

## INTERVIEW II

DATE: October 21, 1980  
INTERVIEWEE: ADAM YARMOLINSKY  
INTERVIEWER: MICHAEL L. GILLETTE  
PLACE: Mr. Yarmolinsky's office, Washington, D. C.

### Tape 1 of 1

G: Let's start with your earliest involvement with the War on Poverty. Were you at all involved before Sargent Shriver's selection?

Y: No. No, again, as I think I spelled out in that article of mine you've got ["The Beginnings of OEO"], I was aware of the fact that there was a task force under Kennedy. I guess there were several task forces. I was vaguely aware of what was going on in the Justice Department with that juvenile delinquency group, but I really wasn't involved at all; I was fully involved in my job at the Pentagon.

It wasn't until the day that I was sitting in on a briefing, a preparation session with the President for a press conference in which he was planning to cover some Defense Department stuff, and I was there along with I suppose the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs. He kept interrupting the briefing session to talk to somebody on the phone about taking a job, and it was quickly apparent that he was talking to Shriver and telling Shriver that he had to take the poverty task force job. And the next day or so Shriver called me to a meeting, which I remember I was particularly

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glad to be called to because otherwise I would have had to go to dinner with the Israeli military attache who was always beating on us for more money for more equipment for Israel.

Shriver's meeting was the first meeting I went to. Thereafter I found myself involved at first on sort of a nighttime basis. I'd go to work on the poverty task force stuff when I left the Pentagon at seven or eight o'clock at night, and then after a bit of that I shifted to full-time as Shriver's deputy.

G: In his phone conversation with you did Shriver indicate why he wanted you to. . . ?

Y: In his phone conversation?

G: Didn't you say that he telephoned you before that task force meeting?

Y: Oh. Oh, he invited me to the meeting.

G: Right.

Y: Why did he invite me?

G: Right.

Y: Well, we had worked together in the Kennedy campaign, and then I was one of three or four people who worked with him on the Kennedy talent hunt between the election and the inauguration. At the end of that period, when he went off, Ralph Dungan and I pretty much ran the talent hunt, and I continued, kept in touch with him after I went to work in the Pentagon for [Robert] McNamara.

G: Had you played any role in the development of the Peace Corps?

Y: No, I really had not.

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G: Do you recall his initial impressions of the War on Poverty? What it should be?

Y: Well, the first impressions were the ones that we exchanged with each other when we were standing at the stalls in the men's room after we had had the briefing from [Walter] Heller and Kermit Gordon at that very first meeting. We had independently reached agreement that the program they were presenting to us made no political sense. You couldn't hang the whole poverty program on community action and you'd have to put together a much more diverse package with elements, something for everybody, that you couldn't get community action started fast enough, that you couldn't do it as just an exemplary program.

We moved rapidly from there to developing what was presented as the legislative package, in which we thought that the centerpiece was the Job Corps. To some extent I at least, and I think he and I thought alike, reflected the thinking of Bob McNamara, with whom obviously I talked a good deal and who felt that the Job Corps was the best idea in the package. Now, some of the other ideas which we thought were kind of promising didn't survive, like in effect the land reform provisions. Our eleventh hour thought about the employment program, which we were going to finance with an additional tax on tobacco, died in the Cabinet Room when Shriver raised it because the President was not about to add a tax at the time he was proposing to take off taxes.

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G: Was it merely a question of taxation, do you think or did it have more to do with the tobacco industry in particular?

Y: No. It was several things. First, we had made an initial decision that the focus of the poverty--one of the choices we said we had to make was whether to concentrate on creating jobs for people, preparing jobs for people, or preparing people for jobs. We decided for the latter, partly because we thought that the President's tax cuts would in effect be job-creating; partly because we thought it takes more time to prepare people for jobs than jobs for people, and I guess partly because we didn't see where we'd get the money for the job part.

