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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE		DATE	RESTRICTION
#1a memo	to McG. Bundy from Admiral Aredall secret <i>open 9-24-12 NLJ/RAC 12-63</i>	1 p	11/12/65	A
#1b report	cover of Final Report " secret	1 p	undated	A
#1d report	cover of Final Report " secret	1 p	10/11-15/65	A
#1h report	director's remarks secret	2 p	undated	A
#1j report	re: war games secret	1 p	undated	A
#1m report	re: war games secret <i>open 9-24-12 NLJ/RAC 12-63</i>	6 p	undated	A
#1 o report	re: war games secret <i>open 12/13/12 per NLJ/RAC 12-63</i>	13 p	undated	A
#1 q report	re: war games secret <i>open 10/10/14 per NLJ/RAC 12-63</i>	57 p	undated	A
#1 t report	re: war games secret <i>open 9-24-12 NLJ/RAC 12-63</i>	6 p	undated	A
#1-w report	re: war games secret <i>sanitized 3/21/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-63</i>	54 p	10/05/65	A
#1 x report	re: war games secret <i>open 9-24-12 NLJ/RAC 12-63</i>	6 p	01/02/66	A
#1-y report	re: war games secret	6 p	01/02/66	A
#1 z report	re: war games secret <i>open 9-24-12 NLJ/RAC 12-63</i>	6 p	01/02/66	A
#1 aa report	re: war games " secret	4 p	01/02/66	A
#1bb report	re: war games " secret	6 p	12/01/66	A
#1 cc report	re: War games secret <i>open NLJ/RAC 12-63, 3/6/23</i>	8 p	12/01/66	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Agency File
JCS -- War Games, vol. III
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION	
#1-dd report	re: War Games secret Open NLS/RAC 12-63, 3/6/23	28 p	12/01/66	A
#2a report	Game Documentation secret sanitized 1-14-88 NLS 87-211 more info released 9/23/13 per NLS/RAC 12-63	180 p	undated	A
#3 memo	to McG. Bundy from Admiral Van Arsdall secret Open 1-14-88 NLS 87-211	2 p	25 06/26/65	A

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Ruth:

Col. Bowman said that no action is necessary on this and, since I already received two copies ! I'm returning this for your junk heap (whoops, files, I mean).

Kay



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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
JOINT WAR GAMES AGENCY

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Bowman
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JWGA-429-65

12 NOV 1965


MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY, SPECIAL ASSISTANT
TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS

Subject: Final Report on EPSILON I-65 (U)

1. (U) Enclosed is a copy of the Final Report on EPSILON for your information. A 26 minute summary is also available on 16 mm film and we would be happy to show it at a time and place convenient to yourself and interested members of your staff.

2. (U) The participants in EPSILON I-65 and those of us in the Joint War Games Agency are extremely appreciative that you attempted in the face of your hectic schedule to attend the Review of EPSILON on 19 October. We regret that after making the trip over, other pressures made it impossible for you to fully observe the video summary and to participate in the discussion. We are especially distressed because a sudden White House conference also caused you to withdraw early from discussion of the SIGMA game last August.

3. (S) JWGA's next politico-military gaming effort, scheduled for January, will employ the familiar format of senior as well as action level teams. It will examine problems associated with a Sino-Indian confrontation circa 1970 with three late afternoon senior meetings held at five day intervals followed by a review and discussion.


C. J. VAN ARSDALL, Jr.
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief, Joint War Games Agency

1 Enclosure
a/s

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 12-63

By LK18 NARA Date 09-11-12

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FINAL REPORT



EPSILON

1-65

Prepared by
JOINT WAR GAMES AGENCY
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ / RAC 12-63
NARA, Date 09-11-12

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

1c

CM-954-65
4 November 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PARTICIPANTS IN EPSILON I-65

Subject: Game Documentation (U)

Enclosed is a final report on the politico-military game, EPSILON I-65.

In addition to actual messages developed by the teams during play, the report contains a Summary and Commentary on the game and all pre-game documentation.

This material is provided to participants and interested agencies for the benefit of planners, intelligence officers and other officials dealing with the future of NATO.

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure

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When Separated From
Classified Enclosure

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Epsilon T-65

11 - 15 OCTOBER 1965

FINAL REPORT



PREPARED
BY
JOINT WAR GAMES AGENCY
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON D.C., 20301

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 12-63
By 448 NARA, Date 09-11-12

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EPSILON I-65

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GAME DIRECTOR'S REMARKS

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PARTICIPANT LIST

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GAME PARTICIPANTS (CONT'D)

Mr. Glenn R. King -----	DIA
Mr. John K. King -----	CIA
Mr. Wolfgang J. Lehmann -----	OSD (ISA)
Mr. Ralph J. McGuire -----	Embassy, Paris
Col Henry V. Middleworth, USA -----	EUCOM
Mr. Wallace Mills -----	CIA
Mr. George F. Muller -----	State
Col Alfred J. Neslen, USAF -----	J-4
Col William B. Robinson, USAF -----	USAF
Mr. Peter Rutter -----	Embassy, Bonn
LCol Marcello J. Rossano, USAF -----	J-1
Mr. Ronald I. Spiers -----	State
LGEN B. E. Spivy, Jr. -----	J-5
Mr Seymour Weiss -----	State
Col Walden F. Woodward, USA -----	USA

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GAME ADMINISTRATION

TSGT Haywood Vaughn, Jr., USAF -----	JWGA
SP6 Gary D. Williams, USA -----	JWGA
A1C Curtis Clark, USAF -----	JWGA
A1C Richard G. Hall, USAF -----	JWGA
Mrs. Marion E. Boland -----	JWGA
Mrs. Wilma Matasic -----	JWGA
Miss Minnie P. Murphy -----	JWGA
Mrs. Carolyn Reynolds -----	JWGA

TELEVISION SUPPORT

Mr. Fredric D. Butcher, Jr., Producer -----	NMCSSC
Mr. Steve A. Olsavsky, Special Effects -----	NMCSSC
SFC Nathan J. Atwood, USA, Special Effects ---	NMCSSC
Major Thomas C. Capraro, TV Coordinator -----	Hq, USAF TV Center
Mr. Norman Morgan, TV Director -----	Hq, USAF TV Center

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SENIOR OFFICIALS

The following senior officials from the offices and agencies concerned reviewed and discussed a video-summary of EPSILON I-65 on 19 October 1965:

Mr. J. C. Ausland -----	JCS
GENERAL Crieghton W. Abrams, Jr., USA -----	USA
Mr. Francis M. Bator -----	White House
GENERAL William H. Blanchard -----	USAF
Honorable McGeorge Bundy -----	White House
LGEN David A. Burchinal, USAF -----	JCS
LGEN Keith K. Compton, USAF -----	USAF
MGEN William T. Fairbourn, USA -----	J-5
Mr. Lawrence Finkelstein -----	OSD (ISA)
LGEN Alva R. Fitch, USA -----	DIA
MGEN E. J. Gibson, USA -----	USA
Mr. Drexel Godfrey -----	CIA
LGEN A. J. Goodpaster, USA -----	JCS
RADM Louis J. Kirn, USN -----	JCS
Mr. Jeffrey C. Kitchen -----	State
Mr. John M. Leddy -----	State
LGEN Lawrence J. Lincoln, USA -----	USA
Mr. Robert Lincoln -----	USIA
RADM R. B. Lynch, USN -----	J-5
LGEN Richard C. Mangrum, USMC -----	USMC
Mr. Leonard H. Marks -----	USIA
LGEN Richard D. Meyer, USA -----	J-4

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SENIOR OFFICIALS (CONT'D)

BGEN Richard D. Reinbold, USAF -----	USAF
ADMIRAL Horacio Rivero, USN -----	USN
Capt Harvey B. Seim, USN -----	OSD (ISA)
MGEN James C. Sherrill, USAF -----	J-4
Mr. Abbott Smith -----	CIA
Mr. Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. -----	State
Honorable Llewellyn E. Thompson -----	State
GENERAL Earle G. Wheeler, USAF -----	JCS
Mr. Joesph J. Wolf -----	State

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EPSILON I-65

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

The following are brief biographical sketches to provide a sample of the background experience of EPSILON I-65 game participants:

Director of Strategic Plans and Policy, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army for past two years. Served as Chief, Plans and Operations, G3 Section, Hq Seventh Army, 1957-59. Member of US Delegation to NATO Military Committee and Standing Group, 1960-62; and participated in two special studies on NATO Force Requirements from June to October 1961. Graduate of the Army War College.

Member of Policy Planning Staff for past two and a half months. Previous assignments in European area include: US Embassies Vienna, Rome; Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State; US Mission to the European Communities, Brussels. Has spent a total of 15 years on subject and prepared various book reviews. Attended Haverford College, Haverford, Pa.; Mid Career Course Foreign Service Institute; Graduate Army War College.

Assigned as a member of the Civil Engineering Branch, Materiel and Service Division, J-4, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Member of "Steering Committee" to survey all US real-estate requirements world-wide (BNSPPT). Chief of Field Survey conducted in Turkey, Greece, Spain, Germany, Portugal and United Kingdom, during the past year. Member of the EULOC Study Group. BS Degree, Mechanical Engineering, University of Utah.

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Director, European Region, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs). As Air Staff Action Officer, assisted in such studies as JSCP, JSOP, etc., including NATO policy papers. Previous assignments include: Air Force Planner with Joint Staff (2 years); Assistant Director of Plans, USAF (1 year); Deputy J-3 (1 year). AB and LL.B Degree.

Director, Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs in the Department of State. Deputy Director of this office from 1962-65. From 1957-62 served as Officer-in-Charge of Disarmament Affairs, Office of Secretary of State, and then as Director, Office of Political Affairs, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Member of US delegations to UN, 1955-57. With AEC (International Affairs Division) 1950-55. Ensign, US Navy 1943-46. Dartmouth College B.A. 1948 (International Affairs major), Princeton University, Master in Public Affairs, 1950.

Assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency as senior civilian estimator on matters related to Western Europe. Combat Infantry Officer with 30th Infantry Division (ETO) in World War II and on the General Staff, Department of the Army (OACSI) during the Korean War. Prior to 1962, senior civilian analyst and deputy of Western European Section in Army Intelligence. Member of several inter-agency study groups and a JCS/DIA/Military Services Joint Task Force. Has participated in seminars at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Graduate Gettysburg College in Political Science.

Assigned to Plans Division, J-1 Joint Staff since June 1964. Has served as J-1 Representative on NATO matters and was a member of the EULOC Study Group. Presently enrolled in graduate program leading to the doctorate in International Relations.

Director, Politico-Military Policy Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations for the past two months. Previous assignment: Head, European Branch, Politico-Military Division, 1962-64. United States Naval Academy Class of 1942. Graduate National War College in 1962.

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Presently assigned to the Operations Directorate, Hq USAFE. Previous related subjects in area: Developed and actioned major sections of "Overall Strategic Concept for NATO" and "Measures to Implant Strategic Concept"; actioned major elements of the NATO Political Directive; worked on Nuclear Strategy, Force Goals for NATO, Nassau Agreement, MLF, and related matters; developed positions for the JCS on NATO strategy, nuclear weapons, organization Political Directive and Strategic appraisal of NATO, etc. Has spent a total of 12 years in this area. Education: Mechanical/Aeronautical Engineering, Northeastern University; graduate of Maryland University, BS in Military Science; Air War College.

Chief, West Europe Staff, Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency for the past 16 months. Educational background: PH.D Graduate Institute of International Relations, University of Geneva, 1949; National War College, 1963; most professional experience related to Far East; Member of Faculty, University of Virginia, 1950-56.

Presently assigned to German-French desk Officer Defense Intelligence Agency Production Center, Military Capability Office. Has assisted in such studies as: Territorial Defense Force Germany; the French D.O.T.; French Amphibious Intervention Force; the French 11th DLI; Disarmament Study; etc. Intelligence Operation Analyst for 16 years. Education includes: 3 years University of Vienna, Austria; Strategic Intelligence School; Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Born in Austria and was a resident for 24 years. Has traveled widely throughout Europe.

Chief, European, Africa and Middle East Branch, Plans and Policy Division, J-6, JCS for the past year. Graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and attended the University of Maryland. Past year, JCS (J-6) action officer responsible for preparation of guidance to US members of NATO C-E Agencies. Currently a member of the US Delegation to a NATO High Level Working Group to review NATO communications requirements.

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Counselor for Politico-Military Affairs, American Embassy, Paris, for the past 2½ years. Background includes: papers on NATO and related problems; Political Advisor, United States European Command; has spent a total of 5 years in the area. Education - MA, George Washington University; National War College (1961).

Chief, War Plans Division, Office Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics for the past two and a half years. Three years on faculty of Army General School and later a member of the Army General Staff. Instructor, British Army Command and General Staff College. With US Army Europe on the staff and with troops in Heidelberg Area, 1950 - 56. Deputy G2 of the Continental Army Command, as Advisor to the Second Infantry Brigade (Separate), and as G3 of XIII Corps. Graduate of University of Alabama (BA in Chemistry); Graduate British Army Staff College, Camberley; Graduate of the Army War College.

Deputy Chief, International Affairs Division, Deputy Directorate of Plans for Policy, Hq, USAF. Served in (a) Special Projects Branch, Military Assistance Division, Hq EUROPEAN Command for three years, (b) Office of NATO Affairs, OASD (International Security Affairs) four years, and (c) Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs for three years. Work on Europe has concentrated on MAP and US and Allied objectives. Graduate Armed Force Staff College; graduate degree in International Affairs and one year as Research Associate, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.

Director, Office of Atlantic Political-Economic Affairs, Department of State from July 1963. Served US Mission to the European Communities Brussels, 1958-61; Chief Western European Research Department of Staff, 1955-58; American Embassy, Paris, 1952-55. Education - University of Chicago, BA; Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, National War College.

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Director, Office of Foreign Economic Affairs, OASD (ISA) for last four years. Various macromilitary-economic studies on capabilities of selected areas to support defense effort and internal development. Contingency studies on Economic Impact of various French and US actions. Previous related assignment in area: Chief, Economic Division, Berlin Sector, OMGUS/HICOG; OSD Representative NATO Annual Meeting, Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee; Financial Coordinator, Vacuum Oil Co., Germany and Venezuela; US Army, Office Chief of Ordnance, Office of Military Government for Germany; Chief Economic Branch, Berlin Sector; State Department, Land Observer Nordrhein Westfalen; National Production Authority; Chief European Branch, Director, Investment Development Division, Bureau of Foreign Commerce; Chief Servicing Branch, Small Business Administration. Graduate, Harvard University, 1930 (BS), Wharton Graduate Business, University of Pennsylvania (MBA) 1934, George Washington Law School (LLB) 1954, and (LLM) 1959.

Head, National Policy Section, Strategic Plans, OPNAV for last 14 months. Time spent in area: Liberty Party, 6th Fleet, prior to 1950. Graduate Iowa State College, BS; George Washington University, MA; International Affairs; Graduate of Air War College and National War College.

Director of Studies and Analysis, DCS/P&O. Previous assignments in European area include: Combat tours, 1942-49; Chief of Staff, 7 AD, UK, November 1951 - June 1954. BS in Business Administration, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio; Masters Degree, Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, and Air War College. Previous duties primarily in Strategic Air Command since 1959.

Regional Affairs Office, Office of Assistant Director for Europe, USIA for past 1½ months. Previously Deputy PAO, US Mission to the European Communities Brussels (63-65); Bologna Center, SAIS, Johns Hopkins, Bologna, Italy (62-63). Education: AB in Public and International Affairs, School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, 1948. Previous USIA Assignments: 1958-62, Aid Information Office, USIS Djakarta, Indonesia. 1952-57, Information Officer, Office of Public Information, USIA, Washington.

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Chief, Atlantic and Political-Military Affairs Unit, Political Section, Bonn Germany for past year. Previous related assignments in area: Italy (48-49), Austria (49-50), London (53-57), worked on NATO in OSD (ISA) (61-63); spent seven years in Europe. Undergraduate of Princeton, 1937; Graduate Harvard - MA in 1946; Instructor in History, MIT, 1937-42. Present job includes FRG's bilateral and multilateral relations with NATO area and Western Europe as well as politico-military affairs.

Deputy Director Political Affairs, USRO for past 9 months. Served in NATO International Staff; American Embassy Rome. Has spent 5 years in the European area. Education: BA, Michigan; MA, Johns Hopkins. Graduate of National War College.

Chief, Policies and Programs Branch, J-3, Division Hq EUCOM for past 15 months. Special Studies on Area: "France and its Contributions to NATO", Individual Research Paper at National War College, 1959-60. Served 8 months as G-1 US Army Communications Zone, 1953-54, and a total of 30 months in Europe including war service. BS Degree from University of Vermont in 1940; USA C&CSC. Armed Forces Staff College, National War College.

Director for Plans and Policy, OJCS, for the last 6 months. Two years as Chairman EUCOM Command, Control Requirements Group. Previously assigned as Director Plans and Operations, USEUCOM, Jan 62 - Feb 64. Spent 18 months WWII 7th Army. 1946-49 Occupation, Germany (US Constabulary). 1962-64 USEUCOM. One year CG, 3rd Armored Division, Frankfurt, Germany. Education: USMA, UK Air Land Warfare School; US National War College.

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Assigned Office in Charge Defense Policy Affairs, Office of Atlantic Politico-Military Affairs, European Bureau, Department of State for past 2½ years. Special studies include a policy analysis and background paper on "France and NATO". Has spent 7 years in Europe including 3 years as Political Advisor to CINCUSAREUR and 2 years as Political Officer, Embassy, Bonn. AB Degree, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

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EPSILON I-65

GAME COMMENTARY

EPSILON I-65 was conducted at the Pentagon during the period 11-15 October 1965 with participants from US agencies concerned with the future of NATO. The credentials of the players were excellent in terms of expert knowledge and current responsibilities. The game itself is summarized at D-1. The initial scenario, team messages and pre-game documentation are also included in this report. It is hoped that the overall package will be useful to planners and intelligence officers concerned with US policy in this area.

The following comments resulted from observations of the Game Staff and are intended to supplement the Summary of EPSILON I-65 at D-1, not to replace it.

1. There were the following common factors in both the "French" and "American" positions at the end of EPSILON I-65:

a. Neither "France" nor the "United States" really wanted France out of the Alliance.

b. Both the "United States" and "France" wanted the US troop presence continued in West Germany. (The "French" proposed a Four Power US-UK-FRG and French command over national forces in Germany).

c. Neither the "French" nor the "United States" team wanted the FRG to get its hands on nuclear hardware.

d. Neither the "French" nor the "United States" team was interested in MLF. (Control revived the idea for the United States but Blue promptly substituted national nuclear components under integrated international staffs).

e. Neither the "French" nor "United States" was seriously pushing toward German reunification.

2. The "French Government" established a non-negotiable condition for the continued presence of US forces on French soil. Instead of reacting strenuously the "United States" acceded to Allied and domestic pressures, thus side-stepping a direct confrontation with the French. Acting in a "reasonable and conciliatory manner," the "United States" put logistics facilities in France in standby under French operational command and shifted its tactical air and command elements to other NATO countries. Some of the Blue team would have preferred to take a firm position against De Gaulle early in the game, but no such stand was ever really taken to retain US or NATO facilities in France. It appeared to be the consensus among the Blue team that logistics facilities in France were of minor significance in peacetime but of major importance in time of war. No detailed evaluation was made of the relative value of individual installations.

3. On the broader issue of French opposition to an integrated Alliance, the "United States" appeared to consider that the French position on this question was also non-negotiable. Blue never sounded out the French to see if there was any room for bargaining; instead Blue held rigidly to the present Alliance organization and solicited support for it from the other Allies.

4. Blue showed no interest in an idea for French associate membership in NATO suggested by "Great Britain", although this would have been agreeable as a contingency to the "FRG" and was apparently not completely beyond the limits of French acceptance. (That was in fact, about where the "French" had arrived when they reduced representation at all NATO Headquarters to liaison officers and offered to "coordinate" activities of French forces with SACEUR).

5. Blue ignored possibilities of compromise and seemed determined to retain a tight Alliance structure even if other Allies followed De Gaulle's lead and the Alliance was reduced to a US/FRG bilateral.

6. When asked why the present "integrated" organization of NATO was of such overwhelming importance, some Blue players asserted that it was a "more credible deterrent" than a less integrated arrangement. This may be debatable since an integrated NATO with France as an associate member, or even the loose Alliance command and control setup finally proposed by the French team, would probably look more formidable to the Kremlin than an integrated NATO military organization from which France had completely withdrawn.

7. It may be that the ultimate "French" position would have even precluded continuing loose ties, but this particular "French" team felt that they could not afford to be completely cut off from the Alliance if NATO continued on an integrated basis.

8. American policies depicted in this game seem frozen into a rigid mold. If the US goal is preservation of an independent Western Europe and peace, the degree of integration within NATO may be less important than other considerations.

9. Actually, it was Control that had the United States decide to comply with the French "condition" by withdrawing its air units and allowing the French to take over standby US logistics facilities. At no point did the US team assume an intransigent attitude toward the French. It tried to head off the French dismantling effort by lining up Allied support for the present NATO structure. As stated above, some Blue players would have preferred to take early action to thwart or frustrate De Gaulle, and possibly this would have been done if Control had not moved the calendar quite so rapidly.

10. The "French" aimed their entire assault against the US portraying it as a bilateral dispute between the US and France. The "United States", on the other hand sought to convince its Allies that this was not a French-US struggle but really a disguised French attack on the NATO Alliance. Both the French and United States sought to put the onus for being unreasonable and over-demanding on the other.

11. Blue attempted to woo the West Germans with prospects of greater military influence within the Alliance (particularly in nuclear planning matters) and launched

a rather luke-warm initiative on the subject of German reunification. Displeased with British initiatives, the US "sternly warned" their UK allies, but in general, the Blue team (perhaps overconfidently), assumed that the other Allies would follow its lead. Blue, feeling that overall US strategic and economic power and European fear of a possible US-Soviet bi-lateral settlement was enough to assure Allied adherence, did little to win their backing.

12. The "French" took a far more active tack in lining up Allied support using both the "carrot" and the "stick" to win over the Germans and UK. The "French" played hard toward an East-West detente and (with Russian cooperation), achieved an atmosphere where the "Germans" thought they were beginning to see real prospects for reunification. (The FRG was actually beginning to consider arrangements along a line which might have involved withdrawal of US forces from Germany.)

13. Although the game pointed to the tremendous importance of Germany in the future of Europe, and the Blue team was very clear on this point, none of the players seriously addressed the question which was uppermost in the "German Mind." At least no specific proposals regarding German reunification were discussed. The US team proposed a quadrapartite discussion of the subject purely as a reaction to French initiatives. There was no real American interest --- quite the contrary. This may be worth further analysis in the light of great US interest in maintaining close US/FRG ties.

14. EPSILON underlines the vital necessity of FRG-US cooperation in dealing with European problems. West Germany is one of the most powerful and dynamic countries in the world and will probably move to greater prominence during the next twenty years. Close relations with Germany are therefore of vital importance to the United States. But it appears that a US which is opposed to German aspirations for reunification can hardly hope to retain a viable relationship. At the end of EPSILON, there was danger, in an atmosphere of detente, that Germany might slip away from the United States in quest of reunification. This raises the question of how long

the US can maintain a close relationship with the Germans without a genuine and constructive interest, and possibly supporting an initiative, toward reunification. A serious approach to this subject (along lines of Henry Kissinger's recent proposals) might be more useful in cementing US/FRG relations than fuzzy prospects for increased nuclear "influence".

15. A position was made by the "French" in EPSILON, as mentioned earlier, that France really could not tolerate continuance of an integrated NATO Alliance from which France had been completely excluded. It was felt that the general impact of such a development could be highly detrimental to De Gaulle's whole future concept of France and Europe. A next logical step might be UK entry and French exclusion from the EEC. This seemed to be an ultimate constraint on "French" initiative. If it came to a real "crunch" and France was about to be black-balled from the NATO club, the "French" team would have made concessions. While this may be a sound assumption, it may also contain more than a hint of wishful thinking. Even outside of NATO, France would still not be isolated from the rest of Europe. She might continue to exercise great influence through geography, the EEC, the Iron and Steel Community, EURATOM and in many other ways, particularly on her immediate neighbors.

16. Throughout the game, the "French" team attempted to use EEC and other economic pressures as levers to influence the other Allies into supporting its defense concepts. At the end of the game, the US felt it had more effective economic leverage than did France. It would appear that a detailed economic analysis of relative influence and vulnerability for all the Allies within and outside EEC would be profitable.

17. Both "French" and "US" messages in this game indicated a desire for American troops to continue in West Germany. As was brought out in the Senior Discussion, this is probably logical but there is no certainty that it constitutes the real French view. Perhaps De Gaulle would prefer to see US forces completely out of Europe and it may be unwise to assume otherwise.

18. When the game concluded, US supply bases were still in standby on French soil under French authority and conceivably would have been available to the Alliance in the event of war.

19. At least two of the teams spent time discussing the question of whether French intransigence was the manifestation of one man's dissatisfaction or the forerunner of deeper, wider under-currents in European thought. This point was never satisfactorily resolved but there was a noticeable feeling of relief, at least in the Blue team, when it appeared De Gaulle might be moving off the stage.

20. An element of Blue strategy which might be mentioned was the insistence that civilian and military institutions of NATO be treated as inseparable when considering their possible removal from French soil.

VIDEO TAPE SUMMARY

N-1

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1-D

EPSILON I-65

VIDEO TAPE SUMMARY

The following presentation is SECRET and NOT FOR FOREIGN DISSEMINATION.

The following material is hypothetical. It is a digest of highlights from EPSILON I-65, a simulation conducted by the Joint War Games Agency, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff between 11 and 15 October 1965.

Gentlemen:

You are about to see a summary of a politico-military game conducted to explore possible issues that may confront the United States and NATO in the next few years.

As Game Director, I must preface the summary with these points - First, in concentrating on NATO and more particularly on the Western European nations, Control purposely held situations elsewhere relatively static, which in some cases may seem unrealistic. Second, we have not the resources nor the time to consider possible breakthroughs in technology or weapons systems. Projections therefore are conservative rather than dramatic. Third, the actions of the teams did mesh reasonably in a plausible way, and Control neither overruled nor ignored anything important. But Control did have to play freely within the spirit of team strategies in advancing the situation to August 1968. Fourth, since the object of the exercise was to surface issues presenting challenges to the United States, Control took pains not to ease the burden of the Blue team. Four teams participated. These were designated: the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and Control representing all other countries.

This was an inter-departmental exercise. These agencies and departments contributed to the development of the initial scenario, and were represented on one or more of the teams.

Here, then, is a condensed presentation covering the highlights of some very heated and illuminating discussions--

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D-1

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 12-63
By LCLB NARA, Date 12-4-12

On the 2nd day of January 1966, serious conflicts seemed to be developing within the various economic, political and military Alliances of Western Europe. In his first major speech since re-election as President, Charles de Gaulle yesterday announced that France was establishing "conditions" for the continued presence of United States forces on French soil. While these conditions were not publicly spelled out, a private message from De Gaulle has been delivered to President Johnson. Speculation is rife that the French intend to force a major withdrawal of all NATO forces from their country as part of a move to reshape the Atlantic Alliance.

Pointing out that France is a "sovereign nation", President de Gaulle explained that his objections to NATO centered on its integrated aspects rather than the Treaty itself and that France was in no sense abandoning its role as a co-defender of Europe. However, he stressed the changes which have occurred during the last fifteen years.

The second aspect of his speech, the announcement that he planned a trip to Poland and possibly to other Eastern European countries in April, added to a flood of speculation.

To understand the mounting strain on Franco-American relations, it is necessary to review developments of the past few months.

The European Economic Community Council met in October without France and arrived at a common agricultural financing position not too unlike France's. A meeting of the EEC heads of state scheduled for November was postponed when De Gaulle stated he could not discuss such weighty problems so close to the French elections.

In his first press conference following re-election, De Gaulle announced that he would seek changes to the constitution to ensure his choice of a successor. He thanked the other five EEC nations for postponing the meeting including a thinly veiled reminder that the EEC was more vital to them than to France. This warning was interpreted as meaning he expects their support in EEC and NATO. In London, Mr. Heath demanded that the Government take early action to initiate British entry into the Common Market.

At the December meeting of the North Atlantic Council, French Foreign Minister Couve and Defense Minister Messmer attended only briefly, departing "under pressure of other business" and leaving a low ranking diplomat as observer. A communique issued after that meeting stated that the conference focused on an interim report by the Select Committee of NATO Defense Ministers. That report addressed problems of improved nuclear communications and planning but it was evident many problems remain to be solved.

Another important subject was raised by Portugal's Minister who commented on Franco's recent death and suggested that the desirability of Spain's entry into NATO be explored.

In BENELUX, there is mounting fear that destruction of the Common Market would have disastrous results for the smaller nations and voices such as Paul Henri Spaak have become more vocal and open in opposition.

In mid-December, Belgium, as if to flout De Gaulle, announced it would not purchase French tanks as had been contemplated but would instead procure the new German tank.

It is understood the US is pressing the FRG to increase military purchases in the US and has informed Bonn the alternative could be US troop reductions in Germany. This situation was exploited by German Gaullists as an indicator that the US will not stand by its military commitments.

The Defense White paper issued in late Fall contained across the board cut-backs in British overseas commitments, and it is understood that more serious reductions were only temporarily deferred by US pressure and support.

It is understood that the Johnson Administration has conferred closely with London in developing a common position for dealing with De Gaulle, and has been advised to move in a manner which leaves the onus for fragmenting the Alliance squarely on the French President. Neither the British nor the Americans have done anything publicly which would preempt French initiative.

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The situation on the southern flank of NATO continues to fester.

There is turmoil in Turkey where Premier Urguplu has announced limited trade agreements with the Soviets. The Turkish Government welcomed NATO integrated mobile force exercises in Southern Turkey during November, but the Turks still question NATO's resolve to stand by her in a time of crisis.

Student riots in Ankara, protesting US Air Force units based on Turkish soil and criticisms of the government's failure to stand by its CENTO Ally Pakistan in the Kashmir fighting, have caused the Turkish Government to postpone elections for six months.

In the US, Senator X was quoted as saying, "The bases in France have been reduced to a level where they have very little significance. We've done that ourselves. We're fighting a major war in Vietnam with little support from our European Allies. Considering balance of payments problems and current attitudes in Europe, the time has come to shift the US Army from Europe to South-east Asia."

Other voices including that of Congressman Y were raised on the Hill, they said: "We are over-extending our foreign commitments and overboard in our efforts to dominate the Western Alliance. There is much to be said for a fresh approach and we ought to meet General de Gaulle half-way!"

The White House has not as yet issued an official statement.

The Soviet Union has praised De Gaulle for his far-sighted approach to world problems and criticized the US for trying to give nuclear weapons to the FRG. In a sensational move towards arms control, the Soviets endorsed expansion of the 1963 Test Ban Treaty to include underground tests.

We have just been handed a bulletin. It has been announced in Paris and Moscow that a Soviet rocket has been used to place a French Television Relay Satellite into orbit. No immediate details were given.

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After viewing this initial scenario, the United States, French and West German teams met to consider their first move. The French team received a private message from President de Gaulle making French operational command of US military activities in France a condition for continued US operations in that country. He imposed a two year deadline.

The West German team was instructed in the light of the French move, to examine possibilities for initiative toward reunification, German nuclear aspirations and US/FRG offset agreements.

Within the game rooms, the French team felt that the US was pre-occupied with the war in SEA; that France had considerable economic leverage within the European Economic Community, and that many factors favored movement toward a loose European confederation -- one free of American as well as Soviet domination -- with France as the dominant power. "De Gaulle" regarded NATO's organization as the principal element in continued US influence over Europe. The French team elected to attack NATO indirectly, by applying pressures bilaterally against the United States -- rather than the Alliance itself.

To the FRG, De Gaulle suggested that too great an interest in either "atlanticism" or nuclear arms would foreclose the Franco-German special relationship, lead to increased recognition of the East German regime and block reunification.

The German team sought greater European integration and stronger Atlantic ties, but they had one eye on Eastern European markets and another on the need to maintain a viable EEC.

The Germans urged the United States to accept French conditions for command over US facilities providing the conditions were no more exacting than similar French/FRG agreements; at the same time, suggested to De Gaulle that he moderate his stand against integration. They continued low-key private urging toward an upgrading of their influence in nuclear planning.

The Control team had the Wilson Government privately inform Washington that it no longer could push Allied nuclear force proposals because they posed impediments to nuclear disarmament negotiations. Prime Minister Wilson advised he was preparing a draft nuclear non-proliferation proposal with the Soviets for presentation to the 18 Nation Disarmament Conference. Further, the UK intended to support a NATO Parliamentarians proposal for political reorganization of the NATO Alliance. This would allow for either integration or a form of associate membership in which a country, such as France, would merely coordinate war plans with SACEUR while maintaining national control over its own forces.

At the team's second meeting, they were confronted by the following account of events between January and December of 1966.

In early 1966, the US indicated to the NATO Allies that it accepted as fact that De Gaulle was intent on dismantling the Alliance Organization. However, the US advised that it was determined to maintain the Alliance on an integrated basis with France if possible -- without France if necessary -- but always keeping the door open for eventual French return. In generating support for its position among the NATO Allies, the US emphasized that the issues were between NATO and France -- not the US and France.

In January 1966, US requests for clarification of French demands were rejected when it became apparent the US was discussing private French conditions with other NATO Allies.

Initial reaction in the US was to adopt a hard line and to withdraw all forces from France. However, this attitude was modified by Allied and domestic pressures to act in a more reasonable and conciliatory manner. In negotiations with the French, US logistics facilities (primarily war reserves), were placed under French operational command but all operational tactical air units were withdrawn. Headquarters, EUCOM was slated for movement to another NATO country, as were Supply and Stock Control facilities.

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The Germans, Belgians and Dutch indicated widespread support for US concessions to preserve the Alliance.

Following De Gaulle's trip to Poland and Moscow, the French and the Soviets quietly pressured the FRG. Implications were that West German concurrence on a non-proliferation agreement could tie in with a general relaxation of tension in Central Europe and movement towards reunification. De Gaulle offered to move the two French divisions in Germany forward on a bilateral basis and hinted at tactical nuclear cooperation with the Germans to include atomic demolition munitions.

Meanwhile in the EEC, progress was made at the November '66 meeting as the result of a "gentlemen's agreement", that the Commission would refer all major matters to Ministers of the nations involved for resolution. De Gaulle accepted an Italian proposal for a January 1967 EEC Heads of State meeting in Rome to consider European political economic and defense matters.

In late November, Secretary General Brosio advised the Governments of NATO that he would appreciate their specific plans for the future of NATO in its present form, as well as on proposals for new political and military organizations. These would be addressed at the December North Atlantic Council meeting.

In the second team meetings, none of the governments really responded to the request for new NATO organizational proposals. However, De Gaulle suggested the UK and Spain attend the January EEC meeting and link their eventual membership in that organization to progress in European defense.

The US expressed grave concern to the British over withdrawal of their ANF proposal and their non-proliferation discussions with the Soviets.

The US placated the West Germans by opening discussions with the UK, France and the FRG on proposals for reunification.

The French were pleased with British stirrings, the American troop withdrawal from their country and an apparent softening in the East following a De Gaulle visit to Moscow.

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The French cut their representation in Headquarters SHAPE to liaison officers and offered to discuss coordination between French military forces and NATO forces with SACEUR.

The Germans watched developments warily, hoping France would remain in the Alliance even on a special non-integrated basis.

The Control team considered these and other team inputs and produced a scenario projection which advanced the calendar by almost two years from the second move.

It is now 15 August 1968.

As the US election campaign steps up, the opposition is hitting hard at Administration foreign policy.

In Southeast Asia, the US is heavily preoccupied and frustrated. Chinese-Indian border clashes continue and the Indians have initiated a nuclear program.

There are indications the Red Chinese will shortly deploy some medium-range ballistic missiles while the Soviet press continues to publish articles boasting of range, accuracy and high yield of Soviet missiles. A mobile MRBM on launcher appeared on May Day. While the Russians are known to be hardening ICBM sites, there are no indications of a "crash" program. It is understood some Soviet mobile MRBMs now guard the border against Red China.

Perhaps as part of this shift in Soviet thinking, all restrictions on passage through the Berlin Wall were "permanently" lifted at Christmas and liberalizing reforms are taking place in the Soviet Union. Eastern European sources advise however, that the present Moscow regime is encountering mounting opposition from military and hard-line factions.

In addition to possible UK EEC entry, the French are offering the Wilson Government support for the pound sterling in order to weaken British backing for US NATO policies. De Gaulle offered the Germans support for higher grain prices in return for cooperation along these lines.

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The British, faced with internal pressures, have sponsored a special NATO Ministerial Conference in London advertised as an effort to "save the Atlantic Alliance".

On the eve of the London Conference, it is understood that the American President has privately warned that a "Fortress America" attitude is building up in the American Congress and public opinion. Unless solidarity is maintained among "the 14", the continued presence of US forces in Europe "may not be insured".

Early yesterday, President de Gaulle underwent major surgery. Under the recently revised French Constitution, his successor is the now Acting President - Prime Minister Pompidou.

The world is watching the London Ministerial Meeting for a showdown between General de Gaulle and the US.

Because of immobility in team positions, Control advanced the situation with the following inputs:

In light of the widening Sino-Soviet rift, Control had the USSR propose:

To dissolve the Warsaw Pact.

To withdraw its divisions from East Germany over a two year period.

To join in a six power commission to take up the problems of Berlin and of a German Peace Treaty (the six powers being the US, UK and France on one hand, the USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia on the other).

To sponsor COMECON-EEC talks aimed at an European economic arrangement.

The quid pro quo for these concessions would be:

Termination of the NATO Alliance.

Removal of US troops from the Federal Republic.

Agreement on a Central European nuclear free zone.

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This Soviet offer provided background for the 1968 London Conference where the following proposals were put forward concerning the future of NATO:

France considered that too strong a response to the Soviet proposal might damage its position with the Germans. It thought however, the Soviet proposals deserved serious exploration.

The French felt that the UK was weak and confused and that Germany held the real key. They believed the Americans had a bargaining advantage with the Federal Republic, but determined to continue toward their goal mixing both conciliatory and coercive actions. The French derided the American veto in Washington's MLF proposals depicting Europe's role in terms of European deck hands and mess officers for what they said was an irrelevant "no go" force. They thought American initiative for a NATO nuclear force was destructively timed in the face of the Soviet demarch, and they again warned the Germans that participation in any nuclear force would foreclose prospects for reunification.

The French indicated willingness to continue an Atlantic Alliance but under revised and deintegrated arrangements.

In their view, these arrangements might include a European Coordinating Committee structured around the old Western European Union, linking members of a loosely structured European Defense Community.

