

INTERVIEWEE: PAUL C. WARNKE (TAPE #1)

INTERVIEWER: DOROTHY PIERCE

January 8, 1969

P: This interview is with Paul C. Warnke, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Today is Wednesday, January 8, 1969. It's three-thirty in the afternoon. We are in Mr. Warnke's office in the Pentagon, and this is Dorothy Pierce.

Mr. Warnke, I would like to begin our interview with brief background information on you that I've gone into and see if I have got the correct information. You were nominated and confirmed as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security in June of 1967.

W: That is correct.

P: Your first government appointment had been just eight months earlier in September 1966 as General Counsel to the Department of Defense.

W: That's also correct.

P: And prior to that you were an associate and partner in a Washington, D.C., law firm.

W: Yes.

P: And since 1948. And I do have all correct information so far?

W: Yes, you do.

P: Mr. Warnke, your predecessor in this office, Mr. John MacNaughton, also served as General Counsel of Defense. Is there any relationship here with these positions, or reasoning, that the two of you have had a similar background?

W: I would say that the only comparison is the fact that Bob McNamara had the feeling that the General Counsel's spot was a good spot into which to introduce new people into the Department of Defense. His concept of the General Counsel's office was as a sort of a utility infielder; that you could utilize somebody who had been legally trained in a variety of sort of special missions. How, in addition to that of course, the Deputy General Counsel, Leonard Niederlehner, has been around the Department of Defense for many, many years. As a consequence, the general law work of the Pentagon is very competently handled, which leaves the General Counsel free to undertake special tasks for the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

So, as a consequence, Bob McNamara first brought Cy Vance in as General Counsel, then after a period made him Secretary of the Army, and then eventually Deputy Secretary of Defense. In John MacNaughton's days, John was made General Counsel after having served, I believe, in Arms Control. And then he moved John to this job, and then had moved him to the Secretary of the Navy job before he was killed.

P: Mr. Warnke, who brought you in originally?

W: Actually, I think it was more Cy Vance's idea than anybody else's. I had known Cy and, of course, Cy himself was a lawyer. The principal reason was that he and Bob McNamara anticipated that Senator McClellan was going to hold an extensive hearing on the F-111; so I was brought in to defend the F-111 program. As a matter of fact, those hearings were never held, or at least they have not been held as yet.

P: That may happen soon. What made you decide to come to work for the government?

W: I'd say a couple of reasons. First of all, I practiced law in Washington for about eighteen years. I think I probably would have taken on a government assignment prior to that time if it hadn't been for the vast wasteland of the Eisenhower years. That came at about the time when I would have been eligible for a more junior position. Then when Kennedy came in in 1960 I was quite available, but nobody ever offered me the kind of a job that I wanted. I was particularly interested in going with the Department of Defense because I had met McNamara, knew Cy, and was very impressed with the caliber of the people here and the nature of the problems. My specific interest was in the field of national security, and this struck me as being an ideal opportunity.

P: As a lawyer, did you find government work a different type of discipline or requiring different techniques?

W: I would not say so. You have to first of all understand something about the nature of a Washington law practice. It's not like the law practice in New York City or in any other part of the world. You're dealing very basically with sort of the interrelationship between big American business and the United States government so that an awful lot of your contacts are government contacts. Not only that, but you get used to working the long hours in a Washington law practice that you find that you work in the United States government.

As far as the techniques are concerned, it seems to me--and this is terribly parochial on my part--that a lawyer's training really puts you in a good position to cope with governmental problems on a policy basis. In other words, your job as a lawyer is to take a look at an overall situation, try and isolate the salient facts, and then come to the best

possible conclusion, or the best possible recommendation for your client. So, essentially, it seemed to me that what I was doing was changing clients, rather than changing techniques.

The big change however, apart from the change in client, was the nature of the problem. Your approach to the problem was the same. The only difference, and a very cardinal difference, was that the problem made an awful lot more difference. It was a problem of infinitely greater significance, so that it made the challenge greater and, also, the attractions greater.

P: You've somewhat answered this for me already, but do you find the demands of public service distinguish themselves from private practice in any other ways than what we've covered?

W: Yes. I'd say that one other way is that you can approach them with a greater degree of objectivity because of the fact that you're trying to represent the national interest. If you're dealing with a problem of a client, you know in advance where it is that you want to come out. Then it's the question of trying to do the best possible job of advocacy in order to promote your client's obvious selfish interests.

Now if you're dealing, instead of that, with a problem in the field of national security, it's more important that you endeavor to be objective, at least until you reach the point at which your superior has come to his conclusions. At that point it again turns into an advocate's role because then you do the best possible job you can of marshaling the facts to support the conclusion.

P: Are you in effect saying that there's room for greater development of idealism in the government?

W: Oh, of course there is--obviously so. I think that's one of the great lures of government service. I've had a great number of friends over the period of my years in Washington who have found it impossible to leave government service even though they could make infinitely more money practicing law on the outside, just because of the fact that they had the appeal and the infinite attraction of working for what they regarded as being the best interest of the United States rather than the inevitably selfish interest of a large corporate client.

P: Of course, power is rather attractive.

W: Yes, but power in the United States Government is sufficiently centralized in the President, and in his Cabinet advisers, so that you don't have that illusion of omnipotence yourself. You have a certain amount of authority, but as far as power is concerned, your only real power is the power to recommend, and hence the influence. You have that degree of power on the outside. It's just that the affairs you're influencing are of a far smaller magnitude.

P: Mr. Warnke, you've already mentioned that in coming on as General Counsel you believed you were going to work at the beginning on the F-111 series. Would you give me your views on how this case developed?