But the minority view, as represented by Bill Wirtz in the Labor Department, was always there. At the last minute we put in this notion of the job program, which was hedged about with some protective devices to keep it from being an employment security program for the Union of Operating Engineers, who said they had to be low-paying, they had to be unskilled jobs, they had to be certain percentage of people from the area where the work was going on and so forth. But we really had not thought it through. It appeared I'm sure as an afterthought. When Shriver presented it and the President said no, and then Bill Wirtz spoke up at the cabinet meeting--this was the one that Shriver took me along to, so I was there--and said, "Mr. President, we really need something like this," the President just ignored him. It was a shocking

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demonstration of the way Johnson sometimes handled things. He didn't even bother to respond; he just went on to the next item on the agenda.

G: Let's go back and talk about that February 2 meeting. This was the first meeting where you had the briefing from Heller and Kermit Gordon.

Y: Gordon, yes. Whether those two--one, possibly both of them were there, I literally don't remember.

G: Do you recall who else attended the meeting and where it was?

Y: Well, it was in a room that I remember was painted government green, and whether it was in OMB or in Shriver's conference room, I can't remember. I think there is a record of where it was, and I think there's also a record perhaps in the [Daniel Patrick] Moynihan book [Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding] of who was there. Harris Wofford was there. I think Frank Mankiewicz was there. It wasn't a very big meeting.

G: Some sources place the meeting at Shriver's home.

Y: No. That's wrong. That's wrong. Why do I remember it? Because I remember it was in a rather dingy office, and I happen to remember the conversation that Shriver and I had about it will never fly. We had that when we both went to the john, standing in adjacent urinal stalls.

G: Now there was a larger meeting two days later.

Y: Was it two days later?

G: Yes.

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Y: That was in Shriver's conference room, and there he got a lot of the people that he liked to gather around him from outside government. That was the one where Dick Boone kept saying maximum feasible participation.

G: How were people chosen to attend this meeting?

Y: The first meeting or the second one?

G: Well, the second one.

Y: The second one was Shriver's list. Shriver carries around in his head a list of sort of interesting people whom he likes to call on. I don't recall whether I had any role in putting together that list or whether Shriver just did it. I simply don't remember. I don't think I did. I don't think it included people whom I dredged up. I mean, later on--not much later, within the week or so--I brought in people whom I tended to call on. It may be that some of those people were people whom I suggested for that first big meeting, but I don't remember.

G: Who would these people have been, for example?

Y: People whom I would have called up?

G: Yes.

Y: Oh, Paul Ylvisaker, with whom I had worked in the Ford Foundation; Paul Jacobs, whom I thought of as kind of an imaginative radical thinker worth listening to; gee, I don't know that I thought of Michael Harrington, his name was in everybody's head because of his book, The Other America. I brought in John Rubel, because he had been a colleague in the Pentagon and I thought of him as an

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inquiring mind. Norb Schlei came in naturally, but I had known him I guess through our Yale Law School connections. Edgar Cahn I may or may not have--I just don't remember. I would have thought of him because he and his wife had written that long piece in the Yale Law Journal that was one of the basic documents.

G: Was it assumed during this period that Sargent Shriver would lead the program that would come out of the task force?

Y: I think it probably was. He made noises about how he didn't want to do it and somebody else should be brought in, but I think it was kind of assumed that if he was heading the task force he would head the [program].

G: Was it ever assumed that he would resign the directorship of the Peace Corps?

Y: It was never assumed. I think if you had asked me at the time I would have said yes, that he would give it up but maybe not immediately.

G: Do you think attempting to do both was a strain on one man?

Y: Oh, I'm sure it was. I'm sure it was. But in those days we thought you could do anything.

G: Why do you think he didn't resign one?

Y: Well, the two fitted together ideologically and emotionally, if not. . . . How long was it before he resigned?

G: Gee, I don't know, I guess it was well over a year.

Y: Was it that long? Probably too busy. (Laughter)

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G: Now shortly after that February 4 meeting, about ten days later, you met at the White House with LBJ and Sargent Shriver and Frank Mankiewicz. Do you recall that meeting? You met with him for about an hour, just before John Steinbeck met with him, if that has any. . . .

