INTERVIEWEE: LARRY TEMPLE (TAPE #3)

INTERVIEWER: JOE B. FRANTZ

June 26, 1970

F: This is interview number three with Mr. Larry Temple in his Austin office, June 26, 1970. The interviewer is Joe B. Frantz.

Larry, let's start today with some of your spring--what we could call-crises, although some of them aren't. But tell me whatever you know about the March 31 address and the decision not to run again.

T: Well, I recall, Joe, that after the President made the decision that he would go on television on March 31--and really discuss the war was the subject matter everyone knew about--and I was among those who only knew about that. I was no privy to the early decision-making process of coming to the conclusion not to seek reelection. But I recall that the discussion relative to the decision to stop the bombing, the very aspects of the war, the various way that the speech took effect, went through many processes. I knew that he had asked Harry McPherson to be the coordinator of putting together the speech. By doing that, Harry obviously was in day-to-day conversation and working with Clark Clifford and with Secretary Rusk, Walt Rostow, and I think that during the process that George Christian came in and out of it.

By going to the bedroom every morning as I did, I came in contact with that speech because by-and-large the various drafts were sent to the President for his night reading. When I would arrive there in the morning the speech would be uppermost on his mind. I know that on occasion, for

example, he'd hand the speech to Mrs. Johnson there in his bedroom and say, in effect, "Bird, what do you think about this?"

F: How long in advance did he start that speech? You might say five years in advance, in one sense, but--

T: My recollection is about three weeks. It could have been four, but roughly three weeks.

F: So there's a lot of time to whittle and hone.

T: That's right. And you'll recall that, at least the aftermath accounts indicate they were many contacts out in the field with General Abrams. The military leaders were all contacted. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were contacted. This speech took many forms with many revisions. I think that, if I am correct in the way I was reading the President at the time, he was using the drafts of the speech to make up his mind what he was going to do. It wasn't a matter that he had made up his mind and he was trying to formalize it verbally with a speech. I think he was using the draft of the speech as the vehicle by which he made up his mind what he was going to do.

F: Did he have, in a sense, two speeches running concurrently, or was it just the shifting back and forth within the speech?

T: No, it was just the speech. It wasn't as if Secretary Rusk would come up with one draft and Secretary Clifford, and then General Abrams, or anyone else, were coming up various drafts. The one draft always funneled through Harry McPherson who was doing the bulk of the drafting work on it. Whose ideas went into it I frankly don't know because I wasn't there during the writing process.

F: Now, Harry personally was known to be somewhat--I hate these labels, but

they're convenient--more dovish than the President on Viet Nam. Would the fact that Harry is handling the speech be any indicator?

T: No, not at all. You'll have to remember that Harry McPherson had been with Lyndon Johnson longer than anyone on the White House staff. He had been with him since the late '50's when he was in the Senate.

F: I realize he could separate Harry McPherson the person from Lyndon Johnson's speech writer.

T: Right. But the President had a lot of confidence in Harry McPherson and in his ability to be able to assemble the views of the various people and put them on paper. He knew that Harry was a good speech writer. So I think he looked to Harry because Harry was a good speech writer and was able to articulate the various views that might be assembled together. The fact that he might be more dovish with regard to the war, or with regard to the bombing than Rostow, was really of no significance. If that crossed the President's mind, he certainly didn't indicate it verbally.

F: He was just looking for the best speech writer for this purpose.

T: Right. And you'll remember that Walt and the others who people at that time thought were maybe a little more hawkish contributed. Every White House meeting anyway, was attended by all sides, all views. Of course, it was during this time that the President had other people come into the White House to give their views--the Dean Achesons and the others that he called in--Mac Bundy. I was just on the edge of that. Other people can tell you more about that. I just knew it was happening. I was there in the office when he would talk to people about it. But as far as being a participant, or having anything to do with that, I didn't.

But, in any event, that speech started taking effect and started being processed. As I say, my view is that he was using the various drafts of the speech to come to his own decision and come to his own conclusions about what he ought to do. I don't think that when he first decided to make the speech he knew exactly what he would say in that speech, and exactly what impact it would have. It was only toward the end that he did make the decision that he ought to pull back on the bombing and wanted to make that announcement.

F: Did you see that forming in your morning conferences, or were you in doubt right up till the last?

T: I think my thought [illegible] but that is only by hindsight. I don't think I was thinking during the process, "Well--"

F: You were just thinking of what had to be done.

T: Right. I was more interested at that time in the mechanics because quite frequently he would look at a draft of a speech and he would try calling Harry, and Harry would be on his way to work--would neither be at home nor at the office--and he would say, "Larry, take this speech down to Harry, and tell him A, B, C, D, E." I would relay those messages. I was more a courier of information rather than having any impact or having anything to contribute to the speech. That was not my area. He knew it was not my area. I knew it was not my area.

F: This is a minor point but of interest. Most of you came to work in White House cars which, of course, had radios. Did the President in that period when you were somewhere between home and the White House utilize that service much, or did he tend to wait until you lighted somewhere before he got in touch with you?

T: Very infrequently did he use that. I think maybe if it were a critical matter, he would.

F: Of course it wouldn't be too private.

T: That was the point I was going to make. The thing you have to remember is that if I'm in a White House car and he calls me, our conversation blares out over the radio to the other people in the cars and to those that are at the base of operations of the motor pool. So he would not want to call Harry McPherson, for example, and discuss the details of the speech with him over the radio because it was just not something he wanted a lot of people knowing about.

F: He'd only talk about something fairly innocuous like, "Harry, you ought to go by [illegible] Statler before you come in," or something?

T: Or something like that. Or, "How long will it be before you're going to be here? Fifteen minutes? Well, I'm going over to the Pentagon. Why don't you detour and meet me over there?'--that sort of thing. But as far as having any conversations that went into substance, very seldom did he do that.

Anyway, I saw that speech taking effect and I, like almost everybody else, was of the view that it was just going to relate to Viet Nam--and only to Viet Nam. I remember that on Saturday, March 30, the President held a little press conference out on the lawn in the Rose Garden. I remember that very well because I went to my daughter's school and flew a kite with her that morning, and he had called my office, apparently just to ask me to be at the press conference. I got there just as the press conference was starting, and it was a very, very relaxed situation. I'd say that he was as relaxed on that morning as I can recall him being

anytime during the spring, which obviously gave no clue as to what was forthcoming the next day. All he wanted to tell the press was that, "I'm going to have this show tomorrow night, and I hope you'll be watching, and I think I'll have something of interest for you." And that was about the upshot of it.

F: He didn't give any real intimation of what he'd have?

T: Well, he did indicate that it would be about the war, but that's all.

F: But not his stand?