W: On how the case developed? Well, if you look at it as a case, I think you would have to say that it originated in a personality conflict. The entire matter since the initiation of the contract award developed because of the fact that there was a clash of personality between two very strong and two very stubborn men. That was Secretary McNamara on the one hand, and Senator McClelland on the other. Apart from that, it's hard to distinguish that contract, except in size, from any of the awards

that take place. Anytime you make a decision on a major weapons system there are, quite clearly, competing contestant to whom it makes a great deal of difference whether or not they get the award. There aren't that many big weapons systems contracts open at any one time.

In this instance you had two competitors, both of whom had come up with what appeared to me to have been quite comparable proposals. A decision was made to give the award to General Dynamics. At that point Senator McClellan, I think largely at the instigation of Senator Jackson, asked that the award be held up. Bob McNamara figured that it was his position to determine who should get the award. The determination had been made and he wasn't going to let the Legislative Branch interfere with the prerogatives of the Executive Branch. As a consequence Senator McClellan's nose got very far out of joint, and has remained so, and I think the pain has increased over the years.

P: Did you have any views as a lawyer before you came to Defense on the developments as they had been so far because, of course, all of this was back in '62, I believe--'61.

W: On the F-111 contract?

P: Yes.

W: I had never had any acquaintance with the facts at all, so that I had no views except for my instinctive bias that Secretary McNamara was probably correct.

P: Did you actively play any role in reviewing the contracts and the--?

W: Yes, I did. A good bit of my time during my first months in the Department was devoted to trying to deal with the investigation. And in that connection, of course, it was necessary to review the documents; to talk

to the people who participated at that time; and to try and form some sort of opinion of what the issues would be in this hearing, which as yet has not been held. So that I became quite familiar with the background.

Then, in addition to that, as you probably know, Secretary McNamara had set up what was initially a weekly review meeting with the contractors. That was with General Dynamics, who was responsible for the airframe, and Pratt and Whitney, who were responsible for the engine. Now the purpose of those was not to deal with the McClellan investigation, but to solve some of the highly complex technological problems that are inherent in the development of a weapons systems of this complexity.

P: You spoke of sort of isolating the issues involved here. What did you see them as--the major ones?

W: First of all, you've got to sort them into the objective ones and the subjective ones. I've referred to the subjective ones. The subjective one was a clash in strong personalities.

The objective ones were, I would suppose, basically three in number. The first one was whether there had been any impropriety with respect to the award itself. In other words, had procedures been subverted in order to come to a preordained conclusion. It was pretty obvious to me that there had been no abuse of the procedural techniques employed.

A second issue was whether the entire project was a bad idea in terms of do-ability. In other words, the concept was one of commonality. That here you have the Air Force with one particular requirement- the Navy with another requirement- and the conclusion made that whichever of these two proposals--by Boeing and by General Dynamics--was accepted, each one of them was to be evaluated in terms of whether or not you did

have a common airplane. The real key technological issue was should you have endeavored to arrive at a common airplane for the two missions: one Air Force and one Navy mission.

And then the third issue, as I saw it, was the competence and efficiency with which the contract had been carried out by the contractor under government management. But those were the basic issues.

P: What was your view on the practicality of a common plane for these two services?

W: I never arrived at any really satisfactory conclusion because I was never sure that the missions which were contemplated by the two services had been adequately defined. In other words, if you look at it in the abstract, there is no reason why you should not have a common airplane for certain missions where the objectives are reconcilable. In this instance, viewed in the abstract, the two missions were reconcilable. Both services wanted a plane which would be capable of flying very fast, flying very high, also flying very low at supersonic speeds, and with an appreciable range and loiter time. Therefore, there were as far as I could see, sufficient elements of similarity in the original concepts, so that you could aim at a single airplane.

After all, we do have instances of commonality at the present time. You have the F-4 which is utilized very extensively both by the Air Force and by the Navy. Accordingly you do have already a prototype of a plane which can be both land-based and carrier-based.

But the question that still remains in my mind is whether you don't end up with a problem--when you start out trying to reconcile two missions--because the chances are very great that either or both missions will



be revised during the development process. And those revisions in mission may really frustrate your initial objective of arriving at a common airplane because the missions are no longer reconcilable. I think that that, to some extent, happened in this case.

P: There has been recent publicity that, in effect, this series has cost the American taxpayer a loss of about one billion dollars. Do you feel there's any validity in that?

W: No, I think there's no validity at all. I think it's also impossible to prove or to disprove--except in the sense that you cannot say that there has been a loss, because the loss is compared to what! It's sort of like a client of mine who told me one year that he lost five hundred thousand dollars. What he meant was that he made two million, five hundred thousand dollars, and he anticipated making three million; so he lost five hundred thousand dollars.

In this particular instance, what they are saying is that Bob McNamara initially said that by having a common airplane we could save one billion dollars. Now let's say, and these figures aren't exact--maybe not even approximate--let's say that the contract had cost us to date two billion dollars more than you initially anticipated. Well, then you could I think by wholly flagistic reasoning come to the conclusion that your total loss had been one billion dollars, or three billion dollars, or you name it. It's just sort of playing with numbers.

P: Did you feel any pressure from any area regarding your assessment of this contract award of the program?

W: None whatsoever.

P: Just a general question. Were there some major legal problems that you

faced during your appointment as General Counsel to the Defense Department that come to mind?

W: Yes. We had a variety of what I regarded as being quite interesting legal problems. One of them has not as yet been satisfactorily resolved. That has to do with the issue as to how you treat contractor personnel, or, let's say, merchant seamen who are caught engaged in illegal activity in Viet Nam.

As you probably know, there are two sections of the Uniform Code of Military Justice which initially gave court martial jurisdiction over civilians under some circumstances. One was held to be unconstitutional, because it provided that in peace time people, such as dependents of members of the Armed Forces stationed overseas, could be tried by court martial. In a couple of instances there were service wives who would decide that they would do in their husbands on foreign soil, and the Supreme Court held that the court martial jurisdiction was not applicable under those circumstances.