Y: This is terrible, but I don't remember that meeting. Frank Mankiewicz was along, too?

G: Yes. This was just before Shriver was sworn in.

Y: I simply blanked it out. Why would I do that?

G: Now, let me ask you in general here if you recall what LBJ's perception of a war on poverty was?

Y: Well, I guess I didn't realize until after the bill was passed that his perception was not as close to reality as one might have thought. Because--I think it was after the bill was passed or shortly before the bill was passed--he was saying to [Bill] Moyers things which led Moyers to conclude that Johnson assumed that community action would be handled entirely by local government or agencies of the federal government, like the NYA, which Johnson had been involved in as a young man. Moyers had to explain to him, no, it wasn't going to be that way. So I really don't think he got involved in the detail of the program.

G: Did this represent, do you think, a distrust of private agencies?

Y: No, I don't think so. No, I don't think it was a choice. I don't think that he made a choice between the two. I really don't think he thought about modalities, means.



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G: In any of these meetings with you and Sargent Shriver, did President Johnson ever talk about what he hoped that the War on Poverty would accomplish?

Y: Oh, he talked endlessly.

G: What would he say in these things?

Y: I had no specific recollection. I mean I can't close my eyes and remember him saying a sentence or a paragraph. I have just a very impressionistic recollection that he was approaching it in a very impressionistic way. He loved to talk. He would quote--who was it, who was the first president of the AFL-CIO--Philip Murray, who talked about giving people a rug on the floor and a picture on the wall and a little of the comforts of home. Poverty is a bad thing, let's get rid of it, it was just about as simple as that.

G: Do you think he envisioned--?

Y: And he was thinking, not about the substance of the program but about the political problems of getting it through. Now I notice this Moyers' memorandum here, "The President wants more logic and less rhetoric in outlining why we must wage war on poverty. He wants to appeal to the mind as well as the heart." Well, maybe that's what the President said to Bill, but I'm more inclined to think it's what Bill--"He wants to point out with facts and figures how the obligation to help the poor goes beyond even the fundamental moral obligation. In other words, eliminating poverty will have what substantial effects on the total American economy?" That could have been Johnson, but it also could have been Bill Moyers.

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G: Do you think LBJ anticipated the conflict between the poor and institutions of local government?

Y: No, no, no. I don't think he did at all, and neither did we. We thought that the conflict would be between the poor and the local government people against the ladies bountiful. It just didn't occur to us. Well, we thought that you'd have some conflict in the South as to the black poor. We had to try to steer a careful course on that one to get the thing through and yet protect the minority poor.

But our problems were so political. I spent an awful lot of time--again as that article spells out--on the problem of trying to get some money in the bill for parochial schools because [Hugh] Carey was in trouble. Or was it Carey was in trouble and Carey would influence [James J.] Delaney and Delaney was on the Rules Committee? Carey had an opponent in the primary, I suppose, who was making a big thing of the fact that the government was going to close the Brooklyn Navy Yard and who had the interesting slogan, "No boats, no votes." Carey kept telling us that this was a grits-and-greens bill, and it did more for the rural South. It wasn't true, and there was a real constitutional problem, but we needed those votes. We needed the conservationist vote, so we put more rural Job Corps camps in than would have made substantive sense. We needed Edith Green's vote and support, and that meant women's Job Corps camps, perhaps more than we thought we could. . . .

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G: It seems in the hearings that Edith Green came in the first day of the hearings with, "Why aren't there any women's Job Corps?" and adamantly pushed for that. Did you all anticipate that she would do that?

Y: No, our consciousness had not been raised at that point. But you know, you could say that one way of describing what happened was that instead of putting together a new program, we put together a lot of programs that had been around for a long time--proposed programs--and by putting them together and giving them a common label and dealing with the political problems in getting them through, we got a positive legislative result which had eluded the grasp of others who had tried with particular pieces.

G: While we're on the subject of Edith Green, let me ask you, why do you think she was so hostile to so many facets of the program?

