INTERVIEW I

DATE: May 27, 1969

INTERVIEWEE: JAMES H. TATE

INTERVIEWER: T. HARRISON BAKER

PLACE: Mayor Tate's office, City Hall, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Tape 1 of 1

B: Sir, do you recall when you first met Lyndon Johnson?

T: I first met Lyndon Johnson at the nation's Capitol when he was the Democratic leader of the Senate during the Eisenhower Administration. I was with a group of railroad executives and mayors headed by former Mayor [Anthony] Celebrezze of Cleveland. Mayor Celebrezze at that time was president of the old National Municipal Association, which is now the National League of Cities. We had with us Mayor Daley of Chicago, Mayor Dilworth of Philadelphia, and Bob Wagner of New York was the mayor of New York at that time, to call on the then Democratic leader of the Senate Lyndon Johnson to seek his support for a program to aid the railroads of the country, particularly at the commuter level.

The railroads, in the East particularly, were having real difficulties, and I was very much impressed with Lyndon Johnson's grasp of the problems with respect to railroads and with the gracious manner in which he received these railroad executives, executives who were obviously not on his side of the aisle, they're mostly Republicans. But certainly he was very much interested in getting their point of view, and he was impressed by the fact that the mayors of Chicago,

Cleveland, Philadelphia and New York wanted to talk to him about getting his support. We didn't know him very well, he was a southerner, and he was not even in consideration as a candidate for president. But I was very much impressed by the manner in which he handled the situation. When we left, the railroad executives to a man told me that they were very much impressed with the manner in which he received them, and certainly they were very much enthused and felt that they would get some support, which we eventually did.

I remember Tony Celebrezze, who is now a judge of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals in Ohio, said, "You know, this all started out with a little meeting we had with Lyndon Johnson in Washington." That was as far back as 1957, but the remarks were made at the time of the railroad mergers under national congressional legislation, resulting in Amtrak and Conrail.

B: Did you think seriously of Mr. Johnson as a presidential contender back in 1956 at the Democratic convention?

T: No. I don't think anyone took Johnson seriously as a presidential candidate until the Los Angeles convention in 1960 when there was quite a formidable campaign advanced by the people from Texas. Of course, he was selected by John Kennedy to be his running mate, and then I think he was pretty well taken seriously.

B: Did you have anything to do with the pre-convention campaign? Did anyone from Mr. Johnson's camp try to get in touch with you?

T: No. The only person that I recall that was for him in Philadelphia was the late Albert M. Greenfield, who said that he had promised Lyndon Johnson that he would be for him. He was a good friend of mine, and he said to me, "Do you think I'm doing the right thing?"

And I said, "Well, if you promised him that you would be for him, you are doing the right thing." He and Emma Guffey Miller, who was the sister of the late U.S. senator from Pennsylvania, Joe Guffey, were for Johnson. They were the only two in the state of Pennsylvania.

B: Were you at that Los Angeles convention?

T: I was. I was a delegate, and I was for Kennedy.

B: Was it much of a surprise in your delegation when the vice presidential position was offered to Mr. Johnson?

T: No. It wasn't because after the convention started to break the way it did, we had some ideas from the late Governor David Lawrence of Pennsylvania who said that this was in the offing, and he wanted our views about it. We discussed it candidly. Well, it was a surprise because the two were competing very closely together, and it seemed at that time that they were the two formidable candidates. It was a great marriage, in my opinion, of the two good candidates, one, the candidate for president and one, the candidate for vice president. I think it was a master stroke on the part of John Kennedy to get Lyndon Johnson interested.

Some of the southerners were not too much impressed by the fact that he hooked up with Kennedy because they felt that he had left their ranks in order to join with Kennedy, but I think it worked out very well.

B: Had the pre-convention campaigns left any bitterness or ill feeling anywhere?

T: I wouldn't think so. This is in the mind of a lot of people, but very seldom expressed, but I think the cynical communication media from time to time like to refer back to it. And unfortunately there has been a great deal of publicity about it. But I think those that were for Johnson finally accepted the fact that they would be for Kennedy for president and for Johnson for vice president, and it worked out very well. Certainly I have had no ill feelings about it. I've been with Johnson all the way just as much as I was with Kennedy.

B: Did Mr. Johnson being on the ticket have an effect in Philadelphia or Pennsylvania?

T: I think it did. I really think it did. I think this gave the stability that probably wasn't too well seen at the time. I felt, as did some of the other political leaders of that time, that while John Kennedy was a great candidate, the fact that he was getting a substantial leader who could help with legislation was very helpful in getting extra votes.