There's another provision that states that in time of war court martial jurisdiction exists over civilians who are accompanying an Armed Force into the field. Now, in Viet Nam, You've got a situation in which you have a number of American civilians who are in fact accompanying an armed force in the field. You have the Merchant Seamen. You've got in addition to that the contractor personnel who make--may be working on building something like an Air Force base. In some instances regrettably they engage in black market activities; sometimes they beat up on one another; sometimes they murder one another. The Vietnamese see no particular reason why they should try and prosecute an American who has

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committed a crime against the United States Government or against another American, so that you're faced with the question that whether under those circumstances you should exercise court martial jurisdiction.

There has been a difference of opinion between the State Department and the Department of Defense on this issue. I felt as General Counsel, and still feel, that there is no more reason why you should shrink from bringing court martial proceedings against the civilian contractor personnel employee who is engaged in black market activities in Viet Nam than you should about bringing court martial proceedings against somebody who is an involuntary member of the Armed Forces. As a matter of fact, you could make the argument that morally there is more reason to take the position that the contractor employee has submitted himself to court martial jurisdiction. He's there on purpose. In many instances the nineteen or twenty-year old kid, who happens to be a member of the Armed Forces, is there very much against his will.

Then we did have a number of very interesting questions with respect to the law of the sea, which I think is much too technical for me to get into at the present time.

Another one that we did have that I thought was a very interesting problem had to do with whether you could declare segregated housing near Army bases, or Air Force bases, or Naval installations to be off-limits. Secretary McNamara wanted very much to insure that the colored serviceman did not encounter discriminatory treatment in endeavoring to find housing for himself and his family near a service base, so that over a period of time we developed a policy of requiring that real estate owners-- by that I mean people who owned apartments, trailer camps, anything of

a multiple housing nature--open up their facilities to all servicemen regardless of color, or else their particular facility would be declared off-limits. There was some considerable doubt, I think, in the minds of lots of people as to whether or not that was legal. In other words, could you tell one serviceman, "You may not rent from a particular proprietor because he discriminates against other servicemen because of their color." Also, which you might anticipate, Chairman Rivers and some of the other Southern legislators would not have been very enthusiastic about any such policy.

We decided that it had to be attempted because it was getting to be a very inflammatory issue. Not only that, we ran into a situation in which the State of Maryland, in connection with open housing legislation, called upon the Secretary of Defense to take action to insure that no discriminatory practices existed. We were able to point to this provision in the Maryland law as sort of the opening wedge, so that initially we evolved the policy of requiring that any housing near bases in Maryland be open to all service personnel or else be open to none.

As a matter of fact, since that time the policy has been made generally applicable and has been accepted, I think, with considerable cooperation of both the realtors and our service personnel.

P: Has it been challenged?

W: It has not. And of course now, it cannot be because of the Fair Housing provisions that have been enacted into law since then. We were a little ahead of the Fair Housing Legislation, but were able to use the Maryland precedent to make it applicable on a nationwide basis once the Fair Housing provisions went into effect.

P: Was your work as the General Counsel strictly legal, or in this position did you also get involved in policy matters?

W: As I've already indicated, Secretary McNamara did not visualize the General Counsel's job as being completely a legal position; so, as a consequence, I did get into policy matters of various types.

P: What are some of the major ones that come to your mind?

W: Well, for one thing I was in charge of a review of the tactical aircraft study that had been put together by a panel of the President's Scientific Advisory Council. Then, frequently, I was asked by Secretary McNamara to consider various problems that arose with respect to the Viet Nam war.

P: What were these at that time?

W: I think that the first one arose out of a series of articles that had been written by Harry Ashmore and Bill Baggs based on their visits to North Viet Nam and certain allegations that had been made either by them or by North Vietnamese to them with respect to the bombing of North Viet Nam. So I was asked to talk with Ashmore and Baggs, and then to find out what I could about the facts which had been reported either through or to them.

In some other instances, I was asked to review various memoranda that had been prepared, again in some instances dealing with the efficacy of the bombing; in some other instances dealing with other aspects of the military campaign in South Viet Nam.

P: What were your conclusions from your meetings with Mr. Ashmore and Mr. Baggs?

W: It was really impossible to come to any kind of a conclusion about which

you could have a real degree of confidence. I think it was very clear, and they admit it, that the North Vietnamese were reporting to them in a highly colored basis. But at the same time you had to concede the inevitability of some attacks on civilian targets in the course of any sort of a bombing campaign.

Typical, for example, was a charge with respect to a particular town, somewhat south of Hanoi. The North Vietnamese used that town as an illustration of an indiscriminate bombing attack that was designed to terrorize rather than to neutralize any sort of military facilities, or facilities that might have been more war supporting. Now I think that both Ashmore and Baggs, in all good faith, accepted that because, for one thing, some of the facilities that had previously been war supporting had been totally destroyed so that even their on-the-scene review did not put them in a position where they could assess the validity of the charge that was made by the North Vietnamese. But at the same time, it was very clear from some of the pictures that they had received and from some of their eye-witness accounts that some civilian targets had been attacked. Now, you never know whether that's inadvertence, or whether it's recklessness on the part of a particular pilot. People don't always behave terribly well under the pressures of war.

P: Mr. Warnke, on what occasions have you met with President Johnson, beginning with the first?

W: Let's see. I think the first occasion was back in 1950, and that was when he came by and shook hands with the people who were sitting at my table at a luncheon intended to raise funds for Senator Wayne Morse.

Third party: (This is Capt. Robert Pace, Military Asst. to the Asst. Secretary of Defense.)

