INTERVIEW II

DATE: April 24, 1981

INTERVIEWEE: BARRY ZORTHIAN

INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette

PLACE: Mr. Zorthian's office, Washington, D.C.

Tape 1 of 1

G: Mr. Zorthian, let's start with some of the points that are raised in that first interview that you did, and in particular some of the meetings that you had with President Johnson. You described a meeting in 1965 with Leonard Marks, John Chancellor, Frank Stanton and Lyndon Johnson in that small office off of the Oval Office.

Z: Yes, I did.

G: Can you recall the details of that meeting?

Z: Some of it. I don't remember whether I've given you this before or not, but if not, it dealt with the press in Vietnam and the coverage we were getting. Leonard was there as director of USIA, John was there as the new director of the Voice of America. Frank Stanton was just a sort of adviser to the President; I don't think he had an official position then. He may have been chairman of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information. He became that later, in any event, but whether he was at that particular time or not I'm not sure.

The President, as was so often the case with President Johnson, engaged more or less [in] a monologue. It certainly wasn't quite a dialogue. But the President was, as he was so often during the few times that I saw him, very perturbed about press coverage, very

concerned about the nature of it. I'm trying to remember, I think this was shortly after the Morley Safer TV spot about the burning of the huts on an action that had received a great deal of reaction, a great deal of attention, negative attention throughout the United States. I do remember clearly the President focusing in, zeroing in on Frank Stanton about the caliber of the CBS news team, saying very specifically he had information showing that there was a good deal of questionable background on Morley Safer and telling Stanton that he'd better get that newsroom straightened out, or he, the President, was going to blow the whistle on some of the correspondents, specifically Safer, and have the information made public and so on.

I found out later, I asked Walter Cronkite about this early enough in the seventies to where his memory would still be fresh, whether Frank Stanton had ever passed any of this information on to the pressroom or put any pressures on them of any kind. I'm happy to say--and I'm sure Walter would have told me at that point--that as far as Walter could remember, not one single bit of that pressure had gone from Stanton onwards. He just took the beating from the President, and Frank Stanton never said a word, I gather, to the newsroom.

G: Did Stanton defend the CBS news team over there?

Z: Oh, sure. I'm sure he defended it in terms of its being a responsible news team and so on. But when President Johnson got going on something like this, there was just no sense in trying to argue with him and defend anything. You just let him talk it out and get it off his chest and work you over a bit and then go about your business, which

was what Stanton did. And I gather Stanton was very close to the President, thought well of him. Later as you know, Stanton arranged to have the President's book published by--what was it, Harcourt?

G: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, I think.

Z: Well, Holt, Rinehart and Winston which CBS owned. It was the book company CBS owned. And I think they probably lost a good deal of money on the whole. But Stanton is a man I admire very much. Under the pressure--it's awfully hard to face up to the President of the United States and take the verbal beating Stanton did and not do anything about it. But as far as I know, as I say, there were absolutely no restrictions or restraints or inhibitions put on the CBS newsroom.

Now there was a whole period where Arthur Sylvester wrote that very unfortunate letter about Morley Safer, with implications as to his loyalty because he had a Canadian background. Supposedly Safer, who happened to be a bachelor, was married, according to Arthur, to an Asian if I remember, at least had a marriage that was in question. It was not the most savory of times between the government and the press.

G: You've got such a wealth of data here. I don't want to get too much out of order, but as long as you're on the subject of Arthur Sylvester and Morley Safer, I want to ask you about that meeting in the summer of 1965 at your villa.

Z: Never could understand it. I was with Arthur. I liked Arthur. He was a tough, hardheaded newsman. You know what his attitude toward the press was, "You don't like what I say, go out and check it yourself.

Go out and be a legman. Go out and be a true journalist." There was that famous incident in which I wasn't anywhere on the scene, it was way before my time, of Arthur having a press conference in Saigon at the waterfront denying there was any American assistance of certain types, certain combat equipment coming in. Evidently either this baby aircraft carrier, at least a warship of some kind, [was] right behind him and some reporter saying, "Arthur, what about that ship behind you, that warship behind you?" And Arthur supposedly replying, "What warship?"

But that was his attitude. He would have no hesitation in issuing a denial, in taking a very firm position in terms of the government's viewpoint, and he recognized and told reporters, "If you don't believe me, you don't like it, go out--you see a warship, write that you see a warship. I'm not going to confirm that it's here." That kind of an attitude was quite, if you will, in contrast to the traditional approach of government press people: tell the truth, no comment if need be, but don't distort, don't deceive, don't be disingenuous. Arthur could be all of those and rationalize it by saying that the government has the right to do this. And his famous quotation during the Cuban missile crisis of saying the government has under certain circumstances the right to lie.

Arthur was, I think to a great extent probably, unfairly criticized by the press. If you understood his philosophy, the press was being told in effect, go be a reporter and write what you see and hear and so on, but you're not going to get help from the government if we don't want to help you.

That press briefing in Saigon, as I say, I've never understood. Arthur was out there visiting. We were having some difficulties, LBJ in Washington was unhappy about the coverage. I was with Arthur all day, I know he hadn't been drinking. I think he may have had one light Scotch before dinner, maybe two, but no more than that. When people like Arthur came out, I used to call the press out so they could get it off their chests, raise whatever questions they had, and it also had the virtue of giving Washington people some flavor of what we were facing out there. So that I always thought it was very helpful.

G: Was the meeting designed to set up any kind of standards of access or of inside information or anything like that?

Z: It wasn't that specific. It was designed to let reporters get whatever beefs they had off their chests, or if nothing else, simply have a dialogue with Sylvester. In a way, you see, I had four bosses. Initially when I got in the press job I had one boss, supposedly, in Washington, Bob Manning, who moved from the State Department to the White House as the coordinator of all Vietnam press policy. Bob then left shortly thereafter, about a month thereafter, for the editorship of the Atlantic magazine. That left me without a clear-cut focal point.

The White House was the ultimate director of press policy I guess, but you didn't have Vietnam people reporting directly to the White House, although quite often we got messages directly. So I'd have Leonard Marks of USIA in a way, Arthur Sylvester at Defense,

whoever happened to be at State--it was Dix Donnelley at one point, Bob McCloskey was press officer at another point--plus whoever happened to be in the White House, Bill Moyers, George Christian, so on. So I had four different people, all with a perfect right to send me out orders, and all presumably on the receiving end of what I was sending back. Now it had some virtues, too, where I could play one off against the other, I must confess, from the field. But nevertheless, it made for a many-headed direction to us out there, because in theory out there we had unity, a unified command, in the press area as well as other areas. They did not in Washington, unless you called the White House press secretary that.

