

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
Letter	RWK to Mac (Secret) open 12-16-97	11-11-65	A
Telegram	Sec. Freeman to Ambassador to India (Secret) open 12-16-97	12-2-65	A
Telegram	Am. Embassy to Sec. of State (Secret) open 12-16-97	12-6-65	A
Memorandum	R.W. Komer to the President (Secret) open 12-16-97	12-6-65	A
Telegram	Komer to Jacobsen for the President (Secret) open 12-16-97	12-8-65	A
Telegram	Sec. Rusk to Congressmen Morgan and Zablocki (Confidential) open 12-16-97	12-8-65	A
Telegram	Sec. Rusk to Sen. Mansfield (Confidential) open 12-16-97	12-8-65	A
Telegram	Sec. Rusk to New Delhi, Joint State-Aid Message (Confidential) open 12-16-97	12-9-65	A
Telegram	Sec. of State to Bundy (Confidential) open 12-16-97	12-10-65	A
Telegram	Komer to the President (Secret) open 12-16-97	12-10-65	A
Memorandum	National Security Action Memorandum No. 339, Memo for the Sec. of Agriculture (Secret)	12-17-65	A
Memorandum	R.W. Komer, Memo for the Record: Pres.'s Meeting with Indian Food Minister Subramaniam (Secret)	12-20-65	A
Memorandum	Thomas L. Hughes to Sec. of State (Confidential)	12-21-65	A
Memorandum	Memorandum of Conversation: Indian Food Situation and Agricultural Program; Indo-Pakistan Relations (Confidential)	12-22-65	A

FILE LOCATION

Legislative Background, Food for India 1966: "Food for India, 11/11/65 to 3/21/66,"
Box 1

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 11652 governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
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10-2-79

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
Memorandum	HHS Memorandum for the Record (Confidential)	12-27-65	A
Telegram	Dept. of State to Am Embassy New Delhi (Secret)	12-30-65	A
Telegram	Dept. of State to Am.Embassy New Delhi (Confidential)	12-30-65	A
Memorandum	McG. B. to the President (with Secret attachment Komer to Pres.)	1-8-66	A
Memorandum	R.W. Komer to the President (Secret)	1-18-66	A
Memo	RWK to & Mac (Secret)	1-20-66	A
Memorandum	Dean Rusk to the President (Confidential)	1-28-66	A
Memorandum	Orville Freeman to the President (with Confidential attachment)	2-1-66	A
Memorandum	R.W. Komer to the President (Secret)	2-1-66	A
Memorandum	R.W. Komer to the Record (Secret)	2-2-66	A
Memorandum	R.W. Komer for the Record (Secret)	2-3-66	A
Memorandum	RWK to Mac (Secret) (with attachment)	2-4-66	A
Letter	Lyndon B. Johnson to Madam Prime Minister (Secret)	undated	A
Memorandum	R.W. Komer to Jack Valenti (Confidential)	2-21-66	A
Memorandum	R.W. Komer to the President (Confidential)	3-10-66	A

FILE LOCATION

Legislative Background, Food for India 1966: "Food for India, 11/11/65 to 3/21/66,"
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10-2-79

~~SECRET~~

Mac -

November 11, 1965

To add to our problems we may have a major Indian food crisis on our hands. Poor rains are apparently resulting in a very bad fall/winter crop. Last year's record production of 83 million tons was estimated earlier to be only 85 this year; new estimates are that it might be even less. Freeman's man, Brown, now in Delhi, has sent in Delhi 1244 attached, estimating that 10-15 million tons more grain imports from all sources may be needed to sustain India's millions to the next harvest. (I believe this figure includes our present shipments which if continued at present rate would make up six million tons of this).

The Baltimore Sun has been running a good series. Latest article attached.

Am running this down and will be ready shortly to advise a course.

RWK

Att: New Delhi 1244, 11/10

The Baltimore Sun, 11/9/65, article entitled "India's Food Output Lags" by James S. Keat

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 12-2-97

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

82

Action

AGR

Info

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FROM: NEW DELHI

ACTION: SECSTATE PRIORITY 1244

DATE: NOVEMBER 10

FOR SEC FREEMAN/SCHNITTKER FROM BROWN

AFTER WEEK STUDY HAVE CONCLUDED CROP WILL BE MUCH LESS THAN OFFICIALLY ADMITTED. BELIEVE POOR CROP WILL RESULT IN MAJOR FOOD CRISIS. PERHAPS MOST SERIOUS IN RECENT HISTORY.

CROP SHORTFALLS NOT LOCALIZED. POOR MONSOON NATIONWIDE AFFECTING NEARLY EVERY STATE. PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WITH FOOD SECRETARY DIAS LAST EVENING CONFIRMS GRAVITY OF SITUATION.

IN LIGHT ABOVE FAST DEVELOPING SITUATION SUGGEST EVALUATE OUR POSITION CONSIDERING STOCK LEVELS, POSSIBLE USE GRAIN SORGHUMS SUPPLEMENT WHEAT AND MERIT USING INDIAN PORTS FULLY CAPACITY TO GET MUCH FOOD AS POSSIBLE IN COUNTRY NOW BEFORE CRISIS REACHES ITS WORST.

ESTIMATE 10-15 MILLION TONS* MORE GRAIN IMPORTS FROM ALL SOURCES MAY BE NEEDED TO SUSTAIN INDIA'S 480 MILLION UNTIL NEXT MAJOR HARVEST.

(#) WHO LEFT THIS MORNING FOR STATES KNOWS DETAILS. COUNTRY TEAM PREPARING SEPARATE MESSAGE ON FOOD SITUATION.

BOWLES

RMA

*AS RECEIVED, CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

(#) OMISSION, CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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State Dept. Guidelines
By SN NARA, Date 12-2-97

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Romer 01509
003 ✓

Origin

SS

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 976

Dec 2 11 56 PM '55

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY FREEMAN.

Please communicate to Subramaniam that I have reviewed our Rome agreement with the President who is pleased with the steps taken and contemplated by the Indian Government to strengthen Indian agriculture. The President looks forward to Subramaniam's outlining his program including points agreed upon at Rome publicly as soon as possible, perhaps when he addresses Council of State as he suggested at Rome he would do soon. Decision on PL-480, both extension period and amount, and fertilizer loan under ~~active~~ active consideration.

GP-1

END

RUSK

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *JW*, NARA, Date *12-2-97*

Drafted by: Sec. Freeman	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: S/S+O:A.H.Douglas,Jr.
Clearances:		

NEA/ SOA: C.S. Coon & S. Sober (informed)
S/S: Mr. Thompson (informed)

~~SECRET~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State**Komer*

40

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Action

SS

Info

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ZNY SSSSS

O 061242Z

FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHITO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1430

RUEHX/WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE UNN

STATE RRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ DEC 26EXDIS

4 1 2 4

19 65

Dec 6, 8:12 a.m.

003

DEPARTMENT PASS AGRICULTURE SECRETARY FREEMAN

REF: EMBTEL 1399

1. SUBRAMANIAM REPORTS CABINET TODAY ADOPTED WITH ONE EXCEPTION NOTED BELOW ENTIRE PROGRAM INCLUDING TARGETS AND FUNDING COMMITMENTS CONTAINED IN ROME AGREEMENT.

2. THE ONE EXCEPTION WAS MATTER OF FERTILIZER DISTRIBUTION WHERE THERE WAS NO PARTICULAR OPPOSITION BUT ONLY DECISION MATTER SUFFICIENTLY COMPLEX TO WARRANT EXAMINATION BY A SUB-

PAGE TWO RUEBAE 276 ~~SECRET~~

COMMITTEE BEFORE A DEFINITIVE CABINET DISCUSSION. SUBRAMANIAM WHOLLY CONFIDENT OF ACCEPTANCE OF PROGRAM IN THIS AREA ALSO IN PLENTY OF TIME TO MAKE GOOD HIS AGREEMENT WITH YOU TO ANNOUNCE BEFORE JANUARY 1.

3. CABINET HAS COMMITTED WITH FINANCE OF COURSE CONCURRING \$42 MILLION OF FREE FOREIGN EXCHANGE PLUS ADDITIONAL APPROXIMATELY EQUIVALENT \$10 MILLION OF SOVIET BLOC RESOURCES FOR IMMEDIATE PURCHASE OF IMPORTED FERTILIZER FOR NEXT KHARIF CROP. THUS HAS DECIDED TO SELF-FINANCE SUBSTANTIALLY MORE THAN THE 100,000 T NITROGEN INDICATED IN YOUR AGREEMENT. ALSO THEY HAVE OPTED TO DO THEMSELVES SLIGHTLY MORE EVEN THAN MISSION'S EARLIER PROPOSAL FOR A MATCHING \$50 MILLION FERTILIZER LOAN WOULD HAVE REQUIRED.

4. FULL SCOPE OF CABINET DECISIONS WILL BE REFLECTED IN SUBRAMANIAM LOK SABHA STATEMENT DECEMBER 7. WE URGENTLY HOPE FOR QUICK U.S. REACTION ALONG LINES DISCUSSED IN PREVIOUS MESSAGES. BESIDE LONGER-TERM PL-480, QUICK, FORTHCOMING U.S.

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By *W*, NARA, Date *12-2-97*

DEC 6 1965

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1430 DEC 6 FROM NEW DELHI

POSITION ON NEAR-TERM FERTILIZER RESPONDING TO ABOVE INDIAN
SELF-HELP DECISION WOULD BE PARTICULARLY HELPFUL.

5. WE STRESS AGAIN THAT NONE OF CABINET SAVE SUBRAMANIAM AND

PAGE THREE RUSBAE 276 ~~SECRET~~

PM AWARE ANY DETAILED U.S. SUGGESTIONS UNDERLVH TODAY'S
DECISION. THIS MAKES SELF-HELP QUALITY CABINET'S ACTION
DOUBLY CONVINCING BUT ALSO MAKES IT ESSENTIAL NO WASHINGTON
STATEMENT REFER TO FREEMAN-SUBRAMANIAM AGREEMENT.

GP-3.
BOWLES

NOTE: PASSED S/S-O 12-6-65 8:20 a.m.

PASSED WHITE HOUSE 12-6-65 8:45 a.m.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

December 6, 1965
Monday/6:00 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

India Food Catastrophe. Freeman's best expert is just back with the considered judgment of the people out there that the food crisis is even more catastrophic than previously estimated. The shortfall will probably run as high as 20 million tons instead of 10-12 million (we're shipping at an annual rate of 6 million). Some famine and starvation seem inevitable, almost despite whatever we do. The whole crisis is now public, with major coverage in the Sunday papers here.

On the longer term front, you've seen Bowles' report (Delhi 1430) that Indian cabinet bought almost all of the Subramaniam/Freeman recommendations. They will be announced Tuesday. India is also allocating \$52 million equivalent to buying fertilizer.

Recommended US Response. We are already past the 4 December deadline if the pipeline is not to be interrupted. The tactics of our response should be to go big enough to seem generously responsive, yet limited enough to retain full bargaining leverage. The sheer magnitude of India's food crisis makes this easy.

A. Make the next allocation 2 or 3 months. The case for a longer period is to reduce panic and hoarding in India by showing that the US will come through. A secondary reason for 3 months is to carry us through Shastri visit, so he won't have to come beg. However, we could stick with 2 months or even one if we went big on amount.

B. 500,000 tons per month would now seem utterly incommensurate with the need (which may be three times higher). With some famine inevitable, should we open ourselves to accusations later that we share the responsibility for having shipped less than Indian capacity to receive? Given all the crisis publicity, our response won't look credible any longer if we keep shipments at 500,000 tons. However, port capacity gives us a ceiling well below the need; thus going to 750,000 tons would show responsiveness, while still making India come to us. Even one month of this would look much better than 2-3 months at 500,000. Bell favors staying

~~SECRET~~

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 12-2-97

~~SECRET~~

Page 2

at 500,000 Title I but adding on 250,000 Title II disaster relief. We pay the freight on the latter, but it looks better and protects us against Krishna Menon-type allegations that we charged money for food when Indians were starving.

C. \$50 million Fertilizer Loan will save 4 million tons of grain we'd otherwise be pressed to give later, though it alone will not meet the immediate problem in the months before the new crop comes in. Bell feels strongly that we should tie conditions to this loan which will force Subramaniam to carry out his promises.

