INTERVIEW II

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INTERVIEWEE: WARREN WOODWARD

INTERVIEWER: DAVID G. McCOMB

PLACE: Mr. Woodward's offices at American Airlines, Dallas, Texas

Tape 1 of 1

M: On the last tape, to pick up where you left off, you mentioned that Johnson had recovered from his kidney stones. The Mayo doctors had gone up there and crushed that stone. And he recovered, I assume, relatively rapidly after that and resumed the campaign. You also mentioned that Connally called in and the two took up where they had left off. Their disagreement also passed as did the stone, apparently.

Now, what did you do after that point? Did he retake the campaign trail with the usual vigor?

W: Yes, I was at Mayo's with him. Once the stone was removed and he was on the road to recovery, it appeared as if it would be another five days or so of recovery there. Then he would return to Texas and resume the campaign. I decided that it would probably be best for me to get on back down. I had done all that I could. Mrs. Johnson stayed.

Incidentally, this is where Dr. Jim Cain comes into the picture almost the first time. Dr. Jim Cain's name will come up in later years in the White House, as you know, as the President's personal physician. But this was really Dr. Jim Cain's first introduction to Johnson and his health problems. This was in 1948. But Dr. Jim Cain had married the daughter of Senator Alvin Wirtz. Senator Alvin Wirtz was Congressman Johnson's great personal friend and advisor and mentor. He was an older

man than Johnson, but Jim Cain had married Alvin Wirtz's daughter. So Jim Cain was there attending this case.

There wasn't much I could do, so I returned to Texas. I remember I went to Houston, and the last thing that the Congressman said to me, "Be sure and send me the clippings from the Houston paper. Let me know how my health problems and everything are being regarded down there. Go by the Chronicle and the Post and see what you can find and nose around a little bit." This is early in the campaign. Things weren't off the ground, and so forth. He was obviously quite anxious to see how things were progressing because he had been very much concerned with his health during this period.

So I left and went to Houston, but not before a call had come in to the Congressman from John Connally. And it was perfectly obvious that whatever disagreements there had been over the manner in which his health news was handled, it was gone by the board. I knew everything was back on the track.

I think it is interesting to note that both the President and John Connally are strong personalities, obviously. They are both distinguished men and men of talent and conviction. While they might frequently have disagreements on a subject, anyone would make a mistake to say that the basic thread of friendship between John Connally and the President was ever truly broken. It is as if a couple of brothers might fight and squabble. But the bond was there then and always has been. I have often been amused at press accounts which would say "Connally is feuding with Johnson", and "They are mad at one another," and so forth. I have seen their friendship tested almost to the breaking point, but the truth of the matter is that it never broke and never has.

M: You get this criticism when Connally went to run for governor of Texas, that there was some break between him and Johnson. But you would

indicate that this wasn't true?

W: No, there has never been any solid break, never has been, and I would imagine there would never be. I can't imagine any circumstance that would ever cause that friendship [to break]. The President has his methods and his style. And John's style was frequently a little different, and these styles might come into conflict.

I don't have any specific recollections about the incident when John commenced to want to run for governor. Johnson was vice president; Connally was Secretary of the navy, and John, being a very proud man, was concerned that people would say, you know, "This is Johnson's stooge coming back to Texas to run; this is a Johnson man." John is very proud and he wanted to be his own man. The plain truth of the matter is that John did not discuss his plans with Vice President Johnson except in a very cursory way, and I don't even know the details of that. But I think it is absolutely true to say that John did not get heavily involved with Vice President Johnson in the preparation and the discussions leading up to his leaving the Navy and going to run. That was John's decision, consulting his friends, doing it in his own way, in his own style.

Now, this may have caused the Vice President to have some feelings that, "Well, you know, we've been friends for a long time, and I wish you would have consulted with me more." This would be a very natural thing, but I don't even know that that was the case. But I think that John, rather independently, made up his mind as to what his course of action would be and the way he pursued it. The Vice President and the Governor have great respect for one another, and have a long friendship. The twenty years that I have been observing that friendship I have seen

it tested but I have never seen it broken. The fundamental affection between the two existed then and exists now. I think that just has to be noted.

But anyway, I left for Houston. Being new to the organization, I remember sighing a little sigh of relief that the two principals were back working together, and I felt relieved as I left for Houston. I stayed down in Houston a couple or three days. Indeed, I did send the clippings back. The President has always been one who has been interested in press clippings. He liked to know what the clippings are about and he wants to know what they are saying. And he did [know]. We sent him the clippings. That is something that I have observed from the beginning to the end, that he liked these clippings, and he liked to see what the clippings were saying, and so forth.

M: Did he try to make up for lost time then?

W: Yes, he came back. You know, come to think about it, he resumed the campaign in Houston. Rather than going direct to Austin upon his release from the hospital, he went to Houston. That was the principal reason that I was sent down there was to work with some of the local people on the arrangements for his first appearance after his release from the hospital.

That trip was to consist primarily of a meeting with local supporters and organizational efforts, but my recollection is that he made his first state-wide radio broadcast, or as much of a state-wide broadcast as we had the money for, over Judge Roy Hofheinz's television station down there. KTHT, I believe, are the call letters for that station. It's out there on South Main Street, about the 4500 block. They have a little studio there. Little--it would hold about fifty, and if you could get fifty people in there, you could make a lot of noise and have good sound effects and enthusiasm. I remember that we chose that studio for that

reason because this is about the beginning of the time when it was getting increasingly difficult [to hold outdoor rallies]. As a matter of fact, this was about the last major Texas campaign in which it was possible to have the large outdoor rallies of the kind which you had in the W. Lee O'Daniel days in which you would take over Hermann Park there in Houston and you would have people come out.

It was very, very hot, and in those days we had late campaigns. As you know, now the filing time for Texas politics is like February 1, and you get the campaigns over with before the real heat of the summer. But we were still campaigning in mid-summer, and people were beginning to get interested in televisions and boats and a lot of other things. The outdoor rally was an increasingly difficult thing to provide.

But the President always put great store in crowds. He liked to play the crowdsmanship game. He liked to have good crowds. Yet it was increasingly difficult to get these crowds. So we always worried about this aspect of it. There are very practical political reasons for that. If you advertised a big rally in Hermann Park and you get two hundred people or three hundred people to show up, it did look bad in the newspaper. But that was the kind of campaign that we had to measure against in the past. Nowadays you just virtually never have those outdoor rallies. The same amount of time and energy that you had to get the crowds out, you can take it and put it into other activities. But this was still a very popular way of campaigning, but it was about the last major campaign to do this. So all during the 1948 campaign, we played the crowdsmanship.