Y: I think she's just a very feisty, difficult lady.

G: There is some thinking that she was overlooked [for] consideration for a job in the Kennedy Administration, and that she held it against Shriver.

Y: Oh, there was some talk of that, yes. I remember that now.

G: HEW?

Y: I don't know.

G: Did you have a formula for dealing with Edith Green?

Y: I'm sure we did, but I can't remember what it was. There was some fuss about whether we would be taking people out of school, sort

of drawing people out of school into the Job Corps, and didn't we have to provide some guarantee that she wanted.

G: Something like letters from the local school principal?

Y: Something like that.

G: Now on February 18 Shriver was sworn in, and you attended that cabinet meeting.

Y: Was that the day of the cabinet meeting that we [discussed]?

G: He was sworn in I think during the cabinet meeting.

Y: Oh, to my recollection I attended only one cabinet meeting, and that was the one where we presented the legislative program. That may have been February 18, but it's hard to see how we could have had it that soon. It should be possible to date that cabinet meeting, I mean, without my recollection. Moynihan and I--Shriver always took two people with him when he went somewhere.

G: The program seems to have been hurried along greatly during that month of February. There was a constant rush to get the program hammered out. You all seemed to be delaying somewhat, to get it either more firmly established and kept getting delays in terms of when you would actually submit the legislation. Do you recall this situation?

Y: No. I just have a vague recollection that we were being pressed to have it yesterday, and I don't doubt that I used that kind of cliché, Pentagon formula, "if you want it bad, you'll get it bad," because that was always happening in the Pentagon, wanted yesterday.

G: Why--?

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Y: Why did they want it in such a hurry? Well, if you're legislatively oriented, you want to get it up there as soon as possible because one of the easiest ways you can lose legislation is just run out of time, and we were worried about running out of time. Whenever you got a new bill, one of the major worries is not that it will be defeated, but that it just won't get all the way before the session is over and then you have to start over again or half over again. I don't doubt that Johnson wanted it, in part, for the 1964 election. He was so determined to have a landslide that he wanted everything. Johnson always wanted everything.

G: And yet he put a hold on the awarding of grants until after the election.

Y: He did?

G: Yes. So, I wonder if that. . . .

Y: I'm now just speculating--he may have done it either because he thought it would look like politicking and would boomerang, or because he figured shrewdly that he'd get a lot more votes from people who were hoping for favors than from the one person who has received them than the nine who were disappointed.

G: In those memos there's a notation that LBJ was intrigued by the suggestion that there be a national foundation to fight poverty. It sounds almost like a volunteer foundation, you don't recall?

Y: It doesn't ring a bell at all.

G: Let me ask you about the difference of opinion between Sargent

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Shriver and Willard Wirtz. I gather that the two really disagreed fundamentally on what the program should consist of.

Y: Well, Wirtz because he was in the labor business, wanted the program to provide jobs--that was point one--and we had made the decision that that was not going to be our order of priorities. Second, Wirtz, I have to say even more than being concerned about substance, was concerned about turf. He was a very jealous bureaucrat, in this as in many things. The stories about Wirtz' temperament are legion. He would much have preferred to run the whole poverty program, and if he wasn't going to run the whole thing he certainly wasn't going to let Shriver run any piece of it that might go in the Labor Department.

There were two fights: one was over the Neighborhood Youth Corps, and the other was over whether the United States Employment Service would be used for the Job Corps, or whether the Job Corps would run its own recruiting program. I insisted, I think successfully as I recall and maybe I'm dreaming, that we couldn't accept the statements of the Labor Department that they would beef up and rejuvenate the USES, but that the best way to do that would be for us to have a competing activity in Rooseveltian fashion. So I believe we won on that one. Maybe when I got out it got turned around and I didn't know it.

G: Well, I think it was to the point that the Employment Service would be the recruiting agency, but that the Job Corps reserved the right to conduct its own special recruitment efforts.