But at any rate, Arthur came out. It was for one of his periodic visits. I think he was with [Robert] McNamara on that particular visit. And as was the custom--I'd done this in the past with Bob Manning and others who came out--I got some of the key press together with him. It was supposed to be a fairly relaxed exchange more or less off the record. Arthur almost went out of his way to be belligerent. He did things that just were out of character, telling the press, the correspondents out there, all of whom had a lot of pride and self esteem as to their role, and a lot of younger feisty reporters, telling them he didn't have to bother with them, he could go around them to their editors. Telling them in effect they weren't very good reporters, not very accurate, literally physically wagging his hands in his ears at them and giving them all kinds of very heated comments. They left there just as mad as could be.

G: Can you recall any particular things that were said?

Z: Well, specifically that type of thing got their dander up. "I really don't care what you write, we don't have to pay any attention to you. We'll go around you to your editors. And that's the way we'll get you fellows straightened out." That kind of [thing]. Morley Safer's report on it was quite accurate.

G: Was it?

Z: Oh, yes.

G: Because Sylvester denied the accuracy of the [report].

Z: As we went upstairs I said, "Arthur, why did you do it?" It was obviously consciously confrontational and belligerent. I said, "Arthur, why did you do it?" He said, "Well, it's good for them." This was really about his reaction. He got very angry at me personally after Morley wrote that article--what was it, six months later, a year later or something. And I said, "Arthur, for crying out loud, you know it's an accurate article. What the hell do you expect me to do?" Arthur said, "It was an off-the-record session, and you should have denied that it happened." I had been called on it. I hadn't denied it, I hadn't confirmed it. I had told someone who called, on the record sort of, "There was an off-the-record session, and I'm not going to comment on it." He found this unacceptable, because by not commenting on it in effect it confirmed the existence. He felt I should have denied the whole thing happened. I said, "Christ! You can't do that!" But this was part of Arthur's philosophy. I used to run into him about once a year or once every six months, and he'd just

berate me for this again and again, right to his dying day. He was a mayor, as you know, up in one of those Hudson Valley towns. I saw him a couple of times when I went up to West Point. He'd be very pleasant, but he'd get on the subject and he'd get so damn mad about it. I don't know, I really still do not understand his real thinking in being that belligerent and bellicose with the reporters.

G: The approach of going through the editors and publishers, did Lyndon Johnson tend to do this?

Z: Occasionally.

G: Did it have any effect, do you recall? You've mentioned the Frank Stanton case.

Z: I hear on another occasion--obviously I wasn't privy to it, but I've heard this from Frank Stanton. I got to know Frank Stanton reasonably well over there. The President called him one day about coverage, and the quotation is: "Frank, you know what you gave me for breakfast?" "No, Mr. President, what?" "You give me shit on a shingle!" The type of thing that Johnson was perfectly capable of [doing]. And this was a call about seven-thirty in the morning or something. Again, as far as I could find out, Stanton said not a word to the pressroom.

G: What about let's say the print, the editors and publishers of newspapers business?

Z: How much he did it I honestly don't know. At that time, as you know, there were occasional flare-ups of Johnson. Wasn't it that period that he called the UPI desk here in Washington one night about a story they ran and just chewed out some poor night copy editor? I'm sure

any time he got a correspondent or an editor in that Oval Office, he chewed them out. It seems to me every time I saw him--well, that's not true. As I say, I didn't see the President that much. But the first three or four times I saw the President I barely had time to say "yes, sir," before he took off on the press and just held forth. You'd ask, "Did you tell him any different or did you present a different viewpoint?" You don't get a chance to.

G: Was his attitude toward the press unrealistic, do you think?

Z: Well, it was unrealistic. He was obviously very frustrated by the coverage. There were enough drawbacks in the nature of press coverage to give some substance to his complaints. But he would get carried away by it. A lot of it, of course, was his own doing, the nature of the man. At least I haven't read a book which has really captured Lyndon B. Johnson. Even if you don't know him intimately, as I did not, seeing a man a few times close up, you very frequently can get a perspective that people even closer cannot. He was bigger than life in every sense of the word. This great intensity, this great sort of overpowering personality. And he couldn't stand the press questioning him. And hell, talk to someone like Hugh Sidey, you really should, about LBJ and the press. Because Hugh was covering him then. He will name instance after instance of LBJ changing a decision already made because it had leaked. He just wanted to prove the press was wrong, or he couldn't stand the thought that the press would get some information that he felt was his prerogative to release on his own terms. You got some of that in the parts I saw, a lot of this is just reading

what's been in print already. But you got some of it in the stuff I saw.

G: Anything in relation to Vietnam? Did he reverse a policy or an appointment or something because it had gotten to the press?

Z: I am trying to think of a specific. What did he do? You know, time does sort of dull your memories. There was a lot of flap at one time about one of those trips he was making to see "his" prime ministers, that great quote of his that someone picked up: "I've got to go out to see my prime ministers and get them straightened out, keep them in line." But I think he changed some of his travel plans because a lot of that had leaked. Certainly a guy like Hugh Sidey will tell you he changed a U.S. domestic trip and a budget total and so on, because of the press. When you come to Vietnam itself, I think a certain number of decisions were made to take into account public opinion, and that public opinion would probably be more accurately described as press opinion. The Johns Hopkins speech he made in 1965, in which he offered to help develop, after the war, North Vietnam, in which he offered economic assistance to North Vietnam, and assistance in education and health and so on, was really designed to--you know, at that time he also said, "On the other hand we've got to maintain our firm military stand"--was really designed to meet the criticisms he was getting from the public. But the public was very definitly the press.

Now whether he ever changed targets because the press was criticizing him on certain types of bombing or there were specific instances where he changed an appointment, I honestly don't know. If you remember,

there was one time when it was clear General [William] Westmoreland was going to leave Vietnam but they denied it. The McNamara appointment to the World Bank was denied, if you remember, and that because of his Vietnam involvement. Certainly I think the timing of announcements, like some of the troop increments, the augmentations, were timed very definitely because of press criticisms or potential press leakage or actual press leakage. The press was always a factor, the press, American public opinion. But American public opinion, in the eyes of the administration, was being formed by the press, and press was always a factor in decisions in Vietnam and in the execution of decisions.