M: Did you get a crowd in Hermann Park?

W: We didn't have one. That was the reason. We felt it would be difficult to do that, because he had been out of circulation. So we went to this little

radio station, and we did not have the big rally. We felt we could reach more people on radio, which you could, and that's what we did. We went to this little radio station. That was his first appearance, as I recall, before the Texas public after his illness. I remember I worked like a dog getting crowds in there--even to get fifty to seventy-five people. I wanted to make sure we had a good noisy vociferous group in there. I remember I brought my mother; my mother was living there, and I got her to come to the studio and so forth. We had quite a show. But that's where he made his second kick-off.

M: How did he perform on radio? Did he come across pretty well?

W: Well, [he had] a little bit of a tendency to shout. He has a good strong voice, and he would get going on his theme and had a little tendency to shout. I always felt the engineers had a great difficulty in modulating in the sound control booth there.

I have always felt he was better on the stump than in a prepared script on radio. I never did feel that you could sense the dynamics of this man in a radio. You really need to see him in person and in action to get it. It's really kind of sad that the crowds--that type of campaigning and the rallies in the park-type thing--left because he was good in that sort of setting. [He was] very, very good where he was very much like a performer who senses his audience and feels his audience; he was good at it. He read the mood of his audience. He was quite good at it.

M: Did he ad-lib a great deal?

W: Yes. Oh, he could make a much better speech speaking from that which he knew and in which he conveyed his personal feelings. He was awfully good at it. We were compelled to have prepared scripts because the press wanted it. Yet he was so much better talking from the heart and from the depth of his experiences in Washington--much better. So we did that.

I remember one time up at Canton, Texas. Now what happened was we got the helicopter and we got into a state-wide campaign in a helicopter. Joe Mashman, who is now vice president of Bell Helicopter, was the pilot.

M: Incidentally, where did you get the idea of a helicopter?

W: Unless somebody else wants to take credit for thinking of this thing, I think probably I raised this idea with him amongst others. I think I was one of the first to do that because we were talking in his office up on the fourth floor of the old Congressional Office Building about the campaign. I brought this helicopter up. I was a flyer in World War II, and he used to like to talk to me about flying in the Eighth Air Force and that sort of thing. We talked a lot about it. He has always been a great fan of aviation, and so forth. We talked about it. We were talking about methods of campaigning, and I raised the issue of helicopters.

You see, he was a great friend of Secretary of the Air Force Symington, and after I raised the issue one day, he talked to Secretary Symington about it. Now, this was in 1948. The helicopter was developed, but not to the extent it is today, obviously. So he had Secretary Symington talk to Larry Bell of the Bell Helicopter Company through his connections with the Air Force, and they discussed the feasibility of it, and it became more and more intriguing.

Here again the Congressman sensed that we were going to have to have some crowd appeal because the old days of just saying, "Come out to the speaking on the lawn" as it were, were gone, and you needed some additional attraction. The mobility of the helicopter and the ability to go into smaller communities, to land a helicopter where they might not have an airport, was attractive. So the idea was broached. Then Secretary Symington checked it out with Larry Bell, who has now passed

away, but who was founder of the Bell Helicopter Company. It was deemed to be feasible, and those were the beginnings.

M: You still had to have advance people?

W: Yes, now when we had the helicopter, it was necessary. It used a special octane of gas, and a survey indicated that 90 octane gas wasn't available just every place. So we then had to get a gasoline truck, and we had to precede. We had to coordinate the night before that; Joe Mashman would say, "Now look, we are going to need fuel at stop X and stop Y. We won't have to refuel at stop A or stop B." Then we had to send this fuel truck in advance, so that was one advancing we had to do. We had to advance the helicopter itself with fuel. That was one thing. Then we sent advance men out in advance of the helicopter with sound equipment on the roof of the car, and we would proceed that way.

But the Congressman never, never ever liked to go any place where there weren't advance preparations. Now, there are very practical reasons for this. This isn't just to make sure you get a crowd or just to make sure the microphone worked. There were very significant reasons why people need to go in in advance of the candidate. You might find that, by oversight, the publisher of the paper, for example, or some other important person in the community hadn't been notified. There were just many, many practical political reasons for sending advance men. The President very early realized the wisdom of having these campaign stops that he was to make well organized and well thought-out in advance to get the maximum effect, because you may not get back into that community. If you go in cold, you are obviously going to make some mistakes that you wouldn't make if you went in [prepared]. So this was a cardinal principle of his all

through his political life. Wherever he went, he wanted it well advanced. I think some of his experiences in this line carried over, and today, as you know, the advance man is a standard fixture of political campaign life. I think it may have started with Johnson in great measure.

M: To get back, you were mentioning an experience you had in Canton, Texas.

W: Yes. We came into Canton, Texas. I never will forget. World War II was sufficiently in the memories of everyone that preparedness and defense was a main theme that we campaigned on in 1948. The Congressman had spoken out in strong measures for preparedness. Preparedness was a key issue, "Never again should we get caught short as we did when Hitler was rampaging. We wanted to be prepared." In those days, the 70-Group Air Force was the principal thing. We were going to talk about the 70-Group Air Force. And he had supported Secretary Symington in getting the appropriations. Johnson was a leading member of the Armed Services Committee, and prior to that the old Naval Affairs Committee. He had always been interested in preparedness.

This is another story, of course, and I will get back to Canton, but he fought a great battle to keep the synthetic rubber plant, I believe at Beaumont or along the coast or Orange or Port Neches I guess it was, somewhere down in the coast. We had a synthetic rubber plant, and there was an attempt to sell it off, cannibilize it, and Johnson wouldn't let them do that. He said, "No, what if the natural rubber supply of the Far East were to fall again to an enemy, were would we be?" He led the fight to keep these plants going that we had invested good money in.
Now, some of the rubber companies didn't like that, and there are some stories about that.