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Y: That sounds like a likely compromise. Wirtz did get to run the Neighborhood Youth Corps. We had this provision in the law that the OEO could coordinate all anti-poverty activities, but I left before we had worked out how that was going to go in practice. And I don't think it ever did work out in practice because there wasn't anybody there who had the time and the inclination to make it work.

We did get the OEO put in the Executive Office of the President, which was fought by OMB because they said it isn't the kind of thing that ought to be in EOP, and they were right in theory. But we couldn't figure out any other way to give OEO the status it needed.

G: Who resolved that dispute?

Y: I guess the President did.

G: You don't recall meeting with him though on that, or Shriver meeting with him? I mean, it would seem to be a presidential decision.

Y: Well, I guess what happened was we submitted the legislation that way and OMB must have objected, and whether they decided not to carry it to the President himself, whether they got signals from Moyers that the President would not favorably entertain their objection, or whether they went to the President and had a showdown, I don't remember. Maybe Shriver does.

G: How about the dispute between Shriver and Wirtz and the compromise here that Labor would run Neighborhood Youth Corps?

Y: Well, there I remember Shriver and I had a session with Wirtz in his oak-paneled conference room. I think that was where that was pretty well resolved. I remember Wirtz saying, "If it were anyone

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but you, Adam, I wouldn't even discuss this." He was taking a very high moral tone.

G: Do you think he felt let down by his representatives in the task force, Moynihan?

Y: I don't know. It would have been in character for him to have felt that, and Moynihan did leave the task force and go off to Europe on a junket about the point where he realized he wasn't getting anywhere.

G: Well, the suggestion has been made that Moynihan really didn't represent the Labor Department's view that strongly. In fact, at one point he said that the Labor Department was incapable of running one aspect of the program.

Y: That's right, too.

G: Do you recall that? Did Moynihan take this position?

Y: I don't recall. I really don't recall. All I recall is a general feeling that Pat was in a very embarrassing position because he was asked to defend [me] when he heard that I was going to go to work for the task force. We were close acquaintances, distant friends. He said he was enormously pleased because he, the Labor Department, had been having this big fight with OMB and CEA, and he assumed that I would be on their side--well, why?--because it was their side. I don't know. Because he was on that side. It was the more practical side. The other people were social science dreamers.

And in a sense he won at least part of that battle. We came out and said, "You can't just have community action, it isn't enough. You've got to have some more specifics."



G: Which was Wirtz' position, too, wasn't it?

Y: Yes. Yes.

G: That you had to have a broader base?

Y: Yes. Yes.

G: Do you recall the President's War on Poverty message, and who drafted the message? This was the message that accompanied the legislative submission?

Y: Well, we did. The first drafts were always done in the agency or the group that was responsible, and then it got polished. I don't know, Dick Goodwin may have got in on it and probably did. I don't recall specifically. I know that we did the first draft.

G: Let me just ask you a few questions about the task force itself. I suppose you were always strapped for space--

Y: Sure were.

G: --and had to move from one location to another.

Y: Yes, I remember we moved to the Renwick and then it began to fall down or it was feared [that it would]. You know that story, the foundations. [We] moved out in a hurry. I can't remember, did we move back to the Peace Corps?

G: I have two different locations in the Peace Corps building, fifth floor and then twelfth floor. And then the Court of Claims.

Y: Well, that's because there were--I was given Bill Moyers' old office because there was no deputy director of the Peace Corps. I used that office I think from the time that I first went over there until I left and the bill went through, with a brief interval in the

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[Renwick], I'm not even sure that Shriver and I really moved into the Renwick before everybody had to get out.

G: You split up in two locations at one point, I understand.

Y: Well, two locations within the Peace Corps building?

G: No, no. I think one was a World War I temporary headquarters and then a nineteenth-century building that was used as an emergency hospital.

Y: Oh, there was. Yes, we did have some space in that building on New York Avenue. I think that was while I was still [there]. That was task force space, yes. We just outgrew.

G: Did the task force have a shortage of operating and planning funds during this stage?

