INTERVIEW I

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INTERVIEWEE: JAMES L. SUNDQUIST

INTERVIEWER: STEPHEN GOODELL

PLACE: Washington, D.C.

Tape 1 of 2

G: This is an interview with Mr. James L. Sundquist, who is presently at the Brookings Institute in Washington, D.C. Mr. Sundquist is the author of the book entitled, Politics and Policy: the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson Years, and as I understand, is to be the author of a forthcoming volume on the administration of some of the programs enacted during the Kennedy and Johnson years. I'd like to begin with a short biographical sketch, after which point you can add whatever you wish.

You were born in 1915 at West Point, Utah. From 1932 until 1934 you were a student at Weber College. In the year 1934-1935, the academic year, you were a student at Northwestern University. In 1939 you received a Bachelor of Science degree from the University of Utah, and in 1942 you received a Master of Science degree in Public Administration from Syracuse University. From 1935 until 1939 you were a reporter for the Salt Lake Tribune. From 1941 until 1947, and then again from 1949 to 1951, you were an administrative analyst with the Bureau of the Budget. Between those two terms, from 1947 to 1949, you were the director of management control, the European Command, U.S. Army in Berlin. From 1951 to 1953, you were the reports and statistics officer,the Office of Defense Mobilization.

From 1953 to 1954, you were the assistant to the chairman of the Democratic National Committee. From 1955 to 1956 you were an assistant to the Governor of New York State, who at that time was Averell Harriman. From 1957 until 1962 you were an assistant to Senator Joseph Clark of Pennsylvania, and from 1963 until 1965 you were the deputy under secretary of agriculture. From 1965 to the present, you have been associated as a senior staff member of the Brookings Institute on government studies. I should also add, for the record, that you, in 1960 and again in 1968, were the secretary to the platform committee of the Democratic National Convention. Moreover, in 1964 you were an active participant in Sargent Shriver's task force on the War on Poverty.

To begin with, how did you happen to join up with the 1964 task force on the War Against Poverty, and what were the dates of your participation?

S: Well, the task force proper began work roughly the first of February, and I stayed with it through February and March, up until about the first of April.

G: At which time the bill had been drafted?

S: Yes, and was up on the Hill. It went up in the middle of March, as I recall, St. Patrick's Day, I believe. But the President asked Shriver to take the job, as I remember it, on the first of February, on Saturday.

G: Right.

S: Shriver called Freeman and several other Cabinet members on Sunday,

February 2, asking them to designate someone to help him. Freeman told me the morning of February 3 that I was to represent his department, and on February 4 I reported for duty.

G: And in April did you then return to the Agriculture Department?

S: Yes. I had, of course, been working on the poverty program in the pre-Shriver period, when the staff planning was being handled by the Council of Economic Advisers with the Bureau of the Budget.

G: This would be in 1963?

S: Yes, and of course the first month of 1964. So I had been in the meetings leading up to whether there should be a task force and whether Shriver or someone else should head it.

G: Well, maybe we can go back to that. You have [discussed] a lot of this [elsewhere]; I want to avoid repetition of what is in your book and other sources. But for the record, could you briefly go back to that 1963 period while President Kennedy was still alive? As I understand it, he and Heller and other people in the administration were proposing a reconnaissance effort and were bringing together proposals for a possible 1964 legislative program. Is that right? They were thinking about this in terms of 1964?

S: Oh, yes. The word went out to the departments during the late spring and early summer on a fairly informal basis, as I remember. But in the fall there was a formal instruction to each department to come up with ideas for what might go into a poverty program. At that point, you will remember, it was entitled, "Widening Participation in Prosperity." There's a memorandum signed by Heller and Kermit

Gordon which outlined the concepts of the program and divided it into three elements--preventing entry into poverty, facilitating exit from poverty, and ameliorating the condition of those who remained in poverty. Those were the three headings. We, as each other department did, sent the memorandum to our bureaus and asked them for their ideas. They came up with innumerable suggestions, which then, in our department, Turley Mace and I winnowed down and processed, so to speak. But generally speaking, unless they were obviously outlandish, we sent them on to the Council of Economic Advisers for their consideration.

G: What was your connection at that point? Simply through the Department of Agriculture? Did you know people in the Executive Office or in the Council of Economic Advisers, Bureau of the Budget at that time?

S: I did, but the reason I represented the department in this was because of the nature of the position I held there. The deputy under secretary could be described as the contact man with a good part of the outside world. There were lots of people in the department who were experts on every phase of agriculture, and I was brought in to handle the interests of the department in a lot of non-agricultural fields related to the Executive Office, to the other departments. A good part of my job was liaison with other agencies.

G: I see. Could you very briefly recapitulate some of the proposals which emanated from your department at that time. You say you

winnowed them down to more manageable proportions.

S: Well, the best ones were the ones that finally got into the Economic Opportunity Bill, the proposed loans and grants to poor farmers and rural non-farmers to permit them to set up small businesses. We had a community facilities program, sewer and water works for rural areas. Each bureau tended to say, "If we only had more money to do what we're now doing, we could do it much better and reach more poor people." The Extension Service, in particular, made a strong pitch for inclusion in the program, contending that extension work was essential to helping people help themselves. I remember the Agricultural Conservation and Stabilization Service came up with a proposal for more ACP. I've forgotten what the initials stand for--Aid to Conservation Practices.

As I said in my book, a bureau would have to be singularly lacking in self-respect if it couldn't figure out some way that it could participate in this enterprise which the President was leading. We realized that many of the proposals weren't worth much, and we finally put our emphasis on the three that seemed to represent substantial innovations. In addition to the community facilities and the grants and loans for rural residents, was what we called our land reform proposal.

G: Which was subsequently deleted from the act.

S: Right.

G: in 1964.

S: On the motion of Senator Lausche.

G: But that did come from the Agriculture Department in 1963?

S: Oh, yes. In the task force period, at which point I was on detail, so I was not representing the department--I think I used that word in error earlier--the department made a strong pitch for getting the Extension Service programs back in there. The judgment was made that since they didn't need new legislation that this could be fought out subsequently in the appropriations process. The community facilities proposal was stricken out largely at the insistence of the Budget Bureau, which had been fighting this consistently all the way along.

G: What would that be intended to do?

S: It was intended to provide an economic base for rural communities that had little opportunity for economic growth in the absence of a basic water supply. The sewage disposal problem was related to it and secondary; frequently those water and sewage systems are planned jointly anyway. It was also under the heading of ameliorating the conditions of those who remained in poverty.

G: You mentioned earlier an extension service as another program. Could you explain how that was--

S: Well, the Extension Service is the organization that embraces the county agricultural agents and the county home demonstration agents, which in many communities have lost the adjective "agriculture" and are engaged in a general adult education activity. They have been active in some cities. In Providence, Rhode Island, and Milwaukee,

Wisconsin, for example, the state extension service is doing a lot of work with poor people. This involves going into their homes, and in the case of the home demonstration agents, working with them in housekeeping, child-rearing, consumer education, how to buy and how to cook and prepare food and so on. They've been working in conjunction with the welfare departments in some places. The Extension Service felt that as part of the War on Poverty they could vastly expand their efforts in this kind of work. While they do it on a professional level, it's not unlike what later developed in the poverty program using subprofessional aides.

G: And the third was what you call the land reform scheme.

S: This was a proposal to resettle some poor people with farm experience on land of their own. It wouldn't take care of very many people. But particularly in the South there is a lot of absentee ownership of rather large estates, and as these come on the market, rather than selling them as one piece, the theory was that some kind of governmental corporation would buy them and then divide them into family farms and permit the re-establishment of displaced farmers.

G: I'm not sure my history is good, but wasn't there a similar scheme in the Freedmen's Bureau back under Reconstruction, the whole forty-acres-and-a-mule myth that developed?

S: I'm not sure my history is good enough to tell you about that period, but it was done in the 1930s under the Resettlement Administration.

G: Tugwell.

S: Yes. We concluded, however, that unlike in the 1930s, in the 1960s it would require a subsidy. This was one of the hangups that resulted in its getting killed.

G: During this period, in 1963, there was what was called a rather informal task force group that was set up. I'm not sure whether this was the "Saturday Club" or whether there was another one operating prior to that. How did the membership of this group of people come to be? Was it just interested parties, or was there somebody who would choose and pick people to come to this?

S: I was not involved in that. No one from our department participated. We knew about its existence, that's all. Bob Lampman and subsequently Bill Capron chaired it. The whole poverty crowd focused, of course, on the urban areas; there was very little attention to the rural side of the picture. And in those Saturday meetings I'm sure that it was essentially an urban group thinking about urban poverty problems.

G: And yet I think in the President's report the balance is given its due, is it not, in terms of the rural versus the urban problems?

S: In the Economic Report?

G: Yes.

S: That's true in the description of the incidence of poverty. When it comes to the solution to the poverty problem, a good many of the urban poverty thinkers have written off the rural areas and have concluded that the only way to deal with rural poverty is to let the people move and then handle them in the cities. Some of this is

conscious and some is unconscious, but insofar as it's expressed consciously, the argument is made that only if people come together in cities can you hope to provide them with the public services necessary to make them employable and then provide them with the employment opportunities. Now formally, of course, the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations both supported rural development in the Area Redevelopment Act and the Public Works and Economic Development Act and the Appalachia Regional Development Act and in a number of the Agriculture Department measures. But these tended to be looked on by the group that might be called urban fundamentalists as gestures, not as serious efforts to stabilize the location of population and deal with poverty where it existed.