If Subramaniam comes through publicly, we recommend a reciprocal White House statement (attached) tailored to your decisions above. It should get a good reaction here and abroad, make the Indians your debtors, and usefully remind Ayub we won't play Kashmir politics with food. But it still leaves India's food crisis unsolved (and only we can solve it), so keeps Shastri coming to you.

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

December 6, 1965

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT

India's critical food needs, as well as its longer-term agricultural problem, are viewed with growing concern by the President, who has followed both closely. He believes that the American people and Congress fully support assisting India to overcome these difficulties in a manner whereby US assistance can be used to maximum effect to complement India's own self-help endeavors.

To help meet the immediate food crisis, the President has authorized another amendment to the existing PL 480 agreement with India which will extend it for _____ months, thus continuing /increasing/ the present monthly rate of shipment to _____ thousand tons of foodgrains. /In addition, because of the risk of famine and starvation, he has authorized an emergency PL 480 Title II disaster relief program of _____ thousand tons per month for the same period.7 Finally, he proposes to authorize, subject to consultation with appropriate members of the Congress, an emergency \$50 million program loan for urgent purchase of fertilizer in the US. It is understood that India plans to spend a like sum of its own foreign exchange. This fertilizer should permit increased Indian foodgrain output of three to four million tons in the next crop year.

The President welcomes further discussions with the Indian Government about how US can help meet India's agricultural problems. Secretary Freeman is inviting Food Minister Subramaniam to come to the US shortly for this purpose.

(N.B. This last para. is added so that it doesn't look as though our only response to a catastrophic 20 million ton shortage is just a few months supply. The add-on about continuing talks protects us without committing us. Freeman is amenable to inviting Subramaniam if the President still wants it)

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 12-2-97

SENT
WHCA

SEND RANCH
8:07 PM EST
WEDNESDAY DEC 8

EEA421
OO WTE10
DE WTE 633

DEC 9 01 07

FROM: KOMER
TO : JACOBSEN FOR THE PRESIDENT
INFO: BILL MOYERS
CITE: CAP65352

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DECEMBER 3, 1965

FOR JACOBSEN FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM KOMER
PASS COPY TO MOYERS

INDIA FOOD DECISIONS. FOLLOWING ARE BEST QUICK REACTIONS.
SENDING FREEMAN AND PERHAPS GALBRAITH TO INDIA WOULD BE
HIGHLY USEFUL GESTURE, WHICH SHOULD SHOW US GOODWILL AND
MAKE INDIANS OUR DEBTORS.

IF ALL INTERIM DECISIONS ARE HELD UP TILL THEN, HOWEVER,
SERIOUS TIMING PROBLEM ARISES. FERTILIZER LOAN MUST BE PROCESSED
BEFORE CHRISTMAS IF INDIANS ARE TO PURCHASE IN TIME TO AFFECT
NEXT RICE CROP. WE MUST ALLOW LEAD TIME TO NEGOTIATE LOAN
TERMS; AID WANTS TO ATTACH CONDITIONS AS A LEVER TO HELP ASSURE
INDIANS FOLLOW THROUGH ON NEW SUBRAMANIAM PROGRAM.

ON THREE MONTHS OF TITLE I VERSUS TWO MONTHS, FORMER WOULD
CARRY US THROUGH FEBRUARY, WHILE TWO MONTHS WOULD PUT NEXT
DECISION POINT AT END OF JANUARY JUST WHEN SHASTRI ARRIVES.
HERE TOO, TIMING IS NOW CRITICAL SINCE LAST MONTH'S ALLOCATION
IS RUNNING OUT AND EACH DAY'S DELAY MEANS THAT MUCH STRETCHOUT
IN SHIPMENT.

AFTER JACOBSEN CALL I AUTHORIZED AID TO START CONSULTING KEY
AVAILABLE HILL PEOPLE ON FERTILIZER, SAYING ONLY THAT YOU WERE
QUOTE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING ONE CLOSE QUOTE. THIS WAS ONLY WAY
TO MEET TOMORROW'S DEADLINE IF YOU CHOSE TO GO AHEAD. MCCORMACK,
MAHON, SPARKMAN, ALBERT, DIRKSEN, FORD AND PASSMAN HAVE GIVEN
THEIR OK. THIS LEAVES HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS GAP, SO AID IS
GOING OUT ON SAME BASIS TO MORGAN AND ZABLOCKI IN PARIS AND
MANSFIELD IN HONG KONG. BELL SAYS HE SHOULD HAVE THEIR OKS BY
NOON TOMORROW. SO BELL, GAUD, AND I THINK THAT YOU WILL HAVE
ENOUGH CONSULTATION BY THEN TO ANNOUNCE, IF YOU SO CHOOSE.
WE OF COURSE GAVE NO INDICATION AS TO YOUR DECISION OR ITS TIMING,
SO YOU ARE NOT COMMITTED. IF WE GOT AHEAD OF GAME, HOWEVER,
I WILL TAKE THE RAP.

FULBRIGHT/HICKENLOOPER ARE IN TAHITI, SO HARD TO GET, MORSE IS
IN INDIA. WE CAN WIRE THEM IF YOU CHOOSE. FREEMAN MAY WISH TO CALL
COOLEY AND ELLENDER AS WELL.

IN SUM, THE ONE THING THAT REALLY NEEDS DOING PRONTO IS AT LEAST A MONTH
ADDITIONAL WHEAT TO KEEP THE PIPELINE GOING. THE REST IS AT YOUR
OPTION. DRAFT ANNOUNCEMENT I SENT DOWN EARLIER CAN EASILY
BE ADJUSTED TO WHATEVER DECISIONS YOU MAKE.

DTG: 090022Z DEC 65

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OUTGOING CABLEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION

04616

DEC 8 7 55 PM '65
DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION

INFO.

SENT TO— PARIS AIDTO 119

LIM DIS

PASS TO CODEL Congressmen Morgan and Zablocki

SUBJECT— Congressional Consultation on AID Loan to India

REFERENCE—

Please pass following message from Secretary Rusk to Congressmen Morgan and Zablocki soonest and ask them keep contents confidential except for other Congressmen.

BEGIN MESSAGE:

Because administration has become increasingly concerned with failure Indian agricultural production to keep up with population growth and demand for food, it has in recent months approved PL 480 wheat sales only on a monthly basis pending time satisfied that India is giving top priority to agricultural production and is adopting improved agricultural policies.

Now two things have occurred:

1. Worst monsoon in decades during past growing season threatens early major food crisis in India.

PAGE 1 OF 3

DRAFTED BY	OFFICE	PHONE NO.	DATE	APPROVED BY:
WGF <i>WGF</i>	AA/NESA	8321	12/8/65	William S. Gaud <i>W89</i>

AID AND OTHER CLEARANCES

NEA/SOA Mr. Schneider (in draft)
WHITE HOUSE; Mr. Komer (in sub.)
STATE; S/S: B read (in sub.)

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2. On December 7 Indian Agricultural Minister Subramaniam announced series of new Indian Government agricultural targets and policies, including greater dependence on private, including foreign, investment for fertilizer and other agricultural inputs. Administration judges this to be ambitious and realistic program aiming at Indian self-sufficiency in food production and feels program merits U. S. support.

Substantially increased availability fertilizer critical to increasing food production. One ton of fertilizer applied this spring will mean six to ten tons increased wheat yield next fall. Indian program emphasizes rapid increase local production fertilizer, but several years required for new plants come on stream, leaving immediate need for substantial fertilizer imports.

seriously
President/considering offer AID loan of \$50 million for import of fertilizer for use in spring planting. When aid bill before Congress last fall, however, Secretary Rusk announced that administration would make no new economic aid loans to India or Pakistan without consulting with Congressional leaders. Accordingly, President has asked for your views on this proposal.

Proposed loan agreement would require India allocate at least \$50 million of its own foreign exchange for fertilizer imports in addition to those financed by AID. Loan would also be closely tied to overall Indian program for improved agricultural performance.

Expect continue shipping PL 480 wheat at present 500,000 tons monthly

PARIS

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3

3

level and considering additional shipments to meet threatened crisis.

Would appreciate your comments soonest. End msg.

Please cable when this message delivered and advise us of any comments.

GP4,

Note: Code Room:

LIM DIS distribution to:

Secretary

Komer, White House

Bell, A/AID

Gaud, DA/AID

Hare, NEA

Macomber, AA/NESA

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DEC 8 7 56 PM '65

86

Origin

SS

Info

ACTION: Amembassy HONG KONG 760
LIM DIS
PASS TO CODEL Sen. Mansfield

SUBJECT: Congressional Consultation on AID Loan to India

Please pass following msg from Secretary Rusk to Sen. Mansfield
soonest and ask him keep contents confidential.

BEGIN MESSAGE:

Because administration has become increasingly concerned with failure Indian agricultural production to keep up with population growth and demand for food, it has in recent months approved PL 480 wheat sales only on a monthly basis pending time satisfied that India is giving top priority to agricultural production and is adopting improved agricultural policies.

Now two things have occurred:

1. Worst monsoon in decades during past growing season threatens early major food crisis in India.

BUNDY-SMITH
BATOR
BOWLER
BOWMAN
CHASE
COOPER
JESSUP
JOHNSON
KEENE
KOMER
HOODY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Group 4

By pn NARA, Date 12-2-97

Drafted by:
AID:AA/NESA:WGFarr:bp:12/8/65

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by: AID:A/AID:William S. Gaud

Clearances:

STATE:NEA/SOA:DTSchneider (in draft)
White House:RKomer (in sub.)
STATE:S/S:BRead (in sub.)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Expect continue shipping PL 480 wheat at present 500,000 tons monthly level and considering additional shipments to meet threatened crisis.

Would appreciate your comments soonest. End msg.

Please cable when this message delivered and advise us of any comments.

GP-4

Note: Code Room:

LIM DIS distribution to:

Secretary
Komer, White House
Bell, A/AID
Gaud, DA/AID
Hare, NEA
Macomber, AA/NESA

RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

fertilizer with other than AID funds. Loan will also be tied ~~xxx~~ in to overall agricultural program. By exchange of letters or otherwise, GOI will be expected agree to certain specific self-help efforts, particularly ~~xxx~~ in private sector production and distribution fertilizer and other inputs. Detailed negotiating instructions follow. FYI.

~~XXXXX~~

RUSK

GP-4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DE RUEHCR 8054 3441319

ZNY CCCCC

O 101301Z

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO WHITEHOUSE ATTN MR BUNDY

O 101203Z

FM AMEMBASSY NEWDELHI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1466

STATE GRNC

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DEC 10

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By pw, NARA, Date 12-2-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REF DEPTTEL 1024, AIDTO 747, AIDTO 748
PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT FURTHER EXTENSION PL 480 TITLE I
PROGRAM OF 1.5 MILLION TONS FOR EARLY SHIPMENT AND OF \$50 MILLION
LOAN FOR URGENT IMPORT FERTILIZER IS HAVING TREMENDOUS IMPACT
IN DELHI AND THROUGHOUT COUNTRY. NEWS IS HITTING FRONT PAGES
OF THE NEWSPAPERS AND BEING RECEIVED WITH GREAT SENSE OF
RELIEF AND GRATITUDE. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND OTHERS ARE
GOING OUT OF THEIR WAY TO PAY PERSONAL TRIBUTE TO PRESIDENT.
MINISTER FOOD AND AGRICULTURE SUBRAMANIAM MADE STATEMENT IN

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 511

PARLIAMENT TODAY ANNOUNCING US ACTION. HE ESPECIALLY EXPRESSED
HIS "THANKS ON BEHALF OF THE GOVT OF INDIA TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON
FOR THE PERSONAL INTEREST BY HIM TOWARDS MEETING THE
IMMEDIATE AS WELL AS THE LONG-RANGE FOOD REQUIREMENTS OF THE
COUNTRY AND ASSISTING IN OUR EFFORTS TO ATTAIN SELF-SUFFICIENCY."

PRIME MINISTER MADE FURTHER FOLLOW-UP STATEMENT IN PARLIAMENT
THIS AFTERNOON. HE ANNOUNCED VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES FOR
TALKS BEGINNING FEBRUARY 1. HE STATED HE LOOKED FORWARD TO
MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT AND AMERICAN PEOPLE. HE SINCERELY
THANKED THE PRESIDENT FOR PROVISION OF ADDITIONAL MILLION AND
A HALF TONS OF FOODGRAINS UNDER NEW PL 480 AGREEMENT.

