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182

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE		DATE	RESTRICTION
#2 letter	to Walt Rostow from Gen. Wheeler secret	1 p	10/23/67	A
#2a memo	Game Requirements (U) secret	XXH 3 p	10/13/67	A
#2c chart	action teams and control secret	1 p	undated	A
#3a letter	to Walt Rostow from Gen. Wheeler secret	1 p	06/05/68	A
#4a report	MU I-68 secret	75 p	04-05/68	A
#5a letter	to Walt Rostow from Gen. Wheeler secret	2 p	03/30/68	A
#5b top secret report	Game Requirements (U) secret	4 p	03/22/68	A
#6 memo	to Walt Rostow from Gen. Birdsong secret	1 p	10/03/68	A
#6a report	re: war games secret	1 p	10/03/68	A
#7a memo	to SecDef from Gen. Wheeler top secret -	3 p	09/24/68	A
#7b report	re: war games top secret -	6 p	undated	A
#8a memo	to Rostow from Gen. Birdsong secret	1 p	11/27/68	A
#8b report	re: war games secret	2 p	11/26/68	A
#9 memo	to Walt Rostow from Saunders secret <i>open 12/3/07</i>	1 p	12/11/68	A
#9a memo	to Walt Rostow from Gen. Birdsong secret	1 p	12/10/68	A
#9b report	re: war games Secret	10 p	undated	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Agency File
JCS -- War Games, Vol. V
Box 31

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282 ✓

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#11 report	Final Report Secret 81 pp <i>sanitized 10-16-85 NLS 85-142</i>	1/11-25/66	A

FILE LOCATION

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

CM-3335-68
21 May 1968

Handwritten initials

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Distinguished Service Medal for Admiral Sharp

1. I concur with the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations in recommending that a Distinguished Service Medal (Gold Star in lieu of second DSM) be presented to Admiral Sharp at a White House ceremony on the occasion of Admiral Sharp's retirement. Suggested dates for such a ceremony are contained in the attached memorandum from the Chief of Naval Operations. Also attached is a proposed citation for this award.

2. Your assistance in arranging for this presentation would be appreciated.

(Sgd) EARLE G. WHEELER

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachments:

CNO Memo, dated 8 May 68
SecNav Memo, dated 22 Apr 68
Proposed Citation

Copy to CNO

Mr Sanders

3/

Mr Rostow / won't
participate.

H. H. Sanders did attend
this meeting on 6/27/68.



~~SECRET - NOFORN~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
JOINT WAR GAMES AGENCY
POLITICO-MILITARY DIVISION

12 JUN 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS ROOM, WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Politico-Military Game, MU I-68

1. Forwarded are copies of documentation of interagency, politico-military game, MU I-68, as indicated below.
2. The Fact Book, Game Messages, and Final Report are distributed to each game participant as well as to other individuals, commands, and agencies having an interest in this game.
3. Additional copies of the documents are available upon request to this office.

Charles P. Murray
CHARLES P. MURRAY
Colonel, USA
Chief, Politico-Military Division

Attachments

1. MU I-68 Game Messages, 1 cy — *Reunders*
2. MU I-68 Final Reports, 2 cys — *1cy to Reunders*

THIS CORRESPONDENCE STANDING
ALONE IS REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET - NOFORN~~

RECEIVED
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1968 JUN 14 AM 10 31

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*Joint
Weiss
Hans
3*

TO Hal Saunders
To Call Col Seadler direct

BKS

Phoned Col. Seadler - 4/10/68 -
11:45 am.
T.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4/3/68

1. Hal Saunders HS
2. Gen. Gumbrecht
S. Ret. BKS

Brom:

I would like to participate.
Will you have someone call, or
shall I?

Hal

Brom: I suggest Hal call
Col Seadler direct. gf

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

5c

MU I-68

SCHEDULE

MON	TUES	WED	THURS	FRI
				<u>26 APRIL</u> Briefing: Team players - 1000 Control players 1400 (Rm BC 942A)
<u>29 APRIL</u> Yellow & Green Teams meet 0930-1530 (BC 942A)	<u>30 APRIL</u> Red & Blue Teams meet 0930-1530 (BC 942A)	<u>1 MAY</u> Control meets 0930-1530 (BC 942A)	<u>2 MAY</u> Yellow & Green Teams meet 0930-1530 (BC 942A)	<u>3 MAY</u> Red & Blue Teams meet 0930-1530 (BC 942A)
<u>6 MAY</u> Control meets 0930-1530 (BC 942A)	<u>7 MAY</u> Yellow & Green Teams meet 0930-1530 (BC 942A)	<u>8 MAY</u> Red & Blue Teams meet 0930-1530 (BC 942A)	<u>9 MAY</u> Control meets 0930-1530 (BC 942A)	<u>10 MAY</u>
<u>13 MAY</u>	<u>14 MAY</u> Critique--All Participants 0900-1030 (5C-1042)	<u>15 MAY</u>	<u>16 MAY</u>	<u>17 MAY</u>

