

INTERVIEWEE: LARRY TEMPLE (TAPE #1)

INTERVIEWER: JOE B. FRANTZ

June 11, 1970, Austin, Texas

F: This is an interview with Mr. Larry Temple in his office in the Texas State Bank Building in Austin, Texas, on June 11, 1970, and the interviewer is Joe B. Frantz. Larry, we may as well get informal at the beginning, and go back to our first name procedures. Very briefly how did you get to the Governor's Mansion, which is where we need to pick you up for this? Where are you from?

T: Originally from Plainview, and came to the University of Texas and did my undergraduate work, and my law degree from the University of Texas. Upon graduation I went to Washington and served for a year as law clerk on the U.S. Supreme Court to Mr. Justice Tom Clark.

F: Had you known him previously, or how did you get there?

T: No, Justice Clark, obviously, by being from Texas has had contact with the University of Texas Law School. As I understood it, for some years Dean Page Keeton had been endeavoring to get Justice Clark to take at least one of his law clerks from the University of Texas. He had never taken a University of Texas Law School graduate as one of his law clerks.

F: Sort of like getting the old Oliver Wendell Holmes tradition set up.

T: That's right. And most of the law clerks were from the East. So they had been trying to get him to take one from the University of Texas; and he did decide to take one from the University of Texas and left it to Dean Keeton to select that individual. So the Dean selected me and--

F: What was that--about '59?

T: I graduated in January of '59 from law school and went to Washington in June of '59; served up there for just the one year, which is the tenure of the clerkship; returned to Austin in July of '60; and became an associate with a law firm here that was at that time Powell, Rauhut, Maginnis, Reavley, and Lochridge. After having been in that law firm practicing law for some two-and-a-half years, when January 1963 came around Governor Connally was looking for what he referred to as new faces to be on his staff and to be in the administration. He was in particular need of some lawyer who would handle the legal aspects of the operation of the Governor's office. Obviously that's kind of limited, because the Attorney General of Texas is the official lawyer for the Governor, but there are things that come up.

F: Somebody to point out the guideposts along the way.

T: That's right. While I did vote for Governor Connally in '62, I'd never met him, didn't know him, he didn't know me. But some of the people in his campaign organization had recommended me to fit that bill, and so I started talking to Governor Connally--I guess really in December of '62. Frankly I didn't think I was much interested at the outset because my law firm was about to take me from a hired hand's status to be a partner in the firm. As a matter of fact that was to take place January 1. But after I talked to him several times I became interested in what he thought--

F: That was sort of a hard decision, wasn't it?

T: Right. I became interested in what he was going to do and wanted to do. So it got to the point where he offered me a position and I took it. So I joined him from the first day the middle of January of '63, and

was there with the Governor as a legal administrative assistant beginning in January of '63. Then in September of '64, about a year-and-a-half later, Howard Rose, who had been his executive assistant--or number-one assistant,--left the Governor and returned to private law practice. At that time the Governor made me his executive assistant, in which position I served until I went to Washington the second time.

F: Back when you were with Justice Clark, did you ever see anything of Senator Johnson?

T: I saw him occasionally, but it wasn't anything where he would recall it. Later when I was at the White House he knew I'd been with Justice Clark, and we used to talk about it on occasion. But he didn't know me then. I obviously knew who he was.

F: You were just one of the people around the place.

T: That's right. I was one of the people from Texas, and on occasion people like George Mahon or Homer Thornberry would invite me to the Texas Congressional delegation luncheon. I would go over there and I would see him there. At the time when I would be introduced to him for the eighth or ninth time, I would be introduced as the fellow who was working for Tom Clark, and he would say he remembered and ask how I was doing. But as far as him knowing me, he didn't at that time really.

F: He was very busy as Majority Leader in those days. When you went to the luncheon, did he always tend to be there?

T: Yes.

F: He found time for that?

T: Yes, without exception. And the thing that I was impressed with was that at that time he always, busy as he was, seemed to have time for

some of the problems of his friends. I remember fairly vividly how Government works from that time. I believe it was in the summer of 1959, but it could have been in the early spring of '60, Justice Clark and the members of the Supreme Court were concerned about some of the widows of former Supreme Court Justices, and the pensions those widows were entitled to under the laws passed by Congress. It was the consensus of judgment of the members of the Court at that time that the pension allocated to widows was not sufficient to take care of their needs. So Justice Clark and Chief Justice Warren thought that they ought to do something to take care of those pensions. While the Chief Justice had previously given testimony in that area, they didn't think it was the right course, or proper, to go over and just lobby for an increase in the pension of the widows.

So Justice Clark had a very private dinner in his home one night at which Chief Justice Warren and then--Majority Leader Johnson and Speaker Rayburn were present. Speaker Rayburn and President Johnson--then Senator Johnson--were advised ahead of time what the subject matter of the dinner was going to be, and they gladly and willingly showed up and discussed the needs and the problems and the statute. Within about three or four weeks thereafter, the legislation had been able to proceed very expeditiously through both Houses, and was ready for the President's signature to take care of the needs of the widows of former members of the Supreme Court. I was impressed with that at the time as sort of a non-textbook way of how legislation is passed.

F: Did Justice Clark see much of Senator Johnson in those days?

T: Very much. I say very much--any time he wanted to see him on any kind

of a business basis he could, as witness this pension bill. But he saw him socially. I know they were very fast and famous friends. I had not realized until later the fondness with which Lyndon Johnson held Tom Clark. I was seeing it from the other end. I know that Tom Clark was totally devoted to Lyndon Johnson, and thought then that he was one of the great men in the history of this country, and liked him. Lyndon Johnson was one of the half-dozen people of whom Tom Clark was most fond.

F: I did, incidentally, have a very good interview with Tom.

T: That's good. Obviously I hold him in high reverence and esteem.

F: You get a little prejudiced.

T: I surely do.

F: At those few luncheons you attended, did you have any opportunity to observe the relationship between the senior Senator from Texas and the junior Senator? Was there an easy flow between them? I'm talking about Ralph Yarborough.

T: Yes. I really didn't notice anything. Obviously from having been in Texas prior to going up there, I was aware of a little bit of differences in politics that appeared from the newspapers in the event. My recollection is that part of the time Senator Yarborough wasn't there, while I always remember that Speaker Rayburn with his bean soup and cornbread and buttermilk was there; and Senator Johnson was there. I only have a vague recollection of Senator Yarborough being there maybe once out of three or four meetings, or twice out of three or four meetings at which I was present. I didn't notice any kind of colloquy or any kind of a reaction between them.

F: Was there any kind of pecking order in the way people sat, or did they

just sit?

T: No, there was a pecking order. The pecking order had to do with the Chairman at the front. I somehow have the thought that Lyndon Johnson was the chairman of the Congressional delegation but that can't be right.

F: It would nearly have to be Mr. Sam, wouldn't it?