G: In any of these dealings, did he ever doubt the accuracy of the information he was receiving from his official sources, say Walt Rostow or. . . ?

Z: Oh, yes.

G: Did he really?

Z: Yes, I think he'd raise the question. He'd do it in two ways. Half the time when he was talking about the press he'd say, "I have this report here from the best people we have in the U.S. government showing we're making progress in the pacification and so on, and here is this New York Times article. Now they can't both be accurate. Your people are distorting and lying, et cetera, et cetera." But he would also raise questions, "the press says so and so," for a battlefield casualty figure, an interpretation of a battlefield [figure], the press

interpreting it this way, your version quite different. Why? What's the problem?

G: Who was he asking this of?

Z: Cables would come out to Westmoreland and to whoever was ambassador often. Now whether he ever questioned Rostow directly, I do not know. But I assume he must have, because out of Rostow's office would come questions about some of the so-called pacification statistics and so on. On the other hand, Rostow's interpretation of those figures, Rostow's tendency to look for the positive and to emphasize that--you know, I don't think anyone including Rostow distorted deliberately, but the process and the evaluation of those figures that came in would tend to be, obviously, or almost by human nature, the positive interpretation, the overstatement, if you will. And that led to much of the problems.

Rostow would get in a correspondent before he went out there and show him all kinds of charts, which Rostow could say perfectly legitimately came from Vietnam, came from "you guys out there," if you raised it with him. Because the military particularly would tend to give the positive aspect, the best possible interpretation of things, and do charts that looked very favorable. Rostow would brief them. Then the guy would come out to Vietnam and look around and get briefings, particularly on the civilian side of the mission, saying things aren't that good, we're not making that much progress, we do have headaches. Walt perceived particular problems and said, "Christ, there are two different worlds they're talking about." That was one

of the major headaches particularly in the 1966-1967-1968 period, Washington and Vietnam, not consciously telling different stories that were 180 degrees apart different, but nevertheless quite different interpretations.

G: Why was there such a gulf between what the press perceived and what the official sources out there perceived?

Z: Well, I've said, and I think there's some validity in the point that probably is oversimplified, there is a half-full, half-empty bottle problem here. One, you deal essentially in many of the aspects of that effort out there with intangibles, with things that were difficult to quantify. Yet the desire to measure the war, which went right back to the start of it, was part, if you will, of the McNamara approach to the military. It was part of standard military as well. Quantify, measure, have benchmarks that you can set up to determine whether you're making progress or not. To take a type of war in which the intangibles were most important, and to seek to quantify them by setting up figures, a statistical approach, and then executing that kind of a program meant that those statistics could be very misleading, could not reflect the full situation, an overall situation. You'd often get into the type of situation of where you'd distribute a hundred bags of rice, or you'd have 1312 incidents. What do those mean? What is the interpretation of those things? And that's what you couldn't quantify, and the interpretation of many of our statistics would tend to be positive by government officials and would tend to be negative by the media. Furthermore, to the extent those

statistics gave a valid picture, when they were finally pulled together from forty-four provinces, distilled at Saigon, distilled further at State and Defense, distilled finally at the White House, you got a very generalized picture.

So Washington very often was reacting to the broad-brush, general, bird's-eye view picture, whereas the press very often--and with the inherent nature of its business, looking for the negative--would focus on the specific, the individual incident, the individual situation, and that would by and large be negative. Based on that specific, often negative [incident, the press] would draw conclusions that ended up being quite at variance with what the official channel of communication provided the Washington policy makers. You know, if the press writes about one terrorist incident, or one abusive incident by the Vietnam army, but Washington looks at forty-four provinces, and forty-four provinces are fine and in one there's been one incident, the interpretation you get from that is quite different from that reporter who sees the one negative and writes a very vivid story about it, without bothering to, because it's not part of his story, say [that] elsewhere in the country the other 99 per cent of the country is perfectly fine. So you get completely accurate facts in both situations but quite different interpretations.

G: Was there a need on behalf of the official sources to make it look as good as possible in order to show. . . .

Z: No one went out and said, "Make it look as good as possible," and no one said, "Hoke up your figures or distort them." But the system we

have would tend to put a premium on that kind of result, because it said, "What progress have you made?" "What are you doing out there?" "Are you pacifying the countryside?" "Are you winning their hearts and minds?" "Are you running an efficient counterpart in your Vietnamese?" So that that soldier or that AID officer or whoever was out there, in response to such questions, would tend to say, "Yes, we've pacified this area." "Yes, we've got a perfectly clean, if you will, efficient Vietnamese counterpart." "Yes, the people are responding positively."

I finally became very discouraged because of this. I used to make a habit of going out to every province at least once a year, and some of them more often, Long An Province, Hau Nghia Province, key provinces right near Saigon. I think when I went out to Long An for the fifth year in a row and heard virtually the same briefing that I had heard the first year about the progress made in that province, and suddenly realized that each year the progress was the same progress, I said, "This is it." You get a little skeptical and you finally say, "I'm being misled." Well, no one was misleading deliberately. Each team of province advisers felt and were perfectly honest in their feelings that they were making progress. But at the end of a year when a new thing would come in, you'd find that there had been very little real movement. There was some obviously; there were areas that were improved eventually. As I say, there's no deliberate distortion, but the effect of the measuring devices and the way the provincial people had to report on them was that they misled you.

See, I'm not sure we were ever able to fight that war correctly. The United States by its very nature of things, its way of fighting a war, pouring in five hundred thousand troops, tons and tons of equipment--I've never forgotten the Vietnamese general, we took him out to the Enterprise, the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. You know, an aircraft carrier in full operation is a very impressive piece of equipment. This poor Vietnamese--he was my counterpart, he was a general, he was minister of information there--just shook his head and said in French, "Formidable, formidable," as he looked at this thing. Well, we were "formidable" all over the place, we had so goddamn much gear, we took that Cam Ranh Bay, which was a sand spit, nothing there, sandy beaches and desolate country and so on, and built a major port out of it in a very short time, things like that. But whether that was so overwhelming, so, if you will, overpowering, that the kind of skillful answer to the insurgency in which the political dimensions were critical, in which the fighting would tend to be less than battalion-sized, battalion-unit fighting, that type of fighting, small action, small unit fighting, whether we could handle that kind of war is a question I really have. Everything we did was on a big scale that we ended up doing. I used to say there was a Vietnamese way of doing things and there's an American way of doing things, and maybe one or the other would have worked. But we tried to find the middle road, and it didn't work for either side as a result.