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By sp/cmm NARA, Date 11-15-07

ATTACHMENT #2

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

26 September 1968

MEMO FOR: Mr. Rostow
Mr. Keeny (in turn)

For your information. Please
return.

9/

Robert N. Ginsburgh

Mr. Saunders ? ⁸

HS R. Bort

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 11, 1968

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Senior Review of the Persian
Gulf War Game--tomorrow,
Thursday, December 12, 2 - 3:30 p.m.
Room 5C-1042, Pentagon

You may recall that you answered General
Wheeler's invitation by saying that you would
try to attend but could not promise.

There is no pressing reason for you to
do so unless you would be interested in what
promises to be a fairly lively discussion of
the future problem area. Unless they are
sidetracked, Clifford, Udall, Nitze, Wheeler,
and others at that level now plan to attend.

If you do go, a quick look at the tabs I
have marked in red in the attached book will
give you a picture of the issues we tried to
focus on and a picture of the action in the
game which will be reviewed in more detail
at the opening of the review.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By je/cbs NARA, Date 11-15-07 Harold H. Saunders

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
JOINT WAR GAMES AGENCY/PMD

9a
✓


MEMORANDUM

Date 10 December 1968

To: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow

Subject: ETA I-68 Senior Review

Attached is a pamphlet containing information and agenda for the Senior Review of ETA I-68 to be conducted from 1400 to 1530 hours, 12 December 1968, Room 5C-1042, the Pentagon.


W. H. BIRDSONG
Brigadier General, USA
Chief, Joint War Games Agency

Attachment
a/s

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WHEN ATTACHMENT REMOVED

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JOINT WAR GAMES AGENCY
COLD WAR DIVISION
POLITICO MILITARY BRANCH

QUARTERLY ACTIVITIES BULLETIN #4
15 April 1966

SENIOR LEVEL REVIEW OF NU-66 VIDEO SUMMARY

Due to conflict between the 8 February Senior Review and Discussion of NU-66 and the Honolulu Conference, a 29 minute video-summary of the politico-military games NU I and II-66 was presented a second time at the Pentagon on 24 March, for senior participants and other interested officials. Individual film showings were later arranged for Secretary of State Rusk, the Honorable William C. Foster, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and General Maxwell D. Taylor.

VIDEO PRESENTATION OF EPSILON-65 FOR ISA

The video summary of EPSILON I-65 (25 minutes) was presented to the Honorable John T. McNaughton, Mr. Adam Yarmolinski, Brigadier General George M. Seignious and Mr. Lawrence S. Finkelstein, ISA (OSD) on 30 April 1966.

PREPARATIONS MADE FOR MU-66

During March and early April the Politico-Military Branch, CWD conducted interviews and research in connection with the politico-military game MU I-66, prepared appropriate reference materials, selected maps, identified major issues, problems and questions for attention in game scenarios and forwarded game invitations to interested agencies. Professor J. C. Hurewitz of Columbia University and the Council for Foreign Relations, Professor Gordon Torrey, Johns Hopkins University and Professor Edwin M. Wright of the Foreign Service Institute agreed to serve as members of the Game Directorate along with Brigadier General James D. Kemp, USAF, newly assigned Chief, JWGA and Colonel Fred Haynes, ISA (OSD). MU I-66 is scheduled to be conducted at the Pentagon between 19 and 27 April with a review and discussion by the participants on 5 May 1966. Plans are being made for a Senior Review and Discussion of the video summary of MU-I-66 on 19 May.

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SIGMA I-65 PRESENTED TO STUDENTS AND FACULTY OF ICAF


On 14 March a briefing was presented to students and faculty members of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces at Fort McNair on JWGA activities by Captain Harris, Colonel Minor and Colonel McDonald. A 35-minute kinescope of SIGMA II-65 was also shown.

SIGMA II-65 SHOWN TO OFFICERS OF OPS 60


On 23 March SIGMA II-65 was shown to officers of OPS 60 by invitation of Rear Admiral J. V. Smith. Colonel McDonald introduced the film and responded to questions regarding the game and CWD activities.