T: Not at all--no indication about it. Then the next day, I was at home on Sunday, and there were those that were at the White House. I knew George was down there, for example--George Christian. He and I, as I indicated to you earlier, just lived a block apart. I knew that he had gone down to the White House to help work on the mechanics for this speech, and I had not been involved on helping with the mechanics so I was just at home.

In the middle of the afternoon, Marvin Watson called me, and said, "The President would like for you to come down here. He has got something he wants you to do." So I went down to the White House and got there, oh, maybe between four and five o'clock.

F: Just you? Not your wife?

T: Just me. And was advised at that time that the President had decided that he would not seek reelection, and that was included in the speech. I saw the draft of the speech. It obviously came as a good deal of surprise to me. I immediately remembered the conversation I had had with John Connally the previous September when he told me that was a possibility and I had totally discounted it. But I saw the draft of the speech and was

told at that time that only Marvin and George Christian and I had copies of that, and that only one of the Signal Corps people who were helping to put it on the teleprompter had a copy of it; and that was not widely disseminated among the people--

F: So the remainder of the Sunday staff just went ahead with usual routine, unbothered by what was upcoming?

T: That's correct. Shortly thereafter, Barefoot Sanders came down to the White House. What the President said was that he wanted Barefoot and Marvin and me to call various people during the speech to advise them what he was going to do--his announcement that he wasn't going to run. Barefoot, obviously, in charge of Congressional liaison, was calling the various members of Congress--the key leaders, none of whom knew at this point.

F: The idea being the Johnson courtesy that a reporter doesn't call Mike Mansfield and say, "What do you think?" And he says, "What are you talking about?"

T: Right. Well, the President knew that most of the people that were going to be called would be watching the program, but he wanted them to know ahead of time. Marvin was calling various political leaders around the country, and various people important to the President from a political standpoint. And I was assigned the responsibility of calling all the Cabinet members.

F: None of whom knew.

T: None of whom knew except Secretary Clifford, whom the President had talked to earlier that day. Secretary Rusk was on an airplane going across the Atlantic. I found out later that he had been advised that the President

probably was going to do this. You'll recall also that--

F: Did you get in touch with Rusk?

T: No, I did not, although I guess technically it was possible. Rusk and Clifford were eliminated from my list. Everybody else was on the list, all the other Cabinet people.

When I first found out about it, my first reaction was that it was a very unwise decision--one that I didn't think should be made. I was concerned about who could be, and would be the President beginning in January '69. I think one of my first thoughts was that there was no Democrat that was capable of winning, other than Lyndon Johnson.

The President went back from his office to the Mansion right after he told me about this and showed me the copy. He didn't tarry to engage in discussion. He didn't say, "I've decided not to run; what do you think." It was more of a telling me what he was going to do and asking that I call the members of the Cabinet.

When he left to go back with Mrs. Johnson to the Mansion--there really is a sort of freshening up process--George Christian and I had a very extended discussion. George told me that he had known about this for a few days, and he thought it was the right decision. He didn't have any doubt about it. I told him at that time that I didn't have any doubt about it, but that I thought it was the wrong decision. He and I engaged in a pretty extensive conversation as to the merits. I don't think he convinced me of the correctness of it, although I later, within a few days, came to the conclusion that I thought it was the right decision, but my first reaction was to the contrary.

F: Did the lame duck--I know how the President disliked that word--but did the

lame duck angel perturb you?

T: It perturbed me some, but I think the principal thing that concerned me was I couldn't really envision anybody else leading this country as President. None of the people that were on the scene, which of course at that time included Senator Robert Kennedy and Vice President Humphrey--I had not reckoned really with Senator McCarthy as being a force although this was after New Hampshire--

F: He still seemed more of a diversion than a reality.

T: Right. But that was really what concerned me. I later decided that I did think it was the correct decision, but my first reaction was to the contrary.

What the President said was that this was the language that he planned to go through with, and this was the language that he planned to give on television--that he would not seek and he would not accept his party's nomination for another term, but that he did not want any of us to start calling until the television broadcast started.

F: That didn't give you just a lot of time to get hold of everyone, did it?

T: No, not at all. I think he had decided that was what he was going to do, and he did think it was a firm decision in his own mind. But Lyndon Johnson's a man who always wants the so-called option, and he wanted the option of changing his mind about it--maybe not changing his mind about whether he was or wasn't going to seek another term--but changing his mind about when and where and how he might make that announcement. So he didn't want to foreclose any other options until he actually started on the speech, which I recall might have been even as late as nine o'clock, Washington time, starting, because I remember there were several hours

involved there after I had gotten to the White House.

I do recall that as soon as the President left to go back to the Mansion and I'd had my discussion with George, that I called my wife to tell her that above all else--I knew she'd planned to watch the telecast--but I surely wanted her to watch it in any event. I didn't give her any insight as to what was going to happen, but I thought it was important that she watch. That was about all that transpired during that several hour period.

F: Do you make preliminary calls to Cabinet people just to get them located, tell them to stand by, the White House was going to call, or anything like that?

T: No, we didn't in this event.

F: Or do you just pick up and hope?

T: Right.

F: Did you have any trouble getting off the phone from any of them so you could get on to someone else?

T: No, the biggest difficulty was getting them on the phone.

F: Oh, they wouldn't leave the TV set?

T: Right. They were home watching television, and, of course, I think their inclination was, "Well, let me just finish watching this television program, then I'll talk to them." What I told the White House operator, who was making the calls for me, was to call and get them to the phone and tell them that I was calling at the special request of the President--that the President knew and I knew that they were watching the telecast, but I had a message that he wanted me to get to them <u>then</u> during the telecast. And I called all of the Cabinet members, as I say, save and

except for Secretary Rusk and Secretary Clifford.

F: What kind of reactions did you get?

T: Shocked. And surprised. I don't think any member of the Cabinet that I talked to, and by the way I talked to Arthur Goldberg, too--the President added him to the list. He obviously wasn't a Cabinet member, but as the UN representative he sometimes sat with and met with the Cabinet. But they were all very surpirsed. I think the shock took various forms.

F: Did anybody argue with you?

T: No. I recall the man who accepted it most matter-of-factly was Larry O'Brien, interestingly enough. Larry just said in effect, "Oh, is that right. Thank you for calling." On the other hand, you had people like Wilbur Cohen who said, "Oh, no! No, that can't be right! Surely that's not right!" I think everyone generally was surprised and shocked. What I did was to take notes with regard to my conversations, because without the President having told me I knew he would be interested in the reactions. I pencilled down those various notes about the reactions, and immediately upon the conclusion of the calls, I dictated to my secretary who was down there by that time a memo with the reactions of all the members of the Cabinet. Within twenty minutes after the telecast, he had that.

