INTERVIEW I

DATE: June 23, 1970

INTERVIEWEE: KENNETH TORP

INTERVIEWER: JOE B. FRANTZ

PLACE: Dr. Frantz's office, Austin, Texas

Tape 1 of 1

F: Mr. Torp, tell us very briefly about how you got to Cyprus in March in 1967, as I recall.

T: Right. This was my first overseas assignment. After very brief training in the Foreign Service Institute, mostly in Greek language training, intensive training for five and a half months, I was simply shot out of the gun. Then through a combination of accident and circumstance, I became the commercial-economic officer on the island.

F: Did you prefer to go into the Greek end of the diplomatic life?

T: No, I was assigned there rather randomly, and the language training was tacked on afterwards.

F: You didn't have a background degree?

T: No, none.

F: Where had you gone to school?

T: CCNY in New York. Got a bachelor's there in Modern American History, Modern European History.

F: Well, you got in on some modern history.

T: Yes.

F: So, you showed up there, then, in a commercial--

T: Economic business, right. But, as you can imagine, on an island like Cyprus where our economic national interests aren't substantially engaged, the interest of the economic section of the embassy is strictly in the political impact of the local economics, on the dynamics of the intercommunal situation. That is: to what extent are the Turks falling behind economically; to what extent will this be a continuing source of future friction and problems and this kind of thing; to what extent are the Greeks assuming a policy of economic domination over the Turkish Cypriots; what economic indications are there that the mainland Turkish government is supporting the Turkish Cypriot community in Cyprus, which would be an indication that it has a proprietary interest in maintaining it? These kinds of things.

So it was strictly kind of a political-economic analysis that we were asked to make on a continuing basis.

F: How big a legation did you have there?

T: In terms of substantive officers, it was rather small. We had an ambassador, a deputy chief of mission, a political officer, an economic officer, a consular officer.

F: Am I right in remembering that we had a chargé when you went there or did that come after?

T: No. No. As a matter of fact, we had ambassadors throughout.

F: You did.

T: We really didn't skip a heartbeat, except for a few days. When I arrived, Taylor Garrison Belcher was ambassador. He left in the

summer of 1969, replaced some three days after his departure by David H. Popper.

F: So Belcher was there through the whole problem.

T: Correct. He's now in Lima, Peru.

F: Could you see it building when you got there?

T: Quite definitely. The indications were there. We had a series of rather serious incidents throughout the spring and summer of 1967, more serious than previous incidents. And each of them contained the possibility of the kind of large scale military confrontation that eventually led to the big crisis in November-December, 1967.

F: But briefly, the island is roughly two-thirds Greek, one-third Turkish.

T: It's an eighty-twenty split.

F: Eighty-twenty?

T: Yes.

F: Heavy on the Greek.

T: Heavy on the Greek side, right.

F: Was this mainly a matter of the expulsion of the Turks?

T: Well, in analyzing the crisis itself, the specifics of the November-December 1967 thing, I think the complexities of the specifics are not as important as how people subsequently reacted to them. There was a little bit of right on both sides.

Probably, in principle, the Greeks were right. The Turks had closed a road that had previously been open to government officers, police force, et cetera. And they were determined to go back in and open it up. When the Turks dragged their heels on agreeing to the

reopening of the road, General George Grivas--who was in charge of the Greek Cypriot National Guard, which is officered by a mainland Greek officer cadre and some eight thousand mainland Greek troops, and wholly Greek constituted units--took it upon himself to open it up through the use of preponderant military force. He over-reacted. They bombarded a small Turkish village with heavy artillery, and they went in and killed some people, looted the place.

F: As part of the ambassadorial community, were you free to go anywhere you wanted to?

T: Oh, yes.

F: There wasn't any problem, then, of getting around the island?

T: No, not for diplomats or foreign citizens. We had complete freedom of movement.

F: But the ordinary Cypriot were sort of compounded to a certain extent?

T: Right, the Turks have certain areas that are under their de facto control and they're barricaded off, protected by their own military force, resistance organization, as well as their own police. So the island is, in fact, partitioned.