T: No, it seems to me like it may have been just one of the other senior Congressmen. But the pecking order had to do with whoever the chairman was, and that does escape me. It may have been Congressman Wright. I don't really know about that. My memory is not that good. But whoever the chairman was plus Speaker Rayburn and Majority Leader Johnson and Senator Yarborough [sat] at the front. Then, if anybody else sat up at the front, it was Congressman Patman, I guess, as the senior man in the delegation other than Speaker Rayburn at the time. Then everybody just sat wherever they came in.

You probably know that at that time they had a meeting in what was the Speaker's dining room every Wednesday, and every other meeting was open to the public. On one Wednesday there would just be the Congressmen, and the Congressmen were not permitted to bring guests. Then the following Wednesday they were permitted to bring guests. But that was kept fairly well in tow because with twenty-two or three or four of them already in that small dining room, there weren't sufficient seats for more than--

F: They couldn't bring five apiece.

T: About ten or twelve more was about all there were seats for.

F: Let's get on back down to Texas now. You joined John Connally's staff in two capacities. Did you see much of by-now Vice President, then President Johnson?

T: No, I didn't. I can recall probably only two occasions at which he was at the Governor's Mansion during that period of time and in town here. One was before the assassination and one was afterward. But I didn't see much of him. I think on occasion when he came down that he invited the Governor to his ranch as you know from your experience. I now know, is sort of his habit--he enjoys having people to his ranch rather than going where they are. I didn't see much of him at all during that period of time.

F: Where were you at the time of the assassination? Were you in Dallas?

T: No. I was here.

F: Getting ready for that evening?

T: It was my responsibility to make all of the arrangements with regard to the reception at the Governor's Mansion. You'll recall that the Texas trip that President Kennedy and President Johnson were making started in San Antonio and went to Houston and Fort Worth on the first day. Then on the second day of the trip, it was designed to be the breakfast in Fort Worth, and then the luncheon in Dallas. Late in the afternoon there was to be a reception at the Governor's Mansion here in Austin at which Governor Connally had invited just about all of the State officials and a few others. But it was primarily to meet the State government people. That was to precede a political fund-raising dinner at the Municipal Auditorium that night. Various people had responsibilities for the various activities, and Governor Connally had allocated to me the responsibility for getting everything ready for the Governor's Mansion reception. Mrs. Connally was particularly concerned about it because she wasn't going to be here until just at the time of the reception, obviously.

- F: She'd almost be a guest at her own reception.
- T: That's right. Obviously, they had gone to San Antonio the previous day to meet President and Mrs. Kennedy and Vice President and Mrs. Johnson, so they were gone. I was working on the reception here, not only the physical arrangements of how it would work and how it would operate--we were concerned at that time about potential rain and how you accommodate things like the coats and umbrellas and paraphernalia of that sort and move the people through. I was working with several of the Secret Service people so they would be apprised of what we were doing for their protection of the President. So I was here in Austin getting ready for that.
- F: Quite apart from the tragedy, you must have felt like you were just left standing on the brink there--worked like a dog and to no avail.
- T: Well, I have another--at least a happy recollection of that day because my first daughter was born on Monday, the 18th. On the morning of Friday, November 22, I had gone to the hospital to take my wife and my newborn daughter home. They had just gotten home and ensconced at home and I said, "While I haven't seen you for the last few days getting ready for this, goodbye--I won't see you really until Saturday." So I had just taken them home and gone back over to the Governor's Mansion at noon to finish the details over there when we heard the information about the tragedy in Dallas.
- F: What was the atmosphere around the Governor's Mansion? You know, the first reports were pretty uncertain about how badly the Governor was wounded.
- T: Yes. I was not around the Governor's Mansion very long because there was



no one there really except the servants and those of us that were getting ready for the party. And immediately people there--I think Mrs. Arno Brill, Mrs. Connally's mother, had come over to get the Connally children home from school and tell them about it.

I went back over to the Governor's office, and there was a definite pall over the group there in the Governor's office because our first word, in the Governor's office, was that the bullet that struck Governor Connally probably was fatal as well. I think you can understand that while we were obviously concerned about President Kennedy, we also probably had maybe a little preferential concern about Governor Connally because our responsibility related to keeping the State government in operation, and we were concerned about how that would operate.

It wasn't until, I guess, mid-or late-afternoon on that Friday that we found out that, while the Governor's wound was very, very serious, it probably was not going to be fatal. He had survived the surgery. You'll recall that the bullet collapsed a lung and, as I understand from doctors, lungs are kind of like balloons--they're deflated, and then you go back and blow them up and they're inflated. So we found out later that day that they had been able to reinflate, and he was in fair condition. Obviously, by then we knew that President Kennedy was dead and President Johnson was on his way back to Washington.

F: Were you in touch with the Lieutenant Governor during that period?

T: Yes. The Lieutenant Governor, who was then Preston Smith--now the Governor--had been invited to take part in some of the activities around the State, and had some reason why he could not participate. Immediately, upon receiving the notice, we called over to the Lieutenant Governor's

apartment and talked with him. I recall that he was having lunch with a fellow by the name of Judge Howard Davidson, who was then and still is a district judge--State district judge in Lubbock. He came over and said, in effect, that he didn't want to come in and get in anybody's way. He didn't want to be thought to be assuming anything that he ought not to assume, either responsibility or assuming of facts--and that he just wanted us to know that he was over in his apartment and was available and could and would do anything that he knew to do. With that he left, and I don't really recall seeing him again until that evening when, on very short notice, there was a memorial prayer service held in the House of Representatives' chamber. I think then--Lieutenant Governor Smith and then--Speaker of the House Byron Tunnell--I think partly at the suggestion of Ben Barnes, who later went through the office of Speaker of the House and is now Lieutenant Governor, but at that time was just a member of the House, but sort of the number one assistant to the Speaker. At Ben's suggestion, they put on a memorial service in the House chamber, and that was obviously well and fully attended and was a very brief ceremony.

F: How real was that flap between Senator Yarborough and Governor Connally?

I realize to a certain extent this has to be supposition on your part, but do you think that the trip was made to heal a split; or do you think that it was just the fact that Texas was a pivotal and an uneasy state in general and with '64 coming up, it was time to make a trip?

T: I think it was the latter. I think there was clearly a split between--

F: We'll grant that their politics aren't the same, but--

T: Right. I think there was that split--was and is--and that's fairly

obvious to anyone. But I don't believe that President Kennedy wanted to come to Texas to heal that split.

Let me take a step backward. In early June of 1963, you will recall that President Kennedy and Vice President Johnson came to El Paso. The details of how they got there I'm not really sure of. It may have been that they were in California on some trip. It seems to me like they were on their way back to Washington. Where they'd been I really don't recall.

F: I would think that was partially in connection with the Chamizal too.