WE ARE RECEIVING NUMEROUS QUESTIONS FROM PRESS AND OTHERS AS
TO NEXT STEPS. WE ASSUME THAT NEXT STEP WILL BE VISIT SUBRAMANIAM
TO THE UNITED STATES TO WORK OUT WITH SECRETARY FREEMAN
AND REST OF USG ARRANGEMENTS FOR FURTHER DELIVERIES IN CONTEXT
OF MORE DETAILED DISCUSSION OF INDIAN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
PROGRAM IN RESPONSE TO QUERIES AS TO WHEN SUBRAMANIAM WILL
MAKE VISIT, WE ARE REPLYING "SOON AS POSSIBLE" AND, IN LINE
WITH MOYERS' PRESS BRIEFING, ARE SAYING THAT WE EXPECT SUBRAMANIAM
VISIT TO TAKE PLACE BEFORE SHASTRI MEETING WITH PRESIDENT.

PAGE THREE RUSBAE 511 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AS REGARDS LEVEL OF FURTHER SHIPMENTS, WE ASSUME THAT, SUBJECT
TO SUCH UNDERSTANDINGS AS MAY BE WORKED OUT WITH SECRETARY
FREEMAN, SHIPMENTS WILL BE MADE TO MAXIMUM CAPACITY SHIPPING
AND PORT FACILITIES. WE FURTHER ASSUME, IN LINE MOYERS' BRIEFING,
THAT EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO OBTAIN MAXIMUM POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTIONS
FROM OTHER COUNTRIES SUCH AS AUSTRALIA, CANADA AND POSSIBLY
FRANCE TO ASSIST INDIA IN PRESENT EMERGENCY.

AS REGARDS TIMING, WE ARE ASSUMING THAT EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE
TO ACHIEVE MAXIMUM INFLOW DURING FIRST HALF OF 1966, BEFORE
RAINY SEASON REDUCES SHIPPING AND UNLOADING CAPACITY.

ADVISE SOONEST IF FOREGOING ASSUMPTIONS ARE CORRECT. GP-3

BOWLES

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1965 DEC 10 21 59

~~SECRET~~

FROM KOMER
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP65867

~~SECRET~~

DECEMBER 10, 1965

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM KOMER

EMBASSY DELHI REPORTS THAT YOUR FOOD ANNOUNCEMENT IS QUOTE HAVING TREMENDOUS IMPACT IN DELHI AND THROUGHOUT COUNTRY. NEWS IS HITTING FRONT PAGES OF NEWSPAPERS AND BEING RECEIVED WITH GREAT SENSE OF RELIEF AND GRATITUDE. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND OTHERS ARE GOING OUT OF THEIR WAY TO PAY PERSONAL TRIBUTE TO PRESIDENT END QUOTE. IN ANNOUNCING US ACTION IN PARLIAMENT TODAY, SUBRAMANIAM EXPRESSED HIS QUOTE THANKS ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON FOR THE PERSONAL INTEREST BY HIM TOWARD MEETING THE IMMEDIATE AS WELL AS THE LONG-RANGE FOOD REQUIREMENTS OF THE COUNTRY AND ASSISTING IN OUR EFFORTS TO ATTAIN SELF-SUFFICIENCY END QUOTE. SHASTRI MADE FOLLOW-UP STATEMENT, WHEN ANNOUNCING VISIT. HE ALSO SINCERELY THANKED THE PRESIDENT FOR ADDITIONAL FOODGRAINS AND FERTILIZER. MEMBERS CHEERED WHEN SHASTRI DID SO.


ON THE AP STORY MATTER, AMBASSADOR NEHRU CALLED PERSONALLY TO SAY THAT HE WAS TO CONVEY TO YOU HOW THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT QUOTE DEPLORED AND DISASSOCIATED ITSELF END QUOTE FROM THE AP STORY. HE ADDED THAT THEY ARE UNABLE TO DISCOVER THAT THIS STORY WENT OUT ON THE WIRES FROM INDIA. AT ANY RATE THE PARTICULAR SENTENCES WHICH MADE UP THE STORY HAD BEEN DUG OUT AND STRUNG TOGETHER FROM ARTICLES WRITTEN OVER A LONG PERIOD WITH A MUCH DIFFERENT OVERALL TONE.

DTG: 10/2143Z DEC 65

~~SECRET~~

February 13, 1966

G. F. ①
C0121
Pope Paul VI



To the Honorable
Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States of America

Mr. President,

Your kind letter of February 10th gives rise to the hope that the grave situation confronting India, and, to a lesser degree, Pakistan will be resolved in great measure. Once again, the United States, blessed by Almighty God with such bounteous riches, has demonstrated its desire to assist those in dire need. Your latest authorization of over three million tons of grain for India is indeed a source of much consolation and joy, and We express to you, Mr. President, and to your noble nation, Our heartfelt gratitude for reaching out the hand of aid to these millions afflicted by natural calamity.

On Wednesday last, We appealed to all our children in

also sent to
Files as of 2/12/66

the world, and through them, to all the nations of this earth to help alleviate the grave conditions existing in that vast Asian subcontinent. We have already given instructions to Our representatives to lay before the leaders of their respective countries the tragic situation of India and Pakistan and We have encouraged them to rally these nations to come to the aid of their suffering brother nations. We are confident that a greater understanding of their responsibility in this moment of grave crisis will forge greater bonds of international cooperation from which We hope that an atmosphere of love, respect and trust will result.

Careful note has been taken of your program to help these countries increase their production and improve the quality of their produce. This is truly a wise plan and will be most instrumental in preparing these nations against similar recurrences as well as aiding towards a general improvement of their conditions.

We pray the Giver of all things to bestow upon your generous country an abundance of heavenly blessings and the rich fruits of peace, harmony and prosperity.

From the Vatican, February 13, 1966

Paulus P. P. VI-

February 25, 1966
Friday 7:30 p.m.

24

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is a cordial reply to the Pope's warmly congratulatory letter about our efforts to meet Indian famine.

It doesn't seem appropriate to suggest again that the Pope also write other leaders (as you did in your 10 February letter) especially since his letter says that he has asked his representatives to lay the problem before them.

But it might be useful if Jack Valenti could mention orally to the Nuncio your continued hope that His Holiness would also write directly to such leaders as de Gaulle, Pearson, etc. -- since you know how great an impact a personal letter from him would have.

For Signature

R. W. Komer

cc: Jack Valenti ✓

RECEIVED
MAR 11 1966
CENTRAL FILES

2/26/66

Your Holiness:

I am deeply grateful for your warm letter of 13 February regarding the United States response to the grave food shortages on the Asian subcontinent. I was greatly impressed by your own appeal and by those of the World Council of Churches, the United Nations and the Food and Agriculture Organization.

As you have already done, we must all bend our efforts now to the practical and difficult matter of encouraging humanitarian responses. In some countries like Italy and the Netherlands, the generosity of private citizens alone has surpassed any expectation. Your own personal gift was an inspiration. But in all candor and confidence, we are disappointed that the other major producers of wheat have so far not contributed in proportion to the size of their stocks. Nor have those nations which enjoy substantial foreign exchange reserves done what we believe they could.

We hope that the call of India's hungry millions will not go unheeded. This country is fully prepared to join with all other willing nations in meeting India's pressing needs.

Sincerely,

S/
LBJ

His Holiness
Pope Paul VI
Vatican City
Rome

LBJ:
RWK:saw



भारतीय राजदूतावास
वाशिंगटन, डी० सी०
EMBASSY OF INDIA
WASHINGTON, D. C.

February 9, 1966

Dear Mr President:

I have the honour to transmit to you
the enclosed message from Shrimati Indira Gandhi,
Prime Minister of India, which has been received
at this Embassy telegraphically.

With my high regard and esteem,

Yours sincerely,

(B.K. Nehru)
Ambassador of India

His Excellency
Lyndon B. Johnson,
The President,
The White House,
WASHINGTON D.C.

New Delhi,
February 9, 1966.

Dear Mr President:

Ambassador B.K. Nehru has reported to me the talk he had with you on the 2nd February. I am grateful to you for receiving him immediately after his return to Washington and for the patient and sympathetic hearing you gave him. Even more, I thank you for your immediate response in making available another three million tons of foodgrains under your P.L.480 programme. This sets at rest our immediate anxieties on the food front. We are intensifying our efforts to make other countries join more meaningfully in the international effort which you have initiated to help us.

There is one matter which is still causing me concern. It is so urgent that I feel I must write about it straightaway as it cannot wait until I am in a position to visit you in Washington which would be some time in the later half of March.

Following the unfortunate conflict with Pakistan, there had been a pause in the flow of U.S. aid to India. You have been good enough to release some of this aid recently to help us to meet our fertiliser needs. The cause of our present deep anxiety is that the suspension of non-project aid has left most of our industries desperately short of essential raw materials, components and spare parts for which they have been relying on U.S. sources of supply. Production and employment in many units have already been affected. In another few weeks, we apprehend large scale unemployment and closure of factories all over the country. I

do hope (2)

(2)

do hope, Mr. President, that this matter will receive your attention in the immediate future as to keep it pending till I am able to come to Washington would only prolong the period for which men and machinery will be kept idle.

With warm regards,

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Indira Gandhi

His Excellency
Lyndon Baines Johnson,
The President,
The White House,
Washington D.C.

OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

2:45 P.M. EST
Friday
February 4, 1966
AT THE WHITE HOUSE

THE PRESIDENT: I have two or three items of interest, I think, to give you.

First of all, I spent some time this week working on the food situation for India. I think I need not dwell at length on the very serious situation that confronts the Government of India and the people as a result of the drought and the famine that exists there.

I have counseled with the appropriate Members of the House and Senate, in Agriculture and Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations and Appropriations fields, and I am today making an allotment of 2 million tons of wheat and 1 million tons of maize to be immediately available, and to be shipped as quickly as is possible.

The wheat will be worth in the neighborhood of \$160 million, and the maize will be between \$45 million and \$50 million.

I plan to see the Prime Minister at her convenience, and we will at that meeting go further into the problems, the mutual problems, to try to arrive at a further course of action and additional measures that we can take and our people can take to be helpful to our friends and to the people of India, and also to talk about things that the people of India can do to help their friends, the people of America.

I have reviewed this at some length with the Ambassador, at great length with the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Agriculture. We have had a number of our best technical personnel there. Some are still there. Others will be going in the next few days.

If there are questions on that, I will take them now, and then I will go into some other things.

QUESTION: Mr. President, I would gather, then, that the resumption of economic aid will await the visit of Mrs. Nehru.

THE PRESIDENT: I wouldn't want to foreclose or preclude any allotments in between, but none have been made as of now. I would anticipate that she would be here in the reasonably near future. I am just passing on the most urgent at the moment. That is food. We have allotted 3-1/2 million tons already this fiscal year, and this will be an additional 3 million, 2 million of wheat and 1 million of maize.

MORE

You can say that we are formulating legislation that we will discuss with the Indian Government, but we are formulating legislation that will be discussed and debated and sent to the Congress unless we change our mind. That is our present plan, to ask for a commitment of the Congress and the American people and to also use whatever influence we have, what leadership in the world, to ask other countries to come in and contribute.

Now, in just what form we will do that is still in the detail state. I went into it last night and I spent some time today with the Secretary of Agriculture on it, but he is going to be working on it today.

QUESTION: Can you say how this might affect the American farm situation?

THE PRESIDENT: I wouldn't think it would affect it a great deal one way or the other. We have adequate supplies.

QUESTION: It will cut down surpluses, though, will it not?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

QUESTION: Mr. President, would you expect Mrs. Gandhi to come here within the next few weeks?

THE PRESIDENT: I think that is a matter for her to announce. She is welcome any time she can come. We have been very receptive to visits of the Prime Minister of India since we got our foreign aid legislation last year, and we were in a position to know what we were authorized to do.

QUESTION: Mr. President, this shipment you just announced is in addition to the emergency grain shipments you authorized late last year?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. This will be a total of 6-1/2 million tons. We have authorized 3-1/2 million and we will authorize another 3 million today. I haven't even told the Secretary the amount. I have been studying this since he left here.

But, as a matter of fact, I am announcing a little more than I thought. I want to be sure that we announce what we can, and then I am going to ask Congress to join me in authorizing me to make a rather substantial increase in allotments and ask the world to help us every way we can.

QUESTION: Mr. President, is the aim to try to get it up to approximately a million tons?