F: Do the Cypriots consider themselves Cypriots, or do they consider themselves Greeks and Turks?

T: This is one of the basic problems. The identity is with the mainland, with the respective mainland powers. They think of themselves as either Greeks or Turks.

F: So as Turks, you can't appeal to the Cypriot pride in the sense that--

T: No, that's something that simply doesn't exist. It doesn't exist

in a form that's operative on the island. And that's the real problem, probably, in the long term: how to build the Cypriot mentality and how to build the Cypriot nationality under this aggravated multinational dispute.

F: Is Archbishop Makarios primarily a Greek or a Cypriot?

T: Well, here's the problem, of course. When you deal with the Archbishop, he personally, we always have suspected would prefer, for example, continued independence to union with Greece--which had been at one time the acceptable Hellenic goal--for his own interest. He wanted to, and we think he continues to want to be the president of the independent republic, of a full UN member state. So we think his interest is in maintaining the island's independence, but asserting his authority over the entire island, that is, breaking down the de facto partition and becoming president of all Cyprus.

F: Is he a theocrat, or primarily a political person?

T: I think he's primarily a political person. He wears three hats. He's the archbishop of the autocephalous Greek Cypriot Orthodox Church. He is the ethnarch of the Greek Cypriot community in Cyprus.

F: What is that?

T: That's a hangover from the Turkish melette system during those years when Cyprus was under the domination of mainland Turkey. They had a melette system under which ethnarchs ruled the subject populations in the name of the sultan or whomever it was. And, of course, his third hat is president of the republic.

F: Yes.

T: But you can be assured that he spent 90 per cent of his time being president of the republic.

F: Is there a quota system of so many Turks and so many Greeks within the Congress?

T: Yes, they have a House of Representatives that's a fifty member unicameral house, which under the Constitution of 1960 is divided thirty-five/fifteen. Thirty-five Greek Cypriots, fifteen Turk Cypriots. However, since the serious troubles of 1963, the Turks--the Turkish Cypriot officials and parliamentarians--have been boycotting the government because they consider it to be illegal. So the House sits only with its Greek members.

F: Well, just to get it on the record and then I'm going to let you take your head on this, and both take it in American fashion and also analytically, as you feel comfortable in it.

We've got a problem about our bilateral arrangements with Turkey. You correct me if I'm wrong on these factors. We've got a problem with Greek coups coming in the midst of this, which makes for concern back home about showing up a Greek military government. We've got the problem that NATO is vitally interested and the problem of course that the UN has a stake in it. So then the United States is coming in as a mediator.

T: Right. I think this is what makes the problem so damned challenging.

It's a small island with a big problem and a lot of strings. It's very complex. As you say, there are all kinds of interests that have to be dealt with.

Maybe what I should do, in terms of the Johnson years, is to focus on the Vance Mission, because this was the only point at which the President stepped in, in a very direct fashion, into the handling of the Cyprus dispute and our policy there. Maybe it would be best to go through it narratively, very briefly, and then make some analytical remarks on why we were successful.

F: Good.

T: After the crisis broke in November-December, 1967, Turkey built up a head of steam, inflamed public opinion was urging them on. They built up an invasion force on the southern coast of Turkey. They flew daylight jet missions over Cyprus that were demonstration flights.

F: Yes.

T: No strafing or bombing, but it's perfectly apparent when they're fifty feet overhead that the Turkish air force was there. The situation became critical almost immediately. In the Department of State, we realized that, after a few days, we had expended our ambassador. His resources in diplomatic capital had already been blown; we needed a big gun. Andat this point Luke Battle and John Walsh, who was the executive secretary of the department at the time--

F: Is that W-A-L-S-H?

T: W-A-L-S-H. He's now the ambassador to Kuwait. They got together a

list of names and brought them up to Dean Rusk. At the top of our list was Cyrus Vance, and he immediately agreed. He said, yes, Vance should be the man. It was sent to the White House. President Johnson also approved immediately. He said, "I want Vance." Within five hours, he was aboard an air force jet on his way to Cyprus.