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Did you want to interject the chairmanship of the Defense POW Policy Committee as a General Counsel, or pick it up later?

W: I don't think that I took over that as General Counsel, did I? I think that came afterwards. I think, Bob, that that was after I became Assistant Secretary for ISA, wasn't it?

B: (Indistinguishable)

W: You're right. I did become that as General Counsel. While I was General Counsel, I was asked to become chairman of the committee which had been established by Paul Nitze. That was the Department of Defense Prisoner of War Advisory Committee. That consisted of representatives of the various services--the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; Defense Intelligence Agency; Joint Chiefs of Staff. The objective was to coordinate all of the Department of Defense activities dealing with prisoners of war and to act as the point of liaison with the Department of State where Averell Harriman had primary responsibility as the President's representative on prisoner of war matters.

P: This is primarily, of course, concerned with Viet Nam?

W: Primarily concerned with Viet Nam. Also, of course, it concerned itself with the Pueblo crew, and with the occasional detainees in Cambodia; and also the pilots--I think there are three of them now, aren't there, Bob--who are being held by the Communist Chinese.

P: When was this appointment?

W: It was in the early summer of 1967.

P: Until when?

W: It's still continuing.

P: And are you still the General Counsel?

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W: I'm still the chairman of the committee, right.

P: I probably will come back to that. I do have some questions later on on the Pueblo, and we can draw on that. We were talking about occasions when you have met the President.

W: The occasions on which I have met President Johnson have been just about as intimate as that first one. I've had almost nothing to do with him directly. I think I sat in on possibly two meetings at which the President was present. I can't think of more than two, can you, Bob?

Bob: Of course, he recognized you when you came to OSD.

W: Yes, but my contact has always been with the President through the Secretary of Defense. I think I participated in one meeting on the question of whether or not to try and sell F-5's to Brazil and Peru in order to forestall their purchase of French Mirages.

I was an attendant at a meeting that the President held with respect to the Middle East crisis back in June of 1967, and I think one meeting in connection with the Pueblo. I think those are the only three meetings at which I've even been present when the President was in the chair.

P: Did you offer any information or conclusions, or were any opinions requested of you in these meetings?

W: On the Middle East one, no--I was there purely as an observer. In the case of the jets for South America, yes--I interjected a remark or two of monumental triviality.

P: What was your position?

W: That there wasn't a darned thing we could do about it. If they wanted to buy Mirages, they were going to buy Mirages, that we shouldn't get ourselves in a demeaning position by trying somehow to bribe them not to.

P: And the Pueblo meeting? Was that a recent--?



W: No, this was immediately after the seizure. I think, you and I, Bob,-- yes we were on our Far East trip at the time of the seizure. We were called back by the Secretary of Defense at the time of that crisis.

And there was a task force that was set up, wasn't there, Bob?

B: Yes, sir.

W: The task force was set up. I think that Sam Berger, who is now Deputy Ambassador in Saigon, was in charge of the task force. At some of the initial meetings the President was a participant; and I was there in one of them.

P: Were you a member of the task force?

W: Yes.

P: How many were on that task force?

W: I'd say that the regular members during the fairly brief period of time in which it was in existence were Ambassador Berger; Walt Rostow; Clark Clifford, who had been named to succeed McNamara but who had not yet taken over the job; McNamara; Rusk; and I think Max Taylor was in at some of the early meetings.

P: How long did you meet in this capacity?

W: I'd say for about a week, and after that period of time the task force--. The task force at really the Secretariat level then disbanded. This was just, you know, to determine what the immediate steps might be that the United States should take.

B: It was to collect the facts in chronology.

W: Yes.

B: It was a task group lower echelon.

W: But then the task group continued at the working level.

P: Did you participate in that?

W: No. I think that one of my deputies, Dick Steadman, participated at that point. Charlie Grosjean was in on it too, but I think that the one who went over and talked with Ambassador Brown, who succeeded Ambassador Berger as head of that task group, was Dick Steadman.

B: He participated as much as we participated through you to the Secretary.

W: That's right.

P: With whom do you deal primarily on the President's staff?

W: I would say more with Walt Rostow than with anybody else except on things like balance of payments problems in which I deal with Ed Fried. Occasionally with Bromley Smith, but usually more directly with Walt.

P: In your very few occasions--this is kind of a general question--of your associations with the President, do you have any impressions of him-- This is not meant to be a loaded question.

W: The finest President I have ever worked for.

P: Over the almost year-and-a-half now, two years-and-a-half--that you've worked in Defense, have you been on call; or what is your status in a crisis situation?

W: I've got a gray phone in my house, so I guess I'm on call.

B: He's on call twenty-four hours a day.

P: And when they develop, you come to the Pentagon?

W: Yes.

P: Stay here?

W: We're usually here anyway.

P: Do they develop during the day primarily? Has the President--Well, you've partially answered this--appointed you to any other committees or panels

or task forces outside of this one on the Pueblo crisis?

W: Yes. I was on a task force for the President when I was General Counsel that had to do with how you deal with labor disputes that affect the national security.

P: Participating from Defense angle?

W: Participating for the Department of Defense, yes.

P: Was this a very extensive panel, and was it for any Presidential messages?

W: It was called for a specific purpose in trying to determine whether there was a more efficient, more comprehensive way, of dealing with such things as steel strikes, railroad strikes, other types of strikes, that might have an immediate adverse impact on the security interests of the United States. We went through the usual changes on compulsory arbitration etc., and came to the conclusion that there is no good solution to dealing with human problems.

P: Have you ever traveled with Mr. Johnson?

W: Never.

P: Ever been asked to travel for him?

W: No. As I say, I've always worked for the Secretary of Defense, so that if I was traveling for the President, then it would be through the Secretary of Defense.

