. It's sort of logical. The way to improve your position economically is to get better skills training.

Wasn't the Job Corps involved in it very, very--I don't know if they called it that, but the idea of doing that sort of thing. It seems to me that--what were the other components of the bill? VISTA, as I keep saying, I just have the impression was sort of a tag-on. Wasn't Section 1 of the bill essentially manpower programs?

G: There was an adult education provision. There was also something they called a land reform, an agricultural aid provision.

S: Was Sundquist pushing that?

G: Yes, and that was ultimately deleted from the bill.

S: I don't have any recollection of that. I remember Sundquist being around, but he was, I think, assistant secretary of Agriculture or something of the type. But damn if I remember what he did. It's been a long time ago.

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G: Do you think the task force discarded any programs or components or ideas because they knew they couldn't get the funding for them?

S: I don't have any idea.

I was trying to remember how much talk I was aware of as to what would sell on the Hill and what wouldn't at the time that we originally drew up the stuff.

(Interruption)

S: But I can't remember because obviously as the months dragged along there when the bill was being considered, it became obvious that Congress was playing a very significant part in it. But what I don't remember is how much people at the time were saying things like, "Well, there's no point in putting this in the bill because it will never pass." I just don't remember.

G: Do you recall the issue of family planning at all?

S: No, nothing at all.

G: Birth control, whether that could be.

S: I didn't even know that was an issue.

G: Did you have any insights of the White House role in this, and was there anyone from the White House that the task force dealt with or had any contact with?

S: Well, that was what I was trying to--remember, we were talking about this I guess before the tape went on, as to who were the President's people that were around. Because it strikes me now, looking back on it, that it's inconceivable that there weren't some clear LBJ folks involved in the process. Everybody practically that I've named, it seems to me, were Kennedy people, and I just can't believe that [on] something this important to the President that he was sort of pushing as one of his

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first projects, there wasn't somebody who was generally understood to be the President's person. Now, I don't know, maybe Shriver and President Johnson--you know, Shriver said, "Well, goddamn it, I'm not going to take it unless it is perfectly plain that I'm your person," rather than having somebody around. But the funny thing about it is that at the time I don't recall being particularly interested in that question.

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Now, all that may show is that I arrived in Washington one month previously, I don't know. But I can't think of anybody who we sort of thought of as--well, Shriver is really a Kennedy person, so therefore there must be somebody else who is really looking after the interests of Johnson. No doubt old Washington hands there thought about that a lot, but I'll be damned if I ever [did]. I mean, you know, I was working for Schlei and Shriver and Yarmolinsky and I was told to put together a statute. So I just did it, I mean me and everybody else, not just me.

G: Did Horowitz work with you?

S: Oh, yes, I got to know him quite well. And I think there was another guy. Was Murray Schwartz involved in the process?

G: I think so. His name has been mentioned.

S: Yes, he was dean at UCLA for a while. Now what his role was, I'm just not sure. I don't know, maybe--he must have been doing something around the place. But I remember Harold Horowitz really well as being very much involved in that, in the process. Where was he at the time, was he at HEW?

G: Yes.

S: Was he at HEW General Counsel office?

G: Yes.

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S: And he'd been around Washington for a bit?

G: Well, I'm not sure how long, at this point.

S: It's funny, the people I remember working on the bill are Horowitz, me, Schlei and Pollak. Now, there must have been a lot of other folks, but I'll be damned if I remember who they are. If you mention them, I might remember, but--

G: How about Jim Adler?

S: I don't even remember who he is. Who is he?

G: Well, he's a lawyer that--

S: Where was he working at the time? Was Michael Josephson involved at all? Was he the general counsel of the Peace Corps? I guess not. Jim Adler--I just don't remember him.

G: Did the drafting committee, this group with Schlei, Horowitz, yourself and others work primarily in the Peace Corps building, or did you go back to, say, the Justice Department and draft the legislation there?

S: Damn if I remember. It seems to me that what we did was--it was very difficult to get anything done in the Peace Corps building because everyone was making these huge demands on resources. I think what we did was we went back to our respective home offices, like maybe Horowitz would go to HEW and I'd go back to the Office of Legal Counsel and we'd do stuff there and we'd meet again at the Peace Corps building. But I don't remember doing a whole lot of stuff like typing and so on in the Peace Corps building because I think, you know, I mean I was so out-ranked by everybody who would get access to typewriters and whatever was the equivalent of xerox machines in those days that I think it was easier to go back. But I don't know; I just can't remember.

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G: Is there anything else about this experience that we haven't discussed that you recall?

S: No, not that I can think of.

G: It's a long time ago.

S: It's a long time ago. But you know it's very funny, because as I said to you before, I don't know how other people reacted who were involved, but for a fellow who had just come into the government without any government experience at all and being thrown into this thing, which was the biggest thing in town at the time and being able to participate in it even though it was obviously in a very minor way. But to be sort of hanging around the edges of it, it was just a very, very memorable two months or six weeks or whatever it was. I mean, it just stands out in my mind as being a very intense, interesting time. And even now talking about it, it sort of is exciting. You'd think with all that the memories would be sharper, but they're not. I think so much of the memories--first of all they just fade and, secondly, they get colored by things that you remember afterwards or insights you have afterwards. You say, "Oh, yes, at the time I realized." I probably didn't. I mean I was like just a babe in town. That's all I can remember, I'm sorry.

I also looked for--my father was still alive then and I used to write him fairly regularly, and I had hoped I would have been able to find some letters describing it, but at least in the records I now have, I poked around in--I mean they're not well organized; they're just a whole lot of correspondence thrown in these boxes. If I ever should in future years get that stuff better organized and I do find that there are some letters, I'll send them on down to you.

G: Thank you very much.

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S: Okay.

End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview I

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

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