F: Ambassador Belcher didn't feel, in effect, that he was being superseded? This was just calling in a bigger gun.

T: Correct. It was our assessment, in the field also, that we needed help, and there was no personal jealousy involved.

F: Really, you weren't dealing with Cyprus where the ambassador would have been sort of the man on the scene, you were dealing with Turkey and Greece . . .

T: Precisely.

F: . . . which gives you a different level.

T: Exactly. We needed help, and we knew it. And we needed someone who would carry with himself, personally, the support of the President of the United States. Vance did this very well. And then, through this long period of shuttlecock diplomacy among the three capitals of Ankara, Athens, and Nicosia, Cyrus Vance, beginning with a very wide and flexible mandate, undertook to offer good offices only to talk to people; inform each of the respective positions; urge flexibility, restraint, this kind of business. It became apparent after about a week of this that we had to convert to a mediation role; accept a much more active position in terms of offering solutions that we thought would be appropriate and acceptable. And it

worked. The specifics aren't important. It was an enormously delicate job. We were surviving by our wits in many cases and by the rapidity with which we communicated with each other; and by the rapidity with which Vance could get from capital to capital.

F: To your knowledge, how close did the Turks come to giving the invasion order?

T: That's something that's really impossible for us to determine.

F: You never [knew]?

T: I think they probably were within a couple of days of it, at several points.

F: But you did definitely feel that it was imminent, that it could happen?

T: Oh, yes. We thought that the threat was credible. And actually, under those circumstances, that would have been the only reasonable assumption to make. We could not, at that point, take the chance that they were bluffing. Our interests were sufficiently engaged on the southeastern flank of NATO that we couldn't gamble, and we moved ahead on that assumption. I think it was correct. I think they were within days of doing something. It could have been punitive bombing, raid, invasion, what have you. There are several levels of response.

At any rate, the Vance Mission succeeded. The specifics of the agreement that he worked out included, really, two basic ingredients. One was that the mainland Greek government would agree to withdraw General Grivas and the eight thousand mainland

Greek troops who were stationed on Cyprus; in return for which, the government of Turkey would scale down its invasion preparations and step down from a war posture. The agreement worked. The troops were evacuated in an orderly fashion, supervised by the UN, and Turkey did eventually step down.

Now, for the analysis which is much more important, I think: What made the Vance Mission a success? Look around. One of the very basic ingredients is the fact that the three governments that were concerned had a sufficient respect for the United States and the President of the United States to step back and wait to see what Vance would do; to accept him, to accept him as somebody who was intervening in good faith to try to resolve the dispute. He wasn't suspected of harboring any plan of his own that would be in our specific interest.

F: There wasn't any feeling, really, that, except as peace is self-serving that the United States was being selfish or seeking in this?

T: Well, I think those who were more politically aware would have said, "The reason we don't suspect Vance is that we have common interest in this." The United States' interest, obviously, is in preventing a Greco-Turkish War carried out with NATO arms or stamped "manufactured in the USA." And our interest is to prevent Greco-Turkish War, too, and that would go for the people sitting in Ankara, Athens, and Nicosia.

F: Did you get the feeling that the people sitting in Ankara and Athens that had jockeyed themselves in a position of no-retreat

rather welcomed someone to show them a face-saving way out?

T: Yes, we did have that feeling. We felt that they got themselves involved in a kind of inexorable, escalatory process, and that they welcomed someone coming out who would offer them the excuse to stop for a minute, take stock, to look at what was going on. From the viewpoint of the Department of State, I think . . . Well, let's go on with the analysis of the governments themselves. I think one of the real factors that contributed to the resolution of this thing was the fact that there was a junta in power in Athens. Juntas aren't very good, in a lot of respects, but they are very good at controlling public opinion as the press, the news media, keep the passions of the population under control, which parliamentary government in Greece had been shown very weak on. They're military men who understood fully the dire consequences of a war with Turkey. They could not have deluded themselves into thinking other than that they would be defeated in Western Thrace by the Turks. See, you had a very strong government that could operate with a lot of flexibility and not worry about criticism of it in the rear, and one that had a very direct military appreciation of the situation.