Y: We operated on a theoretical budget of ten thousand dollars. We operated by borrowing people from government agencies and non-government agencies and getting volunteers. We had a lot of people who just worked for free. We borrowed secretaries and we borrowed services. We had an additional restriction because there was a legislative rider that said that no money could be spent by the agencies on what eventually became VISTA, so we had to be very careful about that. That was a particularly severe handicap. But I was begging thousands, I mean, four-figure advances from the White House.

G: Did you ever get that fund, that President's contingency fund, freed up, do you recall?

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Y: The fifty thousand dollars that was talked about here?

G: Yes.

Y: I don't think we did. I don't think we ever did.

G: Do you think that the shortage of funds was a severe handicap or at all influenced the way the program evolved? If you had had more money, would you have brought in different people or done different things?

Y: I don't think so. No. No, I can't say that we would have. I think we managed, we scrounged reasonably effectively.

G: Within the task force, was there a feeling that the existing cabinet departments were not really focusing on the poor?

Y: Yes. I don't know that we articulated it, but I have at least subsequently done a lot of writing on how bureaucracies work. They do what they're best at, which is what they have been doing, and you give them a new problem and they try to figure out how they can assimilate the new rhetoric to their previous functions and tasks.

G: To what extent did the members of this task force who were from various departments represent the views of those departments that they came from?

Y: Practically not at all. Moynihan was the exception. He was stuck. [James] Sundquist, I'm sure, represented [Agriculture]. He had no trouble because he worked for--what was he?--deputy to the under secretary. I don't remember who it was. [Charles S. Murphy] Was the under secretary [John] Schnittker at the time? At any rate, the top people in Agriculture, the secretary and I suppose the under

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secretary, were good progressive politicians and they didn't give Jim a hard time. Jim himself was so committed to the idea that he wasn't about to [disagree]. And then he skillfully drew on the Farmers Home Administration, which was the home of the old New Deal survivors in Agriculture, and used them. So Agriculture was not at cross-purposes with us at all.

And the people from Defense were my people. Defense had no [objections]. I determined early on that the thing that the Department of Defense was best at was housing, clothing, feeding, training, moving people, and that in the Job Corps we tried to use them that way as much as we could despite the anguished cries of knee-jerk liberals. And the Department was perfectly willing to be used that way provided they got reimbursed. We said, "Yes, you'll get reimbursed, so don't worry about it."

G: This was an issue early on, how much of a military tone the program should take?

Y: Yes. That's right. That's right.

G: I gather this was completely shot down in the early stages. Do you recall who was responsible for its defeat?

Y: Well, not to take credit or anything, but I think I was. I think I just said no, this is silly, and went ahead almost ignoring it, since it had no locus in the Congress and no sympathetic ear from Moyers or Shriver.

G: I gather that you were in favor of the idea of using the military.

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Y: Yes, yes. So the people that came crying that this was a bad thing couldn't persuade me and they couldn't persuade Shriver and they couldn't persuade Moyers, and they didn't have a focus in the Congress, so I was able to say, "I hear what you're saying, but I think you're wrong and we're not going to do it that way."

G: But wasn't the role of the military greatly reduced in, say, the Job Corps?

Y: Not in the planning stage. Now, I saw the military as the logistics people, and only the logistics people. Now it may be that in the rural Job Corps camps, once they get started, that the Interior and Agriculture bureaucracies did battle with the military. I don't know. I was out of it by that time. But in the planning stage, no. I don't think there was any reduction in the original intention.

G: Did HEW want to run the poverty program, do you recall?

Y: Well, now, that's a good question. Of course they must have and Wilbur Cohen was right in there. Who was the secretary? Was it [Anthony] Celebrezze?

G: Celebrezze, yes.

Y: Celebrezze was such a nothing.

G: I have a note here that he even threatened to resign at one point.

Y: There was a point where he felt--yes, I guess he was nudged into it, because--that's right, I had forgotten that. But I had forgotten it because it was sort of so what, don't resign. It doesn't matter, but don't resign. Don't make waves.