T: I think that was partially in connection early with the Chamizal. You'll recall that later on President Johnson went down to the signing of the Chamizal in '67. Anyway they were in El Paso, and Governor Connally went out there to meet them. The Governor invited me to go with him on that trip; primarily we had just gone through a legislative session and there were several key technical bills that I had briefed. We were going to discuss them going out and coming back.

At that time the Governor advised me on our return trip that President Kennedy had talked about coming to Texas for a fund-raising dinner, and he said that then-Vice President Johnson was interested in a fund-raising dinner at some time in Texas because, as I understood it--all this obviously is hearsay, second, and third-hand--but it is my recollection of the discussion with Governor Connally. He said that Vice President Johnson felt some kind of pressure for money to be raised in Texas because Vice President Johnson was getting little comments from around the Administration of "Well, we've got a big deficit from the 1960 election. We're going to need some money in '64, and Texas really hasn't done its part. We've been able to get money from other places,

but Texas hasn't done its part." It was the Vice President's view, as I understood it, and it very clearly was Governor Connally's view that Texas had done a very substantial part with regard to the fund-raising.

But in any event President Kennedy and, perhaps, Attorney General Robert Kennedy and others were desirous of having a fund-raising dinner in Texas to help reduce that '60 campaign deficit and to get ready for '64. That was the point of discussion at the El Paso meeting. Governor Connally told them that he did not think the time was right to come down. The first suggestion that President Kennedy had, as I understood it, was that they come down in August and have the dinner in August--before the end of August--to coincide with Vice President Johnson's birthday. Governor Connally vetoed that completely, saying that he had some experience with raising money for campaigns and putting on dinners; and that the people from whom you'd raise this money were people who were gone on vacation during that period of time.

F: They don't come out in August.

T: That's right. And if you're talking about trying a hundred-dollar-a-plate dinner, they're not going to be available, number one. And even if you took the attitude of "Well, let's get their money. Whether they show up or not makes no difference." That doesn't work because the people are not available to be contacted to have their money ready. So Governor Connally just said, "No, I won't do it. I won't have any part of it if you're going to do it in August." This was, I guess, pretty much of a veto of his, as I heard it from him.

Now, obviously I wasn't present at the time of the meeting. That was in the hotel with, I guess, just the three present. Maybe there was

a fourth one. There was a fellow who was then the Treasurer of the Democratic National Committee--big heavy-set fellow that later went back East, whatever his name was, and I'll think of it in a minute. But Governor Connally, in any event, vetoed that, and they started talking about a later time of having a dinner. No definite decision was made at the June meeting about the November trip and the November dinner.

Subsequent to that time Governor Connally was called by somebody from Washington--who it was I don't know--who said, "We'd like for you to come up here and talk to us--talk to the President about this dinner." He did go to Washington. As I know from having talked to him and, later, from having talked to President Johnson--then Vice President Johnson--the call and request for John Connally to come to Washington to talk about the dinner was done without Lyndon Johnson's knowledge. John Connally went to Washington and met with the President, without Lyndon Johnson's knowledge, and obviously without his presence.

F: Do you think that he was told not to tell the Vice President?

T: That's the impression I have, but I don't know.

F: It would be such a natural for him to touch base always with Johnson.

T: So he did meet with the President. It seems to me that he probably saw the Vice President later that evening before he left without discussing it.

F: One of those off-the-record conferences?

T: Yes. Well, but I think he probably did not tell Vice President Johnson about the meeting. In any event, it was during that evolution of meetings and calls that the November time worked out. I'm satisfied--back to your original question--that the purpose of the trip down here: One, was to

raise money; and two, was to get President Kennedy a little bit higher in the popularity standings.

I think probably the newspapers and history at that time will reflect that President Kennedy was not anywhere close to his popularity peak of 1960 or '61 in Texas in the spring, summer, and fall of '63, number one. And number two, his brother, the Attorney General, was substantially less popular in Texas. There were people in Texas who were saying, "Well, if he would get rid of Bobby, he'd be a whole lot better off. I'd like him if he'd get rid of Bobby--that sort of thing. The Attorney General was not really very popular, and I don't think it related to any one thing like segregation lawsuits or anything. I think it was just--

F: He was an irritant.

T: Yes, I think he was an irritant. I think that's what people thought of him. But I think the purpose of the trip was to heal whatever political wounds President Kennedy had here in Texas, and to raise the money. The dinner was designed to raise that money--to try to raise between five hundred thousand dollars and a million dollars, as I recall.

F: They seemed to be going in that direction.

T: It seemed to be going in that direction. The dinner appeared to be going unsuccessfully the last week. I recall that after nothing had been done, or very little had been done more accurately, in the way of ticket sales, on Monday, the 18th, Governor Connally just took the bull by the horns and went over and got in the State Democratic Executive Committee offices on one or two evenings in a row and started calling people and selling tickets. It wasn't a matter of calling and saying,

"Will you buy a thousand dollars worth of tickets?" He was talking about larger demoninations than that. I recall one evening he sold about a hundred thousand dollars worth of tickets by getting on the telephone.

I had not been with the Governor sufficiently long that I was crass about those things. I was very impressed with the way he pulled that off.

I think his attitude was that he was going to let them put on the dinner until it got in trouble. Then when it got in trouble, he came in and took it over and got it in the posture where it was going to be a success from a financial standpoint.

F: What do you do in a case like that? Do you return the money? Or the money hadn't come in?

T: No, I don't know what you ordinarily do. I can tell you what was done at that time. What was done with that money was, first of all, there was a record made--which by the way is an excellent record. I'd hope that maybe, not in conjunction with this but in conjunction with the Library, they'd see to it that several copies of that record--. The record that was made was all President Kennedy. It was, first, his Inaugural speech that everybody knew and thought so much of. Then it was a summary of his trip to Texas, and a transcript of his trip to Texas. They'd taken a recording of his speech in San Antonio, and taken a recording of his speech in Houston, and I believe Fort Worth, and put all of them together to tell about the trip. Then there was a voice in the background that was telling about it and what happened in Dallas. It wasn't any maudlin sort of thing, but it very briefly covered the Dallas part.

That was sent out to all of those that bought tickets to the dinner, plus a copy of the dinner program, plus a copy of the speech that had

been prepared for the President to deliver at the dinner. The people who had bought tickets were advised that they could get their money back if they wanted it. My recollection is nobody asked for it. Maybe there were one or two that did, and I may have forgotten about them. My recollection is that no one did. Then, after paying for the expenses of the dinner, and there were expenses because the caterer had come down and had brought steaks, and the steaks were already out unfrozen and were about to spoil. I have a vague recollection that those steaks were given to some charity around here, some children's home, or something, but in any event they had to be paid for. You take all of those expenses and the committed expenses out of it, and there were still several hundreds of thousands dollars left. That was I think split between the national party and the state party. How much was there I don't recall.