B: Did you see anything of Mr. Johnson while he was vice president?

T: Yes. The Vice President at that time--it's a little difficult calling him vice president because I regard him as the great president during my time as mayor--I saw him any number of times when we went to Washington in behalf of legislation for the big cities. While Jack Kennedy had a very good organization with Larry O'Brien handling the legislation, we also knew that if you touched base with the Vice President that he would be very helpful. He was very close to the mayors of the big cities, as was later demonstrated by his interest when he became president.

B: While Mr. Johnson was vice president, was he more or less formally assigned responsibility for cities as Mr. Humphrey was later on?

T: No, he was not.

B: Just an informal thing?

T: If you knew him, you would see him and seek his support, and he was very helpful in the Senate and with his friends in the House. No, there was no formal arrangement as in the case of Hubert Humphrey.

B: Was there anyone in the Kennedy Administration who acted as the contact man for the cities?

T: I would say Larry O'Brien more than anybody else. He had a pretty good team. He worked very closely with the National League of Cities and U.S. Conference of Mayors. He also had Chuck Daley and Claude Desautels who worked with him. I think they were very effective in working with the big cities, especially in our legislation. And they seemed to be aware of it.

Particularly I shouldn't forget this, this is pretty important, because Lyndon Johnson when he was vice president made an historical trip to Philadelphia. John Kennedy was here in 1962, when he, as president of the United States, made his famous interdependent speech at Independence Hall on the Fourth of July. Other people call it Independence Day but around here we call it the Fourth of July. It's a big event in Philadelphia because it is the birthplace of our country in Philadelphia, and we have the Liberty Bell, and the Declaration of Independence was adopted here at the session held in Philadelphia by the then representatives of the various colonial states.

I think Lyndon Johnson, when he came here, made a great impression and this was in the wake of the previous visit of John Kennedy in 1962, the previous Fourth of July. Remember, the Fourth of July is a very warm day in the North. Most of the people go to the beach, or they go to visit their families in other parts of the country. It's pretty much of a holiday, but we in Philadelphia have been building up this program for some time. We were more than pleased that Lyndon Johnson came because he brought not only a good speech to Philadelphia, but he stayed with us a good deal of the time and we got to know him a whole lot better. He was very well received by the crowds. There were about ten thousand people there at Independence Hall, and we had a rather informal luncheon afterwards. It was there that he delivered a very eloquent talk which took the best part of an hour. It was more of a folksy tale about the South and about this country and about the future of the world. And I think many people who had not been close to him at that time began to recognize in him a great man, a real patriot.

B: Is this mostly civic and political--?

T: It was civic and political leaders. There were about three hundred there. It was rather good because usually they go to the exercises in the morning and they leave and they go out to the beach or the country or some place like that, but they stayed around and they listened to him. As he left the Benjamin Franklin Hotel in Philadelphia, which is the hotel nearest the historical site, he was greeted by large crowds of people. In fact, it was very difficult to get him

away. As you know, he had a great trick of going in one side of the car and going out the other side and went across the street and shook hands with people. There were people not only from Philadelphia but from all around because they would visit Independence Hall and the Liberty Bell on the Fourth of July, which was the birthday of the Liberty Bell.

So I was very much impressed with that visit. My wife was. She especially liked the manner in which Mrs. Johnson presented herself, a very gracious lady. The older daughter was with them on that occasion with a friend of hers, and my daughter, Anne Marie, was with us. My son, Frank, was away at school. My daughter was very much impressed with the older daughter. It was an impressive visit and people talked about it for a couple of weeks afterwards, about how well he was received in Philadelphia.

B: Did you get a chance to talk to Mr. Johnson privately on that occasion?

T: Not too much. He was interested in talking to--I was really the host, but we didn't sit down for a long chat or anything like that. It was mostly small talk, nothing serious. I enjoyed every bit of it.

B: That would have been the summer of 1963?

T: That was on July 4, 1963, that's right. After that, I would see him from time to time in Washington on legislation for the big cities.

B: Later that year after the Kennedy assassination when Mr. Johnson became president, did you see him or hear from him fairly soon after he acceded to the presidency?