POLITICO-MILITARY BRANCH STRENGTH TEMPORARILY REDUCED

Due to retirement of CDR Harold Willyard, USN, the Politico-Military Branch is currently reduced to three officers. Two additional officers have been assigned and will report for duty during the coming months. One, Lt Col Robert M. Smith, USA, is returning from Vietnam the long way on 45 days delay enroute and expects to visit Nepal, Bhutan, India, Pakistan and various Middle East countries on the way.


THOMAS J. McDONALD
Colonel, USA
Head, Politico-Military Branch

APPROVED BY:


WILLIAM T. MINOR
Colonel, USAF
Chief, Cold War Division

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SANITIZED

NLL 66

SANITIZED
Authority NLJ 85-142
By ing, NARS, Date 10-16-85

RECEIVED
JONATHAN BUNDY'S OFFICE
1226 EAR 14 AM 11 00



FINAL REPORT

PREPARED BY
JOINT WAR GAMES AGENCY
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

GROUP-1
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85-142-56




NU I & II-66

11 - 25 JANUARY 1966

FINAL REPORT

PREPARED BY

JOINT WAR GAMES AGENCY
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301





THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

CM-1194-66
28 February 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PARTICIPANTS OF NU I and II - 66

Subject: Final Report (U)

Enclosed is a copy of the Final Report on the politico-military
games, NU I and II - 66.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Earle G. Wheeler".

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure

When Enclosure is Detached
This document is downgraded
to Unclassified

NU I & II - 66

FINAL REPORT

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NU I & II - 66

FINAL REPORT

FOREWORD

This volume constitutes the Final Report of NU I & II - 66, two inter-agency politico-military games played by senior as well as action level officials of the Executive Branch during the period 11 January - 8 February 1966. It includes summaries of both games, a commentary and transcripts of the discussions which followed the game.

This Final Report was preceded by a Fact Book, published prior to the game, which contained General Information, Background Information and a list of Issues, Problems and Questions designed to set the stage for game play. A second volume, Game Documentation published on 28 January 1966 contained all scenarios and team messages pertaining to both games.

This written report will be followed in the near future by a documentary type video/film report of NU-66 which will be available for presentation to groups within interested agencies and should be of particular interest to officials preparing for the forthcoming state visit of Prime Minister Gandhi.

In addition to game participants, this material is available to interested agencies for the orientation of planners, intelligence officers and senior officials dealing with broader aspects of Asian policy.

NU-66 was the twenty-fourth in a series of politico-military simulations conducted by JWGA since 1961. Covering a wide spectrum of international conflict, written reports on these games vary from For Official Use Only to Top Secret. Distribution has generally been limited to participants and responsible agencies. Listed below are dates, titles, subjects and related information pertaining to these exercises:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CLASS</u>
Fall 1961	NONE	Berlin	In-house CWD	S
22-26 Jan 62	SIGMA I-62 (Phase I)	SE Asia	Experi- mental	S
12-16 Feb 62	SIGMA II-62 (Phase II)	SE Asia	Inter- agency	TS
3-4 May 62	ZIP I-62*	Disarmament/ Zonal In- spection	Inter- agency (Experi- mental)	S
14-18 May 62	MU I-62	Middle East	Inter- agency	TS
28-31 May 62	ZIP II-62	Disarmament/ Zonal In- spection	Inter- agency (Experi- mental)	S
23-26 Jul 62	ZIP III-62*	Disarmament/ Zonal In- spection	Inter- agency	TS
13-17 Aug 62	MU II-62**	Middle East	Inter- agency	TS
17-21 Sep 62	EPSILON I-62	Berlin	Inter- agency	TS
23-25 Nov 62	EPSILON II-62***	Berlin	Inter- agency	TS

* No formal report
 ** Conducted at CINCNELM, London
 *** Conducted at Camp David

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CLASS</u>
3-7 Dec 62	OLYMPIAD I-62	Middle East, Berlin, ZIP, DAFT (De- cade after)	Civilians from Labor, Industry, Creative Arts	S
Mar 63	TAU /BETA*	Test Ban	Inter- agency	S
Jun 63	SIGMA I-63*	Indonesia, Malaysia	Inter- agency	S
Aug 63	ZIP V	Disarmament/ Zonal In- spection	Summer Interns	FOUO
Aug 63	ZIP VI	Disarmament/ Zonal In- spection	Summer Interns	FOUO
23-31 Oct 63	CHI I-63	Insurgency Angola, Indonesia, Iran and Venezuela (This was 4 games in 1)	Inter- agency (two level)	S-NF
2-5 Mar 64	EPSILON I-64	Revolt in East Germany	Inter- agency (two level)	S-NF
6-9 Apr 64	SIGMA I-64	Southeast Asia (1965)	Inter- agency (two level)	S-NF
18-22 May 64	IOTA I-64	Intelligence Readiness (1965)	DIA	S-NF