But in any event, preparedness was the key theme, and we were there in Canton. We had a flatbed truck in this little park where the helicopter had landed. The Congressman got up and had been introduced and was making his speech. Now, by this time I had heard his speech many, many times, and I could almost tell what stage of it he was in. I hate to tell these stories out of school, but it's a part of the political lore, I guess. I knew when to start leading the applause. I knew when he had hit a special point. I knew that that was a good point to applaud. I would wander through the crowd. I would start over on one side and when he would make a point I would lead the applause. I would start clapping and everybody would pick it up. It gets kind of contagious, and I would walk through the crowd picking up the various high points of his speech. I would lead the applause and start it. I would start it if it were necessary. A lot of times it wasn't necessary. But if it was something we needed to be demonstrative about, why, I would lead that thing. So this particular day he was making his speech that, "never again did we want to send the boys through the flak-filled skies of Europe unprotected." He went on to say, "I've got young men in my campaign, and I have a young man in this traveling with me that was over there in the Eighth Air Force, and he got shot. I don't want him to ever have to go over there again to do it." I started applauding. That was one of the high points. I just applauded and everybody was cheering. Then he got a good reaction, so he kept building this theme, that "this young man who was traveling with him, who had been over there with the Eighth Air Force and who had fought, we would never want to send him over unprepared again. We have got to give him the tools that he will need." The point was being well received, so I just kept leading the applause. Finally the Congressman got carried away with himself, and he said, "I want that young man to

come up here." So I started applauding, "Send him up," you know, and I led the applause. Again, I was just kind of listening to this out of one ear, and I knew we had a good thing going, so I just [kept on]. Well, it turned out he was talking about me, because I had been in the Eighth Air Force, and I was just sitting there applauding to get the young man to come up on the flatbed truck so he could be introduced to the audience, you see, because the Congressman had gotten carried away with this demonstration. Finally it dawned on me that I was the one that was supposed to go on the flatbed truck, and I was mortified that I had been out there leading the applause on this thing. I had an open shirt. It was hot, hot work campaigning in the Texas summer. You just better believe it, but I got up there and got through that with mortification all right. Again the President was feeling his crowd. He understood it, and he knew that they liked this.

So he had a great story that he used to tell the crowd all the time, that he always got a good reaction. Would you be interested in hearing this particular story?

M: Yes.

W: I'm just rambling, so you had better stop me when you don't want me to ramble.

M: Go right ahead.

W: There was one particular story that he always got a great, great response from. He talked about an old boy he went to school with, in Johnson City I guess, and his name was Sandy. He always called him Sandy. Sandy was on the football team but never got in the game. But they finally came to the last game of the season. And he built this thing up: Sandy hadn't

played and he was going to graduate. The Congressman could really belt this story. But it's now two minutes to go and the home team is behind 7-6, and the coach is desperate to win this game because it means the championship. Sandy is sitting there, and finally it's thirty seconds to go. He said he had nothing to lose and Sandy kept on his sleeve saying "Let me in, coach, let me in." All was lost anyway, so he said, "Sandy, go on in." Sandy goes on in. He gets in there and he calls play number 12. They execute play number 12 and make a touchdown and win and Sandy is a hero. They got back in there and the coach was saying to him, "Sandy, my god, why in the world did you call play number 12? We haven't used that in years. And how in the hell could you go in there and call play number 12?" "Well," he says, "Coach, I just didn't know what to do. I was in the huddle, and I was there with my teammates for the last time. And I looked over there and I saw old Joe who had played guard, number 7, and I looked over here and there was Pete, number 6, and I just put 7 and 6 together and got play number 12 and called it." And he always got a big laugh at this point. He said, "Why, Sandy, you dumb so-and-so, 7 and 6 is not 12, that's 13." And Sandy just looks up to him and said, "Well, Coach, if I were as smart as you, we would have lost that ball game."

This was always a great crowd pleaser, and he told it well and he could draw it out. He just got more laughs, and we went all through the campaign with the Sandy joke. It was a good one to bring the crowd.

We made a lot of the small towns. In those days, in 1948, you did that. You didn't miss any. Now you reach these small communities by television. I might say, however, that it is still a pretty successful technique to go to these small towns, because Governor Preston Smith in this last campaign went back to the technique of going to all communities, just making them all and doing a lot of handshaking. This is not a bad technique at all. Congressman Johnson knew it to perfection and worked it.

M: Did he do a lot of handshaking?

W: An awful lot of handshaking. As a matter of fact, we had a hard time keeping on schedule because that's where he started his phrase: He liked to "press the flesh." And he did. As soon as his speaking was over, he would get down and he would mix and mingle with them.

You see, he had a reputation for being a congressman that got things done. His reputation spread over from the Tenth District. It was well known all throughout Texas that this was the most effective congressman in the Texas delegation, that he made a reputation for looking after his constituents. No letter came into his office and stayed there lest it was answered in twenty-four hours. If it had a request, we had an extensive suspense system. We would ask somebody to work on it. If it hadn't been answered and a reply hadn't been forthcoming, why, we followed through. No request went unanswered, at least in some form.

I expect somebody has already told you about the "I can't do it" Club that he organized up in Washington. That was when he had asked certain departments to assist him in certain projects of benefit to his constituency. They had turned him down and said, "We would like to help, Congressman, but we just can't do it now." So he organized the "I can't do it" Club. He got a little certificate and he would send this certificate to the

bureaucrat who said it couldn't be done. He just doesn't know the meaning of the phrase "it can't be done." He just doesn't know the meaning of that.

So during this campaign, a lot of people had heard about his reputation of being able to do, and what happened was after every speaking someone would come up and say, "Congressman, my boy is having difficulty getting his pension again." This is just after the war. "He is having difficulty getting his pension, and I wondered if you could help with VA." And I always had a notebook and a pencil. I would tag along right behind him, and he would say, "Yes, give your name to my assistant, and he will look right into it." And he never forgot. He always followed up, "When you were at Canton and that farmer asked you to help his boy with his pension, did you do something about it?" He always remembered it.

This is one of his great strengths, that he cared about people and their problems. He took more pride in it, the more humble the person was. From the lowest station, he took great pride in being able to help them. He never forgot these things. So after every campaign speech in these small communities, somebody would come up during the handshaking and say, "Can you help me with this?" I never left one of these speakings without a notebook with two or three requests to be followed through, even through they were not in his congressional district. It was quite an insight into the man's personality to see him campaign this way and to be concerned about people.

M: That must have been exhausting to him. He made, what, as many as six speeches a day?

W: Oh, yes, my recollection is that we were able to get in, considering the night speeches and night appearances, as high as fourteen appearances in a day of more-or-less formal nature. Following the final speech of the night, there would always be a group of local people who

would want to come see him. So counting those you would get anywhere from fourteen to sixteen appearances starting from a breakfast all the way through. Every minute was utilized. Now, one of the logistics, of course, was keeping him in shirts. You can imagine how you would wilt down a shirt.

M: You can do that in an hour or so.