In Turkey, we also were very fortunate in having, at the time, a very strong government. The Demirel government and the Justice Party were in a very firm position. And we had two very good personalities involved; that is, Suleiman Demirel, himself the prime minister, and the foreign minister, Caglayangil, both of whom were committed to the long-range goal of Greco-Turkish rapprochement and friend-

ship. So there was a very strong government there.

The real problem was with Archbishop Makarios. This emerged during the latter phases of the Vance Mission, when we were sending Vance-grams around to each other saying things like, "We fashioned two legs of the stool, and we've got to nail this guy Makarios down." He proved to be a wily negotiator, stubborn and serene in the face of the threat of Turkish invasion. We eventually got him to go along, but he was dragged kicking and screaming. We had to hit him with an appeal from the Secretary General of the UN, to which the Greeks and the Turks immediately responded in an affirmative fashion. His hand was forced; he couldn't do anything but respond in kind. So that's the analysis of the three governments.

Now, from a bureaucratic standpoint, when you look at the mission, one of the very good things about it was the broadness of the mandate that Vance himself had from the President; and that was to do whatever you can to bring about peace. There were no limitations set on what he could do. In other words, nobody said to him, "Go out there and urge restraint, but don't get involved, don't interject yourself between people, don't become activist." He had a broad range of options available at any one time.

F: He didn't have to cable the White House every time he went across the hall to talk to somebody else?

T: No. He was reporting frequently and receiving very little in the way of specific instructions. And here we get to another almost unique characteristic of the crisis. And that's that it was not managed from the White House; it was managed from the

Department of State. At the time of the Cyprus crisis, it was becoming apparent the British pound would be devalued, and some of the foreign affairs specialists in the White House were simply tied down. There was a time when we thought Rostow was becoming interested in Cyprus; but then his time was taken up with the pound crisis. So it never escalated out of the Department of State. It was handled by a task force that was under the control of Luke Battle, the assistant secretary of State and directly, in an operational sense, under the deputy assistant secretary, Stuart Rockwell, now our ambassador to Morocco. It was handled very well in this fashion, because it was a very small group, with very little press interest, that could operate with quick reaction and a lot of flexibility. We have some practice, you know, in crisis management in the department, and I think this is one of the cases where we were allowed to do our own thing. We did it very well. It worked out.

F: Was there a feeling in your group that this was a kind of a classic confirmation of what had long been maintained in the State Department; that is, if they'll give us enough leeway, we know the local situation and can handle it?

T: Well, yes. But I certainly wouldn't want to make the implication that somebody else could not have done it. It's perfectly reasonable to me that some of the very bright people in the White House could have handled this. We did, and we succeeded.

F: The Russians didn't choose to wade in these waters particularly,

did they?

T: Very little.

F: Just wasn't any profit to them, in getting something?

T: I think they felt that the situation was too volatile. The Soviet Union is, after all, a status quo power right now, and I don't think that they want to get involved in this buzz-saw operation. If they urged the Turks on to an invasion, some radical alteration of the balance in the Eastern Mediterranian might have emerged that would have been against their interest. For example, Cyprus could have been partitioned, simply split it up between Greece and Turkey, which would, in effect, NATOize the island. It no longer would be an independent republic where they have a very strong Communist party. They have some influence on Makarios, and there was no direct NATO link. If Turkey simply occupied the island and took over the administration of the island, it would also have been NATOized; and they saw all of these presumably radical solutions to the Cyprus problem emerging from the military situation. So they, in effect, backed off. We had some indication that the Russians may have tried to play some games with Makarios in terms of urging him on a little bit, egging him on; but it was very low-level stuff and certainly not enough to make a case that they were stirring up the waters.

F: Is Cyprus a good listening post for the Mid-East troubles? (Laughter) It creates its own problems; that's sufficient.

T: I'm not clear what you mean by a listening post.

F: Well, you've got the Israelis not too far away; you've got the Egyptians not too far away; you've got that whole Mid-Eastern set-up there.