The committee would be underlayered by a Nuclear Coordinating Group which might include the Federal Republic and Italy in addition to the nuclear powers.

There would also be an eight nation war planning staff; in effect, EEC plus the UK and Spain.

A Four Power Directorate was offered to control the independent national forces operating in West Germany.

To make these ideas more palatable to their Allies, the French suggested reopening the Kennedy Round implying that they would be more forthcoming; they offered to finalize

UK and Spanish EEC membership, while pointing out that all these moves were aimed in the direction of an expanded continental system -- a "European Europe:."

At the same time that they requested all integrated NATO headquarters be removed from France within one year, they welcomed movement of the NATO Military Committee to their country and suggested the proposed European Defense Community planning staff be located there.

The French indicated a willingness to cooperate temporarily on matters of allied transit. Nothing was said of US supply bases in France under French operational command and it was explicit that the French wanted the US presence continued in West Germany. They asked for American reaffirmation of Article V of the NATO Treaty.

The FRG position requested:

A greater voice in NATO command.

A firm US strategic commitment.

Continued US presence in Europe.

A co-equal voice in European security.

Participation in all phases of planning for the use of nuclear weapons in Europe.

The German team determined not to appear too "hungry" with respect to nuclear hardware and to generally support the US position. Nevertheless, its real interest was reunification. It was willing to be less rigid than the US in keeping France within the Alliance and was more willing than the US to see a loose NATO organizational structure. It wanted a German Chairman on the Four Power Military Directorate in Germany and co-equal representation on any nuclear directorate.

The FRG regarded events to date as propitious in that there was at least some movement in the direction of reunification.

The German team looked at the detente between NATO and the Warsaw Pact as a means of achieving Soviet troop withdrawals and an overall German settlement. Adjustments in NATO which might advance this cause were worthy of serious consideration.

They were only willing to see US troops withdraw from Germany if there were firm guarantees and real capabilities for defense.

This seemed an acceptable price for a "German Settlement".

As EPSILON-I concluded, the United States team was holding fast to the concept of an "integrated NATO" with or without France.

The Americans felt that De Gaulle's illness would weaken the French position and that the United States had more leverage for appealing to the other EEC nations than did France. The US also believed that France had at least as much, if not more, to gain from the European Economic Community than did her partners.

The US backed the Select Committee as a forum for resolving nuclear problems and offered proposals for sharing the production of armaments and space technology with the UK, FRG, Federal Republic and other Allies.

The US proposed that the NATO Military Committee be moved to the Continent.

The US team felt that fear of a Washington-Moscow Axis in settling European problems would be a powerful factor in obtaining Allied support for US policies.

The United States had no intention of reaffirming Article V of the Treaty in the context of the French position. It thought that the FRG and UK and other Allies would line up with the United States, when they realized, they could not replace NATO with bilateral agreements with the United States.

The United States was ready to support UK and Spanish entry into EEC and felt that it could accommodate German desires within the integrated NATO structure.

The US team introduced an interesting idea with respect to nuclear coordination within the Alliance.

This was an Allied Nuclear Force composed of land, sea and air elements all of them nationally contributed and nationally manned, assigned to SACEUR. The components would be Polaris submarines (US as well British), extended range PERSHING missiles, and F-111 aircraft. All of the headquarters between SACEUR and the unit commands would have mixed-manned or integrated nuclear planning staffs.

The US team assumed that these suggestions would be unacceptable to France and proposed to move all NATO civil and military headquarters to another NATO country, and to replace France with Germany in the Standing Group.

The United States intended to approach the question of the Soviet proposals only after consultation within the North Atlantic Council.

The United States planned to obtain Congressional support for an even more generous US position on tariffs, quotas, etc., in the Kennedy II Round.

Regardless of its threats in the final analysis, the United States team was determined to remain in Germany in an integrated Alliance if this were in any way possible.

The Germans were focused on reunification, but all of the Europeans, including the French, seemed unwilling to see a complete withdrawal of either the American military presence, or the nuclear umbrella in the security of Europe.

The game did not reach the point where Europe looked like this. (Map of Europe with France, Switzerland and Austria deleted was displayed on the screen.)

That was where EPSILON ended on Friday the 15th of October. This briefing was prepared and produced with the assistance of the Display Systems Division, National Military Command Systems Support Center and Headquarters, United States Air Force Television Center.

1-p

SENIOR DISCUSSION

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1-9

EPSILON I-65

SENIOR REVIEW

(SNF) A group of senior governmental officials met with all participants involved in play of the game at 1630 hours, 19 October 1965 to review the Politico-Military Game, EPSILON I-65. Since senior officials did not participate in the actual play, a video tape brief (the text of which is contained at pages D-1 through D-13), was shown to acquaint those present with a brief of the highlights of the game. A verbatim record of the discussion follows the listed areas for examination. No attribution is made to specific discussion participants.

Senior officials are identified by the governmental department or agency they are from, while game participants are identified by the team to which they were assigned.

DIRECTOR: Gentlemen, we have more than a quorum. Thank you all for coming. We hope we have an interesting summary. It's going to be abbreviated, highlights only to start off with and certainly after we are through, we hope that you can discuss some of the problems that have been brought out. As to the arrangements here, the request from participating agencies for places at the review quite exceeded the capacity of suitable and available conference rooms, so the Air Force TV Group came to our rescue. Within the secure area and in the immediate vicinity there are two small viewing rooms and a studio across the way. We have approximately thirty other people, all representing agencies that participated and requested that they be allowed to see the review.

This is a trial run. We had fair success at the team meeting that started at two o'clock.

It's policy in these exercises that we publish a game report which we will do as soon as possible, and all of the agencies that participated will get copies. This report

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ / PAC 12-63

By 448 NARA, Date 09-29-2014

SECRET - NOFORN

will not attribute statements to any person by name. All actions are team actions. For the discussions, both the one at the meeting before, and this one, no statement will be attributed to any individual. We have prepared highlights, it will take thirty-one minutes, and if you can look at any convenient one of these screens, you'll see it. May we have the review please?

VIDEO SUMMARY

DIRECTOR: Gentlemen, obviously that was just the highlights. The meetings went on and there were rather heated discussions which, if you have specific questions, all of the team captains and a number of the players are in the room now and we can discuss some of those. However, as you can see, the United States team held fast to a position of some sort of an integrated command structure throughout. They took initiative really, only at the last move, where they came out with a firm proposal which they expected the French to turn down. But as the play of the exercise continued, we in Control were of the opinion that, on balance, it appeared that the details of French association with NATO may not be so important that it should become a crisis issue -- that possibly the United States can live quite well with a strong integrated Alliance, plus some sort of a loose tie with France. It appeared too, that Germany was the key to our associations in Europe, and towards the tail-end, the Blue Team was talking of -- if everything fell apart, "let's go bilateral with the Germans and the rest of them, exclusive of France, are likely to have to come along." Of interest to us, was quite a difference between the views on reunification as portrayed in this scenario, and the views of about eighteen months ago when we had a game on East German uprising where, at that time, it came out loud and clearly that nobody really wanted German reunification. But under the situation that portrays a lessening of tensions with the Soviets, as you saw in the scenario, the French, the US, the UK and the Germans were all talking reunification. Whether or not this was just talk or whether it's real will be up to you.

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The French team apparently had an underlying fear of a NATO without France, of France being more or less isolated.

It was interesting that there was some difference of opinion -- quite a bit of difference of opinion -- as to the leverage which EEC gave to France. However, in the final analysis, I believe I speak for the Blue team that this is not something that can not be lived with necessarily. The United States has a lot of hole cards in this particular area too. They might be able to counteract the French leverage here. One question at least, didn't get itself resolved. We did not come to any particular point here that would represent a point beyond which the United States has to take a definite initiative against De Gaulle. Everything that was proposed in here -- somewhere or another, the Blue team had a solution for it that was an acceptable solution, without actually throwing down the gauntlet and making people choose sides. Whether or not this is realistic is subject to some questions.

The question of timing -- you'll note that Control took great liberties with time in here and in the absence of positive action which was getting this exercise on to points of crisis; we arbitrarily advanced time quite somewhat and I know that it's a feeling of a number of teams as expressed in the review earlier, that this is something that we cannot live with -- just letting things ride on and time pass -- until we are faced with some sort of a crisis situation. I should like, if you would have any ideas, to have some discussion on my conclusion that the United States can live with an integrated command that excludes France -- that was the final opinion of the Blue team, wasn't it?

BLUE: Yes, it was.

JCS: I'd like to find out what rationale was advanced to support this. I'd like to find out from the team what factors led them to this conclusion.

BLUE: Well, I'd start out basically by saying that we approached it more from the point of view that we would have to live without France. That we felt that the threat continues -- that there was nothing that was presented to us that essentially diminished the threat

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from the East. From out point of view a military integrated side of the Alliance still made sense, and in fact, is indispensable in our presence in Europe. I might say as a collateral point, I don't think we felt that Europe under French domination would be any more acceptable to our Allies than a Europe with substantial American domination. We felt, therefore, the only choice left to us was to, if necessary, continue without France but to maintain -- as was pointed out we were extremely cautious about this -- trying to keep the door open and we were accommodating so long as we thought that it made any sense. Beyond a certain point we were not prepared to go.

JCS: That brings us to the question as to how loose is loose? And what do you pay for these loose arrangements? In other words, did you get down to addressing specifics in this area as to what the arrangements might be, and what you would have to pay in return and so on? This is really the basis of my question.

BLUE: I think the basic problem that the team had here was that we probably are going to have in real life -- was that we could never really pin the French down to just really what they had in mind, which was tried again and again.

JCS: I gathered that, but why?

BLUE: But this was the real problem to try to force him to make a confrontation or a condition that was blunt enough to convince our Allies they've got to call a halt here, or draw the line on him and not make us be the ones to make the initiative. We had quite a difficult time doing it, very frankly. And the accommodations we tried to make -- we didn't really make accommodations but time dragged on in an effort to keep from causing the confrontations ourselves. Finally, the Control team jumped quite long periods of time in here, honestly this dragged it out far longer than any of us cared to see this dragged out. In other words, a real arrangement has to be made with our Allies, in our view, fairly early in the business, somehow.

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JCS: I think if I may offer an opinion. I don't think anyone, at least no one I know of, has advocated that this hypothetical door should be slammed in General de Gaulle's or the French face. This isn't what I'm talking about. But the way it was stated by Control here was that we could live with an integrated NATO, having only loose ties with France. Now immediately you got to get down to some sort of a blueprint as to what kind of ties one is talking about.

BLUE: I don't think that the Blue team came to quite that conclusion

JCS: Control came to that, as I understand it.

BLUE: That wasn't the Blue team's position, was it?

DIRECTOR: How are you going to live with it?

BLUE: We proposed to live -- trying to get the "14".....

DIRECTOR: And live without them!

JCS: With a congenial atmosphere, is that the idea?

BLUE: Hopefully

STATE: The nature of the loose ties being things like some arrangements of re-entry in time of war?

BLUE: Yes.

STATE: This becomes merely a sort of a political loss, rather than anything you could really rely on to assume all these events going forward.

JCS: Also, how much are you paying in terms of perhaps such a thing as Article V in return for this -- I just don't know. That's the reason I wanted to get down to the specifics on this.

BLUE: We definitely held back on Article V until we got the Allies to go with us somewhere and then agree with them.

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JCS: Yes, I know.

BLUE: I think it would be very helpful if my suggestion of trying to get the Captain of the French Team to talk, just a minute or so, about this "hanging in the air" attack that he wanted to try and couldn't -- wasn't allowed to completely. I think this is a very important point that may come up later.

WHITE: Well, of course, the thrust of the French Team's actions was to make the Americans be the "demanders" if you like -- to make them take the initiatives -- both with respect to the American installations in France and with respect to NATO itself. We went along simply putting forth the conditions, trying to get the Americans to respond with proposals or arrangements that would satisfy them. We just simply said, this is our condition. Here is the time limit. Now it's up to you to meet our condition.

We had thought at one point that we would use exactly the same tactic with respect to NATO itself. This did not come through in the subsequent scenarios, but this is what we were trying to do.

I would like to make one comment on the NATO with France. Of course, one of our primary objectives on the French Team was to prevent a coalition of NATO without France and therefore we came up toward the end of the game with a series of alternative proposals for European defense arrangements -- very loose ones -- that excluded the United States -- our Eight Power Directorate for example. In the same connection, we felt that we did have certain leverage on the other Europeans. One, as a result of the desire of the Europeans to continue with progress in the Common Market. This is why we used the Common Market as our forum, if you like, for defense policy. Also, we felt we had a lever on Germany because of the German fear of doing anything that would preclude reunification or that might induce a French recognition of East Germany, the two things being closely allied. And we were not at all convinced when the game was over that, in fact, things were not going very well our way.

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STATE: May I ask a question? In seeking to use the Common Market as a lever on Germany with respect to NATO, what did you assume as to the French demands on the Common Market itself, that is to say, there is something in the Common Market arrangement that the French want to get rid of. How did you handle this? How did you assume that the French could use this as a lever on NATO and still get its way on what it wants in the Common Market?

WHITE: First of all, we said that the existing arrangements in the Common Market, i.e., a sort of "Gentlemen's Agreement" under which it was -- in the scenario -- operating. We said these arrangements are perfectly satisfactory to us. However, as General de Gaulle has said in the past, "there can be no further progress in the Common Market unless there is prior agreement on defense policy." What he had said specifically was that there can be no further progress toward political or economic unity in Europe until there is prior agreement on defense policy. Now mind you, what we were trying to do was to find an alternative arrangement for some of the proposals the Americans were coming up with. But, we said, therefore let us take the Common Market -- use it as a forum to discuss defense policy. Now obviously there could be no realistic defense policy in Europe without UK or Spanish participation.

We will ask them to come in to the defense discussions if the defense discussions -- and you see we kept limiting it to the defense -- if these are successful, then we will be prepared to move ahead to further negotiations on UK and Spanish entry into the Common Market. But on the specific point of the French desires for converting or changing the Common Market as it exists right now, we simply didn't address that -- we finessed that by talking defense and saying there could be no further progress until there is agreement on defense and this sort of thing.

STATE: Would the German Team accept this? How did the German Team react to that?

WHITE: You want to hear from the German Team?

YELLOW: The Italians were in bed with the French in the scenario, sir. You've got to know that.

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STATE: You fouled that up! (Laughter)

YELLOW: Throughout this game the German Team adopted what they called the "rubber line" just as long as they were winning, and we were doing pretty good; and here we agreed that we would be glad to talk about the defense of Europe in any form with anybody, including the EEC.

BLUE: This wasn't made clear by your message.

YELLOW: We didn't have a side dialogue, which we needed a couple of times badly with the American Team.

WHITE: Your only dialogue with the Americans was when the French were there and I think that was bad for everybody except France. I think that the French proposed a scheme, a system here that would have offered real competition for anything that the Americans could offer. The Americans were in a position of a dogmatic, pretty rigid insistence on the continuation of an integrated structure and all they were prepared to do if our last -- the game ended, in our judgement, with a statement by the French that: we would continue to be signatories to the treaty, we would continue to be participants in the North Atlantic Council and on the Military Committee, provided that all of the sub-structure was disintegrated, and we had, we thought, a German acceptance of this Eight Power arrangement for the development of a relatively reduced defense community in Europe. So that we had a forum established in Europe which was acceptable to the Germans, in which the United States was included, and still, we ended the game with a threat to discontinue or to denounce the NATO Treaty if the rest of our demands weren't met.

Now I would think that the United States -- I gather the American Team was prepared to have a pretty brutal approach here -- in effect threatened to go to Moscow -- unless their demands, in effect for continuation of integration were met -- and I'm not sure that that's a very viable position for the United States.

STATE: Does the position the French Team ended up with accomplish the objectives assumed for the General at the beginning?

WHITE: Yes, in a very large part.

BLUE: Integration was only in Germany.

BLUE: Except that there was no assumption that the Germans had bought this!

STATE: Why? Did the Germans buy this?

WHITE: This wasn't played out, but I think that we ended with a situation that would have been terribly tempting to the Germans and for the other Europeans.

STATE: Because of progress on reunification?

WHITE: No, I think that was out of the question.

STATE: What was it that tempted the Germans to go in this direction?

WHITE: The choice between a real split -- a break with France on the one hand, and on the other, something that would allow a continuation of trans-Atlantic ties, albeit loose, but a continuation of the Treaty, and a potential movement -- perhaps in a post-De Gaulle period -- on the political unification front in Europe, because De Gaulle sees the EEC -- he tried to expand it by putting in the British and Spaniards -- and using this as a basis for the development over time of a common defense policy. I think that would be pretty attractive to a lot of the Europeans.

STATE: Did anybody put in an input as to the British proposing to take the place of France in the Common Market?

WHITE: No.

BLUE: One of the things that's missing all through was the opportunity to have private dialogues with your Allies. And it was sorely missed. This is one of the things that came out loud and clear.

JCS: Did I understand that the US troops remained in Europe under this plan, that the French wanted them to remain in Europe and in Germany and that the French scheme had that as one of its elements?

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WHITE: Yes!

JCS: Does the solution, or does the view, then depend on the assumption that the US would keep its troops in Europe under these circumstances? Under the French proposal?

WHITE: If the US had wanted to pull its troops out in the face of our proposal -- I think this would have given the French great opportunities.

JCS: What would the Germans think about these opportunities -- these opportunities for pulling the American troops out?

WHITE: I don't think that we would have liked this. (Laughter)! Because we depend on that to handle the German problem.

WHITE: Yes, you see one of our main objectives was to keep the Germans under control, to keep them in a position where they could not take off on some scheme of their own. Therefore, this Four Power directorate which we tie to occupation responsibilities was one of these.

BLUE: I think the US Team had a stronger position than is being reflected here in this conversation. First of all, we felt that we had the military cards on our side. As the General indicated with the position of the FRG, however, attractive the French thing might seem, in the last analysis they would go with us. In the economic situation, we really -- the French could not really, bring much of a "crunch" however they might maneuver in regard to EEC. And it was our feeling that we never had to really bring up the Soviet situation. It was simply there within the context of the game. The key point in the game, as it was played, is that the US Team must take the position some place along the line that it will no longer make conciliatory moves with the French.

I think this is the key to the game because so long as the United States takes the position that it will make concessions and adjustments to maintain a loose Alliance with the French, then the French position

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is strong! But once the United States takes the position that it will no longer make those concessions in the term of a loose Alliance for the maintenance of appearance, then the American position is quite strong. I think this is the pivotal part of the game. That's difficult -- to get to that position.

DIRECTOR: Did the French Team agree with that -- that if the Americans got rough your position was undermined?

WHITE: I think that the Americans, if they'd really threatened to cast Germany loose, that's one thing that would really have bothered us. Though we were prepared to accept a limited structure with limited integration in Germany itself.

STATE: You mean they'd cast Germany loose unless.....

WHITE: As a fact, say look we pulled out our troops because we're not prepared to cope with Germany alone, particularly if its Germany and the UK in a European complex. So for the foreseeable future, we need the US.

BLUE: That wasn't the other side of the coin. The other side of the coin was a strong bilateral with the Germans. In other words to tell our Allies, look if you won't go with this in terms of the "14", then we will make a strong bilateral with the Germans, and this is what we felt would be unpalatable to them.

YELLOW: Going back to your question. There are several things in the scenario here that are important. One, Ulbricht is dead. Willie Stopf is in power. Things are going pretty well. There's lots of economic interchange in the satellites -- with East Germany. From the German point of view, things are really confused in the Alliance. The Soviets are concentrating on China, making noises, pretty official noises, that all they want is a nice covering for their rear so they can concentrate toward the East. We saw the possibility of getting the Russian forces completely pulled back to the Soviet Union; we saw the possibility of stronger bilateral assurances with the United States, and possibly other

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assurances with our Allies. We're going to be left with our Germany forces intact. We thought that there is a possibility, if we didn't play it too fast or too furious, that we might come out winning in this, in Bonn.

DIRECTOR: This was the difficulty of course, in any game like this when you project it that far ahead. We did not try to put in an intelligence estimate that indicated whether the Soviets had pulled ground divisions down, or cut down on their military budgets. It was played in a general atmosphere though, that the tensions were being steadily reduced. We recognized that if we built up a Soviet threat, military threat -- built up tensions -- that this would automatically tend to make the Alliance more cohesive and this was not the name of the game. Let's put it that way!

We didn't really plan whether any of the proposals resulted in the West Germans getting a finger any nearer the nuclear trigger than they have it now. Everybody agreed that they should have more of a voice in NATO Councils! They're already in on some of the atomic planning. There was no difference in proposals other than to say, "Yes, you can get in on them".

BLUE: Everybody agreed, but nobody did anything.

DIRECTOR: Nobody did anything. Your finger is still out somewhere in the wild blue yonder.

BLUE: Of course Control gave us a situation in which the Germans apparently were less interested in a hardware solution too, which made our task there a bit easier.

DIRECTOR: Yes.

JCS: I know you said that the thrust of this was -- the French turned their fire on the US rather than on NATO. But was any thought given to a French line of action in which they would not seek to have the US retain its forces in Europe, but to have the US get its forces out of Europe, with the idea of accomplishing a dismantling of NATO and restoring a system of free movement and political maneuver in Western Europe?

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Behind my question is really a question as to whether this scenario measures up to De Gaulle's possible purposes. Here quite a time has gone by and there's not really much to show in terms of his accomplishing the kinds of things that we think he may be seeking to accomplish. I'm just wondering whether this assumption that the French wanted our forces kept in Europe didn't inhibit the range of the study.

WHITE: No, that was our assumption. And we limited it to Germany, they're holding it in Germany now.

JCS: But so long as those troops are kept there, this keeps NATO in existence, and that in itself may be more inhibiting than -- keeps the NATO structure in existence, let's put it that way. That could be more inhibiting than De Gaulle's purposes would really prefer.

CONTROL: That assumption wasn't in the scenario. In fact, there were three US ties left to Europe in this French position. One, they'd share nuclear guarantees with French and the British; one was a share in Four Power arrangement in Germany -- vaguely defined, presumably with independent national forces with some kind of a Four Power Command arrangement over them. And the only other thing left was, again very vaguely defined, some coordination between US military planning and European military planning. But no integrated headquarters for anything except sitting over the four national forces in Germany.

WHITE: I don't really think this is an unrealistic position for we French to have taken because one thing that we don't want to do at this point is to have Germany cast loose. This is where an American presence is really important and the price of giving up on that would have been to face a Germany that we can't really deal with on the basis of our own resources.

JCS: I think your point is a very logical one, but I don't know if it's a very French one.....

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YELLOW: The way that statement, concerning the new arrangements the French proposed was in the scenario, was that this would be the first step towards creating conditions needed to bring "a political Europe into being". Maybe it was the first step towards what you consider to be the true French position.

CONTROL: I think the Control Group was bothered by this to some extent too. It had to take the French statement of objectives, this was given by the French Team on the first move. It certainly was in terms of Mr. _____'s outline. Given that as a basic input as to what the French were trying to do, this other range of possibilities just didn't really enter the game at all.

WHITE: We really thought we could sell that statement of objectives to De Gaulle.

BLUE: He's sick. (Laughter)

STATE: If he's sick enough, this policy may have worked out. (Laughter)

ARMY: I would say one thing concerning _____'s thoughts, it seems to me that your whole thing would have collapsed unless you did have this assumption, that France wanted our forces in Germany, because nobody can show how we can keep them there unless we can depend on France when the balloon goes up -- on French soil and French support to support them. So, if you assume France didn't want our forces in Germany, it seems to me your whole thing collapsed.

WHITE: Of course, there is this too, that De Gaulle has in fact made a statement concerning arrangements in Germany which is very close to what we proposed.

STATE: I'm surprised, if I understood correctly, that the "crunch" on our LOC didn't come until 1968.

BLUE: '66.

STATE: There are some statements, we jumped to '68 and then there were

BLUE: We still didn't have the "14" solidly with us or even any two or three of them.

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BLUE: We had worked up an agreement with them on taking certain things out of France, certain headquarters, but leaving under French command, the facilities.

CONTROL: War reserves, supplies were left there but the operational units were pulled out.

WHITE: They were under French command.

STATE: I should have thought in some ways that would have been more useful to take one of the more radical possibilities and then gamed that on out. For example, if France was out of NATO, then what happens? Do they break the Franco-German Treaty? Do they go to the Soviet Union, make a deal? Do the Scandinavian countries go neutral and so on -- to make it a little starchy? It seems to me in my mind, the presentation comes out very fuzzily without much help in clarifying in what our alternatives are if the American Team had forced the issue, then see what happens.

CONTROL: The proposition here was to see if we could get a French position as tempting to the other Europeans as possible and include some other factors as tempting and see if you can at any point of the game persuade the Americans to modify their position at all between the "14" card NATO or they are going to go home, and in spite of all the temptations we could advance, nobody was able to get the Americans to withdraw.

STATE: What I don't understand is why the Germans would have accepted what is in effect a discriminatory or unequal arrangement on this whole system. The motivations that you impute to the rest of the non-French characters in this play, which enable you to get as far as you did on the French, seem to be two -- one, a simple desire on the part of the rest to propitiate the French for one reason or another, political or otherwise -- including maintenance of some Franco-German relationships based on the treaty, which is a general thing -- and the only other significant material element, in this, is the Common Market which seems to me cuts in both directions, and I don't think it would be as strong as we seemed to find in the game. Were the other motivations there that the French Team played on in trying to get this far?

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WHITE: I think not. I think there were those, plus a general impression that if the detente continues, a lot of this was more relevant than it might have been in other circumstances.

WHITE: We played on the possibility of recognition of East Germany or something like that quite a bit.

STATE: The general assumption here really was the desire for accommodation, both accommodation internally with the French and the accommodation between Western Europe and Eastern Europe.

CONTROL: You've got to recognize that the way this latest game was played, the French took the Common Market and built on it -- brought the British in. They offered them a good deal of support. This was put in by Control. The Italians after a settlement of the immediate EEC crisis offered a summit meeting, a heads of government meeting, and the French Team's response was to come back and say, "Yes, and let's have the British and Spaniards there too. Let's talk about defense. If defense goes, then we'll take care of the economic problems of the British including, at one point, the support of the British sterling." So the leverage swung from the way we sometimes talk about it amongst ourselves till it was really positive thinking.

STATE: What about our leverage on the British in this situation? Were most of the support's going to have to come from us anyhow?

WHITE: Let's ask the American Team.

BLUE: This is one of our rather hard-nosed positions, which never got a chance to execute. That was one of the British. It was a German and the other Russian. This never got executed and we never got a chance to talk to them.

CONTROL: We assumed that the British were interested in talking non-proliferation with the Russians at the expense of nuclear arrangements was not an unreasonable assumption. And we also assumed that the French indicated to the British that they thought they might be able to talk to the other Europeans about some financial help to the British, if European arrangements could be worked out properly.

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WHITE: Of course Control helped the French in this too by allowing a "Gentlemen's Agreement" at EEC to continue without anybody putting any pressure on us -- the French -- to alter this. We had almost two years of this "Gentlemen's Agreement" as I recall to emphasize EEC with no pressure.

DIRECTOR: Did the French think they could live with a "Gentlemen's Agreement" alright?

CHORUS: Sure!

DIRECTOR: Couldn't figure out anyway to get around that one. It seemed to be working.

WHITE: See we even used that at one point when we said that the present arrangements were perfectly satisfactory to us, so we are not under any pressure, but as a carrot to you other Europeans -- why this is a way it could have gone.

STATE: I think you ought to back up a year, switch teams and continue to play. (Laughter)

DIRECTOR: There's one thing about these exercises. You can always figure out where you could start off and go in another direction and that would mean continuing around in a circle probably. We wondered whether or not if the Blue Team, the US Team, had taken the position that they ended up in when they finally got the bit in their teeth and said, "Alright boys, choose sides. We're ready for you to choose sides," whether that might not have happened almost anywhere in the play of the game with about the same results you expected out of your final move.

BLUE: Well, I think we certainly judged that we couldn't do that at the very beginning.

DIRECTOR: Initially.

BLUE: First stage.

BLUE: And then we lost control to Control and on that. We certainly didn't feel that we could take an extremely hard line at the very beginning.

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BLUE: This was too long to wait.

DIRECTOR: Did you consider whether or not in Let's go back just a minute. We in Control saw all these people standing up saying, "Yes, let's fight but you lead first," nobody wanted to get off top-dead-center. If this had continued for a time, did you discuss whether or not any deadline that Mr. de Gaulle set would have any teeth in it? In other words, suppose you don't get out at the end of two years or whatever he says? What then?

YELLOW: You have to be a fortune teller to motivate these European nations to get exercised about doing any thing dramatic when one, they're making money; things are humming, everybody is getting along, the Soviets are not interested in them and the detente is continuing. It gets pretty attractive to make accommodations. There wasn't any war.

WHITE: They needed another crisis, I guess.

STATE: I should have thought the French could have offered to take one or two things: either offer bilateral arrangements or offer a NATO arrangement in return for Article V, and say alright, we're prepared or not prepared to continue on an integrated basis, but we will provide you certain facilities and be available in time that the balloon goes up, and of course Article V continues.

JCS: That's possible, it seems to me.

BLUE: We weren't faced with that situation. But if we had been we might

STATE: Let me ask you if any thought was given to a French proposal on a non-integrated basis in peacetime with integrated command in wartime with a French "Supremo"?

WHITE: No, we didn't go that far, but on this other point of course, our proposal, i.e., a NATO Treaty with nothing under it is just exactly what the French -- in other words -- this does carry continuation of Article V.

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STATE: Another point, it seems to me, on this EEC business is that the French are not in a very good position to both break up NATO and pull out of the EEC because then they're really isolated.

BLUE: This is the way we felt too. This is why we felt the EEC didn't bother us too much.

USIA: Did the US team ever _____ the "Gentlemen's Agreement" in the EEC? Or weren't you going to sign it at all?

BLUE: We had just reached the point of calling a halt to all this stuff and getting the Allies with us: the British for their reasons, the Germans, the EEC if the French tried to use that as a weapon, when the game ended. We never had a chance to execute it, or even discuss it with the Allies.

BLUE: We didn't feel that the French position was too credible.

STATE: Instead of waiting for another emergency, it seemed confusing to the purpose of the game to inject this change in Eastern Germany and Eastern Europe. It seemed rather unrealistic and changing the issue, these things like their breaking down the Berlin Wall, and so on; you'd have to have an enormous change to have made that possible. Otherwise all of East Berlin would have come over.

WHITE: I don't think that really changed the way the game was played. I agree with your remark.

CIA: Well, in that connection, weren't the Germans kind of passive all through this? It seems to me that with the postulated conditions they might have played around a little more and put the fear of God into maybe the Americans and the French a little bit. Did you think perhaps, of trying something with the Russians? Trying even perhaps under the circumstances postulated, a negotiation with the East Germans. If indeed, unification was at the very top of their objectives. They seemed to have kept right on respectably in the policy that they now have.

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YELLOW: Yes, we discussed that with the Chancellor a number of times. (Laughter) But on the whole, the plus to him seemed to outweigh the minus so much. We were very much alarmed that the Americans would get very tough with us on the Offset in '66, but when we passed that danger and with the easing of the situation in East Germany, and this small but still distinct hope on reunification, we decided not to take the risk. We thought it might bounce!

JCS: You mean the Americans didn't get tough on the Offset in '66?

YELLOW: No, we were afraid in '66 they would open up, actually. (Laughter)

JCS: How realistic is it to, or how real I suppose is a better term, was this support afforded by the UK and France for German reunification? Was this just a lot of words or was there any meaning to it?

WHITE: As far as the French Team was concerned, we were playing the other side of the coin. We kept telling them that if they did this, that or the other thing, then reunification would be impossible.

DIRECTOR: My impression is that nobody really wants that yet.

JCS: I'm sure that the British must have been more forthcoming than the French in that regard. How did they play it exactly?

WHITE: That was Control.

DIRECTOR: Control had to do that.

CONTROL: There was no British initiative on reunification.

JCS: I can check that one off. (Laughter)

WHITE: One point we mentioned earlier, which is kind of interesting to some of us at any rate, is that both the United States Team and the French Team seemed

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to think they had a decided asset in their ability to put pressure on Europe by going through Moscow and both of us at various times were the US Team didn't use it; they had it in the back of their mind and in the write-up in their scenario they hit it very heavy. We on the French side, of course, were playing this street all through the game. Kind of interesting that both teams felt this was an asset to them.

USIA: Is that why you launched the rocket with the satellite?

CIA: I'd like to go back to the comment on how realistic that is, as a gambit.

STATE: I think it's only realistic as far as the United States is concerned.

WHITE: I don't think anyone else even thought this would be realistic for us.

STATE: The French can't deliver anything the Russians want as far as a trade is concerned, and we could. If we pulled out, they got something.

WHITE: That's why we thought that the first French objective was to try to get Europe organized with the American influence cut down, because we can't really talk to Moscow until we have something to deliver and we just don't have that under present circumstances.

WHITE: We can frighten the Germans by making them think.....

WHITE: Yes, that's right, there was just a talking point.

DIRECTOR: It was interesting that for the first time we didn't think it necessary to set up a Soviet Team for one of these games. A couple of people wanted to talk to the Soviets but basically had we had one, I don't know what they would have done except sit on their ditty box and laugh.

JCS: They might have given helpful hints.

DIRECTOR: Yes sir.

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STATE: The Soviet Team was in a lot of trouble though if you had one with the situation you gave in the East. And the situation postulated inside Russia where you had a hard-nosed militant group challenging a liberal Kosygin regime with some uncertainty as to the future.

DIRECTOR: It would have been an internal problem first and external secondly. So far we haven't gotten around, thank goodness, to try to game the internal problems of Russia.

CONTROL: Were you suggesting that it was unrealistic to assume that if the Americans and the French were competing to try to win European loyalties, that the Russians might make friendly and warming sounds to weaken interest in NATO.

STATE: You mean, sounds to us?

CONTROL: No, to the Europeans?

STATE: Well, I think they will, of course, encourage the French in any of these kind of things that are divisive, but when it comes to really hard agreements, the French haven't got the cards. They know what the French have and don't have as well as anybody else. They just don't see the deal, except a temporary thing just to make trouble. But the thing that would be feasible for we and the Russians and feasible in the sense -- it's not feasible if, it wouldn't be US policy -- but it would be certainly conceivable and I think Germans and others would think about it. They've always been worried that we will get together with the Russians and make a "sphere of influence agreement" or something of this sort and divide up the world. This is what De Gaulle accuses us of having in mind. Certainly Adenauer suspected us of this many times.

BLUE: This is why the US Team said in effect, in the final position, that any consideration of these Russian overtures would only have to be done in an integrated NATO fashion, and the implication was we had said it, without it, and there was a possibility we would threaten them with it, at least, if this doesn't happen.

STATE: Incidentally, they mentioned the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and withdrawing troops -- an offer which has been made many times. Since the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact would be a little bit different now than

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it was when they originally made it, because when they originally made it they had complete control of all these countries. Now they don't have. So it has a little bit more meaning than it did then but not very much.

DIA: The context in which that was given however in the scenario; that they did this as their initial ploy rather than as quid pro quo, and that they were in fact much more concerned about the position vis-a-vis China than against Western Europe -- is probably more cooperation than we could hope for in this decade. I don't think that we can expect our relations with Russia or Russian confidence in the West to improve that fast.

STATE: They would consider a reduction in troops.

DIA: A reduction? Yes. They might well do that.

JCS: That's been offered too.

STATE: Of course each time that there's been any signs of talking about it, they've retreated a little bit and said we would have a gradual reduction.

STATE: What would you pay for that?

STATE: I think there are certain advantages, at least potential, at least, to the West Germans if there was sufficient reduction on the Soviet side that the East German regime had to begin to think about its own public opinion and act accordingly. If the Germans ever wanted to take that gamble, you could make an argument that this would follow. It would depend if they didn't have enough troops actually there to sit on them; they'd have to be worried.

CONTROL: The idea behind this concerting of Russian tactics at this point was to find out if any of the teams who were considering a NATO and European problem, were willing to make the Soviet inputs a major one; as it turned out, each of the teams: US, French and German simply laid the Soviets consideration aside to take that up later to thrash out our own problems. This is an instructive lesson.

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WHITE: That was partly because the proposal contained absolutely nothing new, only things you have been hearing from the Russians for years and years.

YELLOW: It wasn't the proposal that was new. It was the environment in which the proposal was made was new, and there was a certain little bait there for the German Team. We for the first time begin to talk about -- in fact, we dispatched a message to our Ambassador in Moscow to explore with the Soviets what their intentions were. This was a signal to the Control that for the first time we saw an opening, so we were still talking in the context of assurances for our security but we weren't giving up the idea. (Laughter)

DIRECTOR: Gentlemen, this, I think, covers most of the points. We can sit around and talk. As usual in these games, we bring up problems and do not come up with any answers. It's been a privilege and a pleasure for us of the Joint War Games Agency to have been able to be of service to all of your departments and agencies in arranging the details, coordinating the exercises and taking the blame for making all the mistakes that Control normally makes. The cooperation of your staffs was certainly wonderful this time in helping to come up with a reasonable initial scenario, sending such fine and valuable, argumentative people to the teams. It was particularly good. I think all of us gained much from having the representatives from the overseas posts; Herr Chancellor Rutter from Bonn, Monsieur le President McGuire and Mr. Getz from Paris and Mr. Brubeck, who was an honest broker from London.

CHAIRMAN, JCS: I think that this discussion has brought out the questions and comments and the complexity of the problem that faces us, and the fact that the Control did act sort of like God, imposing death and sickness on various eminent people for the benefit of the added confusion factor that this provided.

I think that some of the thoughts expressed here as to other lines that might have been explored also underlines the complexity of the problem and the degree of latitude in which General de Gaulle has to operate.

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I myself enjoyed listening to this exchange here, and the two or three questions that I asked were based really upon the fact that I was a little amazed at a couple of the thoughts that were advanced, although when put into context I could see where they might have been most useful and attractive at the time. I would like to add my thanks to that of the Game Director for the participation and interest displayed by all, both the working members and those of us who came here to sit in at the end and enjoy the fruits of your labors here. I think that we will have to have another one here, but I don't believe we'll get into the internal aspects of the Soviet Union. (Laughter) Thank you very much.

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EPSILON I-65

GAME PARTICIPANT DISCUSSION (U)

(SNF) Participants involved in the play of EPSILON I-65 met at 1400, 19 October 1965, to review and discuss the Politico-Military Game, EPSILON I-65. Since participants were familiar with only the information and actions pertaining to their individual team, a video tape brief (the text of which is contained at pages D-1 through D-13) and copies of all team messages were distributed to acquaint participants with all the game actions.