T: Yes, I expected that we would as a group stop by to see him in the White House as the mayors of the big cities of America, but Congressman Green, who was a former Democratic leader in Philadelphia, the father of the present Congressman, died on December 22. And Lyndon Johnson came to Philadelphia with Mrs. Johnson for the funeral and attended the mass at the Catholic cathedral--the Cathedral of St. Peter and Paul in Philadelphia. People were rather surprised that he did so because they weren't aware of the fact that Congressman Green was that close to Lyndon Johnson. I remember he was in the same pew in the church with me. We have a communion service in the Catholic Church and the Secret Service men were aware of the fact that he usually followed the crowd, so that when it came time for the communion he made a move as if to go to the front, as we call it, and one of the Secret Service men said, "No, not now." So my wife and I of course went to the communion rail because we're Catholics, too.

But he impressed everybody with the manner in which he conducted himself. He was well respected and they just thought it was great that he'd come into a Catholic church as a Protestant. We hadn't had the Ecumenical Council yet. So they were very much impressed, and it was a great mark of respect which he paid to Mr. Green and his family.

B: How soon after Mr. Johnson became president did the cities begin to get his attention? Did the mayors as a group or in one of their organizations meet with him?

T: Let's put it this way. In 1963 I was in Houston, Texas, I think that was in August of 1963. He was still vice president, he was not running

for re-election, although everybody assumed that he would be the candidate for vice president with Kennedy in 1964. We had the meeting of the National League of Cities, then know as the American Municipal Association, and he addressed us at a meeting at about eleven o'clock in the morning in Houston, Texas. The Mayor at that time was a man by the name of [Lewis] Cutrer, the mayor of Houston. Evidently they had had some sort of political factional fight, and the Mayor sent me with two other mayors--I don't recall who they were--to receive the Vice President at the curbside of the Shamrock Hotel when he came into town. He came in a car. He was with a few people, I don't recall who they were, probably some security people. It was a very warm day in August. As he came out of the car, he said, "Hello, Jim, how are you? Do we have a good crowd?" I said, "We have a good crowd, Mr. President."

We went into the hall and he delivered a speech on civil rights in Houston, Texas, which was out of this world. Civil rights of course wasn't very popular then. Things were pretty well upset in the South. He recalled the days when he was a school teacher. He taught school in Houston. Then he got onto civil rights and pointed out the many problems that were facing America. He said he thought it was not only good business but good politics to get behind the civil rights movement. Then he said, "You're sitting here. There are about thirty-five hundred of you. You're all municipal officials. I'm going to say something that will be pretty interesting to all of you. Here is the Mayor of Philadelphia sitting here, that's where

the Declaration of Independence was signed. I'm going to ask him to send you a copy of the Declaration of Independence so that you can recall its words and make them effective." I thought that was pretty good. We sent three thousand copies. We didn't just give them out, we sent them from Philadelphia.

I don't think some of them liked it. As a matter of fact, I'm not too sure that the Mayor of Houston at that time liked it. He, incidentally, was running for re-election, the Mayor was, and he lost out. It wasn't over that, but I think there was some argument about the policemen's pay or something like that. He was against it, and the policemen of course conducted a pretty good campaign for it. The present mayor whose name if [Louie] Welch, I think, succeeded him. He was a councilman at that time.

I guess it was early in January of 1964 that he began to pick up the ball in the interest of the United States Conference of Mayors and the National League of Cities, then the American Municipal Association. He would meet with us from time to time about the problems of the cities because we're a pretty formidable group and we're very active in behalf of legislation. So he got behind the legislation which John Kennedy had started but never seemed to get out of committee. He really made it roll in those early days in 1964.

B: That would have been what eventually became the Model Cities--

T: The Model Cities legislation was not approved until late in 1967.

B: Were the mayors taken in and asked for their advice in the drafting stage of legislation like that?

T: No. Our work was at the congressional hearing level. We were called upon to testify. Mayor Collins of Boston, Mayor Daley of Chicago, Mayor Wagner of New York, when he was mayor, then would come and testify; men like Beverly Brierley of Nashville who is now the president of the National League of Cities, Jerry Cavanagh of Detroit, and there was another man from Tacoma, Washington--he came in several times. But we weren't brought in at the level of advising as to the actual drafting. Of course the bills were written by the various committees. I think that's the procedure in the National Congress, and they would change it around based on testimony that they received. It was a pretty successful movement because we were able to get a real start on the big city programs with respect to urban development. Of course he later came up with the astounding ideas with respect to the poverty program and the Model Cities, all of which came later. In the early days it was proposed by his administration, and when he was elected.