F: There was a flap--and I don't know how much of it was newspaper and how much of it was real--over Senator Yarborough's being shunned by not being invited to the Governor's Mansion. Was this real?

T: It was very real. What the Governor decided--and I wouldn't suggest that the differences between Governor Connally and Senator Yarborough may not have been part of the basis of the decision--but what he decided was that he would only invite State government people to that reception. Now there had to be some limitation. How you decide what that limitation is is another question. But there had to be some limitation because if you've seen the Governor's Mansion, it is just a series of small rooms on the first level. It's not set up for a large group at all.

It was the Governor's view that he ought to use this occasion to let those people meet the President and see the President who had not seen



him at any of the other occasions and might not see him at any of the other occasions. Let him be exposed to the State government people, and let the State government people be exposed to him. Because it was the Governor's view at the time that when President Kennedy sought reelection in 1964 that he was going to have political problems in Texas; that the State Democratic party was at a pretty strong peak then because all of the State Government offices were occupied by Democratic office holders. I know Governor Connally said to me, and said to others privately, that the only way that we could be helpful to President Kennedy in '64 would be to get the State government people for him. Most of them were for him in 1960 because [of] Lyndon Johnson being on the ticket, and if we could get them back activated again, that perhaps he could carry the State of Texas.

So Governor Connally decided that he was going to invite these State government people, and he made the decision that there would not be any outsiders--federal government people. He didn't invite any of the Congressmen. It may be a case of the Congressmen getting ruled out because of Senator Yarborough, but he did not invite Senator Yarborough. I think he did it knowingly, but he also did it because there was not sufficient room to invite everybody. He had to cut off somewhere, and I'm sure that cut-off didn't really bother him very much. You will recall that when Senator Yarborough found out about it he made the famous statement that it didn't surprise him that Governor Connally would do that because Governor Connally was governmentally uneducated. So there was that flap, and the flap had been in existence before, and it was just a continuation.

F: That wasn't the end of it.

T: That's right.

F: Did the fact no that you have a President from Texas in the White House, and you've got sort of an interregnum in a sense before Governor Connally can get back into full harness, did that make any great difference in your own activities?

T: Not really. There was a substantial difference in our own activities because of the physical limitation of what Governor Connally was able to do. He got out of the hospital in Dallas and returned to Austin about two weeks later--two or three weeks later. During that time several of us took trips to Dallas and tried to do a little bit of business. But a man who has been shot and is slowly recuperating is not much interested in talking about a whole lot of business. He's doing his best, but he obviously was in some pain. That sort of a transition of getting him back into the full operation was difficult for us. I guess we ought not to be concerned about our difficulty. It wasn't anywhere nearly as difficult for us as it was for him. But he came back and he still was physically limited. You'll recall that he had to wear his arm in a sling most of the spring. We were in the process of moving out of our offices into temporary offices while they remodeled our offices which complicated the whole thing even worse.

F: Was there a good bit of communication back and forth then between the Governor's office and the President's office in the next couple of years?

T: Some, but not really very much. You know, you've got to know and understand--as I know you do--Governor Connally and President Johnson to know

that both of them are people who like to keep their own counsel pretty closely on a lot of things. I'm sure there were quite a few conversations between Governor Connally and President Johnson that none of us were privy to.

F: He didn't in effect have a hot line to the White House.

T: No, not at all. There was a Signal Corps telephone ultimately put in over at the Governor's Mansion. President Johnson wanted it if he wanted to call the Governor--well, I say he wanted it. I think what happened, as happens so frequently, is the Signal Corps decided that they need to expedite their operations because when the President would pick up the phone and say, "Get me John Connally," it was not really an excuse with which he was pleased to say, "Well, we can't get him on the phone--the line's busy." I think what happened there is, as happened in so many cases, was the Signal Corps came in and put a line in over there. I don't know for sure, but I think that's what happened--as they put lines elsewhere so when the President wanted to call somebody they could get that individual on the phone. The President later told me at one time that there were a lot of Signal Corps phones around that he didn't even know existed, so it sort of gives credence to what I thought that happened anyway.

But I think they probably had several conversations. But the relationship between Texas and Texas government and the White House was a little different but not measurably different. For example, when Walter Jenkins was there--I had known and dealt with Walter Jenkins quite a bit and when Walter was there, if we had some little something that we needed some help on--maybe to set up an appointment or get something expedited

through a governmental agency-- obviously on occasion we would make a call to Walter or to someone there, but that was fairly infrequent. There was a little additional benefit by having a Texan with whom we were acquainted in the White House, but I don't think it was a very measurable thing. I'm sure the people in New Jersey who knew Walter Jenkins and who knew Lyndon Johnson were probably doing the same thing.

F: Some of the President's programs went beyond what Governor Connally thought the State of Texas was ready for. As far as you know, this never bothered the relationship between the two men, or did Governor Connally ever feel it made his position particularly difficult?

T: No. The one thing about the relationship between John Connally and Lyndon Johnson through the years--and obviously I haven't been a witness to that relationship as long as it has been in existence--but by looking back on some of the things I know now and some of the things I saw at the time and have seen since from going from Governor Connally to President Johnson and since then, is that neither of them has ever had any reticence about one, taking any position they wanted to or felt like they should. And neither had any reticence about telling the other what their views were, maybe on raised voices on occasion. Governor Connally told me, for example, that there were times in the 1948 Senatorial campaign--when he was handling it for then--Senator Johnson--that there were times that he disagreed with the way things were supposed to be done. I think one of their basic disagreements related to a kidney ailment that the President had, and how that ought to be handled publicly. Governor Connally told me that on at least two occasions their arguments got so heated that he was ordered out of the house by Lyndon Johnson.

So he has never had any reluctance to state his view.

There was one thing that I think Governor Connally did that I think by hindsight was a very good thing for him to do--although I was one of the ones who disagreed with it at the time. You'll recall that in the summer of 1963--this was still before President Kennedy's death--there was a pending Civil Rights Bill up before Congress that had in it what was known as the Public Accommodations Section that there was a large amount of controversy about. Since I'll assume that you're familiar with that, I won't discuss what the Public Accommodations Section was, but there was a large amount of controversy. It was very clear, both from polls and from speaking to people around Texas, that the majority of the people in Texas were opposed to that section of the Civil Rights Bill. It was Governor Connally's view, from the statistics that we had obtained, that while there may have been need for a public accommodation section elsewhere--he didn't know--there was no need for such a section in Texas. We did a very sizeable survey of motion picture theaters, restaurants, hotels, motels, the public accommodations facilities, with regard to what had happened on the desegregation in these facilities. It was clear that we had made great, great strides and that the vast majority of them were already completely desegregated and the others were in the process of doing that. There was no seating of certain people in the balcony of a theater as you and I may have witnessed when we were growing up, and that sort of thing.