W: Oh, absolutely, in the hot sun. So we had quite a logistics problem of keeping him supplied with shirts because they wouldn't be just wilted, they would absolutely become wringing wet, and we would have to have him shirts. Zephyr Wright, a long-time associate, as my recollection, was doing some of the laundry, and she knew how to do his shirts with just enough starch.

You know, a lot of people have spoken to me about eccentricities of politicians in these situations. They are not eccentricities. They are very real reasons why a candidate [needs such things]. If he is going to be at his best, you need to keep him comfortable. Can you imagine someone trying to campaign with a shirt that is not too tight from starch or one thing and another? There is a mistaken impression about that. We did a lot of things to make the candidate comfortable, and everything we did was more than justified. This is how some of these stories about eccentricities spring up. The plain truth of the matter is you need to do these things. You have to do these things. They are not eccentricities. You can't push a human being to these limits without trying to make him as comfortable as possible. I remember there are some stories about these eccentricities from time to time. All through his political life there were. But the plain truth of the matter is I am sure we increased his efficiency by X percent by being able to make him comfortable.

I really think that President Johnson, Congressman Johnson, Senator Johnson developed to a very fine degree the art of personal campaigning.

I don't think there is any question about it, and many of today's campaign techniques he explored first. I think he really was an innovator in campaign techniques. I don't think there is any question about it.

M: How did he go about appealing to the minority groups--the Mexicans and the Negroes?

W: He didn't have to develop that relationship, because that relationship came to him naturally in some of his earlier campaigns--in the 1940 and the 1941 campaign because of his known friendship with President Roosevelt. As you know the minority groups felt about President Roosevelt in those days much as, say, the minority groups felt about Senator Kennedy or President Kennedy in these times. Johnson had been working with young people. He had a great rapport with the young people, helping them to find jobs. This goes back to NYA days, of course. But he didn't have to. That relationship was there. They knew that he cared about them because he had grown up and taught school down in South Texas with the Latin Americans. The Latin Americans in Texas have always known that he cared about them from the earliest days when he was teaching school and would help those that were a little behind. He would tutor them and so forth. Then with the relationship of Roosevelt, he was always well regarded by the minorities who knew him to be their friend. That relationship didn't have to be [developed].

M: Now, what did you do at the time of the election when the votes were so close, in 1948?

W: He went to the old Hancock Home there in Austin, which was headquarters. The votes were coming in there.

M: How did they come in? Did they come in over radio?

W: The Texas Election Bureau is sort of the official bureau. But we prided ourselves in having a county man, someone who was our man, our campaign manager, I guess is a better way to say it, in each of the two hundred and fifty-four Texas counties. We relied on them to give us as much information as possible. Particularly when it appeared it was going to be close, why, we relied on them.

M: Did they phone in results?

W: They would phone in the results, or we would call them. Our campaign was over, so all the campaign workers came back into the headquarters there. And we would divide up into little "you take these counties and someone else take the other" and we liaisoned with them. We kept up with our men that way. Once a vote is counted, it remains, as I understand it, unofficial until it is certified. It has to be a certified vote, and that usually comes about a week later and so forth. So it was terribly important that we see that all of the votes were certified and in. So we stayed on the phone. The period of a week to ten days there was a hectic period of staying on the phone. We were on the phone continually with our people in this regard. My memory is a lot of frantic activity on the phone; that's what we were doing. It was very effective. We knew just about what was going on in any district. If somebody said, "We will have the vote certified by tomorrow," or "Somebody's out of town," you see, we would make a suspense note and call back. That's what we did principally in those hectic days right after.

M: When it became certain that the vote was going to be very, very close, what did you do?

W: There are others that can comment on that and tell this story better than myself. At this point, I had only been with the Congressman four or five months maybe by this time and I certainly was an unseasoned political person. So I didn't even attempt--I don't think I did--to intrude on

the decisions being made on that. John Connally was very much involved in that and some others, and they worked on it. At this time I started working on some of the administration, like keeping the headquarters going. As a matter of fact, I did not go to the convention, that famous convention, the Democratic State Convention in Fort Worth at which I believe Charlie Gibson from Amarillo came in and cast the deciding vote in the State Democratic Executive Committee certifying Johnson as the official nominee of the Democratic Party. It got down that close, and my memory was that it was a tie vote in the State Democratic Executive Committee. Charlie Gibson was the committeeman from Amarillo, Potter County, and he came in and certified it. There are others that have this story more in detail and can give you more definitively some of the political considerations that went in.

M: You kept the office going?

W: As I say, I didn't go to Fort Worth to the convention. I stayed behind. I longed to be there, but somebody had to stay there and kind of keep the shop running. We still had our headquarters there and commenced to organize the files and so forth. We had to kind of keep in readiness because we assumed that the Republicans would have a candidate against us, which they did. Mr. H. J. Jack Porter was the Republican nominee, so we had to keep things intact. Once the Democratic primary was over, we just couldn't relax. We knew we had to maintain something there, so I was there trying to keep a skeleton force. Money was always a problem, of course. But that's what I did at that time.

M: Then after the campaign was over with, did you return to Washington?

W: Yes. It was November, of course, the second Tuesday of November. The election was over and Johnson was elected. There was a Supreme Court fight on this thing. It went all the way up there, and

that's a story that has been often told and is available to historians and anyone else that wants to see it. The Senate being the final judge of the qualifications of its members, I think they got into it, and they dismissed it. All of the charges that were raised on this close thing, I think it is significant that not one single place from Federal Judge Whitfield Davidson--that no time when the facts were heard did anyone ever rule against Congressman Johnson. Several groups heard it from federal judges to the United States Supreme Court judge, the Senate itself, and he won it in every instance. So it is November, and he has been certified. I go up there and get a place to stay at McLean Gardens I think is where I located.

M: You didn't go back to the Dodge Hotel?

W: No, I did not. I got an apartment out at the McLean Gardens which is off Wisconsin and Massachusetts. And John Connally had been persuaded to come back up. John did not want to. He wanted to stay, but once again the Congressman said, "Would you come up and help me get the staff organized and get started?" So John did. We got John and Nellie an apartment. I guess they had two or three kids at that time, and we obtained for them an apartment at the McLean Gardens. They came up and arrived there about Christmas. Horace Busby and I had gotten the Christmas tree and put it in their apartment, so we spent Christmas together in 1948.