After he was elected, it became a greater force and he seemed to emphasize aid to the big cities more than we ever had before. As I just said to some people in the press the other day, I thought that while John Kennedy recognized the mayors of America and recognized the big city problems, not much was accomplished while he was president. Now this isn't said disrespectfully. But Lyndon Johnson carried through with the real meat of meaningful programs for the big cities of America. Certainly I think he could be called not only a president who was for the poor but one who was very much for the big cities.

B: Was it clear that Mr. Johnson assigned his vice president, Mr. Humphrey, sort of the coordinating responsibility?

T: There was no question about that. For the first time the Vice President was given a real responsibility in this respect, for Humphrey became the officer in the Johnson Administration for the big cities and was so recognized. They had tried this in the Kennedy Administration but it did not get through. At that time Kennedy had Weaver in as an aide with respect to housing, but Johnson had HUD--the Department of Housing and Urban Development--cabinet officer for the big cities that was recognized by the Congress and by the President. Of course, even though the department was approved, it was some time before Bob Weaver was selected. There was no question about it at the time. There were a number of people who were interested but he finally came through and I think did a good job. There are some people who think that the choice of Bob Weaver was unfortunate because he did not have the drive of some of the other people that might do the job. They were interested, for instance, in a man who had a great deal to do with NASA. That's Mr. [James] Webb. They thought he could do a good job, and I think he could have, but Mr. Johnson made the choice and we got behind Weaver. Weaver was very helpful.

But the driving force all along was Hubert Humphrey and Johnson. I think Hubert Humphrey was very helpful to the President in this respect. He saw more of the mayors, and he was sent by the President to see the mayors. He worked with us on the legislation rather than just detailing it to somebody like Larry O'Brien. We knew that when

we went to see the President in Washington--some of those pictures on the wall over there. You can see even with Mrs. Johnson there are about forty mayors right in there. On that very day after we had that picture taken with her--he isn't there--we thought we were just visiting with her with respect to her city more beautiful program. And she went back into the Oval Room of the White House--no, it wasn't the Oval Room, it was a room that had a small seat where maybe two or three people could sit like that little sofa.

B: It might be the Fish Room.

T: It might have been. But she was seated there talking to us and we were suggesting different ideas, and he came in. That was in the early part of 1965 and he was troubled by the Vietnam War then, so she talked to us. Then he got into the act, as they say, and began to talk about the problems of the big cities and the war. He wanted our views, but he did most of the talking, which was the usual situation with him. But I remember Mrs. Johnson and he sat in the seat and I sat next to him. Every once in a while he'd turn to me and he'd sort of poke me in the chest and say, "Isn't that right?" or something like that.

B: How were the lower level federal officials to deal with? Did you get cooperation out of the sub-cabinet and department head people that you had to deal with?

T: We always had trouble in that respect. Of course, we call them bureaucrats, you know. The President was easier to handle than the officials themselves. Many times they were not, in plain words, loosened up;

they did not entirely reflect his views. The reason for it was that I think that a lot of them had been accustomed to the same old system in Congress. I think John Kennedy had the same problem. We did rather well with Kennedy, but I used to say to Congressman Green, who was then the leader, "You fellows come up with these great ideas and you support them in the Congress and we feel that something has really been accomplished until we run into a hard-headed bureaucrat in one of the federal departments. We don't seem to get anywhere." Then we'd have to get our delegation together and walk in to the bureau head and say, "Look, we have to have it done this way," and this would eliminate the usual answer. They would say, "We have a Congress to deal with," and we got the impression sometimes that they were trying to get votes for their program rather than put across what we really wanted.

The President had us down to the White House any number of times for social affairs and made them interesting. Sometimes you'd get the impression that you were being lobbied, but it was a nice way to be lobbied. Of course, he was really troubled about the Vietnam War. He had us in there one night. Mrs. Tate went down with me. I suppose there were about twenty-five or thirty mayors, and all the wives were there. He took the men in one room and they had charts explaining the problems of the Vietnam War, and theytook the women on a tour of the White House. They not only took them once, they took them twice while we were in there. He had Secretary of War Bob McNamara and various department heads, such as Secretary of State Dean Rusk, to talk about the war. He had those who were handling the economics

at that time to talk about their problems, too. Then he'd get up and talk about it, also. We did not have dinner until half past eleven. I was seated with him because of my position, I suppose--I don't know why, but I was at the same table with him. At that time I was not president of the National League of Cities, but I happened to be at the same table with him in the East Room, where they have the social events. My wife was at another table. We finished dinner about a quarter after twelve. He got up and called for attention and he said, "As I was saying when we came in here yesterday," which I thought was pretty good. We all thought we were going to go home, say, "Goodnight, Mr. President." "No," he said, "we're not finished yet."