The following is a verbatim record of the discussion (Participants are identified by the team to which they were assigned):

DIRECTOR: Those of you who are here and didn't participate you're going to get the initial scenario all over again. We had to try, with the aid of the TV people, to put together just a "highlights type" briefing. This is going to be largely for the benefit of the Seniors who will come in who did not participate in the game.

You who participated will find that it is really abbreviated and we do expect to have some questions; we'll have to fill on the details in which they're interested later on.

Furthermore, due to the fact that we couldn't get a room large enough to accommodate everybody since all the agencies sent names over that they'd like to have in the Review -- to our right behind the bulkhead and across the way, the Air Force has a closed circuit television up here and the whole area is a secure area including the cables and everything else. So for the first time in the Pentagon, that I know of, we're having a little closed circuit TV deal

with some people in the other rooms who will see the same thing on the screen that you're seeing here. Whether or not they will be able to tell who is speaking in here in discussion is questionable because we only have that little camera up there and this one here that gets very little. At least they will be able to hear the discussion.

With that, we'll just go right into the resume of the game and then I have some points that I'd like to see if we cannot clear up, but bring up and see if we, who kind of monitored the whole thing, came out with anything that you might all agree with from this game. So, if we may roll them now. Go ahead!

**** VIDEO PRESENTATION ****

DIRECTOR: Going over all the teams' final positions, I seem to read out of this that the details of France's association with NATO may not be so important that it should become a crisis issue. Possibly we can live quite well with a strong integrated alliance and possibly loose ties with France. Does anybody disagree thoroughly with that?

BLUE TEAM: I think it's up for grabs! It's up to Congress.

DIRECTOR: Of course you've got to do a lot of selling for anything, but just gelling down, if this group is representative of the thinking that may go on, France doesn't appear to be a giant over here that we have to have. There are some built-in conflicts. There are no two ways about it. The thing that is of interest to us in the Gaming Staff is to see something that is altogether different from a game that we had that had an East German uprising postulated -- where it came out loud and clear -- and this was about 18 months ago -- that nobody was really interested in seeing Germany reunified. We polled the various teams.

The French team was opposed to it. The Russian team was opposed to it. The United States said lip-service and if this is what it takes to get the FRG,

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alright, but we could care less about having this monolithic gimmick that is bigger than anything else in a position to raise hell with its neighbors over here. The low countries -- the representatives that represented them said they didn't want it. Now here we come at the end of the dial that the Germans were pushing a reunification and the United States was talking about reunification. Of course there's a little difference in this too in that we in Control played down tensions from the Soviet side. In that other game there were some. Not very great.

YELLOW TEAM: I think you put your finger on it there Van. You got the situation in your last scenario that for the first time -- sort of like, who wants to be the President of the United States? Well as the man who might, you know. The sense of the German team was for the first time things were beginning to line up so that initiative might well be taken.

DIRECTOR: Alright.

BLUE TEAM: On reunification?

YELLOW TEAM: You begin to get a little fervor stirred up among the German team.

DIRECTOR: In other words, as the detente gets to look better and better from their standpoint, and there seems to be a real ease in the tensions, this reunification is likely to come up higher and higher?

YELLOW TEAM: You couldn't get much enthusiasm on our German team worked up to NATO because it was in a pretty good state of disarray. It was a time for opportunism and what better rating opportunism can you have in Germany when you might work a reunification gimmick and to play a detente -- uncertainty, and begin to foster a little German unity is this a way to bring it ---.

DIRECTOR: Alright.

YELLOW TEAM: Even though one of our psychological objectives was not to foster extremism. Nationalism!

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BLUE TEAM: I think that we ought make it clear that from the Blue team's point of view, that although the reunification and detente issues were very heavily considered all along, that our central position remained the Alliance, and that we were willing to take a look at the demarche from the Soviets and the discussions of reunification, only within the context of an alliance which had made up its mind that it was going to do business without France. And I think this is very much a secondary issue, and I think had we been asked specifically, we all would have agreed that there really wasn't a chance that the Alliance itself would ever agree to this sort of thing. There's too much opposition to it. You upset all the in a way it's meaningless to talk about a detente and reunification at the same time. The two are antithetical, and if we were going to talk about a hopefully revitalized alliance, we're certainly willing to give serious consideration to the Soviet proposal; but I don't think one of us thought for a moment that it would ever lead to anything like sanction of reunification. I just think that the whole context of our position was that we accepted division and it would be more or less permanent.

BLUE TEAM: Certainly within the visable future.

WHITE TEAM: Of course the reunification question, as far as France was concerned -- this gave us a weapon, if you like -- to attack integration and to attack MLF; not that we were ever in favor of reunification, but it was a very good card for us to keep playing vis-a-vis the Germans.

DIRECTOR: We had some varied comment from the intelligence community, and from a representative in Europe, as to actually what the feeling was in Germany itself, and apparently everybody over there is not for it either. I don't know what the situation is right now. We entered the exercise with but one piece of guidance let's say, from the Chairman, and that was that the question that has been bugging me and I have been asking everybody all around: "How far can the United States go before having to take any initiative against Mr. de Gaulle?" That is, what

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demands might he make that are entirely unacceptable? This was not addressed directly, but I don't think that anything came up in the game really that couldn't be handled.

BLUE TEAM: You reached that point when the business of command and control arrived. You reached the point where we had to disagree or had to take a stand that we couldn't agree on what we wanted.

DIRECTOR: That's I think evident, right from the very beginning.

BLUE TEAM: Yes, that's right.

DIRECTOR: What I mean, we could make arrangements to take care of that.

BLUE TEAM: At that stage, we were responding to him, certainly; not until our last move did we really suggest taking an action ourselves that would force him, then, to do something to which we would respond -- in which we would in a sense take the initiative. We assumed that our proposal would be unacceptable to him and therefore we would do this, this and this.

BLUE TEAM: I think a few things happened in this same regard though in the problem as it was played. One is that there was no evidence that we could get -- in fact it wasn't done I guess -- the arrangement for a type agreement amongst the major elements of the other "14". And therein, in my own opinion, was a considerable failure on the part of the United States (as portrayed by the Control group) -- to achieve such a line-up and position which we were in real life trying to get ready to work out. It went far too long without any solid agreement, at least between Germany and the UK.

WHITE TEAM: And of course on that.....

BLUE TEAM: I know, De Gaulle is going to be working like hell to keep us from gaining that and I think it was quite realistic in the way it was played. But I make the point that it went far too

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long, in my opinion, before we finally had to get hardnosed. Well we didn't until the last business in '68 and I think that's too damn late. I personally think that's too late in the game to somehow force a showdown or the issue on the thing. I also agree with _____ who came up with a proposal they wouldn't let him use which was to keep things dangling and just wait, wait and wait, and never be forced into a showdown corner on De Gaulle's part. I think that's going to be our greatest problem, don't you?

WHITE TEAM: I'm a little bit confused about where all this ended up because I thought that when we met with the Germans, (we the French, that is), we had gotten pretty much acceptance by them of our major objectives which was to develop a specifically European Grouping in the defense field, excluding the US, or at least in which the US would have something of a bilateral relationship with it. I don't know what the eventual outcome of that was; but also, we maintained at the end of the game, it seems to me, we kept our basic bargaining advantage which was, in effect, a hint that we would remain signatories to the NATO Treaty and participants in the Military Committee and the NAC, provided that the rest of the structure was disintegrated. I don't feel that we got a very strong American position on that. Certainly we got anything but a certain sound out of the Germans.

BLUE TEAM: Maybe it wasn't portrayed correctly, but the American team had gotten real hardnosed in that last session. Maybe the words didn't come out loud and clear, but they weren't going to let the British,.....they laid down the law in effect to the British on this....they would so do -- .

WHITE TEAM: You mean about the British participation in this Defense Group?

BLUE TEAM:and the same thing with the Germans, there was no.....question either: the

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British and the Germans stayed on our terms, or we were going to re-evaluate the whole thing.

CONTROL: I think about the most interesting thing in this game, at this point, was at the end of it, we got two sets of what are, in the last analysis, knowledgeable American officials here portraying "gamesters" of opposing forces, both of whom think came out in a very strong and favorable position. Now there is something curious about a game where the two key teams both end up saying "Aha! we've really got them this time!"

BLUE TEAM: There was no opportunity to actually dicker behind the scenes with the other foreign powers and this never gave either one of us a real feel for where we stood with them. Maybe it never will.

CONTROL: Shouldn't we be addressing why these two teams appreciated their position at the end so differently?

BLUE TEAM: Because they both made a lot of assumptions without the solid ground of bilateral discussion and agreements in between.

DIRECTOR: This is a fallacy of game play but we found that in the past, every once in awhile, it comes out about that way; what a country thinks it's getting across to another one is not just exactly read loud and clear. Now, it was our opinion from reading all these things, that the United States felt that the Federal Republic and the other countries of NATO were with them whether solidly or not was a little mushy -- but were going along with this.

BLUE TEAM: When it came right down to the clinch, and the clinch never quite got out even until after this last session we had, the way the game was played. But that's my original point. This can't wait in real life, I don't think, that long.

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DIRECTOR: Well, now on that particular point, isn't this going to put all our NATO Allies individually on the spot?

CONTROL: I think that's the real lesson, Admiral, rather than the lesson you drew at the beginning. The real lesson is that all three of these teams don't want to break at least your European teams -- the British and Germans and to an amazing extent -- I found -- this bothered me throughout the game play by the French -- that the French were playing it differently than they might of too. Some of the assumptions of what the French were up to are challengeable right from the beginning; but the way the game was played, you couldn't get the issues resolved. That was tried by the Control scenario initially -- the first Control move tried to force some kind of a showdown and the final one -- and you get a great deal of reiteration on the American position but an inability to line up (as says,) the Germans and the British with a solid position. It just never gels.

BLUE TEAM: That's partly because of the way the game is played isn't it? It seems to me that the US team, the last day we were in a much different mood than we had been in the days leading up to that. To us everything seemed to fall into place, to a certain extent, and we thought we were in a much stronger position, at that point, than we had been prior to it although in retrospect the elements of strength, to a large degree, were present all the way along; perhaps that is why we are on the line we are in fact.

BLUE TEAM: Well, the key to the game really is to get the United States to break the policy of feeling that a consiliatory position towards France is important; in other words, that the French have something to offer. Or conversely perhaps that the French can hurt us in any way -- but I think once the United States team, within the context as Control set the game -- once the United States team, for whatever rationale will take the position that it can do

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business without the French and that it will lay down the law to both the UK and the FRG, then the game really does fall into place. Then, I don't think the French really have very many strong cards to play, because I think as you said, that the strength of the French position comes in the fact that we will stay if so-and-so. In other words, it's a girl who if you can just get me --- if you'll do one more thing for me, I'll stay; and I think what the United States has to do within the context of this game is finally make up its mind that the break is a clean one, or is going to go ahead on a strong position. Then I think it plays!

YELLOW TEAM: Well don't you think had China not been such an important factor in this game you might have come to that point? You had a complete diversion of the Soviet Union during a portion of this game with China, so I think that China is an answer to the problems. You didn't have to come to that point because there wasn't anything compelling. Everybody was agreed to disagree and running off in various disagreement, but they weren't important because everything was going. You know we shifted states in Western Europe and NATO went sailing along.

DIRECTOR: Well, regardless of whether its China, or what it is, as long as there is no estimate by anyone of the NATO countries that any sort of a fight, militarily, with the Soviet Union is anything but a very low probability event, wouldn't it go the same way?

BLUE TEAM: I don't think that China bothered the US team very much in this detente.

WHITE TEAM: I feel that the French team was a bit divided on that. I wanted to make more of the sovereign Chinese problems than the rest of the team. I wanted to ask the American team to what extent did this business of De Gaulle's operation bring you to the idea that your blocks were all falling into place.

BLUE TEAM: Very little, I would say. That was some more tone than anything else.

BLUE TEAM: A slight bonus.

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BLUE TEAM: The French will, in conviction and steadfastness, be eroded by that. There would be a certain amount of confusion.

WHITE TEAM: I got a stronger sense of progress from your written statement on this

BLUE TEAM: I'll stand on the written statement.
(Laughter).

WHITE TEAM: Of course the way the game went, it wasn't until after the last move that the confrontation really comes out.

BLUE TEAM: Its the London conference.....

WHITE TEAM: Well that's right, and the situation is that the United States in effect has put up one series of proposals, i.e., a continuation of NATO without France if necessary; but France has offered a totally different set of proposals for the other Europeans to consider and I must say, we felt that we still had, in fact, a number of pretty good cards that we had held back which were left to play. Specifically from the team's point, our willingness perhaps, to stay in the Alliance if it was agreed the way we wanted it. This was a card that we felt would be divisive with respect to the other Europeans, and they would not be so ready and so willing to seize upon the American position and say: "Yes, alright France goes." Maybe the Americans were, but we didn't feel that the other teams were.

BLUE TEAM: I think that's exactly what will happen in real life with similar reasoning on their part, don't you? I think this is why somehow we've got to begin to twist the arms a little bit long before December '68.

CONTROL: The way this played.....the French team had so much of interest of the Germans and the British and the rest of them on the table, they really had a very strong position.

BLUE TEAM: Right.

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CONTROL: Control cooperated with this and there are lots of questions about whether the French would ever have exercised the options they did. But the way it was played, they had these guys really drooling. In this kind of a situation, it makes the hard American position win. You've got to be prepared to do what you're really aren't prepared to do, and that's to pull out.....

WHITE TEAM: In the real _____ the option is at a loss.

CONTROL: But, this is the ultimate leverage that you've got. The other ultimate leverage, pointed out in the American paper, is the deal with the Soviets. Neither one of these things seem to be very realistic, and they didn't talk about forcing it.

BLUE TEAM: And the third one

WHITE TEAM: Unless you get at it a lot earlier, you're going to be whipped.

WHITE TEAM: I'm not sure that the French team made any moves that were really out of the ball park as far as the French were concerned.

WHITE TEAM: I'm curious about that. What did you have in mind?

CONTROL: Well, one which is arguable, in the light of past history is would they deliberately set up a situation in which the British would be offered a role in the Community (EEC). Now you can argue this either way. The stakes are high enough so that this is the pay-off. But from a purely French standpoint, this creates a situation in which they are a larger power which is more likely to take over and run that Community in the long run. You could go back and discuss the history of the 14th of January '63, but most people, I think, would accept the proposition that the General really didn't want these people in there to challenge his leadership in the Community. Is this fair?

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WHITE TEAM: Yes, I think that's right. This was a certain calculated risk. For us, the big thing is to get something going in Europe in which the United States is not a direct participant -- which has a relation between it and the United States, that does not involve kind of a supernational structure which our proposal did not involve -- and under these circumstances, I'm not sure that it would be unrealistic to the French to provide a possibility to the British.

CONTROL: I'm not saying it's unrealistic. I said it was a key option.

WHITE TEAM: Don't forget that the French condition for this -- for British entry into the Common Market -- was agreement on defense policy.

BLUE TEAM: This was what forced the US to be hardnosed about their relations with the British in this case. I'd be curious to know from the French team, what were the moves that you could think of the US might make that you dreaded most?

WHITE TEAM: Mixed manned submarines.

BLUE TEAM: As a French team? _____ I guess it would be an interesting thing to get out of this....

WHITE TEAM: I think one of the major things we were concerned with was something on the nuclear side; some kind of a collective nuclear organization, whether its ANF, MLF or something like that. That would in effect offer a real alternative to the Germans, which would in effect carry into the future a trans-Atlantic relationship of the type that we could not compete with, because, we have a policy constraint of not being able to offer the Germans a real role with respect to our own nuclear forces. The other built-in disadvantage is that our stuff is just so much smaller than what the Americans have to offer. But the Americans didn't go ahead with this.

BLUE TEAM: Yes that did. But we didn't go soon enough, the way the game was played, and I think

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this is another part of this same arm twisting --- a combination of "carrot" and "arm twisting" and that has to be done. Not to say that the US proposal was the most attractive one, but I think its probably an attractive one to start out with and to go perhaps as far as necessary to get the Germans into it. I don't think we intended to miss this. I think the way the game was played that we were too late in really pushing it.

WHITE TEAM: You see we unlimbered every gun we had, practically, on that one.

WHITE TEAM: This was a big objective here -- to kill that nuclear thing.

DIRECTOR: I was interested in the affirmative that in the way the French team put it down, and finally, De Gaulle said to the Germans: "Your're likely to get your hands on a nuclear trigger, Bub."

WHITE TEAM: Well, that was Control.

WHITE TEAM: Yes, Control was moving quite far. You can't blame the French team for giving the Germans a nuclear role much further than we have any reason to suspect they did anyhow.

WHITE TEAM: I'm not sure that the French would have any objection to some kind of a loose planning arrangement in a European context. This doesn't give the Germans any basic control, and when the Americans didn't push ahead to something which was better, potentially better, from the standpoint of the Germans and others, we felt that we really had a pretty good bargain on this.

BLUE TEAM: In all fairness, this proposal we heard the US make is nothing more than exists today, in a slightly different package. Because the planning goes on in international staffs today and there are almost all these kind of gimmicks available.

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WHITE TEAM: We recognized that, and pointed it out in our little rump session; really what the Americans were bringing forth here was a pretty mousy proposition.

BLUE TEAM: It's a force under SACEUR's control in being, like air defense, and that's about the only real difference but we still got the US

WHITE TEAM: We didn't clearly understand the American proposal as given to us by Control because we thought at first -- before your session -- we thought that in fact the Americans were offering mixed-manned submarines. This is what we read.

DIRECTOR: That was a mistake. We should have chosen another word for that. These were national forces.

BLUE TEAM: That's right. This is of course a pivotal point in the whole thing; but, I think, I would submit that it's a debatable matter of when you say that the thing that you fear the most was the offer of mixed-manned hardware, of whatever sort; this is at best a debatable point as to the political persuasiveness of such an offer. When the Germans and the UK have to weight what is available on one hand, against what is available within the context of the French offer, I really don't think that the mixed-manning of hardware would loom as large in that scale of decisions as you seem to think it would.

WHITE TEAM: Of course when you put it in terms of our offer, that was exactly what our offer was designed to do. That was to provide them with an option -- with an alternative -- and the fact that we understood it to be mixed-manning perhaps carried us a little bit further along.

WHITE TEAM: I don't think it's the mixed-manning per se.

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WHITE TEAM: No, it's the whole meaning of the MLF in the sense of an attempt to give the Germans more of a role.

BLUE TEAM: That was what the German military people I know have talked to and there were quite a few of them at the time I was over there. They don't really think much of this mixed-manning bit. That's not what's bothering them. At least I haven't found any that did.

DIRECTOR: They wanted to get up on the planning level?

BLUE TEAM: Most of them were on the planning and target level today. They participate. The Deputy Director of the section in SHAPE that actually passes on all planning is a German. The boss of his boss is another German. Even the Deputy Chief for Operations in Plans and Operations in SHAPE is. We've got Germans in various other elements of the various commands. They're involved in planning.

WHITE TEAM: Regardless of what the Germans specifically want, we thought from the standpoint of French interests, it would be highly undesirable to have the Germans and Americans, for what ever reason, going ahead with a project like this which would really be a pretty strong tie. We could deal with the kind of ties there are today we thought, but to get into a new order of propositions like this, would be more than we could compete with. This was a competition for the Germans.

BLUE TEAM: Interestingly enough, the US team kicked around -- of course it wasn't put into writing -- a proposition that if things really came unglued and they couldn't get anything together, would they as a last resort, or final effort try at least, do anything necessary to keep a bilateral with the Germans on which then to hopefully rebuild with the UK and others to bring France back in.

CONTROL: Why would a bilateral with the Germans be a better last ditch position than a quadrilateral with the French, Germans and British?

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BLUE TEAM: Because, so long as you maintain a position within the United States team that you're trying to preserve the marriage with France, your position is weak. You must make that break -- someplace. You must take that position someplace along the line, otherwise you're continually answering. I'm over-stating it to make my point, but I think the more we wrestled with this, the more we saw. First of all, I think, we quite rightly wanted to reach a position where the French had taken an overt step. It was clear and we took their proposals at the London International Conference as being that step. But so long as you have the United States team in the frame of mind that they will do almost anything to preserve the marriage, then they really can never get out a workable policy. Again, I'm over-stating a little bit, but I think this was pivotal to our position.

BLUE TEAM: It finally came to that with us; and we said, among ourselves, that if it really came unglued, we would just go to a bilateral with the Germans in order to keep our forces, to keep Germany under -- to keep them tame, so to speak, at least in that fashion -- to keep our presence there, and then try to build back the British and the others little by little to come back to rejoin eventually and have an integrated NATO again. Even though initially, it seemed to come unglued.

YELLOW TEAM: We on the German team didn't know that you had that hard substitute.

BLUE TEAM: I know. We kept that very quiet.

YELLOW TEAM: We hinted and asked for bilateral conversations in the worse way right there.

BLUE TEAM: We'd have gone a long way to do that if we had to. Of course, it never followed the game didn't go that far.

BLUE TEAM: A good point was raised when you talk about this spectre of some sort of meaningful nuclear cooperation in which France is not included.

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As you know, I'm not completely persuaded as to the force of that particular argument; but I think what our team Captain and _____ really got across to the rest of us was that the spectre of the other "14" going together without France was in the last analysis something that would be very, very difficult for him to accept. It would be difficult for the French people to accept; and I think this is the thing which made us feel we had a strong position, because France was working herself into an isolation position.

WHITE TEAM: Certainly with regard to that, it was the last thing we wanted. Our primary objective was to prevent the coalition of four teams, but not at the expense of agreeing to continue NATO the way it was. And we thought that there were enough possibilities in the situations for us to prevent that happening from a combination of "carrot" and "stick" offering, as much as we could, to create a purely European based system; a European community which could in turn cooperate with the United States.

BLUE TEAM: I say again -- I think for the rest of us -- we felt like: if we had to come down to the wire, and it had all went to pot, that we would try to start over, if necessary, with a basic bilateral and then rebuild rather than hold them together actually and perhaps have to rebuild. I don't know.

YELLOW TEAM: The result of all this was that the pluses for the Germans came out a lot more clearly than the minuses.

BLUE TEAM: That's right.

YELLOW TEAM: And if you pile this on top of the congenital German propensity to straddle, Yellow wasn't faced with enough of a conflict situation because of the pluses developing in EEC and the possibility of the British coming back on the Continent, what the Germans was sure to interpret as a real detente and move towards reunification. Although this

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didn't come through to the other teams at all, it certainly would come through to the Germans as something they would have to nibble at. And in the absence of a real negative sign on Atlantic disengagement, or on a break in their relations with France, which would cause them to bite the bullet, then we just tended to brush the thing under the rug and sail along trying to have your cake and eat it too.

WHITE TEAM: We tried to get the message through to you people.

BLUE TEAM: I think that looking at the Germans through the Control scenario, that we found that their position justified our ideas, our moves. We found that it wasn't nearly as weak or as straddling as you suggest it might have been -- especially at the end.

DIRECTOR: In Control, in trying to project the thing forward, we felt that the Germans had very little room to maneuver. How did you feel about it?

YELLOW TEAM: We felt we had to sort of take a position in the maneuvering area which we called the rubber line. (Laughter)

DIRECTOR: The stretch of this rubber band didn't go very far one way or another.

WHITE TEAM: On the other hand, everybody -- all the players -- were looking upon Germany as really critical. The French team was playing for Germany. The American team was playing for Germany. This should have given the Germans an awful lot of leverage and we were rather surprised that we didn't see more initiative from them.

YELLOW TEAM: Why should the Germans have taken an initiative in the scenario that had developed? We were fat.

YELLOW TEAM: The French power position continues to drop through the three year period and the German

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power position goes up. We don't have to excite everybody by straining at the back because we think that over a period the game will favor us. Let it go on and be played this way.

WHITE TEAM: You might scare them if you did look around.....

YELLOW TEAM: Well yes, then you do back off.

WHITE TEAM: This is sort of strange, because we and the US both, through our scenarios, are indicating that we feel we have leverage in Moscow. This is another interesting aspect.

BLUE TEAM: How was that?

WHITE TEAM: We felt from the French team that our motions to the East would be the kind of thing that would worry the Germans and the rest of Europe a good bit, and yet, I read that just now in the last message about the move; they feel that they had "almost matchless" leverage upon Moscow.

BLUE TEAM: No, not on Moscow. Naturally if an integrated NATO didn't stay together, we had the spectre of US making settlements for them with Moscow directly.

WHITE TEAM: It's interesting that there is a remarkable congruence of American and French policy here in that; one, the Americans want, as you say, to keep the Germans tame, as certainly do the French; and secondly, the Americans feel that they can pressure the Germans, if you like, by going to Moscow. So do the French.

BLUE TEAM: And neither one seemed to compete.

BLUE TEAM: But none of the American positions ever depended upon any sort of a serious response to the Soviets. We made up our minds early that we would not take that seriously, that we would firm up our position and then talk to that later; but in no way depend upon it.

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WHITE TEAM: If the Soviets had made a different sounding proposition, it might have had a different effect.

BLUE TEAM: I doubt it. We wouldn't trust them. That was our general feeling. It didn't matter much what they said. We'd play it for whatever leverage it would get. We wouldn't trust it. We wouldn't accept it.

DIRECTOR: It was interesting to a whole lot of us, who were not really knowledgeable on EEC matters, to listen to the discussions of those of you who do know, as to whether or not this is something that will give leverage and to whom. It seems to me in the final analysis that France can only play this one so far, and that the United States is in a fairly strong position for stepping in, to let's say not take France's place, but to provide a whole lot of agricultural stuff on a fairly good basis there.

WHITE TEAM: Well, that's true on the economic side of it, but I do think that France has a pretty potent lever in the desire in Europe for a continuation of the EEC and continual progress in that. To hold out the carrot, such progress being possible if certain things are done -- it seems like certain incentive to the other countries, and conversely to reiterate that no further progress will be possible if the other things are done.

CONTROL TEAM: I'm surprised that you should conclude that. It would seem to me that the way the French team played it, (I have already indicated some doubts about that) at the end they had the Germans, in particular, back in under their control. They had bought off the British with real bait for the British, and one could only say that if this had come to a "crunch," it would have been pretty tough for the Germans and the British to have thrown all this out the window for an integrated command structure in NATO. Now, there's a paradox here. You could say that in the end

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BLUE TEAM: But those are not at all the alternatives. What you've just said, that about throwing NATO out the window, there are a whole lot of other things that could happen along with that, which we think neither the British nor the Germans are willing to accept.

CONTROL TEAM: The point is that this did provide leverage for the French, didn't it? It still makes it harder for the Germans and the British to pull out and go our way.

DIRECTOR: Unless we make some counter proposals.

BLUE TEAM: I certainly think all of these things have to happen sooner, as I said in the beginning. But what you're assuming is that the last French positions were bought by the Germans and UK and they never got played. The US discussions and bilaterals with them never got really said. Although we said what we were going to do. I don't think that was necessarily what you say would have won the point.

BLUE TEAM: What stands out here is that in an ideal environment where over a period of time, almost everything put into this by anybody, except the Americans, were inputs designed to tempt people away from the Americans and toward the French. In this context, the Americans at no point felt that they could or needed to -- I don't know whether or not it may be a mix of the two -- make any real concessions to anybody here except dangling the possibility of a Polaris force. Otherwise the American position is virtually pat from the beginning and it seems to me that is what this says is -- what we got here is some very powerful hole cards in the form of strategic commitments and

BLUE TEAM: American economy and all this?

BLUE TEAM: With all of these hole cards, which in the last analysis are pure force, we're not going to make any concessions to make it more palatable or more tempting. We're just going to rely on the fact that they can't get off the hook, even if they want to. Let them wiggle a little bit.

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WHITE TEAM: By them --- you say them --- but what you really mean is France. In other words, are we going to let France put that kind of leverage on us from our position? This is really the fundamental question in the game.

BLUE TEAM: Because these hole cards, on the other side, they're positive benefits to the others. They're not merely clubs.

WHITE TEAM: They're also positive detriments if they don't continue, or at least we thought so. When you come down to that nasty point where you said: "If you guys don't come along, why the hell with you, or we'll break your arm, or some other hard thing" --- you don't do it that way, at least I hope you don't have to right away. I hope there are some inducements that we can use.

WHITE TEAM: But weren't there any inducements worth factoring into the game? That's what I am getting at.

BLUE TEAM: You mean inducements to the French?

WHITE TEAM: No, to the British and the others.

BLUE TEAM: I think one inducement would have been if we had been able to sound out the Soviets on these various demarches. I think it was sort of a little bit playing unrealistically for the United States to accept the word --- the message that De Gaulle brings back --- the message Erhard brings back and not to sound the Soviets directly, say at a summit meeting and so on. Not that we believe the Soviets wanted to settle all of Europe's questions, but had we gone ourselves through the sounding operations, the summit or a meeting of that sort, then our position in putting the squeeze on the rest of Europe and the inducement of the Germans would have been much stronger. I think that was perhaps an unrealistic scenario, there for a little while, that we would not ourselves wish to engage in a dialogue with the Soviets before, rather than leaving it until later.

WHITE TEAM: What would be the purpose if the US knew of this kind of a position: that if you don't go along with us we'll go to the Soviets? That's kind of cutting off your nose to spite your face.

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BLUE TEAM: I don't think exactly in that context. I think that we're thinking that if NATO does this we would only think of talking to a settlement with the Russians in an integrated NATO context. If that falls apart, then we wouldn't talk to them on that basis at all, but it gets to be strictly a US-Russian type discussion on the subject. We will talk to it, with them and for them, in a NATO integrated context. Otherwise, it's a separate discussion which we don't think they would like a bit.

WHITE TEAM: I think more specifically that the Germans certainly must be frightened to death of the US and Russia settling their future for them. De Gaulle would be horrified if he thought that any such major development coming along without his participation and his control.....

BLUE TEAM: Of course, if there is no NATO as we know it, there's less possibility of the United States settling the future of the Europeans for them. We can talk to the Soviets about things of mutual interests. Particularly if you had a Europe organized this way, the way we thought maybe it was going to be organized.

BLUE TEAM: I'm just curious, if NATO did fall apart and the Russians came to us and said: "Let's between us settle --- make a peace treaty with the Germans," wouldn't this be pretty horrifying to the French, the UK and some of the other people?

WHITE TEAM: To say nothing of the Germans.

BLUE TEAM: Had you considered this?

BLUE TEAM: Of course it would.

BLUE TEAM: I think it's important to recognize that, in the play of the game, we never used this threat of going to the Soviets before the settlement of the thing. We made up our minds that we would go very true on the policy of a settlement of the "14". France held up to the final end without ever talking of going to the Soviets either overtly or covertly.

BLUE TEAM: We never pulled out the club, but we always assumed that the others would recognize that it existed.

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WHITE TEAM: What was the basis of making this at the end of the game when the Soviets could make some offers and had talked in the meantime to De Gaulle and Erhard, and Erhard had gone to Moscow? What was the basis for the US Team just writing off the Soviets and saying, "Let's leave this completely out."?

BLUE TEAM: Control wrote it and put us in that position at the end.

WHITE TEAM: But once you were in that position, why did you simply ignore it? Did you think there was nothing to be done about the Soviet position?

BLUE TEAM: We couldn't talk to that until we'd settled an integrated NATO out loud. --- We could among ourselves.

WHITE TEAM: I think that was the French position too. A prior piece of business was the organization in the West, and we wanted to get Europe organized our way before we talked to the Soviets.

WHITE TEAM: Yes, that's true. Of course, we did make noises within the Western European context of initiatives toward Moscow.

BLUE TEAM: We were ready to make counter-noises the same way along with some of these arms questions at the time the game ended. I think this is a fair statement, isn't it?

BLUE TEAM: We certainly listed that as one of our.....

BLUE TEAM: Incidentally, let me ask a question; would a bilateral with the Germans --- if all of this came apart, and you could really go to the Germans and make things not only good, but hard as well --- if we did work up a bilateral, wouldn't that just absolutely worry all of the rest of the Europeans as well. Would this automatically have to come back in and get hold of it too?

WHITE TEAM: It would make the French furious.

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BLUE TEAM: Sure it would, but wouldn't it make the others jump to an integrated NATO again, or something like that?

WHITE TEAM: What other way is there?

WHITE TEAM: You're talking about going to the Germans and working up some bilateral. But if you read the last objective of the German Team, if the central objective remains reunification and as I read it --- the German Team had come a long way in the game. By saying, "Well, if this is the situation, we accept the possibility that a weakening of the present NATO organization, including ultimately the withdrawal of American troops from Germany --- A German withdrawal from NATO may be necessary to achieve an acceptable German settlement." But the American Team is willing to say, "Let's forget about this Russian offer and work things out with the Germans."

CONTROL TEAM: Which would put the Germans in the position of saying: "Well, this Russian opportunity, if it had been real, you'll never know".....it's another lost opportunity and it ends a great history of these. So I wonder if the American Team wouldn't have a German problem on its hands.

DIRECTOR: That's projected out right far. I don't know that we'll have that problem, but you've got a good question there. That puts them right between the rock and the hard one.

WHITE TEAM: Since Germany was supposedly the key to the game.

DIRECTOR: The end of this German world goes on for a while? Until you come to the verb! (Laughter)

WHITE TEAM: You know one of the interesting aspects, I think, is that the Europe, as seen by the French Team in 1968; because of the position we finally came up with is remarkably close to the Europe as seen in Paris over the weekend in the article that appeared in *Politique Etrangere*..

BLUE TEAM: Is that right?

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WHITE TEAM: Did they make a way out prediction of things to come or something?

WHITE TEAM: This is an article written by "XXX", in this magazine; that the story is going around Paris, that it was approved by De Gaulle. It outlines the sort of Europe that he has in mind, and it is just identical to what we finally ended up with. Amazing!

WHITE TEAM: I think under these circumstances the United States would get an awful lot of pressure not to push this integration nonsense, and people begin to be suspicious of the United States. Why they want all this integration? The Soviets are changing. --- To press this would really prevent the development of the Europe along the line of which even the United States has had in the past --- talked about the dumb-bell theory in the statement. Granted, because De Gaulle is still around! It's a Europe of nation states rather than an integrated Europe, but I would think some of the other Europeans would see enough possibility in this EEC, plus Spain, plus UK, the Defense Community, to make them think twice about

BLUE TEAM: Don't we want some kind of a handle reaching through the handle of that dumb-bell on Germany though, for a long time to come? I don't want to have to fight them again. I don't know about the rest of you.

CONTROL TEAM: Well, I think the paradox of this situation --- looked at it with some different American objective rather than an integrated NATO command which keeps us locked on this European situation which is against other objectives --- particularly shifting the burden of keeping the British afloat. This is beautiful! I mean you could say that the French play is really something that the Americans are after. That everybody would undoubtedly come back to question the relative ranks as your objectives. I assume that the hand hold that you've got is still in the strategic nuclear area even if this comes to pass. How you would evaluate these various military arrangements? But under the French plan or any other plan, it's still the American strategic deterrent.

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WHITE TEAM: Under the French proposal for the war game, there is an American hand on the Germans in the quadripartite command with Germany.

CONTROL TEAM: Plus the nuclear arrangements, plus the --- so I think the real question, for some of us at least that persists here is this: Why, at a time when the Russians are at least making conciliatory noise and the Germans in an explicit move say, "We're interested in exploring what this is all about and presumably want to keep conditions unprejudiced," when the French are not giving a lot of substance -- at least coming up with something that looks a little better than you might have expected De Gaulle to end up with here; with all the other inducements within the picture, why do the Americans, considering what they could get out of at this point, want to go to the mat and quote ultimata and quote either/or -- really sharp alternatives in order to keep that European power structure as it's been in the past? What is it about that particular set of arrangements that makes them so important that all the other considerations that have been introduced into the game -- you'd rather withdraw from Europe than concede on those arrangements?

BLUE TEAM: I think part of the answer to that is the way the scenario is built. And you came up with the last point where you have the German position, which we were given to understand is the German position, and not just bargaining point.

BLUE TEAM: Let's face it in real life -- what are they going to do to us when this thing begins to happen? Are we going to hold out for NATO -- a 14 nation NATO -- like the NSAM presently is drafted to say, and try to go down that road; if so, how far down that road? We felt we ought to play it that way, that's what we know is in the wind, at least. I'd be interested to know now, everybody's thought about it here. You think this not the way to go for some reason; shouldn't we, at least for these few years to come, insist on this kind of a thing? This is certainly what national policy is being drafted to say. And do you find, after looking at this now, is the wrong thing to do? Of course, we're looking at maybe some false circumstances here; but a lot of them could be realistic. Maybe we ought to ask ourselves that question.

DIRECTOR: There's a basis of all of the differences. We have on thing that we did not project definitively for anybody. It's the basis for some of

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our differences right now. And there's no way to judge from anything you have here, as to what the degree and nature of the communist threat, as seen from all the nations, is in 1968. And I think that's going to hinge on whether the United States could, and under these circumstances, say yes! And this would be based on the intelligence estimate, political, military and everything else at that time. Now is the time to see if we can't make a deal and reshape the face of Europe.

BLUE TEAM: That's what the French proposed. Much as the French proposed. That's an alternative.

DIRECTOR: Because certainly there's that difference right now, and with the scenario projection lessening tensions all along, if there had been anything that we could have thrown in here -- the only thing you remember that we put in was there is no-crash program on the hardening of the missiles. We didn't mention whether they lessened their ground forces. This was just too much to put in. But in actual fact, if you came up with a situation at the end as to whether or not the United States would hold on to the hard line or would give and start talking, I think we could depend on that.

BLUE TEAM: Sure have a big bearing.

WHITE TEAM: What is it in this German position at the end of the game? Maybe I shouldn't be reading the last message -- maybe I should be reading the one before last.

BLUE TEAM: You should be reading the last Control message.

WHITE TEAM: Control message?

BLUE TEAM: Right, the Red message. Especially page 141.

BLUE TEAM: This influenced our thinking a great deal in answering your question. We recognized all along the pivotal importance of the Soviet approach, and so on; but Control in a way seemed to take it out of our hands by posing a London Conference -- to which everyone came with serious positions. And here was a French position. And

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here was a German position. And here was a US position. All postdating considerably the Soviet demarche. And we simply felt that Control had put us in a position where we couldn't really make the Soviet demarche a pivotal part of the game.

WHITE TEAM: In this statement of the German position on paragraph 24?

BLUE TEAM: Well, all of 24, you see -- and 23 is the French position, and 22 speaks to the London Conference. It's really pages 140 & 141 of the Control Message.

BLUE TEAM: We consider that this to a large extent, pre-empted the previous Russian business.

BLUE TEAM: Is there anybody that doesn't think that the US ought to go down this road to an integrated NATO? If necessary, do a little arm twisting towards the end to keep the Germans and the UK together? I'm curious. Under the circumstances we know now, which I realize the circumstances can change by threat or whatever.....