T: It's not really. It's an insular problem. The Cypriots are thrown back on themselves. We in the embassy used to accuse all of the Cypriots of having a disease called omphalomania, which is a neurotic obsession with one's navel.

F: You may have to spell that. (Laughter)

T: (Laughter) It's Greek! O-M-P-H-A-L-O-M-A-N-I-A. You know, they tend to simply observe their own navel.

F: Did the fact that earlier in the year you'd been through this Six Day War, the fact that you'd had the bombing of the Liberty, play any part at all in our behavior?

T: I would say that it did not. It's that kind of an isolated problem.

F: This is its own package.

T: Yes, it is. It's rather unique. And it's not directly connected to the Middle East. Its lines of connection are up to Greece and Turkey and to the West.

F: Was the removal of the Greek troops a very sticky point to get over to the Greeks?

T: Yes, it was, because it certainly appeared on the surface as though they were backing down in the face of Turkish pressure. This disturbs the Greek philotimo and pride.

F: I'm sure the old democratic government couldn't have done it.

T: They probably could not. Right. And this is why I say we were

fortunate that there was a junta in power at the time. They could control that kind of reaction.

F: Did you have any problem with Greek Cypriots getting weapons from the Czech and other Soviet bloc countries?

T: Yes, there was an incident prior to my arrival--and I believe it was either in January or February, 1967--in which the Greek Cypriot National Guard purchased Czechoslovakian weapons. The Turkish Cypriots reacted strongly, as did the mainland government of Turkey, and with such forcefulness that they forced the Greek Cypriots to put these arms under UN control. We should mention, I think at this point, that there is a UN force in Cyprus, a peacekeeping force, an eight nation multinational contingent.

F: We're always a little tender about each other's sovereignty. Was there any problem at all between NATO, the UN, and the US in this mediation role? U Thant sent a personal representative.

T: Yes, he did.

F: And NATO had Brosio.

T: Brosio, Manlio Brosio, was out in the area; as was Rolz-Bennet, Jose Rolz-Bennet. I think they helped. And there was, to my knowledge, no significant grating of interests among the three mediators. But it became perfectly apparent that the only one who had sufficient political wallop to get the job done, where it had to be done, in Ankara and in Athens, was an emissary from the President of the United States.

F: Am I right in thinking that our legation in Athens was not at top

strength at this time?

T: I wasn't there. So I couldn't say. I did not get that impression from the Nicosia end. Phillips Talbot was the ambassador, and he was there at the time. He was on board and working very hard on the problem. And of course, Pete Hart was in Ankara.

F: Did both Turks and Greeks, in their sort of preliminary sorties of nonaggressive flap, did they indicate they were doing this as part of NATO training, or did they excuse themselves in this, or were they actually quite candid on the fact that they were overseeing their interests in the island?

T: To my knowledge, the Turks didn't make any statements about their overflights of Cyprus. It's perfectly apparent that these were designed to impress on not only Archbishop Makarios, but the Greek Cypriots, that Turkish mainland military might was immediately available right there.

F: Was Andreas Papandreou mixed up in this?

T: No. Thank God. He wasn't. The Junta had the situation domestically under very good control.

F: Did the fact that you had this new Junta maybe reduce tempers a little bit of the Greeks somewhat? Make them a little less certain of the rightness, that is, their rightness in the forefront?

T: Yes. I think there was certainly a feeling after the coup, that Greek Cypriots could no longer identify with the government of Athens the way they did in the past. They felt themselves to be quite superior in being an outpost of democracy in the Hellenic

world. So there was some reduction of the intimacy with which the two governments interacted. Yes.

F: Any difficulty in getting the Archbishop to accept the Vance Mission?

T: Oh, yes. He had serious problems. There was a time--

F: Was Belcher the go-between in this case?

T: He had a very close personal relationship with the Archbishop, and I think he continued to play a key role on Cyprus in spite of the fact that Vance was there. They worked very well together, Vance relying on Belcher's expertise and entree with the Archbishop.

F: They could talk to each other then?

T: Yes. And Belcher relying on Vance's immediate knowledge of what was going on in the other capitals and the fact that he was carrying the aura of the President.