They had a band outside and we had a dance until half past one or a quarter of two in the morning, which was very gracious of him. I said to him, "I don't know how you do it." "Oh," he said, "I get a little nap after lunch." Because a number of times I had lunch with him with a couple of other mayors to discuss some of the problems.

B: Did you get the impression on an occasion like that he was trying to sort of explain to you why there wasn't as much money forthcoming as the cities might have wanted?

T: He always said that. He said, "You know we can't get the money out of the Congress." At one stage of the game, he said to me, "You know, I can't get one single Texas congressman to vote for my program. I can't even raise the federal debt level." You know, they have a federal debt level. I sort of looked at him wistfully and I said,

"Well, I've got five congressmen in Philadelphia." He said, "You're very lucky." At that time he wasn't getting any support from Texas. That was in 1967.

B: Did he ever talk to you about the problem of urban disorders?

T: Yes.

B: The reason I ask is that Philadelphia had comparatively mild trouble in 1963 and 1964, and then to now, no more. I was wondering if he'd ever asked you how you did it.

T: No, he never really did solicit me directly. Some of the other people did in the federal government. Hubert Humphrey did, but very frankly, he never asked me. He would send for different people from Philadelphia from time to time, including Judge [Leon] Higginbotham from Philadelphia who was a Negro district court judge, a young man whom we think of very highly, and who sat in on some sort of civil rights council that they had in Washington. But he never talked to me directly, but generally about the problems of the big cities.

B: But he did discuss the urban disorders with you?

T: That's correct. But not specifically with relation to Philadelphia. We had pretty well licked our problem at that time because we--in fact it was during the campaign in 1964 when we had what we call our riot, which was small compared to what the other cities had. We had a lot of damage, some looting, but no fires or gun fighting. When something like that happens and the city declares it to be a riot, the city must pay for the damage because of a state statute--the city itself does--and I guess the cost to us was close to $10 million. We've had to pay those claims off.

But it was rather frustrating because he talked in terms of "I don't know what you're going to do for these people. You know, we do everything we possibly can. We give them as much money as we can for housing. We've devoted ourselves to meaningful poverty programs. We've loosened up the areas of civil rights, we've got better legislation in civil rights." It just really disturbed him. But I think he was not as much troubled with that as he was with the problems of the Vietnam War. This seemed to bug him all the time. Even with Nixon today it seems to be bothering him. There appears to be a solution for everything, but there doesn't seem to be a solution to the Vietnam War. President Johnson always seemed to think, "Maybe it will all be straightened out by the end of this year, or maybe next fall everything will be all right, if we're just permitted to do what we can." It seemed to bother him more than anything else. As he used to say, "If I could only find somebody to negotiate with them, to negotiate the peace."

He'd have us in there from time to time. The last time there were about ten of us in to see him, and it was a joint group of the United States Conference of Mayors and the National League of Cities. He spent about an hour with us, and he seemed to just have this idea "I wish I could do something about it, but I can't." We went in to discuss with him this problem of cutting back $6 billion which we felt would materially affect the program for the big cities. You remember, Mills wanted him to--

B: Across-the-board reduction.

T: Across-the-board reduction in exchange for the surtax. He had talked to a lot of people about it and he tried to explain it to us, "You know, we have to do this. I don't want to do it but they've got me over a barrel. I want you to understand. If you have any ideas about where should we cut, we'd be very glad to have them." We said, "We'll support you in anything you want, but don't cut our program." That's what we said. He wasn't satisfied with that and then he tried to convince us that we ought to acknowledge certain areas where it should be cut, which we never do, you know. We thought if there was any cut that had to be made, it would have to be made by the department people themselves, and eventually it really wasn't hurt badly at all. We took a licking in some areas, but we did rather well under his administration.

B: We're about to run out of time, but one more question here. Did Mr. Johnson ever discuss politics with you for 1968 before his withdrawal?

T: No. His withdrawal was a complete surprise. I got the message the night he gave it on the television.

B: Were you one of the ones he had someone call?