* Cancelled immediately prior to game play

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CLASS</u>
8-17 Sep 64	SIGMA II-64	Southeast Asia (1965)	Inter-agency (2 level)	S-NF
May 65	SIGMA I-65	Southeast Asia (1965)	In-House CWD	S-NF
26 Jul to 5 Aug 65	SIGMA II-65	Southeast Asia (1965-66)	Inter-agency	S-NF
11-15 Oct 65	EPSILON I-65	France and NATO (65-70)	Inter-agency	S-NF
11-25 Jan 66	NU I & II-66	China-India (1970)	Inter-agency (2 level)	S-NF

In addition to written reports covering most of these games, the Cold War Division, Joint War Games Agency, has video tapes and film summaries of recent games under the following titles. Requests for showings or temporary loan of films should be made to the Joint War Games Agency.

SIGMA II-64. A documentary-style composite of three 1964 politico-military games examining a projection of the conflict in Southeast Asia thru April 1965. Classification SECRET - NOFORN. (Running time: 27 minutes)

SIGMA II-65. A documentary-style report of a politico-military game examining the current (July 1965) situation in Southeast Asia thru 1966. Classification SECRET - NOFORN. (Running time: 37 minutes)

EPSILON I-65. A documentary-style report of a game exploring internal problems of the NATO Alliance between 1966 and 1970. Classification SECRET - NOFORN. (Running time: 27 minutes)

William T. Minor

WILLIAM T. MINOR
Colonel, USAF
Chief, Cold War Division

[REDACTED]

SUMMARY OF NU I - 66

On 12 October 1970, following a lightning coup by insurgents in Sikkim, Red Chinese ground and air forces drove into that small mountain country threatening the Indian town of Siliguri and the LOC supporting an Indian corps in Assam. Concurrent CPR attacks in the NEFA and Kashmir pushed the Indians back to Chinese claimed borders as Peiping issued veiled nuclear warnings to New Delhi.

Responding to Government of India (GOI) requests, the US expedited the flow of economic and military assistance. It countered the ChiCom threat by deploying US air defense, fighter aircraft and air transport units to India and a nuclear capable naval task force into the Bay of Bengal.

The Kremlin continued military and economic aid at current levels carefully avoiding military involvement while "deploring" the introduction of nuclear forces into the crisis area.

New Delhi's efforts to meet the military threat were severely hampered by domestic problems. Harbor and internal distribution facilities were strained and communist inspired uprisings in Kerala and Nagaland threatened to spread to other famine ridden areas.

By late October a "People's Government of Bhutan" had invited Peking's assistance, Indian and Chinese forces were fighting in Nepal, and Nagaland had proclaimed itself an independent state.

Repeated requests from New Delhi and Washington to overfly East Pakistan and expand the Siliguri air corridor failed and a joint US/Indian airlift through the fifteen mile gap barely met the needs of hard pressed Indian forces in Assam. On 27 October a US transport was shot down in the corridor by a Chinese MIG.

[REDACTED]

A US suggestion that India agree to a plebiscite in Kashmir in exchange for passage through East Pakistan continued to be unacceptable to the GOI and on 29 October an Indian Air Force (IAF) transport was downed by a Pakistani fighter over East Pakistan. Indian violation of East Pakistan, coupled with the movement of Indian reinforcements to Kashmir, led Pakistan to launch a major attack into Kashmir and toward the Indian capital of New Delhi.

Washington responded to GOI requests for additional assistance with more air support. The USAF relieved the IAF of its commitments from Sikkim to the east resulting in several major engagements between US and Red Chinese aircraft, but enabling India to mass against the Pakistani attack.

As the game ended, Moscow had not replied to a GOI request for assistance. Washington favored Soviet aid to India against Pakistan while the US continued to help meet the Chinese threat. In early November a joint US/USSR effort in the UN Security Council calling for an immediate cease-fire was gaining world-wide support.

In Washington, it seemed clear that a viable India was an essential prerequisite to Chinese containment.