Then [they] had the swearing-in and commenced to organize the staff. We had the old offices of W. Lee O'Daniel. They were very, very crowded, extremely crowded, but we were over there. John was the head man and did a fine job in getting us all pulled together. There was Walter Jenkins and myself and we commenced to build a staff. I forget now, but I think maybe Gene Latimer might have been with us at that time; I guess he was. Mildred Stegall, Glynn Stegall, all beloved friends that we started out [with]. John stayed,

I think, about nine months until about September 1 when he returned. Then Walter became the administrative assistant. Walter stayed until he, Walter, made his campaign for Congress against Frank Ikard in Wichita Falls, losing in a close race. Then Walter returned after that race to the staff.

M: How long did you stay with the Senator's staff?

W: I married in the spring of 1952, and I stayed through 1952 and returned to Texas in January of 1953. So I had been there, actually on the payroll, from 1948 to January of 1953. I returned to Texas because I thought I wanted to raise my family in Texas, and so forth, and went down to Houston. As I say, we stayed in close contacts and [had] many relationships on and off.

I might skip at this point to a couple of things, or maybe we can tell the story later, I don't know. It's not much of a story, but it might be somewhat revealing. One was, it must have been the 1958 Senatorial campaign, the off-year elections. Yes, I believe it was 1958. Senator Johnson was then in a very prominent position as majority leader. He had had his heart attack and had recovered, and we went on a campaign trip. We borrowed a fast plane, one of the fastest ones we could get, and we made a campaign trip to Indiana, to Wyoming, to Utah, to Nevada, to New Mexico, and back into Texas. We made all those states, campaigning for the Democratic nominee for senator in each of those states. Senator Vance Hartke, now Senator Vance Hartke, was running in Indiana. Gale McGee was a history professor running for Senator in Wyoming. Frank Moss in Utah; Howard Cannon in Nevada; those were all--they were not incumbents, they were seeking the office of senator. That's four, and then we stopped in New Mexico and made a brief campaign pitch for Senator Dennis

Chavez who was obviously not in any trouble, but he did campaign there. That was five. Of the four that Senator Johnson campaigned for--and this was about like Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, and Saturday and Sunday before the election on Tuesday in November of 1958, I believe--those four, that late in the campaign, by anybody's standards, and you could check it any way were all beat when Senator Johnson went in there, they were all behind. If the election had been held that day, they would have been defeated. There is no question about it. They were running behind, every one of them. And I think it's absolutely accurate to say that Senator Johnson came in an absolutely classic political way and elected all four of those senators. I don't think there is any question about it, that it was his personal drive and energy and endorsement and consultation and advice to those men in those states. He pulled all of them through. I remember being so amazed because when we came in they were behind in each instance. He pulled all four of them through. Of course, Chavez won. But it was an absolutely brilliant bit of political campaigning in territory with which he was not terribly familiar. But he grasped the situation. He grasped the political situation as he went into each state. It didn't take but ten minutes of a briefing from local people, saying "This is the situation," and he knew exactly what the problem was.

Kind of an amusing story, in Indiana, Indianapolis, we got off the plane and a nice-looking young fellow came up to me and said, "Are you traveling with Senator Johnson?" I said, "Yes." He told me his name, and he said, "You know, I'm running for congressman. Now I know the Senator is here to elect the senator, but I'm running for Congress and I'm in a Republican district. But I think I've got a chance, I think I've got a chance." He said, "Would you ask the Senator when he makes his speech

tonight for Hartke if he would just mention my name. I think it just might be the difference." I said, "I'll mention it." I went on, and about an hour later, I ran on to this young man again, and he tugged at me again and said, "Now don't forget this. I think I can make it. I think I can make it." I said, "Fine, I will." And he mentioned it to me three more times before that night was over. He was quite an earnest young man, but an attractive fellow, and I said I would do it. Finally before we left for the hall that night, I did say to the Senator, "Now, this young man is running for Congress, and thinks he's got a chance. He realizes you are here to make a speech for Hartke, but if you just mention his name and urge people to vote for him, it might just be the trick to pull him in." So we go to the podium, and he is introduced and makes his speech, and I had whispered in his ear, "Now, mention this young man's name." That was the last thing I reminded him of. And he went there and he said, "I am delighted to be here for Vance Hartke, and I just want to say that you have a fine Democratic slate, and particularly I think you ought to also go out and vote for that fine young man who is running for Congress." Then it dawned on him that he had forgotten the man's name. I had been telling him the man's name right along, but he forgot it. So he didn't know what else to do, but to just keep on praising this young man. He would say, "This fine young man, now I want you to vote for this young man who is going to be your next congressman," and he went on. Finally the crowd caught the humor of the thing and realized he didn't know the name, and they hollered the name out. They said, "Joe Barr," and he said, "That's right, that's who I want you to vote for, Joe Barr." Well, Joe Barr did get elected, and I think it was partly because of this fulsome praise that the man was giving him because he couldn't remember his name for

the moment. He was elected.

Later Joe Barr became under secretary of the treasury and was secretary of the treasury in the closing days of the Johnson Administration, took Secretary Fowler's place. That was the same Joe Barr.

After it was over, Joe Barr came up to me, and he was so grateful, he said, "That was just wonderful," and so forth. He took it in good humor that the Senator had forgotten his name, but he said, "It did me a lot of good," and he said, "What do I do?" I said, "Now, you call me on election night, and let me know how the results are going, and I will tell the Senator." And I told him where I would be. And he did [call]. He went to Congress and served I think one or two terms. He was in a Republican district and he was eventually defeated, but stayed in public life and was a very able young public servant. But that was Joe Barr, and that happened there in Indianapolis.

We went on to Casper, Wyoming, and had a fine meeting with Gale McGee. It was particularly helpful because the Senator was able to discuss the oil industry. Coming from an oil state, he was able to discuss the oil industry and they had just begun to find some major reserves in Wyoming. The oil industry had moved up there, and the President was able to talk very knowledgeably and intelligently about oil and its problems and so forth. I think this was very valuable.

M: Did you often go with him to campaign?

W: Whenever I was invited, and I guess I was invited [every time]. Yes, I got involved in all of the campaigns one way or the other.

M: Did you get involved in Texas politics to a great extent, such as the 1956 fight with Allan Shivers?

W: Yes, I did. Yes, I did. That was essentially not an election, but it was a precinct fight, as you know. I was living in Houston at the time, and I left my post there and went to Austin and just kind of moved to Austin for the period of the time that it took. Now, you have got to bear in mind that was a matter of developing your precinct leaders because it had to do with the control of the Democratic Party. That's what that issue was. Just to simplify it, Governor Allan Shivers was leading the forces of the "conservative group" and Mr. Rayburn and Senator Johnson were leading the forces under the party regular or "liberal group" is what it amounted to. It was deeply feared that if Mr. Shivers gained control of the Democratic Party and its machinery that he would lead it into the camp of the Republicans because this had been done in 1952. So that was the issue there. That took a little different style of campaigning from a general election, because these results were to be found in precinct meetings instead of a polling place.