CONTROL TEAM: What's the point of the integrated command structure? Isn't it to have an effective deterrent which will be convincing?

BLUE TEAM: That's part of it. The other part is: Do you put your troops and other things out there with a command and an arrangement that is from the start patently not going to be effective? From a military point of view, that is not worth anything unless you have an integrated command to take care of the troops that are therein being and are going to operate. And if you don't have that, it isn't going to be a good thing. The Congress won't let us stay there in my opinion unless we have it.

CONTROL TEAM: If the Soviets had been hard instead of soft? Control has said the Soviets are doing this to put pressure on Berlin on the interdiction of this, etc.

BLUE TEAM: Then there isn't any doubt, it seems to me, but that you would get quite a different solution.

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BLUE TEAM: But if you're going to have forces in being over in Europe on the ground, then you want to have them put together in a realistic, controllable, effective, military organization. And if you don't have that, you shouldn't leave them there! In fact, Congress won't let you.

WHITE TEAM: OK, but our French proposal provided for such a system in Germany where it counts.

BLUE TEAM: Maybe. Well, Germany isn't the only place that counts. But maybe! There are other places too.

DIRECTOR: Militarily, the deal that would come out of that -- and this is just off the top of the head -- assuming rearrangements in troops, French troops, down here under a German, I believe they were going to be down south, Americans in the middle, and Germans up at the north; and your front is real narrow. I'm afraid Mr. de Gaulle would make one of his points anyway under such an arrangement -- and that's a trip wire type of deal rather than giving you the options as the United States would be inclined to have.

BLUE TEAM: It doesn't really go all that far, but it will assume

DIRECTOR: It gets a little bit of weight -- it erodes our position and pushes his up.

BLUE TEAM: You can't fight a nonnuclear war like the last one this way, but I don't think anybody intends to anyway.

WHITE TEAM: In response to your question, is it real trouble here? You may find yourself under pressure in a political arrangement in Europe here. But you are now arguing limited by what makes sense militarily; and that you're not willing to compromise military sense --- or at least there is only so far you can go in making military make nonsense out of military arrangements for the benefit of political concessions.

BLUE TEAM: The military have had to do that many times, to make it even a point of utter nonsense, militarily. But for good political reasons, and I'm not belittling the reasons themselves and I don't say that we couldn't and wouldn't do it. We'll damn well do whatever has to be done, but right now both sides of the River feel that we should keep this position and I'm just raising the point here -- the thought that's been generated through here are these general kinds of conditions. Does that seem to now appear to be the wrong thing to do? At least when you get clear down to the end of the road, such as was about reached here.

CONTROL TEAM: The answer is no, because you don't have that soft Soviet position Part of the answer is, if you're going to play it, you better force the issue a little quicker than the Blue Team.....

BLUE TEAM: Oh, I agree with that. I think that we need to get an agreement with the Allies long before we did -- and that's the intention, or you won't be successful either.

WHITE TEAM: My judgement is that there are real possibilities for the French, the way the American team prolonged this business.

BLUE TEAM: Well, let us say that the American team did prolong. There were events jumped two years at a time before we got any of our licks in. (Laughter)

DIRECTOR: We had to get all these people off of top dead center.

BLUE TEAM: Yes, I know it -- I know your problem, but we never prolonged it by choice.

WHITE TEAM: Well, next time let one of us Frenchmen be on Control. (Laughter)

DIRECTOR: Well, Gentlemen, I think this would just about wind it up here. I certainly want to thank everybody for participating. Some of you are going to be

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around here for the Senior Critique, and please be just as vocal then if you have the opportunity, and are not pre-empted by some of the others as you are now, because things are not -- never have been in the past forums where anything is decided. There's not going to be a piece of paper floating by for you to put your "chop" on and go up to the boss and get approval out of this.

You will get a Game Report which hopefully will get out in about two weeks so that you can chew over any little ideas that seem to be tasty and that you want to do anything else with. But that's all that this is going to be -- any action will have to be at your initiative and staffed through your own echelons up there. So let's take a break.

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GAME DOCUMENTATION

EPSILON I-65

POLITICO-MILITARY GAMES
(Published Prior to Play)

1. (U) General.

a. The Joint War Games Agency, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has three major divisions (See Attachment #1). Two of these divisions are concerned with problems of limited and general war; the third, the Cold War Division, has two branches, the Computer Games Branch, and the Politico-Military Branch, which is responsible for the preparation and conduct of high level, inter-agency politico-military games.

b. The Politico-Military Branch is authorized five officers (one from each Service in addition to the Branch Chief), to develop and conduct politico-military games. An annual program of games, as well as each individual game, is developed with assistance from interested agencies and departments. Responsible officials are contacted by Politico-Military Branch project officers for ideas and suggestions in conducting research. Scenarios are then developed by interviewing knowledgeable people, identifying major issues and problems, developing an appropriate game organization and in preparing for the exercise. Efforts are made to obtain participants with detailed and expert knowledge of the subject to be examined.

c. JWGA's politico-military games are generally conducted on an inter-agency basis with participants from the principal organizations involved in national security planning. The emphasis in most games is on current or potential problems associated with international affairs.

d. Games are often conducted with high level officials participating on "senior level" teams which review and discuss proposals developed by "action level" teams. The exact format of each game varies according to the special requirements that may be posed, but in general,

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these are "desk" or "manual" type games in which teams meet and discuss a situation which has been portrayed in a scenario. They develop an estimate of the situation, their objectives, strategies and specific actions (including contingency actions) to be taken in political, psychological, economic or military areas.

e. A Control Team examines the "Move Message" which each team provides and determines the positions of other countries and influences. A scenario projection is then prepared which advances the situation to a new point in time and requires the opposing teams to make new decisions. This process is repeated three or four times.

f. Generally these games are followed by a review and discussion using video-tape presentations which summarize the action. Such meetings provide opportunities for some of the highest officials from the agencies concerned to change opinions, comment on game hypothetical events and discuss related "real life" questions.

g. Final game reports disseminated on a "need to know" basis, on video-tape and in written form serve as the basis for follow-on studies and actions. They are also useful for the analysis of contingency plans and often help in pointing up intelligence and other program requirements for various agencies, departments and military commands.

2. (U) Transportation/Parking.

a. There is a minimum of parking space available at the Pentagon. Participants from agencies outside the Pentagon are encouraged to use government or commercial transportation. Passes for use on Department of Defense buses may be obtained for civilian game participants.

b. For those who must drive, "Visitor Parking" areas are located in South Parking, lanes 12 and 13 (3 hour limit), and around the perimeter of South and North Parking (5 hour limit after 8 AM). (See Attachment #2) This area is limited and at least 30 minutes should be allowed to obtain a space. Parking limits in Visitor Parking can be extended by advising a JWGA representative of the parking lane number, license number, make, model, color and year of your car.

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c. Temporary parking passes may also be obtained by advising Politico-Military Branch a week prior to game play. Space in temporary pass areas are not specifically assigned, and more passes are issued than available spaces; therefore, early arrival is necessary to assure a parking space.

3. (U) Directions to Game Location. Game rooms are located in BC 942A, the Pentagon. BC 942A can be reached by the following routes:

a. To BC 942A from Concourse - Descend Stairway 93D (located along left side of the bank) to the basement. Proceed left and follow directional signs marked "Joint War Games Agency".

b. To BC 942A from River Entrance - Descend escalator following directional signs marked "Joint War Games Agency".

4. (U) Security.

a. Politico-military games are played for the most part at the SECRET - NOFORN level. Material discussed in game rooms may be TOP SECRET and all participants must be cleared for TOP SECRET information. Individual clearances will be confirmed in writing prior to the game by the Administrative Section, Cold War Division.

b. Game titles are UNCLASSIFIED when used without association with a particular subject area. When the game title is associated with a specific area or with a specific country, the classification is SECRET - NOFORN.

c. Temporary building passes will be issued to players not possessing the "Special" Pentagon building pass. This pass must be displayed, while in the Pentagon, after 1800 hours and before 0700 hours daily, and at all times on Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays.

5. (U) Administration.


a. During the conduct of the game and the Review, participants may be reached by telephone at Code 11,


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Extension 79860 or 57683 (from civilian phones, call OX-7-9860 or OX-5-7683).

b. A Final Report will be prepared for distribution to interested agencies and game players.

c. Preparations for the game are coordinated by Lt Col Thomas J. McDonald, Head, Politico-Military Branch, Cold War Division. In the event of questions, comments, or any further assistance, call Code 11, Extension 79860 or 57683 (from civilian phones, call OX-7-9860 or OX-5-7683).





EPSILON I-65

GENERAL INFORMATION
(Published Prior to Play)

1. (S) EPSILON I-65 will be conducted in Pentagon game rooms (BC 942A) from Monday 11 October through Friday 15 October 1965. This is the second exercise of the FY'66 Program of Inter-Agency Politico Military Games conducted at request of the Chairman, JCS by the Joint War Games Agency, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Its purpose is to examine possible problems arising in Europe between 1965 and 1970 with the principal focus on matters associated with increasing French intransigence in alliance relationships. It is hoped that this examination will lead to:

- a. New perspectives on alliance relationships.
- b. Insight into potential alliance problems or wind-fall opportunities.
- c. Ideas to enhance current plans and future programs.
- d. Development of realistic scenario material against which current and future contingency plans can be evaluated.

2. (S) Teams will represent the United States (Blue), the Federal Republic of Germany (Yellow), and the Republic of France (White). The schedule for each team is indicated on pages G-10 and 11.

3. (U) The following organizations (U.S. participation only) have been invited to participate:

- a. The White House Staff.
- b. The Department of State (including representatives from the U.S. Embassies to NATO, France, the Federal Republic, the United Kingdom and Belgium).
- c. The Central Intelligence Agency.

d. The United States Information Agency.

e. The Department of Defense:

- (1) Office of the Secretary of Defense (ISA)
- (2) Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- (3) Army
- (4) Navy
- (5) Air Force
- (6) US European Command

4. (U) EPSILON I-65 will be a single level game without specific restrictions on the grade of participants. Criteria for nomination of players and Control personnel will be direct knowledge, experience and current responsibility for planning in the NATO area. The size and numbers of teams will be limited to reduce total time requirements and to facilitate discussion. Balance will be sought in team organization between political, military, economic (including logistics) and psychological background of participants.

5. (U) The starting point for EPSILON I-65 will be 2 January 1966. A scenario will be issued to participants depicting events leading up to that date. In addition to the initial scenario, reference material, appropriate maps and other data will be available in game rooms.

6. (U) Success of the game depends largely on the ability of playing teams to devise plausible and thought-provoking stratagems and actions which advance the interest of the government or group represented. Control is responsible for introducing logical third country inputs and other influences and for making an honest evaluation of actions initiated by the various teams.

7. (U) It is not intended that individual players should attempt to represent their agencies or to limit their comments to a particular area of expertise. Each player is expected to serve as a generalist while providing advice in those areas where he has special knowledge.

8. (U) A single team "Move Message" will be prepared by each team captain on appropriately colored forms at the conclusion of team deliberations. The first "Move Message" submitted by each team should include an estimate of the situation, national objectives, broad strategies and specific moves (including contingencies) in the military, political, psychological and economic area. Subsequent messages need not repeat broad objectives or strategies unless these are modified.

9. (U) While teams are deliberating, the game clock is "stopped". Time only "moves" after teams have submitted their decisions to Control and it only moves to the extent determined by Control. Control, which represents other nations, influences and fate may advance time a week, month or perhaps years for the next move and will prepare a scenario projection outlining the situation which results from team actions and other developments (see attached Game Mechanics).

10. (U) A Joint War Games Officer will serve as Game Staff Representative (GSR) on each team. In addition to serving as a member of the team, the GSR will provide administrative information to players and assist team captains in the preparation of messages. During deliberations, team requests for additional information should be submitted through the Game Staff Representative who will determine whether or not a written message is required. Written messages will be held to a minimum on administrative matters, however, queries of substance on which Control will be required to make a ruling should normally be reduced to writing. Forms are arranged in sheets of four NCR* sheets. Drafters should retain one copy of each message, passing the others to Control through the Game Staff Representative. Typewriters are available in each room, however legible hand-written messages are acceptable.

11. (U) A video tape summary of EPSILON I-65 will be prepared for presentation at the review and discussion of EPSILON I-65. The Review and Preliminary Discussion of EPSILON I-65 will be conducted at 1400 hours and the

* No carbon required

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Senior Review and Discussion will be conducted at 1630 hours, 19 October 1965 in the Pentagon Conference Room: 5C 1040. All game players are requested to attend both of these meetings to review a video summary of the game and to discuss issues and problems surfaced during play. The period of each meeting will be two hours. At the Senior Review, very senior officials of the interested agencies will assemble to review EPSILON I-65 and to discuss issues and problems surfaced during the exercise. Senior participants in this Review have been invited on an individual basis. Other officials desiring to view the summary of EPSILON I-65 can be accommodated at the Preliminary Review and Discussion. A second Senior Review will be conducted in Europe (date and location to be announced); representatives from the Joint War Games Agency will attend the European Review. It is desired that other interested officials and game participants from Europe attend this Review.

12. (U) The game title, EPSILON I-65 is unclassified when used without association with a particular subject area. The general focus of the game is SECRET - NOT FOR FOREIGN DISSEMINATION. Discussions during the game will include TOP SECRET material.

13. (U) EPSILON I-65 is scheduled to begin with a briefing at 0830 hours Monday, 11 October 1965 in Room BC 942A, the Pentagon. It is suggested that participants from out of town arrive somewhat earlier to accomplish necessary administrative coordination. On Monday, 11 October, teams will meet for approximately four hours. Team Captains will remain after their teams adjourn to prepare Move Messages. Only a skeleton Control team consisting of Game Staff Representatives and Control members from out of town will meet on 11 October to handle scenario questions generated by playing teams. The plenary meetings of the Control Group will be held on Tuesday, 12 October and Thursday, 14 October at 0830 and will last approximately four hours. Playing teams will not meet on Tuesday or Thursday. Control members from the Washington area will not be required to participate on Monday, Wednesday or Friday, but are invited to observe team discussions on those days if they so desire.

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14. (U) The Project Officer for EPSILON I-65 is LCol Rolland V. Heiser, USA (OX 7-9860). The Game Manager is LCol Walter S. Seadler, USAF (OX 7-9892). Requests for assistance in obtaining reservations or other administrative matters should be referred to LCol Seadler.-

1 Attachment
a/s

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
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EPSILON 1-65

GAME MECHANICS

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EPSILON I-65

TEAM SCHEDULES

11 October 1965

0830 Briefing for all members of Yellow, White and Blue Teams and for only Control members from out of town; Room BC-942A, the Pentagon.

0900- Yellow, White and Blue Team members deliberate
1230 and discuss actions in Room BC-942A.
Designated Control Team members remain in game room area.

1230- Team Captains prepare "Move I Messages".
1400

12 October 1965

0830 Briefing for all Control Team members by Yellow, White and Blue Team Game Staff Representatives on "Move I Messages" in Room BC-942A.

0900- Control Team members deliberate.
1230

1230- Game Director prepares scenario
1500 projection for Move II.

13 October 1965

0830 Briefing for all members of Yellow, White and Blue Teams on second scenario in Room BC-942A.

0900- Yellow, White and Blue Team members deliberate
1230 and discuss actions in Room BC-942A.
Designated Control Team members remain in game room area.

1230- Team Captains prepare "Move II Messages".
1400

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14 October 1965

0830 Briefing for all Control Team members by Yellow, White, and Blue Team Game Staff Representatives on "Move II Messages" in Room BC-942A.

0900- Control Team members deliberate.
1230

1230 Control Team prepares scenario projection
1500 for Move III.

15 October 1965

0830 Briefing for all members of Yellow, White and Blue Teams on third sceanrio in Room BC-942A.

0900- Yellow, White and Blue Team members deliber-
1230 ate and discuss actions in Room BC-942A. Designated Control Team members remain in game room area.

1230- Team Captains prepare "Move III Messages".
1400

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GENERAL CHARLES DE GAULLE's 27 APRIL 1965 SPEECH*

Broadcast and televised speech by General De Gaulle
President of the French Republic at the Elysee (April 27, 1965).

In the world of today characterized by so many problems, where possible dangers point towards the infinite, where requirements and ambitions of states clash so sharply, what is the part France has to play?

Let us admit that having formerly been a people of colossal stature, in terms of populations, wealth and power, we are emerging afresh to play once again our international role, for a hundred years ago, the growth of our population and of our economy and at the same time our strength began to decline. Afterwards, the two world wars followed which ruined and decimated us, while two great countries, the U.S.A. and Russia in their turn reached the apex of power. In this more humble situation, the temptation to reunification, which is to a weakened people the equivalent of abandon to a humiliated man, could have led us to the unremitting decadence. All the more so that having assumed in days of yore the habit of always playing leading parts, sometimes not without presumption, our relative weakening then risked to make us lose self confidence. We might have been discouraged comparing our statistics to those of each of the two gigantic powers, as regards population, overall production of their factories or mines, or the number of satellites orbited around the earth, or the mass of megatons that their devices can produce for destruction.

After the upsurge of French confidence and pride, which, during the last war, saved us from the deadly abyss and in spite of the living forces which reappeared at home with renewed vigour, the tendency to self effacement momentarily came to the surface, to such an extent that it became a doctrine and a policy. For this reason some Partisans would have wanted to tie us body and soul to the totalitarian empire. That's also the reason for which others claimed that we had to, not just as commonsense dictates, remain the allies of our allies so long as to

* Ref: U.S. Embassy Paris Message 6063, dated 27 April 1965

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the East a threat of domination remained, but further more because absorbed into an Atlantic system within which our defense, our economy, our engagements, would depend necessarily on the arms, on the material domination and policy of America. The same people, with the same intention, meant that our country, instead of participating, as is natural, in an organized cooperation of free nations of the old continent, should be literally dissolved within a so-called integrated Europe which, robbed of the main springs which are the sovereignty of peoples and the responsibility of states would be automatically subordinated to its protector from over seas, and so, doubtless, there would remain French workmen, peasants, engineers, teachers, civil servants, members of parliament, and ministers, but there would no longer be any France. Well! The capital event of the last seven years is that we have resisted the siren song of abandonment and have chosen independence.

It is true that independence implies conditions and that these are not easy to fulfill. However, as one can see, we can fulfill them. In the political sphere, without disavowing our American friendship, we must behave as Europeans, which we are and, as such, we should concentrate on reestablishing from one end to the other of our continent, a balance founded upon understanding and cooperation between all peoples who live like us. This is what we are doing by promoting reconciliation with Germany, by proposing to our neighbors on both sides of the Rhine and the Alps a real solidarity of the six, by renewing with East European countries, as they emerge from their crushing yoke, relations of active comprehension which we had with them formerly.

As for the problems in the rest of the world, our independence leads us to play a part in conformity with what is now our own concept, namely: No hegemony whatsoever regardless of its origin, no foreign intervention in the internal affairs of a state, no order forbidding any country to have peaceful relations with any other, can be justified. On the contrary, according to us, the superior interest of the human race dictates that each nation should be responsible for its own affairs, freed from encroachments, helped forward in its progress without conditions of subordination. Hence, our disapproval of the war in Asia which is spreading more and more each day, hence our far curable attitude with regard to the efforts of human liberation and national organization undertaken

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by several countries in Latin America, hence our assistance for the development of a large number of new African states and the relations which we have with China, etc. In short, there exists now a French policy and it is conducted from Paris.

Regarding security, our independence requires that in the atomic era in which we live, we possess the necessary means to ourselves deter a possible aggressor, without prejudice to our alliances, but without our allies holding our destiny in their hands. Now, we are developing these means of dissuasion. Doubtless, they impose on us a merited revival. But they do not cost us any more than the contribution we should have had to make to Atlantic integration and under which our protection would have been uncertain, had we continued to belong to it as subordinate auxiliaries. Thus, we are reaching the point where no state in the world can bring death and destruction here without obtaining likewise in return. This is certainly the best possible guarantee in the economic, scientific and technical spheres to safeguard our independence, and being obliged to face up to the enormous wealth of certain countries, without however refusing to deal with them, we must act in such a way that our activities remain, for the essential, under French administration and management. We must also compete at all costs in the most advanced fields of technology which determine the value, the autonomy, the life of the entire industrial set-up; which requires the most amount of research, experiment, and perfected equipment, which demand great numbers of the highest qualified teams of scientists, technicians and skilled workers. Lastly, whenever it is opportune, in a specified branch of activity, to pool our inventions, our talents, our resources, with those of another country, we must often choose one of those nearest to us and whose weight, we may hope, will not squash us. That is why we have imposed on ourselves financial, economic and monetary stability which allows us to dispense with foreign aid. We change into gold the excess of dollars imported into our country as a result of the American deficit in balance of payments. Over the past six years we have multiplied by six the amount we spend on research. We are organizing a common industrial and agricultural market with Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland and Luxemburg. We are jointly tunnelling Mont Blanc with the Italians.

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We are building the Moselle Canal jointly with the Germans and Luxembourgers. We are joining with Britain to build the first supersonic air liner in the world, and we are prepared to extend this Franco-British cooperation to other types of civil and military aircraft. We have just concluded an agreement with Soviet Russia for the development and use of our color television process. In fact, however large the glass that is offered us from abroad, we prefer to drink out of our own, whilst not forgetting to toast those around us.

Undoubtedly, this independence which we practice once again in all spheres, does not cease to astonish, and indeed to scandalise, certain circles for whom the thralldom of France, was both a habit and a rule. Such people talk of machiavellism, but as though the clearest behavior were not to follow our own road. They are alarmed at our isolation, when there have never been so many eager people about us.

On the other hand, the fact that we have regained our faculty to judge and to act concerning every problem, appears on occasion to seem disobligeing to a state which might believe itself, by reason of its power, to be invested with supreme and universal responsibility. But who knows that one day this country, which is our friend, may not find in France arisen, plenty to counter-balance the annoyance which it feels today? Finally, the reappearance of a nation with free hands, which we have become once again, obviously modifies the world scene, which after Yalta seemed limited to two players. But since this division of the world into two hegemonies, and in consequence, into two camps, the liberty, equality and fraternity of the people was certainly not ensured and now another order, another equilibrium are necessary for peace. Who can uphold them better than we, so long as we remain ourselves?

Frenchmen, Frenchwomen! You can see how it is! For us, for all, and as much as ever, France must be, France! Vive La Republique Vive La France!

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GENERAL DE GAULLE'S PRESS CONFERENCE, 9 SEPTEMBER 1965
AT THE ELYSEE PALACE*

Following is text of de Gaulle's press conference
as issued by Elysee:

Ladies and Gentlemen:

I am happy to see you. I have the impression that our meeting today will assume a kind of special importance. This is due to the various situations, that is to say, the situation of the world, which is now in ferment and disturbed by many upheavals; that of our country, which is entering a new stage in its internal and external progress; and finally, the situation connected with the forthcoming end of the present seven-year term. And this is my state of mind as I ask you to be good enough to formulate the questions you want to ask me. I am ready.

Question: Mr. President, can you tell us if you expect to run for election on December 5?

Answer: I wish to tell you right now that you will know that, I promise you, within two months.

Question: General, what do you have to say regarding the current crisis between India and Pakistan?

Question: Mr. President, I should like to add to my colleague's question regarding the Indian-Pakistani situation. I should like to know whether France, which is an ally of Pakistan under the SEATO Treaty, for example, is to take a position in support of its ally or is to advocate conciliation?

Answer: On your question relating to the deplorable conflict now taking place between Pakistan and India, I shall simply tell you this today: that it, I repeat,

* Ref: U.S. Embassy Paris Message 1284, dated 9 September 1965

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is deplorable; that, for the present, there is a procedure that has been normally instituted by the United Nations, and especially by the Secretary General, who is there, and that one can hope that his demarches will succeed in establishing a cease-fire. This will naturally be only a temporary solution. As for the final settlement of the problem, I shall speak to you about it when I come to speak about the entire French policy with respect to the world of today.

In short, if I understand correctly, you have asked me first of all where we stand and then where we are going from the economic and social standpoint. This is the first point. Secondly, you speak to me of the Common Market -- several questions have been asked of me, and that is very understandable. I have also been asked about several matters concerning France's policy with respect to the world as it is today: it concerns Europe; it concerns the Southeast Asian conflict; it concerns other matters also...and then, you speak to me about the seven-year term and the government in relation to the seven-year term. I shall reply to these various questions.

Question: General, at this new session of Parliament contradictory opinions have been expressed regarding the nation's economic situation. Some are optimistic; others are pessimistic. Could you tell us what you think of it, and more specifically, what prospects can the Fifth Plan open up in this connection?

Answer: I do not think that the studies, discussions and conclusions relating to our economic and social situation, the conditions of our development, the objectives that must be attained, the action that we must carry out therefore, have ever been as methodical and thorough as they are this year. The drafting of the Fifth Plan by the General Commissariat and its various committees; the cooperation of the regional economic development commissions; the decisions adopted by the Government; the discussions that have taken place or that are going to take place in the Economic and Social Council to permit it to formulate its opinion on the proposed measures and in the Parliament in order that it may enact them into law, and all of this

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accompanied by the comments of all the information media, have made it possible to establish advisedly the guidelines and the choices that will determine our national activity for five years.

This undoubtedly constitutes decisive progress in the planning we adopted and put into effect at the time of the Liberation in the deplorable state in which we then found ourselves, but which we then neglected somewhat when our economic life depended to a great extent on loans granted by foreign countries, and now finally have put into effect and honored since we have recovered our independence in this area as in the others.

But one can be independent in two very different ways -- either by shutting oneself behind ramparts and, if it is a matter of the economy, protecting oneself with customs barriers, or by facing squarely the resources and capabilities of others; that is, speaking of trade, by initiating and increasing commercial relations. Since for us, accustomed as we are to protectionism through long practice, the incentive of rivalry is salutary in our transformation efforts, since, furthermore, the new markets are outside our own country; since, finally, throughout the world, one's presence follows one's merchandise, and since we wish to be everywhere, we have, while taking precautions with respect to certain countries burdened by their surpluses and while granting preferences with respect to our partners in the European Common Market and those African countries to which we are linked by special agreements, chosen to live henceforth in a state of competition.

But one must meet this competition and profit from it. Which is to say that all depends on how good our production system is in comparison with that of others. Therefore, our collective effort in the course of the next five years will aim principally at making that system decidedly competitive. The economic independence and strength of France depend directly on that, while the result will be an increase in the national income and in the standard of living. But in the face of the industrial and agricultural capacities that surround us, adapting our resources will require a vast investment effort.

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Investment. On the State level, this means, that what is devoted to the operation of the government departments and public services is to be as small as possible in relation to what it does for the equipping of the country. Moreover, among expenses in the latter category, priority must go to those which most directly improve national productivity; I mean principally scientific research, communications of every type, technical education and vocational training.

Yes, in the coming years we will see France in a good position among the leading countries of the world as regards manpower and resources for invention, experimentation and application. We will see it actively push the construction of highways -- exceptionally good and numerous as its secondary roads are -- and develop its telephone system. We will see it put its technical schools and institutes on the same level as its classical institutions, as befits a country which wishes to have many qualified leaders at every level of its activities. We shall see it offer broader possibilities to its young people and to its adults either to learn a trade, change trades, or improve their skills, because the modern age requires a constant increase in the output of enterprises, utilizing in the best possible way the growing number of young people, increasing the mobility of French workers between geographic areas and occupations and, particularly, offering surplus in agricultural workers decent openings promptly in industry or in the third sector. Of course, what is already in process in other fields -- housing, hospitalization, sports, etc., -- must be actively continued, but keeping in mind what must be done, above all, for the infrastructure and the human and material resources of the national production, on which, after all, everything depends.

Investments, which from budget to budget thus absorb an increasing share of the expenditures by the public sector, constitute, at the same time, a categorical imperative for private enterprises as a whole. Whether this is done through self-financing or through recourse to the financial market, it is, for them, the sole but highly effective opportunity to obtain equipment that will make them competitive as soon as our economy is opened to international trade. Now, although in this respect inflation and rising prices of products were able,

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until recently, to give them certain unwholesome facilities -- to the point where our entire economic, financial, monetary and social machinery was swaying on the brink of the abyss -- the necessary has now been done and will continue to be done to dry up henceforth such poisoned well-springs.

Savings, on the other hand, revived by the stability of prices and money and by the balanced budget, are becoming once again the great reservoir on which prosperity can draw. In the coming years, it will, of course, be one of the principal tasks of the State to encourage the growth of savings instead of consumption, to help make the funds thus formed more active, thanks to the interest, and more easily accessible to worthwhile enterprises, concentration and organization being, in this connection, the essential criteria. Note that this expanded effort made by the State to increase the national plant capacity, whether in the private sector, in the sector of public and semi-public enterprises, or in the sector placed directly under its administration, implies that the information furnished to the highest authorities must be more complete and better coordinated. Three high committees, composed of a very small number of competent persons, will be set up for this purpose as soon as the Fifth Plan is put into effect.

As the threat of general war ceases to strangle the world and brutal conquest ceases to entice the strongest, progress will become a universal aspiration; science, technology, and industry will give each developed country the opportunity to grow and expand; the speed of communications and multiplicity of contacts between peoples will arouse in all a growing desire to deal with each other. Thus, competition will be more and more a matter of a just ambition. That is why France wishes to have the means for it.

Question: What, in your opinion, are the causes of the crisis in the Common Market, and how do you think one can get out of it?

Answer: What happened in Brussels on June 30 with regard to the agricultural financial settlement has brought to light not only persistent reluctance of most of our partners to bring agriculture into the Common Market but also certain fundamental errors or

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ambiguities contained in the treaties concerning the economic union of the Six. Thus, sooner or later, the crisis was inevitable.

The three treaties, setting up, respectively, the European Coal and Steel Community, EURATOM, and the Common Market were concluded before France's recovery in 1958. That is why those three treaties take into account above all what the others requested. In the case of the European Coal and Steel Community, apart from the Franco-German rapprochement which it was intended to reveal, it consisted essentially in giving back to Germany the right to dispose of its coal and its steel, and in making it possible for Italy, which of course has no coal or iron, to obtain some at fairly reasonable cost in order to create for itself, in its turn, a strong metallurgical industry.

As for EURATOM, that institution tended to pool everything that had been done, or was to be done, in the field of atomic energy -- of which France, owing to the advances it had made, would supply the largest part. But the institution also tended to control the production of fissionable materials with a view to preventing their use for military purposes, whereas among the Six our country alone was able to manufacture nuclear armaments.

Lastly, the Treaty of Rome fixed very completely the terms of the industrial community, about which our neighbors were chiefly concerned, but not at all those of the agricultural community, in which we were the most interested.

Furthermore, the three treaties each instituted an executive body in the form of an independent commission of the States, although its members were appointed and remunerated by them. And a legislative system in the form of an assembly composed of members of the various parliaments, but none of them had received from their electors a mandate that was other than national.

This hypothetical technocracy, which was for the most part foreign and was destined to encroach upon French democracy in settling problems upon which our very existence depends, was obviously not suitable

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for us, since we had resolved to take our destiny into our own hands. Everyone knows that it has long been our idea to group the States of Western Europe in the economic field, and, I add, in the political field. To be convinced of this, one has merely to refer to the statements that I made during and at the end of the World War, at a time when no one was talking about it, and then afterwards on many solemn occasions, and also to all the acts performed by my Government for this purpose. Indeed, as regards economic affairs, we hold it to be true that the organized adjustment of the respective activities of the countries situated on either side of the Rhine and the Alps follows from the fact that they are very close neighbors, that from the standpoint of production they are both similar and complementary, and that it is in keeping with the conditions of our time to form larger units than any of our European States.

Furthermore, France, which is enjoying full prosperity and whose currency has become one of the strongest in the world, has every reason to renounce its former protectionism and to open its doors gradually to competition.

That is why for the last seven years we have very actively helped to build the Economic Community, which theoretically was instituted in 1957 but existed only on paper until 1959 because the chronic deficit in the French balance of payments prevented this institution from making a start other than in speeches. But what we wanted then and what we want now is an equitable and reasonable Community. Equitable: this means that agricultural products, under appropriate conditions, must enter the Common Market at the same time as industrial products; and reasonable means that nothing that is important today in the organization, and tomorrow in the operation of the Common Market of the Six, must be decided, or a fortiori applied, other than by the responsible public authorities of the Six States, that is to say, the governments controlled by the parliaments.

Now, we know -- God knows we know -- that there is a different conception regarding a European federation in which, according to the dreams of those who

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conceived it, the countries would lose their national personality, and in which, moreover, in the absence of a federator such as Caesar and his successors, Charlemagne, Otto, Charles V, Napoleon, Hitler and Stalin in the East, the European federation would be governed by a stateless and irresponsible technocratic Areopagus. We also know that France proposes, instead of this completely unrealistic project, a plan for an organized cooperation of the States which would probably evolve toward a confederation.

This plan alone seems to us to conform to what the nations of our continent really are. It alone could one day permit the accession of such countries as Great Britain and Spain, which, like ours, do not want to lose their sovereignty. Lastly, this plan would render an entente of all of Europe conceivable in the future.

Then, regardless of what the ulterior motives may have been with regard to the political theories, it had seemed that the very long drawn out and very detailed Brussels negotiations were on the point of drawing to a successful conclusion. To be sure, we had had the greatest difficulty in persuading our partners to consent in practice to agricultural products forming an integral part of the Community. Now you know that, to us, this is an indispensable condition. Because unless it were fulfilled, the very heavy burden represented by the support of our agriculture would weigh more heavily on us than on our neighbors, and we would thus be handicapped in meeting industrial competition.

That is why, in January 1962, we agreed to go on to the second phase of the Rome Treaty, that is, to a substantial lowering of the customs barriers, only on the condition of a formal commitment of the Six to settle the agricultural problem, particularly from the financial viewpoint made not later than June 30 of that year, under conditions and in accordance with a time schedule which were explicitly specified. Although there was some weeping and gnashing of teeth at that time, we succeeded in obtaining the adherence of our partners and we had reason to believe that in the end they would fulfill their commitments.

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Furthermore, while observing that the cumbersome international apparatus constructed at great expense around the Commission often duplicated the work of the competent services of the Six Governments, we also noted, during the course of the work, the competence of the officials of the Community, and noted that they refrained from encroaching excessively upon the only responsibilities that were valid, namely, those of the States.

It was too good to last. Indeed, on June 30, our delegation met with a refusal concerning the definitive drafting of a financial settlement conforming to what had been previously agreed to. A short while before that, the Commission, suddenly laying aside its political reticence, had formulated regarding this financial settlement conditions that tended to assign it a budget of its own which would have amounted to 20 billion new francs with the States delivering customs levies and receipts to it, thereby literally making it a great and independent financial power. It is true that, according to the authors of the plan, this enormous budget which the States would have maintained at the expense of their taxpayers but would not have controlled, was to be subject to examination by the European Assembly.

But the intervention of the Assembly, which is essentially consultative and the members of which have never, anywhere, been elected for that purpose, would only aggravate the usurpative character of what was demanded. Be that as it may, the connection, whether or not premeditated, between the supranational demands of the Brussels Commission, the support which several delegations declared themselves ready to give it and, lastly, the fact that some of our partners went back at the last minute on what they had committed themselves to -- all this obliged us to terminate the negotiations. I must add that, in the light of that event, we were able to see more clearly the situation that France might find itself in the future if such and such a provision written into the Treaty of Rome were actually applied. For example, after January 1, 1966, according to the text, the decisions of the Council of Ministers of the Six would be adopted by a majority vote, which would mean that France's hand might be forced in any economic matter,

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and consequently in social and even political matters, and that, in particular, what might have seemed an accomplishment in the agricultural field could, despite France, be called into question at any moment.

Furthermore, from that same date, that proposals of the Brussels Commission would have to be adopted or rejected by the Council of Ministers just as they were, without the Six States being able to change anything unless they were, for a wonder, unanimous in formulating an amendment. Now we know that the members of the Commission, previously appointed by agreement of the Governments, are now in no wise responsible to them, and that, even at the end of their term, a unanimous decision of the Six would be necessary to replace them -- which makes them practically irremovable.

One can see where such subordination could lead us if we were to let ourselves give up our right of self-determination and objure our Constitution, which provides that French sovereignty belongs to the French people, who exercise it through their representatives and by means of the referendum. The Constitution permits no exception.

That is the way things stand. Naturally, it is conceivable and desirable that the great enterprise of the European Economic Community be rebuilt some day, but before that happens a certain amount of time will elapse, the duration of which no one can foresee, for no one knows whether, when or how the policy of each of our five partners, given a certain electoral or parliamentary combination of circumstances, will finally be adapted to the needs as, once again, they have just been demonstrated.

Be that as it may, France for its part is ready to participate in any exchanges of views which may be proposed by the Governments and, if need be, it is prepared to resume the Brussels negotiations as soon as the inclusion of agriculture in the Common Market is really adopted and an end is put to the excessive demands that are contrary to common sense and reality.

Question: Mr. President, French diplomacy rests on the principle of national independence. The adversaries of this principle say that it has become outmoded. Can this principle of national independence be reconciled with the aspirations of the peoples toward a greater unity in Europe?

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Various questions on NATO, Europe, the countries of the East, Southeast Asia.

Answer: We are now in a century that is two-thirds over, (garble) yet, since it began the world has undergone unprecedented changes, as far as pace and extent are concerned. Everything indicates that the movement will continue, for a whole combination of facts of immense scope is now working to reshape the universe.

Within this whole there is: the accession to sovereignty of a great number of States that were created or restored since the war and, at the same time, the unfolding of their reciprocal quarrels; the preponderant power acquired by two countries, America and Russia, which tends to make them rivals and to place under their respective hegemony the countries that are within their reach; the profound gestation which is occurring in enormous China and which predestines it to a world role of the first magnitude; the existence and increase of nuclear armaments which are capable of destroying great nations, all of a sudden and completely; lastly and above all, the general movement toward progress encouraged in every region of the earth by the opportunities of this modern industrial age.

In short, a world, which is in full development, is filled at the same time with nearly boundless hope and with gigantic perils.

Faced with such a situation, what can France's role be? But, first of all, must it have a role? There are quite a few, as we know, who think that it does not. According to them, being no longer in a position to act on our own, either in the political, economic, technological or military areas, we must henceforth let ourselves be led by others. Moreover, there are ideologies to cover this renunciation. Thus, there are some in our country, using the Internationale as a screen, who would like to make us subservient to Moscow; still others, invoking either arbitrary theories or the convenience of their interests, claim that our country must effect its national personality in international organizations which are so conceived as to enable the United States to play in them, be it from within or from without, a preponderant role to which, on principle, we can only conform. This is the way in which

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those I have referred to view our participation in the UN or in NATO and hope to see us dissolving ourselves in a so-called "European" federation, which actually would be an "Atlantic" one.