It was sort of interesting--the transformation that night, in addition to the other transformations--of the activity around the White House. It was relatively quiet and lackadaisical prior to the speech. There weren't many people around there. Obviously, there were no staff members except [illegible] George Christian and Marvin Watson and Jim Jones, who was down there [illegible] of it, and Barefoot Sanders and me and Walt Rostow, who was [illegible] the other aspect of it--who were aware of what

was going to happen and what the President was going to say. There were few others down there. Everyone was at home ready to watch and see the telecast and hear what was going to happen about the war.

I would say that within a matter of minutes after the telecast the switchboard was just buzzing. All of a sudden people started showing up. It was at this point maybe ten o'clock at night. All of a sudden White House staff members who were at somebody's home watching the telecast started coming down. Now the people from just out of the blue--obviously people that had access to the White House, because you don't just walk into the White House--but I remember that in the President's oval office, in Marvin's office adjoining it, and in my office, there were maybe four or five people prior to the telecast who were not technicians. They were the technical people who were doing the TV work in the President's office. But by eleven o'clock there were probably forty or fifty people, and all of a sudden it became a great beehive of activity. There were just a lot of people around. The President, of course, subsequently went over to the Mansion and held an impromptu press conference.

F: Now he enjoys surprises. I presume, in that sense, he got a stimulation out of it.

T: I guess so. It was not visible that he did. But I would say that there was a greater appearance of relief than joy. That was also true with regard to Mrs. Johnson, by the way. You could sort of see a lot of tiredness leave her face after that. The President in a very, very relaxed mood again met the press over in the Mansion maybe some thirty minutes after the telecast. He was in good form, relaxed, with the winking and joshing of the press corps, and obviously satisfied and happy with his

decision, and convinced that it was the correct decision.

F: Did you get an equivalent outpouring of letters and telegrams then?

T: Yes. As a matter of fact, the President was unable to answer all of the telephone calls he got. He got many, many calls from many people, not all limited to the Democratic party. [He received] calls from people like Governor Rockefeller, I recall very well, [Who] called him to say that he didn't know what went into the decision and why the President did it, but that the President was still his President, and he, Governor Rockefeller, supported that decision and that President--as well as the many calls that you expect from Congressional leaders and other people around the country. Obviously, the President was unable to take all the calls; and even that night, by midnight or so, wires started coming in.

F: Was it the impression of the staff that this did, at least in a domestic sense, strengthen his hand in conducting foreign policy? That is, it divorced him from having political motives?

T: Yes, sir, I think that's right. That was part of the motivation for his decision. I know that he felt very keenly about the fact that this might be the catalyst to end the war. This might be what could end the war, to get us out of Viet Nam, to get peace talks started. I know he felt very strongly about that because for several days following the speech, that's really about all he talked about. I didn't have that conversation with him prior to the speech because I didn't know about it. But I know in the mornings in the bedroom that's what he would talk about it. "Well, they can't say that I'm trying to do this for political motivation. All I'm interested in is doing whatever is necessary, one, to end the war and two, to protect our boys over there." Protecting

our boys over there always was uppermost in his mind. I recall he made a decision either late, late the night of the speech or early the next morning to go to Chicago on the morning of April 1.

F: This was a sudden decision--the overt part of it was sudden?

T: Well, it was something he'd sort of been holding in abeyance. I believe it was the National Association of Broadcasters. I'm not clear in my mind about that--

F: He amplified a little bit from the March 31 speech; he enlarged a little on what was said there.

T: Correct. He decided that he would go out there. I think part of his decision to go out there was to sort of get a feel for what reaction there was to his decision. I think he believed that the National Association of Broadcasters would probably give him as much a feel as he could get from any group. I recall that early the next morning we got on his airplane and headed toward Chicago. I do also recall that he got a tremendous reception from the people around the hotel who'd gotten word that he was coming--the throngs that showed up, as well as the people in this very large hall that were attending the meeting of the National Association of Broadcasters.

I also remember that on the way to and returning from Chicago the President kept wanting to stay in contact with the White House to see what kind of reaction was coming into the White House. Lyndon Johnson is a man who is interested in reactions. He always has been whether it's talking about some domestic legislation, or whatever. Once he has done something, he wants to know what the reaction to it or response is. Obviously, a decision that was as major as this one, he was interested in.

I remember we maintained constant contact through the radio on the airplane back to the White House to see were the wires coming in at the rate of a hundred an hour, or were they coming in at the rate of ten thousand an hour. I don't remember what the answer to that was, but it was very heavy I do recall; and what seemed to be the tenor of them; that sort of thing.

F: You spoke of Governor Rockefeller awhile ago. I spent an evening in mid-to-late April '68 in the White House. I stepped on the elevator to go to my room and met Governor Rockefeller and his wife and you. Later you told me not to mention what I'd run in to.

T: I must say, Joe, I'd forgotten about that.

F: Was there any significance in that?

T: None at all. The President was very, very fond of Governor Rockefeller and Mrs. Rockefeller--I say the President, the President and Mrs. Johnson. I'm satisfied from my contacts with Governor Rockefeller, which were fairly limited, that that was a very mutual and reciprocal feeling.

What had transpired that particular evening was that Governor Rockefeller was in town, and the President, liking Governor Rockefeller, wanted him to come by and have dinner with him. He had had the conversation with Governor Rockefeller. The Governor said he'd be delighted to have dinner. There was a little secrecy to the mechanism of getting him in and out, only because the President didn't want anybody to know about it and think it had any political impact, because it had none. It was purely social.

F: The speculation would have been--

T: Exactly. That maybe he was trying to talk to Governor Rockefeller about getting him in the race. Now, you'll recall this was before Governor

Rockefeller got back into the race after he had gotten out for the Republican nomination. And whether the President was for Governor Rockefeller vis-a-vis Vice President Humphrey, or the Democratic nominee--

F: The speculation would have been tremendous.

T: Right. The President just didn't want to get into that, and it was purely social, so we went through the secretive proceeding of the Governor coming to see me. He came in not the back or the front part of the White House, but came in the west door of the West Wing, and came in to see me. I took the Governor and Mrs. Rockefeller over and up the elevator to the second floor. It was only to avoid misconstruction of the visit--purely social.

F: You were around, of course, and you didn't have much time to savor the reaction from the March 31 speech when Martin Luther King was shot down in Memphis. What was your role in the midst of this? This was followed of course, by the April riot.

T: Well, it varied. You will recall that at the time of the Martin Luther King assassination the President was scheduled to go to Hawaii.

F: Mrs. Johnson was entertaining foreign editors down in this part of the world.

T: Right. The President was going to Hawaii, as I recall, to meet President Park of South Korea; and, as a matter of fact, was to leave that evening.

My recollection is not good as to whether he was going to come to Texas and spend the night and then go on--the mechanics and procedures are not clear in my mind. But I do recall that George Christian already had some of the news media on the airplane out at Andrews Air Force Base. Some of our people that were going were already at the airplane

ready to leave. That's how imminent the departure was.