So Governor Connally was opposed to that section of the Civil Rights Bill. He concluded that what he should do is state his opposition to that particular provision.

After some very serious discussion with black leaders in the State with whom he had contact and Mexican-American leaders as well as his own political people, he concluded that what he ought to do was go on statewide television hookup in late July of '63, immediately prior to leaving to go to the National Governors' Conference and state his views. I was strongly opposed to it and so stated then. I thought that if that was his view--obviously it was his view but nothing could come from his making a statewide speech. I was fearful that he would be labeled a George Wallace racist when in fact that was not his intent at all. His intent was the "We don't need a law to tell us how we ought to do things, because we're doing it anyway;" and that this is the federal government getting into an area that right now they ought not to get into. So I was opposed to it, but he decided in spite of my counsel--as he did a lot of things in spite of my counsel--that he ought to do it.

You'll recall he did make that speech statewide, and it was very, very well received by the people and got some ninety-odd percent favorable response. The state pollster took a poll. The Governor's popularity was at one of its highest peaks; and showed that people in this State did agree with his position--did agree that the public facilities ought to be public--available to everyone. That was kind of a sixty-forty view, or seventy-thirty, but they agreed with his position. But they also agreed that we didn't need the statute. But the thing that I think that one program did was to sever in the minds of a lot of people in this state, and out-of-state, what I refer to as the umbilical cord between John Connally on the one hand and Jack Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson on the other hand.

F: Lyndon's boy, John?

T: Right. You recall when he ran he was labeled as Lyndon's boy, John, and it was suggested that President Kennedy and/or Vice President Johnson had sent him down here to take control of the State and to be their messenger boy. While people that knew him didn't think that, that view still was fairly prevalent in the minds of some. By making this statement of position, which was contrary--very strongly contrary--to what President Kennedy wanted, and what President Kennedy's view was, and strongly contrary to what Lyndon Johnson's view and position were he demonstrated, I think, finally for everyone that he was his own man.

That really wasn't the reason he did it, but that was the result. I think more people remember it from that standpoint than the substance of what he said or what was in the public accommodations feature of the Civil Rights Bill. As I say, I disagreed with it at the time, but the end result it accomplished was, I think, a valid, good result from his standpoint, from Lyndon Johnson's standpoint, and from Jack Kennedy's standpoint, and the State of Texas' standpoint. I think that independence was a very valid, good result.

F: As far as you know, did President Johnson consult with Governor Connally on keeping Joe Kilgore out of the Senatorial race in '64, and the fact that Ralph Yarborough would be the lone Democratic candidate of any substance?

T: I recall that period of time very well because that was my first meeting of Joe Kilgore. I met Joe Kilgore at the Governor's Mansion two days before the filing deadline, so I do have a vivid recollection of that incident and that time.

F: There was at that moment that question of is he, or isn't he.

T: There clearly was that question. It seemed to me like I saw him over there on a Saturday before the filing deadline Monday night, or Tuesday-- whatever that time--two or three days before. I was aware at that time that there were the stories and rumors going around that President Johnson was trying to keep Joe Kilgore out of the Senate race. I later heard the story from President Johnson's standpoint which I will relate in a moment. I never knew of a single conversation that Lyndon Johnson and John Connally had. Knowing the two of them and how proud they are, it's quite possible they never had a conversation directly.

F: It was one of the things they'd better not discuss.

T: Also knowing, you might say, how secretive--how closely they both kept their own counsel--if they did have a conversation, it could clearly have been held without my knowing it, without somebody as close to the President as Walter Jenkins knowing it. They could have had a conversation with no one knowing it except the operator who put it through plus the two of them.

But I do know that it was Governor Connally's view that he wasn't trying to encourage Joe Kilgore to get in the race. He said that he thinks it's a mistake for anybody to push another man in any race. A man ought to be able to make up his own mind, and if Governor Connally's counsel was sought, obviously he would give that. But he said that "it's a mistake to push a man into a race. He ought to decide for himself." So he didn't try pushing Joe Kilgore in the race, but he did want the situation to be such where Joe had a free, unfettered choice to make on that. It was my impression at the time that he thought that Joe did not



25

have a free, unfettered choice, that it was suggested to Joe by somebody that the source of money supply to run a race could be, and probably would be, dried up if Joe got in the race, and that he wouldn't have that kind of support that he anticipated. Now, whether that really took place, whether that conversation was had or not, I don't know. But that was sort of the prevalent rumor, and that's about all I've got is the prevalent rumor.

F: Did Governor Connally want, like President Johnson, to talk to everybody about something that was on his mind, even though he never revealed his own feelings on it, but as you know, President Johnson would grab everybody in sight when something was bothering him, or he had something--

T: No. I'd say that's a difference between the two. Governor Connally had a few people in whose judgment he had confidence that he would talk to about various problems. On occasion he would call in larger groups of people, but he didn't just happen to run into Joe Doakes on the street and want to know what Joe Doakes' opinion was on a particular problem he was mulling over at the time.

I do recall this same '64 incident that right after--right about the time, not right after--because the filing deadline had passed right about the time of the Joe Kilgore decision process in January '64. Governor Connally said--and you'll have to recall he still was injured at this point--he said that with Senator Yarborough up there making things unpleasant and with a Texas President he thought that really things might be harder for Texas than with a Massachusetts President; and that for a lot of reasons he might find it unpleasant to continue to be Governor. And there might be somebody who could do a better job of it than he could

and he suggested very strongly he might not run; and called a meeting of his political operatives from all over the State to the Mansion--some fifty or sixty people--and laid out the possibility that he might not run.

Obviously, they were all just aghast at the thought of it to a man--just said he had to run as you would expect pretty much followers of political figures do. And, of course, at that time with the combination of the ascendancy of his popularity prior to the assassination, coupled with his shooting at the time of the assassination, there was nobody more popular in the State than John Connally. But that was a process he went through. Obviously he ultimately decided to run, not only ran in '64 but ran in '66, although he gave long serious thought about not running in '66. And it was no surprise to me when he decided not to run in '68, because there was a period of time I thought he wasn't going to run in '66.

F: Did he ever consider in either '64 or '66 running for Senator?

T: No, he never did.

F: A few people wanted him to.

T: The reason why is Governor Connally stated to me many times that he never had had any desire for a career in politics; that he thought he might be able to contribute something to the State by coming back and giving a sort of renewed respect for the Governor's office. Occasionally people would say that they thought he was a little aloof, and he was a hard man to get on the telephone, and that may have been an indirect result. He didn't mean to be aloof, and I didn't find him that way. But he did want to create a renewed respect for the Governor's office, and he did a lot

of things like refurbishing all the offices to make them look more decent than they had looked. They had looked shabby for many, many years. He and Mrs. Connally redid all the Mansion grounds as you will recall. He got a limousine for the Governor which had been appropriated by the legislature, but everybody was afraid to take because it might have political repercussions. He took it, he used it, got an airplane. He wanted to renew the respect for the Governor's office and for state government.