G: Correct me if I'm wrong, but was it a phenomenon of the sixties that there was this recognition that there was an urban problem not simply of poverty in urban areas, but also what has become known as the crisis of the cities? Was this a concomitant understanding?

S: Well, the tracing of the history of ideas is always a very complex thing and difficult to do in one dimension, in a one-dimensional tape. There was the coming together, it seemed to me, of a lot of streams of criticism which tended to be focused on particular urban problems. There were the people who were worried about the urban tax base and housing who got into urban renewal. Meanwhile, the welfare people were looking at individuals, and the race relations people were looking at that element. The juvenile delinquency movement grew out of a concern with youth gangs and

crime. As these people began to get to know one another better, and as their streams of thinking came together, then there was a tendency more to talk about the crisis of the cities rather than the crisis of the street gang or the slum and so on.

G: Now, what prompted me is your comment that there was this focus or this emphasis on urban poverty rather than the other, and I was wondering if this had anything to do with it, or whether there was a--

S: That seemed to me to be a different matter. That's just the whole nature of our culture. The rural areas are looked on as backwaters, the people who live there are looked on as unenterprising and hardly worth saving, because if they had any gumption they'd get up and leave. Our culture is thoroughly urban centered. Our newspapers, our magazines are published, and our radio and television programs originate in urban centers. If there is any attention to rural areas, it tends to be the kind of treatment that is given the Indians in cowboy and Indian shows, as a sort of a relic from the past. So that throughout this period it was always my fight and my frustration to get some attention paid to the rural areas. It would always, in the discussions, tend to come up as an afterthought. After they had discussed the urban poverty problem and the crisis of the ghettos, then they would say, "Oh, yes, of course, there's also the rural areas." I believe that the weight of economic and intellectual opinion was against programs like Appalachia and Area Redevelopment. Certainly we encountered great resistance to these programs in the Budget Bureau and in the other elements of the

Executive Office, other than the political elements. There was a sensitivity in the White House, but not in the career agencies.

G: I see. I was just going to make that point, that Johnson, at least in some of the literature that has arisen about him, is termed the "Populist President," you know, that is, making the association between his rural environmental roots.

S: Well, that's right. And the same prejudice against the rural areas that I found so frustrating had something to do, I believe, with his nonacceptance in the intellectual world. He was looked on as an anachronism, too.

G: Yes, I've come across that comment, that the styles of life were so entirely different the urban sophisticate has a great deal of difficulty understanding the more raw and earthy expressions or patterns of life.

S: And the movement of population has been away from rural areas for half a century, quite dramatically. So the assumption underlying so many people's thinking is that this is inevitable and will continue, and therefore why worry about the rural areas, because in a little while they won't be here at all, except for those rich farmers who are being subsidized too much already. This was part of the difficulty we had in putting through the community facilities measures I mentioned to you before, the water and sewer system development. The attitude in the Budget Bureau at the point where these were buried was that, "Well, this is just throwing money down the drain, because these communities are withering away. It's apparent in the

statistics." We tried to say that this was a confusion of cause and effect, that they were withering away because they didn't have the basic public services. There were plenty of illustrations how the population trend itself could be reversed by the provision of basic water and sewer systems that would make these places fit to live in, but we got nowhere until the Congress took the matter in hand itself some years later.

But I might return to the point where we got off on this tangent. The water and sewer proposals were rather favorably received by Shriver, who tended to look favorably upon any new idea, a very open-minded person, as I've said elsewhere. The Budget Bureau took a stand against this. Shriver was reluctant to take it out, and he went along with taking it out only when the Budget Bureau gave him a firm promise to consider it on its merits when it was presented separately. Maybe they considered it on its merits, but it came out in the same place it had before. It was rejected until Senator Aiken initiated it on the Hill, and then it went through Congress easily.

G: This is another tangent, but does this process reflect the inclinations or the interests and prejudices of certain sections within the Budget Bureau, or do they have anything at all to do with the person who happens to be director at the time? I am thinking of either Kermit Gordon or Charles Schultze, which would have been the two directors of the period you're talking about.

S: I think it depends primarily on the directors and the directors' aides. The agriculture division of the Budget Bureau was sympathetic

to these measures. They consisted of people, to a considerable extent, with rural backgrounds. They had come out of the Agriculture Department or associated fields of academic work. The economists at the head of the Budget Bureau at that period were Kermit Gordon and Charlie Schultze and Bill Capron, and I guess you'd have to say that they were the ones who reflected the general urban attitude of the intellectual world.

G: Yet I seem to recall, I can't cite specifics, but I have seen memoranda written by Schultze on precisely rural problems and ways to go about--this isn't to say that they ignore them, but is to say that they deal with them in a particular way.

S: I don't know what memorandum you're referring to.

G: I think it's a memorandum that Schultze sent to the Task Force on the War on Poverty. Again, my memory is not clear at this point, but it was dealing specifically with rural poverty programs.

S: I don't remember that. He may have written something on how to organize rural community action programs.

G: Well, as I say, I can't recall specifically offhand, but I can check on it. In fact, I can show it to you if you'd like.

S: I'd like to see it. It surprises me.

G: So that your functions, you would describe how you came--

S: Excuse me, I would say that the urban solution to rural problems, when they thought about it seriously and tried to be constructive, was that what we needed in rural areas was better human development programs, so that you would produce well-educated, well-trained,

healthy individuals for purposes of migration. The urbanists assumed a continuing flow of people out of the rural areas to the cities, and they recognized that the human material that was in that migration stream was not highly qualified. That's quite different from saying that we should invest money in rural America to develop that particular part of the nation's geography so that the people could stay there. This was the Budget Bureau's critique of the Appalachia program, that much too much money was going into highways and other elements of intrastructure when it ought to be going into developing human resources.

G: It may not be in the preamble of the act, but it certainly is the underlying rationale for the Appalachian Regional Commission; that is, to keep people in these areas, but to improve the areas in order to keep the people there.

S: That's right. That's what the area itself wants, of course, and that's why the politicians tend to take that view and have some empathy toward rural areas, because rural areas are filled with voters. But the objective analysts, the cost-benefit economic types, fall back upon a higher wisdom.

G: I gather then that your function when you were detached and became a member of the Task Force was to press for solutions to rural problems. Is that correct, or did you have a much broader kind of scope?

S: Well, it was both. My first responsibility was to develop the rural side of the program, and in one of my first conversations with Shriver, I said that what he ought to have was a rural title, because

the bill as a whole was bound to be urban oriented. I told him of the success we'd had in getting housing bills through, omnibus housing bills, by virtue of always having a Title V dealing with rural housing. That was good for quite a number of votes, and when it came on the floor of the Senate or the House, people could look at it and say, "Well, it's a balanced bill. It's predominantly urban, but there is some rural language and an acknowledgement that there's a rural problem." Shriver caught this immediately, and without any significant discussion said, "Fine, go ahead, we'll do it that way. Draft something." So then I took the best of the material that had bubbled up out of the department in the fall, and we refined that and worked it up and put it in.

G: Who else beside yourself represented Agriculture on the Task Force?

S: Let's pause a minute on that word "representation." It was understood that I was not representing Agriculture. I was part of Shriver's staff and was detached from the department, so that when it came to the question of representation, then John Baker headed that up.

G: I see.

S: He came to the meetings representing the department. Working with him were Turley Mace, the head of the Office of Rural Areas Development, and on the Farmers Home Administration items, Joseph C. Doherty was the man who came over and sat with me.

G: I see.

S: Doherty developed most of the supporting documentation. All the items

that wound up in the bill were Farmers Home Administration proposals.

G: I see. But anyway, you then were a free agent. You were dealing with the omnibus topics. You weren't restricted to any one particular area.

S: Well, I was specialized in that area. When the assignment sheet came out, the rural title was assigned to me, and various other elements of the bill were assigned to other people. However, everybody there, to the extent he wanted to be, kibitzed on everything, so that I had a chance to get my licks in on community action or the Job Corps or whatever it might be. A task force, I guess, is always a fluid kind of organization without any fixed lines of responsibility, and Shriver was in no position to discipline anybody, or fire them, because they belonged to somebody else in the first place and he needed them anyway. So if there was a meeting going on and you walked into the room and began to take part, nobody told you to leave. There were several of us that made it a point to get in on most everything. Some of the people who came over restricted themselves to specific features of the thing more, probably, than I did.

G: What was the method of operation?

S: I was going to say, in addition, Shriver's own temperament and method of operation was extremely open and fluid. He doesn't like fixed organizations anyway, so he was perfectly in his milieu on this one. What were you saying?

G: I was about to ask you about his method of operation. You're

suggesting that he wasn't drawing hierarchical lines or setting up an organizational chart, that people were involved in a number of different areas? Was this advantageous? I can think of situations where somebody who perhaps doesn't have the expertise that's necessary, let's say, to an intelligent discussion of what the potential of community action might be, giving his two cents worth and so forth and perhaps having an influence on the subsequent acceptance of that idea. Is this a good thing?

S: In that kind of circumstance, probably yes. What you want when you're developing a program is the freest flow of ideas that you can get. Who knows where a good idea's going to come from? It might come from anywhere. Later on, when you're running a program, it may be you need to organize it more tightly. Of course, since I was there representing--well, there's that word representing again--specializing in the rural aspect of the poverty problem, there was nothing to prevent my taking an interest in something like community action from the standpoint of how would it work in rural areas, how will we get it organized, what should the language of the bill say? And the same would apply to VISTA and Job Corps and other aspects as well. As a matter of fact, the Agriculture Department would be involved in the administration of Job Corps camps, so I maintained liaison with the Forest Service on that particular thing.