G: In these meetings that you had with the President, what role did Bill Moyers play?

Z: Well, Bill was obviously the conduit, as far as I was concerned, to the President. I'm trying to think. The one specific one I remember with Bill, and I may have said it in 1969 but it stands out so vividly. On a trip back--and this had to be about 1965 or so--we were having government press people and the people interested in press [to] a meeting at the White House being chaired by Bill Moyers. Someone came in with a note which he passed to Bill. Bill read it and turned to me and said, "The Boss wants to see us upstairs right away." So the two of us went up to the family quarters. This was an immediately after lunch meeting, so it had to be about two-thirty or so. LBJ, as he used to periodically, was in bed in his own bedroom, not a huge room. We went in. When he saw us there he barely said hello, and I'm not even sure he said hello. He started taking off on the press.

G: What was he concerned about?

Z: Chewing us out, "Goddamn it, why can't you handle that press out there better? Why do you let them write that? Why don't you straighten them out?" et cetera, et cetera. Not really looking for an answer, just wanting to get his frustrations and annoyance about the press off [his chest], and we were the best target. Bill had undoubtedly been through this so many times he knew better than to try to answer or say anything beyond "Yes, Mr. President." I would occasionally try to get a word in and discovered quickly that it was better to just keep your mouth shut and sit there.

But the fascinating part of this, and I guess LBJ, again, this was typical of him because others have gone through this kind of

story. But in the middle of this monologue, nonstop monologue, [he] threw off his bedcovers, got out of bed, walked around, not missing one word, he still kept talking, walked over to the john where the door was open, left it open, relieved himself loudly, still talking, came back, got back into bed, put the covers over him again, never stopped talking, and the talk was all about the press. Well, that's quite a sight for a not-young, but nevertheless a fairly junior government official to sit there and watch the President of the United States walking over to the john.

G: Did he question the loyalty of the press?

Z: Oh, sure.

G: Did he think that they were communist-backed?

Z: Oh, yes. He would just fulminate against them, he'd get so goddamned mad.

G: Did you have any indication of Bill Moyers' uneasiness about the war at this point, or the correctnemss of our policy?

Z: Uneasiness in criticism, but not an awful lot of this even about the way we'd executed. Question marks about how the military was doing it, or how we were doing it even on the civilian side. I don't think I ever heard Bill say, and there's no reason he should say it to me because what relations we had were on a specific aspect, but I don't think I ever heard him question the war as such.

Same thing about McNamara, who presumably began questioning the war in 1967, questions about the way the air force was executing, about the results they were getting. Again, if you will, the fifth

time in Long An type of problem. Not that McNamara would specifically say, "Christ, you guys aren't doing a very good job." But from the questions he'd ask, you could obviously be aware he had a lot of real reservations about how well it was going. But I never heard McNamara question the war.

The only time that I got into questions about the war itself overall, in terms of officials, high officials at Washington, was that famous visit by Phil Habib, Bill DuPuy and George Carver about March of 1968. I remember at that time they were saying "What about it? Does this make sense? What do we have to [do]?" I remember saying to Phil, "I think the time has come where we have to go the Vietnamese and say they either get their act together, quit all this internal squabbling that's affecting their efficiency, or let's pull up stakes and get out. We're at that stage." I don't mean to claim that I was at all unusual on this or very far ahead of anyone. By then we're at a stage of saying this whole thing is not going.

G: Do you think by the mere fact they were asking question like this meant that there was a change in policy, or at least an openness to consider it?

Z: At least a readiness to consider a change, yes.

Tet was a shock within the government as well as outside. Even though we felt Tet had been misinterpreted to a great extent--and you'll see a lot of that in the letter to Peter Braestrup--even by the official interpretation that it had been stopped in its tracks, that it was a long-term loss to the VC and so on, the fact that they were

able to do that with the very limited advance warning we had and so on, was a shock within government and it obviously was a shock to LBJ. You know that front page of the Washington Post that next morning with the pctures of the brand-new American Embassy, the whole symbol of everything, sort of not destroyed but pretty well damaged and dead people all around it had to be one of the great, great shocking traumatic events in Washington. And to raise questions would be perfectly natural, perfectly legitimate.

G: Some of the points that you raised in that speech to the Press Club when you came back were--you mentioned that the government did respond to press criticisms.

Z: Yes, it did.

G: Can you recall how?

Z: Oh, on issues like use of napalm. The most dramatic and clear-cut case was the tear gas incident where they wanted to test tear gas in some of these close situations, particularly in underground tunnels and so on as a means of flushing out the VC. And unwisely, we didn't announce it in advance, and Peter Arnett and Horst--oh, what's his name, the photographer--Faas ran across it and ran an exclusive AP story on it saying "nonlethal gas used by Americans." Christ, non-lethal doesn't mean a damn thing. Sure, it's nonlethal, it was tear gas. If they had said tear gas it would have been something else, but "nonlethal" led to riots all over the world about our use of gas, USIS libraries burned down and so on. We immediately banned the use of

that tear gas. Our poor colonel didn't get the word and he used it and he almost got cashiered out of the place.

Now about six months later after the thing had sort of calmed down, they started using it again and they found out it didn't work too well. They didn't use it very much, in certain very limited situations where you really had an enclosed situation it might have been useful. But hell, the use of defoliation, the use of the mighty mouse, that airborne gatling gun approach, a lot of those things were--the terms were, what impact will it have on public opinion? But the channel of public opinion was the press. You can argue whether they led it or followed it, but it was the press treatment of some of this material that was a matter of concern.

G: So in a sense the press served as a conscience in a way.

Z: Certainly a monitor, a policeman, if you will. Very definitely.

G: Another point that you raised was the question of qualification of the press, the fact that evidently there were no qualifications with regard to language, knowledge, experience, background, anything like this.

Z: Very little. Insufficient. Just as the press criticized the official institution for turning over too rapidly, for its lack of qualification in handling that type of war, so I think the press could very legitimately be questioned about its qualifications for covering that type of war, for knowing what were the elements to judge such an effort by. And where the old hands were concerned, if you divided up the judgment of the Vietnam War in terms of veteran correspondents

with a lot of experience and younger correspondents without much experience prior to Vietnam, you'd see that the attitude toward the war was quite different and the evaluation of it quite different.