But he said he didn't really have any desire for a career in politics, and that a man ought not to run for the Senate unless from that point on he wanted to have a career in politics. He didn't have that desire in '64, he didn't have it in '66, and, to my knowledge, has never had it during the period of time I've known him. So he never thought about running. He may have thrown out some bait in '64 or '66 for political purposes about running, but he never gave any serious thought to it.

F: You said earlier that you were going to tell about what President Johnson said later about the Kilgore incident.

T: Sometime in 1968 President Johnson called me in and said, "You're a friend of Joe Kilgore's, aren't you?"

I said, "Yes, sir."

And he said, "Well, I have invited Joe and his wife Jane--Mrs. Johnson and I have invited Joe and Jane to the White House on several occasions, and he has always declined, since he has been back in Austin," I think maybe Joe and Jane had been there during maybe late '63, but "he has always declined." And he said, "I don't really fully understand"--I think he did partly understand, but this is sort of his way of getting into things--"I don't fully understand why he declines it. I've invited

him now. I don't want to just keep inviting him if it's going to offend him and he's going to turn this invitation down. It's the third or fourth or fifth one. We've invited them to stay in the Mansion when they come up here for one of the State dinners. If they turn this one down, I won't have anything to do but conclude that he just really doesn't care for our hospitality, and that he finds our invitations offensive, and I just won't bother him with them any more. I won't extend him any more invitations."

Well, I assumed, and I think I probably assumed correctly, that, while the President didn't ask me to, I was supposed to convey that message to Joe, which I did. But at that time when he asked about the situation with Joe, I said, "Well, Mr. President, I think the problem rests a considerable amount more with Jane Kilgore than it does with Joe,"

He said, "Why?" I said, "Well, I think it relates back to 1964. I'm not going to presume anything. I wasn't here, and I wasn't with Joe so I don't know what transpired. But you and I are both familiar with the very popular rumor and very popular story that you kept him from running for the Senate. And I know that Jane thinks that. I know that she has said that. I think that's the reason that they don't have any desire to come up here to the White House."

He said, "Well, that really is not true. I never had a single conversation with Joe Kilgore during that time. Now he had some conversations with Walter Jenkins. I remember that Walter came to me in the middle of a Cabinet meeting and said, "Joe Kilgore wants to talk to you, and I think it's about the Senate race because he wants to be sure that you're going to be neutral in it." I told Walter to go back and

29

talk to him and tell him that I'd try to talk to him later, but we were right in the middle of a lot of things related to government. He may have told me what they were, I don't recall what it was he was in the middle of. But he said, "I never talked to Joe--not one single time from the time his name was mentioned as a possible candidate for the Senate until he announced he wasn't going to run." He said, "The only time I really know that he was having a conversation with Walter was at that time Walter talked to me in the Cabinet Room. So I didn't keep him out of the Senate race. I didn't call him. I didn't threaten him. I didn't tell what I would or wouldn't do or might or might not do. I just didn't talk to him." And so that was the other side that I heard.

As an aftermath of how we got into that, I did talk to Joe. I may have conveyed the message a little more subtly than even the subtleness of the President's statement. In any event Joe and Jane Kilgore did come to that State dinner, and did spend the night at the White House, I think did have a nice time; did enjoy themselves; and I know that the President and Mrs. Johnson were especially pleased that they came. That's about all I remember about that.

F: How did you happen to get to Washington the second time?

T: I got to Washington the second time through a combination of John Connally and George Christian and Jake Jacobson, I guess--as I later found out.

F: Was it anticipated or did it come suddenly to you?

T: No. When I went to work for Governor Connally in 1963--I've always loved politics and enjoyed participating in some form, but what I really wanted to do was practice law. As I had said earlier I was about to be a partner in a fine law firm. It's the law firm, by the way, that Joe Kilgore

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has now come back to and is one of the key partners in. I told the Governor that I would come with him for two years, and then I wanted it understood that at the end of two years I was going to leave and go back to law practice.

Well, right at about three or four months before that two years terminated was when Howard Rose left as executive assistant. He had had sort of a two-year understanding, too, and so the Governor said, "You can't leave. I want you to be my executive assistant." So I said, "Well, I'll stay on awhile longer." So I did.

Then in 1966, in the summer of '66, I had two very handsome opportunities I thought at the time--and still think they were handsome--to become a partner in two law firms here in Austin that I thought were very attractive. And so I went to the Governor and I said, "Governor, here it is 1966, and I've been here three-and-a-half years. I really think that it's time for me to do something else. I'm not indispensable to you. You've got some other good people. I'd like to start talking to you about plans of leaving and going back into law practice."

He said, "Well, next year is going to be a very difficult time for us with the legislature." This was during the time he was campaigning. He'd already won the Democratic primary and was going on for the general election. He said, "I would like, if you can, for you to stay until after the legislative session. I've got no claim on you, and if you want to leave and it's just an opportunity you feel may not be available to you, then you go ahead and take it. But I'd personally appreciate it if you could stay and would stay until the end of the legislative session in '67. Then you can leave at that time. I'm satisfied the

the opportunities will be even greater for you then. If they're not and you want me to help, I'll be glad to help any way I can. I don't want to meddle in your business or try to tell you what to do, but I'll help." So that was enough for me. I didn't have any particular timetable I just had to do something. So I declined both offers that were available and stayed with the Governor.

Then the very day the legislative session was over in '67, I went to him that evening and I said: "Now Governor, the legislative session is over today, and you recall you and I had this conversation."

He said, "Yes, I do recall that."

I said, "Now I think I need to do something. I need to start making plans. I don't need to leave tomorrow, but I do want to leave, and I do want to get back in law practice. And I sort of had in mind to give you some chance of planning--it's about June 1--of leaving September 1 of '67."

He said, "All right. You start making your plans. Don't you say anything until you and I decide when we might tell someone, and I won't say anything. But instead of September 1, I'd rather you'd make it October 1. I'm going to Africa for a month's safari in August, and I don't want to just come back in September and you leave. I want to kind of have kind of a thirty-day period." And I said that obviously was fine.

So I started talking to some people here. They had been talking to me, and trying to decide whether I was going to set up on my own or practice with somebody. You'll recall that this was just a year after George Christian went to Washington. It was in May of '66 that George went to Washington; and had been there a year. By this point had gone

from being some assistant to being the Press Secretary. He already was the Press Secretary to the President. So on one of these trips down here George said, "Would you have any interest in coming up to Washington and doing something?"

I said, "No, not really. I've kind of done my stint. I've been to Washington with Justice Clark, and I overstayed my two years here. I'm really ready to get back in law practice."

He said, "The President has talked about you a time or two."

I said, "Well, the President doesn't even know me."