THE PRESIDENT: I would say that is pure speculation. We don't have any aim, goal, or objective. We want to do whatever we can to try -- not to have more than we need or less than we need, but we are surveying that now. We don't know what other nations will do. You can be sure America will do more than her part. I think we do a great disservice when we speculate that America is going to contribute X or Y amounts before we have even decided that, because you then wed us to a position in the public mind which is not justified, and which I am not authorized to make.

QUESTION: Mr. President, would this be a part of your Food For Peace Message, or will you put in a special bill that would apply to India?

THE PRESIDENT: This will be India, a special emergency situation for India.

QUESTION: Mr. President, can you tell us what India's needs are at this point on a monthly basis or a yearly basis?

THE PRESIDENT: They have a shortage of roughly 19 million tons, and they are taking steps to ration and pull that down to several million tons -- 6, 7, 8, maybe down to 11 or 12 million. They can speak better about that than I can, although I had a detailed report from the Ambassador last night that I reviewed with the Congress.

Is there anything else?

QUESTION: Will you take questions on other subjects, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. I am going to make another little announcement and you will probably want to ask me something on that.

For some time I have been wanting to visit with Ambassador Lodge and General Westmoreland. Last week we explored the possibility of General Westmoreland coming here and addressing a group, and that did not work out. So I ascertained this would be in Pearl Harbor and Honolulu this week end. I have tentative plans to have Ambassador Lodge come --

QUESTION: What was that, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: I have plans to ask Ambassador Lodge to come into Honolulu and join General Westmoreland there. I will ask the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, with appropriate education and health officials, to join me and a very limited White House working group. We will leave here sometime late tomorrow and go to Honolulu.

We will ask the Chief of State, Mr. Hui, and the Prime Minister, Mr. Ky, to also come there for a visit, and to exchange views with us. We will have both military and non-military briefings.

Following those meetings on Tuesday, I will return to Washington with some of the Cabinet and perhaps Mr. Bundy, the Secretary of Agriculture and other technical people, may go on to explore and inaugurate certain classification programs in the fields of health, education, and agriculture in Vietnam.

As I said, I have been wanting to have a chance to review with Ambassador Lodge and General Westmoreland our complete program there. Since General Westmoreland is going to be there anyway, I thought it would be good for us this week end to meet him there instead of trying to have them

4:55 p.m., Thursday
February 3, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM Joe Califano

Here is the information on food assistance to India that you requested. The "Total Commodities" column is higher than the wheat column because it contains some other items, mostly sorghum, in addition to wheat.

Attach.

February 3, 1966

FOOD ASSISTANCE TO INDIA

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Wheat</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>Mil. MT</u>	<u>Mil. \$</u>	<u>Commodities</u> <u>Mil. \$</u>
1957	1.76	102.7	149.2
1958	1.87	113.9	126.1
1959	3.22	204.5	232.9
1960	3.15	187.3	251.0
1961	3.21	192.7	298.1
1962	1.98	121.6	162.3
1963	3.51	219.1	307.2
1964	4.46	285.0	365.5
1965	5.91	401.9	502.6
→ 1966 (1st half)	<u>3.01</u>	<u>171.6</u>	<u>189.4</u>
TOTAL	32.08	2,000.1	2,584.3

There were no Title I PL 480 programs with India during fiscal years 1953, 1954, 1955 and 1956.

Since late last year, monthly grain shipments have been:

	<u>Million Metric Tons</u>
July	.63
August	.5
September	.60
October	.59
November	.40
December	.46
January	.68

India food

February 3, 1966
Thursday 4:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached are Freeman's proposals (worked out with State and AID) for an interim allocation and an equitable formula. I too would strongly endorse them as the course which best meets your criteria and avoids multiple added headaches later.

A. Two million ton interim allocation. We could stretch out any amount from 500,000 tons up over the next few months. But applying the criterion you gave B.K. Nehru -- enough to relieve the pressure on Mrs. Gandhi through her late March visit -- Agriculture/AID urge 2 million. This would look responsive and buy time for full Hill debate on the big problem.

B. Formula for a matching effort. Can we legitimately tell other countries that they must now take up part of what we have been regularly sending India under PL 480 for the last few years, i.e., 500,000 tons monthly? It's also difficult to find any workable formula to cover India's full 11 million ton need. So we would say we'd continue to meet India's pre-famine need as before, but insist that others participate fully in meeting the famine emergency (5 out of 11 million tons). Freeman says we could offer to match others on a 2 for 1 basis (since we have 2/3 of the world's uncommitted food reserves) or even 50/50 (our share in the the World Food Program). We could ask the UN to monitor the pledging. It would be mighty hard to get others to match these offers, but the formula would be clear, understandable and defensible before Congress and the world.

Presentation to the Congressional Group. If the above makes sense, you could tell the group this evening, after Freeman's briefing, that:

1. You feel the US must help India, but on a basis where other nations help proportionately too.
2. You regard this as a problem on which the Congress should be fully heard.
3. So you intend to send a special message, asking legislative support for the full US participation envisaged including endorsement of the entire amount of money involved.
4. We can't expect others to take over what we've normally been giving India in PL 480 (recently at a rate of 6 m. tons per year). We'll negotiate this with the Indians ourselves. But we can expect all others to join us in the humanitarian endeavor to meet India's special famine needs, which they and we estimate at another 5 m. tons.

So, just as we've pledged to provide 50% of the UN World Food Program, you propose pledging that we'll help meet on a matching basis (one for one), India's emergency needs. We will ask India and the UN to call on other nations for a special program, through which they will share the burden by pledging in food or food equivalent an amount equal to what we put up.

6. At a time when Vietnam and other US burdens are so heavy, you want the Congress to debate fully and decide in its wisdom whether the US should take on this new burden -- with the cost involved.

R. W. Komer

Attachment

Mr. Valenti

February 3, 1966
Tuesday 3:45 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Reply to Pope Paul's appeal for food aid to India. At Tab A is his letter to you. It provides an excellent occasion for a reply which cites all that we are doing, and enlists the Pope's help in stimulating others to make a suitably generous response.

The UN appeal will probably come out on Friday morning. So I'd urge that we also cable this letter promptly via Embassy Rome, so that it reaches His Holiness before the UN appeal is issued. For signature, if you approve this idea.

R. W. Komer

*Jack, if the President approves
this you may want to give a
copy to the Murcis.*

Carl Komer

RECEIVED
FEB 25 1966
CENTRAL FILES

2/8/66

U. F. ⑥
C0121
C0310
CM/Grain
C0230
FO 3-2
Brambilla, Franco
C01-3

Your Holiness:

I fully share your deep humanitarian concern for the victims of famine in South Asia. As you know, the United States has for years been providing massive food assistance to both India and Pakistan. We have sent India alone over 35 million tons of foodgrains. Since receiving your appeal I have authorized yet another 3 million tons. We are also engaged in a sweeping effort to help both countries increase their own production and improve the nutritional quality of what they produce.

We will do yet more -- but even the great resources of my country may be strained to meet India's enormous needs. So I earnestly seek your help in bringing together in a truly international effort all nations who can contribute in any way. We must use this crisis to forge greater bonds of international cooperation too.

I believe that the United Nations will shortly issue a worldwide appeal. I hope that you can join me in actively supporting it, and in calling on all nations able to do so to help in the name of humanity. France, Canada, Australia and Argentina in particular have considerable grain stocks beyond their current needs. A letter from you, similar to that which you have just sent to me, would do much to encourage the leaders of these nations as well to make a generous response. In fact, few nations are so small or poor that they have nothing to give, and hunger is a trial that should unite all men.

We ask your invaluable help and assure you that the United States will not be found wanting.

Sincerely,

His Holiness
Pope Paul VI
Vatican City, Rome

cc: McGB
LBJ:RWK:saw
(Typed 2/8/66)

RECEIVED
FEB 25
CENTRAL

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RESIDENT COMMISSIONER
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MRS. CHRISTINE S. GALLAGHER, CLERK
HYDE H. MURRAY, ASSISTANT CLERK
JOHN J. HEIMBURGER, GENERAL COUNSEL
FRANCIS M. LE MAY, STAFF CONSULTANT

House of Representatives, U.S.
Committee on Agriculture
Washington, D.C.

February 3, 1966

*sent to Sec. of Agriculture
by Post memo 2/5/66.*

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

I am gravely concerned that the United States, with its great food and fiber abundance and potential, may do "too little too late" to meet urgent famine needs and to narrow the world food gap.

My anxiety is based upon the administration's new world food policy, as reflected in your Budget and subsequent messages. These messages have not given much encouragement to those of us in the Congress who believe that:

- we have a mission to use our great abundance to feed and clothe people while these people struggle to achieve self-sufficiency in their own agriculture;
- our greatest opportunity to present America's real image to the world is in the dimension of our response to the hunger and suffering of mankind, and,
- there is no road more certain in the direction of world peace, than rendering to the needs and to the self-reliance of the masses of people in the Free World.

I learned this morning that you have delayed sending up to the Congress your specific world food policy message. I find some hope in this delay that

The President
The White House

Page Two

February 3, 1966

you personally will see that the dimensions of this policy are vastly enlarged over the portents of your previous messages.

Moreover, Mr. President, I suggest that you take dramatic steps now to get food to the hungry and riot-ravaged areas of India. I propose that you forthwith establish an air lift of food by our Air Force to those isolated provinces of India where Communists are leading food riots, and to other areas of that great nation where drought has brought on famine.

We have made our wheat available to India, but poor harbor and interior transportation facilities will let this relief only trickle through to many famine areas. I am proposing that, with the cooperation of the Indian government, we deliver wheat by seagoing vessels to nearest ports with adequate unloading facilities, then use our Air Force cargo planes to take the food directly to the provinces where people are hungry and starving.


This undertaking could be accomplished with the same precision that our military aircraft supplied Berlin during the Communist blockade.

It would show to the world the great heart of America.

Mr. President, if Russia and China were able to match the ingenuity of our agriculture and they, not us, had controlled the sources of food and fiber abundance, the larger part of the world long since may have swung into the Communist fold, for starving people may exchange their liberty for food in the stomachs.

By a large and confident employment of our food and fiber abundance, Mr. President, America can relieve human agony, encourage self-reliance in peoples, and persuade them in the ways of peace.

Very respectfully yours,


Chairman

HDC/bmp

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thursday, 1:30 p.m.

February 3, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM Joe Califano

Here is a proposed scenario for this evening for your approval:

1. The President would briefly mention the subject of the meeting and the nature of the problem.

(Komer is preparing a list of points for your consideration and possible use.)

2. Secretary Freeman will brief in detail on the situation in India.

(I have asked him to make the points you mentioned this morning and also to give some details on his study of the Indian situation.)

3. Freeman would outline how he has recommended that the President proceed.

a. An interim allocation to take us through the Ghandi visit.

b. A special Presidential message on India's food problem and a Congressional resolution to obtain authority for the (1) tremendous amounts of food involved, (2) cost involved, (3) proposed formula (U. S. would give 6 million tons as usual; of the additional 5 million tons U. S. would give two-thirds (it has two-thirds of the world's food reserves) and the rest of the world would give one-third, and (4) self-help by India.

4. The President would ask for discussion of the Freeman proposal to get the views of the members present.

Approved-

Disapproved

no
Hold no
ask Freeman if he has lost his mind?
no/no/no/ maybe 7/5/10
but not 6 + 2/3 75. It must be 5
that's for Carter



DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

*orig. to Califano
by H.S. hand 2/3/66*

FEB 3 - 1966

India food

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

As background for briefing members of Congress this afternoon on the India situation I have attached:

1. A summary of India's food situation.
2. A note on the most immediate problem of level of allocation.
3. Suggested summaries for sharing the burden with other countries.
4. Some ideas of what India could do for us while helping herself at the same time.

Sincerely,

Orville L. Freeman

FEB 3 1966

February 3, 1966

Summary of India's Food Situation

Last year India had 95 million tons of grain from production and imports. This year, with a harvest of 76 million tons, there is an apparent import deficit of 19 million tons. The Government of India estimates this can be reduced to 11 million tons by drawing down existing meager stocks and "belt tightening." At this point procurement of the grain needed to operate rationing (belt tightening) programs is far behind schedule.

Eleven million tons of wheat is valued at about \$750 million. This is equivalent to one half of India's total annual export earnings.

Against this import deficit of 11 million tons, other countries have thus far contributed 350,000 tons of wheat or about 3 percent of the total need. Offers to provide additional emergency assistance, including foodstuffs other than grain, fertilizer and shipping, increase this total to 4 percent or so.