G: You're saying that one of the important tasks of the task force was to seek out new ideas. How did you go about doing this, or how did Shriver go about doing it? Was there any systematic way, or was it

just a matter of thinking of somebody, or having somebody recommended, picking up a phone and calling him and so forth?

S: It was a combination of the two. Nothing ever seemed very systematic, but there may have been more system in it than appeared on the surface. Shriver called people that he thought would have something to contribute, asked them to come in, and then whoever was around would sit with them and pick their brains. He did at one point ask two or three people, I'm not sure who they were, I know I was one of them, to put together a list of people who ought to be brought in, and that was a little more systematic. We then looked at different segments of the population--industry, labor, education and so on--and tried to get a representation from these various groups. Then we showed him the list, and he said, "Fine, go ahead and set up a series of meetings, and I'll attend as many as I can." So we invited most of the people who had experience in community action in the various Ford Foundation and juvenile delinquency projects that were the forerunners of community action. Governor Sanford came in and Mayor Lee, and people like that, Mayor Houlihan of Oakland; we had Hilliard in from Chicago and so on. Jim Patton appeared one day.

G: How about Ford Foundation people?

S: I had Marion Crank come in from Little River County, Arkansas. Ylvisaker was in the original February 4 meeting, and he maintained contact with us throughout. He was always available if somebody needed to consult with him or wanted him to critique a piece of writing. Howard Hallman also joined the task force, full time for a

while, from New Haven, where he was Mike Sviridoff's deputy. And Mike himself, of course, was down.

G: I don't want to break this narrative, but you differentiated between "representatives" and "free agents" such as yourself who might have been released to participate on the task force. Was there any skewing of representation in terms of executive departments? I'm thinking back to a letter I've seen, a letter to an editor I think, and the person was concerned about the fact that there wasn't enough representation from the educational institutions in the country. Is this accurate? If you look, for example, at the list of task force people, you see a good deal of people coming from Labor, Commerce and Agriculture and so forth; I can't recall many from HEW.

S: Well, HEW was asked to designate somebody, and Wilbur Cohen came over for the meeting on February 4. I assumed that Wilbur was going to stay, just as Pat Moynihan and I stayed. He didn't, and in his place turned up, after a few days' gap, Harold Horowitz. Horowitz confided to me at one point that he was unsure whether he was there as a legal draftsman, or whether he was there in Wilbur's stead to represent the whole range of interests of the department. I don't believe that was ever cleared up.

G: He became a legal draftsman, didn't he?

S: Yes, but he didn't represent Health and Education and Welfare in a substantive way as completely as Moynihan and I represented our Departments and maintained liaison with them. I've used that word representation again. There was an element of representation in it,

in the sense that we were to look out for their interests and keep in touch with them and bring them in where they were concerned. We didn't necessarily represent them substantively in the discussions within the task force, and there were occasions when I took a view opposite to the view of the department. When I told Freeman this a time or two when it became uncomfortable, he told me that was exactly what I was supposed to do and not to give it a second thought. I don't think that Pat Moynihan had that same kind of understanding with Secretary Wirtz, for instance. In the field of education, Keppel himself came over and got into the act very intensively, so there was no problem about the representation of the education side of the government. There were no representatives of educational institutions in the early phase, you're quite right, but then there weren't representatives of other outside interests either.

G: Am I correct, I think it was Congress that added educational provisions in the bill. I may be wrong here, but I don't think there was that kind of provision in the initial legislation that was proposed to the Congress. The adult education was added, was it not? In other words, the emphasis was on community action--

S: Yes, it was.

G: --on job training, on VISTA and so forth.

S: It was added, but it was also already in the bill, because community action was all embracing. Our contention when the proposal to add basic adult education was made was that there was no more reason to add that than fifty other subjects.

G: That community action would have been an eclectic program that would provide for a number of these?

S: Yes. And this brings to mind something I meant to say earlier, going back to the 1963 period. I had taken over to the Council of Economic Advisers the list of proposals after Turley Mace and I had shaken it down, and there may have been, say, twenty that we felt worthy of forwarding. The council, that is Bill Capron, had received, I suppose, a couple hundred suggestions altogether. It was during this period when they were swimming around, wondering how to make a selection from among all these proposals, all of which had some merit but none of which had outstanding merit, that the community action idea began to come to the fore, not only as a program in itself, but as the means for mediating among all these other programs. At the point they had settled on community action--that was in December--as the way to go about the whole poverty program. In my book, you'll remember that I pointed out that as of mid-December the entire five hundred million in the budget was earmarked for community action.

G: Right.

S: I reported at a staff meeting in the Agriculture Department, and I recall that I said that every proposal we sent over had been approved. The people around the table beamed, and then I went on to explain that this was subject, of course, to the communities deciding that these were the programs they wanted and initiating proposals for them. The reaction around the table was, "Well, that's fair enough. We won't have any trouble working with the community action agencies,

and we'll be prepared to carry out the programs that they recommend." But this got everybody off the hook. I was very conscious of it myself, and I assume that the people in the Budget Bureau and the council felt the same way, that community action was the solution to their problem of selection.

G: Why was Shriver chosen to become head of the task force? And then I gather there was an understanding that he would simply continue as head of OEO?

S: We had a couple of meetings at the White House on how the program should be organized.

G: Who is "we"?

S: Well, the meetings were chaired by Ted Sorensen or Mike Feldman, or both, and the departmental representatives came. One of the meetings was preceded by the distribution of a paper, setting up alternative organization plans. I assume you have that somewhere in your files. This was at the point where community action was the program, and the question was, "How do you organize community action?" There were several alternatives, the two basic ones being HEW or an independent agency. Then I think there may have been a third or fourth alternative involving an interdepartmental committee, with perhaps HEW as the operating agency. But the question at the White House meeting was, "Does HEW get this program, or doesn't it?"

Our Department had taken a stand strongly against HEW running it. As I recall it, nobody supported HEW in the meeting except Secretary Wirtz, which surprised me at the time. Secretary Celebrezze made

his opening remarks on behalf of HEW, and then Wilbur Cohen, who was sitting behind him, took over and they made their case. This was the period after the assassination and Ted Sorensen was visibly in a state of shock. He didn't have his heart in mediating this nasty jursidictional dispute. He, I know, lost control of the meeting at times and left for a while and came back, so that there was no decicive hand at the helm at that point.

Sometime about the same time the Council of Economic Advisers had reached the conclusion independently that we needed someone with stature and political appeal to handle the salesmanship of this program to the Congress. And Bill Capron's name is on a memorandum to the President pointing out that the program was going to need both specific development and most of all salesmanship, and that someone ought to be designated by the President in whom he had confidence. Two names were on that piece of paper: Abe Fortas and Sargent Shriver. This memorandum, I assume, went forward, so that you had two factors, then, bearing on the decision. One was the squabbling that was going on as to how the thing would be organized; the other was the feeling on the part of the President's staff advisers that somebody had to be charged with the congressional presentation.

This was not something that the Council or the Budget Bureau either one felt equipped to do, and they were quite right. It was an enormous lobbying job that had to be organized, and those agencies aren't set up for that purpose and don't have any skill at it. So I don't know how these two lines of influence converged on the President,

or whether they did converge. At any rate, at the point where he decided he wanted a man to sell the program to Congress, he decided at the same time that he would have an independent agency rather than giving the community action job to HEW.

G: I'm just speculating, but it would seem logical that if the memorandum came from Capron, went to the President, that he would have talked to Fortas about it and perhaps gotten a lean in that direction from Fortas.

S: I can only speculate about that. I didn't know about the memorandum until I did the research on my book some months later, but it was during the same period. I personally thought that that had more bearing on the President's decision than the jurisdictional dispute as such.

G: The memorandum?

S: Yes, and the whole problem of congressional presentation. The President obviously needed someone to carry this ball. He had to decide the other question at some point, but the notion that the Shriver appointment arose out of the jurisdictional dispute, which is the version that's appeared in Roger Davidson's work, I think is oversimplified. It just wasn't a direct cause and effect relationship.

G: In February Shriver took over and set up a task force, put together a number of people from various agencies and departments and so forth. It's my impression that the moving forces in 1963 and up until February of 1964, before the whole poverty program, were located in the Bureau

of the Budget and the Council of Economic Advisers and among certain people in the Executive Office, the White House staff. And the key people, to single them out, would have been--well, one [who] comes to mind immediately is Heller. What happened to Heller after February of 1964?

S: Heller had gotten out of it earlier, as a matter of fact. The control had passed from the council to the Budget Bureau at the point where you had to put together a specific legislative program and a budget. The council doesn't have a staff of analysts that are prepared to review the departmental proposals. It was natural that that would move over to the Budget Bureau, and that transition took place in November. As a matter of fact, before the assassination the Budget Bureau had the two hundred proposals and was doing the main job of trying to sort them out.

G: That was the whittling down to thirty-five?

S: Yes, and then finally to one. Although there was a hundred and forty million in the budget earmarked for educational programs, too, which was added to the five hundred million at a subsequent point. But the five hundred million which is called "War on Poverty" or its equivalent was all community action.

G: In your book, and I've seen it also elsewhere, you're suggesting that there was a particular understanding among people in the Bureau of the Budget as to what the poverty program would be, and that the focus was on community action; then with the task force and Shriver, the whole thrust, the whole direction changed, in that it became an

omnibus bill. There were other programs added and so forth. What is the underlying reason for this? Is it simply that here was a chance to get all the old ideas, all the programs that have been stalled on the Hill and so forth into this one poverty program, or was it more systematic?