P: Do you travel much in your position? You did mention a Far East trip.

W: Not a great deal. I found it very difficult to leave town unless the Secretary leaves town, so that that has been primarily on NATO meetings and on a trip to Viet Nam with Bob McNamara back in July 1967, and one with Clark Clifford in July 1968. The other occasions have been NATO meetings

with the Secretary--in one instance with Paul Nitze. This was after Bob McNamara had accepted the appointment to the World Bank and before he had left. Then on one occasion I went, without the Secretary, to attend a Security Committee meeting with the Japanese. That was interrupted about half way through with McNamara telling me to come on home. I haven't tried to get away alone since.

P: This is sort of a duplication here, but have you been given any special assignments or responsibilities beyond what would be encompassed in International Security Affairs?

W: We've always interpreted International Security Affairs, Miss Pierce, sufficiently broadly so that nothing would be outside of the scope. We take a very expansive view of the charter.

P: Then can you briefly give me an idea of what this broadly encompassed position is?

W: Well, I think that the charter, as far as the establishment of ISA is concerned, reads something along the lines that the function of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs is to identify emerging and existing problems throughout the world that may be of interest to the security of the United States. And unless you're very narrow-minded, you can expand that to take in just about anything.

P: And how do you interpret it?

W: Very broadly. What I mean by that, to be serious about it, is that it's really impossible for any aspect of our foreign policy, for any international development, not to affect, one way or another, the national security. Now, under those circumstances, of course you've got to take a very broad view as to what is intended by the words that I've just

recited. Now, as a consequence, also the Secretary of Defense very frequently finds himself in a position where he is examining the exact same problem that the Secretary of State is examining so that unless you're quite careful, you're going to get your signals crossed. That's what it's important that there be such a position as the Assistant Secretary of Defense in International Security Affairs, because he must act as a liaison with the Department of State and see to it that we are pursuing consistent policies on the various situations that arise.

P: Does this type of interpretation and this coordination with the State Department make any difficulty in making effective and quick decisions on critical situations?

W: No, I'd say it certainly makes no difficulty. It eliminates difficulties that otherwise would develop.

P: You have a great many bases to touch here, though, don't you?

W: No, because there's no official clearance procedure that has to be followed. But what you have to do is just make sure that the positions which you are taking on behalf of the Secretary of Defense don't run in conflict with the positions that are being taken on the part of the Secretary of State.

P: Has this occurred?

W: No, because I've done the job so efficiently.

P: Between the State and the Defense Department, in reaching an agreement on your policy decisions regarding foreign affairs, are you always in agreement?

W: Well, of course, we're not always in agreement. There'd be no reason for the President having a multiplicity of advisers if they're always

going to be in agreement at all times. And no two human beings find themselves consistently in agreement, even on simple matters. These are matters of immense complexity, and there are often differences of opinion. But what you want to do is to expose those differences rather than to submerge them, and, if necessary, bring them to the President for resolution. And that frequently occurs.

P: Does it come to a point of a determination of whether this is a military or a diplomatic strategy that should be considered?

W: I would say that on any problem that's of sufficient significance to be brought to the President of the United States, it's going to be both--if it's either.

Take for example such a question as, as anything arising out of the Middle East crisis. Now, obviously you can't look at what the American options are in connection with the Middle East without looking at it from the standpoint of what's going to affect the foreign policy interests of the United States and also what's militarily feasible. In other words, let's say that we were to conclude--which we won't--that the thing to do at this stage would be to threaten the United Arab Republic. "If you don't sign a peace treaty with Israel, then we'll invade you."

Now, you have two questions on that. One of them would be, politically, is that a desirable thing to do? Would that tend to protect American interests in the area? Now that question as to whether it would be politically desirable would have to be one that would be primarily determined by the Department of State. I'm quite confident that they would determine that the answer is "No", that it would not be in our interests. But let's say that they were to lose their mind and say that

the answer is "Yes." Well, then you'd have to make a military determination as to whether or not this could be done. In other words, do you have the capability of invading and occupying the United Arab Republic and, also, in the event the Soviet Union were to take exception to your contact, are you in a position where you can repel any connected counteraction on the part of the Soviet Union!

So on any question of that sort, you've got political matters which are primarily the determination of the Department of State, but on which the Department of Defense certainly would express a position. We would have to express a position because we would have the fundamental responsibility for military implementation of that policy in the final analysis.

P: Is the order in which you've given these the way you would address the situation, politically and then militarily?

W: It would, I would suppose, be that more often than the other way around. But it would not be the inevitable order. In other words, there would be come instances in which it would be so clear that your military capability was inadequate so that you would never resolve the political question as to whether or not it would be in your interests to take that kind of overt military action.

Oh, I might cite for example something like Czechoslovakia. I would say that nobody ever really addressed the political question as to whether it would be in the American interest to try and repel the Russian invaders because of the fact that it was so apparent from the military standpoint that you couldn't do it!

P: I believe that our Military Assistance Program comes within your area of

of responsibility.

W: That is correct.

P: I'd really like to just let you talk a little about your views on it in terms of its having done what it is meant to do, and in the light of the fact that it has been sort of a continuing controversy.

W: Well, let's start out by trying to state what it is that military assistance is intended to do. Part of the trouble, of course, is that it's intended to do a variety of things, not all of which are consistent.

The general genesis of military assistance was in the post-World War II period, where it was important to us to restore the military capability of Western Europe. You had a situation where in the aftermath of World War II their economies and their military machines were virtually decimated. Not only that, but they didn't have the economic capacity to provide for their own defense. And you had the challenge of Russia which was clearly, at that time, in an expansionist mood.