F: Right.

T: But we had serious problems with Makarios. And I think, here, we get into a problem that becomes a little delicate as far as public release is concerned. But what happened specifically, at the end, was that we had an agreement nailed down in Athens and Ankara, and we could not get the Archbishop to go along with it. At this point, we simply told him that we had a very important message coming from Washington, and we asked him not to do anything or make any statements until this message arrived and we could deliver it. This is a fiction. There was no such message.

What we wanted to do was buy some time to get to U Thant, to make it clear to him that if he did not issue an appeal immediately,

based on the agreement worked out in Athens and Ankara, that there could very well be a war out there. We got him out of bed in New York at eight o'clock in the morning; explained the situation to him. This was Pedersen who was at the UN at the time, and Goldberg. And he agreed, issued the appeal, and as I say, was immediately responded to by Athens and Ankara. The Archbishop was forced, then, to respond in kind. He could not put himself in the position of torpedoing an agreement worked out by Athens and Ankara that had the support of the UN Secretary General. So Makarios responded affirmatively, and it was over at that point.

F: He was totally rational enough to see that he could isolate himself?

T: Yes. Yes.

F: What did this do to your work?

T: Well, when you get into a crisis situation, and you have someone like Vance running around, there's an escalation that goes on. And I was standing duty watches and watching for important telegrams; and at some times simply being a messenger boy running up to the palace with cables.

F: Everybody was now on twenty-four hour call.

T: Oh, yes. We were sleeping in the embassy and none of us got very much sleep for a couple of weeks. It was a hectic time.

F: Did you ever consider evacuation?

T: We did evacuate American dependent wives and children and any U.S. citizens that wanted to go. We sent them out to Beirut, and they stayed there for about three weeks.

F: Did we send in any military observers?

T: No, we did not. No.

F: We proceeded as if we had faith that this was going to work out?

T: We did not see a military role for the United States in this situation. It would have been destructive of our ability to control the situation, if we had introduced military force of our own.

F: The last thing you wanted were a few in uniform around?

T: Right, yes. Especially on Cyprus, at ground zero, where the problem arose and where it would ultimately have to be resolved. If we had troops on that island, it would have been impossible for us to maintain leverage over the Archbishop.

F: There was some feeling that Makarios was cozying up to the Reds to strengthen his position. Did you see any indication of that?

T: Well, yes, I think it's true. I think he does it to us, too. After all, Cyprus has officially a nonaligned foreign policy, and he would like to get the support of any strong government for the continued independence of Cyprus. And that means support against any Turkish threat, support for his negotiating position against the Turkish Cypriots.

Our position, now, is to support the independence of Cyprus. We've said it openly at the U.N. Security Council session that just renewed the U.N. peacekeeping forces mandate. The Soviets do this, and they gain some capital from it. I think it's logical, in terms of Makarios' own assessment of the situation, to keep the Soviet Union on the line.

F: Yes.

T: Yes.

F: This is predicting, which is always dangerous in a sensitive [inaudible], but I think with your expertise in the field, did you have a feeling when the crisis was over, and have you had the feeling since that this agreement would hold up for a reasonable length of time?

T: Yes, I did.

F: This wasn't just a year's stopgap, necessarily? This had the looks of something that would work and endure?

T: Well, in terms of the Vance Mission itself, I should make it clear that the mandate did not include seeking a solution to the Cyprus problem. It was merely to prevent a war and that's all. But the crisis had a sobering influence on the parties. I think they realized they came very close, and they drew back from that. I think it convinced Archbishop Makarios that he could not beat the Turkish Cypriots into submission.

F: Took twenty-one decades, now, to . . .

T: Right. He finally learned that he could not do this without calling down the wrath of Ankara on his head. So after the crisis, we had a lot of objective evidence that suggested that things were getting much better. Makarios began to kill the Turks with kindness. [He] took down all of the Greek barricades; offered freedom of movement throughout the island to Turkish Cypriots; removed economic restrictions on the Turkish enclaves. Intercommunal negotiations were initiated in June of 1968; local talks, that are now going on on

the island. There has been, since November-December, 1967, no serious intercommunal incident, not one shot fired in anger that I can recall. So the situation has improved significantly as a result of this.