Just as an aside, the way this usually worked is that it's obviously quicker to go by helicopter to Andrews than it is to drive, and those that were not going by helicopter usually left early. Some of us who waited with the President rode on the helicopter, and we were there until the last minute.

In any event when word first came in of the Martin Luther King shooting, the first word was that he had been shot, without any indication that--

F: Who delivers a message like that--just whoever is on duty or whoever hears it, and then it would come into the Situation Room.

T: I think it would come into the Situation Room whether some newsman called George Christian, and George told the President, or whether it came through the Situation Room for Walt, I don't recall in that particular instance.

At the time word came in, it was just that he had been shot, without regard to the seriousness of it, and obviously without regard to circumstances--other than he'd been shot, whether the man had been apprehended or whether it was a sniper was not clear at first. I remember the President's first reaction was that he wanted to hold up the trip to Hawaii, really only for a matter of hours to see what the condition was, because we didn't know the seriousness of it. But until we did determine the seriousness of it, until he did have all the facts, he just wanted to hold the trip up. He didn't want to be on an airplane going somewhere, because even though communications on Air Force One are just superb, it's not quite like having all of the communications at the

White House.

Of course, it was only shortly thereafter that word came that by the time he had gotten to the hospital, or shortly thereafter, that he was dead. Then the President made the decision that under the circumstances, he would delay, at least for that night, his trip to Hawaii. The reason I say at least for that night is because President Park had not left South Korea yet, but the President--as great an impact as he knew Martin Luther King's death would have, he didn't want to cause a foreign crisis of any kind by sort-of rejecting the President of South Korea by neglecting him or failing to show up. Obviously, that later was taken care of and smoothed over by just delaying the trip by several weeks.

F: It was a little ticklish. Since Martin Luther King has no official position in this country, how much importance do you attach to him. That is, how do you explain to a foreign dignitary that, in a sense, he outranks him?

T: That's correct, and I think that's what was going through the President's mind even though he may not have articulated it quite that way. The President decided very quickly, after word reached us that Martin Luther King had died. It seems to me like it was dark when it happened, so it seems to me like it was 8:30 or 9 o'clock at night, I'm not really sure--

F: I got the word here--I was attending a banquet, and somebody came in late, about 7:30, and said that had happened. I don't think they said he was dead, just shot at that point, so I think it was around 6:30 when he was first shot, which in April would have been 7:30 in Washington and therefore getting close to dark.

T: It was 6:30 here, did you say? I'm sure that must be about right.

F: 6:30 in Memphis.

T: The President immediately decided that it was appropriate and maybe for the sake of sort of soothing this country for him to make some statement, and that was the unanimous advice of those with whom he discussed the subject. A statement was put together. I really don't have any clear recollection as to who wrote it, but it seems to me like Harry McPherson came in and the President said, "I want to say, A,B,C,D,E. I want it to be short; I want it to be to the point. Here's what I want to say." Which is usually the way he did this. Somebody else may have actually written it, but the thoughts and the ideas usually were Lyndon Johnson's.

F: There were the points he wanted to make.

T: That's right. It might be somebody else's words to put in form of the substance of what he wanted to say. I recall that--maybe it was not quite dark, it seems like ot was--because I recall that he went on the steps right outside of his office--the steps leading down to the Rose Garden--and that's where he made the very brief speech. Obviously there was a lot of technicalities that had to be worked out very quickly that fell within George's realm of getting all three networks to get a uniform camera--one camera that feeds to all three of them, that sort of thing.

F: How soon can he get set up on something like that?

T: As I recall, George was able to do that in about forty or forty-five minutes. It takes awhile to put the statement in words, so it worked out about right, although I remember the President's impatience because he was ready before the cameras were ready. He typically was impatient when he was ready before the cameras were ready.

Then, the next several days were very difficult, and kind-of

surprising and shocking times. You'll recall that the riots and the fires started in Washington. And I remember my own surprise to be able to stand on the steps of the White House and see fires blazing. I thought it was something I'd never see in this country--just within eyesight of the White House, and smoke everywhere.

F: Did the President ever go look?

T: Yes.

F: From the second floor?

T: From the second floor. You could look out the window. I don't think he ever took the step out to the front steps of the White House as I did, and out in front of the West Wing as I did. You just could literally see the flames shooting in the air. I recall that coming and going to the White House in the cars that it became necessary to line the walls around the White House with military. Here these soldiers are, and I say soldiers without any memory as to whether they were Army or Marine or Navy or whatever, but to see these soldiers with fixed bayonets and with the hard hats almost as if you were in a war zone somewhere. It really is a very frightening feeling--not that I felt unsafe, not that I was concerned that somebody was going to throw a rock or shoot a gun or light a fire where I was. I was a little concerned about my family, but the riots never spread over into Virginia. They were really centralized there in Washington.

F: There was a certain portent though that must have hung over the White House.

T: Right. There was; and immediately the next morning I started meeting, along with some other people in the White House, with the people who

would operate the city of Washington in the event that martial law was declared and troops were called out. One was the Under Secretary of the Army, who was really in charge of the various troops. The Deputy Attorney General was involved--

F: Who was that--Warren Christopher?

T: Warren Christopher; and Dave McGiffert (?)--I believe is the fellow's name with the Secretary of the Army, I believe he was General Counsel for the Army then--was over there with regard to the availability and the stationing of troops. Clearly, Mayor Walter Washington was still the governing authority in the District of Columbia.

F: The President worked rather well with Washington, didn't he?

T: Very well. The President's very fond of Washington. Washington was well liked, and I guess still is, in the city of Washington by the people. Although they don't elect their mayor--he's appointed by the President--I think he clearly was at that time the consensus choice of the people. Had there been an election and if anybody had been foolhardy enough to run against him, he would have been elected. He was the recognized leader of the people.

I was involved because the President was looking to me to handle whatever technical legal details were requisite for him to call out the military if that became a necessary step, as it did. This was not an area with which I was familiar, but I talked with people at the Department of Justice, partly to the Attorney General, primarily with Warren Christopher, the Deputy Attorney General. The various forms were pulled out that were used during the Detroit riots in '67 when I wasn't there.

F: They more or less have a modus operandi for this--they don't have to go to the books?

T: That's right. But you really want to go back to the books to confirm the correctness of what you're doing. There are really two orders that the President needs to sign. One is the order that he has been advised by the local authorities that the situation has gotten to the point they can't handle it. There's a lot of legalese that says that, but that's the net effect of it. Therefore, he is declaring martial law. That's the first order. The second order is that he is calling out the troops. He is federalizing the force to go in. Just as a hypertechnical point, it's important which he signs first. You can't just put in front of him and say, "Here are two documents you need to sign "because as a purely technical matter--"

F: He has got to get a situation before he can--

T: Right. He needs to sign the order saying that the situation is out of hand and declaring martial law before he does the second, because the statute required it in that point. I guess had he wanted to, he could have signed the first one to declare martial law and waited a day or two to federalize the troops. But the situation just wouldn't permit that. You don't really want to declare martial law until you have to, and you don't really have to until you're prepared to send the troops in. As a political matter, you wouldn't want to declare martial law just to be declaring it.