G: How so?

Z: Well, the veterans by and large tending to be more sympathetic, supportive of the effort; the brand-new ones tending to be more critical of the effort. And this was a matter of experience, knowledge, learning. Now, it finally got to be standard, conventional wisdom to be against the war or critical of it, with all the superficial criticism a lot of young brash reporters would use. But I think the press is legitimately subject to criticism for the qualification of most of its correspondents. Now, no one starts off qualified. In World War II they weren't qualified either, but they kept at it and stayed with it. The press turned over enormously in Vietnam, almost as much as the one-year tours. The press's tours weren't much more. There were a few old hands. But an awful lot of them were short-timers, and an awful lot of coverage came out of quick visits, in and out, two weeks at the most, one week sometimes. Now you can't understand much of a war like that.

The press used to use that as a criticism of the government: "You only serve here a year. How the hell can you know much about it?" Well, the man making the criticism very often was [there] less than a year himself. Now as I say, there were some who stayed on. But nevertheless, generally, I think the criticism is true. They weren't qualified certainly in language, certainly not in Vietnamese. Most of

them used Vietnamese as their interpreter, legman, source of information. Time magazine found out its senior Vietnamese had been a colonel in the VC, an intelligence colonel, went back there and is still there as far as is known. And who knows how many other guys? But even if they weren't VC, and I don't mean to claim there were a lot of them working with the press, they were Vietnamese and the reporters were not communicating directly with their sources. Very few of them know French, let alone Vietnamese, and French was a much more comfortable Western language for most of the Vietnamese with whom we were dealing than English. Some of them were more comfortable in English.

G: Did you have any other examples that the interpreters were misserving the press in terms of getting accurate information?

Z: Oh, sure.

G: Can you [cite an example]?

Z: I remember there was a New York Times story Bernie Weinraub wrote once on interpreting some figures given out by the Vietnamese government on how successful the war had been. When we ran it down [we] discovered it had all been given to him by a Vietnamese interpreter or assistant reporter, whatever he was, and he'd been simply misinformed. That would happen very often. The Vietnamese both in terms of the official American structure, but [also] in terms of the press, had a magnificent habit--it was an Asian habit--of telling you what they thought you wanted to hear. Very often they thought the American military in the official structure and civilian structure wanted to hear progress, so they reported progress. Just as often the Vietnamese working

for the media thought they wanted to hear criticism, so you'd hear criticism. Furthermore many of the opposition elements in Vietnam, to the government, were wise enough or smart enough or shrewd enough to channel comments to the press, to get to the press, and largely that was through the interpreters and Vietnamese members of the bureaus out there that they used as channels for comment.

I think that qualification aspect was one problem. A third major problem I think was dramatically underlined this week. The whole flap over that "Jimmy's World" story at the [Washington] Post I think has a relevance to Vietnam, to the coverage of Vietnam. I worry less about the hoax on that one story, that kind of thing is going to happen every so often no matter what system you have. Someone is going to put over a hoax. It's not the first newspaper hoax and it won't be the last. What does bother me and I think what should be a matter of concern to the profession of journalism, the institution of journalism, in this country, is the pressures existing within the paper to make the front page, on the tendency, because of the importance of making the front page, to write a story right up to its hilt and maybe overstate it to give it the most dramatic interpretation possible in order to make that front page. In television terms, the same problem, to make that six o'clock news, to make the evening news show. That is television's front pages. The documentaries and so on, fine, but they don't carry the weight to a journalist or to a TV man that the six o'clock news does or the front pages. And younger reporters in both media trying to make their mark, trying to make those two outlets,

would tend to write up their story to the maximum possible permissible, and sometimes maybe over the line, or interpret the facts in a way that would tend to get that kind of placement.

That I think was a lot of the trouble. A reporter's story that agreed with the government wasn't likely to make the front page. And I think the savvy correspondents out there knew this, where this was the case. There were cases of telegrams from home office, particularly in television, saying you haven't got enough battlefield material, you haven't got enough blood and gore, if you will. Get out to that battlefield. We want casualties, we want a war on the screen, otherwise we don't get our audience. Journalists out there would very often complain, but they knew where the pressures were and what was the measurement of their effectiveness.

G: Was there a peer pressure among the correspondents there to see the war in the same vein?

Z: Oh, yes, very definitely. There's a herd instinct among correspondents.

G: Pack journalism?

Z: Oh, yes, absolutely.

G: Can you recall any specifics here that would point to that?

Z: I think the worst time for that was in Tet, when a lot of press got out there, and because of curfew and so on couldn't move around. An awful lot of them stayed at the Caravelle Hotel. There was no place they could really go at night, and there was a sort of incestuous briefing of each other and the development of conventional wisdom among each other that had to reflect itself in papers. The press was close

to each other out there, particularly the representatives of the major media. The networks, the Washington Post, the New York Times, the news magazines and the wire services would tend to be close friends, to work together, go out on stories together. There was an awful lot of interchange. Now I don't think it was malicious, I don't think it was negative in its initation, in its intent. But it inevitably got into being against the establishment--the establishment there was the government--and the questioning of the government's position, judgments and so on, and [they began] to inevitably sort of reinforce each other, and if you will, even developed common stories, common outlooks.

By and large the origins of much of the press criticism, Halberstam and Malcolm Browne and Peter Arnett and Neil Sheehan and that early gang were good friends. There would tend to be the younger people as well, whereas the old timers that come in from Hong Kong or so on, once a month or once every other month--and this is the early period I'm talking about--[would] look at the situation, get out, and maybe not have this interface with the younger guys and write somewhat different [stories]. That's one reason that Sylvester, with our concurrence and even our urging, in 1965 started to underwrite, subsidize trips to Vietnam on the part of correspondents from here, from Washington, because of the feeling that the group out there had gotten to be so, if you will, clannish and so subject to this kind of herd coverage, that bringing some fresh eyes out there might give some different perspective to the coverage.

G: Halberstam describes the phenomenon of reporters becoming more disenchanted with official policy after they'd been out there. He mentioned poeple like Charlie Mohr and especially Frank McCulloch, and these were seasoned people. McCulloch had been. . . .