I do not believe, as you can well imagine, that such a national abdication would be justified. I do not believe that it would be useful to the others, not even to Russia or America. I do not believe that the French people, in their overwhelming majority, deem it to be consistent with the feeling they have of their own worth, nor even with simple common sense. No doubt, France, today, no longer appears to be the gigantic nation that it was in the days of Louis XIV or Napoleon I. No doubt also, the terrible collapse of 1940, even though it was preceded during World War I by an admirable display of the capabilities and merits of our country, even though it was followed during World War II by the upsurge of the Resistance Movement, the success of the Liberation and our presence at the moment of victory, this collapse has left doubt in many minds, if not despair. No doubt, the lack of substance of the regime of yesterday hampered our national recovery. But this recovery is now obvious, and even impressive. We are a people in ascendancy, as are our population, our production, our external trade, our monetary reserves, our standard of living, the dissemination of our language and of our culture, the might of our weapons, the successes of our athletes, etc. Our public powers are displaying a stability and effectiveness which they had not shown for a long time. Finally, throughout the world, France's possibilities, what it is doing, what it wants to do, are attracting an attention and consideration which contrast with the indifference or commiseration with which it was formerly too often surrounded. In short, we can and, consequently we must have a policy of our own. What policy? Above all, we must hold ourselves apart from all infeudation. To be sure, in many fields we have every reason to associate ourselves with others. But on condition that we retain our self-determination.

Thus, for as long as we deem the solidarity of the Western nations necessary to the possible defense of Europe, our country shall remain the ally of its allies. But, upon the expiration of the commitments that we made in the past,

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that is to say, not later than 1969, the subordination, called "integration," which is contemplated by NATO and which places our destiny in foreign hands will cease so far as we are concerned. Thus, while seeking to unite in the economic, political, cultural and strategic fields the States situated on either side of the Rhine and the Alps, we are seeing to it that this organization does not deprive us of control over our own destiny. And thus, while finding it proper that an international system should arrange monetary relations, we do not recognize the currency of any particular State as having any privileged and automatic value in relation to gold, which is, which remains, and which must remain, in the present state of affairs, the only true standard. Furthermore, having been, together with four other powers, one of the founders of the United Nations, and while desiring that it remain the meeting place for the delegations of all peoples and the open forum for their discussions, we do not consider ourselves bound, even financially, by armed interventions contrary to the Charter and to which we have not given our approval. Furthermore, it is in behaving in this manner that we think we can, in the long run, best serve the alliance of free peoples, the European Community, the international monetary institutions, and the United Nations.

Indeed, the independence thus regained enables France to be, despite the ideologies and hegemonies of the great powers, despite the passions and prejudices of races, and over and above the rivalries and ambitions of the nations, a champion of that cooperation without which the troubles, the interventions and the conflicts which lead the world to war would spread. Furthermore, France is eminently qualified to act in that direction. It is qualified by its very nature, which inclines it toward human contact, it is qualified because of the image that history gives it and which opens for it a sort of latent credit when problems of universal import are involved.

It is qualified because it has renounced all the colonial ascendancy that it imposed upon other peoples and it is qualified because it presents itself as a nation whose hands are free and whose policy is not determined by any pressure from outside.

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Furthermore, we do not merely pay lip service to cooperation but put it into practice wherever we can under conditions naturally appropriate to the situation of our various partners. This is the case with respect to almost all the peoples of Africa who formerly were bound to us, as well as Ruanda and the Congo (Leopoldville) and, in Asia, Cambodia and Laos; each of these States upon becoming independent, having established its relations with us by means of individual agreements with a view to its development -- agreements the last of which, but by no means the least important, is the one that governs petroleum relations between France and Algeria. It is our policy that this shall also be the case with the various countries of that Latin America with which we have so many deep affinities, whose attainment of the status of a continent economically strong, politically independent and socially liberated, is henceforth necessary to World equilibrium and world peace; where already Mexico and, two months ago, Chile, on the occasion of President Frei's visit, decided to associate their progress more closely with ours. It is our wish that this may increasingly be the case, as we stated recently on the occasion of the trips to Paris of King Hussein and President Helou, for the eastern nations, from Istanbul to Addis Ababa, and all the way from Cairo to Kabul, in accordance with all the human and natural reasons that have woven between them and us a traditional friendship.

It is ture that to provide the wherewithal for two billion men to live decently and to progress, in their turn, requires an effort that far exceeds France's possibilities. Happily, among the developed countries, others besides us also contributing their share, although ours is the largest in relation to our resources. But how much more beneficial would this assistance, which is scattered and so often opposed, be if it were combined on a vast scale! In particular, what a role Europe could play in this connection if it were willing to unite! It is precisely the pacification of our torn Continent, then the rapprochement of all the peoples inhabiting it, and finally their cooperation for their own development and the development of others, that are the essential, albeit long-range, goals of France's policy.

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Thus, despite all the wounds suffered and all the accumulation grievances, we have concluded with Germany a treaty which, although it is still in many respects in a state of cordial virtuality, nevertheless organizes the periodic meeting of the two governments and is proving fruitful in certain fields such as culture and the youth movements. We have begun to establish with five of our neighbors an economic community which we hope will one day be completed and we have proposed organizing a system of at least political collaboration. We are increasing our contacts and exchanges with the countries of the East, considering and treating each of them, of course, in accordance with its national personality. In this respect, we attach great importance to the new course taken by our relations with Russia. We congratulate ourselves on the results achieved on the occasion of the visit of President Maurer with regard to Franco-Rumanian relations. We are preparing with great pleasure to receive President Cyrankiewicz, hoping this his presence here will further the practical rapprochement of the Polish and French peoples, who have been friends and allies throughout their history. We do not hesitate to predict that the day will come when, in order to establish a constructive understanding from the Atlantic to the Urals, the whole of Europe will want to solve its own problems and, first of all, that of Germany, in the only way that it can be done, that is, by a general agreement. When that day comes, our Continent may again play the part in the world, for the good of all mankind, worthy of its resources and its capacities. It is under very different conditions but for a similar reason that we think that in Asia the end of the present fighting and then the satisfactory development of the peoples can be achieved only by relations to be established, negotiations to be opened, and a *modus vivendi* to be achieved by the Powers whose direct or indirect responsibility has been involved, since the end of the World War, in the events that have taken place in the southeastern part of that continent, that is, China, France, America, Russia and England.

But we also think, more firmly than ever, that the basic condition for such an entente, would be the actual end of all foreign intervention and, consequently, the complete and controlled neutralization of the zone where

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fighting is taking place. That is, moreover, what France had, for its part, subscribed to in 1954. That is what it has since rigorously observed. That is what it considers necessary since, after the departure of its troops from Indo-China, the United States have intervened. But it is quite obvious that this is not the path that is now being followed. That is why all speculations concerning French mediation in this matter are baseless. At present, France has nothing to do other than to conserve its strength for later, and, if the time ever comes, to be in a position to be useful, particularly at Peking, Washington, Moscow and London, with regard to the contacts that might be necessary in order to arrive at the solution with regards to the controls that would guarantee the solution, and with regard to the assistance that would then have to be given to those unfortunate countries that France has certainly not forgotten.

Moreover, the same entente of the same Powers which have the means for war and peace is, for this historic period in which we are now living, essential to the understanding and cooperation that the world must establish among all its races, all its regimes and all its peoples, if it is not to bring about, sooner or later, its own destruction. It so happens that these five Powers, upon whom depends the fate of Southeast Asia in the final analysis, and which are moreover the Powers that possess the nuclear weapons, twenty years ago founded the United Nations together and became the permanent members of the Security Council. If they wished, and provided of course that they were there together, they could see to it that this organization, instead of being an arena for the futile rivalry of two hegemonies, became the framework in which the development of the entire world would be considered and where the conscience of the human community would thereby be strengthened. It is obvious that today there is no chance that such a project will come into being. But, if a rapprochement, then agreement, between those chiefly responsible for the world ever appeared possible for that purpose, France would, for its part, be fully prepared to help.

Such is, on the whole, the policy of our country. To be sure, its objectives are long-range ones. This is due to the scope of the problems confronting the world of today. But this is also due to the fact that France,

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being no longer embroiled in futile undertakings, or dependent upon the actions of others, or incited to chase, continually and in all directions, after every fleeting chimera, France is now able to pursue far-reaching and continuous plans. That is what it is doing abroad, while striving to build up its new power within.

Question: At the end of your seven-year term, and with a view to the forthcoming presidential election, can you express an opinion regarding the institutions of the Fifth Republic and particularly on the role of the President of the Republic?

Answer: The regime that the country adopted seven years ago and which everything indicates it will follow from now on, is the regime of the national majority, I mean by that a majority obtained from the entire nation, expressing itself as an indivisible and sovereign whole.

When a nation is formed and, internally, certain fundamental geographic, ethnic, economic, social, and moral ideas are the very fiber of its being, and on the outside it finds itself in contact with foreign influences and ambitions, there exist for it, despite and beyond its diversities, a whole complex of conditions essential to its action and, finally, to its existence, and that is the public interest. It is, moreover, its instinct for the public interest that cements its unity, and it is the fact that the State conforms thereto or not that renders either valid or meaningless its political undertakings. In a modern democracy disposed to effective action, but threatened, it is therefore essential that the will of the nation be manifested as a whole when its destiny is involved. This is certainly the basis of our present institutions.

To be sure, in yesterday's system the people were called upon periodically to elect an assembly that held the sovereignty, but that was of course done only on a fragmentary scale so that the results had only a partial, hence a questionable and confused, meaning. Indeed, in practice, only the parties, that is to say, organizations established to advocate special tendencies and to support

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the interests of certain categories of people, nominated candidates for the electors' votes. And they did this under differing circumstances depending on the regions and the inhabitants. It is true that sometimes, during the course of the balloting, they combined their hostilities in order to eliminate adversaries, but these were only negative operations. Indeed, the Parliament, which was given the right and duty to decide alone and definitively on matters vital to the nation and to be the exclusive source of power, consisted in a juxtaposition of rival, even opposing, groups from which a majority could not be obtained except through hazardous, fallacious combinations. It is easy to understand why such a regime, whatever the worth of the men who were in it, was usually not able to adopt or carry out the firm, continuous plans that constitute a policy, nor could it, with greater reason, truly represent France in the great drama of our time.

To be sure, the Constitution that the French, enlightened by many lessons, gave the Republic in 1958 assigned to the Parliament the legislative power and the right of control, for, in public action, debate and a balance are essential. But what our Constitution contains that is completely new and essential is the advent of the people, as such and collectively, as the direct source of the power of the Chief of State and, if necessary, as his direct recourse; and the assignment to the President -- who alone is the representative and the agent of the entire nation -- of the duty to lay down the lines of its conduct in the essential domains and to provide the means for carrying them out. It is by virtue of this dual institution and because it has had full play that the present regime has enjoyed the stability, the authority and the effectiveness which have enabled it to solve the grave problems that France was facing and to conduct its affairs in such a manner that its situation today appears to be better and stronger than yesterday in all respects.

Yes, the President of the Republic, called on and supported by the confidence of the entire nation, acted in conformity with his trust and the responsibilities that, under our regime, devolve upon him because of his

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office when, in the course of the past seven years, he established the guidelines of French policy at home and abroad; when he supervised its development step by step; when he made the supreme decisions relating to the problems involving its destiny and which therefore meant cutting so many Gordian knots. It was the same in the question of the State security institutions; national defense; the nation's general development; economic, financial, and monetary stability, etc. Or, in the Algerian affair, in Europe, decolonization, African cooperation, our attitude toward Germany, the United States, Great Britain, Russia, China, Latin America, the Orient, etc. Moreover, in asking the nation, on four occasions, to express its approval through a referendum; in dissolving the National Assembly once; in applying Article 16 during an alarming crisis, the Chief of State simply used the means that the Constitution gives him to decide on his own and to provide for the smooth operation and continuity of the government -- all this in opposition to some who think, as did Chamfort, "that sovereignty rests with the people, but the people must never exercise it."

There has been mention of "personal power." If what is meant by that is that the President of the Republic has personally made the decisions that it devolved upon him to make, that is quite correct. In what position, either high or low, is the one holding that position entitled to shirk his duty? Moreover, who ever thought that General De Gaulle, called to the helm, should be content with opening flower shows? For example, when the Algerian problem preoccupied -- to say the least -- all of France, to whom did France, with a single voice assign the task of solving it? But if what is meant is that the President isolate himself from everything and everyone and that, before acting, he listened only to himself, the evidence is being ignored. With how much advice and consultation has he surrounded himself! To date, in the course of the seven-year terms, the Chief of State has had 302 meetings with the Council of Ministers; 420 with limited interministerial councils; received the Premier in his office 605 times; the Presidents of the Assembly 78 times; about 2,000 times, one or another member of the government; more than 100 times, the chairman or rapporteurs of the parliamentary committees or group chairmen; about 1,500 times, the principal officials,

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experts, union officials, not to mention letters, memoranda and reports sent to him by one official or another, or the study of files. And, with respect to foreign problems, the 600 hours of conversation with foreign chiefs of state or governments and the one thousand talks with their ministers or ambassadors have greatly supplemented the President's information. In any case, no important measure has been adopted at his level until after there has been deliberation on it by those who were familiar with it and who would be responsible for carrying it out. This was, moreover, quite natural, for public affairs are too varied and too complicated today to be treated otherwise. As for the element of risk, there is much less risk in ukases issued from the height of an ivory tower than from endless examinations from which no decision results.

However, it is above all with the people themselves that he who is the representative and guide maintains direct contact. Thus, the nation may know in person the man who is at its head; may perceive the ties that unite them to him; may be cognizant of his ideas, his acts, his plans. It is also in this way that he has the opportunity to show Frenchmen, whatever their class or region, that they are all equally the citizens of one and the same country; to learn, by being on the spot, the status of the souls of men and the state of things; lastly, to learn for himself, among his fellow countrymen, what they want him to do.

I do not believe that there have ever been so many such contacts as in the past seven years: 30 addresses to the entire nation by radio and television; 12 press conferences broadcast in their entirety; 36 formal speeches delivered at public ceremonies; a number of trips, apart from at least 200 official appearances in Paris, in the 94 department of the mother country and overseas during which the Chief of State saw with his own eyes at least 15 million Frenchmen; invited to confer with him all members of Parliament, all the constituted bodies, all counselors-general, all mayors of France, visited about 2500 communes, including all of the major ones, responded at city halls to the welcomes of nearly 400 chairmen of municipal councils and 100,000 leading citizens, spoke from platforms in more than 600 localities to the assembled populace, talked with countless individuals and shook innumerable hands.

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In short, the President of the Republic, designated by the national majority, is now the keystone that holds and welds together the edifice of our institutions. How can one deny that, therefore, the public powers are now kept in balance? The unity of the government -- which in seven years has had only two Premiers, each of them invested, supported and maintained by the confidence of the Chief of State --- is a new and exemplary fact as contrasted with the discordance of the unstable assemblages that the former ministries were. Thus, in public action in the country's administration, a continuity and effectiveness whose progress is obvious.

At the same time, and for the first time in the history of the Republic, there is in the Parliament a definite majority, because, a national majority having been formed in the country around the President such an important event could not fail to have consequences in the general elections, despite the inherent diversity in tendencies, persons and districts. Therefore, the legislative work done since 1958, in the economic, social, financial and administrative fields, with respect to civil law, education, industry, defense, etc., constitutes a series of exceptionally important, coherent reforms. And the budget has always been adopted before the end of the year, which never happened before. Lastly, within the order framework where the authorities carry out their responsibilities smoothly, the State organs, the civil service, the diplomatic corps, and the armed forces are able to carry out their tasks normally and objectively.

There is no perfection in this work, but, by comparison with what it was yesterday, the French State now appears completely transformed from the standpoint of strength and effectiveness.

Let no one be mistaken about that anywhere in the world. Within three months, the nation will say with its votes whether it wants the practices of the past to return or whether it wants the new regime to ensure, tomorrow as today, the conduct of national life. For, everyone knows it and feels it, this will be the stake in the presidential election.

Ladies and gentlemen, I thank you.

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JOINT WAR GAMES AGENCY
COLD WAR DIVISION

5 October 1965

ISSUES, PROBLEMS AND QUESTIONS

The Issues, Problems and Questions discussed in the attached paper were written based on research and inter-agency discussion as one of the initial steps in drafting a scenario and developing an organizational approach to the politico-military game EPSILON I-65.

The material is presented in a manner intended to provoke discussion and to stimulate thought, not to advance any particular viewpoint or position. It certainly does not represent the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any government department. It is intended to cover a range of argumentation currently appearing in both classified and unclassified literature with direct bearing on the problem of French intransigence.

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EPSILON I-65

ISSUES, PROBLEMS AND QUESTIONS

Is There a Communist Military Threat to Western Europe?Yes

In spite of present tranquil conditions within the USSR and Eastern European countries and increasing East-West intercourse, the Soviet Union continues to pose a military threat to Western Europe. Despite an atmosphere of detent and obvious liberalization in certain communist countries, 700 medium-range ballistic missiles are still zeroed in on targets from the Thuringian Border to Gibraltar. Powerful conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact continue to be deployed on the Central Front facing West and they can be rapidly and massively reinforced. Their components are backed by extensive thermo-nuclear and space technology, and an expanding economic base.

There is no doubt that a military threat exists and will continue to exist for the foreseeable future. In addition to capabilities for aggression, it is a basic principle of Marxist-Leninist Doctrine to expand and extend its influence. This process, institutionalized in the

No

There is no real Soviet military threat in Western Europe. Stalin's interests in establishing buffer states between Russia and the West were largely satisfied during the period immediately after World War II. Integration into the Soviet empire of Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and the establishment of friendly communist governments in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and East Germany have provided the Soviet leadership with a necessary sense of security. The Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries have no intention of applying military pressures on the West and are as apprehensive of developments which upset European equilibrium as any Western country.

The Russians, the Poles, and indeed all of the Eastern European countries, do have a deep-seated fear of resurgent German nationalism. Military preparations which have been made in Eastern Europe are defensive not offensive. If NATO had not been organized,

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Soviet system will manifest itself in the future as it has during the immediate post-war period, the Korean Confrontation, more recently the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.

Pressures to expand communist influences may be exacerbated by instability within the Kremlin, or they may emerge suddenly in resurgent form after an interim leadership has been replaced by a more confident post-Khrushchev regime.

Breakthroughs in technology, new political crisis on the flanks of NATO, the conflict in Southeast Asia or any one of a dozen incipient trouble spots could fan new and dangerous tensions in Western Europe.

there never would have been a Warsaw Pact. When NATO dissolves, opportunities to build bridges between East and West will be enhanced. Even if the communist side has hostile intentions, they would be deterred by the magnitude of present United States nuclear capabilities. The Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated the determination which the United States can bring to the defense of its own interests and that the defense of Western Europe is obviously vital to the U.S. national interest. United States thermo-nuclear power in all its forms is a powerful deterrent to communist attack on Western Europe.

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Is A Western Alliance Essential?Yes

In the long run only the combined economic-military potential of both the United States and Western Europe can off-set the mounting power of the communist world. A loosely drawn traditional association of powers (such as Metternich's Concert of Europe), would not be sufficient to assure the integrity of Western civilization. Indeed, a loosely drawn association might attract adventurous communist initiatives in much the same way that allied force reductions after World War II tempted Stalin. History proves that only an effective and viable alliance such as NATO can off-set a dynamic program of communist expansion. If the Western countries drift apart during the second half of the Twentieth Century, the resulting instability will be magnified by persistent communist efforts. The communist world will exploit every divergency in Western policy in Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America to their own advantage.

The realities of nuclear power make it more essential than ever that advance planning and coordination be accomplished between Allies well in advance of potential

No

Europe needs a confederation not a federal structure. European countries are sufficiently unique in terms of history and tradition that they are less amenable to the organizational patterns which pervade the Western Hemisphere. England, France and Germany are far different basically than the American states of Pennsylvania, New York and California. It is impossible to subjugate sovereign instincts of European countries into a single federal union, at least in the foreseeable future.

Europe is not as concerned with problems of Asia and Latin America as the United States and there are many areas where interests of the Western powers clash. Alliances can be better arrived at in the traditional manner of diplomacy on a bilateral basis between sovereign states.

The North Atlantic Treaty may be preserved as the basis for an understanding between the present members of the Alliance, but the organization itself can be dissolved in such a way as not to unleash divisive forces. Well thought out and properly implemented plans which return the security of Western Europe

crises. Some form of alliance is essential, not merely to arrive at broad agreement on strategic concepts but to harmonize economic and political policies.

In a political sense, an alliance is vital to the long term interest of the West in that it will help the Federal Republic of Germany to maintain a Western orientation. If the Alliance is dissolved, and if the centralizing influence of European integration is removed, prospects for a German swing towards the East will increase. This could be extremely hazardous.

The NATO Alliance is a profoundly important factor in the eventual movement toward European integration and an eventual Atlantic unity. A military alliance tends even more than an economic or purely cultural affiliation to unite peoples.

Problems of the Western World extend far beyond Europe, involving policies in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Objectives and programs must be coordinated to a greater degree than they ever have in the past if progress is to be made on such pressing global problems as over-population and insufficient resources. The United States has been a major influence for peace

to the individual member states need not result in a weakening of the Alliance structure. German ground forces backed up by French, German and BENELUX ground and air forces and by a French nuclear capability may be a more credible deterrent to communist aggression than US/German ground forces configured for conventional defense. Such arrangements can be arrived at bilaterally and without the ponderous NATO command structure. In any event, present command arrangements of NATO are far too cumbersome and complex to meet the requirements of modern war, and many of the advantages claimed for an alliance organization are totally lacking under the present circumstances. The present alliance is oriented toward American political and military domination rather than security arrangements; the continued presence of US forces in sovereign nations such as France and Germany is repugnant to their sense of national pride.

If the United States were not tied to an Atlantic Alliance, it would have a freer hand in dealing with the Soviets. The common American-Soviet interest in reducing the threat of thermo-nuclear war could be advanced by unilateral agreements if the United States were not overly concerned with the sensibilities of

and development in the world since the end of World War II, but its influence can best be applied through the framework of an alliance. A break down in the alliance structure could have deleterious effects on American public opinion and tend to drive America toward an insular policy. Disillusionment with the Western Alliance would release forces aimed at withdrawing U.S. military units from Western Europe and the isolationism which pervaded U.S. policies between the two great wars. It would foster a tide of neutralism in Germany and invite Soviet exploitation.

In spite of certain tendencies toward poly-centrism within the Eastern Bloc, the Soviet Union continues to exercise a high degree of hegemony over the countries of Eastern Europe. Centralized Soviet control and influence and concerted planning in economic as well as psychological areas gives a strength to communist nations which transcends their actual economic capacity. Any diminution of unity among the Western nations tends to magnify the impact of communist policies.

Allies. If the United States were not affiliated with so many nations in the Western Alliance, there would be less danger of American involvement in such crises as Cyprus or Berlin and far better prospects for obtaining overall arms control agreements.

If the United States was not committed to its present major role in NATO, it is possible that major reductions could be made in military forces and in the cost of national defense.

US capabilities for responding rapidly to specific international requirements (such as Southeast Asia), would be enhanced if it were not necessary to coordinate action with fourteen other nations.

Disestablishment of the Atlantic Alliance might set up parallel forces in Eastern Europe resulting in abolition of the Warsaw Pact.

The real guarantee of Western European security is still United States' strategic power. This would be available and relied on by Europeans whether there was or was not a NATO Alliance!

Dissolution of the Western Alliance might set in train a chain of developments leading to the reunification of Germany. German reunification, if it were accomplished under conditions which did not threaten the peace of Europe, would in itself go a long way toward ameliorating friction between the East and the West.

Must a Western Alliance be Highly Integrated?Yes

As stated above, thermo-nuclear and missile technology demand a maximum of coordination. It is difficult to visualize members of an alliance effectively coordinating such complex weapons systems as inter-continental ballistic missiles, immediate-range ballistic missiles, anti-missile missiles and supersonic air fleets without extensive planning on a highly integrated basis. Coordinated employment of modern naval fleets and ground forces are only slightly less compelling. The idea of a return to the coordinating arrangements which prevailed between Allies in Europe before World War I (such as the French-English Staff Talks), is unthinkable. Crisis coordination during the Cuban Confrontation, Berlin, Suez and Lebanon all underline requirements for a highly integrated command structure, particularly with respect to operations on the Central Front. Such matters as nuclear strategy have to be worked out in advance in order that effective executive action can be taken during the moment of crisis. The analogy has been made that the Allies are like a group of people preparing to take a motor trip through the mountains. They can agree on the route and the

No

The finality of thermo-nuclear war is too obvious, especially for a small nation to integrate its strategic decision-making machinery with other nations. No country can be truly sovereign unless it possesses nuclear weapons. Nuclear integration must follow, it can not precede political integration.

While the advent of nuclear weapons presents problems with respect to planning, it is obvious that sovereign nations cannot, and will not, relinquish authority for decisions which may literally mean life or death for a nation. No major power can afford to turn over unlimited authority to initiate the use of nuclear weapons to an Allied consortium; nor can it accept promises from an Ally that such weapons would be used in its behalf in some undefined future crisis.

By avoiding the problems of an integrated alliance, the United States (which is the only real thermo-nuclear power in the West), has a free hand to use or not to use its powerful weapons. There are so many instances where the United States will be involved in confrontations (such as Cuba) in which our European

timing, but only one person can actually steer the automobile around the curves. This is truer today than it has ever been before due to the thermo-nuclear risks involved. It's simply impossible to have 15 fingers on 15 nuclear triggers and it is just as impossible to have 15 fingers on one safety catch. There must be an integrated strategy for the employment of all weapons.

Allies are not involved that a minimum of integration is desirable. On the other hand, there are so many potential crisis situations involving the European nations that the United States would do well to stay out of highly integrated alliances and avoid involvement in matters peripheral to its real national interest.

The analogy of the automobile in the mountains presupposes that all of the passengers are moving toward the same destination; this may not be the case in terms of the American "Great Design" at least from General de Gaulle's viewpoint.

Must the Western Alliance Have a Single Nuclear Authority?

Yes

It is essential that all strategic planning and decision-making be highly centralized for reasons stated above. (Add arguments on counter-force etc., R&D, costs, obsolescence, etc.). Since the United States is the prime possessor of thermo-nuclear weapons and associated sophisticated equipment, it is appropriate that the United States be the principal executive agent in this matter. The United States can make strategic decisions on behalf of the Alliance on the basis of extensive know-how, larger

No

While it may be desirable to have a single nuclear authority for matters of common interest to the Alliance, it is equally apparent that each sovereign member of any alliance must retain control over at least a portion of its own nuclear weapons. This is essential in order to assure the credibility of each national military deterrent and to meet individual requirements of national security. While the Americans may be sincere in assertions that they will commit their

investments in such weapons, and greater responsibility. Americans would never delegate authority for the use of America's strategic weapons except to a single authority under American influence.

nuclear power to the defense of Western Europe, a potential enemy may not be convinced. Therefore, even such a limited nuclear capability as the proposed French force de frappe has major significance for the defense of France and it is inevitable that a sovereign Federal Republic of Germany will at some point require its own nuclear trigger. To arguments that individual national nuclear capabilities are insignificant in the face of Soviet thermonuclear power, it is only necessary to remember the consternation generated in the United States by prospects of less than 50 hostile intermediate-range ballistic missiles located 90 miles off its coast in Cuba.

A similar argument can be made by the French and by the Germans, and in the former case, it is actually being made vociferously by such advocates of independent French nuclear power as General Gallois. While France stood with the United States during the moment of crisis over Soviet missiles in Cuba, it is highly doubtful that the French would assume this posture in a similar confrontation over Southeast Asia.

Are Multi-National Nuclear Forces Desirable?Yes

In order to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons and thereby not exacerbate East-West tensions, while at the same time affording a limited degree of participation in nuclear activities to all NATO Allies, it is desirable that at least one component element of all alliance nuclear forces be developed as a allied-national force. The military value of such a force could equate with that of several national nuclear forces. It could have its own control authority. In effect it would have 15 fingers on the nuclear trigger as well as on the safety catch. If it was organized on the basis of individual national components, one or more of these might be withdrawn in time of crisis. If it was organized on a mixed manned basis with personnel of the various nations integrated on the ships or in the units which transported the nuclear weapons, this would be less feasible.

Such a multi-national force would tend to put all of the alliance members into the same nuclear boat. It would require integrated planning.

No

The idea of a multi-national nuclear force, whether organized with individual national units operating separately or with integrated crews of different nations on the same ships, is nothing more than a political arrangement. It is doubtful whether participation in such a force would deter those nations which have the capability for developing nuclear weapons from proceeding with their own independent programs. The only exception to this of course is West Germany which is operating under particular restraints in this connection. Possibly participation in a multi-lateral force would deter internal pressures toward nuclear arms in West Germany for some years, but since Germany would not have a unilateral say in the use made of these weapons, it would never be a real substitute for German nuclear deterrent. In the meanwhile, disruptive forces which have been unleashed by discussions of a multilateral force have done considerable harm. Indeed, American pressures towards the formalization of some such organization has contributed

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It's main value would, of course, be political (in siphoning off German energies for attainment of their own national nuclear capability).

to the problem with the French. General de Gaulle sees a multi-lateral nuclear organization as an attempt to reduce French chances of achieving a position of pre-eminence in Europe.

The United States would never participate in such an organization if the MLF had the capability of initiating a nuclear war under circumstances that were not central to US national interests. Other countries would feel the same way. Its existence would impose tighter constraints on alliance decision-making during a period of crisis. Every associated nation would be patiently more involved as events escalated, with consequent pressures on the central authority.

If De Gaulle becomes convinced that Germany is turning toward the idea of an MLF, he will interpret this as evidence the Germans are opposed to his ideas for a European confederation and may speed-up French disengagement from NATO.

Must the West Have a Capability for Graduated Response?

Yes

There will be crises in the future involving the borders of Western Germany and access to West Berlin when limited communist forces will have to be opposed by conventional Western force. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 might

No

The greater the conventional capability for responding to Soviet aggression in Western Europe, the less credible will be the nuclear deterrent. If Soviet military initiatives are to be met in Western Europe by conventional forces, or if

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never have been resolved peacefully had it not been for local U.S. conventional superiority. Similar occasions will arise in the future. It is therefore essential that the Western Alliance have a capability to apply graduated levels of conventional force before resorting to nuclear weapons. Pre-arranged distance and time factors can be worked out among Allies in order to protect Western Europe from the havoc of a full scale conventional war; nevertheless, some degree of restraint prior to the introduction of even limited nuclear weapons is essential.

Exclusive reliance on nuclear weapons creates an unacceptably high threshold for limited communist initiatives. There is such a wide range of communist actions detrimental to the security of the West that cannot logically be countered by nuclear force. A conventional capability will have a higher degree of credibility for dealing with such circumstances than a nuclear deterrent.

The Western European countries have the capability of providing necessary additional conventional forces. Total manpower resources of the West are superior to those of the East.

too large a capability for conducting conventional defense exists, it will be interpreted in the East as a sign of reluctance to employ nuclear weapons and as an invitation to conventional aggression.

Even a limited national nuclear capability, such as the proposed French force de frappe, is a more credible deterrent to Soviet aggression than several additional divisions of French conventional forces in Germany.

Mankind has now entered the nuclear era and it is ridiculous to ignore the realities of these weapons. They exist and they will be used.

Red China is on the way to achieving a nuclear capability and a dozen other countries may have atomic weapons within a decade. The idea of stopping nuclear proliferation is ideolistic and impractical.

On 1 December 1964, Defense Minister Messmer said to the National Assembly:

"We desire that, faced by a grave menace to the independence, the integrity, the security of the nation, the government of our country can answer by a threat terrible enough

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Progress toward nuclear arms control is as vital to the future of society as other global problems such as population control and resource conservation. Greater reliance on conventional forces also diminishes prospects of nuclear war.

to deter an eventual aggressor before the irreparable has happened."

The following day, Prime Minister Pompidou said:

"The destructiveness of atomic armament is such that one cannot envisage war except as a total catastrophe. Hence, it is no longer a question of 'preparing victory' but of preserving peace. This is called dissuasion."

Paris argues that both conventional fighting and warfare with tactical nuclear weapons must be avoided in Western Europe. On the one hand, the French argue that the Western powers do not have the means or the depth of territory needed to carry on a successful conventional defense of Western Europe against a conventional Soviet invasion.

But on the other hand, tactical nuclear weapons are no better. Gen Ailleret, Chief of the French Defense Staff has written:

"It is clear that a nuclear exchange, even if only tactical, will completely crush Europe across three thousand kilometers from the Atlantic to the Soviet Frontier. This solution does not seem to us susceptible of being found satisfactory by the Europeans because, if it spares them invasion, it does not protect them from destruction."

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The answer to the dilemma is this:

"...in case of major aggression in Europe, the only strategy susceptible of defending it effectively against invasion is that of an immediate response against the potential of the aggressor with the most powerful means..."

The only problem, then, is to define what constitutes clear-cut (characterise) aggression. For this purpose General Ailleret reverts to a trip-wire concept:

"...we can suggest installing, the length of the regions to be protected, a defensive position destined not to stop powerful attacks on the spot, whether they are purely conventional or whether they benefit from nuclear support, but to measure a minimum level of enemy attack defining the aggression which unleashes the defensive nuclear strategy."

He concludes:

"Sheltered behind these positions and the nuclear arsenal of the allied countries, Europe, if it were understood that the rupture of the line automatically unleashed the nuclear response which, crushing the body and the tail of the serpent, thereby blocked the progression of the head, would no longer fear one of the principal

dangers which threatens it and which flexible response specifically aims at, that is, direct invasion by an air-land battle force."

As appears from the above passage, the French maintain that the current American doctrine of "flexible response" may answer to American security needs but not to Western Europe's. This doctrine is said to increase the danger to Western Europe because it encourages the USSR to think that its aggression might not be met at once, and perhaps not at all, by nuclear devastation. Official French spokesmen are usually careful to deny that they doubt US intentions, but they suggest that the USSR might nevertheless misunderstand them. Thus, on December 2, Pompidou said:

"The risk is less in the decision of the United States than in the error of judgment that the adversary might make. Was it not an analogous error of judgment which they came to make in the Cuban affair?"

Is De Gaulle Moving Toward an Independent French and Eventually An Independent Western European Political Position?

Yes

De Gaulle's oft stated objective is an independent confederation of European states dominated by France (in a close Franco-German entente), maintaining an

No

De Gaulle is above all a realist. French overtures for the creation of a three nation Directorate within alliance affairs, the Fouchet Proposal, and French requests for nuclear

independent political posture from that of either the United States or the Soviet Union. It is De Gaulle's hope that a loosely confederated system in Western Europe would eventually attract the countries of Eastern Europe and lead to settlement with the Soviets. He feels that the nuclear stand-off between the United States and the Soviet Union affords smaller nations more room for political maneuver, than has existed previously, and presents an opportunity to restore France to the front rank of world powers. His assertion of increasing French independence and unilateral moves to create a French thermo-nuclear capability are both a means and an end; they bolster traditional attitudes of nationalism among the French people, and they counter-act the deleterious effects on national morale of military defeats in Algeria, Indochina and in the Second World War.

De Gaulle has serious doubts concerning the long-term resolve of the United States for the defense of Western Europe and recognizes that there are major divergencies between the United States and Western European positions on important questions. He feels that US efforts to achieve an integrated Atlantic Union mask a US trend to dominate Western Europe. Along with some other Europeans, he is distrustful

assistance have been rejected by his Alliance partners. Neither the Americans nor the British have consulted France on occasions where the French interest was deeply involved. De Gaulle simply wants greater influence for France in the affairs of the Atlantic Alliance and a greater degree of independence for members of the Treaty Organization.

Rather than making specific proposals which experience indicates would be ignored or rejected, De Gaulle has adopted his present course of action to force a major re-appraisal of alliance relationships. He is an old man with little hope that policies initiated by him now will be vigorously implemented by his successors. It is within the realm of possibility however, that he can force major organizational concessions from his Allies.

Whether current political maneuvers result in a readjustment within the Alliance, or general disillusionment with the Treaty Organization, probably depends on the degree of mutual understanding which can be achieved between De Gaulle and the U.S. during the next two or three years. If measures undertaken by the United States, Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany create new and more significant frictions between France and other Alliance

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of both the United States and the Soviet Union, since he feels that at some time the two super-powers will arrive at an understanding which sacrifices the interests of other European countries.

He cannot forget that Germany has attacked France three times in the last century and he has misgivings about any arrangements (such as MLF) which draws Germany closer to the United States than to France. He feels that the United Kingdom is oriented more toward the United States than to Europe while France, by virtue of geographic position, tradition and culture, is destined to be the central force in European development.

He knows that with or without the Atlantic Alliance, it would be contrary to United States interests to allow Western Europe to fall under Soviet influence. He is confident that U.S. thermonuclear power will be available for the defense of Europe regardless of unilateral French political moves.

members, it is more likely that France will move toward an independent political position. If however, reason and mature judgment prevail, it seems likely that arrangements can be concluded which will satisfy legitimate US, French and other European aspirations regarding the future of the Atlantic Organization.

There is no clear evidence that De Gaulle is preparing for a unilateral rapprochement with the Soviets, although it is clear he is interested in opening channels of communication and understanding with the other Eastern European countries. A more forthcoming U.S. policy, one offering greater recognition of the importance of France in the Alliance, some nuclear sharing, increased French representation in high policy councils of the Alliance, and a freeze on further integration -- these are the things De Gaulle really wants.

Should the United States Resist Efforts of General De Gaulle to Alter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization?

Yes

Since it is essential that NATO move toward more rather than less integration, it is important that the United States resist efforts of President

No

When it becomes apparent that General de Gaulle is determined to make major modifications to the NATO Alliance, the United States

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De Gaulle to modify the Alliance structure. Resistance should initially be organized covertly among the other thirteen nations and a common front should be presented in as amiable a manner as possible. Every effort should be made to prevent an open break with the French and to soften the divisive impact if a break occurs. If other measures fail, however, NATO can and must continue without the French. (After De Gaulle has passed France may elect to return).

We should assume initially that the basis for French intransigence is De Gaulle's wish for greater French representation and influence within the Alliance structure. His withdrawal of French military units and refusal to permit the participation of French officers in recent exercises may be tactical ploys aimed at obtaining organizational concessions within the Alliance. Before beginning to move NATO Headquarters and combat units from French soil, specific proposals should be made aimed at obtaining De Gaulle's cooperation. There is a wide range of organizational and policy matters which can be reviewed to advantage and in the interests of alliance harmony. While making preliminary arrangements for the rapid redeployment of facilities and units to other NATO countries, if required,

has no alternative but to cooperate. NATO without France would be ineffective as an alliance, and a major breach between the United States and France at this juncture would be more harmful to Western security than de-integration of the NATO command structure.