S: This emerged during the February 4 meeting. Yarmolinsky and others have written that Shriver was fundamentally pretty skeptical about community action. So was Kermit Gordon for a while. So were many other people. Shriver didn't think that this rather abstract idea which would take some time to bear fruit would be a dramatic embodiment of the President's declaration of unconditional war. This seemed to me to be kind of an intuitive reaction, and it was shared by everybody in that room, that, "Well, if we're going to have a war on poverty, let's put into it all the weapons we can assemble." So out of that meeting came a general directive to go out and get all the ideas that we could. So we began to take out of our desk drawers all the things that had been rejected during the period when the two hundred ideas were being boiled down to one.

G: What was your feeling about this at the time? Were you satisfied that community action was adequate in terms of the BOB concept of the leverage, or the coordination of the coordination, or did you feel that a war on poverty had to be much broader, that it was a multi-problem?

S: During the period prior to February 4, I was much taken with community action. I thought it was a brilliant organizational invention.

It corresponded to many things we had been trying to do in the Department of Agriculture with what was called Rural Areas Development. We were setting up Rural Areas Development committees, and they were to come up with community development plans. This seemed essentially the same approach, and was one that we were intellectually committed to. It also solved the selection problem, which was not as keen at my level as it was at the higher levels, but it nevertheless existed.

It would have been difficult for us to decide which of those twenty programs to take a ride on and allocate the money to. The community action idea deferred that kind of decision. But on February 4, when the consensus arose that in addition to community action there were a lot of other things we ought to be doing, this made sense to me, and I remember going along with the crowd enthusiastically. Those of us who had looked at the problem from a narrow point of view, from a specialized departmental point of view, hadn't tried to think it through in its entirety. I don't think I had ever focused on the question in the way that you presented it: what ought to be in a war on poverty? These other measures, after all, were pending up there.

G: Right.

S: So it was a matter of legislative tactics more than anything else.

G: Well, the reason I--

S: The Council of Economic Advisers laid out in the economic report the contents of the War on Poverty at that stage defined very broadly.

You remember, everything was in it. The tax cut was part of the War on Poverty.

G: Right. You make this point in your book.

S: Yes.

G: The distinct difference between the War on Poverty and the poverty program.

S: So then the Community Action Agency became an additional idea, along with all the others. So all that was added with the change in strategy was to incorporate a number of pending measures in a single bill rather than in a series of bills.

G: Part of the reasoning for that question was that Moynihan suggests that to some extent there were political considerations on the part of Shriver for bringing in these other programs. He makes it very clear that Shriver was thinking in terms of the 1964 campaign and election, and that raises two questions in my own mind. One is, was this the understanding during February, March, and April? [Secondly], when did the President first make it known that he would declare a moratorium? You know, there was this moratorium declared after the bill was passed, that there would be no programs funded because he didn't want to use it as a campaign issue. I mean, were there those kinds of political considerations which might have had something to do with the inclusion of these programs as well?

S: I don't know. I don't know whether Moynihan knows. I never talked directly with Shriver about this. One thing that was clear was that Shriver at that time was running for vice president, and he wanted

to do something that would get him into the limelight. That certainly entered into his judgments on how you moved and when you moved on particular programs. Community action had the aura of a very complicated long-range planning process that wouldn't produce results inside of two or three years. The Ford Foundation and the Juvenile Delinquency Committee, particularly the latter, had put so much emphasis on comprehensive planning that they had run into trouble.

G: Excuse me, let me interrupt right here. I've seen this. What is meant by comprehensive planning? Does this mean analysis and proposals of schemes for dealing with particular problems? What is involved in a two, three year planning period?

S: It's like the kind of process that now takes place in the Model Cities Program, whereby every agency that has a contribution to make gets together, and then they apportion the roles and functions and decide how they are all going to interrelate and what they are going to give emphasis to. They carve out areas of activity and lay out a program which presumably will be mutually reinforcing. Part of the difficulty is that nobody quite knows the answer to your question. However, in the Model Cities Program--

G: The reason I asked it is because Moynihan makes the case, and part of his case in his whole book, his whole thesis, is that without adequate planning you couldn't expect adequately run programs. I'm wondering why he uses the Boone criteria of one year in the Ford Foundation, that there will be one year for setting up the program and planning and so forth. I was just wondering what takes a whole

year before you even begin to spend money.

S: Let's backtrack on this a moment then, without losing the point where we were.

G: Sure. Right.

S: When Dave Hackett first put into the Council of Economic Advisers planning system a proposal for community action, he proposed ten areas and proposed that a comprehensive survey be made in each area, which would take about a year, prior to the enactment of legislation to authorize community action programs. That was how cautious he and his advisers were. One thing that influenced him was the proposition of which that group was so conscious, that nobody quite knew what needs to be done to eradicate poverty. It's not a simple thing. They had a research approach, research and demonstration.

G: Yes.

S: So along with the planning is a notion that there has got to be some very hard thought and perhaps some experimentation as to what you want to do.

G: Would the emphasis have been on the research or the demonstration?

S: Well, you research through demonstration.

G: The reason I asked that question is because it seems to me that the R and D programs in the whole community action sphere of OEO and its operations has been the critical one. I'm sure you'll probably take issue with this, but the controversy surrounding community action, particularly as laid out in Moynihan's book, has not been with community action per se, but [with] the R and D, the experimental, the

testing the social or scientific hypotheses, the setting up of these R and D community action agencies, sometimes in opposition to the ordinary community action agency. I'm wondering if the caution was in the R and D aspect of the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency? You know, there's a comparable case that could be made.

S: I wouldn't distinguish that sharply between the R and D community action projects and the regular ones. Some of the most controversial, the one in Syracuse, was an R and D project. But some of the programs undertaken by the regular agencies were controversial, too, in their communities. In the February 4 meeting there was a sharp focus on this point. The community action people, in their presentation, had suggested that the planning approach be taken along the lines of the way that the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency had run its projects. But I think in their original presentation they acknowledged that they would use what was called the building block approach.

I remember my own contribution to the meeting, just before noon, was a plea in that direction, that when the President had declared unconditional war on poverty you couldn't, first, limit the number of areas. That had been in the original proposal; in fact, it had been in the thinking from the very beginning. At the time Shriver took over the Budget Bureau and the Council had been thinking in terms of not more than fifty areas. Well, this was one point I made my pitch against. You can't have unconditional war on poverty, and after you've designated your fifty areas tell all the other mayors and

county commissioners and civil leaders to go back and wait, they could fight their war on poverty later. It just didn't respond to the President's leadership which he was asserting then, and it was not in accord with the country's response to that leadership. The country was ready to move on a truly unconditional war on poverty, and we couldn't come up with a program which said we are going to fight an unconditional war in fifty places. By the same token we had to start moving on as many things as we could be confident of their merits as possible.

By that point, or at that point or shortly afterward, there seemed to be no question that the consensus of the meeting was clear. on both those points, that we would go universal at once and we would use the building block approach. My complaint about Moynihan's book is that he treats the suggestion that this be a universal program as though it were a kind of conspiracy of the social scientists to thrust their untried theories on the country. It was the social scientists who were the most cautious. It was they who said, "Let's hold this to ten areas" in Hackett's original proposal, or fifty at the time the Budget Bureau got hold of it. It was the politicians who said, "Let's take this idea and make it universal, whether or not we know what we're doing."

G: Just to continue that point for a moment, I recall that in Moynihan's book he makes the point that it was LBJ, it was the President who wanted--I can quote him here, "He wanted action, not planning. He wanted nationwide scope, not target areas. And he wanted to see

that the Negroes got something fast, without in the process alarming the whites." Now I don't know how accurate he is on that, but he does make that point.

S: I don't know what the President's personal contribution was on these points. Shriver talked to the President; none of the rest of us, to my knowledge, did. Shriver's interests and the President's interests coincided. Moreover, whether Shriver or the President were motivated by the 1964 election is to some extent moot, because they probably would have behaved in exactly the same way anyway. The election's in November, but the Congress meets in January. If you're going up to Congress with a budget in January and you have to defend it shortly after that, you want something to be able to show. So quite apart from the politics of it, there was every reason for an administrator with Shriver's temperament to want to have a few elements in that program where he could show some results fast.

G: Yes. Assuming . . .

S: When you're fighting a war, you may launch a bomb strike on the enemy that has no strategic value at all. The Doolittle Raid on Tokyo is a case in point. But you've got to do something for home consumption to show that the war is on and by golly you're winning it. I think Shriver also, as I said earlier, was influenced by the feeling that the Job Corps was something concrete and attractive and manageable, where you could explain quite easily what you were trying to do. Whereas community action was a fuzzy concept and experimental, and nobody knew what it was, except it was whatever any community

decided it would be.

G: Did he really believe that about Job Corps?

S: I think so. I think the Job Corps idea attracted Shriver emotionally from the very beginning.

G: And yet there were untested theories of the Job Corps that nobody knew. The whole educational--the application of innovative and relevant educational materials, for example, making them, you know, deal with a poverty target population, half of which or great proportions of which were illiterate.

S: Oh, yes.

G: It wasn't a simple remedial exercise.

S: No. But Shriver felt fairly secure in this area. To begin with, there was the experience with CCC in the thirties, which by common acclaim was a success. All he had to do was do the same thing they had done. He had been president of the school board in Chicago, so he knew about vocational education and basic adult education. This would be the application of pretty tried and true educational principles. You'd have to modify them and refine them, but that was something the educators were certainly able to do, in contrast to community action, where you didn't even know what the content of the program was.