Other countries have uncommitted export supplies of wheat totalling 6-7 million tons -- mostly in Canada. We have about twice that amount.

Exportable supplies in other countries with commitments made to India in parentheses are as follows: (tons)

Canada	4,000,000 (165,000)	Australia	1,000,000 (150,000)
France	1,000,000 (0)	Italy	200,000 (0)
Argentina	500,000 (0)	Greece	500,000 (5)

Importing countries like Germany, UK and Japan could supply cash shipping or fertilizer -- not grain.

To sustain her people to the next major harvest, India will need to import monthly 1.2 million tons during April and May; 900,000 tons during June, July and August; 1.2 million tons in September and October; and 750,000 tons in November and December. If imports drop much below this level, the internal system for allocating and distributing grain between States may well break down.

Other countries should fill at least one-fourth to one-fifth of the 11 million ton minimum deficit with grain or equivalent value in fertilizer or shipping. This would not be at all unreasonable and would serve several useful purposes including an object lesson in the real value of our food aid. Some possible formulas and tactics to follow in reaching this goal are summarized below.

February 3, 1966

The Immediate Problem of Allocation Level

Pipelines to India, now full as a result of the December 10 1.5 million ton allocation, will begin to run dry February 12, without a further allocation.

To get through Mrs. Gandhi's visit in late March (as you told P.K. Nehru) -- we recommend an allocation of two million tons to be shipped as rapidly as possible. This would permit us to push March shipments up to the 1.2 million tons pre-monsoon rate suggested by the Agriculture team.

If other countries contributed immediately -- which we strongly doubt -- they might stretch a 1.5 million ton U.S. allocation into barely adequate supplies for India through March, but we could probably face the tensions of a gap in the pipeline just when Mrs. Gandhi is here.

February 3, 1966

Formulas for Sharing the Burden of India's Food Emergency

Starting from India's 11 million ton need, we could (a) ask others to provide a percentage of the total, or (b) a percentage of the amount above our 6 million ton contribution last year. We recommend the latter.

So we have:

Needs	- 11 million tons
1965 U.S. shipments	- <u>6</u> million tons
Emergency needs	- 5 million tons

- (1) We have about 2/3 of the world's uncommitted food grain supply even after accounting for a 1965-level India program. We could offer to fill about 2/3 of India's emergency needs which are mainly for food grains, while other countries supply the rest.

This would bring our total in the current 12 months to about 9.3 million tons while others supplied 1.7 million tons.

- (2) We provide 50 percent of the contributions to the FAO World Food Program. If we were also to provide half of India's emergency needs instead of two-thirds -- our total would be 8.5 million tons out of eleven, with other countries asked to send 2.5 million tons. This appears to be out of reach, but might be a starting point.

February 3, 1966

What Can We Get From India

We can and should insist on firm agricultural, economic, and political commitments from the government of India, some of which are now made but require monitoring.

1. Subramanian's November agreements in Rome on long-range agricultural reform and investment were being carried out up to Shastri's death. We believe the commitment to agriculture is at least as strong in the new government.

2. We should insist that India create and maintain a favorable climate for private foreign investment -- particularly in fertilizer -- because this is the key part of the agricultural sector.

3. We can insist that she not repeat the mistakes of the past in centralizing economic control in the Government. Import controls must be liberalized for the strategic industries, especially the agricultural supply industries if they are to function as they must if the required inputs are to be produced in India.

4. India has come through pretty well in the Tashkent Agreement but can help us more on Viet Nam.

5. We should keep our eye on India's progress in family planning. They've had lots of high objectives but have made little real progress in this area. This requires the kind of enthusiasm and priority that India gives to her quarrel with Pakistan.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

EXECUTIVE

F03-2/C0121

FG400

Wednesday, February 2, 1966

5:45 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry H. Wilson, Jr.

I have conferred with Larry O'Brien on suggested Members of Congress for purposes of your meeting on Food for India. We have revised the list slightly and we suggest that the following Members be invited:

Senate

Mansfield
R. Long
Hayden
Ellender
Fulbright
Russell (Ga.)
Sparkman
Aiken
Hickenlooper

House

McCormack
Albert
Morgan
Mahon
Cooley
Whitten
Poage
Mrs. Bolton
Dague (Pa.)

We deleted Passman from your suggested list and substituted Whitten, in that Food for Peace appears before the Agriculture Subcommittee for appropriations, rather than before the Foreign Operations Subcommittee.

We felt that Senator Hayden should be invited to balance off Mahon.

We felt that Cooley as Chairman of the authorizing Committee, and Poage as Chairman of the authorizing Subcommittee, should be invited.

good get them in

△

Original to Mrs Territo

Filed 6/5/67

We felt there should be Republican representation from both Houses.

In that Hickenlooper and Aiken are the ranking Republicans respectively on the Foreign Relations and Agriculture Committees, we suggest Mrs. Bolton and Dague as ranking Republicans on the Foreign Affairs and House Agriculture Committees.

February 2, 1966
Wednesday 9:15 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Talking points for BK Nehru. Our best guess is that he'll plead India's acute famine prospects and the sad state of its economy, then ask for emergency help in both categories. Assuming that you'll plan to be mostly a friendly listener at this point, you might make the following interim response:

1. We're impressed with the way Mrs. Gandhi has taken hold and seems to be going in the right direction.

2. We're also impressed with the spirit of Tashkent and progress toward a Pak/Indian stand-down.

3. You look forward to seeing Mrs. Gandhi -- the sooner the better.

4. We'll take a close look at BK's requests:

(a) On food for famine, he knows we want to be helpful. We've already done far more than all other countries combined. But we've tried to make clear that other nations should pitch in to do a fair share of the job, India itself must make a greater effort to get the Soviets, Canadians, Australians, Japanese, and others to help out. There's too much of a tendency to leave everything to Uncle Sam.

(b) On other economic aid requests, we'll try to get our ducks in a row to have answers for Mrs. Gandhi.

5. In general, India can depend on us to be helpful in as many ways as we can, consistent with our other problems. However, you're sure that India, like other countries will take due note of your strong convictions on self help, just highlighted in the Aid Message. Performance, not promises, will be the test we shall apply.

R. W. Komer



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1783

3339 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008

to JV

January 29, 1966

Dear Mr. Valenti:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a letter from His Holiness, Pope Paul VI, to the President of the United States, and shall be grateful if you will kindly arrange to have it arrive in the hands of the President.

Accept, Mr. Valenti, the renewed assurances of my high consideration.

+ G. Tagliozzi
Apostolic Delegate

The Honorable
Jack Valenti
Special Assistant to the President
The White House

1733

HIS EXCELLENCY
LYNDON B. JOHNSON
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The world at this critical time needs examples of true brotherhood with its consequent results of understanding and sympathy. We know very well of the generosity of the American people, particularly in the post-war period, and we see it continuing even today in areas so much in need of assistance.

Undoubtedly Your Excellency is aware of the grave situation that now faces India, and to a certain extent also Pakistan, due to a serious shortage of food. Millions of innocent people will suffer starvation and malnutrition. Our heart goes out to these poor people whom we would so desire to assist in this grave hour of need. We appeal to Your Excellency, and, through you, to your good people, to come to the aid of these impoverished and stricken nations. The United States has been most sympathetic to these suffering nations, but in the face of the greatest food shortage in the history of India, we hope that your nation will once again provide exceptional assistance. The future alone will prove how much such an act of true brotherly love will have contributed to peace and understanding in the world. We, too, according to our very limited means, have extended a helping hand to these stricken peoples.

Confident that our plea will be heard, we invoke upon your Excellency and the people of the United States, already blessed beyond measure by God, an abundance of heavenly favors and the blessings of peace, happiness and prosperity.

From the Vatican, January 21, 1966

Paulus P P. VI.

(Drafting Office and Officer)

January 6, 1966.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: January 5, 1966

SUBJECT: India Drought Relief

PARTICIPANTS: Robert W. Komer, Deputy Special Asst. to the President

Richard W. Reuter, Special Asst. to the Secretary (M/FFP)

COPIES TO:

Some 91 districts in 7 states of India have been identified as areas where crop harvest may drop to 25-40% of normal. Twelve million people live in these areas, out of a 7-state population total of 111 million. (Punjab and Uttar Pradesh not included, although parts of these two states later may also have to be added to the list of seriously affected drought areas).

Despite Indian, U.S. and world efforts there will be severe food shortages. The President and Minister Subramaniam emphasized the importance of minimizing the impact of this on children, nursing mothers, and particularly vulnerable elements of the population. Title II emergency grants of food for disaster relief are the best way to assure protection to this group and, like the Title III voluntary agency programs, are clearly visible U. S. humanitarian efforts.

The Indian Government has submitted an ambitious emergency plan primarily for child feeding and work relief projects with some free distribution in the "areas of acute scarcity" (summary attached). The total proposal would cost approximately \$544 million (U.S. CCC cost basis, including freight). Next week an AID-USDA-Food For Peace team will visit India to review the proposal and available resources of personnel and equipment. However, time is running out:

--- setting

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

-2-

- setting up the distributive mechanism requires time and the assurance of supplies;
- ports now not used to capacity may in the spring be less efficient and seriously more costly;
- for children the need is now.

Mr. Komer pointed out that we do face contradictory factors in the India food problem. An emergency Sec. 201 grant now of perhaps 10% of the Indian request would gain us valuable time. The assurance of supplies en route would allow us to divert some Title III commodities so relief feeding could be started as soon as possible after the special task force review of the Indian program. Such a relief distribution to women and children now may allow us to make use of these months for necessary food movement but not get out so far ahead of the G.O.I. and the world that they do not really come to grips with the total Indian food problem.

In answer to Mr. Komer's query, Mr. Reuter stated that under this proposal we might now provide:

180,000 tons of wheat

100,000 tons of processed foods comprised of flour, rolled wheat, bulgur and cornmeal

2,000 tons of oil

8,000 tons of milk powder and/or soymeal products

However, in order to differentiate clearly from our Title I program, Mr. Reuter suggested we use the dollar value figures (estimated at \$54,160,000) rather than commodity tonnage (290,000 tons). We also would want to keep some flexibility in commodity composition to encourage to a maximum degree Indian and third country contributions to these free delivery plans.

(Mr. Reuter was out of the city when the coordinating committee met on Tuesday, Jan. 4, but it is his understanding that they tended to favor the Title I route at the moment. Since the discussion outlined in this memorandum, Mr. Reuter has not checked the concerned agencies).

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

SUMMARY OF INDIAN RELIEF REQUESTS
(PER TOAID 844)

To be supplied under PL 480 - Title II - Section 201

Wheat (For laborers on work relief and in relief camps in "acute scarcity areas" - 1 Kg per day for 270 days for 6 million workers aged 15 - 59)	1.6 million tons
Wheat (Free to young, old and infirm - $\frac{1}{2}$ Kg per day for 270 days for 6 million people - in "acute shortage areas")	.8 million tons
Wheat (To support rural works outside "acute shortage areas")	.15 million tons
Wheat - TOTAL	<hr/> 2.55 million tons
Milk (Free to mothers and children - 2 oz per day for 270 days for 6 million people in "area of acute scarcity")	92 thousand tons
Vegetable Oil (Free to nursing mothers - $1\frac{1}{2}$ oz per day for 270 days for 1 million people in "area of acute scarcity")	12 thousand tons
To Be Financed by A.I.D. or P.L. 480	
Cattle fodder	486 thousand tons
Heavy construction machinery and equipment for public works program	\$350,000
Multivitamin tablets	2.1 billion pieces

JAN 6 1966

Areas of Acute Scarcity

91 Districts have been tentatively identified in 7 states where crop may be 25 - 40% of normal, 12 million people in these areas out of 111 million total in seven states.

Above districts do not include Punjab and U.P., parts of which may be added.