F: On something like this, is there a lot of scurrying in the White House staff, or do most of the people go on with their regular duties, and there's just a small sort of cadre who communicate with the President on this?

T: The latter. Well, I guess [to] all of that the answer is "yes." By and large, I think most people go on with their duties. They're concerned

about it. They're interested. But as far as having a direct contact with it, they don't, and they just go about their business.

In this particular instance I recall very clearly that the orders were signed by the President sitting in the West Sitting Hall on the second floor of the Mansion late in the afternoon. He wasn't in his office. He had been over there and had eaten lunch late, and the situation had just gotten to the point that the orders had to be signed, and so he signed them over there. I recall that he called me and told me to bring them over there. I got over there and there were several people--I don't even recall who was there--Marvin Watson, George Christian. I took the orders over there, and he did sign them. Of course, George immediately released the information to the news media.

The President awaited the one further conversation with Walter Washington. I remember he was very frustrated because he couldn't get Walter on the phone. Walter was touring the area. The President wanted to have one last conversation with him to be sure what the situation was before he signed the orders declaring martial law and calling out the troops. He couldn't get Mayor Washington on the phone for some fifteen minutes. It wasn't a protracted period of time, but it seemed like a lengthy period of time.

I also recall that, at the time--it seems to me that it was prior to the response from Hanoi about the peace talks--and the President got Cy Vance to come down from New York to sort of oversee the military operations in Washington. Cy had done that in Detroit in 1967. An office had been set up for Cy in the Pentagon. He was sort of the President's command official to help look after the situation in Washington

because the President valued his experience. It wasn't a matter of not having confidence in the other people, but a lot of the other people had not been in Detroit. He valued Cy's experience and Cy's judgment.

F: There wasn't any contention between Mayor Washington and the President regarding the necessity for martial law?

T: Not at all. My recollection is that there was no one who recommended against what the President did. At that point with the fires burning, the people having been shot at, with massive looting going on in Washington, I think it was the unanimous thought that it was imperative that something be done. The police force was incapable of handling the situation in Washington.

F: Does the President stay pretty deliberate in this sort of situation, or is he likely to give out with sort of an impatience that things are going awry--or one way or another "shoot the sons-of-bitches" attitude?

T: No. The thing about Lyndon Johnson that I think those that have seen him know is that he's always impatient. In the calmest of times, he is impatient. He wants action to be going. He wants something to be happening. But I would say that at a time of real crisis, I believe I'd rather have him making the decisions for me than anybody I ever knew. Because when everything else is critical and people are inclined to be upset or to be emotional or to be irritated, to be impatient, to be unhappy, he is able to either call from a reserve he has got--a reservoir of some kind, I don't know what--but he is able to maintain calm and a methodical ability to make decisions. I think he's an excitable man, and I think he's an impatient man, but he doesn't demonstrate that at a time of crisis.

F: He's not stampeded into decisions.

T: Not at all.

F: Did you ever have any opportunity to observe his personal relationship with Martin Luther King?

T: No. I do recall that he had had conversations with King during the time I was there. You'll recall that Martin Luther King had, at least from the public standpoint, initiated the idea of Resurrection City. One of the thoughts that went through the minds of a lot of people was what about Resurrection City; what happens now. I think that because of the other activities that Dr. King had been involved in that there were a lot of people that were not overly concerned about Resurrection City as long as he was in control; that he might be able to, or probably would be able to, prevent any violence, prevent any destruction, prevent any problems. But with Dr. King gone, and of course Ralph Abernathy at that time was a total unknown quantity to people generally--I'm not suggesting that the President didn't know him, or didn't know something about him, but he was an unknown quantity as to his ability to lead the people. There was a considerable amount of discussion about Resurrection City. What does the federal government do? How does it react about Resurrection City?

F: You've got some kind of a gathering of uncertain quality that is--

T: An uncertain quantity, too, at this point, by the way.

F: --that is upcoming. Do you try to do anything to delay it or to head it off, or do you still pretty well leave it under the control of those who have solicited it from Dr. King?

T: Well, [illegible] Dr. King before his death, there were contacts

being made. The Attorney General, Ramsey Clark, for example, was having contact with Dr. King. The people at the National Park Service on whose land this was going to be held were having contact with Dr. King. Various people were having contact with him, and I think those contacts just continued with the other people.

F: Does the President take a direct hand in where something like that is going to be held. I'm talking about the physical side. We know it's in Washington, but whether it's on the Elipse, or whether it's over by the Reflecting Pool, or whether it's right there on the White House lawn, and so forth. Does he leave that up to the controlling agencies there in Washington, or does he express himself fairly freely?

T: He expresses himself freely. In this case, there weren't just a lot of alternatives. The discussions as to the location were held between the National Park Service people--and the one thing I remember is that Ramsey Clark was right in the middle of all of this--I do recall that--partly because of his liberal credentials. He was well known to those that were putting on the Resurrection City activity and was respected and liked by them, so he was a natural to be involved in it, aside from his role as Attorney General and chief law enforcement officer. And there were discussion; there were discussions of other sites--discussions of other sites prior to Martin Luther King's death--after his death.

F: The President likes to sort of stay on top of that situation. He didn't say to the Park Service, "Nash Castro, handle this," sor of thing and "let me know what you come up with."

T: No, he never did that. He was aware of the various considerations that went into it. And I recall at one time sitting in on a meeting with

Ramsey and the President in which other possible sites were discussed. Ramsey came over to discuss the site, Camp Walters is a name that sticks a little bit in my mind as a site, and the problems relative to it. Ramsey discussed the various alternatives, what the problems were, what the benefits were--that sort of thing, and, I think, with the idea of trying to steer these people who were coming in a site that was physically able to accommodate them, and where the activity could be held without disturbing everything else that was going on around the city. Obviously, the decision was made to hold it there without really knowing the full size of it.

F: Along that line, Ramsey the President has known since he was Tom Clark's little boy. Ramsey, also, becomes a real point of contention in the latter days of the Johnson Administration. Now did Johnson treat him more or less on the equivalent status with all the other Cabinet heads, or did he always look on him as Tom Clark's little boy?

T: No. He always treated him the way he treated all the other Cabinet people. Ramsey is a pretty hard-headed fellow whenever he wants to be. He didn't think that he was dealing with one of his daddy's friends. He thought he was Attorney General of the United States dealing with the President of the United States, and acted accordingly, as did the President.