Again this was the beginning of precinct politics in Texas. Heretofore we hadn't paid a whole lot of attention to the precinct convention, but the precinct convention became increasingly important after this date. Here again the technique that was used was the telephone. We had to call our county men. They were still holdovers from the 1948 campaign that had gone with us like Lloyd Croslin up in Lubbock, Chilton O'Brien down in Beaumont, and these people, Bob Clark here in Dallas, and so forth. We would call our leaders and say, "Now, you are going to have to get out to the precinct convention." This was essentially a matter of turning your people out to the precinct conventions, and we did that by phone. There were some television speeches and some appearances, but essentially this was an organizational thing, and we tried to do it by phone. I remember we sat in the headquarters and used the phone. But that was the technique that was used there.

M: Being from Houston, you must have run into Frankie Randolph. Did you?

W: Frankie Randolph was, strangely enough, never. . . Although the President, philosophically and in other ways, supported most of the things in which she was interested, liberals in Texas have had a wonderful way of committing suicide, you know, and snatching defeat from the jaws of victory--this sort of thing. Yes, we knew Frankie Randolph, and she was of the party regular group.

M: Wasn't there some fight over selecting her as a national committeewoman?

W: Yes. We had supported Mrs. Lloyd Bentsen, Mrs. B. A. Bentsen, in the convention here in Dallas that year.

M: That was in the spring.

W: They were insistent that Mrs. Randolph be, so Mrs. Randolph was elected. I believe we went with Byron Skelton. So what it amounted to was we said we would like to see Byron Skelton and Mrs. B. A. Bentsen to be the committeeman and committeewoman. I believe they agreed with us on Skelton but said they wanted Mrs. Randolph, and Mrs. Randolph was elected at the so-called "Governor's Convention," here in Dallas that year. That was 1956 though, wasn't it?

M: Spring of 1956.

W: Later on that year, Mr. Johnson called me. I had gone back to Houston, and he called and said, "Now, we've got to have somebody to head up the state campaign headquarters." So I went back to Austin as a state campaign manager for the Stevenson-Kefauver forces in Texas against Dwight Eisenhower in the second time. We really had no chance. I thought we did, but we really had no chance. Shivers did go for Eisenhower. I believe Price Daniel did go for Eisenhower. We didn't have much chance. We put on a pretty good campaign. Money was hard to get, but it is awfully hard to unseat a popular president on his request for a second term.

M: Was there a strain between Johnson and the liberals under Frankie Randolph as a result of--

W: Not as a result of Frankie Randolph. I think that the Senator knew that the strength of the Democratic Party in Texas was in having as many under one umbrella as we could get--not to splinter yourself, not to fracture your party. He has always been that way. He has always felt the party was big enough to hold lots of people of divergent views. His was not any attempt to take away from any of the liberals or even any of the conservatives, but rather to follow the middle course in which we could have a place where everybody that wanted to work under the shelter of the Democratic Party could do so.

Really what concerned the Senator, so it seems to me, was the fact that he wanted to make sure that the party leadership--whoever it was, the conservatives, or the liberals, or whoever controlled it--would not defect in the November elections. It was really a matter of party integrity at this point, because there had been great dissatisfaction and great bitterness because we would elect a man to be head of the Democratic Party in Texas, or he would be elected governor on the Democratic ticket and immediately support the Republican. This was very galling to the Democratic regulars and the liberals. In those days the real issue was whether or not elected leaders of the Democratic Party would lead the party, or the Republicans. This was the principal concern. It wasn't so much over the liberal issues that we know today. The great division in those times was whether or not you were going to elect somebody to head the Democratic Party and then he in turn take them into the Republican camp. This was very much the issue in those times.

M: Did you ever observe Johnson and Rayburn working together, either on legislative matters or in campaigns?

W: Oh, I would have to refresh my memory, but yes, I have seen them. As a matter of fact, Mr. Rayburn was one of the first ones to speak out in that 1956 precinct fight which we were tied in against Allan Shivers. It was Sam Rayburn who first felt the necessity of making sure that the Democratic Party, whoever was heading it up, would be committed to support the Democratic nominees in November. So Senator Johnson worked very closely with Mr. Rayburn at that time. Mr. Rayburn was pretty much our leader, rather than Senator Johnson, in that 1956 precinct fight. Mr. Rayburn was very much involved in that. Indeed he was. My memory of Mr. Johnson and Mr. Rayburn is that Mr. Johnson was very, very deferential to Mr. Rayburn, much as a son would be to a father. [He] had great respect for him and loved him and was always mindful of his needs and requirements and respectful to him and of him. [He] worked very closely with him and regarded his advice highly and that sort of thing. But my memory is that Speaker Rayburn played a large prominent leading role in that.

M: Did you get involved in Johnson's race for the presidency in 1960?

W: In 1960, yes.

M: What did you do for him there?

W: Let's see. By that time, I had come back to Austin to work for Mrs. Johnson at the station. I want to take that back a little bit.

M: You haven't mentioned that.

W: I left Houston in about 1958.

M: What did you do in Houston, incidentally?

W: I was executive vice president of the Southwestern Savings Association, a savings and loan institution there. Right after this campaign we made into Indiana and Wyoming and so forth--it was really as a matter of fact on the way back from that trip that the Senator approached me about coming back to work for Mrs. Johnson. I had indicated that I didn't

particularly want to come back to Washington. He indicated that he would like me to consider Mrs. Johnson's operation, and I should talk to her, which I did with respect to her business properties. By this time, by 1960, I had. So I want to correct a little bit. I was involved, as you have to be. But I wasn't totally involved in the 1960 campaign, because working for Mrs. Johnson and the radio station, it was kind of felt best that those of us in the radio--that we ought to kind of not take too prominent a part.

I will say this, though. I did have the very unique experience of riding in the car with the Senate Majority Leader to the Senate Office Building in that caucus room, or one of the rooms there, in which he made his announcement to the press that he would be a candidate for the Democratic nomination. Now, you see, from January of 1960 up until the end of the session, Johnson had taken the role of staying out of this thing. Now, a lot of people say, "Well, why did he do this?" Well, my view of it is that he did it because he felt that as majority leader, of a majority in Congress but a minority party as far as the White House is concerned, he had an obligation to work with the President and keep some sort of legislation moving, and that if he had announced as a candidate in, say, January or February of 1960, that everything that he did would have been suspect. Therefore, he felt he had to maintain an unannounced position which would permit him to perform as Senate majority leader.