Cost

Frank Ellis has costed the proposed Title II programs

c.c.c. Cost	\$460 million
Freight	84
	<hr/>
Total	\$544 million

NESA/SA:
WCFurst:thp 12/23/65



DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

Administratively Confidential

January 4, 1966

MEMORANDUM

To: The President
The White House

From: Orville L. Freeman *Orville L. Freeman*
Secretary of Agriculture

Subject: Follow up on Indian Food and Agricultural Situation

1. Your conference with Subramaniam was persuasive and effective. Since December 20, 1965 the Indian Government has taken a number of steps consistent with the course of action you outlined.
 - A. The India Supply Mission acting promptly and efficiently completed on December 29, 1965 purchase of the entire 1 1/2 million tons of wheat allocated by your direction. Shipping has been booked.
 - B. Assistance has been requested from other countries. We don't have detailed and exact information but it is reliably reported that Canada has made a commitment of \$15 million to supply commodities. New Zealand has made a token offer of dry milk solid. Sweden will make available 3,500 tons of milk powder. The Netherlands has promised 100,000 guilders to be used to purchase milk powder and baby food. India is pressing Moscow to help. The U.K. has indicated their willingness to make some shipping available. Germany has been approached. Subramaniam informs me that he has called to Shastri's attention that an appeal might be made to the U.N. He had some preliminary discussions with U Thant who promised his help when Subramaniam was in New York.
 - C. Prime Minister Shastri continues to give Subramaniam firm support as he carries forward commitments made in Rome and in his visit with you. Although other factors apparently entered into the picture, the allocation of foreign exchange for fertilizer which we had insisted must be made apparently caused the final breach leading to the acceptance by Shastri of Finance Minister Krishnamachari's resignation. Until very recently the Prime Minister would not have stood fast under such pressure. The fact he has done so verifies the wisdom of your insistence that the Indian Government take specific strong steps to improve their agriculture.

2--The President

D. The working check list to be used to monitor long term agricultural development has been placed in the hands of the Indian Government. The check list itself is being refined and improved by a Subcommittee of the NSA Committee. This check list procedure promises to be a workable system of measuring progress and making certain that long term general agreements are carried out in practice. The willing acceptance by the Indian Government of this kind of cooperative surveillance is promising.

2. Crop short fall estimates are unchanged since my memorandum to you dated December 23, 1965. To avoid mass starvation India must import 10 to 15 million tons of grain according to these estimates. As previously reported, we do have the availabilities and the capacity to move that amount of grain but the ability of the Indians to receive and distribute it remains to be verified.

I would call to your attention at this point certain physical facts in connection with the problem which lies before us.

1. The famine threat will be greatest from May until the crop begins to come in in late October.
2. The port capacity in India will diminish approximately 250,000 tons a month when the monsoon begins late in May.
3. Arrival in India of the 1 1/2 million ton allocation which has been purchased and booked will not reach the 1 million ton a month level which we had hoped would test Indian port capacity.
4. In the absence of further action there will be a gap in arrivals during April until whatever amount of grain the President sees fit to make available following Shastri's visit has been dispatched and reaches India. The length of the gap will depend on how long it takes to book the ships and load them following any new commitment as a result of the Shastri visit.

The physical facts set down above add up to a gap in the pipeline and a sharp short fall during the first 4 months of 1966 from the 1 million ton a month target. So far as January and February are concerned, little can be done to reach the 1 million ton level. There are, however, several possibilities that might make it possible to reach the 1 million ton a month figure in March and carry it forward without a gap in the pipeline.

3--The President

- a. The Indian Government could contract now for shipping the first week in February. Then if the President decided to allot additional grain to India it can move immediately. India has reported to us that she is now booking shipping for 200,000 tons of grain beyond the 1.5 million ton allocation already made. A recent report indicates that authorization has been issued to book an additional 900,000 tons ahead. This will be done carefully and selectively so as not to cause price rises. I discussed this with Subramaniam when he was here and while I told him I thought he ought to book ahead in this fashion I made it crystal clear there was no commitment by the President for any additional amount of wheat.
- b. An international emergency effort could be put together and announced in the near future which would include contributions by other countries of food grain, other foodstuff shipping supplies and services. The United States as its contribution to such a disaster effort could make up the difference under Title II the disaster section of P.L. 480 between what other countries made available and the estimated 250,000 to 500,000 tons needed to fill the pipeline and test India's port capacity in March. Such an effort might be announced as an emergency humanitarian international effort distinct from our bilateral arrangements with India under Title I.
- c. The Indian Government can take immediate steps to try and divert ships currently at sea so that they will reach Indian ports in January, February and March. The volume so diverted would be replaced from the 1 1/2 million tons already allocated or whatever amount the President might subsequently agree to make available. My experts estimate that a maximum of only 150,000 tons at very considerable cost to the Indian Government could be added in this way. This is difficult and expensive to do but we continue to push the Indians hard to do it.
- d. Any short fall of arrivals from the 1 million ton a month schedule in the early months of 1966 might be made up by extraordinary efforts at minor ports later in the year. Planning currently under way to develop means to handle 5 million tons in addition to the current 10 million ton target is being expanded to 7 million tons.

4--The President

3. The NSA Committee has met and has the following recommendations to make:

- A. That a team of specialists be sent to India as quickly as possible. Such a team would be headed by Clarence Eskildsen, the Deputy Administrator of the Foreign Agricultural Service, who has had service in India and is a competent and experienced executive in foreign agricultural matters. There will be representatives from AID and the Maritime Administration on the team. It is of critical importance that we have more solid information on the crop short fall, and on port facilities, planned improvements and internal transportation and distribution plans. Ben Heineman, Chairman of the Board of the Chicago and Great Western, with whom I have consulted reports to me that internal distribution situation is not in as good shape as reported by the Indians. I want to check this out carefully.

Several weeks ago you authorized me to dispatch such a team. They are now scheduled to leave Thursday night.

- B. The NSA Committee considered at some length whether a team headed by the Secretary of Agriculture to include prominent Congressmen and possibly representatives of other countries, i.e., Canada, Argentina and Australia, might follow the team of specialists in several weeks. No firm conclusion was reached. The Committee will meet again this week. A number of questions were raised for exploration.

- (1) Would such a visit help set the stage for the Shastri visit? Would it be useful to the President to have the information from both the specialists and the higher level group when he meets with Shastri?
- (2) Would such a trip be interpreted as checking on India? As underwriting India's need? Could it be played as an international effort? Might attention be directed to overall agricultural needs in the less developed countries in general by visiting a country other than India -- perhaps Pakistan?
- (3) Would a prominent team so dramatize the United States' interest and contribution that if next summer it is widely reported that Indians are starving (which is likely no matter what we do) the United States would be insulated

5--The President

from the charge both at home and abroad that we failed to act promptly despite the fact we had heavy reserves of wheat on hand.

- (4) Would such a team be more useful following up on the Shastri visit rather than preceding it.

These and other questions will be considered by the Committee and a report made later in the week.



DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

December 23, 1965

MEMORANDUM

To: The President
The White House

From: Orville L. Freeman
Secretary of Agriculture

Subject: Talks with the Indian Minister of Food and Agriculture

India Food
orig. sent to President with Rusk memo 12/23
Orville L. Freeman

We have completed extended and friendly talks with Minister Subramaniam. He was accompanied in these talks by the Indian Ambassador and staff specialists on short and long range food problems in India.

On our side Dave Bell, Paul Ignatius, and Dick Reuter took part along with staff specialists from State, AID, Defense and the World Bank.

We had a detailed and penetrating exchange of views on India's plans and our potential for meeting the immediate food emergency and on the policies and programs which the Government of India has recently set in motion to meet the long term food and population crisis.

About 25 members of the House and Senate took part in a dinner discussion with the Minister Monday night. They heard him speak and questioned him closely, particularly in regard to self help efforts in India. They also pressed for information on what countries other than the United States are prepared to do to provide food, fertilizer and other assistance to India in the crisis months ahead. I believe this discussion improved our prospects considerably for a constructive discussion of the Indian situation with Congress early in the session.

Subramaniam also is meeting with American private fertilizer companies including private sessions with companies with whom they have been in negotiations. I am informed that the American fertilizer people are encouraged but still skeptical. However, we believe they are prepared to make another effort. We are encouraging them to do so and at every opportunity emphasize to Subramaniam that American capital has been disillusioned and he must proceed carefully and aggressively to earn their confidence if India is to get the fertilizer it needs so badly.

2-The President-December 23, 1965

The Immediate Problem

Subramaniam's present crop estimate of 76 million tons of food grains in 1966 plus 11 million tons of imports would be 8 million tons short of last year's 95 million tons of food grains which included 7 million tons of imports, 6 million from the United States. The Indian Government believes that with stringent rationing and belt-tightening (cut ounces of grain from 12 per day to 8 or even 6 if necessary) they can get by with 11 million tons of imports if the crop does not deteriorate further. Ten to 12 tons appears to be a firm minimum-needs figure if widespread starvation is to be prevented. Subramaniam assures us that current scanty reserves of about 3 million tons held by the Center and State Governments are now being used to prevent starvation and that reports of current widespread famine are exaggerated.

The 76 million tons production estimate may have to be revised down next January when the returns on the crop currently in harvest are known. We are doing forward planning to meet such a contingency.

We pushed the Minister hard in regard to Indian port capacity, how it might be expanded, and his willingness to risk labor disputes if necessary, the availability of internal transport, and the authority for the Center Government to bring the States into line in distributing food grains. He gave us the strongest assurances of his willingness and ability to act on all of these points.

If the Indian Government can carry through on these assurances, it is our best judgment now that one million tons can be imported and distributed each month beginning in February 1966 through the normal port and distribution facilities. On this basis estimating 750,000 tons during monsoon months, the ten to twelve million-ton target can be reached for calendar year 1966. This assumes that the United States and other donor countries can immediately fill and "keep the pipelines full" at all times. To make sure that there is no lag in supply and resulting failure to fully utilize the one-million ton port and distribution capacity, it will be necessary:

1. to divert some shipments currently at sea en route to non-emergency destination (otherwise about 700,000 tons of the 11 million ton 1966 capacity will be lost or will have to be made up later by emergency means) and
2. to be sure there is steady loading and dispatch of vessels from the export end from now until the next harvest is in hand next fall.

3--The President-December 23, 1965

We were impressed by the Minister's attitude and determination to move imported food quickly into hungry bellies. However, I feel it necessary to make our own on-the-spot estimate of the supply situation and verification of the Indian capabilities early in 1966. The Minister has agreed to work closely with a team of experts which I tentatively plan to take or send to India about the second or third week in January.

We also discussed a "contingency plan" to go into effect if the Indian crop now in harvest deteriorates further. We were told that an additional short-fall of five million tons is possible. That would mean a crop of 71, rather than 76 million tons. The details of adding port and internal distribution capacity if the situation should worsen are now being worked out. We are confident that another five million tons can be handled by taking extraordinary measures such as lighter-~~ing~~ from large tankers with small boats into smaller ports if required. We will know by February or March whether we must face this contingency. U.S. supply availabilities are adequate but such a 15 million ton volume would strain our own internal transport and port facilities. U.S. commercial exports are running at a record level now. Some ports are already near maximum levels and box cars, as you are well aware, are short. Forward planning for this is also under way.

Pursuant to your instructions and the Minister's strong interest, special planning is under way to provide for nutrition supplements for children, nursing and pregnant mothers.

The Long-Term Problem

Subramaniam set out in further detail the long-term policy and program commitments which the Indian Cabinet agreed to shortly after he and I talked in Rome. The program follow-through here is not as precise or detailed as the plans to meet the short-run logistic problem. Accordingly, we are now establishing with the Indians machinery to check India's progress in fertilizer development, seed distribution, price incentives, etc., according to agreed-upon progress check points. Working with AID and the Indian government in Washington and in Delhi, such a series of check points, jointly reviewed, maybe quarterly, will make it possible for us to know whether the Indians are just talking or making tangible progress. Such a procedure will make it possible for the U.S. to make its long-term aid and technical assistance contingent upon specific actions and measured progress by the Indian Government. Subramaniam was receptive to this proposal.

I won't burden you with the details of India's long-term plan to become self-sufficient by 1971 at this time. It involves earmarking 32 million acres of the best quality, best watered land in the hands of the best

4--The President-December 23, 1965

cultivators. Fertilizer supplies, improved seeds, credit and other factors will be concentrated on these lands with the objective of adding one ton per acre to the output by 1971.

It is clear that much thought has been given to the specifics of fertilizer, seeds, irrigation, chemicals, machinery and credit. The big job of carrying it out remains ahead.

General Comment

Subramaniam and Ambassador Nehru were tremendously impressed with the warmth of your welcome and the deep concern you expressed that people, especially children, must eat and your strong statement that we must declare "nuclear war" on obstructions to moving food to people. You sent him away deeply impressed with your sincere concern and interest in the Indian people.

Subramaniam's personal performance impressed our people favorably. He knows his subject and demonstrates firm confidence that he has the support of his Government and can carry forward his plans to action.