G: No. Can I stop you on that one point? You're making the connection between old CCC and the Job Corps. I think it was Christopher Weeks' book, Job Corps: Dollars and Dropouts, where he does point out that the Job Corps was not to be CCC camps. For example, any conservation

benefits that might accrue from this Job Corps experience were simply to be incidental; the whole point was not for conservation purposes or to keep kids off the street, but --

S: But I'm talking about how Shriver saw the program on February 4, not how the experts saw it when they got into it deeper.

G: Yes.

S: But as of the third day he was on the job it wasn't even called the Job Corps then, but the Youth Conservation Corps. Taking kids off the streets and putting them into some kind of educational setting was a much clearer and manageable idea than community action. Then Shriver was looking for other things, too. The Domestic Service Corps, which became VISTA, had been through the planning stage, and he had been running the Peace Corps, so the idea of a domestic Peace Corps was something that was clear to him, something he could visualize himself running successfully.

G: This was Stephen Pollak's task force, was it not? On domestic, the national service--

S: That sounds right.

G: And then he became a member of the task force, didn't he?

S: I'm not sure who headed it. I thought Dave Hackett was heading up the planning. But anyway, it was that group.

G: So that at the outset it was very difficult to anticipate what things were going to be, you're saying, with reference to Job Corps, for example. They weren't thinking in terms of Job Corps as what it became, but simply as a visible, manageable and hopefully very

successful program.

S: Well, we started with it as it had been introduced and was pending in the Congress, which was the Youth Conservation Corps with this emphasis on the conservation side. There was a home town Youth Corps element of it that became the National--

G: Neighborhood Youth Corps?

S: Neighborhood Youth Corps, yes. Of course, that was easy to visualize, too. That, likewise, had its counterpart in the Depression. You remember that Shriver was of the generation that remembered the legislation of the thirties, and maybe that's one reason that our land reform proposal appealed to him. I remember saying in a talk I gave that we had re-created in a single act the CCC, the NYA, the WPA, and the Resettlement Administration.

G: Where were the Green Belt Cities? (Laughter)

S: And the adult work program, which was a counterpart of the WPA, was readily accepted, too. I think the striking thing was that when Shriver cast his dragnet out for new ideas and additional ideas, how few came in. There was nothing, really, that was different.

G: Yes.

S: That was really a new idea, except community action. And that was a new idea only in the organizational sense, not in the program sense.

G: Except that the President's Committee had been tampering with that, with an incipient form of community action.

S: But actually it was the only new idea that hadn't been tried in the

1930's. One of the most conspicuous missing elements was any contribution from HUD. I guess it wasn't HUD then, it was HHFA. But Shriver authorized me to get in touch with HHFA and see if they could figure out something to put into the program. I called Morton Schussheim, who was in charge of their program planning operation. Schussheim came over, and we talked about it one Saturday. Then he went back to see what he could do, but they never did come in with anything. It seemed to me, and to this day it seems to me, that they should have somehow been involved in the War on Poverty.

G: Was there any reason why the War on Poverty wasn't a bricks and mortar program, such as the Appalachian program became? Why was it what is called a human development [program]?

S: This may be the outgrowth of HUD's failure to participate. I don't know why Shriver on the first day didn't ask HHFA to designate someone, just as he had asked Freeman and Wirtz and Celebrezze to, but evidently he didn't.

G: I have another question here, but I think you've answered it before. Are you suggesting that before February the decision had already been made to create a separate Cabinet level agency, such as what OEO became, and that had been a matter that had been decided.

S: All I can say is that the meeting in the White House, which must have been in January, at which the resistance to HEW's running the program was manifest, took place and left the clear recommendation from the group, which must have been conveyed to the President by Sorensen, that the government as a whole would be happier with an independent

agency than any other solution.

G: Yes.

S: When the President made the decision, I don't know.

G: It is my understanding, and I gather that I am wrong then--

S: I guess he made it prior to February, because from the very outset of our association with Shriver, we took for granted that there would be an independent agency headed by him. When was his message to Congress? That was in [that].

G: The President's?

S: Yes.

G: January.

S: When he mentioned Shriver by name?

G: Oh.

S: It was after his appointment of Shriver.

G: That was later; February, wasn't it?

S: I think so. Anyway, by that time he announced that Shriver would by his personal chief of staff.

G: Yes, right. I think it was the 26th of February, but I'm not sure. Was that the Rose Garden?

S: No. It was a special message to the Congress on poverty.

G: Oh! The special message. I can't recall.

S: No, it wasn't until March. It was March 16. I guess that was the first time. I don't know, he must have said something to the press when he appointed Shriver.

G: Yes. Well, there were two occasions. One, there was a letter which

was made public, and I think that was the 6th. And there was another on February 26, when I think there was a Rose Garden ceremony in which Shriver was--I don't remember whether it was indicated at that time that he would continue. I don't think it was. But this business of--

S: But wait. Hindsight is always clearer, but I'm sure that we all took it for granted that Shriver would be heading an agency. The only question from that time on was what went into the agency and what would it be called. The creation of the Office of Economic Opportunity, that is the drafting of the language creating it, took place in February, and I don't remember the question as to whether there would be such an office ever arising. It was understood.

G: Well, I started to say earlier, it was my impression--

S: There was a question as to whether it would be in the Office of the President or not.

G: Ah! That's the point I wanted to try to get you to make.
To what extent was the effort to coordinate the entire anti-poverty effort the rationale of making it a separate Cabinet level [entity] crossing Cabinet lines, part of the Executive Office, and so forth.

S: It wasn't Cabinet level, it was supra-Cabinet level. It was part of the Executive Office.

G: Right. Because it needed the authority to coordinate.

S: Yes, and community action was a coordinating concept. It wasn't a program, it was an instrumentality for coordinating a lot of programs at the community level.

G: I'm just wondering to what extent this was the motive for making OEO separate, supra-Cabinet.

S: Oh, it was the motive, no question about that. If it had been designed as an operating agency, it wouldn't have been given Executive Office status. All through the early language, the Council of Economic Advisers Report, the budget message that year, the notion that community action would be a coordinating idea and that the War on Poverty was a coordinating concept was the overriding idea.

G: That was the overriding idea?

S: Oh, yes.

G: Where did it become the underriding idea, or where did it just fall by the wayside? Because I think the habitual complaint has been, among the administrators of the poverty program, that Shriver never really did have a status to be a coordinator.

S: I just completed an article on the question of coordinating the War on Poverty, and I said the reason that the War on Poverty never did get coordinated was that the President and his advisers either didn't see the administrative requisites of coordination or didn't pay any attention to them. The President was concerned about the substance of the program and the politics, and he was going to have Shriver there as a coordinator and that would be that. Administration would take care of itself. Well, had he thought about the coordinating role in administrative terms he would have recognized that Shriver was not the man for that kind of a job. Shriver had certainly no interest. Nobody knows what his talent would be if he

had the interest, but since he didn't have the interest the question is moot. An intragovernmental coordinating job, that's a job not for a public figure who has vice presidential aspirations, it's a job for a--

G: Bertrand Harding?

S: A Bertrand Harding, an anonymous Budget Bureau type. Shriver was not the man for that. It may be that you don't have a staff coordinator, a chief of staff as he put it, and a congressional salesman in the same person. The latter reason is why they picked Shriver, because he had talent on the Hill. It would have been just very lucky if he had been willing to be an anonymous coordinator, too, but that is a contradiction in terms.

G: But didn't you also need somebody who could wield authority and force in the Cabinet? Because it certainly was going to involve conflict and friction between prerogatives of this new agency and the old--

S: Well, yes. Now wait a minute. You don't have conflict with Cabinet members except when you are competing with them. The Budget Bureau doesn't compete with them. The council doesn't compete with them. If OEO had been a staff coordinating body, there wouldn't have been any conflict. The conflict came as to who was going to run particular programs, and OEO was one of the organizations that wanted to run the programs.

G: I see.

S: My concept at that time . . .

G: So rather than the delegation, it would simply be a coordinator and no

operations--

S: No operations. I don't know that I thought it through completely at that time, but that was my picture. I had been advocating for years the establishment in the Executive Office of the President of some kind of an agency with an operating role. This was the missing element in the presidency that I had felt very keenly when I was working at the departmental level. There are all kinds of people up there who plan the government and organize the government and work on the budgets, but there isn't anybody up there to help the President run the government. So the notion of an Executive Office agency with the responsibility for getting something done appealed to me very greatly. It seemed to me that this agency would have to run community action, but that since that was a coordinating scheme essentially and not a program, that while there would be complications that couldn't at that time be foreseen it was not incompatible. But I remember it was with somewhat of a sense of shock that I listened when Shriver came back and said, "I'm going to run the Job Corps. It's been decided." He had a most happy expression on his face, as though he'd just received the Christmas present that he had been praying for.

My reaction at that time was, "Oh, God! Here goes the concept of an Executive Office coordinating agency." Didn't Shriver see that he couldn't get into operations and do his fundamental job? I may have expressed myself on that point at that time, but whether it was that time or at other times, it eventually dawned on me that here was a man who never did intend to do the Executive Office coordinating

job the way that I had personally thought about it. Nor was there any evidence that the other agencies in the Executive Office were going to let him do it. In fact the Budget Bureau, in the person of Kermit Gordon, had fought with some vigor to keep the office out of the Executive Office of the President, which suggested to me that maybe the Budget Bureau didn't understand this coordinating role either. Certainly they didn't want any additional competition in the Executive Office. The President decided that, "Well, we'll put it in the Executive Office for the first year." This was his concession to Kermit. And then, of course, after that inertia kept it there, but it never did function as an Executive Office agency.