T: I was one of the ones he had Marvin Watson call. I was seated watching the President on the television, and he said, "Are you listening to the President?" I said, "Yes, I am." He said, "Well, he's about to say that he's not going to run again." I said, "You must be kidding!" He said, "No, he's serious." I said, "Is this irrevocable?" He said, "Yes, it is. The President wants you to know how much he

appreciates the support you've given him." We were going around saying, "Johnson's going to run and we're behind him 100 per cent." We were lining up labor leaders. We had the big city mayors all lined up, and we had all sorts of meetings arranged, the literature was ready for distribution. It was a complete shock to us. So that when he made the announcement I was very much surprised.

B: You had already begun what would have been the Lyndon Johnson campaign for 1968, then.

T: That's correct, no question about it.

B: Did all that turn immediately to Mr. Humphrey?

T: Oh, no. The Humphrey campaign was slow getting off the ground. As a matter of fact I couldn't find Humphrey for about four days. He was down in Mexico when the President withdrew. We made various attempts to get him. He said he wanted to think about a lot of things, he wanted to talk to the President. His aides were all for it, those like Bill Connell and Norm Sherman and a few of the other people around him. But I think Hubert wanted to be convinced that he could get the Johnson support, as well as to make sure that he was serious about what he was doing. You know, a lot of people thought this was just a maneuver in order to get peace. I believe he was sincere. But after what happened, I'm not too sure it was a good move. I think if he had stayed he might have been re-elected.

B: Do you think you could have gotten him re-elected?

T: I didn't find it especially tough to sell him. I thought he was a good campaigner, he was sincere in his folksy way about him, and

while people derided him or criticized him because he seemed to be corny every once in a while, I found him to be sincere. He brought this country a long way. Maybe things were pretty bad on the Vietnam War, maybe he would have had this dissent and all of these problems that Hubert Humphrey had even more so with the people stirred up at the various campaign rallies. Though Hubert Humphrey was a great campaigner and I was for him all the way, believe me I was, I think Johnson, if he had run, would have been elected.

B: What was your opinion of the Humphrey campaign?

T: Humphrey himself was good, but I don't think he had the assistance he could have had if everybody had worked together. I think Gene McCarthy ruined the campaign. It was a cold, deliberate, preconceived idea to knock Humphrey down. He would have done the same thing with Johnson, but I think Johnsan would have overcome Gene McCarthy.

B: McCarthy had that much effect?

T: I think so. He just stirred up the younger people beyond even their own ideas. They had ideas about the government and the way things should be, but he misled them. He really misled them. He was more or less of a false prophet.

B: Did you ever think during the campaign of trying to get Mr. Johnson to take a more active part?

T: This was thought about, and I think efforts were made to get him to take a more active part but by whom I don't know. I talked to Mayor [Joseph] Barr of Pittsburgh. He tried to get him to come out to

Chicago during the convenion and he wouldn't come out. He thought it would hurt Hubert Humphrey rather than help him. He felt pretty badly about the situation. I was disturbed lots of times when. . . For instance, he was to come to Philadelphia during the Humphrey campaign and we had it all set up.

B: Mr. Johnson was to come.

T: Johnson was to come here and all of a sudden it was cancelled. It was cancelled, the information I had, because the press got wind of his trip and he wanted it to be a surprise trip. This was as late as the middle of October in 1968. He cancelled out, and I said to the Secret Service man at the time, "I can't understand this. We've made all sorts of plans to have the President come in. He has good friends here and will be well received. There's no reason for him to worry about anything. Real security, we have a good police force in Philadelphia." They said, "Well, he got upset by the fact that they knew about it ahead of time and he wanted it to be a surprise visit. He hoped that he could come in and talk to people about the campaign without having to be bothered with a lot of other problems."

It disturbed me at the time because I felt he could have been more helpful. But that's just conjecture on my part. I think the man was sincere all the way, but I think he was bugged by the idea of the Vietnam War and that if he did too much in connection with the campaign it would affect the peace that he sought so much. You see, negotiations were going on, and you'll remember at the end they had the cease-fire just shortly before the election. Some say it helped Humphrey,

some say it did not--it was too late. I think anything he could have done at that time would have been helpful.

B: Our time limit is about up. Is there anything else you'd like to add to this kind of record?

T: I just want to say that very frankly I think Lyndon Johnson was not only a great statesman, I think he was a good president. He'll go down in history as a real leader of this country. He was responsible for more breakthroughs on legislation and more modern ideas than any president we've had in recent history. I've seen Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson in my lifetime, and I'm sure that when the history is written, he will be the most outstanding--not the most popular, but the most outstanding.

B: Thank you very much, sir.

[End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview I]

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