He said, "Oh, yes, he knows more than you think he knows. He knows who the people are who are around his friends. He knows who the people around John Connally are, like he knows about me, George Christian; he said that he'd like to get you to Washington. I think there are a lot of positions available that you could get if you wanted them."

I said, "I really don't want them, George. I'm just not interested." Well, the Governor said something to me about it at about the same time, and I said, "No, thank you, I'm just not interested," and didn't proceed much beyond that.

You'll recall that in early 1967--late '66 I should say--Nick Katzenbach moved over from being Attorney General to being Under Secretary of State, and Ramsey Clark became Acting Attorney General. In early '67 Justice Clark had announced his retirement from the Supreme Court, which was obvious to everyone as a reason for paving the way so Ramsey might be available to be Attorney General. There was thought to be a conflict between a father being on the Supreme Court and the government's principal advocate before the Supreme Court being his son. So the



Justice did retire, and in June of 1967 all of the former law clerks of Justice Clark arranged to have sort of a retirement party and pay tribute to the Justice. We were going to have it in Washington--the law clerks from all over the country and at that point there were law clerks in Texas, California, Illinois, New York, everywhere. So Louann--my wife--and I went to Washington in late June of '67 for that occasion. And went up there and George Christian invited us over to his home one evening for dinner, and we visited with him. And he said, "Why don't you come by and have lunch with me while you're here at the White House?"

I said, "Fine."

He said, "Tomorrow's Saturday and is really when I'd like for you to come." I just thought it was just a loose invitation. As I later found out, the President had asked him to have me over for lunch on Saturday.

So we went over and had lunch with him at the White House. That was my first excursion of the west wing of the White House; and like everybody else who makes his first trip there, was very impressed with it. We went back to George's office after lunch; and the President called. George said, "I'm just right here, just had lunch with Louann and Larry Temple. They're in my office."

The President said, "Well, bring them around to my office." This was the Saturday of the famous seven [six] day war. Maybe it was earlier in June than I recall. But anyway, the famous Arab-Israel seven [six] day war that had begun on Sunday-Monday and ended on that Saturday. When we went in there, I recall that the President was having a conversation with George. He just greeted us. He said, "Just a minute--I'll be

next with you," and it wasn't really very effusive, but I didn't expect it to be very effusive.

He was showing George a notebook that he had with the various messages that he had sent--my recollection is--to Kosygin, and Kosygin had sent to him. Apparently there were some messages to some representatives of the Arab and Israel governments, both; they were in chronological order. He was showing George what they had said and what he had said. I remember he said, "Now, let me show you this next one, George, because I really socked it to him good on this one." I remember that so vividly because I thought how out of character it was for my image of Lyndon Johnson for him to say something like that.

Then he invited us to go over and have lunch with him--which was my first experience in knowing that Lyndon Johnson ate lunch at 2:30 or 3:00 o'clock, which is about what time it was at this point. We told him we had eaten, but he said to come go with him anyway. So Louann and I and George and one of his secretaries, Mary Beck, went over and ate lunch with him.

The President spent all of the luncheon time in conversation with me about various things in Texas. He was asking my view of the University of Texas, for example. We got into it by asking, "What has John done that he's particularly proud of?", and I said something about higher education. He said, "Well, what have you got to be proud of in higher education"--sort of a needling thing that I later came to recognize as a standard ploy with him. I told him about the various University of Texas rankings, thought to be top-grade departments. I mentioned the law school. I mentioned what I thought was the engineering and chemistry

school, some of the other various departments that I had some familiarity with. He needled me a little bit about that, and he needled me a little bit about some people that Governor Connally had appointed to judgeships. So we had kind of an hour's colloquy back and forth about everything which I enjoyed very much. It was the first time I had ever been around him that length of time. At least the first time where--

F: You just really talked with him.

T: where the two of us were talking. I may have been around him where I was at one end of the room and he was at the other, but that was the first time. I recall he was putting together a boat trip. I was impressed by the fact that he was constantly using the telephone that you will remember hangs under the table. He was going to go out on the boat later that day and he was inviting people--Barefoot Sanders and his wife, it seems to me like George Mahon and his wife, and various people he was inviting to go out. Oh, the Deasons--Bill Deason and his wife. I thought it was interesting that these conversations inviting these people didn't take very long. You know, he'd pick up the phone and say, "Get these twenty people for me," or "these fifteen people," or whatever it was--probably more like ten, but whatever it was. Then he and I would talk and when the phone would ring, he'd pick it up and it would take him less than thirty seconds to tell them he was going on the boat and they ought to be there at a certain time, and he wanted them to go with him. He got no declinations, I might say.

At the conclusion of our luncheon he said, "Well, why don't you come and go on the boat with us? We'll spend the night out, and we'll have a good time."

I said, "Well, I really can't do that. I'm up here for the occasion of the retirement of Mr. Justice Clark, and our big activity is this evening, and I want to be there for that."

He said, "Well, wouldn't you rather be with me than to be with old Tom?"

I said, "Meaning no disrespect for you or the office you hold, I think under these circumstances I feel an obligation, one, to be there; and two, I want to be there because he's a man that means a lot to me."

He said, "Well, that was the right answer."

Then he invited Louann and me to stay at the White House. He said, "Just move over in here and stay here the rest of the time you're in Washington." This was Saturday, and he said, "When are you leaving?"

I said, "Monday,"

He said, "Don't leave Monday. Stay till Wednesday or Thursday. You can have a good time. It won't cost you any rent. Rent's free. I'll give you your breakfast every morning, and you can have whatever food you want, and it'll be a free operation." So we thanked him.

And then when he left--we stayed until he got in his car with all the people to go off to the boat--George Christian said, "When are you going to move?"

I said, "Oh, we're not going to move over to the White House."

He said, "Well, of course you are."

I said, "No, he was very kind and thoughtful and I know we'd enjoy it. He was nice to do it, and I appreciate the invitation, but we're not going to have that kind of imposition."

And this I remember because I do think it sort of epitomizes Lyndon

Johnson--he said, "Let me tell you. You'll make a mistake if you don't do it, because you'll hurt his feelings." He said, "Once a man obtains a certain degree of wealth, as Lyndon Johnson has, and has reached the pinnacle of power, there's not really much you can do for him. And what he really enjoys, and what he really benefits from, is doing things for other people. And getting you to come over here and see the White House and stay at the White House is something he enjoys, because he knows you enjoy it. He vicariously accepts your enjoyment of it. And if you don't come over here and he gets back and he finds out that you haven't done it, it won't make him mad and it won't offend him, but it'll hurt his feelings, because he won't get that enjoyment that he would have gotten out of it otherwise."

Well, I wasn't really sure I believed George as good a friend as he was of mine. I wasn't sure I believed him; but I later came to believe that was the case.