G: Yes, so that the intent was there to coordinate, but it was simply the mechanism wasn't set up adequately, and added to that, the personality of the person.

S: Well, when you say "the intent was there," it depends on whom you are talking about. The intent was there in the minds of some of the staff planners in the council and the Bureau of the Budget, but not necessarily in all of them. Because there were some there who were concerned about the impairment of the Bureau's own functions.

G: Who would have been some of those people?

S: It seemed to me that it was reflected in the Bureau's official position against putting OEO in the Office of the President.

G: No, I mean on the task force, Who did see this coordinating role as you saw it?

S: Well, not very many. The concentration of the task force was on

the substance of the programs. This is what happens all the time in government. Administrative aspects of any piece of legislation are handled so incidentally, and it was true here, too. Moynihan was concerned with Title I, and I was concerned with Title III. Other people were concerned with Title II. And [as for] the administrative language, somebody just wrote something for the first draft of the act, and then some of us looked at it. But there was very little attention to it. I can't recall anybody working very hard on this coordination phraseology very hard except myself. I was the one at Shriver's house, with Yarmolinsky there, who challenged the way it was written and got it substantially modified.

G: You did?

S: Yes. I think Adam was there, but I can't remember anybody else, including him, participating in the argument particularly. And now that I am focusing on it, I'm not dead sure Adam was there either. The particular issue I had with Shriver was on language that had been drafted, which he was quite fond of, which would authorize him to revoke laws of Congress.

G: Revoke laws of Congress.

S: Precisely. He would have been able to set aside any congressional enactment where it conflicted with a community action program. This was in the section of the act that became Title VI, where it dealt with preference to be given elements of community action programs.

There was some other language there, too; at this time I can't say precisely what it was. It had to do with his relations with other departments and with the President. The part about changing laws of Congress I remember quite clearly, and I persuaded him to strike that out. The other language, I believe, had to do with whether he acted in his own name or advised the President, and I got some of the language changed so that he would assist the President or advise the President, rather than act in his own name.

G: This says something about Shriver's perception of the governmental processes, I think. Would you like to elaborate a little more on that?

S: I don't think that he had a keen sensitivity to these nuances of government organization, no. Very few people do if they haven't lived in that world. Shriver had been an operator of a fairly independent agency. He had not had to work with jurisdictional feuds as a way of life.

G: But the business about being able to obviate any intent of Congress in any conflict, the lines become very fuzzy, don't they?

S: I don't know that once it was pointed out to him that he had much difficulty seeing it.

G: Plus the political consideration that Congress certainly wasn't going to pass that, would it?

S: Well, that was my--that was <u>the</u> argument. If he had been able to get it passed and gotten away with it, it might not have been a bad idea.

G: Okay. Newspaper references during this whole period. I know that there were some leaks, and there were people who were talking to press

men who probably shouldn't have been because of the fact that the President wanted this to be a surprise, or he just didn't want news of this leaking out. But there were newspaper accounts of the period, and there were references to what was called the clash of empire builders and the blood dripping off the walls and so forth. What was this in reference to?

S: The fight over the Job Corps, I suppose.

G: Labor and Shriver?

S: Yes, and then the Defense Department got involved. This is told, I believe accurately, in Chris Weeks' book. He filled in some aspects of it that I wasn't aware of at the time. I didn't know that the Defense Department ever made a pitch for the actual operation of the camps. I thought that at the most they offered logistical services. But according to Weeks, and I have no reason to disbelieve it, this was a line of retreat.

G: This was Yarmolinsky's idea?

S: Yes. Which he cleared with McNamara, of course. Then somebody leaked this militarization, so-called, scheme to Evans and Novak, and that aroused the liberal community. It seemed to me that Shriver's getting the assignment to run the thing himself was a resolution of the dispute between the Labor Department and the Defense Department, which Shriver may have engineered, because it was obvious that he wanted this. You asked earlier about his temperament. My impression was that he was a hundred per cent operator by temperament. He wanted a grant of responsibility to go out and do something, with as much

autonomy as possible.

G: Would you call it evangelical?

S: Certainly. But the Job Corps fitted his purposes precisely. He never took much interest, I don't believe, in the delegated programs once they had been delegated, because they they were somebody else's responsibility. His staff may have taken interest, but I don't think he personally did.

G: Yes. Except when necessary if that program were to be taken out.

S: Nor did he take any great personal interest in the development of government-wide anti-poverty plans. His personal interest was in dedicating Job Corps camps and acting as an inspirational leader for his subordinates and the institutions for which he was responsible. This was all predictable in his record and administrative habits as Peace Corps director.

G: You said that he didn't pay any attention to the national anti-poverty planning. OEO was in 1967 required by law to prepare this, but they had been preparing one as early as 1965. Was there any thought given during the task force period to the scope and kind of requirements essential to this kind of planning?

S: Oh, not that I know of.

G: No one took any [interest]?

S: The task force had more than one period. But up until the law was sent to the Hill, we were just focusing on what should go in the law. After that, I guess the task force was thinking primarily about, "How in God's name do we get these programs working that we

are now responsible for?"

G: I guess that would be a more appropriate question if I were to take it back to 1963, where the people on the Council of Economic Advisers are considering this kind of thing.

S: Well, I guess so.

G: It's probably not fair to ask, if you don't have direct knowledge.

S: That's right, but they were thinking in those terms. It's apparent in the Lampman analyses in the Council of Economic Advisers economic report chapter that they were thinking in terms of, "How do you put together a national plan to eliminate poverty?" And that kind of thinking carried over into the Kershaw-Levine operation. But all I was saying was that this was not Shriver's interest. He may have seen the need for it intellectually and had tolerated people on his staff to do it, but he didn't personally put any intellectual energy into it.

G: Part of the reason for that is the question about the economic thinking, or the assumptions, of the people on the Task Force. I gather that there was no discussion along these lines because it was assumed that you had a program to put together, and that was the primary task at hand.

S: If you mean did we have academic discussions about it, no.

G: Well, not so much academic discussions, but if you're putting together a program there are those, I think Michael Harrington would be one of them, and he was part of the task force, who probably would have advocated something quite different from what actually finally came out.

(Tape interrupted)

Tape 2 of 2

G: Referring back to the last tape when it ran out, I had put the question, rhetorically perhaps, that there was no economic discussion, academic or not, but that the task force people were more concerned with putting together a program than challenging fundamental economic assumptions.

S: Let me repeat something I said before. The War on Poverty was assumed at that time to embrace practically everything the government was doing, the tax cut, the Appalachia program, the Manpower Development and Training Act, the Area Redevelopment Act, Social Security, raising minimum wages, everything. The only question was what do you add to this complex with five hundred million dollars, and even that had been pretty well committed to the community action idea, with which nobody was quarreling.

G: What about a job creation program?

S: The tax cut was presumably going to do that.

G: That was the economic rationale?

S: Yes.

G: All you had to do was train people, and then at the end of the pipeline there would be jobs because of the tax cut.

S: Right. And if that didn't turn out to be the case, we'd find it out later. Well, this didn't satisfy Bill Wirtz; he was the principal protagonist of the job creation program. But I don't think that Harrington felt himself in a position to mediate this dispute

among economists as to the nature of unemployment. Harrington, Paul Jacobs and Frank Mankiewicz were general kibitzers on the operation, but they didn't make any contribution to the program.

G: What was their involvement? You said "general kibitzers." How did they happen to get into it?

S: They got into it because Shriver likes to have a variety and range of advisers.

G: I mean, how in the world did Shriver know a Michael Harrington? I mean, Mankiewicz was with him in the Peace Corps, but Paul Jacobs and Michael Harrington just seem to come from another world.

S: Well, Paul Jacobs. I don't know how he got to know Paul Jacobs, but he was on his Peace Corps advisory council. So he'd known him then. Harrington was obviously a proper invitee because he'd written the book. Anyway, those three fellows teamed up and wrote a series of strategic memoranda, which must be in the files somewhere.

G: I've seen one of them.

S: I don't recall. I used to read the memoranda from the standpoint of, "How does this affect the legislation?" I couldn't see that it had any effect, so I put them aside. I remember one of them, at the end of about four pages of single-spaced prose, wound up with a sentence which said, in effect, "Of course, there really is no solution to the problem of poverty except abolishing capitalism." That seemed to me to have no--

G: That sounds like Frank --

S: --immediate application. Well, it was signed by all three names.

G: I'd like to see that memorandum, particularly before I go to see Mankiewicz.

S: It was said half in fun.

G: Well, there are more temperate ways, perhaps, not so much abolishing capitalism, but there is certainly--the advocacy of economic planning goes back, you know, to reputable economists such as Tugwell, for example, his critique of the New Deal because it didn't make this kind of thrust.

S: Yes, but we were setting up a mechanism to do that.

G: The community action mechanism?

S: The OEO in the Office of the President. This had unlimited possibilities, so that you didn't cross these bridges. What you said was, "We're taking the necessary first steps now"--as we did when we passed the Employment Act of 1946 and created the Council of Economic Advisers. We didn't know in 1946 what would be the content of a full employment program, but by golly we were going to set somebody up in the government who had the responsibility of thinking about it and coming up with the answers, which turned out to be the case. Twenty years later we've got a marvelous institution. We had the same feeling about the OEO, and I would suppose that Harrington thought about it that way, that here was a chance to create within the government a center of thinking on the things that he, Harrington, was concerned with.