Z: McCulloch was a first rate journalist, and McCulloch was a very good journalist in terms of his coverage of the military particularly, in other areas, too, but the military particularly. But I wouldn't list Frank McCulloch as hostile to the government's position. In fact a lot of Time's coverage about that time was very, if not positive, at least very fair, and a lot of it was positive. Now that doesn't say McCulloch was in love with Uncle Sam's representatives out there. I think he had a healthy amount of skepticism about them, eventually maybe even became disenchanted, although I'm not sure that's the right word. I think he undoubtedly questioned official information, went out and did his own coverage, but a lot of that coverage that he did was positive. McCulloch had good relations, and I think generally positive relations at the working level in the military particularly, and out in the field, but also with a lot of the civilian structure.

G: How about the reporters that the government subsidized to go out there?

Z: Oh, the program didn't last very long. I guess some decent stories came out of it. There were a number of them. I remember Jack Raymond came out for the New York Times. Keyes Beech, a real old hand and very often quite positive about coverage out there and one of the veterans, I remember when he criticized this whole project as quite

sinister almost in a press meeting, I had the pleasure of telling him at that point, "Keyes, I'm glad you said that because I just got in the list for next week's visit and the first name on it is Peter Lisagor," who worked for the same paper as Keyes. But Peter came out. What's her name, Maggie Higgins came out on one of those trips. Claude--what was his name, of Aviation Weekly? Quite a few came out.

G: How about Joe Alsop?

Z: Joe came out quite often, I'm not sure he came out on that Defense Department sponsored visit. But Joe would come out. Joe of course would be treated like an independent government. He'd arrive, he'd occasionally spend the night with the Ambassador, particularly with Henry Cabot Lodge, demanded--not demand, asked for a car in a way that you felt was a demand, to drive him around the city because taxi cabs were too much bother, and goddamn, we would respond to it.

G: They say there was a simulated rank for reporters.

Z: Well, there used to be. In World War II you got a simulated rank. I guess he was treated as an officer officially, and maybe he was a major. There really wasn't up and down the line; I think they all got treated as majors, but if there had been one, Joe would have been treated as a three-star general, maybe even a four-star general.

G: Did you just assume that he was going to write a pro-administration piece, and did that have something to do with the way he was treated?

Z: Joe was basically for the effort and for stopping, if you will, communist expansion in Southeast Asia. And his stories would tend to be positive. He'd have very little patience with "these young squirts

out here, these young brash reporters, who didn't know what they were talking about," quote, unquote. Now nevertheless, Joe would criticize the way it was being done, and Joe in fact was the perpetrator of one of the breeches of the tacit understanding between the press and the government. You know, there were a lot of things that the press did not violate and that were tacitly accepted as ground rules. Joe was the first guy to confirm that U.S. planes were flying missions out of Thailand. Now the Thais had said, "You can go ahead and fly these missions, but on one condition, you never announce it publicly and never confirm it. Sure we know the Russians know about it. But if the Russians come in and complain to us we can always say we don't know what you're talking about. If you ever confirm it the Russians can come in and say, 'Hey, here is the U.S. government confirming this.'" Joe wrote a story about the planes flying out and put the embassy there in one hell of a spot on whether to confirm or deny and so on.

We had the same situation with the Laotians and the bombing of Laos, where Souvanna Phouma had in effect said, "Go ahead and bomb," in the Laotian panhandle there, "but don't ever announce it or confirm it." Well, the reporters knew this perfectly well, but for a long time they said nothing. Any knowledgeable reporter knew we had cross-border operations into Cambodia and into Laos, LRP [Long Range Patrol] teams and so on. It wasn't until very late in the war that Dick Dudman and a couple of others wrote about it, visitors coming in. The reporters on the scene there had tacitly accepted the ground rules.

Not that they were ever laid down. We wouldn't confirm anything, but they could have written about them. They could have put together the pieces.

G: Well, how did they know what to write about and what not to write about? How did they know that they weren't supposed to write about. . . ?

Z: Well, on something like cross-border operations, they knew damn well that in effect that we would never confirm it or even discuss it, that this was verboten territory. Now, they'd go at the working level, they'd have contacts and over a late night drink they'd know pretty damn well what was happening. We had very few written restrictions on correpondents. There was a restriction on tactical military information, and this was agreeable to correspondents. You know, movement of troops, initiation of a combat action, or take-off of planes and so on, because if they wrote a story and sent it by wire that planes took off today from Tan Son Nhut airport for North Vietnam, while they were transmitting it the North Vietnamese were perfectly capable of monitoring it and settling up their defenses well ahead of time.

That tactical information, these restrictions the reporters accepted. And in all the time I was there we only lifted credentials on about five correspondents, and two or three of those cases were questionable as [to] whether they had been real violations. Everything else was a reporter's responsibilty. He could write anything he wanted. I'd say this was the first uncensored war. There was no precensorship. TV film went out, photographs went out, copy went out. Now a reporter would say, "Well, the Vietnamese took a copy and their

intelligence looked at it." That may be true, but nevertheless, delays were very rare. There were a couple of times during coups, but it was very rare that there were any obstacles to communications, and when it was, it was sort of a general thing during one of those coups, and then even during one of those coups we sent out copy through Embassy channels. We put a word limit on because of capability of the facility, but we sent copy over official lines out of the Embassy for reporters.

G: Were there any repercussions to the Alsop revelation about [Thailand]?

Z: Just a lot of discomfort in Thailand and our mission in Thailand with the Thai government. A certain amount of chewing out in telegraphs from Washington. That wasn't our parish. Saigon fortunately didn't catch that one, that was more Bangkok's parish, but we'd get the traffic on that kind of thing. Dean Rusk, you know, was not the world's greatest believer in an open war and the right-to-know type of--in fact has been quoted as saying "this right-to-know crap." He would go along with what he felt had to be, because of the nature of the animal, but it was not a philosophical enthusiasm about--what was my basic guidance?--maximum candor.

G: Sylvester accused Morley Safer of endangering American lives in violating security information or something of this nature. Do you recall what he had reference to and whether or not there was substance to the charge?