SO anyway we stayed there. And when we were getting ready to leave, obviously, George had had a conversation with the President. George said, "Larry, there is a vacancy heading up the Civil Division at the Department of Justice. It's a Presidential appointment. It's an Assistant Attorney General, one of the five-six-seven-eight top positions in the Department of Justice." He said, "I'm not in any position to offer you that position, but I'm satisfied that you can have that position if you want it." Well, he obviously was satisfied because the man who did have the authority had said so. That was the position Barefoot Sanders had held by the way prior to coming to the White House.

I said, "George, I'm really not interested. I'm sure there are

literally hundreds or thousands of people in this country--lawyers--who would just jump at the chance to do that. And I don't mean to demean the generosity of that, or the high position of that, but I'm really just not interested. I want to go back and practice law, and now's the time for me to do it."

So he said, "Fine," and my trip was concluded without any other meeting with the President.

Later on in the summer, both--let me see, there was a trip. I believe we had Hurricane Beulah transpire during that time in the Valley and did the devastation down there. The President came down here and picked up Governor Connally; and George was on that trip. There was some little discussion about me between the three of them on that trip, I later found out.

Later the Governor and George asked independently if I'd have any interest in going up and being on the White House staff. And again--you know, it's one of these things that you don't get that chance again, but I still had my mind sort of pointing directly toward returning to law practice. And, as a matter of fact, had tentatively committed to a firm to come in and be one of the top partners in that firm--income percentage I thought to me was far more than I had been making and something I wanted to do. The money obviously was very attractive to me on it. And so in September Governor Connally was going on a trip down to Houston, I think, speaking. I never traveled with him on his speaking trips. He called me the day before he was going to go and said, "I want to talk to you. I want you to go on that trip with me." And whoever--Mike Myers had been traveling with him. And he said, "Let's just the

two of us go down; I want to visit with you going down and back"

Going down there, he talked about the economy and how people in positions working for government sometimes miss opportunities to make money, and he realized that it was important to me with a young family to want to try to make some money while I could, and that he knew I was interested in a law practice and all, and kind of laid the groundwork. I understood what he was laying the groundwork for. He said that he was satisfied that if I wanted to do it, I could go up and be one of the White House staff members; and that while he knew that I wanted to go back to law practice, that he thought I ought to do it.

I said, "Well, Governor, I don't know where the end point is in getting back to law practice. If I were going to sort of be a career government employee or want to get into politics, this would be just ideal. Or if I wanted to stay in Washington and practice law in Washington, going up there would be helpful. But I don't, and I think that I need to make some decision about getting into law practice."

He said, "Well, you ought to go up there for two years."

I said, "Well, I've had one of those two year deals here with you. And here we are four-and-a-half years later from my two-year agreement with you."

And he said this--and this was in September: "Well, let me tell you. I think there is a fairly good chance that President Johnson will not run for reelection." I didn't believe it then--I did not know of the conversations he had had--but he said, "I think there's a fairly good chance if you go up now, in less than a year-and-a-half, you'll be back here. You get all the benefit out of being up there, without worrying

about a time period. What you ought to do is tell the President that you'll go up for exactly two years, and that you're going to leave in two years. Just tell him two years. Don't do like you did with me and wait until the end of two years to say it. Just every few months remind him of the two year period. Jake Jacobson did it."

And that was the thing that was impressive to me because you'll recall Jake Jacobson told him he'd go up for two years, and Jake went up there on April 15, 1965, and left on April 15, 1967.

So he said, "I want you to talk to George and I want you to talk to Jake, but I think you ought to go. I think it's good for him, and I think it's good for you. I think you can make a contribution. You can give him another viewpoint of state government--how it operates as well as maybe a different regional viewpoint from a lot of the people who he talks to up there." So I told him I'd think about it, and he said: "You ought to go up there as a top assistant. You ought not to go up unless you're going to be one of the top assistants. If he says, 'Come up and start as a number two or three echelon and work up,'--don't do that. If you're going to go, either go up there in that supposed top echelon or not at all. Go up there as a special assistant as opposed to a deputy special assistant or something."

Well, I talked to George and George made the same pitch; and talked to Jake, and Jake thought that it would be advisable. So I visited with my family. And finally Louann and I decided that it would be something we'd enjoy. So I told George that if the offer was made that I would accept it. To this point I had not had any conversations with Lyndon Johnson. I knew he was talking to George, and I knew he was talking to



Governor Connally.

So one day in September I was sitting in my office--and my secretary sat right out there by the Governor's secretary because I was in an office right off of his--and my secretary came in just all wide-eyed and said: "They say the President of the United States is calling you. I assume he wants the Governor; but they say he's calling you."

So I said, "Well, I'll talk to him."

So he said, "Larry, I need you up here. I want you to come up and help me." He said, "understand that if you come you only want to come for two years. I'll make a deal with you. You come up here and make it more than two years. You come up here in October and you stay here until January of 1970. That'll be two years and three or four months. You come stay until January 1, 1970, and I understand that you want to get back to law practice. But you come up here and help me. And if you want to leave--I may try to talk you out of it--but if you want to leave in January of '70, then I'm willing for you to go. But I may try to talk you out of it." He said, "Now I've got some problems about making you Special Assistant. But now John tells me that you won't come up here unless I make you a Special Assistant."

I obviously hadn't talked to him at all on anything. I said, "That obviously is my preference, Mr. President. If I can't come in at a status equal to some of the other people there, I'm not sure I can do you any good. Maybe it's partly vanity on my part, but I don't think it's really totally vanity."

He said, "Well, what would you think about some other title?"

I said, "Well, obviously if I'm going to practice law, anything

that has lawyer or anything in it would be probably more helpful to me."

He said, "Well, I've got one special counsel. Old Harry McPherson is Special Counsel. No President has ever had more than one Special Counsel, but I guess we could have two. Would you like to be Special Counsel?"

I said, "Gosh, that would be fine with me."

He said, "Well, you can be Special Counsel and if you want to be Special Assistant later on, I'll change you to that."

I said, "Well, Mr. President, if you want to give me the title Special Counsel, I wouldn't ever want any other title."

He said, "Fine, you come up here and you'll be Special Counsel." And that's where we got started.

F: You took off within a month.

T: Yes. I took off and went up there the last part of October. I think the commission I have, which was given to me my first day up there, reflects October 23, and that was my first day on the job.

F: The New York Times announced it on October 14--I checked that out.

72-23

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

Gift of Personal Statement

By Larry Temple

to the

Lyndon Baines Johnson Library

In accordance with Sec. 507 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (44 U.S.C. 397) and regulations issued thereunder (41 CFR 101-10), I, \_\_\_\_\_, hereinafter referred to as the donor, hereby give, donate, and convey to the United States of America for eventual deposit in the proposed Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, and for administration therein by the authorities thereof, a tape and transcript of a personal statement approved by me and prepared for the purpose of deposit in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. The gift of this material is made subject to the following terms and conditions:

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Larry Temple  
January 5, 1971  
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