My own feeling is that that probably as much as anything cost him the nomination. I don't have any doubt in my mind that had he pursued the nomination aggressively from late 1959 and early 1960, that he could have had the nomination or come very close to it. But he felt that he had to stay out of it until June of 1960 when the session was over, because he

had an obligation as majority leader to continue to get the congressional program through. If he had been an announced candidate all during that six months period, say, why, he would have been suspect. If some legislation didn't get passed, people would say, "Well, Johnson held it because he wanted to embarrass Ike." He just wouldn't have been able to be effective at all.

M: Did he realize the importance of the primaries?

W: Oh, I think so. I think he understood that. I never heard him say this, but it is my view, and I believe I am correct in this, that he stayed out of primaries, out of announcing, despite great pressures, because he knew that he would have to resign as Senate majority leader because he couldn't continue effectively and be majority leader and be a candidate at the same time. It just wouldn't work. Now, if he had been minority leader, it might have been possible, because you must understand that Mr. Johnson said repeatedly that "We have only one president at a time," and Mr. Eisenhower was his president and he was going to try to do what he felt best for the country, and so forth. In a very real sense, his being majority leader, I think, played a great part in costing him the nomination in 1960, because I believe that with his strength as majority leader that had he started in late 1959, early 1960, to pursue the nomination in whatever way, either primaries or what have you, why, I just really believe that he could have done it.

M: Did he say anything to you on the car ride over to make the announcement?

W: Yes, he said, "When I go in there, call Speaker Rayburn and tell him that I am going to have this press conference and for him to tune it in on the television and listen to it. And tell him that I don't think that the

announcement that I will have to make will disappoint him." I did. I called Speaker Rayburn and told him that I had a message, that the Senator was going to the caucus room for his press conference and that the Senator wished for him to tune it in and felt that he, the Speaker, would not be disappointed with the announcement he had to make. The background to that was apparently as late as that day or that morning the Speaker had called and urged him to go ahead and announce and get in the race for the nomination because no longer could he stay out. The Senator had made up his mind to do that and wanted me to get that message, and I took that.

M: Did you happen to go to Los Angeles?

W: Yes, I did. I did go to Los Angeles. I think I might have been an alternate delegate. I guess I was an alternate delegate to that particular convention. I went to the 1952 convention. I went to the 1956 convention. I went to the 1960 convention.

M: Were you surprised when Johnson took the vice presidential position?

W: No, I was not surprised at all.

M: Why not?

W: You just have to understand this man's sense of duty. It's just as simple as that. You know, you can make a lot of conversation about it, but it never crossed my mind that were it offered to him that he wouldn't take it. I have heard him say, "You can't accept all the benefits of the party, all the emoluments of the party, all of the good things of the party, and then when they ask you to do something that you might not prefer to do, you can't say, 'No, I am going to turn my back.'" Now, he just never felt that way. He feels you have got to take the good with the bad. Not that the vice presidency was bad because he had a very high respect for it, but I am saying that he was getting lots of advice, "You can be

more effective as Senate majority leader." Well, the plain truth is he just had a greater depth of understanding of what was involved than those that were advising him. But to me, I knew that he would accept it if it were offered to him. I didn't know whether anybody would offer it to him. I didn't have any feel for that, but once it was offered, anybody who knows Lyndon Johnson would have known that he would accept that. That came as no surprise at all, that he accepted that. He felt it was his duty. He felt it may have some political problems associated with it, but you just don't turn your back. You just don't do it. If the party asks you to be it, you just don't do it. Having accepted the privileges of the party all the way through his political career and then he said, "no," and then be dog in the manger and go back and sulk. There were problems for him politically if he didn't accept it as well as if he did, you see. But no.

M: Did you have any contact with him immediately after the death of Kennedy in Dallas?

W: With him?

M: Were you still with the radio station?

W: No, by this time--I went to Washington on November 1, 1963, as vice president of American Airlines, and three weeks later the assassination occurred. I arrived on about a Friday night in Washington, and on Saturday the Vice President and Mrs. Johnson were good enough to call and say, "Why don't you come over on Sunday night for Sunday supper." My wife and I did. We went over there, and he said, "Now, a lot of people are going to know that you are my friend and you are taking on a new spot here. Just play it--he didn't use the word "cool", I don't believe that word came in it, but that was the context--"just pace yourself and don't try to get too involved too quickly. We'll stay in touch and if I can give you any advice

or if you need to talk to me, fine, but just use good sound advice." Then he wanted to know a little about what I was going to be doing for American Airlines in the public affairs arena.

Incidentally, my title was vice president for public affairs for the system, not just Washington. I was based in Washington, but I had responsibility for the public affairs program over the system. I had system responsibilities, and it wasn't confined to Washington at all.

But anyway, we had a very pleasant evening with them. I didn't want to bother them, and so I think that for the next three weeks I just got my feet on the ground and got acclimated. So I didn't hear or make any contact for the next two or three weeks. Then the assassination came.

Let's see, I did see him one time. I had to be in Los Angeles on the evening that he was speaking to a Democratic fund-raising meeting in Los Angeles as vice president. This must have been about November 15 or 16, somewhere in there, and I was out there. I did see him just briefly there. I think he thought I might have been out politicking, but what I had done was I had gone out to California to see if I could sell some charters. The Democratic Party was wanting to contract for some airlines carriers there, and we were in competition with TWA and United for a charter for the campaigns and so forth. I had gone out there to see if I could get some business for the company. So I was there when the political leaders that were going to make the decisions were going to be in Los Angeles for this dinner. I was there and saw him just briefly then. Then I went on back to Washington and I didn't see him again until the day of the assassination.

I was stunned like everybody else, not knowing what to do. Then all of a sudden it occurred to me that the home front, The Elms, might be untended, and there might be something I could do out there to be of value in a personal sense. So I went out to The Elms and sure enough it was beginning to get chaotic out at The Elms. People were beginning to show up, the Secret Service finally were there and put the security on it. They began to secure the place and do all the necessary electronic detection, security check, of the house. I was there, and the phone was beginning to ring, obviously.

Incidentally, it's kind of interesting. As far as I know, the Johnsons the entire time they lived in Washington never had an unlisted phone number. I think I'm right on that. Maybe toward the latter days, but I don't think he ever had. He never did unlist his phone number.