G: Curiously, also, twenty years later one of the first chairmen, Leon Keyserling, becomes one of the strongest critics of OEO.

S: Oh, is that right?

G: Yes.

S: Well, on the same grounds . . .

G: I'm not sure whether they're the same kind, you know, whether it's relevant because of the same kind of grounds, but he obviously is asking for more money.

S: A lot of us felt that--

G: That's another of my questions.

S: --five hundred million dollars was not going to turn out to be enough, but this was the first year, after all, and we set something in motion. What we were concerned with then was getting a national commitment to an objective. At that point you don't quibble very much about the specific content of the program. In fact, the more conservative and cautious you are, the more likely you are to get the commitment. But we felt that once the act was passed and the OEO was in being, and the President's leadership at that time on these matters was superb, that these other problems would work themselves out.

G: In other words, once the commitment had been made it would become a part of the national consensus, and then you could go from there?

S: Right.

G: Sort of like the surtax and ABM?

S: It's like a declaration of war. I think the military analogy, while it's been decried by the liberals, is a very useful one. I thought of it in those terms. When we declared war on the Axis powers in 1941 we didn't define with much care at all how we were going to win that

war, but by God we knew we were going to do it. This was the bridge I wanted to cross.

G: Get the commitment.

S: Right. That was, of course, why I felt so keenly that we wanted this organization in the Office of the President, and I didn't want it to get involved in operations and get distracted by what seemed to be sorties rather than strategy.

G: You say that your primary concern was that of getting the bill through, getting something put together, making the commitment, which I gather has other implications. But was there any consideration given to--I'm going to deliberately exaggerate--a five hundred billion dollar poverty program, if that's what it took to eliminate poverty, with the rhetoric of the declaration of unconditional war? You know, much of the criticism has come subsequently because of this.

S: I'd have to say that no thought was given to that. In that particular budget year, we were limited to five hundred million, and next year's budget we'd think about next year.

G: And that was that?

S: Yes. Of course, I should qualify my remarks every few minutes here by saying that I wasn't necessarily in on all the discussions. But there weren't any theoretical economists around there. As a matter of fact, when it came time to develop the rhetoric surrounding this bill, and I tried my hand at writing some things, I felt a need for some theoretical economics and persuaded Shriver--I shouldn't say "persuaded," I suggested to him and he readily acquiesced--to bring

Bob Lampman in. So Lampman came in for a couple of weeks at that point. But up until that time we had no one on the task force who was doing this kind of thinking at all. We were all playing the role of legislative tacticians. The question was, "What programs can we get enacted?" And, "What should we get enacted through this bill that we don't already have on the books?"

G: So you always had your eye cocked to the Hill.

S: Yes. We were writing a bill.

G: Yes. You said that you knew that Shriver was meeting with the President, but that you never met with him. What kind of contact, what kind of relationship, existed between the White House and the task force? And add to that, was there any priority item, was there any special interest that the White House had in any particular program?

S: I don't recall that the White House had any impact whatever on the content of the bill. Now, they must have acquiesced at some point in putting into the bill the various pieces of legislation which were pending on the Hill already, and in the case of one bill this was fairly delicate. This was a bill that was being handled by Bobby Kennedy, the Juvenile Delinquency Bill. At one point it was considered putting that in, too, but Kennedy objected that he was getting it through all right on his own and not to muddy the waters, and Shriver yielded. But no, to my knowledge, no positive ideas came

from the White House. They all were generated within the task force context.

G: I see.

S: Nor was anything taken out by the White House. The Budget Bureau did take out that little item I told you about, but I think that's the only one. We functioned with remarkable autonomy.

G: Who was the liaison between the White House [and the task force] other than Shriver? Who from the White House? Would that have been Moyers?

S: No one was over in the task force from the White House. When Shriver or Yarmolinsky wanted to talk to the White House, I don't know who they talked to. A good deal of the liaison was probably through the Budget Bureau; Bill Cannon sat with us fairly consistently.

G: I see.

S: And Schultze came around a time or two.

G: That sort of exhausts what I had wanted to ask about the task force. I can't recall offhand back to the original tape, but I think I did ask what programs were considered and rejected by the task force. Maybe I didn't ask that.

S: In the meeting that Norbert Schlei chaired, when the departments came in with their formal critique, it's my impression that the only things that were rejected, that they protested, were expansion of already authorized programs. We had taken the view that where something was authorized already there was no need to pass a law

authorizing it again. The Shriver approach was one of inclusion, not exclusion. He was trying, up to the last minute, to get some additional things to put in there. That was one reason we approached HHFA, and he was trying hard to get something out of the Small Business Administration. He also had John Rubel in as an idea man from the outside. I don't remember anything significant being excluded, unless you want to count that abortive proposal to put a tax on cigarettes and employ people.

G: Yes. I'd like to turn to community action for a moment. You suggest in your book, and Moynihan suggests in his as in other references elsewhere, that there was no strict understood definition of what community action was to be. There were ideas, say, that the Bureau of the Budget had a particular view of community action, but you also say that the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency people and the Ford Foundation people had different approaches. And there were three strategies that you point out. I think Moynihan says there were four and so forth. Were these differences that evident in February and March of 1964, or were they even a primary consideration? Were they simply dismissed? Was it ever discussed?

S: The differences were certainly not so apparent then. As a matter of fact, the three alternative strategies I mention I got from Peter Marris' speech, which he gave a year after the poverty program was enacted. At the time that the task force was working, I don't recall that anybody had

made this kind of an analysis. What I said in the book was, if somebody had gone into it thoroughly they would have discovered what Marris discovered later, because the fact was that they were already going in divergent directions.

G: Yes.

S: But nobody knew that. The first person to have pointed that out was apparently Moynihan. But when he called Kermit Gordon and asked for an audience on this point it was not until May, and by that time the die had been cast. It was a very flexible piece of legislation, and it just seemed to me that the strategy, and the specific programs to emphasize, could turn out to be whatever later seemed like a good idea. Nobody, as of February or March, anticipated the direction it eventually went, or if they did anticipate it, there's absolutely nothing on the record or in anybody's recollection.

G: You left in April, then, after the bill had gone to the Hill.

S: Yes.

G: Did that terminate your relationship with the OEO people?

S: Oh, no. I don't know how much time you want to spend on this, but until I left the department I probably put in half my time on the poverty program, primarily on community action.

G: Oh, I see. I didn't know that.

S: The Agriculture Department felt that it had a responsibility for getting community action agencies organized in rural areas, and I created a poverty task force within the Department.

G: The Department of Agriculture?

S: Yes. We had representation from all the agencies, and we organized a team of field people, essentially the Office of Rural Areas Development, who went into particular states and tried to get things moving.

G: Would this have been sort of the counterpart to what became the Urban Areas Task Force within the task force, the so-called Dick Boone and Jack Conway group that Moynihan talks about?

S: There was a rural task force in OEO which was staffed primarily with Department of Agriculture people, and it was my job to find the people and get them detailed over there. I more or less picked Dick Hausler as the head of it. Then our people worked with them. However, the Hausler group in OEO didn't do much field work. They were in the headquarters processing applications, and they didn't have much time to get out and promote.

G: Did you run into any difficulties at that point, or was this sort of the drawing board stage?

S: During the next year we ran into all kinds of difficulties. I don't know how much you want to go into this.

G: You could go into it in any depth you want to go into it.

S: The basic difficulty was that the OEO had a complete and thorough and unshakable distrust of the Department of Agriculture. They thought we were a department of racists and that the best thing we could do for the program was get out of it. Now when I say "they," this varied among individuals in the OEO, but our efforts were generally thwarted. One of our main thrusts was to try to get some

money from them to put people on our payroll to get out and organize community action agencies, and we never succeeded in getting anything from them.

G: This is in 1965?

S: Yes, 1964 and 1965.

G: And the people with whom you would have dealt would have been people like [William H.] Bozman or Frederick O. R. Hayes? In community action?

S: We dealt primarily with Dick Boone.

G: Oh, Boone.

S: Initially. Boone was a very hard man to get anything much out of, because he moved so deliberately. But finally when we went forward with our proposal for personnel, the Extension Service was to be our chosen instrument. This fell on deaf ears. Then we modified it. I guess Boone suggested that we should try in three states, and we picked out South Carolina, Minnesota and Arkansas, because we were very confident that the extension services in those states would perform. We laid out with some care exactly how they'd be set up, and how they'd proceed. This got through Dick Boone and the community action shop and was vetoed by the general counsel, Don Baker.

G: Oh what grounds?

S: On policy grounds, on the grounds the Department of Agriculture was essentially segregationist. I think he finally said it would be all right to let Minnesota go, "But we don't want to put any money on the

Department of Agriculture in South Carolina and Arkansas." We did get some community action agencies started, but it was very tough going. Actually, while we worked hard at it, the job didn't get done until the state technical assistance agencies were set up and the money put into them. Then they tended to get complete coverage in particular states.

It may be that the department never could have done it, but at that time we were concerned that nobody else was doing it and that all the money was going into the cities, and we did have a nationwide network of rural areas development committees and technical action panels that we felt we ought to throw into the effort. We couldn't have avoided trying. It was very frustrating. Then we also wanted to get a piece of the research money, to do research on rural poverty problems. The only happy relationship with OEO was the Job Corps and the Forest Service. The Forest Service did its usual brilliant, methodical job of planning and preparation and building on the experience of the CCC. When they made their presentation to the Job Corps, which was at that time floundering, the Job Corps seized upon the staff work they'd done, and the conservation camps got moving rather well.