While it is appropriate for the United States to express its views and to take legitimate steps to impress France with the folly of General de Gaulle's course, the United States should make it clear that it has, in fact, no interest in continuing the arrangement except from the standpoint of Western security and will respect the wishes of its Alliance partners.

It may be that apparent American readiness to withdraw forces from Western Europe and to cooperate in de-integration of the Alliance would be sufficient to generate powerful forces toward integration among the Western European countries and even France itself.

There is no reason to think that De Gaulle's withdrawal from NATO would compromise the United States or France's position with respect to occupation rights in West Berlin, nor should this interfere with bilateral treaty arrangements between

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it would be prudent to offer De Gaulle a more important role for France in NATO. Proposals for nuclear information-sharing, more liberal arrangements for support of the French force de frappe, and a revised U.S. strategic policy may temper the French attitude. If not, major modifications which do not dilute the integrated nature of the Alliance should be discussed with a view to enhancing the French position in high alliance councils. Only when it becomes clearly apparent that De Gaulle's real goal is actual dissolution of the alliance should plans for continuing without France be implemented. A forthcoming American attitude, with respect to NATO, should be characterized by personal diplomacy at the highest levels and by imaginative major proposals aimed at marshalling European opinion in favor of further integration. These proposals should extend beyond the military area into such questions as monetary liquidity, multilateral aid to developing nations, joint armament production agreements, wider nuclear planning, and clear evidence that the United States is not attempting to dominate the future of Western Europe.

the United States and with the Federal Republic of Germany. With or without French cooperation, the United States can continue its troop presence in Western Germany, albeit on a reduced basis. Every effort should be made to obtain residual rights with respect to bases, installations and communication facilities within France for use in the event of war. If the Alliance is dissolved harmoniously, chances of preserving these arrangements may be enhanced.

It may be possible to obtain certain concessions from the French in the maintenance of other integrated European activities, such as the Common Market in return for agreement in the reorganization of NATO.

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Can the Western Alliance Maintain a Credible Military Posture
For the Defense of Western Europe Without French Participation?

Yes

Withdrawal of France from NATO will impose some real limitations on planning and preparations for the defense of Western Europe. It may sharply reduce the credibility of a conventional defense. Elimination of allied lines of communication across France, and proximity to the battle-front front of a substitute LOC across Germany and/or the Low Countries, would appear to diminish NATO's staying power for conventional war.

While diminishing the deterrent value of conventional forces however, French withdrawal also lowers the "threshold" of nuclear war. Following current French reasoning, this situation would be a better overall deterrent to war in Europe.

Withdrawal from France of some NATO Headquarters and facilities, which have little peace-time importance, will not seriously degrade NATO's ability to fight conventionally for a short period because adequate stockage is available in Germany.

Furthermore, whether France is or is not officially a part of NATO, it is hard to visualize a military confrontation between East and West in which France would stand aside.

No

The defense of Western Europe will become tremendously complicated if the French withdraw from NATO. Prospects of French neutrality, and possibly even a lack of sympathy with NATO defense planning efforts, would so weaken the military structure of the Alliance as to make continuation of integrated command, control and communications impracticable. The need for coordinating logistics, targeting and myriad other arrangements depends so heavily on the French that we cannot do without them.

Continued presence of U.S. forces in Germany in association only with German, and reduced UK and BENELUX forces would constitute an invitation to Soviet initiative which could have dire consequences. It would be better to withdraw US forces and allow the Europeans to make their own provisions for defense.

Aside from military considerations, French withdrawal and the accompanying acrimony are likely to completely disrupt relations between the remaining Allies. The BENELUX nations will resist the shift of major bases and support complexes to their soil for economic and psychological reasons. The

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Regardless of the lack of advance command arrangements, or the coordination of plans and targets, it is generally believed that France would participate fully in the defense of Western Europe.

nationalist elements in Germany, Italy and other countries are likely to gain adherents and the whole rationale of a Europe in transition toward Federation will be destroyed.

The suggestion that a French government would attempt to remain neutral through a period of major confrontation is refuted by recent French positions during periods of crisis over Cuba and Berlin. The idea that NATO forces would be denied French air space or room to maneuver under such conditions is hard to accept.

The present locations of depots, ports, rail and pipeline facilities in France for the support of NATO forces are not vital to the initial period of conventional defense along the Iron Curtain. They could be reconstituted or shifted from civilian to military use in an emergency -- especially if NATO maintained residual rights. They are only used now on a skeleton basis since the bulk of logistical support for U.S. forces in Germany does not even at this time come through France.

In the event of limited nuclear war in Western Europe, facilities of this kind in France may be too far forward for practical purposes in any case.

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Standby arrangements for logistical bases might better be made in the UK, Spain or North Africa -- beyond effective range of Soviet MRBMs and tactical air.

For all the talk about NATO as an integrated alliance, there has actually been little accomplished in terms of coordinating logistics, strategic policies, or realistic contingency plans. The French haven't really participated in years and French withdrawal now will have little practical effect.

Can NATO Re-deploy its Forces From France and Maintain a Credible Posture for Defense of Western Europe?

Yes

Even without U.S. ground forces in Western Europe, the Soviet Union would be deterred from aggression in that area by U.S. strategic power.

The credibility of U.S. determination would be further enhanced by the continued presence of US/NATO forces in West Germany.

The fact that conventional capabilities had been reduced would actually enhance the deterrent value of nuclear weapons against conventional attack since it would be doubtful if conventional forces could defend successfully. (The nuclear threshold would therefore be lowered.)

No

Removal of U.S. LOC facilities from France would seriously degrade the defensive posture of the U.S. Seventh Army.

Prospects for obtaining vital ammunition, POL and other supplies would be seriously reduced due to the vulnerability of BENELUX facilities to enemy air attack and ground attack.

The densely populated area of BENELUX militates against its use as a major LOC.

The willingness of BENELUX governments to permit a U.S. LOC to function on their territory under the threat of Soviet nuclear attack is subject to question.

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The increasing power of the French force de dissuasion would provide a credible European deterrent especially if France were linked to the FRG by a treaty of alliance.

If NATO is denied on LOC in France, alternative arrangements can be made in the UK, BENELUX and elsewhere to meet requirements of limited conventional war. If hostilities increased beyond this, nuclear weapons would be used and it is unlikely that permanent LOC facilities in France would be appreciably less vulnerable than those in BENELUX.

Due to the reduced population density in France, a LOC there might be more susceptible to attack than similar facilities in the crowded BENELUX countries.

There is also a greater danger of Soviet inspired sabotage and guerrilla activity in France due to the large size of the French Communist Party.

If nuclear war is initiated, fixed installations of major size will have better prospects for survival in areas well removed from France (or BENELUX) such as Spain, Iceland, Portugal and North Africa.

Supply tonnages presently located in France would be more useful if they were pre-positioned in forward

The fact that France was not irrevocably committed to an integrated alliance would raise serious doubts concerning the French political position in a major East-West confrontation. This might so reduce the maneuver area of NATO forces defending West Germany as to seriously degrade the deterrent credibility of NATO.

The shift of additional logistics support operations into West Germany is infeasible due to crowding which already hampers US/FRG military activities.

The prospect of France going neutral would undermine the whole basic strategy for the defense of Western Europe and would strike at the heart of Western political unity. Unless France provides suitable residual rights on French territory for NATO LOC purposes, associated movement privileges and firm force commitments, Western Europe is exposed to Communist aggression.

There are insufficient aircraft in required configurations to drastically up-grade the amount of logistics support provided by air. Procurement of sufficient numbers and associated basing and logistics would be prohibitively expensive.

New types of surface transport (ground and sea) are not sufficiently practicable

areas and more directly available to Seventh Army.

Advanced forms of transportation (air, sea and ground*) can be employed to replenish Seventh Army from more distant base areas as pre-positioned forward stocks are consumed in combat.

It is extremely difficult to conceive of a military confrontation between the Western Allies and Warsaw Pact countries in which France would not stand aligned with the West. The Soviets would have to take this into consideration in weighing the risks of any overt military action.

The concept of France shifting into a role where French cooperation could no longer be a basic assumption of defense strategy for Western Europe must pre-suppose a drastic change in the political configuration of the continent. It would require a whole new appraisal of Western relationships.

to permit greater reliance on bases further removed from the front and it would cost too much to develop them.

* To be procured.

Is the Aim of Achieving Early European Integration Fully Compatible with the Broader Goal of Atlantic Unity?

Yes

It is difficult to achieve a consensus on major problems among allies joined together by a loosely drawn system of alliances. Questions such as nuclear deterrence, a common East-West trade policy, future nuclear proliferation, development of the emerging nations, and crisis situations in areas outside of Europe cannot be effectively coordinated among fifteen sovereign nations, all of whom are pursuing national interests. Diversity among the Western nations is exploited by the communist world in a manner which adversely affects each of the Western nations. Broad common objectives, policies and programs are essential if Western society is to survive the long term inroads of communism. Important steps have already been taken to integrate economic, monetary, trade, labor and military activities among countries participating in EEC, EFTA, NATO and many other European and Atlantic associations. Impetus toward European political integration has been an important concomitant of these efforts.

Achievement of a higher level of European integration will facilitate development of close bonds between the United States and its Western Allies.

No

U.S. insistence on progress toward a politically integrated Western Europe runs counter to deeply held feelings of nationalism and to special interests in some countries. Gaullist intransigence is only a symptom of attitudes which pervades a large bloc of opinion throughout Europe.

There are a diversity of views in the questions on which the United States would most like to achieve consensus -- the nature of the communist threat, nuclear deterrence, flexible response, East-West trade, arms control, German reunification, Atlantic trade and monetary policies, aid to developing nations, Asian, African and Latin American matters.

As long as these differences exist, it is unlikely that an integrated Europe can be created, and even if they did not exist, fundamental differences in traditions, historical outlook and general values militate against European integration.

Europeans like De Gaulle can visualize a loosely drawn confederation of European states joined by a system of traditional alliances. They feel that it is just as feasible to have ties with the United States in this manner

as to amalgamate into one monolithic United States of Europe and then negotiate a single treaty.

Indeed, it is argued that the United States may defeat its hopes of Atlantic unity by helping to create a powerful single political entity in Western Europe. A European leader such as De Gaulle could become an even more serious impediment to American aspirations if he spoke for an integrated Europe.

Some Europeans assert this is the real American goal -- creation of a powerful and independent Europe which can defend itself from Communist aggression so the United States can withdraw its strategic protection from the Continent.

EPSILON I-65

Problems

How to modify the Alliance in a manner acceptable to all NATO nations including France?

How to preserve NATO without France?

How to develop an effective NATO strategy without France?

How to maintain an effective military posture in Europe without France?

How to solve NATO's nuclear problems?

How to cope with pressures for German reunification?

How to muster support from the other NATO Allies to offset De Gaulle's opposition to (further) integration?

How to develop support within France for continued French participation in NATO?

How to prepare for the eventuality of French withdrawal without precipitating the event?

How to maintain an adequate defense posture during a period of withdrawal from France by non-French forces?

How to continue cooperation with the French and other Allies in spite of the withdrawal of non-French forces from France?



How to prepare ground so as to get France, once out of NATO, back in?

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Questions

Can De Gaulle's present course be changed?

What are the political, military and economic implications of a NATO without France?

Can Western Europe be defended without the territory of France to lend depth to the defense?

Can NATO be supplied in wartime without bases in France?

What other nations in NATO can provide the bases essential to NATO?

Will the BENELUX countries agree to major headquarters being established on their soil?

Will the BENELUX countries permit the US to relocate major facilities from France into their territory?

Is the relocation of installations from France to other NATO nations cost effective?

What logistical complexes presently located in France can be eliminated through the use of advance resupply techniques?

Should the U.S. advocate or support a move for appointment of a Tactical Nuclear Commander in key NATO defense areas?

Should the US advocate or support appointment of a Strategic Nuclear Commander under SACEUR with appropriate delivery systems?

Should the US assign a certain number of CONUS based Minute-man, B-52s, and additional Polaris submarines -- or any one of these systems or combination thereof -- to SACEUR?

Should the US advocate a land based or sea based MRBM force for ACE?

Should the US resume the initiative to press for early agreements on the ANF/MLF?

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Will the British and West Germans join forces with the United States in moves toward a multilateral force?

Will De Gaulle turn toward the Soviets with new initiatives for a European settlement?

Can the structure of NATO withstand centrifugal forces developing in Greece and Turkey, the Cyprus questions, US policies in Southeast Asia

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EPSILON I-65

CRISIS CHRONOLOGY

APRIL 1964

President de Gaulle undergoes successful surgery for diseased prostate gland. Premier Pompidou assumes interim control of government during period of De Gaulle's illness.

French government announces withdrawal of naval officers from NATO commands in Mediterranean and English Channel, explaining it is abnormal for French naval officers to share command responsibilities in organizations which no longer have authority over French units.

MAY 1964

Private sources say the French Foreign Minister deplores public criticism of NATO and feels that "the less said about NATO the better." Similar sources indicate France has no plans for NATO change, however French may consider reform proposals if Spaak or others insist on posing them. De Gaulle said to prefer strict national control of all military forces.

In a major policy speech on 7 May, Under Secretary Ball states, "effective solutions will not be achieved merely by tinkering with the NATO structure, but rather by progress in achieving a greater cohesion in relations among member nations."

JUNE 1964

Soviet and East German governments sign 20 year treaty of "friendship, mutual assistance and cooperation."

At meeting between President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard, President publicly reaffirms U.S. commitments to Berlin, and states that, "until Germany is unified, only the ... government of the Federal Republic of Germany and no one else can speak for the German people." Erhard states Bonn fully backs the U.S. proposal for a unified Western

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nuclear force, but that the Germans do not aspire to national control of nuclear weapons.

Authoritative French sources state privately that they are convinced De Gaulle plans a new move against NATO. He asks for complete accounting of French financial contribution.

The 17 Nation UN Disarmament Committee resumes meetings after a five week recess. France continues to refuse to take a seat as the 18th member of the Committee. As U.S. and USSR state their respective positions, USSR makes it clear the Soviet Union will not join in an agreement curtailing the spread of nuclear weapons unless the U.S. abandons its plans for formation of a joint Western fleet of nuclear missile firing warships.

The U.S., Britain and France publicly denounce the Soviet-East German friendship treaty.

Chancellor Erhard refuses Soviet invitation to meet with Khrushchev in Moscow.

JULY 1964

President de Gaulle declares publicly that a military defeat of the continued Communist attempt to dominate the Indochinese peninsula is unlikely. He proposes that the U.S., USSR, Communist China and France agree to leave the peninsula, guarantee its neutrality and future political independence. President Johnson rebuffs the French proposal and restates U.S. policy.

In private conversation the French Foreign Minister insists no French initiative is planned on NATO. French commitment of two divisions in Germany is firm.

De Gaulle, in a press conference, lists whole series of differences with FRG, including reform of NATO. He states that in six years France will have 2,000 Hiroshima type bombs, thus reducing dependence on U.S.

As French war memorial in Saigon is destroyed, the French question South Vietnamese determination to honor international agreements. 17,000 French citizens still live in South Vietnam.

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AUGUST 1964

U.S. Navy planes bomb North Vietnamese coastal bases, patrol boats and an oil installation in retaliation for earlier North Vietnamese PT boat attacks on 2 U.S. destroyers. While a majority of NATO members support the U.S. action, the French government does not express approval. French officials say this crisis points up the necessity for accepting President de Gaulle's repeated calls for an international conference on Southeast Asia.

Italian Manlio Brosio assumes chair of NATO Secretary General from retiring Stikker.

Turkey informs NATO military command it has withdrawn its air units and bases from NATO for use in the Cyprus crisis.

The NATO Council meets on Cyprus question.

SEPTEMBER 1964

French Defense Minister instructs French naval officers not to participate in forthcoming NATO exercise. Private sources indicate De Gaulle does not like political implications of the exercise.

French Foreign Minister professes ignorance of the NATO exercise problem and says he knows of no new political decision regarding NATO in private conversations.

De Gaulle approves SACLANT-CINCLANT planning guidance of June 30th, and also approves replacement of French officers on SACLANT staff when their terms are up.

Acting Premier Willi Stoph is elected Premier of the German Democratic Republic, replacing the late Otto Grotewohl.

Classified sources indicate Erhard sounded out De Gaulle on summit meeting. De Gaulle reportedly did not say "No," but replied, "we will have to see." Erhard privately says De Gaulle wants closer cooperation with the Federal Republic of Germany.

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OCTOBER 1964

Khrushchev stripped of positions of leadership in the Soviet government and the Communist Party. Brezhnev becomes First Secretary of the Communist Party while Kosygin succeeds Khrushchev as Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, equivalent to premier

Communist China detonates her first nuclear device.

Harold Wilson becomes Prime Minister of Great Britain as Labor Party narrowly defeats Conservatives.

De Gaulle completes Latin American trip during which he visits ten Latin American republics.

British Foreign Secretary Walker confers with President Johnson and other U.S. officials concerning scheduled meeting of President with Prime Minister Wilson. The Johnson-Wilson talks are to deal with reorganization of NATO and possible re-negotiation of the 1962 US-British Nassau Agreement which provides for purchase of U.S. Polaris Missiles for British submarines. Walker also says his government could not reach a final decision on the NATO multilateral nuclear naval force (MLF) by the end of the year.

French Foreign Minister reportedly says government of France has doubts about the MLF, which have been reinforced by Erhard's suggestion of a US-FRG operated MLF. He also questions the military efficiency of the MLF.

Private French sources indicate the French apparently realized only a few weeks ago that there is a chance of the MLF coming into being, if only through US-FRG agreement. French policy changes to more direct, though officially unavowed, opposition to the MLF. The French believe the MLF would transform the Alliance into one in which the U.S. would be indefinitely involved in European defense matters.

French Foreign Office officials say in private discussions, the MLF is now political rather than a military problem and that De Gaulle believes the whole future of Germany as "European" rather than as a state tied to the U.S. is at stake in the affair.

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Premier Pompidou privately tells Spaak in discussion of common European foreign policy that it should not be one of opposition to the U.S. or one that would cause the U.S. and Europe to grow farther apart. The French stress that the test of European defense is the ability to respond to Soviet aggression "independently if necessary" with atomic weapons. French officials are violently opposed to the MLF, observing it would make a mockery of the Franco-German Treaty. There are threats of French withdrawal from or non-cooperation with NATO if the MLF comes into being.

After the meeting Spaak privately states he is impressed by French hostility toward the Germans at all levels. He thinks a Franco-Soviet agreement aimed in part at Germany is possible.

Spaak also privately states he is impressed by De Gaulle's fatalistic resignation to continued deterioration of the European integration movement and Atlantic Alliance. De Gaulle feels the regressive trend justifies his view that NATO is unworkable and that the only hope is his "Europe of the States." De Gaulle opposes NATO because it provides a forum for U.S. voice in European defense matters.

British Labor Government announces imposition of a temporary 15% surcharge on imports, tax incentives for exports and other measures to protect the British pound and bolster the country's economy.

De Gaulle declares in a message to Chinese Premier Chou En-lai that France is prepared to participate at any moment in any serious negotiations among the five nuclear powers.

France and the USSR sign a five year trade agreement under which France extends \$356 million in credits to the Soviet Union for a term of seven years.

NOVEMBER 1964

President Johnson is reelected by a record plurality of more than 15½ million votes.

British Labor Government raises the bank interest rate from 5% to 7% in an effort to bring in foreign money, protect the value of the pound sterling and halt inflationary speculation in sterling.

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De Gaulle is privately said to have commented that France will not see MLF come into being without taking strenuous appropriate counteraction. De Gaulle also notes that MLF signing would free France totally from U.S., Russia and Germany to pursue her policy entirely independently. The French Foreign Minister is said to be opposed to this method of cutting France adrift from her Western Allies according to private sources.

In response to a private query of the German Ambassador as to why the French were suddenly taking so negative an attitude toward the MLF, the French Foreign Minister replies that it is a U.S. device to insure U.S. political and military dominance in Europe for the future.

The French Foreign Minister in a private discussion of the MLF, says the French policy change has been brought about by the acceleration of the whole MLF matter. He makes no charges of change of the U.S. position but admits that growing German obsession with nuclear weapons is a problem. The Foreign Minister says that frequent criticism has been aimed at the absence of clear French views on Europe, relations with the U.S., defense, NATO, etc. He says that in reality the problem arises from the absence of any movement towards the formation of a viable Europe and that he feels that until developments in this line take some discernible form there is little purpose in attempting serious discussions.

A Gaullist French general says privately that the MLF is designed "to coldly stab NATO to death." NATO will become irrevocably divided. He describes the MLF as militarily unimportant and politically disastrous. British proposals are also unacceptable. The nuclear problem has been nonexistent in Germany until the U.S. created it. He says the U.S. has supported NATO as a device to prevent a united Europe in military field and to maintain dependence on U.S.

De Gaulle in private conversation says that virtually no one in Europe or the U.S. believes a Soviet attack is likely. He feels the German interest in the MLF is a concealed measure of expressing their nationalism. He says France is in no hurry to see a reunited Germany. There is no European policy because each European state is following its own policy. He feels that with the diminution of the Soviet threat and loosening of the Soviet Bloc there will be less need for U.S. forces in Europe. He is not satisfied

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with the present structure of NATO because he sees in it American control. He indicates the French are not prepared to stay in the present NATO structure after 1969. He says General Staff studies can be coordinated in war time.

Representatives of U.S. and Yugoslavia sign an agreement for exchange of Fulbright scholars and professors starting in the summer of 1965.

DECEMBER 1964

De Gaulle privately tells a U.S. official that thanks are due to the U.S. for assuring the defense of Europe in the immediate post war years. He now considers the threat reduced and Europe changed. He says the form of the Alliance no longer conforms to reality. He feels that at present the Alliance is cracking at the seams, with France producing its own weapons while Germany has none and England is not disposed to carry the burden of expense for the defense of Europe. The MLF will destroy NATO. He says it is not necessary to be integrated to be allied. The French did not take the MLF so seriously in the beginning while it seemed to be in the nature of a military theme or a staff study, but recently the Germans and the French are giving it much more substance. He says that both the U.S. and the French know that the MLF will not eliminate the German appetite for nuclear arms but will in all probability increase it. This will put the Germans in a privileged position.

The French Foreign Minister privately informs German official that the MLF is "absolutely inconceivable." The German official believes similar comments have been made to the Italians.

Pompidou, in a defense policy address, says that France's nuclear arm is intended to prevent, not wage war. Equality, in this regard is helpful but not essential since it suffices for the enemy to know that his own soil is vulnerable. The NATO Alliance, which is and remains a necessity, offers certainty of final victory but not protection against attack. French arms alone can convince the aggressor of certain retaliation -- a retaliation fully equal in measure to what France represents as a prize for aggression. The fact that France is in Europe places its nuclear force fully and automatically at Europe's service, but this is not necessarily

true of outside defense forces. The multi-national nuclear defense merging non-European and European forces under a so-called double veto is illusory since the enemy can doubt the multilateral will to resist. Creation of a European force raises problems for which there are no solutions yet. Whether national or European, France's nuclear defense remains aligned with the Alliance.

West Germany agrees to reduce its grain prices to uniform levels required under Common Market plans for completion of a Europe wide agricultural system. The West German decision is taken in the wake of a French threat to withdraw from the Common Market unless the farm program is fully implemented.

Italy and Communist China agree to exchange trade missions. The total value of 1964 trade between Italy and Communist China is estimated at more than \$50 million.

Prime Minister Wilson and President Johnson meet at the White House. President Johnson reportedly expresses interest in Wilson's proposals for a multilateral nuclear force that would not be composed entirely of surface ships. Wilson states Britain is unalterably opposed to any suggestion that involves the dropping of the overriding U.S. consent or veto on the use of any nuclear weapon.

The North Atlantic Council convenes in Paris for a meeting devoted primarily to the U.S. proposal for establishment of a joint Western Multilateral Force (MLF). The Council reaches no decision on the matter in its three days of debate. U.S. delegation spokesmen disclose that the U.S., Britain, West Germany, Italy and Netherlands representatives will meet in January to discuss ways of proceeding with the projected force on the basis of the U.S. proposal that it be manned by mixed crews representing all participating nations. The meeting will be open to any of the other NATO states that choose to attend.

The French Foreign Minister privately tries to talk the Germans out of their support for the MLF. German officials privately state they believe that De Gaulle will never agree to German participation in an MLF arrangement.

After giving the French the UK paper on ANF, the British Foreign Secretary privately asks whether France is planning to leave NATO. The French Foreign Minister says that this

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is a line peddled by the U.S. He adds that France did not want to leave NATO but had no other choice. He says France could not accept any of the ANF or MLF formulae and that the French were opposed to all European nuclear forces except the French.

JANUARY 1965

French Foreign Office officials say privately that De Gaulle is currently optimistic because of the apparent collapse of the MLF and failure to date to replace it with anything acceptable to any group of countries. They prefer future talks on the ANF be held outside the North Atlantic Council. They feel De Gaulle wants to leave NATO definitely by 1969 and would like to find a pretext to terminate French participation earlier. The ANF could trigger the withdrawal. De Gaulle and the Foreign Minister agree that the post-war period is terminated and that abnormalities from that period such as NATO should be eliminated. De Gaulle says that ANF and NATO would not be principal subjects at issue between France and the U.S., but rather Vietnam and U.S. economic hegemony.

The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the European Economic Community (EEC) each reduced tariffs by 10%. This brought EFTA internal tariffs on industrial goods down to 30% of the level existing among EFTA members when the association was formed in 1960. The EEC cut brought internal tariffs on industrial products down to 30% of the average tariffs in effect between the members when the trade group began operations in 1958.

Sir Winston Churchill dies.

Indonesia becomes first nation to withdraw from the UN.

West German Chancellor Erhard and De Gaulle meet to discuss such problems as political unification of Western Europe, German reunification and West Germany's role in Western nuclear defense. De Gaulle's position is that a German nuclear role is incompatible with German reunification.

A French-East German trade agreement calls for an 80% increase in trade between the two countries in 1965.

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FEBRUARY 1965

In response to a question concerning French intentions with regard to NATO, the French Foreign Minister privately states that, as he had stated before, France will not do anything in regard to the NATO structure until the period prescribed in the treaty -- he admits, in reply to a question, that the treaty does not require waiting until that period. He says that since this was so far in the future, France had no specific suggestions. He says all they want to do is bring the structural arrangements of NATO into conformity with the changes which have occurred in the world situation in the last 18 years. He stresses the fact that France does not wish to change the Alliance, and by this he means the terms of the NATO Treaty, but only the structure that was set up after Korea. He says there is a certain withdrawal of French involvement in NATO which he prefers to call demobilization.

De Gaulle, in a press conference, calls for (1) a five power Geneva Conference (including Communist China) to reform the UN (2) Negotiation of German reunification by Europeans and (3) a return to the Gold Standard. All three recommendations are contrary to U.S. policy.

Chancellor Erhard confirms that his government has cut off arms shipments to Israel following a UAR warning that Cairo would end diplomatic relations with West Germany and recognize East Germany if arms shipments continue.

British Foreign Secretary insists that the EFTA should be included in any European unity plans.

The British government reduces the surcharge on industrial imports from 15% to 10% effective 27 April.

West Germany halts all economic aid to the UAR in retaliation for the visit to the UAR of East German Chief of State, Walter Ulbricht.

MARCH 1965

The U.S. announces it opposes UN Secretary General's plan for a seven nation peace conference on Vietnam or similar proposals until North Vietnam indicates a desire to halt its aggression.

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U.S. Secretary of State proposes that discussions be held within the Atlantic Alliance on a reorganization of NATO, on means of sharing responsibility for nuclear weapons, on expansion of the international monetary system and on development of common policies toward the Communist world and other problems outside Europe in a speech in Cleveland, Ohio.

Private sources say De Gaulle told Secretary General Brosio that it was his firm intention to withdraw from the NATO Organization in 1969 and to continue the Alliance as a classical Alliance. He said he would not attack NATO before 1969 if matters remained as they are. He does not object to U.S. troops in Germany. De Gaulle does not want to initiate any conversation because of the fear of isolation. He indicated that success of the ANF might give him excuse for attack on NATO before 1969.

A senior French official states privately that De Gaulle told him that time would be ripe next year for discussion of revision of NATO. The official expresses hope that the agreement on changes could eventually be reached quietly and undramatically. He points out that French proposals for reorganization of NATO in 1958 had been rebuffed.

APRIL 1965

President Johnson announces that the U.S. is ready to participate in unconditional discussions toward a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. He urges Southeast Asian nations, including North Vietnam, to undertake a massive cooperative economic development program that would be financed by the U.S. and all other industrialized countries, including the Soviet Union.

The West German Bundestag holds a four hour plenary session in West Berlin's Congress Hall for the first time since 1958.

The Italian Foreign Minister proposes that foreign ministers of the six Common Market countries hold a political unity meeting in Venice in May. The French Foreign Minister objects to the timing because there is insufficient evidence of agreement among the six EEC nations on goals and means for achieving European political unity.

The British Ambassador to France states that Britain remains convinced that a Europe capable of being an equal partner with the U.S. in a wider Atlantic framework can never

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emerge unless Britain herself plays her full and proper part in it. He calls for progress in European political unity, tariff reduction and nuclear strategy.

A private source says De Gaulle will be ready to accept a four power directorate including Germany because he believes little can be accomplished by consideration of problems in the 15 man NATO group.

De Gaulle in a TV-radio speech says:

"Our means of (nuclear) dissuasion do not cost us any more than the contribution we should have had to make to Atlantic Integration and under which our protection would have been uncertain, had we continued to it as subordinate auxiliaries. ... Thus, we are reaching the point where no state in the world can bring death and destruction here without obtaining likewise in return."

Private sources say De Gaulle instructed the French Defense Minister as follows before the spring NATO Defense Minister Meeting:

"If defense planning of NATO is questioned and discussed, we should note the fact that NATO as it presently exists no longer meets its objective which is to assure the defense of Europe. Say that we will draw the necessary consequences at the opportune time. Further, if it is desired to put under study a new organization of the Alliance, we should make it known that we reserve our position insofar as participation in the study is concerned but that in any case we will not participate in any organization which is integrated."

U.S. Marines land in Santo Domingo to protect and evacuate American civilians whose lives were endangered by the civil strife.

MAY 1965

U.S. charges Dominican revolt has been taken over by Communists.

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The six EEC nations agree to a program for bolstering the British pound. Britain would borrow about \$900 million from the International Monetary Fund and about \$500 million from a pool operated by ten nations including the U.S. and France.

The foreign ministers of the Organization of American States vote to establish an inter-American military force to help restore order to the Dominican Republic.

Communist China explodes a second nuclear device on May 14th. This device may have been dropped from a plane.

President Johnson, in a TV address directly to Europe says:

"There are some efforts today to replace partnership with suspicion and to drive toward ... a policy of division. The people of the Atlantic will not return to that narrow nationalism which has ... bloodied the fabric of our society for generations ... The kind of nationalism which would blight the hopes and destroy the dream of European unity ... is the way back toward the anguish from which we all came."

EEC Ministers meet in Brussels but fail to agree on agricultural financing policy. The unresolved issues hinge on money needed to subsidize EEC farm surplus exports, to transfer farm workers to factories, to modernize farm production and to support farm prices.

Queen Elizabeth visits West Germany.

De Gaulle privately tells US official it will be necessary to reexamine the treaty in 1969. He says he favors Alliance with U.S., UK and Germany, but will have to look at the question of a council. He states clearly that any form of integration is unacceptable and there would no longer be any troops or military installations in France not under French command. The U.S. will be given plenty of warning and time to consider French suggestions. War plans can be coordinated when hostilities start.

De Gaulle is reported by private sources to be surprised to read of plans for construction of a new SHAPE headquarters and issues instructions forbidding French support of construction.

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Private French Foreign Office sources say De Gaulle intends to suggest a change of Article V when the time for revision comes. He wants to make the language of commitment more explicit and automatic. He also wants to abolish Article IX. He is said to prefer a series of bilateral agreements to a quadripartite agreement to replace NATO.

NATO Secretary General officially informed France will not participate in FALLEX 66 because instructions for the exercise have not been prepared in conformity with the strategic conceptions officially accepted by the NATO powers. The Secretary General privately suggested the scenario could be changed. The French Defense Minister says that it is not just the scenario but the whole manner in which FALLEX 64 was carried out. He argues that non-French officers will in fact carry out the operation in conflict with French strategy.

The NATO Ministerial Council voices firm support of the U.S. commitment to defend South Vietnam. Only France holds that the U.S. should withdraw from Vietnam.

JUNE 1965

President de Gaulle publicly charges that American forces are involved in a dirty affair in Vietnam with their tanks, their trucks and their planes. He says the U.S. must realize that there are others in the world than themselves and the Soviet Union. When that happens, he says, things will go better because we have nothing against them.

South Vietnam severs diplomatic relations with France but retains consular ties. The South Vietnamese charge that France pretends to be a friend, but isn't. The De Gaulle government has always, directly or indirectly helped our enemies.

French Foreign Minister moves to block a grant of some supranational powers to the EEC by accepting a delay in French plans for a common European market in farm products.

At the NATO Defense Minister's Meeting, the U.S. proposes that NATO create a common market for arms within the Alliance and that it establish a select committee of four or five NATO powers to study ways to improve consultation on the use of nuclear weapons.

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Vice President Humphrey meets with De Gaulle in Paris. The French dropped insistence on return to gold standard.

Private French Foreign Office sources say that a list of NATO properties in France to be returned to French control is currently being prepared. De Gaulle reported to personally have taken responsibility for the "Select Committee" matter. The French are interested in the terms of reference, duration and participation in the Committee. Other private sources say De Gaulle does not regard the McNamara proposal as meaningful.

According to private sources De Gaulle reportedly tells Mayor Brandt that the U.S. had misled France and the FRG on nuclear strategy. Under current U.S. thinking the FRG would be the first to suffer and France the next. De Gaulle tries hard to convince Brandt that the U.S. had reached an agreement with USSR at the expense of Europe, not to attack one another.

In a meeting with Chancellor Erhard, private sources say De Gaulle reportedly makes it clear that his withdrawal from NATO will not necessarily mean that present U.S. supply lines across France would have to be eliminated; however, they must be under French control.

Senator Robert Kennedy in a major address to the Senate, declares the U.S. "should initiate at once negotiations with the Soviet Union and other nations with nuclear capability or potential, looking toward a non-proliferation treaty." He asserts, "We have not ourselves done all we can to secure a non-proliferation treaty. The most prominent example is the question of the multilateral force, and the variant Atlantic nuclear force." He calls for "a form of nuclear guarantee to West Germany and other countries of Europe" which would not be rejected by the USSR.

JULY 1965

President Johnson announces the Soviet Union is agreeable to the resumption of negotiations of the eighteen nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva. The Committee's disarmament negotiations recessed in September 1964 and subsequently the disarmament question was discussed by the 114 member UN Disarmament Commission.

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The French Foreign Minister, presiding as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the EEC, adjourns the meeting unilaterally and announces no agreement has been reached on the agricultural finance program. The French government begins an immediate boycott of Common Market institutions, bringing to a halt action on all EEC political and economic matters currently under discussion.

President Johnson announces he has ordered U.S. military forces in Vietnam increased from 75,000 to 125,000 men.

France rejects U.S. proposal for creation of four or five NATO defense ministers committee to study ways to improve Western consultation on the use of nuclear weapons.

French Defense Minister orders French military personnel at SHAPE not to participate in preparations for NATO military exercise FALLEX-66.

The U.S. apologizes to France for incident in which a U.S. jet makes four photo-reconnaissance passes over a French nuclear production plant.

U.S. Ambassador Harriman visits Moscow on what American officials describe as a private trip. While there, Harriman confers with Soviet Premier Kosygin.

The U.S. calls on the UN Security Council to help with settlement of the Vietnamese war.

Private sources say evidence indicates the French Foreign Minister believes the French government does not wish to change the North Atlantic Treaty as such, while De Gaulle seems to hold the opposite view.

Private sources say De Gaulle, in a meeting with the British Foreign Secretary, says the U.S. interest in Europe should be maintained but the present military structure should be abolished. He notes excessive control of Alliance commands by the U.S. He proposes the present military organization of NATO be changed to a series of bilateral arrangements, with two exceptions: (1) a tripartite group to manage nuclear affairs and (2) a quadripartite common command for Germany. Western Germany would participate in this command with the U.S., UK and France, but not in controlling nuclear weapons.

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U.S. proposes that a world conference similar to the 1944 Bretton Woods Meeting be called to institute international monetary reform. France calls proposal "inopportune".

AUGUST 1965

Singapore withdraws from the Federation of Malaysia.

The U.S. announces it will no longer demand that voting rights in the UN General Assembly be denied the UN members who are more than two years in arrears in paying their assessments for UN peace keeping expenses.

President Johnson denies that U.S. troops will be kept in South Vietnam if the Saigon government requests their withdrawal.

Indian and Pakistan forces involved in heavy fighting in and around Kashmir.

U.S. submits a draft treaty to the 18 nation UN Disarmament Committee in Geneva to prohibit the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The proposal is immediately repudiated by the Soviet delegate and is criticized by the U.S. NATO Allies at the conference.

SEPTEMBER 1965

Communist China announces support of Pakistan in its conflict with India.

De Gaulle holds his twelfth press conference since 1959. He indicates France will quit NATO by 1970. He announces France will end its boycott of ministerial meetings of the EEC only if the EEC members agree to include an agricultural finance program within the framework of the EEC. He mentions increasing French contacts with the Soviet Union and East European countries. He calls for complete and controlled neutralization of the Vietnam war zone. He envisages a Europe extending from the Atlantic to the Urals which will settle the German problem by general agreement.

President Johnson urges a strengthening of the NATO Alliance.

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Communist Chinese official in a major policy speech, urges revolutionaries in under-developed countries to wage a "peoples war" aimed at "encirclement" of the U.S. and other capitalist countries.

De Gaulle tells a senior U.S. official privately: The NATO matter is not urgent. France and the U.S. are allied and it is natural that they should remain allied as long as the Soviet menace persists. The menace will last for a considerable time to come. The French government does not intend to break up the Alliance. There will be a de facto understanding for common defense between the U.S. and France even if no signed treaty exists.

The organization -- as distinguished from the Alliance -- is a different question. The organization did not exist at the time the treaty was signed. Since the treaty was signed, the Soviet Union has developed atomic weapons. The United States and its allies could not be sure what the United States would do in the event of an attack. Second, a vast transformation has taken place in Europe. European nations have moved from a position of weakness to a reassertion of their national personalities. France is no longer prepared to accept the principle of subordination, which is what is meant by integration.