Now, under those circumstances, what you were doing was to shore up the defense of Western Europe. And we had already discovered twice in the twentieth century that the security of Western Europe was vital to our security. I don't think anybody had any doubts about the validity of that objective; and that that program at that time received very widespread support, even from quarters that were opposed to the economic programs that they regarded as being "give-away" programs. In other words, the relationship of our own national security is sufficiently clear so that even opponents of foreign aid would support a military assistance program.

Now you've got elements of that classic motivation in military assistance



still. We still have Greece and Turkey who are members of the NATO Alliance, and who don't have the economic self-sufficiency to provide for their own defense.

Now on other elements that are involved in the Military Assistance Program--the second one, let's say, are base rights. In some instances our military assistance enables us to enjoy access to bases throughout the world. We are not, in the case of Ethiopia, for example, primarily concerned about Ethiopia's ability to defend itself. Ethiopia's security is not crucial to the security of the United States. Not only that, but they are not subjected to the kind of threat that Western Europe was subjected to subsequent to World War II. But we have certain facilities in Ethiopia which are of value to the United States of America. So in those instances military assistance constitutes a quid pro quo for base rights--again not very controversial.

And then a third type of military assistance involved training programs, which are designed to preserve American influence over the military machines of foreign countries. You're beginning at that stage to get into a more controversial area. You get people who maintain, for example, that our military training programs and our small materiel aid programs in Latin America have the effect of shoring up military dictations.

I think they're totally irrelevant to the existence of the military dictatorships. They would exist because of the internal problems of those countries in the absence of any military aid whatsoever. And we've had recent examples of that. We don't have any substantial military aid program in Peru, but nonetheless you had a military coup. In the case of Argentina, certainly the Ongania coup was, in no respect, subsidized by

military aid.

But those who quite rightly look with dismay at the existing internal situations in Latin America tend in some instances to attribute the shortcomings--that are totally indigenous shortcomings--somehow to our very small aid programs. I happen to think that the aid programs are valuable, and they're good value for the amount of money that is involved in them. But they are controversial, and we have to recognize that they're controversial.

And then finally you've got military assistance, which I think everybody accepts, to such countries as Korea, or--maybe everybody doesn't accept it--to Taiwan, the countries that border on the Communist world; and where we feel that their ability to defend themselves is important to our security--not as directly to our security in those instances as it is with respect to Western Europe. But nonetheless experience has indicated that if the Communist nations in Asia try any sort of expansion we tend to be drawn in, and from that standpoint it's certainly in our interest to see to it that they've got their own self defense capability rather than our being faced with the very tough decision as to whether to intervene on their behalf as we've done in the past.

So that you've got a whole collection of different kinds of things under the overall head of military assistance. Now the Grant Aid program itself, the military Grant Aid program, has gone down very substantially in the past several years. I think at one point, Bob, it was what?--On a comparable basis, something like one-and-a-half billion dollars.

B: 1.532.

summer of 1967.

And I think that essentially what it showed was the great sensitivity of Congress, reflecting the great sensitivity of the people of the United States, with respect to American involvement. We had all become, I think, influenced by the experience in Viet Nam. And some Congressmen have even said to me, in hearings at which I've testified, that the way we got drawn into Viet Nam was first of all through military assistance. So as far as they were concerned, all military assistance was bad because it had the potential of dragging us into another Viet Nam.

Now the fact is that no military sales on either a credit or a cash basis can be made without the approval of the Secretary of State. So the Department of Defense is not in the position where it's an unfettered arms merchant. It never has been. Our military transfers are all dealt with as a part of the total foreign policy of the United States.

P: The area that I think comes to mind concerning this most strongly right now, of course, is your Middle East situation. I would take it this would be like what you were referring to in your Latin American countries, except that we've seen a rather dynamic explosion of our arms being used against each other. And it comes down to the question, and I think you may have partially answered this, but that in supplying arms are we not running the risk of generating conflict and not just promoting security?

W: I'd say the answer there is a categorical "no." That our supply of arms cannot be blamed for any of the conflicts that have existed during our time. Let me give you two examples, and they're the two examples that are cited most often in criticism of our arms supply policy. The first of them is India-Pakistan, and the second one is the Middle East.

W: Yes. And it's now down to something like three hundred and seventy-five million dollars. Of that amount some one hundred and sixty million is for Korea; another almost one hundred million is for Turkey; and some thirty-five to forty million is Greece--So that you can see there's not a great deal left in military assistance.

P: In grants.

W: In grants. Now, the more controversial part of the program in recent years has been military sales. And that's what has taken most of the heat. The reasons, I think, are probably more psychological than they are practical.

Really, the controversy back in 1967 originated in the hearings on the Export-Import Bank legislation, because at that point the Banking and Currency Committees stumbled over the facts that the Export-Import Bank had a category of loans that they referred to as "Country X loans." And some of the members of Congress thought that this was an effort on the part of the Export-Import Bank, and more importantly on the part of the Department of Defense, to hide the fact that the Export-Import Bank was making loans to finance sales of military equipment to lesser-developed countries.

As a matter of fact, that was not the case. The Country X Loans were thoroughly known by the Armed Services Committees, and the purpose of classifying them as Country X Loans had to do more with the bankers' caution than it had to do with anything else. The Export-Import Bank wanted them classified as Country X so that neighboring countries would not recognize that their neighbors were receiving credit assistance. But nonetheless this is what started the particular controversy back in the

Now let's take India and Pakistan. Prior to 1965 the United States supplied major end items both to India and to Pakistan. We did so because of our view that it was important that both of these countries have the capacity to deter any aggression by either Communist China or by the Soviet Union. That's a classic consistent ingredient of our foreign policy. It's sometimes referred to as "close-in containment." It's sometimes referred to as "shoring up the defense of the free world." I don't think anybody really objects to it.