But in any event the phone began to ring. I'm trying to remember who was there. Maybe one or two friends had shown up and servants. The first thing you know they were beginning to say things, and the press was calling, and it looked like a very difficult situation. So I remember speaking to someone to see if we could get the telephones shut off. Because as of that moment, you see, it was then the White House. I mean, effectively, it was the home of the President from that moment. So we finally, through the cooperation of all concerned, got the telephones hooked up through the White House switchboard, and that offered some control. But nobody in that house certainly could speak for the President of the United States, and so I remember being concerned about what we would do even for the calls that came through the White House. So we just kind of had a pact that we wouldn't say anything, and just not even identify who we were, just say there was no one here. We tried to control the calls a little bit that way.

By this time, somebody had gone to get Luci. Luci must have been about a junior or something at the National Cathedral and very dramatic. Luci has always been very dramatic, and felt things deeply with great sensitivity. So she was beginning to cry and was emotional and distraught and so forth. Like every teen-age girl she wanted to get on that phone and call friends and this, that, and the other. I don't know why the phones were so important, but I didn't want the phones going on. I couldn't figure out what to do with Luci. I just didn't know, and finally a bolt of lightning came out, and I called Luci. I said, "Luci, the one thing your daddy always liked was to see you looking pretty. He always likes to see you look your very best." She said, "That's right." "And don't you think it would mean a lot to him that when he arrives home tonight after this tragic day, one of the nicest things you could do for him would be to look your very best." And she said, "That's right." I said, "Why don't you go up and wash your hair and get under the dryer and get yourself pretty, because that will mean more. Get your prettiest dress on, the one he likes. That will mean as much to him as anything, to see you when he comes in that door." Well, she bought it. For the next two or three hours we had her under the dryer and washing her hair and fixing her nails. We got her out of circulation. I don't know whether Luci ever knows of that trick we pulled on her, but it did work. It helped her to compose herself and forget things and so forth.

I stayed there that evening until the First Lady Mrs. Johnson arrived. After landing at Andrews, she came directly to The Elms and I think the President went elsewhere, and she stayed there. She came to The Elms. As soon as she was there and I saw that some of her other friends[were] and I had spoken to her and say that things were under control, I left. I

just didn't feel that I should intrude on that evening anymore. I had done what I could. So I left after seeing that she was there and there was nothing I could do. I left and went on home.

The next day was Thanksgiving Day, wasn't it?

M: That would be the twenty-third.

W: The twenty-third is my birthday, and I think it happened to fall on Thanksgiving that year. But in any event--wasn't John Kennedy buried on a Saturday?

M: He was killed on a Friday.

W: No, no, it was on the Wednesday [Friday, November 22, was the Friday before Thanksgiving] before Thanksgiving, I think.

M: Is that when it was?

W: Yes.

M: We'll check.

W: In any event, I think the state funeral was over by Saturday.

It was either that Sunday or one week from then, but it seemed like it was that Sunday we got a call from the Johnsons to come over for potluck on Sunday night at The Elms. I thought to myself, "My heavens, it just gets to be an unreal situation when you go to take potluck with the President of the United States." We ate in the little kitchenette-dinette, not the main dining area, there in The Elms and had a very pleasant evening. So much for that.

M: Did he say anything to you about how it felt to be president at that time?

W: No, I would have to refresh my memory. I don't have any particular [recollection of it]. He kind of wanted friends around him for the unwinding period, you see. We didn't attempt to draw him out on this sort of thing. We tried to be

what friends are supposed to be, you know, there to lean on. But we didn't encourage him to do any retelling and I don't have any particular memory. He was very much preoccupied with what he should do with respect to the American public to continue the continuity of government, give them strength, because he felt that the public had had as much of a trauma inflicted upon them as he had had. He was concerned for the public and so forth, and immensely concerned for the welfare of Mrs. Kennedy and all the family. Of course, the First Lady was completely generous and tolerant all during that period. They were very mindful of the Kennedy's feelings and so forth. It was a solemn time, but I don't know--he was making his way gradually and forcefully in his own mind he was commencing to figure out the best way to pick up the reins of government. That's the kind of mood it was. He was picking up the reins firmly but not so firmly that it gave any other appearance other than of trying to make sure that the American government continued after a great tragedy.

M: Did you campaign for him in 1964?

W: Yes, I worked for the First Lady in 1964.

M: The train ride?

W: Yes, that's a story we might have to tell on another occasion. That story, or my recollection of that and also the story of the trip to New Zealand maybe a little bit about the inauguration, those things, maybe we could save those for another session.

M: You have been talking about an hour and a half. We might draw this to a close for this part. But I might, right here at the end, pick up any other contacts you might have in preparations for another session, just as you mentioned the train ride with Lady Bird and the trip to New Zealand and the inauguration. You have had, I presume, continual social contact, dinners, and that sort of thing.

W: Oh, yes. We were privileged to be at state dinners.

M: Did you ever serve on any special committees or anything like that?

W: Yes, the President was kind enough to appoint me to the National Commission on Selective Service. I felt that the report that the National Selective Service Commission turned in was one of the best commission reports that he had had. I thought it was particularly a job well done. My part was minor. I don't mean that to be as immodest as it sounds. But it was a good report, a good study. I don't think that he was particularly enamored of it because it was one of the few that didn't have a consensus. He likes to have a consensus, as you know. He likes to have everybody in agreement, and I think that's desirable in many cases. We were in about 99 percent agreement on most issues, but there were a couple of areas that we were not in agreement in the commission. But that was a good study and was well received. The New York Times and others gave it a good review.

I think this is kind of interesting; "Hate the draft" is getting to be almost a cliche these days, you know. This is the thing that is bugging the young people: the draft, you know. You never hear any definitive discussions. You just say the "draft" and that brings in all the evil that you can muster up. But it's interesting that the President recognized the inequities of the draft I think as early as 1965 and was commencing to think about it. By June of 1966 he had appointed this commission to study the draft, to do the very thing that the young people two years later are beginning to burn libraries about now. But he was immensely interested in this draft question and its inequities, and set up this commission in early or mid 1966. But he had been working on this thing and was sensitive to it. I have always thought it amusing,

these young people talking about, "We've got to change the draft." Incidentally, there is virtually no difference in the commission's reports and the Nixon [reports]. You know, Nixon sent a bill to Congress for the revision of the draft. It almost takes our recommendation almost 100 percent. And incidentally President Johnson sent a draft reform bill to the Congress, so Johnson and draft reform were synonymous. He worked on draft reform as a major part of his administration. It's funny how these things get lost, but he was extremely concerned.

M: We might talk about that some again later on a future date. I want to thank you right now for the time you have given me.

[End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview II]

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