Subramaniam expressed to me his deep concern that the general economic assistance program for India be resumed. Clearly, its lapse is hurting them severely. I told him that would be reviewed by the President and Prime Minister at the appropriate time, but I felt it would strengthen India's case if he made quick progress in agriculture. In effect, I said he can make agriculture the "blocking back" for the rest of the Indian program. He agreed.

He asked what he might say on his return to India expressing concern about possible political attacks from the Communist and fanatic Hindu party if there were no definite and measurable assurances of further United States availabilities. I responded that he knew his own politics best and I couldn't tell him what to say but I would recommend that he report on the action taken here as a result of the President's personal directive to move promptly the 1.5 million tons already programmed and that alternative plans for the future were reviewed but that no future commitments were made beyond the President's expression of sympathetic concern. I further advised that he emphasize that other countries in addition to the United States must help and that the extent of India's request to the United States would not be known until this was determined. I told him it was not advisable for me to join with him in meeting the press because that would encourage the numbers game already in process based on the President's known humanitarian concern and Subramaniam's estimates of the crop shortfall. He readily agreed.

5--The President-December 23, 1965

Actions

Staff work and forward planning to carry out the responsibilities you assigned to me in National Security Memorandum No. 339 is going forward.

I have called a meeting of the Committee set up by NSA Memorandum 339 for 9:30 a.m., Monday, December 27, to review action plans preparatory for submittal to the President as directed. I propose to recommend to the Committee that I send or lead personally a team to India the second or third week of January to:

1. inspect the ports and internal transport on the spot verifying the facts and judgments presented to us by the Indians during the current sessions in Washington, D.C. Plans to handle 10 to 11 million tons and also the contingency plan to handle an additional 5 million tons need to be checked out.
2. evaluate the soundness of the current crop estimate and judge what the 1966 crop short-fall actually will be.
3. review plans and prospects for the 1967 Indian crop so that everything possible is done to prevent comparable demands on the U.S. in 1967.
4. keep the pressure on the Indian Government to get assistance from other countries by forming a consortium or whatever means it takes to get help from other countries. There is a need for strong pressure here. Food grain availabilities in the world are limited by commercial sales to Russia and China made by Canada, Australia, France and Argentina. I believe maximum pressure should be put on them by India to make food grain available even to the extent of diverting shipments already on the high seas. Countries without grain can be pushed to provide inputs such as fertilizer for the 1967 crop. I am not yet convinced that the Indians are willing to move hard and dramatically on this front. We must continue to press them hard at all levels.
5. review on the spot the monitoring scheme now being worked out to measure basic agricultural progress so we can set specific targets and evaluate progress toward such targets quarterly or semi-annually. It needs to be understood at the highest level in the Indian government that failure to meet the targets will in the absence of overwhelming justification result in an AID cut-off.

6--The President-December 23, 1965

6. decide what kind of staff team will be needed in India next year to carry out both the short-run logistical and the long-term agricultural improvement missions.
7. verify or revise current estimates of capacity and actions that need to be taken.



DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

December 22, 1965

Honorable C. Subramaniam
Minister of Food and Agriculture
c/o Indian Embassy
2700 Macomb Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Minister:

We were pleased that you could accept our invitation to come here on such short notice to discuss the food situation in your country. Your visit has made us intensely aware of the serious difficulties faced by your people and of the means by which our governments might cooperate in meeting these difficulties.

As you make your plans to speed the movement of grain into India, it would be most helpful if you could provide on a weekly basis information on the arrival of grain by ports as well as supply and distribution information on grain under the control of the Central Government. We also need more detailed information on a monthly basis, including the supply and distribution of grains held by the states. I understand that representatives of your Government and mine are in agreement as to the detailed format for this reporting. We would hope to be advised of any unusual situations which would affect the movement of grain.

We understand that you would welcome a team of U.S. specialists to make a quick survey of the port and internal transport system, along with storage facilities. We are prepared to send such a team within a few weeks. The leader of the team, someone well acquainted with Indian agriculture and food problems, might be stationed in New Delhi working closely with you. I might designate a Special Representative who would be on a more permanent basis. He would keep me posted on progress in implementing your longer-term agricultural development plans. If he could have access to you and be privy to your plans it would be very helpful.

After current crop prospects, the short-fall in 1966 and the potential 1967 short-fall have been reviewed once more, we believe that an appeal should be made for external assistance to the "Community of Nations". This appeal should be made as quickly and dramatically as feasible. It would be well if it preceded the meeting between Prime Minister Shastri and President Johnson in early February. This might even take the form of an appeal by the representative of India to the United Nations.

2--Honorable C. Subramaniam

It is also my understanding that you have begun to examine the possibilities of using large bulk carriers to discharge grain in midstream into smaller vessels and lighters for ultimate delivery to ports. In our discussion, there appeared to be certain problems in connection with the registry of the "liberty" type or smaller vessels which might be used for this purpose as well as the availability of such vessels. I trust you will be examining this situation further with the objective of increasing the overall discharge capacity at your ports as rapidly as possible.

We would like some help from you in overcoming certain problems we face in the United States. Internal rail transport and some ports are already in full use. If shipping requirements are increased, we may need to use facilities not normally used for shipments to your country. Your cooperation and that of your purchasing mission here in Washington in meeting these problems and limitations we face will be appreciated.

We are pleased with the progress that we have been able to make during our talks this week and we hope that we can continue our further close cooperation during the months ahead. Please keep us informed of any way in which we can be of further assistance.

You have done a splendid job here and left a strong favorable impression with everyone.

I have enjoyed coming to know you personally and look forward to a close and enjoyable personal and working relationship.

Sincerely yours,



DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE

WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

EX-111

F03-2/C0121

DEC 20 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR HONORABLE DOUGLASS CATER

Subject: Crash Program for Famine Relief in India

It is proposed that the President discuss with the Indian Minister of Agriculture the development of a crash program of famine relief for India which would mobilize the resources of United States agriculture, industry, and government to assist the government of India in averting what may otherwise be one of the worst famines of modern times. We estimate that such a program would cost \$100 million.

1. Magnitude of the Problem:

It is estimated that there may be 2 million deaths in India due to famine in the critical period from January 15 to May 15, 1966. Of the 485 million people in India, there are approximately 96 million children 6 years of age or under and 85 million children between the ages of 7 and 14 years. At the present time the U.S. Food for Peace, AID school lunch, and related programs reach some 10 percent of the school age youngsters, but only 0.6 percent of the more vulnerable children under 6 years of age. Malnutrition is a major factor, particularly when associated with the all too prevalent communicable diseases, in the high mortality rate of Indian children, half of whom die before they reach age 6. In order to avert a possible disaster for these children an integrated, coordinated, effective program will have to be developed in the near future.

Nothing else sent to
Central Files as of

6/28/67

WR

2. Proposed Crash Program for Famine Relief:

It is proposed that the President call on private U.S. agriculture and industry to mobilize their resources to produce formulated foods to assist in meeting the nutritional needs of approximately 25 million children for the critical 4-month period from January 15 to May 15, 1966. Formulated foods have already been developed and tested in India. The proposed amount of 400,000 tons of formulated foods which have already been tested in India would meet approximately 1/4 of the energy requirements and all of the other nutritional (e.g., protein, vitamins) requirements of these children.

This type of formulated foods could be produced and made available by U.S. industrial plants within 2-3 weeks. Industrial foods concerns, such as General Foods, Quaker Oats, General Mills, Purina, Heinz, Campbell's Soup, Corn Products, and others have more than adequate plant capacity, some now idle, to meet the famine program production target of 3,200 tons per day.

The cost of this program to the U.S. Government is estimated to be less than 3 cents per recipient per day, or a total cost of \$90 million for the food, as well as transportation and distribution. An additional \$10 million should be made available to cover the cost of initial air-lift shipment, and possible contingencies. These costs are over and above present Food for Peace commitments. (See attachment)

Air-lift shipments of food could begin by Christmas. U.S. jet cargo planes, flying either East or West could each carry one day's food for over a quarter million Indian youngsters. The 700 Peace Corps volunteers and the highly competent AID staff now in India could provide assistance in distribution during the famine period.

In addition to mobilizing the resources of U.S. agriculture, industry and government to meet this critical problem, the President might wish to stimulate the development of private donations to support the famine relief program.

/s/ Philip R. Lee, M.D.

Philip R. Lee, M.D.
Assistant Secretary
for Health and Scientific Affairs

Attachment

Proposed Action to Relieve
Wholesale Famine and Deaths in India

COST OF FORMULA FOOD, ITS SHIPMENT AND DISTRIBUTION

A. I. Ingredients		Approx. Level in Product	Est. Cost Per Lb. of Product
(a)	<u>FFP Commodities</u>		
	Wheat	65%	3.6
	Soy Oil	6%	0.6
	Dry Skim Milk	4%	0.7
(b)	<u>Other</u>		
	Soy Grits	20%	1.4
	Mineral Supplement	4.5%	0.1
	Vitamin Mix	.25%	0.4
II. Manufacturing, quality control, testing and packaging			6.0
Subtotal			12.8
Transportation to Port of Debarkation			0.7
Transportation by boat to India (estimated)			3.0
Distribution in Country (From PL 480 funds)			5.0
TOTAL			21.5¢ per pound
LESS PL 480 and FFP			9.9¢
ADDITIONAL COST PER LB.			11.6¢

Proposed Action to Relieve
Wholesale Famine and Deaths in India

TOTAL COST OF PROGRAM AND NUMBERS OF PEOPLE TO BE FED

	Total Lbs. Needed for 4 Mos. (Tons)	Total Cost for 4 Mos. (in millions)
B. Number of People to be Fed:		
(a) 16 Million preschool children at level of $\frac{1}{4}$ of total calories or approximately $\frac{1}{4}$ lb. per child per day.	240,000	103.2
(b) 8 Million school age children at level of $\frac{1}{5}$ total calories or approximately $\frac{1}{5}$ lb. per child per day.	120,000	51.6
(c) 2 Million other age groups, especially pregnant and lactating mothers at level of $\frac{1}{6}$ total calories or approximately $\frac{1}{6}$ lb. per person per day.	30,000	12.9
	<hr/>	<hr/>
TOTAL	390,000	167.7
	<hr/>	<hr/>
LESS PL 480 and FFP (still in U.S. but allocated)		77.22
		<hr/>
TOTAL ADDITIONAL FUNDS		90.48

VOCATIONAL AGRICULTURAL EDUCATION AND
COMMUNITY ACTION

School-to-School will encompass programs in vocational agricultural education and community development projects. The school abroad, as it has in the United States, must become a focus for more than academic activities. This involvement in the extra-curricular aspects of education will expand both the role of education and its meaningfulness in the developing countries.

Vocational agricultural education has been a major factor in developing the productive capacity of the American agricultural system. Its potential is as great throughout the world, but the limited resources and diffuse nature of the educational systems has hampered its growth.

Local high school organizations in the United States such as Future Farmers of America, Future Homemakers of America, 4-H Clubs, etc. would contribute to the purchase of seeds, fertilizer, chemicals, pesticides and hand implements for the development of experimental agriculture plots at rural schools abroad. The schools, in turn, would contribute funds and/or land for the initiation of the program on a self-help basis. These plots would serve as a practical training ground in agricultural methods and as a source of improved agricultural practices. Students from the respective schools involved, in conjunction with the student exchange facet of the School-to-School program, could spend a part of the academic year in each others countries. This exchange serves not only for the development of better cultural under-

standing but also for the development of more effective agricultural technology.

Student participation in community action projects has become the means for extending the efforts and influence of the student in his environment. Secondary school and university students across the world have responded to their governments' call to assist in the nations' development. In the ambivalent and often frustrating world of the young student abroad, these programs have provided a sense of meaning and national pride.

School-to-School would encourage the extension of these efforts through contributions by United States student groups for the development of community action self-help projects. Personal contact and program involvement by such groups as the National Student Association and the Junior Chamber of Commerce are anticipated at the University level. The scope of these projects will vary greatly depending upon the determination of local communities, but among the possibilities are the extension of such School-to-School efforts as construction of educational facilities, development of health and sanitation projects and implementation of nutrition programs.

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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UNCLAS DECEMBER 11

REF DEPTTEL 1027

AS INDICATED IN EMBTEL 1471, PL-480 AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED AT
3:30 PM DECEMBER 10 DELHI TIME.