G: You talk of the OEO administrators in this period as if they caused a lot of the problems themselves. Apparently they weren't getting along with other departments and so forth unless they really needed to. Would this be universal in terms of all the other agencies that had to deal with them, with OEO?

S: Oh, that's a hard question. I had the impression that there were

frictions all over the place, yes.

G: Why? I mean, you know, was it just the quality of the person that was at OEO, or was it sort of an intrinsic difficulty built into the act as it was passed?

S: The Economic Opportunity Act and the Office of Economic Opportunity and the community action agencies all came into being because the old line agencies had failed. It was quite explicit in the doctrine surrounding community action that the welfare bureaucracy and the other bureaucracies, the education bureaucracy, were not dealing effectively with poor people. This was certainly the attitude among the poor, and particularly the blacks. Well, OEO then came into being with the assignment of challenging the established ways of doing things. The Agriculture Department and the Labor Department and HEW certainly represented established ways of doing things. As I said earlier, our proposal was to use the established Extension Service to go in and organize community action. It was very easy for OEO to say, "Those are the very people that we were set up to supplant." You got a new crowd in OEO that hadn't been in the government before, unsympathetic with the established ways of doing things.

I wouldn't want to say they were wrong. I don't think as a matter of fact, the Extension Service would have done the job well. I certainly feel that way now. But I was fighting their battle at the time. I was also very conscious that nobody had any better approach to the problem. So I argued, why didn't they put their money on us and let us see what we could do? Some of the people were extremely hostile.

I remember Bill Haddad called the various departments to a series of meetings to talk about how the inspection function would work, and I had a real blowup with him, mainly on the point of whether or not their people would be able to relieve Department of Agriculture employees from their duties on the spot. I told him in no uncertain terms that Secretary Freeman would never stand for somebody else firing his people.

We didn't care how many reports they brought back and how much advice they gave us, but they weren't going to act on internal USDA disciplinary matters. I checked this point with two or three other departments to see if they were going to take the same stand, and obviously they were. So in this instance the whole government ganged up against Haddad, who was obviously so far off base that he couldn't have held his position anyway. The story around town, of course, was that Wirtz and Shriver hadn't spoken for years. This struck me as thoroughly plausible, but I don't have any evidence, really, on relations with other departments.

G: In your book you point to what I interpret to be your feeling that there was an intrinsic or inherent contradiction in community action which may not have been anticipated at the time. But that it all boils down, after four or five years' experience of program operation, to whether the community at large is willing to, I think as you put it, fund--majorities funding minorities, when the two interests clash. I wonder if this says anything about the structural nature of poverty, and whether the program, as it was designed, is adequate to deal with

this kind of thing. I think you mention a book by Davidson? Is that his name?

S: Yes.

G: I was reading an article where he does point to this element, and he makes the point that whenever you organize these people, whether to facilitate services or whether to educate consumers or teach them their legal rights or what have you, you're always going to run into conflict. I'm wondering to what extent that conflict is generated by the structural and inherent nature of poverty. In other words, I'm sort of taking issue with what you're suggesting in your book. I'm not sure that I'm--

S: I think you were agreeing with it.

G: Well, yes, right.

S: The point is a simple one, that the majority isn't going to finance its own overthrow, or even finance a tax on itself over a long period of time. But even accepting that, it seemed to me that we ought to try as long as we could politically get away with it, and that statement would have sounded more prescient if OEO and community action had been abolished. Actually, they survived rather well under the circumstances. There is now a substantial vested interest in these programs, to where the majority is afraid to eliminate them.

G: In some of the programs.

S: Well, they're afraid to--

G: I wouldn't say Job Corps would be one.

S: No, that's right. It doesn't have any constituency. But community action does, and community action is a formidable antagonist in many communities. Moreover, in some places it's so docile that it doesn't make any difference, so why bother with it? But in either case it survives. Now, where it is a substantial force and the politicians are afraid to tackle it, some of them also are using it and expect to profit by it. It becomes an ally of one or another faction within the power structure, and that really is the way the minority groups have gotten ahead in this country all the time. They, most of them, affiliated themselves--

G: The process of absorption?

S: Well, they affiliated themselves with the Democratic Party, and the Democratic Party then, which may have had its roots in the upper class, had a commonality of interest with the lower class. If you're talking about the structural nature of poverty in the political system, that's probably the key point, that numerically they have enormous political strength if it gets organized, and once they get it partly organized, then they've got enough strength to maintain the organization and develop their power.

G: Which would be adapted to economics, or solutions of economic problems. In other words, there are political processes or methods for economic problems. They may analyze an economic problem in terms of a political solution, as a lot of community action agencies have done.

S: They may analyze the problem wrong, too, but the motive power is there

for the support of anti-poverty programs, whether they're well conceived or badly conceived.

G: Two of the really sort of dark horse programs weren't even considered in the task force as far as I know, maybe I'm wrong. One is the Legal Services, which I think has tremendous potential along these lines that we were talking about, and the other is Head Start.

S: Oh, they were both considered. Legal Services was specially mentioned by YIvisaker right at the outset as being very important.

G: In the task force, you mean?

S: Oh, yes. Yes, in the early days of the task force. But when you authorize community action, you've authorized Legal Services and you've authorized Head Start. The equivalent of Head Start was a feature of all "grey areas" programs, I think. At any rate, it was a conspicuous feature of the North Carolina programs.

G: You sort of keep coming back to this. When you've authorized community action, essentially you're authorizing just about anything that the community wants to do, and all the federal government does is give them the money on a ninety-ten ratio. Is that what you're saying?

S: Yes. That was the way we saw it then. And as I said earlier in relation to Adult Basic Education, we resisted the requests that were coming from all over to say, "Community action will include this particular kind of program." In a sense that contradicted the whole notion that the community would decide for itself--

G: The whole shift of the national emphasis programs.

S: --what went into the program. But the law when it did come out did have

some very loose language about what would be covered, as I remember.

G: Yes.

S: Legal Services was not in there.

G: Not that I recall. I think it was in 1965 that the Congress altered the language of the act.

S: After OEO began developing national emphasis programs, then Congress got into the spirit of the thing and developed some of its own.

G: Yes. The other area I wanted to ask you about was the 1964 campaign. Evans and Novak, in their book Lyndon Baines Johnson: the Exercise of Power, do have a little short vignette about this anti-campaign group. I thought I would just let you explain it and talk in terms that you would like to about it, rather than ask specific questions.

S: I assume you'll be talking to Mike Feldman, who put the thing together. He had representation from a number of departments, more on a personal basis than official. I went over there because I thought it would be fun, and he thought I'd be useful. The function of this task force was to think up all the gimmicks or tactics that we could that weren't being covered by other people, and in particular to deal with the, shall we say, negative side of the campaign, as distinct from the positive presentation of the Johnson candidacy.

The main thing that I contributed, as I recall it, was to take the basic data on what would happen to the farmers in the absence of any farm programs and put it into the hands of the local people wherever Goldwater appeared. Now, the department had gotten independent agricultural economists from Iowa State and Kansas State and Oklahoma

State, and maybe one or two others, to compute what would happen to farm income, state by state and program by program, if Goldwater's proposal that agriculture programs be abolished was enacted. Then we took those figures and translated them into data on every county and each state. So that when Goldwater was to appear, say, in Pueblo, Colorado, the Democratic county chairman could challenge him in whatever seemed to be the best way, with placards or hecklers or statements to the press before and after the Goldwater appearance. The same thing was done in some other fields, and we tried to do this systematically. It's all kind of a blur to me now. A lot of what was done there was very marginal to the campaign. I guess it would maybe fair to say it was all marginal.

G: It's hard to measure that.

S: We thought of some cute leaks to columnists that would hit Goldwater in some of his weak points. These were always fun at the time, and you have a feeling you're participating, but they don't influence very many votes. One thing, though, that impressed me was that the President took a very great interest in this operation. Mike was in very close communication with him throughout, which gave us all a sense of purpose we otherwise wouldn't have had.

G: Evans and Novak call it his "pet project." Then you confirm by what you just said, that he apparently was terribly interested in it?

S: That was my impression, yes. If Mike has records on all of this, they ought to be assembled somewhere.

G: Did this group have anything to do with those infamous, notorious

television advertisements of a little girl plucking a daisy?

S: No, no.

G: You were more with the things you've just described?

S: Yes.

G: Did you ever plant speakers or hecklers, that sort of thing? Or was it that minute in detail?

S: Not hecklers, but it seemed to me that one element of our operation was to pick up some of the best things that had appeared on signs at the Goldwater rallies and circulate them. I didn't do that myself, but I believe it went on in part of our operation. This was a pretty loose thing. We met every day, I guess, after work in effect, at four-thirty I believe, and would run through maybe an hour, hour and a half, two hours.

G: It was all on your own time, then?

S: Virtually all, yes. We might have taken the last half-hour of the day. But the idea was that it would be on our own time. But people would come in late and leave early, and the attendance was spotty and depended on what was being considered. We didn't all participate in everything. So I don't know for sure what some of the others were doing.

G: How did Evans and Novak find out about this? They say it was such a secret, clandestine operation, that Johnson wanted this to be [secret].

S: It was secret at the time, but I don't think we were sworn to any great secrecy once the election was over. I don't think I've ever had occasion to talk about it, but if Evans or Novak had asked me after the

campaign what I did in the campaign, I might have mentioned it.

[End of Tape 2 of 2 and Interview I]

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