De Gaulle says that as far as he is concerned the Alliance will remain but the organization is no longer suitable. He hopes the organization can be re-examined in concert, but France is not alone in this field. Other countries are beginning to feel the same way. The Germans, for example, are beginning to see a need in the future for an alliance without subordination.

He says there can be no foreign forces on French soil except those under French command. The French government will not make proposals but later on it will lay down conditions. These conditions will be made by discussions between the U.S. and France and the decisions will not involve Germany or the UK.

De Gaulle says he feels the efficiency of an Alliance will be seriously impaired if some members feel subordinated to others, which is the present situation of the NATO Alliance. However, Germany's role in the organization of Europe did not mean she could be accepted on the same basis as other nations with reference to nuclear matters. German

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participation -- whether partial or indirect -- in the control of atomic weapons would ruin any possible contacts with Soviet Russia or Eastern Europe.

The US official calls on the French to put forward their proposals on NATO as soon as possible. He doubts whether the question of U.S. troops could be dealt with bilaterally. The French Foreign Minister replies that the agreements affecting the stationing of troops are bilateral except in the case of Germany.

The Foreign Minister says there is nothing immediate but he feels the French government will raise these questions some time next year.

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EPSILON I-65

INITIAL SCENARIO FOR ALL TEAMS
(In format of TV Presentation)

Good morning! This is the news for the 2nd of January 1966.

In his first major speech since re-election as President, Charles de Gaulle yesterday announced that France was establishing "conditions" for the continued presence of United States forces on French soil. While these conditions were not publicly spelled out, a private message from De Gaulle has been delivered to President Johnson. Speculation is rife that the French intend to force a major withdrawal of all NATO forces from their country as part of a move to reshape the Atlantic Alliance.

Pointing out that France is a "sovereign nation," President de Gaulle explained that his objections to NATO centered on its integrated aspects rather than the Treaty itself and that France was in no sense abandoning its role as a co-defender of Europe. However, he stressed the changes which have occurred during the last fifteen years.

The second aspect of his speech, announcement that he planned a trip to Poland and possibly to other Eastern European countries in April added to a flood of speculation.

To understand the mounting strain on Franco-American relations it is necessary to review developments of the past few months.

Since De Gaulle's September press conference, private meetings between French and United States diplomats have indicated that De Gaulle was contemplating a hard line of action with respect to NATO. News leaks regarding these discussions have been alternately regarded either as trial balloons by De Gaulle or efforts

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by other French officials to block his move. French Foreign Minister Couve's visit to Moscow in October and Cultural Affairs Minister Malroux's second trip to Communist China in November were interpreted widely as a French bid for influence in Southeast Asian peace efforts, a demonstration of French independence from NATO and a bid for "Third World" leadership.

The EEC Council met in October without France and arrived at a common agriculture financing position not too unlike France's. A meeting of the EEC heads of state scheduled for November was postponed when De Gaulle stated he could not discuss such weighty problems so close to the French elections.

In his first press conference following re-election De Gaulle announced that he would seek changes to the French constitution to ensure his choice of a successor. He thanked the other five EEC nations for postponing the meeting, including a thinly veiled reminder that the EEC was more vital to them than to France. This warning was interpreted as meaning he expects their support in EEC and NATO. In London, Mr. Heath demanded that the Government take early action to initiate British entry into the Common Market.

At the December meeting of the North Atlantic Council French Foreign Minister Couve and Defense Minister Messmer attended only briefly, departing "under pressure of other business" and leaving a low ranking diplomat as an observer. A communique issued after that meeting stated that the conference focused on an interim report by the Select Committee of NATO Defense Ministers. That report addressed problems of improved nuclear communications and planning but it was evident many problems remain to be solved.

Another important subject was raised by Portugal's Minister who commented on Franco's recent death and suggested that the desirability of Spain's entry into NATO be explored.

 has been accompanied in the eyes of many Europeans by a major shift of US interest from Europe to Asia. Growing US

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force deployments in Vietnam appear to pre-occupy both the American leadership and public opinion raising concern as to the credibility of US commitments to NATO.

Behind the scenes, US diplomats are reported attempting to organize an effort to preserve NATO. It is understood that European officials have been briefed on US plans in the event President de Gaulle requires withdrawal from French soil.

While the BENELUX governments want NATO preserved, it is given to understand that each request for relocation of a NATO facility from France to the lowlands would be judged on its individual merits. In the case of Britain, there is strong left-wing opposition to new American bases on English soil. While leaders of these nations appear to support US efforts to maintain the integrated structure of NATO there is serious concern regarding economic and other pressures France may bring to bear.

In BENELUX there is mounting fear that destruction of the Common Market could have disastrous results for the smaller nations and voices such as Paul Henri Spaak have become more vocal and open in opposition.

In mid-December, Belgium, as if to flout De Gaulle, announced it would not purchase French tanks as had been contemplated but would instead procure the new German tank.

In Germany after Erhardt's confirmation as Chancellor, it was announced FRG policy would be based on closer relations with the US with respect to NATO. His speech appeared to call for the indefinite retention of the US troops in Germany, movement toward German reunification and a "flexible policy" vis-a-vis France on EEC matters. However, some commentators stressed Erhardt's intention of preserving the "special relationship" between the FRG and France.

During November the German Chancellor visited Washington to confer with President Johnson. They announced jointly the "convergence of (their) vital interests in NATO.

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It is understood the US is pressing the FRG to increase military purchases in the US and has informed Bonn the alternative could be US troop reductions in Germany. This situation was exploited by German Gaullists as an indicator that the US will not stand by its military commitments.

In England, financial problems have precipitated a major re-evaluation of defense and mounting pressure to jettison Empire commitments in Aden and Singapore. Labor's meager majority of one coupled with increasingly severe opposition attacks indicate a general election may be imminent.

The Defense White paper issued in late Fall contained across the board cut-backs in British overseas commitments and it is understood that more serious reductions were only temporarily deferred by US pressure and support.

It is understood that the Johnson Administration has conferred closely with London in developing a common position for dealing with De Gaulle and has been advised to move in a manner which leaves the onus for fragmenting the Alliance squarely on the French President. Neither the British nor the Americans have done anything publicly which would preempt French initiative.

The situation on the southern flank of NATO continues to fester.

There is turmoil in Turkey where Premier Urguplu has announced limited trade agreements with the Soviets. The Turkish government welcomed NATO integrated mobile force exercises in Southern Turkey during November but the Turks still question NATO's resolve to stand by her in a time of crisis.

Student riots in Ankara protesting US Air Force units based on Turkish soil and criticism of the government's failure to stand by its CENTO Ally Pakistan in the Kashmir fighting have caused the Turkish government to postpone elections for six months.

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In the US Senator X was quoted as saying, "The bases in France have been reduced to a level where they have very little significance in any case. We've done that ourselves. A request from the French to withdraw will only formalize the situation. It is obvious that we can only fight a brief conventional war to defend Europe--before resorting to nuclear weapons. When that happens it won't make much difference whether our bases are in France or not.

We're fighting a major war in Vietnam with little support from our European allies. Considering balance of payment problems and current attitudes in Europe the time has come to shift the US Army from Europe to Southeast Asia."

Other voices including that of Congressman Y were raised on the Hill, "We are overextended in our foreign commitments and overboard in our efforts to dominate the Western Alliance. There is much to be said for a fresh approach and we ought to meet General de Gaulle half-way!"

The White House has not as yet issued an official statement.

Turning to other world news, the US troop buildup in Vietnam continues, with increasing US ground and air initiative in South Vietnam. Although Viet Cong terrorism, sabotage and hit and run attacks against isolated Vietnamese outposts have continued there have been few major engagements in recent months. Offensives by US Army and Marine units have the enemy on the defensive while the tempo of air attacks against North Vietnam continues at levels attained last summer. Rumor of behind the scenes discussions between Washington and Hanoi continue to be denied by both sides.

Indian-Pakistani border clashes continue intermittently despite presence of a UN truce team and there appears to be a danger that Pakistan will renew the conflict unless early action is taken toward a Kashmir plebiscite.

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Communist control is growing in the Indonesian government but there is mounting dissidence in Sumatra, Borneo and the Celebes.

In the Congo, continuing instability is resulting in increasing Belgian presence in the country -- to the chagrin of the Organization of African Unity.

NATO nations are involved in many of these world trouble spots and in several cases there is a clash of vital interests between NATO Allies.

The Soviet Union praised De Gaulle for his far-sighted approach to world problems and criticized the US for trying to give nuclear weapons to the FRG. In a sensational move towards arms control, the Soviets endorsed expansion of the 1963 Test Ban Treaty to include underground tests.

I have just been handed a bulletin. It has been announced in Paris and Moscow that a Soviet rocket has been used to place a French Television relay satellite into orbit. No immediate details were given.

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F-93

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MESSAGE NO. 1

FROM CONTROL to YELLOW

MOVE NO. I

DTG 2 Jan 1966

1. The Chancellor requests review of the FRG position on the following issues.

a. Initiatives with respect to German reunification.

b. The status of the FRG relative to nuclear weapons.

c. The problem of possible bilateral agreement between the United States and the USSR in the area of arms control under conditions which might be detrimental to the German interests.

d. The subject of US-FRG "offset purchase" agreements.

2. It is requested that these subjects be considered in the context of current Franco-American disagreement.

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F-94

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ / RAC 12-63

By LKB NARA, Date 09-11-72

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

MESSAGE No. 2

FROM CONTROL TO WHITE

MOVE No. I

DTG: 2 Jan 1966

1. The Soviet Ambassador delivered a note to the Foreign Office stating that the Soviet Union looks with pleasure on President de Gaulle's proposed trip to Poland. The note left an opening for De Gaulle to visit Moscow if he desires.

2. The following extract is from President de Gaulle's message to President Johnson on 2 January:

"The Government of France is preparing and will shortly provide the Government of the United States a list of specific conditions which, if not met by the Government of the United States, will result in a request for withdrawal within two years from French soil of all United States forces not under French command.

"These conditions will include:

"a. French command and control of the Chateauroux base complex.

"b. French authority over the ultimate use of supplies, personnel, and equipment processed through United States bases on French soil."

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

F-95

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

MESSAGE NO. 3

FROM CONTROL to BLUE

MOVE NO. I

DTG 2 Jan 1966

The following extract is from President de Gaulle's message to President Johnson.

"1. The Government of France is preparing and will shortly provide the Government of the United States a list of specific conditions which, if not met by the Government of the United States, will result in a request for withdrawal within two years from French soil of all United States forces not under French command.

"2. These conditions will include:

"a. French command and control of the Chateauroux base complex.

"b. French authority over the ultimate use of supplies, personnel and equipment processed through United States bases on French soil."

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F-96

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

MESSAGE NO. 1

FROM BLUE TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. I

DTG: 021100 Jan 66

What kind of Government does Spain have following Franco's death?

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

F-97

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

MESSAGE NO. 4

FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS

MOVE NO. I

DTG. 021100 Jan 1966

Franco has been succeeded in Spain by Gen. Munoz Grandes. While he is expected to follow many former Franco policies, he has announced that his government will be more lenient in its labor policies. It is speculated that the royal family may eventually be returned to the throne.

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F-98

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MESSAGE No. 5

FROM CONTROL TO BLUE

MOVE NO. I

DTG 021150 Jan 66

Clarifies the GOF conditions to provide that all US installations on French soil be under French operational command. This includes operational authority over units and installations. Inform US that France is ready to discuss any proposals US might wish to make to satisfy these conditions. Quietly remind US (high level Foreign Office Source) that these agreements are secret bilaterals, and violation of secret nature of these agreements will be viewed by France as most serious.

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F-99

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

MESSAGE NO. 1

FROM YELLOW TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. I

REFERENCE: CONTROL TO YELLOW

DTG: 021535 Jan 66

MSG NO. 1

MOVE NO. I

I. LONG RANGE GOALS

The creation of a stable, prosperous, democratic reunified Germany which politically, economically and militarily is able to play an important role in a Europe moving ever closer to political union, which profits from ever closer Atlantic ties and which is able and willing to make a large contribution to world stability and progress.

II. OBJECTIVES

Political

- Reunification of Germany by peaceful means.
- Maintain and expand the strength of the Alliance within an integrated structure.
- Achieve a political union of Western European states on a federal basis.
- Preserve and enhance the Atlantic tie with North America.

Psychological

- Complete the rehabilitation of the German image.
- Establish the FRG as the sole spokesman for the German people.
- Avoid German extremism.
- Maintain the promotion of "The German economic miracle."

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ / RAC 12-63

By LKB NARA, Date 09-11-12

Economic

- Continue the dynamic expansion and stability of the German economy.
- Provide the economic base for a Western European union with strong and viable Atlantic ties.
- Establish additional economic ties with Eastern Europe, while continuing to assert the special role of the FRG in the West's trade with the GDR.

Military

- Provide for the security and stability of the FRG within the integrated framework of NATO.
- Establish and maintain a defense environment that permits the attaining of the political and economic objectives of the FRG.

III. COURSES OF ACTION

A. Reunification of Germany - The Chancellor has asked for a review of this issue in the current environment.

The problem of German reunification remains the central problem in Europe today. All practicable steps must be taken to achieve German reunification, and all steps taken by the FRG in other areas must be considered in the context of German reunification. We do not see opportunities for new issues or a change in pace in our approach to the reunification issue resulting from today's situation.

In view of the unchanged Soviet position, the current French rapprochement with the Soviets, and the unsettled situation within NATO and the EEC, the FRG should not now take substantive initiatives on this issue.

As tactics to keep the issue in the forefront of world consideration:

1. The FRG should propose to the Allies and the USSR the reconstitution of the Allied Control Commission as a forum for discussion of this issue.

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2. The FRG and its allies should maintain that lasting European stability cannot be achieved without a settlement of the German problem.

B. The Chancellor has also asked for a review of the status of the FRG relative to nuclear weapons:

We should abide by our 1954 Paris Commitment in which we renounced the production of nuclear weapons, and have no current intention to seek to acquire such weapons - though we do not wish now to give a commitment to this effect. Nevertheless, the legitimate security interests of the FRG and the necessity for our government to be an equal partner in the Alliance demand: 1) that we obtain an increased voice in the management of the nuclear affairs of the Alliance, and 2) that we continue to maintain a force of modern nuclear-capable delivery vehicles sufficient for the defense of the FRG and NATO.

To this end, we should continue to maintain our interest in a multi-lateral, mixed-manned force, including a component of surface ships, and should be prepared to contribute a substantial share (at least 25%) to such a force, provided the U.S. takes the lead in obtaining Allied agreement to this arrangement. Our initiatives for such a force should not be pressed to the point that they cause, or become the pretext for, French withdrawal from NATO, nor the cause of extreme Soviet reactions in Berlin or elsewhere in Europe.

In the short term, our more prudent course of action would be to emphasize the necessity for substantive consultation (as opposed to mere data dissemination) within the Select Committee concerning the development, management, planning and utilization of the nuclear resources of the Alliance. Meanwhile, we should utilize a governmental level dialogue with the U.S. to attempt to obtain bilateral assurances of consultation concerning all nuclear matters affecting the FRG or involving nuclear weapons stored in (or to be used in or on behalf of) the FRG. The agreement and arrangements for consultation with the U.S. should be similar to those we confidently believe the U.S. now has with certain other countries (e.g., Canada and the U.K.) in which she maintains nuclear weapons and/or forces.

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C. US-USSR Arms Control Agreements

With respect to the dangers of bilateral US-USSR arms control agreements, the FRG is reassured by the U.S. handling of the non-dissemination issue in the ENDC at Geneva. It considers, however, that bilateral US-USSR actions on arms control should not be taken without due U.S. regard for German security interests (viz. the creation of a counterforce to Soviet MRBM's) and for the possibility of using arms control agreements as a means of inducing the Soviets to agree to progress on German reunification. It remains a matter of real concern to the FRG that arms control should not be accorded priority over the legitimate political and security interests of the German people. Hopefully, any bilateral US/FRG discussions over nuclear arrangements that may be effected by our interactions in "B" above, and substantive consultation on nuclear matters in the Select Committee, can provide a continuing avenue to influence or eliminate detrimental arms control proposals before they are negotiated at Geneva.

D. US/FRG Offset Agreement

We have reviewed the present U.S. offset commitment that continues until 1 January 1967. As we have recently indicated to the U.S., we will have extreme difficulty during the two year period in offsetting more than 50% of U.S. expenditures. If the U.S. would accept offsetting costs of certain commercial deliveries (e.g., civil aircraft) this would assist somewhat. The fact remains that to achieve an equal offset, substantial increase (4 billion marks - or more) in our defense budget will be required. Major increases in manpower, facilities, training areas, etc., will also be needed to accommodate this increase and the offsetting purchases resulting. Serious domestic political problems are involved.

The U.S. has now officially threatened withdrawal of substantial forces; the real French intention is unclear. Thus, while it will be a difficult decision for us, the FRG must make an attempt to achieve a reasonably complete 1965-66 offset with the U.S. If not, the U.S. concern with uncertain LOCs, their improving capabilities for rapid redeployment, strong

domestic urging - plus a live engagement in SE Asia - all portend withdrawal of up to 2 Divisions and several tactical air wings from the FRG.

Thus, we recommend the Chancellor take the action necessary to improve the FRG military forces through offsetting purchases from the U.S. during the 1965-66 agreement. Future agreements must be scaled down; however, the extent is unclear at the moment.

IV. Contingency Considerations

A. French Attitude Toward NATO and U.S. Facilities in France.

Later this month the Chancellor will have his semi-annual meeting with General de Gaulle. At this meeting the Chancellor should urge General de Gaulle to moderate intentions previously expressed and accept some NATO integration beyond that he said was acceptable only in Germany. Limited NATO integration, confined solely to the FRG, would be discriminatory and establish an intolerable double-standard within the Alliance.

If the French are asking the U.S. to accept French command and control arrangement over logistic facilities in France that are no more restrictive than our agreements with France, we should urge the U.S. to accept. This would avoid relocation of U.S. facilities, avoid disruption of support, heavy expense to all nations, increased vulnerability, and the sharing of already critical real estate.

If the evolving French attitude is hardening and is for more demanding control than already accepted by the FRG, we should actively encourage Allied (UK-BENELUX) acceptance of relocated US LOC facilities. We have a vital interest in continued maintenance of US LOC facilities since we, too, are dependent in large measure on these same LOCs.

B. France and NATO

The FRG is vitally interested in keeping France in NATO, but not at the expense of NATO's integrated defensive structure nor the disengagement of the U.S. in Europe's defense. If there appears a chance to make minor concessions to France, short of disestablishing

the over-all NATO integrated structure, the FRG should encourage these concessions.

Among these, a reorganization of NATO forces in Central Europe could be undertaken which would compensate for the reduction in the BAOR (which may occur as a result of Healey's review of the UK defense budget), relocate FRG forces in the NORTHAG area to strengthen the North German Plains Area, and provide for a new Army group in the South under French command.

C. Spain and NATO

While current events in Spain have not yet stabilized, it appears that the question of Spain's admission to NATO should again be considered. The FRG should not be the initiator of this issue in the NAC, but should quietly support Spain's admission. The accession of Spain to NATO would strengthen the Southern flank, provide an avenue of support for the SE flank, provide additional training areas for NATO use, and relieve congestion in FRG airspace and training/maneuver areas.

D. Anticipatory Actions

1. EEC - The FRG cannot accept the destruction of the EEC and the resultant loss of the advantages of the Common Market. In time, we believe that the French must also see and accept the futility of her present position in the EEC. While we cannot let the EEC dissolve, there is little new by way of initiative that we can take today. We should act to assure that the current period of drift does not become discouraging to the "Five" and should make one more appeal for a meeting of the "Six". Failing French acceptance, we should engage in discussions leading to a continuance of the EEC on the basis of the "Five" while working toward opening an invitation for the UK to come in.

2. In order to hedge the possibility of U.S. withdrawal of major forces from the FRG, the MOD should be directed immediately to study various combinations of unit withdrawals, the most advantageous residual arrangements for the FRG (militarily and fiscally) to compensate for loss of U.S. capabilities, and proposals for maintaining DOBs, forward pre-positioning, ready casernes, etc., in event of emergency redeployment of such units.

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MESSAGE NO. 2

FROM BLUE TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. I

DTG 021710 Jan 66

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

A. We expect the threat will continue. Furthermore, we believe that the changes in the world since 1949 do not constitute a case for breaking up the Alliance Organization.

B. We believe that the actions taken by General de Gaulle in Control Messages 1 and 5 of Move I represent the first concrete move by De Gaulle to implement the general position stated in his September 1965 press conference.

C. While we cannot predict the speed of his subsequent moves or his final objectives, we think that the General should be taken at his word; we believe the General aims to dismantle the Alliance Organization.

D. While not disregarding the military importance of France and French territory, we believe that if necessary the Alliance can be maintained without France even though at increased risk and cost.

E. We believe that by skilled advocacy we can bring our other 13 NATO Allies to support the general US point of view. In this connection, we judge that the sharpening of conditions and the clear threat (in Control Message 5) are a tactical error by De Gaulle and his advisors; the tone and nature of this message should make it easier to bring our other Allies along with us.

II. LONG RANGE GOAL

The US should support the maximum feasible Western European cooperation and coordination, both within the region and with the US, in political, economic and military spheres.

III. OBJECTIVES

A. To continue the North Atlantic Alliance with an integrated command structure, if possible with France and if not possible without her. Whatever the eventual

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLI/RAC 12-63

NARA, Date 09-11-12

By UCLB

arrangements, the door should be left open to France's return.

B. To continue our efforts to keep Western Germany completely tied into the Western Alliance system, and specifically into an integrated military structure.

C. With regard to Western Germany, to maintain our clear support for eventual reunification of all Germany, and for maintaining the Western position in Berlin until reunification comes about on the basis of self-determination.

D. The US should continue its support for an outward-looking and expanding Common Market, successful conclusion of the Kennedy round, possible merger of the 6 and the 7, and encouraging the other members of the Common Market to maintain the structure even if France refuses to go any further.

E. If the definitive break comes between France and NATO, to make clear that De Gaulle is the villain and that the argument is between France and NATO and not between France and the United States.

F. To strengthen the practice of political consultation within the Alliance as a factor toward cohesion. This is primarily a function of US leadership.

G. Should it eventually prove necessary to move NATO and US facilities from France in peacetime, to obtain re-entry rights in case of war.

IV. COURSES OF ACTION

In response to the conditions posed by France, as clarified and expanded by Message No. 5, Move I, the US should take the following steps.

A. A reply to General de Gaulle from President Johnson should acknowledge receipt of the General's message and state that the American Embassy in Paris will provide US comments.

B. France should then be provided, through this channel, what is in effect a request for further clarification, but worded in such a fashion as to indicate US assumption that the following illustrative points are as we state them, i.e.,

the US assumes that the following actions, operations or situations will not have to be submitted to French control:

1. Changes in US force strengths within major existing units and authorized strength ceilings stationed in France.
2. Redeployment of materiel outside France.
3. Introduction of materiel within France.
4. Materiel levels.
5. Utilization of units.
6. Launch of US aircraft under alert conditions.
7. Monitoring of US owned communications and cryptographic facilities.
8. The existing status of forces agreement will undergo no change.

C. The US should then undertake consultation with the principally interested NATO Allies: the UK, the FRG, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Canada. The remaining Allies should be kept informed. (The FRG and the Canadians should be reminded that they have facilities in France which would be subject to attack by De Gaulle.) The object of this consultation would be to establish that the US forces and facilities concerned are in Europe for the support of NATO missions and that the French move is therefore aimed at NATO and not only the US.

D. The agreement of these Allies should be sought for raising the matter for discussion in the North Atlantic Council. To the French threat regarding the secrecy and bilateral character of US-French agreements, our reply should be that the details of these agreements in themselves are not raised for discussion in the Council; Council discussions will be in the context of the effect of the French conditions on NATO's posture.

E. Public Position: The US should make unilateral declaration on the subject. In response to press questions,

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US should acknowledge receipt of General de Gaulle's message without revealing the details, point out that we continue to be willing to discuss any proposals put forward by France, and state that we are studying the matter with France and our other Allies.

F. Key Senators and Congressmen should be kept fully informed of the developing situation,

V. CONTINGENCIES

In view of the accelerating pace of events, we should pursue in a more specific basis with the Allies concerned the question of relocation of US and NATO facilities outside France.

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MESSAGE NO. 6

FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS MOVE NO. II

DTG: 010830 Dec 66

1st SCENARIO PROJECTION

1. It is now 1 December 1966. In the US the economy is growing at a strong pace. Demands of commitments in SEA are not straining the economy. Force levels in the area have not exceeded those scheduled for 1 July 1966.

2. Early in the year a high ranking US diplomat visited each NATO nation assuring its leaders that the US intends to preserve the Alliance with an integrated command structure, if possible with France, and if not, without her. Whatever the eventual arrangements, the door would be left open to France's return. The US made it clear that it believed De Gaulle should be taken at his word that he intends to dismantle NATO. The diplomat reassured the FRG that the US supports eventual German reunification and will support the Western position in Berlin until reunification comes about on the basis of self-determination.

3. In a secret message to President Johnson, De Gaulle stated that his only condition affecting the presence of US troops on French soil was that they be placed under French operational command to include operational authority over units and installations. In reply, the US Ambassador in Paris delivered a message to De Gaulle seeking clarification on the US assumption that the following situations, would not have to be submitted to French control:

a. Changes in US force strengths within major existing units and authorized strength ceilings stationed in France.

b. Redeployment of materiel outside France.

c. Introduction of materiel within France.

d. Materiel levels.

e. Utilization of units.

f. Launch of US aircraft under alert conditions.

g. Monitoring of US owned communications and cryptographic facilities.

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By LVH

NARA, Date 09-11-12

h. The existing status of forces agreement will undergo no change.

De Gaulle replied to the effect that agreement must first be met on principles before discussing details. However he agreed to study the questions.

4. A message from De Gaulle soon followed advising President Johnson that, in view of the fact that the US was consulting the other NATO nations on this "bilateral" subject, the French Government had no alternative than to stand firmly by its original condition. Initial US reaction was to withdraw its installations from France. In seeking Congressional support, President Johnson bowed to domestic and foreign pressures to preserve the Alliance.

5. In a series of negotiations with the French, it was agreed that all US tactical aviation units would be withdrawn from French soil and relocated elsewhere in Europe. However, US logistics elements (primarily war reserve stocks) would remain on French soil under French operational authority. The NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency at Chateauroux was not affected. The US agreed that its forces in France would be used only to support NATO and Quadripartite LIVE OAK operations. The French indicated that Hq EUCOM must be considered an operational headquarters and would have to be removed from French soil.

6. Soon afterward, in a cable to the Secretary of State, German Foreign Minister Schroeder reported on private talks with Spaak and Luns indicating widespread NATO support for US concessions to preserve NATO. He assured the US of the FRG desire to preserve the Alliance and her appreciation of US efforts in this direction.

7. In his June meeting with Erhard, De Gaulle reported on his recent trip to Poland and Moscow. He stated that there appeared to be genuine interest in relaxing East-West tensions. He made vague suggestions about Soviet interest in reducing tensions in Central Europe. In essence this sounded like an overture for a NATO-Warsaw Pact detente. Explicit in such an arrangement would be a nuclear weapons non-proliferation agreement. Germany would have to be a signatory to such an agreement. De Gaulle pointed out that the arrangement would involve a "nuclear freeze" in Central Europe which could lead to eventual solutions of the frontier and reunification problems.

8. De Gaulle implied that if the FRG supported this arrangement he would lend his support to a new initiative for a political solution of the German problem. He added that the economic advantages were obvious. In the meantime, he offered to move his 2 divisions in Germany to forward positions in order to play a greater role in the conventional defense of the FRG. He further suggested exploratory talks aimed at discussing tactical nuclear weapons and ADM. Erhard replied that while reunification was dear to the hearts of all Germans, the proposals would have to be studied in detail.

9. In a note to the Defense Ministers of the US, UK, FRG and Italy, De Gaulle submitted a proposal for coordination of targeting of the French "Force de Dissuasion." To this end, he invited them to send liaison officers to the Headquarters of the French Strategic Air Command. To date there have been no constructive results from this proposal.

10. Later in the month, Soviet Premier Kosygin surprised Bonn by accepting Erhard's standing invitation to come to the FRG - which had originally be extended to Khrushchev. Private talks between Erhard and Kosygin during the one day visit were inconclusive but the Soviet overture itself was favorably interpreted by the FRG.

11. In July, Walter Ulbricht died of throat cancer. From the succession struggle that ensued in Pankow there emerged a strong faction led by Willi Stoph which favored a loosening of East German organizational ties with the Warsaw Pact. A series of reports from reliable Berlin sources showed apparent Soviet support for this faction rather than a contender group led by Honecker.

12. The Wilson government informed Washington in confidence in August that it no longer could push the ANF because it posed a serious impediment to any progress in nuclear disarmament negotiations. Wilson advised that he intended in 1967 to conclude with the USSR a draft non-proliferation treaty for presentation at the ENDC, and that his government would formally and publicly sink the ANF in March 1967. The London Sunday Times military editor referred to the intended move in terms so accurate it was apparent the government had deliberately leaked the story as a hedge for the future.

13. Progress was reflected at the November EEC meeting as a result of the temporary solution to its internal problems experienced with France joined the Five in agreeing on agricultural financing. During the year the commission handled routine policy matters, but under a gentleman's agreement, made a point of not applying the majority vote rule or becoming involved in significant matters which were referred to the ministers for solution. France returned to the Council for the November meeting. As a gesture of his appreciation of the progress in the EEC, De Gaulle accepted an Italian invitation to Heads of Government to discuss the need for progress in the unification of European political, economic and defense policies. The meeting is scheduled for January 1967.

14. Meanwhile the US delegation to the Kennedy round discussions expressed its displeasure at France's foot dragging. There were rumors that the US would walk out of the meetings unless substantial progress was made.

15. The UK announced it would support at the December Ministerial Meeting a NATO Parliamentarian's proposal for the political reorganization of the Alliance. The new organization would consist of two classes of members - those interested in participating in an integrated Western military defense force under SACEUR, and others retaining national forces under national command. Coordination with SACEUR's forces would be accomplished through agreed war plans. Both classes of members would participate on an equal footing in a political council similar to the old NAC. Military organization within NATO was not a part of the proposal.

16. Last week Secretary Brosio met with Presidents Johnson and De Gaulle during a trip around NATO in the course of which he conferred with all the other members. Brosio reported strong favorable reaction of support for the US concessions to France, and a new optimism regarding NATO's future as a result of the US move. While the BENELUX nations expressed a hope that SHAPE Headquarters would not have to be moved from France, none objected to its relocation on their soil. Brosio advised the presidents that he needs to know how they propose to deal with:

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

a. Specific plans pertaining to the future of NATO in its present form to include a time schedule for proposed actions.

b. The proposed new NATO Political organization to be considered at the NAC meeting.

c. Specific characteristics of a future military organization to serve under the new NATO political organization, if adopted.

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MESSAGE NO. 7

FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS MOVE NO. II

DTG: 010900 Dec 66

The following is an extract of an editorial in the Gaullist daily newspaper, entitled "Realite et Reunification". A Foreign Office source told US, British and German Embassy officers that the editorial is very important.

"The evolution in Eastern Europe towards independence from the Soviet Union is beginning to make itself felt throughout the communist world, even in East Germany. French policy under General de Gaulle toward recognition of states has been based upon the reality of the state, and upon its freedom from foreign domination. As the General had stated on many occasions, the reunification of Germany could be achieved only through the agreement of the countries who are Germany's neighbors. As the General had also stated, if the Federal Republic of Germany permitted itself to be seduced by the fair (belle) but soul destroying temptress of "Atlanticism", or if the FRG permitted itself to become addicted to such intoxicating nuclear cocktails as the MLF, the agreement of the FRG's neighbors, both to the East and to the West, to reunification would obviously become impossible. Hence, it is logical that the German Democratic Republic would be a reality. With respect to the Franco-German Treaty, as the General had said during his visit to the FRG, 'Treaties are like young girls and roses. They last while they last.'"

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MESSAGE NO. 8

FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS

MOVE NO. II

DTG: 011100 Dec 66

Nothing has been forthcoming from the French with respect to Brosio's request in paragraph 16, Message No. 6. There is rumor in Paris that the French are preparing a new initiative with a view to reshaping the entire Alliance structure.

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MESSAGE No. 2

1.c.c.

FROM WHITE TO CONTROL

MOVE No. II

DTG: 011315 Dec 66

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

During the last 11 months we have made successful steps toward our long range goal in Europe and improving on our major policy deficiencies.

A. Our relations with Bonn have improved. With the "death" of the ANF, our relations with FRG are further improved. We have gained operational control over US bases and units in France thereby increasing our stature in Europe and at the same time weakened the US influence.

B. Our major concern still remains the possible formation of an integrated Alliance without France. This cooperative venture has been divided further, to our advantage, by the independent UK non-proliferation proposal with the USSR and the dropping of the ANF; this is a further indication of the fragmentation of the Alliance. The proposed NATO political organization is another indication that the European countries are even further divided in their views on the European Alliance rather than together in their efforts to form an Alliance without France.

C. De Gaulle's visits to Poland and Moscow have further strengthened France's position as the "spokesman" of Europe in any future developments leading to a European settlement.

II. ACTIONS

1. At his press conference before the NATO Ministerial Meeting, General de Gaulle announced:

"The time has come for consideration of new arrangements in Europe.

With respect to the EEC, the present arrangements are, for the present, working satisfactorily. However, as I have said repeatedly, no agreement on further political and economic progress can be reached without prior agreement on defense policy. Obviously, there can be no realistic discussion of European defense

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F-123

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RPC 12-163

By 48 NARA, Date 8/26/22

policy without the participation of the United Kingdom and Spain. France would consider it reasonable, indeed necessary, that the heads of government of the UK and Spain be invited to the forthcoming meetings. This meeting should consider especially arrangements for the coordination and cooperation of these nuclear forces possessed by European nations. If agreement on defense policy can be reached, France, for its part, would be willing to reinstate the negotiations for the entry of the UK into the EEC and to institute negotiations for the entry of Spain. We would consider that such negotiations would almost certainly be crowned with success.

With respect to the defense of Europe, we consider it more necessary than ever that the nations of Europe assume fuller responsibility and authority for their own defense. This is not to say, or course, that we wish to sever the ties that have bound us for centuries to our great and powerful ally across the Atlantic. Obviously, however, if the nations of Europe are not yet ready to assume this responsibility, and prefer to continue to be subordinate to a non-European hegemony, however well disposed, even though this subordination be disguised under the name of integration, we do not see how there can be any agreement on defense policy, which, as I just said, is a necessary prerequisite to further political and economic progress. France, for its part is prepared to enter into a close and meaningful defense arrangement with its friends across the Pyrenees, and we have, therefore, instructed our Ambassador in Madrid to propose discussions leading to such an arrangement. France is ready, indeed willing, to proceed with similar bilateral discussions with those of our other European allies who wish to demonstrate their readiness to assume their rightful responsibility and authority for their own defense. This is not to say that we are not also ready to remain allied in multilateral but necessary arrangements with those of our allies who have special responsibilities arising from World War II, in cooperation with our friends across the Rhine, for the Defense of Germany."

2. Background briefing on the status of the French MRBM program reveals that program is in an advanced state. Preliminary components tests have been highly successful and a series of full systems test firings are scheduled for the near future. French nuclear weapons tests in the tactical weapons area have been successful.

3. Background sources point out that the new addition of French MRBM to the force de frappe will be in support of European defense and stress the contrast with US policies which have been to avoid the deployment of MRBM's in Europe due to distrust of it's European defense partners.

4. General de Gaulle has advised SACEUR that henceforth, French officers in SHAPE will have the status of liaison officers similar to the French officers at SACIANT. The French military command is prepared to discuss arrangements for coordination of French military forces with those under SACEUR.

5. In reply to Secretary Brosio's question pertaining to the French position on NATO's future and the proposed new NATO political organization, General de Gaulle advised that France's position was announced in his Press Conference in December. France will conduct itself in accordance with this position at the NAC meeting.

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MESSAGE NO. 2

FROM YELLOW TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. II

DTG: 011150 Dec 66

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION (As of 1 Dec 1966)

A. Events of the past year have not brought progress toward reunification but do offer prospect for some movement in the year ahead. The Alliance has undergone a significant change but has been preserved through concessions to the French and at the sacrifice of full agreement on integrated defense. On the other hand, the evolution through which the Alliance is going could lead to an improved German position within it. There has been progress toward economic fulfillment of the Common Market, and political prospects for European unity have improved. Our psychological and economic goals have largely been achieved. German security within an integrated NATO framework remains a primary problem. A new examination of this is called for.

B. Events with respect to non-dissemination and nuclear sharing have been unsatisfactory, and we envisage further de Gaulle proposals to weaken an integrated Alliance. Our January 1965 objectives remain relatively unchanged. One minor modification is proposed in Section II.

C. We welcome the movement toward an East-West detente, the resumption of political and economic discussions in the EEC, and the continuing presence of France in NATO. At the same time we now favor steps leading to an initiative on German reunification; progress on nuclear sharing in advance of any agreement on non-dissemination; and continued resistance to measures undermining the integrated structure and functioning of the Alliance.

II. OBJECTIVES

We recommend the Chancellor accept a modification to our second political objective, stated in our Basic Policy Paper of 1965 - to read as follows:

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Military (replaces 1)

- Provide for the security and stability of the FRG within NATO, where possible within an integrated framework - but with advantageous bilateral arrangements when necessary.

NOTE: This pragmatic change in objectives will enable us to work more efficiently in the environment that may exist within NATO.

III. COURSES OF ACTION

A. NATO Political Reorganization

Our position for communication to SYG Brosio prior to the December NATO Ministerial Meeting is that the FRG will reject the British proposal on the grounds that it would violate the principle of equality among NATO members and give official cognizance to the maintenance of the Alliance on a non-integrated basis.

NOTE: However, we recommend the Chancellor adopt the following fallback positions and actions if they appear necessary and effective to keep France within the Alliance:

In response to the UK proposal, our interests vis-a-vis France can be served by pressing for full integration for all other NATO nations, but reluctantly accepting an integrated political status and a non-integrated military status for France as the price of keeping her within the Alliance. This concession to France will have minimum impact on our security, as contrasted to the degrading impact if all other NATO Allies were to choose a loose coordination of national plans. We should encourage the French to move their two divisions in the FRG forward in any event - as evidence

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of their continued adherence to the treaty provisions and as sound military disposition of forces.

The dangers of this fallback course are 1) the invitation it provides to future French initiatives to capitalize on their success in this round, and 2) the possibility that others will follow the French example. To forestall the latter possibility, we should seek US/UK agreement on a firm position of integrated military relationship for the remaining NATO Allies - treating only the French as an exception.