F: Some of the criticism that the President received was because of some of Ramsey's feelings, particularly on this matter of gun controls and on the admonition, you know, that you should show restraint in handling rioters and so on. Did the President ever indicate his dissatisfaction with Ramsey on this?

T: Oh, I can recall the President indicating irritation with Ramsey about

various things, but he indicated irritation about me, but there was never any thought I don't think of firing me. You know, there were times that he indicated irritation about various people in the Administration, either in the Cabinet or out.

F: You can't get much beyond the level of "I wonder why old Ramsey wants to say that or do that" or something?

T: Yes, that was the form it took. A lot of times he'd say, "Oh, Goddamn Ramsey. Now why did he do that? That doesn't make any sense. Why would he do that?" Usually, I would have the opportunity to be the middle man. He'd say, "Call Ramsey, and ask him why he did so-and-so."

You know, Lyndon Johnson has had a reputation for a long time of getting unhappy with people and calling them and really chewing them out. I must say I didn't experience that very much. He always was nice to me, treated me with complete deference, even at times I knew he was unhappy with me and he let me know he was unhappy with me. As far as chastising me in public, in front of people, trying to embarrass me, that never happened. I noticed that with regard to the people he respected, whose judgment, whose ability, whose recommendations that he respected, that he did the same thing always. More than that, when he was irritated with them, or unhappy with them, or uncertain as to why they did things, instead of calling them directly, he would send an intermediary. There were several times he was unhappy with Ramsey about things, or curious to why Ramsey made decisions, and he would say, "Call Ramsey, and ask him why he did so-and-so."

F: Which, in a sense, mitigated the criticism intended because this was Larry Temple really calling Ramsey.

T: Right. If I called and said, "Ramsey, the President sure does appear to be unhappy about your statement or about your decision, and he wonders what motivated it." Well, that's sort of a pleasant little inquiring coming from Larry Temple as opposed to the President of the United States saying, "My God, why did you do A,B,C?" And there were a lot of times the President was irritated and unhappy with Ramsey. I would say it would be a fair conclusion to say that during the year 1968 there were more occasions where the President was irritated with Ramsey than there were occasions where he was irritated with any other Cabinet officer. But I think that's primarily attributable to the fact that Ramsey was involved in more things in 1968 than any other Cabinet officer.

F: He was, in some ways, the most exposed officer outside of Dean Rusk.

T: That's right. He was handling the Court nominations vis-a-vis the Congress. He was working on gun legislation. He was working on other legislation. He was working on Resurrection City. He was the guy who instituted litigation against--anti-trust litigation. He was the guy that instituted indictments. So the fact that the President might have been irritated on more occasions with Ramsey than any other Cabinet officer doesn't really mean a whole lot.

F: He was involved in every bit of discontent.

T: Right. That did happen quite frequently. But the President had no reticence about getting word to Ramsey in one form or another that he was unhappy with him; and Ramsey had no reticence about defending his positions.

F: In fact, he never really countermanded him on anything?

T: No. I think there were occasions where the President made decisions that

were contrary to Ramsey's recommendations, but he made lots of decisions contrary to a lot of people's recommendations. But as far as Ramsey doing something, a la Wirtz, and the President picking up the phone and saying, "Ramsey, you're wrong; backtrack; change that," I don't recall that happening.

Now without remembering any specifics, I do know there were occasions where--. I do remember some specifics. There were occasions where Ramsey would say, "Now, Mr. President, this is something that I want to recommend to you, and I think we ought to do it a certain way." The President would just say, "No, Ramsey, I disagree. We're not going to do it that way."

F: They saw eye-to-eye on gun control?

T: Yes, saw eye-to-eye on things like wiretapping, which was very, very important. The President had a deep-seated feeling against wiretapping, against the invasion of a guy's privacy. He thought that in earlier administrations that there was 'way too much wiretapping going on. Ramsey was the one who told the FBI that there was going to be a very limited amount, only in national security. We weren't just going to be wiretapping to try to find criminals here, there, and yon. The President backed him up to the hilt, and I must say--not only is that my view, I think everybody around the Whit House had that view--that if the government ever gets into an extensive amount of wiretapping, that they're going to really be invading privacy.

F: Freedom control.

T: Right. That was not really the view of most of the professionals at the FBI. They were not happy with this decision. I think left to their

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own devices they would have wiretapped hither and yon.

F: As far as you know, did J. Edgar Hoover ever remonstrate on this to the President?

T: Not to my knowledge. I think he was aware of the President's view about it.

F: Does the Attorney General, as far as you can tell, hold sort of a whip hand over the FBI--I'm thinking particularly of Director Hoover, who are nominally subordinate--but Mr. Hoover is an American institution.

T: Mr. Hoover never thought he was subordinate to that or any other Attorney General. I think that was apparent. I think that was one of the areas in which Ramsey remained frustrated because Mr. Hoover, as you say, was and is a national institution, had much, much stroke in the Congress. Ramsey did his best to ride herd over the FBI, but I'm not sure he ever thought that he was in full control of the situation. He was nominally the head of the FBI.

Of course, he had some authority because in some areas the FBI needed his signature approval to do things, like wiretapping. He wouldn't give that approval. When it needed his approval, or his permission to go to court and he declined it, that would cause unhappiness, it was clear over there. I didn't witness it firsthand, the relationship between all the Attorneys General and Hoover, but my guess is from what I saw and what I heard and what was told to me by some of the FBI people, is that Ramsey probably did a better job of trying to be a boss over Hoover than anybody that preceded him. I don't know about the successor.

F: Did the President ever consider retiring Hoover so far as you know?

T: No, not so far as I know. I do know that there was a fellow named Deke

Galotch (?)(DeLoache?)--Cartha. His nickname that everybody called him was Deke who, I think, technically was the number three man over there, but we looked upon Deke being the number two man. All of our contact from the White House that went directly to the FBI--and there were some, not trying to get around Ramsey, but just trying to expedite things--our direct contact went to Deke. The President was very high on Deke, liked Deke, had confidence in him. I think the thought went through the President's mind that if Hoover ever decided to retire, that Deke might be a good one for that position. I also happen to know that that was not Ramsey's view.

I happen to know from conversations I had with him that Ramsey would have preferred bringing somebody in from the outside to head up the FBI, and not get a Hoover-trained man in that position. I noted with interest in the paper in the last week that Deke has retired from the FBI, and the speculative stories are that President Nixon has the view that whoever succeeds Hoover ought to come from outside, and Deke sees there's no future for him, and is leaving. Whether that's true or not, I obviously don't know. But the relationship between the White House and the FBI, I thought was really pretty good.

F: WEre you involved in the concern around the assassination of Robert Kennedy?