Now the problem, of course, is that the traditional hostility between the Moslems and the Hindus makes the Indians and the Paks look at one another as the other's greatest threat, rather than the Soviet Union or Communist China. Back in 1965, after a series of border incidents, you ended up with a shooting war; and they were both utilizing to a considerable extent American military equipment. That war was brought to a halt. One of the reasons that we could help bring it to a halt was that we were the supplier, and we could shut off the tap.

What sort of situation do we have at the present time? You've got one in which the major supplier of Pakistan is Communist China. The major supplier of India is the Soviet Union. Now, let's say that they got back to shooting at one another! Are we any better off because India is firing Soviet bullets, and the Paks are firing Chinese bullets? Or haven't we just put ourselves in a position in which we have lost the ability to influence the conduct of each country to a considerable extent.

Now, I don't happen to advocate a restoration of our role as a major supplier of arms to either the Pakistani or the Indians. But I don't think that that has lessened the degree of tension between the two

countries, nor has it diminished the risk that they may shoot at one another. It's just that I feel that from our standpoint we don't gain anything by being a major supplier of arms to either country. It doesn't give us the ultimate control, but our position as an arms supplier or as a non-arms supplier is really irrelevant as to whether or not there's going to be a further outbreak of hostilities between the Indians and the Paks. There are bullets enough in the world, and there are people enough to supply them, so that our role in that connection--where you've got this sort of a traditional rivalry--is a matter of irrelevance. Or as a matter of fact you could contend that you had some marginal greater influence by continuing to supply arms.

Now the second instance, of course, is the Middle East. But again you have to look at it in terms of what the alternative is. We are presently supplying the Jordanians with some military equipment. We are supplying some to Saudi Arabia. And we're supplying Israel. And there's no question of the fact that the possibility exists--a real possibility--that military arms will be used by one side against the other side. But what's your alternative? The alternative obviously would be not to supply Israel, or not to supply any of the Arab nations.

Now let's say that it were politically possible, which it is not, to cut off Israel at the present time. Would that, in fact, diminish the risk of a flareup in the Middle East? Or mightn't it--in fact, wouldn't it almost certainly--encourage the Arabs to feel that they could now overrun Israel, or try to overrun Israel? Wouldn't they be the less deterred than they are at the present time. We would then be in a position where France has cut off Israel, where we've cut off Israel, and where the

Soviet Union is continuing to supply the radical Arab States. So that I would say that the chances of a really prolonged bloody war in the Middle East would be increased.

All right then, your other alternative is to continue to supply Israel, but to say that it's silly for us to supply Israel and also supply Jordan which is shooting at Israel which is returning their fire. But then what happens?

All that then happens is that the Jordanians also begin to receive arms from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union now supplies the UAR; it supplies Syria; it supplies Iraq. Do we want really to add Jordan and Saudi Arabia to the list of the Soviet's clients? Would that promote the chances of peace? Or wouldn't it instead just increase the polarization in the area so that all of the Arabs are looking toward the Soviet Union, and only Israel is looking to the United States. And wouldn't that in turn increase the risk of confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States?

So that obviously none of us likes the idea that the Jordanians may be firing American bullets at the Israelis and possibly at planes that have been supplied by the United States to Israel. But if the alternative is that the Jordanians are going to fly Russian planes, drop bombs on Israel, and the Israelis are going to be flying American planes and drop bombs on Jordan, and then you end up with Soviet military advisers in Jordan and American military advisers in Israel, and then you're off to the races! So you just have to consider what will happen if you don't continue to pursue a policy which admittedly has got distinct limitations and distinct objections.

P: That answered my other question. You could make a pretty strong case, although it wouldn't weigh the balance of the fact that it would take us out of the atmosphere of being the "big brother" dictating and supplying. But as long as you approach it in the terms that you accept this as a thing we must do in order to keep a balance of--

W: I'm not saying it's good. All I'm saying is that it's less bad than any other option which is available to us.

P: In your judgment could there be any changes in this arrangement, or do you see that as the way it is, as it has to be?

W: In which arrangement specifically would that be? With regard to the Middle East specifically? Yes, sure! All you've got to do is to get the cooperation of the Soviet Union! That's the answer to an awful lot of problems of the world. If we could get the cooperation of the Soviet Union with respect to Viet Nam, we could bring the conflict to an end quite rapidly. If we could get the cooperation of the Soviet Union with respect to the Middle East, we could certainly do a great deal to dampen down the tensions that exist in that area at the present time.

P: But in our own MAP (Military Assistance Program) program you don't see any areas that should be changed?

W: Oh, I think that there are probably a lot of areas that should be changed, and I would hope that there will continue to be a very careful review. All I'm saying is that it is under very careful review at the present time, and if we make mistakes it's not because we're not trying not to make mistakes. I'm sure that we do make mistakes, and I'm sure that people will continue to. But the question still is the fact that because there are imperfections in our arms supply program doesn't necessarily mean that



we would be better off with no arms supply program. I think you've got to pay the price of making some mistakes to get the benefits that, in my opinion, very clearly outweigh the mistakes.

P: Do you see any change in this posture in both military assistance and foreign aid in the future?

W: I would imagine that the Military Assistance Program as a grant aid program will virtually fade out of existence within the next several years. I think we will continue to supply arms on a sales basis and on a credit sales basis.

P: You mentioned, of course, the military bases in this. Due to events that have happened within the last couple of years, I know there has been considerable talk about re-thinking or re-evaluation of the need for bases, especially in Europe. What is your assessment of this?

W: First of all, of course, it depends upon what you feel is a sound American foreign policy. There are some people who feel that the United States ought to withdraw essentially from its foreign commitments--that our intervention causes more harm than it brings about good. Now if that's your view, then obviously we should withdraw from bases to implement that view.