To offset further French initiatives away from integration, a further concession could include the establishment of an additional Army Group in the South consisting of French and German forces under French command.

The FRG should press for additional key command and staff positions by virtue of her contribution to ACE and her increased importance to the Alliance. If the UK continues to degrade the BAOR the FRG should seek command of ACE forces in Northern Germany. US support of FRG command in the North could be enhanced by agreeing to make additional offset purchases in order to modernize our forces. An increased defense budget might be justified internally as a result of a greater voice in ACE and more authority in the defense of NATO/FRG territory.

B. Brosio Request for NATO Modifications

The SYG requests a specific recommendation from us et al, concerning NATO in light of current proposals - including a time schedule for proposed actions. We recommend the Chancellor demur on this request, but indicate that we will be glad to consider all proposals presented.

C. European Defense Discussions

The Italians, obviously responding to French initiatives, have proposed EEC discussion of European political, economic and defense policies. We should

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use this opportunity to discourage acceptance of French moves to disassociate European defense policies from the essential Atlantic ties, though indicating our readiness to discuss European defense in any context.

D. Force de Frappe Targeting Coordination

The FRG considers that prior to any discussions of targeting, the circumstances under which the force de frappe would be employed should be considered by a meeting of the NAC at the Ministerial level, following exploratory discussions in the Select Committee. Should France accept the Athens Guidelines for the force de frappe, the Alliance may direct staff discussions at the technical level on the pattern of procedures now followed by SHAPE and SAC.

NOTE: Our position should be coordinated with the US and modified as necessary to follow their lead. We should, however, oppose move of the US toward acceptance of any form of bilateral US/French coordination that by-passes SHAPE.

E. Reunification and Berlin

1. Explore with De Gaulle at the next meeting full understanding of what a possible non-proliferation agreement will consist of and how it would affect the FRG.

NOTE: In the absence of any indication that Communist China or France would subscribe to a meaningful non-dissemination agreement or that the Bloc will support moves on German reunification, the FRG should not accede to a non-dissemination treaty which precludes measures essential for German security (i.e., FRG participation in a multilateral nuclear force or in NATO nuclear planning).

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2. Explore extent to which France would support a reunification initiative if FRG showed interest in an acceptable non-proliferation arrangement.

3. Offer to repay Kosygin's visit to Bonn. Probe Russians on same subjects raised with French.

4. Relate German policies in political and military fields to the prospect of concessions from USSR and East Germany, and to the possibility of support from Allies.

5. Depending on the outcome of these soundings, we should consider a major German initiative toward reunification - taking into account the problems of nuclear weapons, Eastern frontier and Berlin.

F. Nuclear Sharing

In response to the negative British position on the MLF, and their withdrawal of the ANF proposal, the FRG should make another effort to solicit support for the original MLF concept. Assuming this initiative is unsuccessful, the FRG in the Select Committee, should press for substantive measures which will permit non-nuclear NATO members to contribute to the development, management, planning and utilization of the nuclear resources of the Alliance. We should intensify our efforts to obtain bilateral agreements and assurances from the US (as indicated in our Message 1, Move I) concerning nuclear sharing. We can not swim "up stream" i.e., go against the will of the US. We can however, attempt to turn its concessions to France to our advantage by becoming more assertive with the US in matters related to nuclear sharing, increased responsibility in integrated command structure and reductions in our offset arrangements.

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MESSAGE NO. 3

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FROM BLUE TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. II

REF: Control Msg to
All Teams No. 6,
Move No. II

DTG: 010900 Dec 66

1. In addition to the US facilities and units previously moved from French soil, the US has decided to move EUCOM to Belgium, with the agreement of the latter country. We have considered other locations for EUCOM and rejected them for various reasons.

2. We have also decided that it would not be feasible to leave the stock control facilities in France, to wit: Hq US Army Supply and Maintenance Agency, the Supply Management Division at Orleans and the Stock Control Division at Verdun, and have therefore decided to co-locate these facilities with EUCOM at its new location.

3. In view of the concerns which De Gaulle's report to Erhard could not fail to arouse among the Germans (Paragraph 7, reference), the US has decided to re-assure the FRG that we would find unacceptable, and support Germany's objections to arrangements in Central Europe which might have the effect of weakening the Federal Republic's and NATO's defense posture in that area, in exchange for vague and illusory suggestions about German reunification.

4. With regard to General De Gaulle's proposals (Paragraph 9, reference), we believe the French proposal should be welcomed as a step forward which could increase the military efficiency of the Alliance. We are presuming, after coordination with the UK, the Federal Republic and Italy, that we speak for these countries as well. Therefore, with the agreement of the countries concerned, we accept the French proposal and suggest that the Standing Group instruct SACEUR to set up the necessary arrangements.

5. We are frankly distressed at the British moves signaled in Paragraph 12 of the reference, although the British view on the ANF, is no surprise to us. However, we find that British intentions to conclude a draft non-proliferation treaty with the USSR entirely

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By CH NARA, Date 12-2-15

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unacceptable as a matter of procedure, as well as violating the spirit of the Alliance. We assume that it would not be necessary for us to take the lead, and that there would be a general protest against such a move without prior full consultation in the North Atlantic Council. We would expect the strongest reactions from all NATO Allies except France to this British leak. Furthermore, and aside from the procedural aspect, we would expect the Federal Republic to react strongly to the substance of the British idea.

6. In connection with the foregoing situation, we have decided to give to the British a tactfully worded but serious warning concerning the direction in which they appear to be moving. While recognizing the appeal that Wilson seems to think his proposals might have to UK, domestic opinion, we also believe that they would raise serious doubts and resistance in a large section of the British population, particularly in the Conservative Wing. We will suggest to the British that the so-called special relationship with the US may be jeopardized if they follow through and continue in this direction, pointing out that a weakening of the special relationship might also have economic and financial implications. We would also be surprised if the Federal Republic did not protest in strong terms to the British.

7. Disturbed over the possible implications of the events mentioned in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the reference, the US, in an effort to maintain control of an increasingly disorderly situation, has decided privately to sound out the Federal Republic as to whether it might not be useful at this time to prepare a new initiative on the subject of German reunification. Our basic purpose would be to stifle any possibility of bilateral developments between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union, or the Soviet Union and France which might take a dangerous turn. Our suggestion to the Germans should include a proposal for Quadripartite (US, UK, FRG and France) discussions. The next stage would be to discuss the matter in the North Atlantic Council before making a proposal to the Soviets that the four Occupying Powers should open talks on German reunification and related subjects. While we have little hope that the Russians would accept the idea, and even less that any useful result would ensue, we believe that the idea would be appealing both to the leadership and the people of the Federal Republic.

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8. We deny the rumors (Paragraph 14, reference) that we will abandon the Kennedy Round discussions, and emphasize our determination to push this negotiation through to a successful conclusion. Our objectives in III, Paragraph D of our Message No. 2, Move I, to Control remain valid.

9. We intend to deal with the problems posed in paragraphs 15 and 16 as one package. For public consumption, the US will restate its belief in the need for the present organization and structure of NATO, although pointing to its willingness to make any necessary adjustments, as demonstrated by the recent relocation of certain facilities. Furthermore, the US reiterates its willingness to study any reasonable proposals in concert with its Allies and to adopt changes which are found acceptable and necessary. However, we are not willing to concur in changes which in our judgment render NATO meaningless in terms of the objectives and goals which are well known to all its members.

10. At the same time the US has developed a private position which it is willing to make known to the Secretary General and to certain of its Allies, i.e., the UK, the FRG, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Canada. This position contains essentially the following elements:

a. Should the command question become critical or should for any other reason it prove impossible for SACEUR and SHAPE to operate from French soil, we are prepared to move that Headquarters.

b. Should similar difficulties affect the subordinate NATO Headquarters in France, they should also be moved to another country.

c. Should the foregoing two steps be taken it would seem only logical that the North Atlantic Council and the civilian Headquarters should also be relocated outside of France.

d. On the premise that representation within the Organization should bear a reasonable relationship to contributions (including real estate and air space) there should be undertaken a reorganization of the military structure to include an equitable distribution

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of posts by nationality, and any necessary streamlining or elimination should be undertaken in the interest of efficiency. These actions would of course affect France most importantly. However, we anticipate De Gaulle will remove all of his officers from integrated NATO military staffs if he forces SHAPE to leave France.

e. We would propose a similar operation on the International Secretariat of the Civil headquarters.

f. We would propose further that the Federal Republic replace France on the Standing Group.

11. We would also inform the Secretary General that we do not relate the elements of this position to a specific time schedule, since the first step must be taken by France. However once the first step is taken, the moves listed above should follow almost automatically.

12. We will inform the Secretary General, the UK, and selected Allies that we find unacceptable the British formulation of two specific and named categories of membership in NATO. Furthermore we fail to understand how the new political council would in any way differ from the present North Atlantic Council.

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MESSAGE NO. 9

FROM CONTROL TO ALL TEAMS

MOVE NO. III

DTG: 150830 Aug 1968

2D SCENARIO PROJECTION

1. It is now 15 August 1968.

2. While the US is enjoying prosperity and continued growth of its GNP, the election campaign is gathering momentum. The opposition is hitting hard at Administration foreign policies particularly in SEA and NATO.

3. In the Far East:

a. The US continues to be heavily preoccupied and somewhat frustrated. The Vietnam conflict has reached a form of stalemate. US force strength stands at the Mid-1966 level. US aid and civil action programs have expanded in South Vietnam. However, there is increased pressure against the US "occupation."

b. The destruction of NVN planes by strikes on airfields early in 1967 and the effective strikes against SAM sites outside the immediate Hanoi area caused a flurry of international excitement which soon fell into a normal pattern.

c. Guerrilla activity in Burma and Thailand has increased.

d. The Sino-Soviet split has worsened. Intelligence confirms that China shortly will be able to deploy a limited number of medium-range ballistic missiles, and that the USSR has in place behind its frontier with China a significant mobile MRBM capability.

e. The incidence of Chinese-Indian border clashes has increased with Chinese incursions into India's Himalayan territory. Estimates continue to indicate that activities are limited to the border area. In May of this year the Indian Government advised both Washington and Moscow that it would soon begin construction of a national nuclear arsenal for lack of progress on world nuclear disarmament efforts embracing Communist China.

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4. In Europe, major changes loom on the horizon unless something happens to solidify the North Atlantic Alliance in its present form. The NATO Ministers are meeting at London in special session to discuss the future of NATO.

5. To understand the current situation it is necessary to examine developments between 1 December 1966 and the present. Events during the period were influenced by:

a. US determination to preserve the Alliance and its integrated military organization with or without France. To this end, the US sought support from the 13 other NATO nations with particular emphasis on the UK and FRG. In fact, the President expressed his displeasure at Wilson's unilateral non-proliferation initiative to the USSR and expressed his hope that the UK would stand firmly by the US in the future.

b. De Gaulle's two-pronged actions. While using the economic advantages of an expanded Common Market to lure the European nations toward the French position, he continued his overtures to the East.

c. The West Germans, seeing certain benefits in De Gaulle's moves, appearing to be listening harder to his proposals while outwardly supporting the US.

6. A series of meetings and conferences in 1966-67 helped set the stage for the current world situation.

a. At the December 1966 NAC Meeting, the US announced plans to relocate Hq USEUCOM and elements of the US Army Supply and Maintenance installations from France to Belgium. The Council also approved plans to move the two French Divisions in Germany to forward positions. It was at this meeting that De Gaulle first hinted at his proposals for the defense of Europe. This led to a series of conferences designed to study possible treaty revisions with the thrust of US and FRG positions aimed at ensuring more equitable distribution of spaces in NATO military headquarters and the Secretariat, and to install the FRG on the Standing Group.

b. The UK and Spain attended the January 1967 EEC Heads of State Meeting in Rome. Ministerial level talks initiated at that time to explore possible options and

trade-offs that would result in UK and Spain EEC membership are still in progress. The French have related progress on this matter to their proposals for loosening the Alliance structure.

c. At the March 1967 Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva, the UK announced that its initiative to scuttle the ANF had led to inconclusive conversations with the Soviets in working toward a major disarmament breakthrough. As the meeting was about to break up, the Soviet Union proposed that it would agree to limited nuclear inspections by Polish/French teams if France would agree to sign the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. This action initiated a series of conferences which are still in progress.

7. While coordinated nuclear planning between the NATO Allies has been progressing through NATO initiatives, some interesting nuclear developments have transpired. French nuclear testing continued and it was reported the French are on the verge of exploding a thermo-nuclear device. Early French MRBM tests indicated technical difficulties.

8. In April 1967, De Gaulle announced that all French officers on NATO staffs would be reduced to the role of liaison officers. He also stated that in the future the French Military Command would coordinate its plans with SACEUR. While the presence of SHAPE and other NATO Headquarters in France was not attacked by President de Gaulle, the US continued to coordinate with other NATO nations on contingency plans for relocation.

9. In June, Chancellor Erhard visited Moscow returning Kosygin's June 1966 Bonn trip. Upon returning he informed the US and UK that Kosygin had repeated his earlier overtures to De Gaulle.

10. The FRG responded favorably to US initiatives suggesting Quadripartite (US, UK, FRG and France) discussions of the German problem. Initial talks, attended by France, resulted in considerable agreement that the time was right to pursue the subject further. Progress was coordinated within the NAC. The UK, acting as spokesman for the group queried the Soviet Union as to its willingness to participate in further talks.

11. At the December 1967 NAC Meeting, reliable US intelligence indicated a reduction in soft MRBM sites in Russia with a corresponding increase in mobile MRBM's. Speculation centered on a reported Soviet MRBM buildup in Asia.

12. The Soviet press continued to publish articles by USSR military and political figures openly boastful of the range, accuracy, and high yield of Soviet missiles. A road-mobile MRBM on launcher was displayed at the May Day Parade (1967). Firm intelligence confirmed continuation of the hardening of ICBM sites but there was no indication of a "crash" or speeded up program. Firings of all types of missiles have continued at about 1965-66 rates.

13. Just prior to the Christmas holidays in 1967, the people of Berlin rejoiced to the news that all restrictions on passage through the Berlin wall were being permanently lifted. This led to speculation that the wall might soon be removed.

14. At the end of 1967, several economic developments affecting the European Community were highlighted.

a. The EEC was flourishing.

b. The Kennedy Rounds concluded with limited success far short of US desires, but with the door not closed by anyone.

c. France, in the face of the worst wheat crop in its history, was hit by a Union demand to increase wages to twice the growth rate of the GNP.

d. Wilson secretly informed President Johnson that during a recent meeting in Paris to resolve problems plaguing the Concorde supersonic transport, De Gaulle unfolded a plan to cut Britain substantially free from its financial dependence on the US. He indicated he was prepared to use French reserves and those of other EEC members to support sterling. Wilson informed De Gaulle that he was counting on continued US financial support, but promised to study the proposals.

15. At his January 1968 talk with Chancellor Erhard, De Gaulle further explored the problems of defense and support for sterling. On the former he bluntly informed Erhard that

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France will never accept a German nuclear role--this is a permanent condition stemming from World War II. He outlined his European defense proposal and invited German participation. On sterling, he told the Chancellor he is prepared to support somewhat higher grain prices in exchange for German backing in his efforts to muster EEC support for the pound sterling. Erhard replied that the Germans might go along in support of sterling provided France agreed to the retention of US forces in Europe; but in the absence of some French compromise in this area, his country would be forced to seek a bilateral nuclear force agreement with the US.

16. By early 1968 there occurred further Soviet moves looking to liberalizing internal reforms. However, Polish and Rumanian sources privately advised the US that the present Moscow regime was running into mounting opposition, apparently from the military as well as the hard line party factions.

17. In May, at Soviet invitation, General de Gaulle met with Premier Kosygin in Moscow for official talks. At week's end the French and Soviet Ambassadors in Washington jointly advised the US that the USSR is informing De Gaulle that it is ready to move toward a general European settlement.

a. The USSR will dissolve the Warsaw Pact and over a two-year period withdraw its divisions from East Germany; it will accept a six-power commission (to consist of the US, UK and France on one hand, and the USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia on the other) to take up the problem of Berlin and a German peace treaty; the USSR is prepared to sponsor CEMA-EEC talks looking to a pan-European economic arrangement; the USSR will offer three sites in East Germany for inspection purposes to ensure withdrawal of Soviet Forces.

b. Soviet requirements are: termination of the NATO Alliance and removal of US troops from West Germany, and conclusion of an agreement for a nuclear free zone in Central Europe.

c. The Soviet representative made it clear Moscow's conditions cannot be separately attacked -- the West must accept or reject the complete package.

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18. Several high-level East European Government sources advised the US that the Soviet demarch represents an all-out and perhaps final effort of the Kosygin-led liberals to retain power and stave off an otherwise ultimate victory for the militarists. These sources hinted at an expected Sino-Soviet confrontation, pointing out that the Soviet leaders must ascertain first whether their Western rear can be secured before they decide upon the method of handling China.

19. Growing internal domestic pressures to reap the economic advantages inherent in EEC membership contrasted with traditional Anglo-American ties led the UK to propose a special NATO Ministerial Conference in London for August 1968. In this effort to be the "honest broker" in preserving the Alliance, Prime Minister Wilson made it clear that the future of Britain hinged on solving Europe's problems. Therefore he was taking this initiative with a hope that meaningful solutions could be found.

20. On the eve of the London Conference, the Alliance was stunned by news of De Gaulle's hospitalization for the removal of a major organ. Details are sketchy, but usually reliable sources report that his condition is deteriorating. De Gaulle revised the French Constitution following his 1965 election to ensure his choice of a successor and Prime Minister Pompidou is now acting President.

21. To insure support for its position on NATO, the US has privately warned the other 13 NATO Allies that a strong "Fortress America" feeling is building up in the Congress and in public opinion and that unless there is solidarity among the 14 NATO Allies on the preservation of NATO, the continued presence of US forces in Europe may not be assured. At the same time the US informed the Allies that Soviet representatives in Washington have indicated that the USSR would prefer to do business with the US rather than De Gaulle and therefore with respect to Franco-Russian proclamations, caveat emptor.

22. During the first meeting of the London Conference, the French, US and FRG ministers each presented his country's proposals on the future of NATO.

23. France is prepared to let the North Atlantic Treaty go on, but the NATO's integrated military structure must disappear and be replaced by new defense arrangements which would provide ultimately for the conditions needed to bring a "political Europe" into being.

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a. First the US, UK and France must offer positive reaffirmation of Article 5 of the Treaty. This will ensure continuation of the West's strategic deterrent through a three-power directorate. Defense of West Germany would be assured by a four-power directorate over US, UK, French and German forces in Germany, each under national command. An eight-power war planning staff (EEC members plus the UK and Spain) would form the cadre of the European Defense Community, whose basis will be a series of bilateral pacts such as the Franco-Spanish defense agreement arrived at in August 1967. It was clear that the French leader envisaged only very loose coordinating arrangements binding these groupings with the US organizational relationship, most tenuous despite its strategic commitment.

b. As a part of the package, France announced that it was prepared to finalize UK and Spanish entry into the EEC. The French Minister stated that he considered the time propitious further to explore Kennedy II negotiations with a view toward linking US trade to the EEC.

c. France suggested a form of "European Coordinating Committee" within the framework of the WEU which could grow through inclusion of the other Allies. This latter concept was linked to conditions allowing the emergence of a political Europe.

24. The FRG position appears to be one of waiting to see what the US and France have to offer. The government appears to be wavering in its former positions. However, the Federal Republic made it clear that it wants:

- a. A greater voice in NATO command.
- b. A firm US strategic nuclear commitment linked to a greater German voice in its planning.
- c. Continued presence of US forces in Europe.
- d. A co-equal voice in European security arrangements.
- e. Participation in all phases of planning for the use of nuclear weapons in Europe.

25. The US:

a. Remains firm in its determination to keep NATO alive with its present integrated military structure, with or without France.

b. Continues to support the functioning of the Select Committee as a forum for working out NATO Nuclear problems. As an inducement for continued FRG support, the US has offered, through the Select Committee, to include Polaris submarines in a NATO multilateral force.

c. Tabled proposals for the creation of mechanisms to share, with the UK, Germany and other NATO Allies who may be interested, production of armaments and space technology.

d. Proposed that the NATO Military Committee be moved to the continent.

26. Upon receipt of the communique from your minister reflecting the above positions, the head of your government directs that you:

a. List those areas in the proposals on which your government is willing to make concessions in order to proceed with meaningful negotiations.

b. Develop additional proposals.

c. Prepare future courses of actions.

Be prepared to provide a member of your team to meet in special session at 1100 hours to discuss concessions and negotiations.

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MESSAGE NO. 3

FROM WHITE TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. III

DTG: 151350 Aug 68

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION (15 August 1968)

A. During the past year and a half, our purposes have not prospered as well as during the previous period. We have apparently prevented a definitive coalition of the other 14 members of NATO against us, but the game is far from won.

B. Unfortunately our proposal for the development of an EEC plus UK and Spain defense policy has not produced clear results. The Americans have revived the MLF (in a more attractive form., i.e., submarines) after we had thought the issue was dead. The Germans are still on a strong pro-NATO, pro-US line, so the MLF offers a real challenge to our policy and our position.

C. The Russians have presented a plan for moving toward a general European settlement which contains nothing fundamentally new. An overly receptive response to the Russian offer would damage us with the Germans so there are limits on our ability to exploit any potentially new Soviet attitudes on European security. Nonetheless, we consider that the Soviet proposals deserve serious considerations and exploration. A French counter-proposal may be in order.

D. The Germans are still the key. The UK are apparently politically weak and confused, and are easier to discount as either a positive or negative element on the scene. The Americans still have a built-in bargaining advantage over us in dealing with Germany. It is possible that despite our moves -- which have been skillful but which stem from an inferior power base as compared to the Anglo-Saxons -- that a NATO without France will be organized, and that some kind of a collective nuclear force with which we cannot compete will be established. It is not time to give up the game, however, since it may still be possible to prevent it by a combination of conciliating and threatening action.

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II. PROPOSALS

In a series of diplomatic contacts in capitals; we put forward the following positions:

A. (Stress to FRG) The US offer to include Polaris submarines in a NATO multilateral force continues to be a meaningless offer. The Americans will still retain a veto over employment of the force, and the American nationally controlled forces are still of such a size that the MLF is irrelevant in terms of the relative power positions. Thus, if a situation arises where the European members of the force wished to employ the MLF, but the US did not, the force could not be used. If the US desires to employ its national forces, it makes no difference whether the MLF is used or not. We fail to understand, therefore, why any European country would wish to submit to this subordination for the purpose of providing deck hands and mess officers for an essentially irrelevant "no go" force.

B. Europe is faced today with a situation in which the Soviet Union appears to be ready to engage in meaningful discussions leading toward a further relaxation of tensions in Europe. While we do not find the Soviet proposals, as presented, to offer anything new, we nonetheless consider that they are consistent with past Soviet diplomatic tactics, and must be taken as an indication of readiness to engage in meaningful discussions. We feel, therefore, that the American proposals are both ill-timed and ill-considered in that the proposal for an MLF would seriously hinder the present trends toward a relaxation of tensions in Europe, would tend (for reasons that are obscure to us) to perpetuate the cold war, and would seriously jeopardize the continuation of the present, relatively liberal regime, in the USSR. For this reason alone, we would consider that the US proposal should be rejected and efforts concentrated on a serious attempt to explore the Soviet position.

C. There is, however, an even more imminent reason for not considering the American proposal. We would again point out to the FRG -- and those other countries who profess to be interested in German reunification -- that FRG participation in any MLF arrangement would forever end hopes for reunification, and the existence of the GDR

would become a fact of international relations. We have noted with interest the Soviet willingness to withdraw, under certain conditions, its troops from the GDR. Should the existence of the GDR become a permanent fact, France would have no choice but to reconsider its relations with the GDR.

D. With respect to the EEC, plus Spain and the UK, we consider that the proposals we have advanced and which the FRG representative indicated his government would accept, represent a real opportunity for the development of a truly European Europe, free to pursue its own destiny, and which can evolve -- who knows -- one day into the basis for an expanded, and peaceful, continental system. As the President of the Republique has repeatedly stressed however, there can be no hope for further progress in this Europe unless and until there is agreement on fundamental defense policy. We, for our part, are desirous of proceeding with the development of the "eight", and we express our friends in Europe will make the decisions that would make such agreement possible.

E. With respect to the proposals advanced by our German Allies, we find ourselves in fundamental agreement with them. Our comments follow:

1. We agree that the FRG should have a greater voice in defense arrangements in Europe, and, in fact, this we have ourselves suggested through our proposed quadripartite arrangements for Germany.

2. We also would welcome a firmer US strategic commitment. Again we also have proposed a nuclear coordinating arrangement, which would include -- in addition to those powers possessing nuclear forces -- the FRG and Italy. Regrettably, and for reasons we do not find clear, the United States has not found it possible to respond. We take this opportunity to reiterate our proposals.

3. We also have proposed the US forces remain in Europe, specifically in Germany.

4. Again, our quadripartite proposals, and our eight power proposal for an EEC to develop European defense arrangements can lead to full participation of the FRG, as a sovereign state in European defense arrangements, including nuclear planning.

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F. With respect to NATO, the President de la Republique has repeatedly stated that the subordination called integration will cease by 1969. Proposals are before the members of the Alliance today which would meet these conditions. France will, of course, remain faithful to its Allies, but will reserve its decision on present treaty arrangements, for a reasonable time, to permit consideration of and decision on its proposals; specifically, its proposal for the eight power European Defense Community and that the integrated NATO command structure be fully disestablished.

In accordance with its well-known position, France must request that integrated headquarters be withdrawn from French soil, within a reasonable period -- i.e., by August 30, 1969. France is willing, to offer, and does so offer, to provide facilities on French soil for the NATO Military Committee Quadripartite Command, as well as facilities for the planning staff for the proposed European Defense Community. If agreement can be reached on defense policy, France will, of course, continue to collaborate with her Allies regarding the use of French territory and airspace under mutually acceptable arrangements consistent with our sovereignty. If, however, no such fundamental agreement is possible, these arrangements will of necessity have to be re-examined.

G. With respect to the Soviet proposals, we consider that they offer genuine possibilities for a further relaxation of tensions, and we feel they should be pursued. We agree that the proposals, as presented, offer nothing new, but, we feel that they constitute an initial bargaining position. We again propose, therefore, the convening of a conference to discuss a non-proliferation agreement, which, we again state, we are prepared, in principle, to sign. This same forum can also, should the discussion prove fruitful, lead to a conference on disarmament.

H. The proposals for discussions between CEMA and the EEC offer real possibilities for the restoration of traditional and profitable trade relation in Europe. France, therefore, proposes that those European countries

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with an interest in such trade relations propose, in identical notes to the USSR, that such discussions be undertaken at an early date, specifically November 15, 1968. It goes without saying that such talks could not be conducted if the nations of Western Europe were divided on basic defense policy.

I. The French press has announced that Edgar Faure has cancelled a planned trip, in a private capacity, to a number of Eastern European countries, including East Germany.

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MESSAGE NO. 3

FROM YELLOW TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. III

DTG: 151100 Aug 68

REF: 1100 Special Meeting

The FRG has been requested to provide a delegate to a Special Meeting called at 1100. We are, of course, providing an FRG delegate to this meeting and are most willing to cooperate in any and all Allied consultations.

We are - however - uncertain as to the agenda, scope, authorities, etc., pertaining to this meeting and are withholding authority for substantive participation by our delegate until this matter is clarified.

Request specifics pertaining to purpose of meeting and objectives to be achieved.

ERHARD

cc: FRG Delegate

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MESSAGE NO. 4

FROM YELLOW TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. III

DTG 151130 Aug 68

Following is text of message from FRG to German Ambassador in Moscow for relay to all teams. QUOTE:

Pls seek appointment with Kosygin and inform him FRG is prepared consider in a constructive and realistic manner -- and to urge to our allies to adopt a similar attitude toward -- any proposals USSR may make to end cold war in Central Europe. It is of course understood that security needs of all German people would be taken into consideration in such proposals.

FYI Allies will be informed of your demarche after you see Kosygin.

SCHROEDER END QUOTE.

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MESSAGE NO. 5

FROM YELLOW TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. III

DTG 151400 Aug 68

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION (15 August 1968)

A. The events of the past three years have evolved to our benefit -- our policies have been successful in bringing us closer to the achievement of reunification of the Germans. If we can continue to be assured of meaningful US engagement and guarantees -- regardless of the outcome of the proposals for change concerning NATO's structure -- we may be able to utilize the current NATO Pact detente to achieve a withdrawal of Soviet forces from the Lands of Eastern Germany within the context of an overall settlement of the German problem.

B. With the prospects of reunification looking brighter than at any time since the end of WWII it appears opportune to accept some adjustments in NATO if it facilitates the eventual re-establishment of a united Germany. Acceptance of some change in character of NATO's integrated structure must be predicated on clearly defined advantages which will accrue to the FRG. Germany's position in Europe has continued to improve economically, and politically; militarily we have yet to achieve an equal status in NATO security arrangements.

C. The Soviet conditions for reunification will inescapably weaken the effectiveness of NATO if agreed to by the West. Any withdrawal of Allied troops from Germany will require the establishment of firm agreements to reconstitute quickly the capability successfully to defend the present NATO territory in the event of bad faith on the part of the USSR.

D. De Gaulle's passing from the scene will permit us to revitalize the 1963 France/FRG treaty of friendship and the opportunities for the Germans within an expanding EEC are evident.

II. COURSES OF ACTION

Reunification

1. This is now the central, active objective of our policies.

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2. We accept the possibility that a weakening of the present NATO organization, including ultimately the withdrawal of American troops from Germany or German withdrawal from NATO, may be necessary to achieve an acceptable German settlement. However, concessions on German security can not be considered separately from progress toward reunification.

3. Pending a final German settlement and permanent provisions, for German security, arrangements for the defense of FRG territory by NATO will continue to be necessary.

4. Germany must now be prepared to take the lead in this matter; Allied support continues to be a most important factor.

B. SPECIFIC ACTIONS RELATING TO AUGUST 68 NAC PROPOSALS

1. French Proposals - (Overall - Don't be too influenced by French position -- it is declining and probably will continue to decline if De Gaulle dies).

a. Loosened NATO - A qualified yes, depending on significant concessions toward reunification.

b. Reaffirmation of Article 5, and a US/UK/FR nuclear directorate.

- Willing to consider only if it is expanded to include the FRG and if a co-equal seat is provided for us in the nuclear directorate.

c. Four Power Allied directorate proposal for FRG:

- Must retain considerable flexibility here; consider only if (a) the directorate is given planning authority for emergency actions, (b) A German chairs the directorate (our territory ... our forces predominant by a factor of 2, etc.), (c) it is tied with other concessions, and (d) the US continues to maintain consequential presence in the FRG until a complete withdrawal of Soviet forces from Europe is obtained.

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d. French proposal for 8-power war planning cadre for EDC (EEC plus UK and Spain).

- Do not reject it out of pocket - first, explore essential European political union that must precede this action.

(NOTE: For tactical maneuver if this issue gains momentum - permit the US to take the lead since their position is key to ours and bilateral US assurances essential in any event. If US weakens and indicates some acceptance of idea, be prepared to extract most favorable positions on such a staff. As long as US remains strong, stay with their position.)

e. French proposal for UK and Spanish entry into EEC and Kennedy II Round.

- Strongly support both proposals.

f. French "Coordinating Committee"

- We should be willing to pursue and exploit this vague proposal -- indications are favorable for us.

2. US Declaratory NAC Position - Support it down the line as long as US holds - positions are likely to change.

3. FRG's Stated Position - Remains our declaratory position (-but be willing to negotiate "C" depending on circumstances and assurances we can extract in light of Soviet demarche -- opportunities for reunification initiative remains correct thrust of negotiating position).

(NOTE: Our prior policies have proved sound - We are prospering, peaceful -- we have witnessed a softening of the Soviets.)

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- Our economic health will permit us to announce increased aid to underdeveloped areas - announce increased aid to:

Spain

Africa (Western oriented stes, i.e., those supporting our position on reunification).

India

C. OTHER COURSES OF ACTION

1. Economic exploitation of the "hole in the wall" in Berlin should intensify; longer credit terms; increased trade; propose technical assistance to agriculture; increased cultural/educational ties.

(NOTE: Don't push too hard or fast on subjects with political connotations. Moving too fast will be counter-productive.)

2. Advise Pompidou that we are interested in revitalizing the 1963 FR/FRG treaty. Do not be provocative toward the French - be conciliatory to the extent possible without jeopardizing our security arrangements.

3. In the Select Committee -- don't push for specific hardware proposals to the extent that it will scare FR and UK, or will fan flame among Soviet militarists.

D. POLICY POSITION FOR USE IN EVENT WITHDRAWAL OF US/UK/FRENCH FORCES FROM FRG BECOMES AN ISSUE

In the event withdrawal of Allied forces from the FRG and termination of FRG membership in NATO is proposed our policy should be one of absolute opposition to such disengagement unless and until satisfactory assurances are obtained from our Allies on each of the following:

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a. That such withdrawal is directly related to the achievement of German reunification,

b. That the position of Germany after such withdrawal is not one of isolation from the Alliance or its consultative bodies, and

c. That absolute guarantees for the security of Germany are obtained.

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MESSAGE NO. 4

FROM BLUE TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. III

DTG 151600 Aug 68

I. REVISED ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

Before turning to specifics of our negotiating position as requested in Paragraph 26 of Message 9, Move III, we believe it is essential to provide a revised estimate of the situation which in our judgment will provide the rationale for our position. In effect this is an effort to document what we believe to be a basic position of US strength.

a. We believe that General de Gaulle's operation and rumors of his condition will take much of the starch out of the French position. The General's illness cannot fail to cause both confusion and concern in France at all levels. While Mr. Pompidou will certainly follow the guidelines of De Gaulle's policies (after all, De Gaulle may recover) but we cannot feel that Pompidou can operate on the world, or even the NATO stage with the same assurance as the General himself.

b. We also feel that insofar as the EEC and related economic matters are concerned, France is not operating from a convincing position of strength, and that conversely the US indeed has a position which should be appealing to France's EEC partners. We furthermore accept the point of view that France has at least as much, if not more, to gain from EEC as any of her partners.

c. We feel that the possibility of a US-Soviet understanding has almost matchless leverage upon both the French and the Germans, to say nothing of the British. The thought of his axis becoming an operating force in the settlement of European and other problems, with consequent loss of influence on the part of the European NATO Allies, will be as important a factor as we will be able to find in bringing acceptance of our points of view.

d. We believe another factor to be considered is the state of domestic opinion in the US and its effect on Europe. In view of our forces and commitment in Vietnam, and the prospect of additional commitments of

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the same nature in Thailand and possibly Burma, we feel that our Allies would, at least, weigh the possibility of a substantial or complete US withdrawal from Europe, and subsequent weakening of the US commitment to defend the NATO area. This situation may well cause our NATO Allies to think twice before buying French proposals which might well result in such US decisions.

e. In summary, and based on the foregoing, we believe that the FRG will line up with the US (and this is certainly supported by the points in the FRG position in Paragraph 24, Move III, Message 9); we believe that the UK cannot afford not to come along with us; and lastly, we believe that the remainder of the NATO Allies, except France, will come along if they are convinced that they cannot replace NATO and achieve security through bilateral agreements with the US.

II. THE FRENCH POSITION

We find the French position as outlined in Paragraph 23 of the message to be unacceptable as a package. In the first place, we cannot accept the demand that the integrated military structure of NATO disappear; and unless De Gaulle has completely reversed himself the "political Europe" to which France refers would have no appeal to the other European NATO partners.

More specifically, we would not be willing to commit ourselves to a positive reaffirmation of Article 5 of the Treaty in the context of this French position. We feel, additionally, that the whole question of Article 5 should be put aside until we have a greater appreciation of the results of our negotiations.

We also find the remainder of the French proposal of Paragraph 23a unacceptable and Paragraph c similarly, has no meaning for us.

However, we find the French proposal regarding Spain, the Kennedy Round and EEC in Paragraph 23b, to be constructive and we are prepared to cooperate in any steps toward these ends.

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III. THE GERMAN POSITION

Without dealing point by point with the German proposal in Paragraph 24, we feel that we can accommodate German desires on all of these points. In fact, with the withdrawal of French officers from integrated NATO Staffs (Paragraph 8) we have already provided additional key positions to the Germans in the military field.

We would point out that the 5 German points, which the Federal Republic has made clear that she wants, to us are linked in each case to the continuation of NATO including its integrated military structure.

IV. THE US POSITION

The 4 point US position needs only enlarging and refinement of some points, not all of which will be dealt with here. However, we do wish to add the following clarifications:

a. Feeling that we must be more specific even at this stage with regard to nuclear problems, we intend to propose to our Allies the creation of an Allied Nuclear Force, composed of land, sea, and air elements, all of them nationally contributed and nationally manned. This force would be assigned to SACEUR. We see the components of these forces as being Polaris missiles for the sea element (and we would look to a possible increase in the number of US-assigned submarines as well as the British subs); the land element would be something on the order of an extended-range Pershing missile; and the air element would be F-111 aircraft. This ANF would, as stated above, be assigned to SACEUR, and all headquarters between SACEUR and the unit commands themselves would be mixed-manned. With regard to the sea element, we do not exclude the possibility of an eventual surface element. The planning and targeting for the use of this ANF will, in all cases, be carried out by integrated mixed-manned staffs.

b. On the assumption that the US proposals would be unacceptable to France, we would propose additionally that SHAPE and the NATO Civil Headquarters be moved from France and relocated in another NATO country. We are prepared to decide on the new location in consultation with the Allies. Subordinate NATO Headquarters in France will, of course, be relocated as well.

c. Since the presence of France as a member of the Standing Group in these new circumstances would be an anomaly, we therefore would propose to replace France with Germany in this position. If necessary, we might also accept Italy on the Standing Group, although we would oppose this development to the limit of diplomatic feasibility.

d. As a collateral issue, and if it appears necessary, the US should make every effort to gain domestic and Congressional support for an even more generous US offer on tariffs, quotas, etc, for our negotiations in Kennedy II.

e. Given the apparent evolution of the Spanish regime, the US should discreetly sound out the other NATO partners as to the possibility of Spanish accession to the treaty. In the present situation, however, we would not be prepared to push this matter if it showed signs of meeting serious resistance.

f. With regard to the Soviet proposal in Paragraph 17, the US feels that any Western response or negotiating position should be developed only after thorough consultation in the NAC.

V. CONTINGENCY







Should the French take the position that their proposals constitute essentially a matter for European decision, with only a limited role for the US, we believe it should be made clear to all that such an attitude would be a certain means of forcing the US to reexamine its commitments to Europe.

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

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Armed Forces Staff College -----	1
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DETAILS ARE NOT TOO IMPORTANT



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