T: Yes. Sort of surprising. It seemed to me it may have been about two or two-thirty in the morning in Washington, I got a call from the Secret Service man, and said--

F: Local call?

T: Yes, from the White House switchboard. [He] said, "Larry, I just got word that Senator Robert Kennedy has been shot in California, and I don't know

what to do about it. Should I call the President?"

I said, "Oh, good God, yes! How seriously shot?"

He said, "We don't know. We haven't gotten word on that. We just know that he has been shot and is in the hospital, and I was reticent to call the President. I wanted to call and ask you what to do."

I said, "I don't have any question about it--call the President and tell him!"

Well, apparently while he was calling me to ask me about it, the Situation Room had called Walt Rostow and had told Walt about it. Then Walt called the President and told him. By the time the Secret Service man called the President, the President already knew. I remember that for some strange reason--

F: You had gone back to bed?

T: Well, laid there for a minute not really knowing what to think or what to do, and about thirty minutes later my wife got up and turned on the television at three or three-thirty or four or whatever time it was in the morning. Surprisingly, television was on. Why she thought to get up and turn on the television I don't know. I must say that thought wouldn't have crossed my mind. I might have thought to get up and turn on the radio for an all-night news program, but it was on, and I remember that we watched it and that for the rest of the night there were just constant news reports about Bobby Kennedy.

Then the next morning when I got to the White House, a lot had been done by the President. The President apparently had been up most of the night. One of the things he did, without technical legal authority at that time, was to assign Secret Service protection--

F: I was going to ask whose initiative that was?

T: That was the President's. To all the candidates. He decided that that was something that was imperative; that if somebody was going to criticize him or going to fault him for it, he was willing to accept that. He thought that he still was the Chief Executive of that government, and--

F: He wouldn't wait for the legalities, he'd take care of the necessities?

T: Exactly. So by the time the sun came up, he had given the orders and the instructions. The Secret Service, which didn't have just an abundance of people, had already started getting its people around to the various candidates. Obviously, the Vice President had Secret Service protection as Vice President. But you had McCarthy and you had Mr. Nixon, you had varioud people.

I recall that when I got there the next morning to the bedroom that--. At this point of course Senator Kennedy had not yet died. He was still alive technically, although by this point we had gotten word that he was unconscious, would probably not regain consciousness even if he lived. The odds were that he would not regain consciousness; that he might be in an alive state for weeks or months or some period of time, but probably would never regain consciousness. There was not a lot that the President could do to help him.

There was a great concern on his part about the proportions of violence in this country, not just the shooting of Bobby Kennedy--although that was the catalyst that gave rise to some action--but closely on the heels of Martin Luther King as well as the various other things that were going on in the country. I remember when I got there at the White House, he had been up, had been talking with people--started talking to me about

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legislation that would give Secret Service protection to the various candidates. DeVier Pierson--he called, and he asked DeVier and me to do some work on legislation. DeVier started contacting, as I recall, Joe Barr, who was then Under Secretary of the Treasury, and started working with him on legislation. The President had talked to Speaker McCormack, had talked to Gerald Ford, had talked to Senator Mansfield and Senator Dirksen, and it was fairly apparent that things were greased to get this legislation through. There wasn't going to be a whole lot of argument about it. You'll recall that there was some decision as to how far this legislation would go. Who would you give Secret Service protection? How about Harold Stassen? Are you going to give protection--?

F: Somebody from the Prohibition party.

T: That's right. So the decision was fairly quickly made that the Majority and Minority Leaders in the House and the Majority and Minority Leaders in the Senate, plus a fifth member to be selected by them, would be the five man selection committee to determine who would get Secret Service protection. Tom Clark, my old friend, became the fifth member of that committee at a later point.

In any event while Bobby Kennedy was lying in a hospital dying in California, the wheels of government were moving very rapidly to try to prevent this sort of thing from reoccurring, and to try to get the Secret Service protection to the various candidates. That was forthcoming very quickly. In the meantime, as I said, the President had assigned these people, and announced that he had made that decision. There was no secret about the fact that there may not have been the technical legal authority. He didn't advertise that. He didn't say, "I do not

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have the authority to do this, but I'm doing it--"

F: He got no real kickback on that?

T: None whatsoever. And I think those that gave any thought to it instinctively thought that that was the correct decision to make. The legislation, as you know, was forthcoming very quickly.

During the time of Bobby Kennedy's being in the hospital and in the process of dying, the President was giving thought to this whole problem of violence in this country. There was discussion about creating a commission. The President had a good deal of reticence about that. He said, "You can't just create commissions. Commissions don't really solve problems. So you have a commission. What does it do?" Then he would argue with himself. He's the greatest devil's advocate I've ever seen because invariably he would take the contrary position to anybody who would have a view. A lot of times people would express views to him and he'd just say, "Well, that's foolhardy. You're wrong about that." And really become an advocate with them and dispute them and argue with them--when in fact he agreed with them, and he was trying to test the validity of their position.

F: People, with good motives perhaps, but without any involvement in the complexities of a problem--I think they've charged this on every President, I know they did on Johnson, they say, "Oh, God, Johnson has named another commission, or another committee to look into this." Was he sensitive to that?

T: Very sensitive. Sensitive not only to that criticism, but to the accuracy of that criticism. That was the reason there was this problem of the decision, the sort-of arguing back and forth in his own mind as to whether

this was the thing to do. Obviously, ultimately he made that decision; and ultimately appointed that Commission on Violence.

F: Any particular reason why he chose Eisenhower--Milton?

T: I think he chose Milton Eisenhower because he wanted a respected leader who was known and would be respected by everybody. He thought Eisenhower fit that category.

F: And who would not be associated probably with politics?

T: Right. Obviously there were politicians on there. There were political people on there. There were people like Terrence Cook, the Archbishop of New York, on there, whom the President had met not too much before that and thought very highly of.

F: Roman Hruska?

T: That's right, Senator Hruska.

F: And Congressman McCullough, I remember.

T: Right. The President--. It's kind of interesting how he decided these things. He never told me this, but I got the impression that he put Senator Hruska on there, for example, because Hruska was an opponent of gun control legislation. He thought that gun control legislation really was imperative following Martin Luther King's assassination and Bobby Kennedy's assassination. He thought this country really needed some type of gun control legislation. He had his views as to what type we ought to have, but in any event we ought to have some. Hruska was an opponent of that. I think that the President put Hruska on there with the idea of converting him and maybe the conversion of Hruska would be the impetus to getting gun control legislation. I think that's the reason Hruska was on there. If Hruska had never been involved in the gun control fight,

maybe another Senator would have been put on. I don't know that the President was successful, if that was his view, and he never told me that was his view. That's only my analysis of it.

F: Did he ever discuss operating philosophy on something like that. You know, give you little handbooks on "how to" handle certain problems?