But let's say that instead of that you feel, as I feel, that it's important that the United States continue to try and exercise some influence on world events; that on the whole our record is good rather than bad; and that, although as we have in the case of military assistance--we've obviously made mistakes--our batting average is pretty good. Then the question is, do we have more bases, or bases in places that are unnecessary to protect the security interests of the United States.

Let's start off with Europe. The fact of the matter is that our bases in Europe have helped preserve the peace now for some twenty-three years. I think that most of our allies in NATO feel that the principal check on Russian ambitions is the presence of a substantial number of Americans overseas; and that if there were to be any marked change in that posture, that that would encourage the Russians into a more aggressive policy than they have been following by-and-large. And that that might lead them to feel that they could with impunity take over Hungary, Romania, even Yugoslavia, conceivable Austria; and bring additional pressures to bear on West Germany. Now under those circumstances obviously the security and independence of the rest of Western Europe would be threatened, which would impinge unfavorably on our own security posture.

Now the real issue, and I think it's an issue that is real and ought to be debated, is how many Americans does it take in Europe to continue to deter the Russians. And I don't think that there's any good answer to that. At the present time, we've got approximately three hundred thousand. I would say that if you could wave a wand and create a situation in which you didn't have three hundred thousand there and hadn't had three hundred thousand there, but had instead something like two hundred thousand, that we'd be in just as good position as we are now; that that would be regarded by the Russians as a sufficient number of Americans to indicate American concern about the security of Western Europe and American willingness to put American lives on the line. But we don't have two hundred thousand there. We have three hundred thousand. If you had two hundred thousand instead of three hundred thousand, you

could cut down on the number of bases.

But if we were to take one hundred thousand troops out of Europe and cut down on the number of bases, what sort of an impression would that give to the Soviet Union! Wouldn't they regard a thirty-three percent cut as indication of American intent eventually to make a sixty-six percent cut, and then a ninety-nine percent cut; and wouldn't they feel--and wouldn't our NATO allies feel--that this was evidence of an American adoption of what I've referred to as the first of these theories as to American foreign policy--that America ought to disengage, become non-involved!

So that I don't think that under existing circumstances you could safely make any substantial reduction in the American presence in Europe, and particularly in the aftermath of Czechoslovakia and the evidence of the Soviet willingness to employ military force to achieve what they regard as their political objectives.

Then you look at the bases in the rest of the world, and you've got quite different atmospherics insofar as our other bases are concerned. You've got some bases which are important because of their location and the intelligence gathering potential that they have--bases such as those in Ethiopia, some of those in Turkey, and so forth. So that in evaluating the continued necessity for those, you've got to take another look what the technological state of the art is, and whether there's any acceptable substitute for the intelligence gathering potential of these bases.

That, of course, was the issue with respect to Peshawar in Pakistan. Now at one point, Peshawar was very important from the standpoint of the intelligence that we were gathering, particularly about the

Communist Chinese missile activities. It has over a period of time, because of technological advances, become less important. So that this is the sort of base that you can evaluate strictly in technological terms and find out whether the existence of the base, the economic cost, sometimes the political liability, is worth incurring because of the value of the intelligence that you cannot gather through any satisfactory substitute.

Then, finally, you've got the bases primarily in the Pacific. And you'd have to split those into two categories. There are obviously some bases which are of crucial importance as long as the Viet Nam conflict continues. So we can put those to one side for the time being. Obviously we're not going to pull back from them.

Then you have other bases such as most of those in Japan, which are important for many of the same reasons that our bases in Europe are important. They are evidence of American interest in the area, of American willingness to become involved in any sort of a security situation that develops in that area. Now your determination as to whether those bases should be retained or whether they should be reduced or whether they should be eliminated, turns on your view of the importance of Asia to the security of the United States.

Now again, I suppose from where I sit I could not be expected to have any other kind of a position--I regard them as important! I think that it's desirable that the United States continue to indicate its interest in the area. And I think that any sort of a sudden change in our posture with respect to Pacific bases would be misread, primarily by our allies. I wouldn't even attempt to guess what the Chinese would do if we were to eliminate our bases in the Pacific. They might very

well do nothing. They've not exhibited, since Korea any particular inclination to try and expand beyond their own borders. But I think that it would terrify the other independent nations of the area. They're not ready yet for us to go home. I think some Japanese would immediately begin to press for some sort of an accommodation with China; and that this might impact adversely on the security of the area.

So the net of what I think I'm saying is that obviously bases are expensive. They cost us heavily in terms of balance of payments. They bring about a whole lot of unfortunate political situations. It sort of arouses the leftist students in Japan. There's more anti-Americanism because there's more Americans in evidence. But to me it's a pretty cheap price to pay--net--in terms of our overall security.

Entirely apart from your views of Viet Nam it's clear that the Malaysians, the Indonesians, the Thais, the Japanese, the Australians, the New Zealanders, all take great comfort from American presence in the Pacific. And I like to have them comfortable, because if they're comfortable they're going to expand. They're going to get stronger themselves. They're going to be in a position where eventually they can take over regional security with our playing a very subordinate role. I think if we were to pull out now this would discourage growth, progress, expansion, on the part of these stronger independent countries in Asia.

So I have come out very strongly for a retention of a substantial American presence and substantial American bases in the Pacific, as well as in Europe. Now that doesn't mean that you shouldn't study to determine whether there are ways in which you can diminish our expense and our exposure. I think we should; I think we are; I think we will continue to.

But as far as the overall is concerned, I think it's got to continue to be important for the foreseeable future that we maintain a very evident American presence.

I'm sorry. Mr. Clifford is calling for me.

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By Paul C. Warnke

to the

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