BOWLES

BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 12/10/65, 4:25 p.m.

PASSED WHITE HOUSE 12/10/65, 4:26 p.m.

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Mr. Valente

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
COUNSELOR AND CHAIRMAN
POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL

Dec. 10, 1965

Jacks:

Dealing with the Indian famine
on the terms suggested could help
the President mightily with the
political and psychological burden
of Viet-nam (at home and abroad)
and provide the launching pad
for his food, fertilizer, and
population control program.
As always, a crisis is both a
danger and an opportunity -

P.S. I attach for you Ben's letter.
I assume the President has read it.

Walt

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Counselor and Chairman
Policy Planning Council
Washington

CO121 (5)
C11/400d-
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FG-150
FG-105
FC2-2/00121.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

December 11, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Indian Famine

We do not yet know the full dimensions of the Indian famine and whether the bottleneck will prove to be grain shipments, Indian port capacity, or Indian internal transport capacity. You undoubtedly have seen the estimate that the food deficiency may be of the order of 27 million tons, from Dick Reuter's deputy (Alan Berg) now in New Delhi.

I have been discussing with Bob Komer a NSAM that might set in motion a U.S. effort based on a policy that no Indian shall starve unnecessarily this year and which might place under (say) Orville Freeman a team of port and internal transport experts as well as the food and shipping men the Department of Agriculture now commands. It is conceivable that emergency methods for enlarging port capacity, opening smaller ports, truck convoys, and even (in certain afflicted provinces) airlift may have to be envisaged.

Aside from the obvious humanitarian aspects of the problem and the opportunity it offers to get closer to the Indians at a critical moment in subcontinental diplomacy and the nuclear nonproliferation problem, there are two further reasons for pursuing this policy to the limit:

-- to balance in Asia and the world the psychological and political impact of what we may have to do in Viet Nam (U.S. Seabees, Corps of Engineers, and even the Air Force might prove helpful in India);

-- to give extra impetus to the world food and population control program we must soon begin to press at high priority.

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-2-

The latter point is particularly important. We are, indeed, staring down the gun barrel of a Malthusian crisis. The drama of the Indian famine should make it easier:

-- for George Woods to launch and get international acceptance of his chemical fertilizer barn-raising;

-- for us to get Congressional approval and public support for an agricultural production and PL 480 program of the kind we want, combined with pressure for better agricultural programs and policies in developing areas. (Our pressure plus the famine has already worked a miracle in Indian agricultural policy.)

-- for us to get the kind of cooperation, we shall need from other agricultural (and chemical fertilizer) surplus countries with respect to India in the short-run and the world food situation in the longer run.

In short, there are hard-headed as well as humanitarian reasons which would counsel that we adopt, dramatize, and implement a policy that no Indian shall starve unnecessarily this year.

Walt
W.W. Rostow

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FROM: JOE CALIFANO
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: WH50546

U N C L A S S I F I E D

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON DC

DECEMBER 1, 1965

VIA WIRE FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM JOE CALIFANO

THERE FOLLOWS THE TEXT OF A MEMORANDUM FROM SECRETARY
FREEMAN AS A BASIS FOR HIS DISCUSSION WITH YOU TOMORROW ON
THE INDIAN FOOD PROBLEM

QUOTE

SUBJECT: INDIA - FOOD AND AGRICULTURE

- I. FOR THE FIRST TIME THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT THROUGH ITS AGRICULTURAL MINISTER SUBRAMANIAM HAS MADE CONCRETE SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES WHICH WILL IF CARRIED OUT VIGOROUSLY SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVE INDIA'S AGRICULTURAL PERFORMANCE.
- II. THE CRITICAL QUESTION REMAINS - HOW THE UNITED STATES CAN MAKE CERTAIN THAT PLEDGES ARE FOLLOWED BY PERFORMANCE.
- III. IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT IN THE NEAR FUTURE WILL MAKE A PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENT ON AGRICULTURE INCORPORATING THE AGREED UPON ACTIONS AND TARGETS WITH A COMMITMENT TO ACCOMPLISH THEM. SUBRAMANIAM INDICATED TO ME THE LIKELIHOOD THAT HE WOULD BE SPEAKING TO THE COUNCIL OF STATE ON DECEMBER 8 TO SPELL OUT A PLAN OF ACTION TO MEET THE CURRENT CRISIS AND THAT HE WOULD INCORPORATE THE COMMITMENTS MADE AT ROME IN SUCH A PRESENTATION.
- IV. THE PUBLIC COMMITMENT BY THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT CAN BE REINFORCED BY THE UNITED STATES AS FOLLOWS:
 - (A) LENGTH OF PUBLIC LAW 480 AGREEMENTS CAN BE CONDITIONED TO THE PERFORMANCE OF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT.
 - (B) THE AGRICULTURAL ACTION COMMITMENTS CAN BE INCORPORATED INTO THE AID ARRANGEMENTS WITH DISBURSEMENTS CONDITIONED ON THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT MEETING ITS AGRICULTURAL COMMITMENTS. PRECISE DETAILED CRITERIA TO MEASURE PERFORMANCE AND INSURE ACTION CAN BE NEGOTIATED. FAILURE ON THE PART OF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT TO PERFORM WILL BE SURFACED UNDER SUCH A PROCEDURE AND THE APPROPRIATE ACTION DECISION CAN BE MADE ACCORDINGLY.

THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE OF ACTIONS MIGHT BE FOLLOWED:

V. THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE OF ACTIONS MIGHT BE FOLLOWED.
(A) COMMUNICATE TO PRIME MINISTER SHASTRI THAT SPELLING OUT AS THE PLAN OF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT THE COMMITMENTS MADE IN ROME WOULD BE FAVORABLY RECEIVED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.

(B) UNITED STATES ANNOUNCE ANOTHER SHORT TERM P.L. 480 AGREEMENT.

(C) FOLLOWING INDIAN GOVERNMENT PUBLIC COMMITMENT PERHAPS THROUGH SUBRAMANIAM'S PROPOSED DECEMBER 8 SPEECH TO THE COUNCIL OF STATE, U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD THEN COMPLIMENT THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT ON STRONG NEW EFFORTS AND ANNOUNCE THE OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR A FURTHER EXTENSION OF P.L. 480 FOR A LONGER PERIOD (BUT STILL LIMITED).

(D) WHEN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT RESUMES NEGOTIATIONS FOR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IT WILL BE MADE PERFECTLY CLEAR PRIVATELY THAT ASSISTANCE WILL BE GEARED TO THE INDIAN PERFORMANCE IN MEETING THEIR AGRICULTURAL COMMITMENTS AND TARGETS. IN THE ALTERNATIVE THE PRESIDENT MIGHT DIRECT THAT NEGOTIATIONS QUIETLY RESUME PRIOR TO THE SHASTRI VISIT. SUCH NEGOTIATIONS COULD PROVIDE A USEFUL BACKDROP FOR THE PRESIDENT'S USE AT THE TIME OF THE SHASTRI VISIT.

VI. SOME PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS

RECENT EVENTS AND MY MEETING WITH SUBRAMANIAM IN ROME ENCOURAGE ME WHERE INDIAN AGRICULTURE IS CONCERNED.

1. IT APPEARS THAT THE PRIME MINISTER IS AT LAST CONVINCED OF THE NEED TO DEPART FROM TRADITIONAL AGRICULTURE TECHNIQUES AND USE MODERN INPUTS, SUCH AS CHEMICAL FERTILIZER.

2. IT APPEARS THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S ATTITUDE WHICH HITHERTO MIGHT BE DESCRIBED AS FABIAN SOCIALIST TOWARD AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT HAS CHANGED. TODAY AGRICULTURE COMMANDS A POSITION AT THE TOP RATHER THAN AT THE BOTTOM OF THE TOTEM POLE IN PRIORITIES.

3. RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY THE PRIME MINISTER SUBSTANTIATE THE CHANGED ATTITUDE AND INCREASED ATTENTION NOW GIVEN TO AGRICULTURE.

4. FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL MINISTER SUBRAMANIAM IMPRESSED ME. HE HAS DRIVE AND ABILITY. HE APPEARS TO HOLD A STRONG POSITION IN THE INDIAN CABINET AND TO HAVE A GOOD DEAL OF POLITICAL SKILL. HE HAS BEEN A STEADFAST SUPPORTER OF THE UNITED STATES.

VII. FINALLY, IT IS MY JUDGMENT, SUPPORTED BY THE INDIAN SPECIALISTS ON MY STAFF, THAT INDIA CAN MAKE THE GRADE. IT DOES HAVE THE PHYSICAL RESOURCES. ITS SOILS ARE FOR INSTANCE INHERENTLY FAR SUPERIOR TO THOSE OF JAPAN. NOW THAT THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT IS TARGETING ITS GOALS AND APPEARS TO BE GIVING NECESSARY PRIORITY IN ALLOCATING ITS RESOURCES AND WE HAVE SOME STRONG LEVERAGE TO INSIST THAT THEY CONTINUE TO DO SO, I BELIEVE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS CAN BE MADE. IT WILL BE SLOW AND TOUGH, BUT IT CAN BE DONE.

UNQUOTE

DTG: 012208Z DEC 1965



DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

December 1, 1965

EXECUTIVE

C0121

CM/Food

CM/Fertilizer

F03-2/C0121

F6150

MEMORANDUM

To: The President
The White House

From: Orville L. Freeman
Secretary of Agriculture

Subject: India - Food and Agriculture

- I. For the first time the Indian Government through its Agricultural Minister^XSubramaniam has made concrete specific commitments to the United States which will if carried out vigorously significantly improve India's agricultural performance.
- II. The critical question remains - How the United States can make certain that pledges are followed by performance.
- III. It is expected that the Indian Government in the near future will make a public pronouncement on agriculture incorporating the agreed upon actions and targets with a commitment to accomplish them. Subramaniam indicated to me the likelihood that he would be speaking to the Council of State on December 8 to spell out a plan of action to meet the current crisis and that he would incorporate the commitments made at Rome in such a presentation.
- IV. The public commitment by the Indian Government can be reinforced by the United States as follows:
- (a) Length of Public Law 480 agreements can be conditioned to the performance of the Indian Government.
 - (b) The agricultural action commitments can be incorporated into the AID arrangements with disbursements conditioned on the Indian Government meeting its agricultural commitments. Precise detailed criteria to measure performance and insure action can be negotiated. Failure on the part of the Indian Government to perform will be surfaced under such a procedure and the appropriate action decision can be made accordingly.

2--The President

V. The following sequence of actions might be followed:

- (a) Communicate to Prime Minister Shastri that spelling out as the plan of the Indian Government the commitments made in Rome would be favorably received by the United States Government.
- (b) United States announce another short term P.L. 480 agreement.
- (c) Following Indian Government public commitment perhaps through Subramaniam's proposed December 8 speech to the Council of State, U. S. Government would then compliment the Indian Government on strong new efforts and announce the opening of negotiations for a further extension of P.L. 480 for a longer period (but still limited).
- (d) When the U.S. Government resumes negotiations for economic assistance it will be made perfectly clear privately that assistance will be geared to the Indian performance in meeting their agricultural commitments and targets. In the alternative the President might direct that negotiations quietly resume prior to the Shastri visit. Such negotiations could provide a useful backdrop for the President's use at the time of the Shastri visit.

VI. Some personal observations

Recent events and my meeting with Subramaniam in Rome encourage me where Indian agriculture is concerned.

1. It appears that the Prime Minister is at last convinced of the need to depart from traditional agriculture techniques and use modern inputs, such as chemical fertilizer.
2. It appears that the Prime Minister's attitude which hitherto might be described as Fabian Socialist toward agricultural development has changed. Today agriculture commands a position at the top rather than at the bottom of the totem pole in priorities.
3. Recent public statements by the Prime Minister substantiate the changed attitude and increased attention now given to agriculture.

3--The President

4. Food and Agricultural Minister Subramaniam impressed me. He has drive and ability. He appears to hold a strong position in the Indian Cabinet and to have a good deal of political skill. He has been a steadfast supporter of the United States.

VII. Finally, it is my judgment, supported by the Indian specialists on my staff, that India can make the grade. It does have the physical resources. Its soils are for instance inherently far superior to those of Japan. Now that the Indian Government is targeting its goals and appears to be giving necessary priority in allocating its resources and we have some strong leverage to insist that they continue to do so, I believe significant progress can be made. It will be slow and tough, but it can be done.

Unquote