T: Not really. Not in the sense of "Let me tell you" lecture, sort of thing. I think that he did some things like that visibly with the idea that if you were smart enough to understand what was going on, you could see what was going on. By that, I don't mean to suggest that I was smart enough that I saw that one, but that really was my view about Hruska. But the President usually just did things. He would discuss part of the reasons for doing them. But if he had deep down in his mind that he was going to accomplish some intended purpose by a particular action, he wouldn't always articulate that to everybody around. He didn't think he was a professor teaching students. He thought he was a man who was acting. Recognizing that you're a professor, I don't mean that derogatorily, but he just didn't feel that as a responsibility.

F: You're supposed to learn by doing.

T: Right.

F: Did he really hold forth much hope for the commission?

T: He did when he finally made the decision to do it. As I say, he grappled with that one for--not an extended length of time because it was announced really at the time of Senator Kennedy's death. But it was a hard grappling for hours as opposed to days. But he held great hope once he made that decision that it would come up with something.

F: Was he aware that it probably would not report until after he had gone out of office?

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T: Yes. I think that he thought that maybe there would be some interim reports that might be helpful. But he knew that from June--as I recall, it was June--until January was a relatively short period of time, and that most of what they could come up with quickly would be pretty superficial. He wasn't suggesting just putting together a commission and then somebody at the White House write a report for them to deliver.

F: For instance on this one, you get Lloyd Cutler as your executive director. Cutler has been in and out of government service and is known. Does Eisenhower choose him? Does the President choose him? Who gets hold of Lloyd Cutler on something like this and decides this is the man who can operate the day-to-day work of this commission?

T: Well, I can tell you in this particular instance the decision on Lloyd Cutler was the President's. How the idea came to him, I'm not real sure. But I think that the President knew for this commission to be successful there would have to be an activist executive for the commission who knew and understood the operations of government, who was a bright talented guy, who understood government and the way it operated. Cutler fit that bill. When I say the decision was the President's, I think as a practical matter that is right. What the President did was that--

F: He recommends.

T: He recommended and got word to the commission that Cutler would be a good one. Cutler wasn't seeking the job. That's not any job a fellow would seek voluntarily. I know the President--through Joe Califano, as I recall--got word to the commission that Cutler probably would be available and in his judgment would be a good man for the job. He didn't have any insistence that they have Cutler. I think if the commission had

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had someone they thought was better, the President would have clearly acceded to their judgment on it.

F: "This is a man you might want to use."

T: Right.

F: Did you get there in time to observe the President's relationship with President Eisenhower?

T: Yes. I saw him with President Eisenhower on several occasions, all of which were amazingly, amazingly harmonious--like two brothers who--

F: Were they warm? I know the problem of abstractions and adjectives, but what is the degree of the relationship as you would describe it?

T: Just almost like brothers who had been through a battle together. I think maybe the Presidency must bring individuals together that might not otherwise be there.

F: It's almost like being an astronaut. There are not very many people you can talk to about it.

T: That's right. I think, Joe, for example, that relationship had its genesis earlier than Lyndon Johnson's Presidency. Obviously, during the '50's they worked closely together, but--without knowing and without having seen--I would not think that they were as close personally during the '50's as they became after Lyndon Johnson ascended to the Presidency.

I remember that we went to Eisenhower's place in Palm Springs, California going to or coming back from somewhere. One of the Hawaii trips. I remember it backed on to the golf course. I remember this very vividly. Oh, I guess it was one of the trips where we had gone off the coast of San Diego to one of the carriers to visit with one of the carriers, maybe on Veterans Day or something. But I remember that we got on a

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helicopter. I guess what we did is we flew on a helicopter really from the carrier right to Palm Springs. I don't guess we took Air Force One and then switched to a helicopter. But we got there and President Eisenhower met us. I remember the President introduced me to President Eisenhower as a "fellow you'll like. He's a Texan," was the sort of introduction. Eisenhower didn't pay much attention to me, as he didn't pay much attention to anybody but the President. The President was his guest. But I remember really how warm their relationship was, and they went in and the President had lunch with President Eisenhower and Mrs. Eisenhower, as I recall.

F: Now President Johnson is a great flesh presser and hugger and so forth; [with] somebody like Eisenhower, is it a good hardy handshake, or is there a laying on of hands?

T: A good hearty handshake, and I recall on this particular occasion PresidentEisenhower put his arm around the President as they started walking toward the house, not for the show of the photographers. I think they had even forgotten. The photographers had been there and had gotten their pictures, and really were in the process of leaving. Whether one of them got the picture or not is insignificant. They had lunch and President Johnson wanted to brief President Eisenhower as to what was happening with regard to the Viet Nam war. He always sought President Eisenhower's counsel and support. And he wanted Eisenhower to know what was happening.

F: Did Eisenhower--as far as you know, did he talk in generalities or did he get specific?

T: The times I saw--I was not in on the meetings. There was a later meeting

where Eisenhower came and had breakfast with President Johnson on Air Force One, as were on our way to or from Hawaii to meet President Thieu of South Viet Nam. But most of the time, from what I was able to observe without being in on the meeting, Eisenhower fairly much just listened and then said, "I think you're doing right, Mr. President. You have my support."

President Johnson was always wont to quote what President Eisenhower had said to him once, and that is that "When it comes to domestic affairs, I am a mean partisan Republican who will oppose you. But when it comes to foreign affairs, you're my President and I will do what you say, and you have my support." President Johnson used to always go on and say, "Now, he's not a mean partisan Republican. He just said that." He like to tell that story, and I've heard that story several times. I wasn't there when President Eisenhower said that, but I think that probably did epitomize what Eisenhower thought his view and position was. But I thought their relationship was very good, and from all visible appearances, very warm.

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to the

Lyndon Baines Johnson Library

In accordance with Sec. 507 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (44 U.S.C. 397) and regulations issued thereunder (41 CFR 101-10), I, _____, hereinafter referred to as the donor, hereby give, donate, and convey to the United States of America for eventual deposit in the proposed Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, and for administration therein by the authorities thereof, a tape and transcript of a personal statement approved by me and prepared for the purpose of deposit in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. The gift of this material is made subject to the following terms and conditions:

1. Title to the material transferred hereunder, and all literary property rights, will pass to the United States as of the date of the delivery of this material into the physical custody of the Archivist of the United States.

2. It is the donor's wish to make the material donated to the United States of America by terms of this instrument available for research as soon as it has been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

3. A revision of this stipulation governing access to the material for research may be entered into between the donor and the Archivist of the United States, or his designee, if it appears desirable.

4. The material donated to the United States pursuant to the foregoing shall be kept intact permanently in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

Signed Larry Temple

Date January 5, 1971

Accepted Harry S. Middleton for
Archivist of the United States

Date DEC 9, 1971