F: Were you there long enough to see any more sort of intermixture in communication of the Greek and the Turk on the island, so that they were developing a certain oneness?

T: Yes. I think there was, especially in 1968, some significant progress in terms of intercommunal tissue mending, normalization of relations. Turks began to work in the Greek sector and move about more freely. Some government schemes began to include the Turkish Cypriots again. But this has, unfortunately, kind of ground to a halt recently, and we haven't seen very much progress. My assessment would be that, in the overall picture, the amount of normalization that took place since the crisis has not been significant.

F: Do you get the feeling that neither Turkey nor Greece has any really aggressive designs on Cyprus except that they want to protect their nationals?

T: I do get that impression. Yes. Both governments are very strong in their official support of the local talks as the best procedure for settling the dispute. The local talks are based on a very simple trade-off: Greek Cypriots give up enosis, union with Greece, as a policy objective; the Turk Cypriots give up partition as a policy objective; and they move forward on the basis of independence, try to design a constitutional structure

that will allow this multinational state to operate.

F: You may get something viable out of that yet.

T: We're not very hopeful. They've been dragging on for some time. But it's good that they're just going on. It's kind of an institutional safety valve.

F: Did you come home as a part of regular rotation, or had there been a general relieving of the personnel there, in a sense?

T: Well, we had some personnel reductions as part of the government-wide reductions. But I came back on a normal rotation, and I am now still doing Cyprus.

F: Oh, you are?

T: Sure.

F: Were you involved, in the American Embassy, or Archbishop Makarios, in the apprehension as a result of this Greek coup?

T: We, as an embassy, immediately after the Greek coup, were watching the situation closely. Although we did not feel that there was a serious or immediate threat that the coup would be extended to Cyprus. However, Archbishop Makarios did feel threatened and he felt threatened for quite a length of time after the coup, that Papadapolous and the rest of the colonels would extend the coup on a realistic basis.

F: You mean he thought they might come right into Cyprus itself?

T: Well, they didn't have to come in because they had eight thousand troops there.

F: The troops were there, and some colonel might proclaim in the name of the Greek troops.

T: Yes. Particularly, because right after the coup there was a lot of left-liberal and communist agitation against the Junta. The Committee for the Restoration of Democracy in Greece was doing this.

F: You mean on Cyprus?

T: Yes. Most of the daily newspapers, the nationalist newspapers, were very strongly criticizing the government of Greece. And there could have been at least some basis for some paranoid concern that these volatile fire-eaters in Athens might just take it on themselves to end all this. As a matter of fact, there was one point, specifically, where we felt the tension, and that was during the May Day celebrations. The coup took place on April 21. On May Day, of course, all the labor organizations--and most of them were communist controlled in Cyprus--were supposed to be out on the streets. And it was quite apparent that they were going to get out on the streets and protest against the coup, against the absence of democratic norms in Athens. We thought there was a possibility, at that time, that the Greek forces on the island might do something to stop all this. They didn't. The government of Cyprus was very adept at controlling it themselves, and keeping the lid on. So, as I say, it took awhile for Makarios to shed the fear that these eight thousand troops might not do something to the sovereignty of the island.

F: Thank you, Mr. Torp. Mr. Torp's address is Department of State,

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[End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview I]

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In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Kenneth Torp of Washington, D.C. do hereby give, donate, and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title, and interest in the tape recording and transcript of the personal interview conducted on June 23 1970 in Austin, Texas and prepared for deposit in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions:

(1) The transcript shall be available for use by researchers as soon as it has been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

(2) The tape recording shall be available to those researchers who have access to the transcript.

(3) I hereby assign to the United States Government all copyright I may have in the interview transcript and tape.

(4) Copies of the transcript and the tape recording may be provided by the Library to researchers upon request.

(5) Copies of the transcript and tape recording may be deposited in or loaned to institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

Kenneth Torp
Donor

July 26, 1978
Date

Archivist of the United States

July 17, 1980
Date