Z: I remember the charge. The specifics I do not remember, and I remember that I felt the charge was simply misdirected. It just wasn't

legitimate. Now if I remember the jeopardizing American lives thing was that by writing stories that were negative about American military action, creating opposition, increased opposition to Americans on the part of VC and Vietnamese. How you can justify that kind of a charge based on such stories I don't know. The security thing I have forgotten. It may well have been built around that--what was the name of that town? Was it Cam Ne, where the burning took place? That kind of story, because again, it showed American troops in a negative position and revealed faces of Americans to the public and therefore presumably to the VC and so on, [and therefore] was a violation of security. But Arthur's charges on that kind of thing were awfully hard to justify.

G: Ev Martin of Newsweek had his visa lifted. Do you recall the circumstances?

Z: Yes, it was the only case I think while I was there. It was by the Vietnamese. They insisted on it. We were not able to stop it. We tried damn hard. It really wasn't a lifting, and that was what the Vietnamese hung it on. They wouldn't give him a renewal. Their argument was they had no obligation to give him a visa, his had run out. And Ev had done something, I forgot what. He had let it run out so he left himself wide open I think. If I remember, and I may be wrong on the facts, he had let it run out and therefore theoretically, technically, was in the country illegally, and it was on that basis. Obviously that wasn't their real reason; they didn't like some of the coverage that was coming out of Newsweek. So their whole point was Ev wouldn't get a renewed visa because he had violated their rules on

visas. Newsweek could send in a new reporter if they wanted, but that was a different problem. That was right towards the end, that was in 1968 or so. But at the same time Newsweek wasn't banned, because Newt Perry was--not Newt Perry.

G: [Francois] Sully.

Z: No, no, well, Sully was there, Sully finally died there. And the big heavy guy who was the old hand there, Newt--oh, I'll remember eventually [Merton Perry?]. But Martin's deputy in the Bureau and Sully were both still there.

G: Sully was apparently an irritant, also.

Z: Sully was an irritant. He was French. He had close contacts with a lot of Vietnamese going back a long way, a lot of them were in opposition to the government. There was always the inevitable suspicion that he was more pro-French than pro-American and therefore anti-the American effort. Some charges were made that way. Occasionally Sully came up with stories or information that wasn't very accurate, or was only half accurate, and the way it was written and interpreted was misleading. So he was, particularly in the later years, very controversial and I guess distrusted by most of the American Establishment.

G: I have a note that John Carroll of the Baltimore Sun prematurely leaked a story about the evacuation of Khe Sanh. Do you recall this?

Z: I do recall it. He got in trouble, and if I remember we lifted John's credentials. He was one of them. Phil Foisie's brother, Jack Foisie's credentials were lifted, and this was a particularly tough one because Jack Foisie's sister happened to be married to the

Secretary of State, Dean Rusk. But Jack was out there, covering for the Los Angeles Times with his material syndicated by the Washington Post-Los Angeles Times syndicate. One of the reasons we lifted it with him was he was testing those limited tactical restrictions on information. This dealt with a Marine Corps operation, if I remember. He said, "Goddamn it, I just think it's wrong to ask us not to run this. The VC know about it, why shouldn't we write about it?" So he wrote it. And we did lift his credentials because it was a clear-cut, deliberate violation of the ground rules, the restrictions on tactical military information. And Jack admitted later to me that he'd been wrong, that he really had wanted to test it and took his medicine. It was only a five-day suspension or some such thing. Maybe it was a week.

G: Were there any repercussions from the State Department on that?

Z: No. No. I think we may have received a telegram saying "receiving a certain amount of criticism back here." But we didn't get much flap from State on that type of thing. On the Ev Martin thing I think there was some pressure, saying "See what you can do to get that visa renewed."

G: [Ellsworth] Bunker did make an effort there, didn't he?

Z: Yes, yes. But they were just determined on that one.

G: While we're on the subject of individual newsmen, let me ask you about Walter Cronkite's change. Remember he came out there.

Z: Oh, sure, I remember very well. Walter had been essentially positive. I think [he had] a certain amount of avuncular attitude toward those

young reporters out there. I don't mean he ever abandoned them or didn't support them, but nevertheless feeling they were young and brash and weren't probably mature enough and didn't have enough perspective to read the war right. So he was basically positive until that Tet trip.

I must say--and I have extremely high regard for Walter Cronkite, I know him casually, certainly not well--one thing that did annoy me about Walter and that famous coverage, that famous particular show, he did coverage in Saigon with a helmet on, in fatigues, looking as if he was in the middle of combat, and there was rubble behind him and various other things. But not too far away was a very untouched area, and when Walter finished filming that spot, that helmet came off and he lit up a cigarette and he went back to the Caravelle Hotel and had a nice cold martini and a pretty well-cooked dinner and got the combat natigues off and slept in a pretty good bed that night. That atmosphere of Walter being in the middle of a combat zone under all kinds of war pressure, shooting and so on, was misleading.

G: But he was in combat in Hue, wasn't he?

Z: Oh, he went up, but I'm just talking about that spot that was done. Oh, no, no, don't let me imply that he didn't see any [action]. He did go up to Hue and so on. He didn't get very far out in shooting. CBS wasn't about to put that kind of talent out where he could be hit. CBS used to send their younger reporters out for the shooting.

G: Reportedly one of the things that disturbed him was the Westmoreland

report about the fighting at Hue that seemed to greatly underestimate the amount of combat going on there and the amount of enemy resistance.

Z: Yes, I think probably--remember that Hue combat focused on the fort there, and that's what kept going for a long time. Again, we would tend--Westmoreland, the field commander, looking at this whole theater, looking at whatever it is, sixty-five cities they had, tending to look at the overall evaluations, tending to make some judgments on the real penetration, the real practical impact, not putting any weight on the psychological impact here in the States or even in Vietnam, looking at it purely in strict military terms--would tend to make a judgment that was probably more optimistic, certainly sounded more optimistic than the situation warranted.

But his basic judgment was confirmed subsequently. About August--Tet took place in January or February, and in August that very Charles Mohr that you talked about--again, a guy for whom I have high respect; Charlie was a good journalist and is a good journalist--wrote a story that ran on the front page in the New York Times saying--after several months in which he had done all his legwork--VC were very seriously hurt by Tet. They lost a good deal of their sort of basic cadre, their experienced cadre. They weren't able to hold onto any of their gains permanently, and all in all Tet was a setback for the VC in military terms. This of course was what Westmoreland had said way early in the game at a point where the shock of Tet was such that no one was going to listen to a purely military judgment on it.