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G: I gather there really was a problem with the feeling on behalf of the existing cabinet officers that OEO was really encroaching on their turf.

Y: Oh, I'm sure there was, but which cabinet officers? Celebrezze was not enough of a factor. Wirtz was a big factor. Agriculture, no. Interior, I don't recall, who was the Interior secretary? [Stewart] Udall. We got on with Udall. There must have been some discussions of who runs the forest camps, but I don't recall that being a real problem.

G: HEW and Labor, I guess, were the big ones.

Y: Yes. But HEW, who were the people from HEW who were lent to us? Wilbur Cohen was--I mean, he must have been involved, and yet I don't have a sense of him, a recollection of him as a big factor. Wilbur is a very powerful and effective fellow.

G: [Harold] Horowitz would have been with HEW, too.

Y: Was he with HEW rather than Justice?

G: I think he was.

Y: Well, I don't remember Horowitz representing his agency. He was very junior at the time. I think he acted just like a member of the task force, not an ambassador from somewhere.

G: What about BOB? What was BOB's position throughout this period?

Y: Well, the only thing on which we had to argue with them--we may have argued on the budget. I don't think we did, because we picked up pieces of the budget that were used for [other things]. We

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stole money from other parts of the budget, which didn't trouble them. The only big argument was about the locus of the agency and there we had a big fight and we won.

G: In retrospect, would you have advocated something other than placing OEO in the Executive Office of the President, say, making it a cabinet level position? Do you think that you had enough clout to deal with the existing agencies?

Y: Without being in the Executive Office?

G: No, as the program developed.

Y: Oh. It's a very hard question to answer for me, because the way I would like to answer it in self-serving fashion is, if I had been there, I think I could have made it work. There was nobody there. The first deputy was perfectly capable of making [it work]. I mean, I'm not going to say I could have done a better job than Jack Conway could have done. But the way Jack Conway went in and out of the job, and his friction with Shriver, which was not his fault, meant that he didn't do it. And who came after Conway? There was a hiatus.

G: Bernie Boutin, I think.

Y: Was he a deputy? Well, Bernie could have done it, except that Bernie was so unsubstantive. I mean, he's a very effective administrator, I know he was. He ran GSA without scandals, and I'm not saying that I could have done that. But Bernie was I think not sufficiently--I'm guessing, I shouldn't even guess, because I was

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off in another part of the forest. But Bernie, you see, was a Kennedy person and I suspect the Johnson people were suspicious of him.

So one thing and another, it didn't get to exercise its coordinating functions which it might have. And I might have flunked out, too, but I sure would have enjoyed trying, and I thought that being in the Executive Office provided the potential to try.

G: What was the interest of the Interior Department in the task force?

Y: Oh, just the rural Job Corps camps.

G: How about the Bureau of Indian Affairs? Did they want to include that aspect, poverty programs aimed at Indians?

Y: At Indians? I'm sure that that came up, but I don't remember it as a significant issue.

G: The Commerce Department? Did they have an interest at all in the [task force]?

Y: No, they had EDA. [Economic Development Administration] I notice that Wirtz wrote a memorandum which I hadn't seen before, or didn't remember, to the President saying that regional poverty programs ought to be included. I don't know whether he was fighting with Commerce at that point or what. But I don't remember any significant [conflict]. Was Bill Batt running EDA? No.

The original picture of the poverty program in the public eye was Appalachia, and one of our earliest missions was to explain that poverty is not out there in the wilderness, it's in your backyard. The leaflets that we got out in the sort of public affairs-



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congressional relations job that we did at the very beginning was poverty is not regional.

G: Was there an urban versus rural bias on the task force, do you think? That the task force tended to think more in terms of urban ghetto poverty rather than rural poverty?

Y: No. I think we were pretty open-minded about that. And of course we were accused by the congressmen from urban districts of having a rural bias, which I think showed not that we had a rural bias, but that we were not in their pocket.

I don't want to wind this up, but I'm a little concerned about the time here. How much more time do you want?

[End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview II]

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
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