The victory the VC had out of Tet and what made it worth the price was the effect it had back here, and to a certain extent in Vietnam, although the impact in the States was more than over there. Remember, this is a generalization, but even though there were critical press stories and a lot more of them than you would have liked, the press by and large supported the basic effort, and the American public, maybe as a result of the press, supported the basic effort until Tet. Tet was what reversed it. Now there had been growing criticism of it before then, but if you check the polls up through that November, the majority of the American public was still behind the war and the press's coverage was positive.

I don't mean there weren't nasty stories and so on, I'm talking as a generalization. In fact in November if I remember correctly--remember November was when a new government was installed. They'd gone through that election. That was criticized but nevertheless also had a great many positive aspects of it. [In] November Westmoreland and Bunker appeared together on a "Meet the Press" show here in the States and in effect said things are going pretty well on the war and had a lot of figures and statistics. And they were believed. They still had some credibilty. LBJ would use Westmoreland because Westmoreland did have some credibility and he'd use that uniform. Westmoreland had to give that speech up in New York which he says he didn't want to do, LBJ insisted he do it, to the Associated Press. He gave that speech to Congress, which he did want to do I think. It was that build-up, that feeling that things were gradually improving and

going in a positive direction that led to the great letdown of Tet. The shock of Tet was just enormous.

G: Was Lyndon Johnson shocked by Tet?

Z: That I just don't know. He had to be shocked to some extent. He sent that team out, he got the thirteen wise old men together, and then he made his basic March decision of not running.

G: Another factor reportedly in Cronkite's change of opinion on the thing was the build-up at Khe Sanh, which to him made it look like we were there for a much longer term and a much heavier troop commitment than reported.

Z: Well, the build-up, of course, by Tet must have been between four-fifty and five hundred [thousand], I don't think it went over five hundred until after Tet, maybe--I can't recall. But the build-up was disturbing a hell of a lot of people and the way we went through the build-up was almost the worst possible way to do it. Yet it's one of the basic decisions LBJ made.

It seems to me LBJ made two basic decisions about that war when you look at the broad strategy and the basic fundamental policy decisions of the war, two of them that were just wrong, with the benefit of hindsight I grant you. But just wrong and led to a lot of the other factors. This isn't original, particularly with me, nor is it a firsthand thing. But one, he never seemed to have a feel, as long as he was Kennedy's succesor, he had the confidence of the American public. He wasn't sure of his public posture, and therefore he wasn't sure he could call on the American public to take on a war deliberately

and consciously and specifically. So he decided to back into the war slice by slice by slice, and that drew it out and out and out and every time there was a build-up of another increment of troops it was interpreted as more escalation. It was almost the worst way to go into it. It spread out over three years or so. And in addition incidentally he didn't give the Vietnamese the right weapons in time, he wouldn't call for that kind of expenditure.

The second one was to have the Great Society and a war, too. As a result of that you get the roots of our inflation and a lot of other things that came from it, because he didn't call on the American people to make a sacrifice. They were never involved, they were told to go about their normal lives and prosperous lives when we were fighting this war, this nasty little war out in Asia. Then suddenly you turn around and we've got a half million people out there for crying out loud and more on the way, no limit to it. And the story broke, remember, then Neil Sheehan's story broke that someone obviously leaked out of the Pentagon to him that Westmoreland wanted two hundred thousand more troops. We were going to hit seven hundred thousand. And that had an enormously negative reaction, that it was an endless pit. And that's what I think Walter Cronkite reacted to, in part, that feeling of just a quagmire, that there was no end to it.

In many ways Westy outlived his time there I think. You know, he was very often criticized and Westy was not I guess without his faults, certainly had them. But I don't think he deserves the sort of negative evaluation he gets currently. I think it will turn around someday.

He had to build up our elements there, he had to justify them. He had to be public, and LBJ used him and his uniform to help, if you will, get the war acceptable. He was always being told, "See the media," "See the press," "You've got to communicate," and I was urging him to. Westy was always being pushed forward. He also accepted that, and I think he enjoyed it, but [Creighton] Abrams didn't have to build it up, he didn't have to go back and justify more troops. In fact, if anything he was trying to cut down troops. He didn't have to see the media, he didn't have to provide a justification, if you will, a rationalization of the war, to the American public because by then we were starting to work our way out of the thing. So Abrams' role and mission, if you will, and the circumstance surrounding him were far different from Westmoreland's. As a result, Abrams came out of the picture as a much more efficient general. And he was a very good general, there's no doubt about that, and maybe better fitted for that type of war than Westmoreland was. But I always do say that the circumstances, the conditions under which both had to work were quite different, and led to some of the difference in evaluation of them.

History has not been written yet, the one with perspective, but some revisionism is coming. You could even make an argument, and I'd say it's overstated and oversimplified, but you could make an argument, there are seeds of an argument, valid seeds, that maybe we won more in Vietnam than we think we did, that the five years or seven years or whatever it was we really spent at an enormous cost, gave the Thais and the Malaysians and Singapore and others that much more time

to get their roots down and to get stable, well-based, reasonably well-based governments. The argument I think can be made that if we hadn't made that stand the thrust and pressure of China and the North Vietnamese extending outward could have toppled these governments much quicker, much earlier, or could have toppled them period, whereas so far they haven't been able to. I've heard people evaluating the war, evaluating the situation in Southeast Asia today, that almost without meaning to make this point, that the governments there had the time to get their roots down better than they would have otherwise. The domino theory, now people say, "What about the domino theory? Pooh-pooh." Well, to some extent we saw it operate in Cambodia and Laos. Now it hasn't worked in Thailand and maybe that's because we in effect bought the Thais the time to resist it.

G: Well, I appreciate your time this morning.

End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview II

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY

Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of Barry Zorthian

In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Barry Zorthian of Washington, D.C. do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recording and transcript of the personal interview conducted on May 6, 1969 in New York City and prepared for deposit in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions:

(1) The transcript shall be available for use by researchers as soon as it has been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

(2) The tape recording shall be available to those researchers who have access to the transcript.

(3) During my lifetime I retain all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the copyright in both the transcript and tape recording shall pass to the United States Government. During my lifetime researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcript and tape recordings without my express consent in each case.

(4) Copies of the transcript and the tape recording may be provided by the Library to researchers upon request.

(5) Copies of the transcript and tape recording may be deposited in or loaned to institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

Barry Zorthian
Donor

Oct. 28, 1978
Date

James B. Rhoads
Archivist of the United States

December 11, 1978
Date