[REDACTED]

SUMMARY OF NU II - 66

On 12 October 1970, following a lightning coup by insurgents in Sikkim, Red Chinese ground and air forces drove through that small mountain country, invested the Indian town of Siliguri and threatened the LOC supporting an Indian army corps in Assam. Concurrent CPR attacks in the NEFA and Kashmir rolled the Indians back as Peiping issued veiled nuclear warnings to New Delhi.

Responding to requests from the Indians, the United States countered ChiCom nuclear threats with blunt talk in Warsaw, deployed a carrier task force into the Bay of Bengal, reinforced air and naval units in SEA and began boosting Indian economic and materiel assistance. The President made it clear however, that US military personnel would not fight on the subcontinent. To forestall a Pakistani attack, the US encouraged the Indians to announce a specific date for a Kashmir plebiscite.

The Kremlin responded to Indian requests by dispatching a high level mission, Soviet fighter squadrons and manned SAMs. Within 48 hours, Russian troop carrier units were arriving in India to facilitate Indian deployments and logistics support. Pravda deplored "unjustified attacks against peace-loving nations."

Assuming that with current help, India could handle the military threat, the United States accepted the risks of Soviet involvement on the subcontinent, confident that US economic and food aid would provide adequate political leverage. Governor Harriman flew to New Delhi to determine the real extent of Soviet-Indian cooperation and to provide assurance of continued US materiel aid (including a dramatic C5A lift of food to famine stricken Kerala and Madras). He made it clear however, that the United States had no intention of matching Soviet military contributions or of becoming directly involved in the fighting.

[REDACTED]

The Indians sought to counter-balance Soviet help with American forces in spite of irritation over the US plebiscite proposal.

Rejecting a five point Chinese peace offer, India began reinforcing hard pressed border units and by invitation moved troops into Bhutan to stabilize that government.

On 17 October, Moscow announced that two of its transports had been shot down by CPR aircraft over Soviet territory and that retaliatory action had been taken against a Red Chinese airfield and nuclear activity -- later identified as an MRBM site in western China. For some hours there was speculation that a major Sino-Soviet conflict was imminent. The US Government avoided involvement and softened third country efforts to defuse the situation, but Peiping elected to let the incident pass and the Soviets have taken no follow on action. During the crisis, US concern for a possible ChiNat attack against Red China resulted in movement of the Seventh Fleet closer to Taiwan and a visit by Ambassador Goldberg to Taipei.

NU I & II - 66

COMMENTARY

In his introductory remarks at the Action Level Review of NU-66, [] "I don't think that anything is intended to be proved by a game. The game is not really valid evidence of what has 'happened' some time in the future. On the other hand, probably real crises -- real historical events -- don't prove anything either. They tend to be unique events unlike each other."

Obviously lessons are drawn from history and participants carry impressions away from games. The following comments are drawn from impressions acquired by personnel of the Cold War Division in preparing and conducting NU-66.

Both NU-I and NU-II were set in a 1970 time frame in order to give Communist China a limited nuclear delivery capability -- thirty-two MRBMs with a range of about 1000 miles and some nuclear carrying Badgers. It became increasingly noticeable however, that non-nuclear ingredients of the "crisis" were more important and that some of these are realities in 1966.

It was apparent from the beginning of NU that the root of the problem, the invitation to Chinese aggression, was Indian political, economic and military weakness. Even without MRBMs, or nuclear-armed Badgers, a Red Chinese attack into traditionally claimed border areas of Ladakh and the Northeast Frontier Agency, a coup in Sikkim, insurgency in Nepal, Bhutan or among the NAGAs and rumors of impending attack through Burma would strain India severely. Like Communist take-overs in Kerala and Madras, dissidence in Manipur-Tripura, and Pakistan champing at the bit, these are not implausible problems well before 1970.

Three additional years of famine, really inept leadership, increasing political cross purposes, major economic shortfalls, rampant communalism, racial and lingual conflict and other weaknesses endemic to Indian

[REDACTED]

society could create the severe situation portrayed in the game. This is particularly true if United States/Indian relations are permitted to erode as a result of the Vietnamese conflict and/or the Kashmir question. Political limitations on U.S. economic and military aid to India or unavoidable slippage in assistance could contribute to an atmosphere of non-achievement.

In NU, it was Indian vulnerability coupled with Chinese frustration in Southeast Asia that triggered the game crisis. Some participants commented that this appeared to be as credible a rationale for Chinese initiative as one in which Red China attacked the subcontinent after Communist successes in Southeast Asia or in order to exploit American preoccupation with Vietnam.

In NU-66, an India strong enough to defend the Himalayan approaches and to preserve the integrity of the border states would have constituted a major bulwark in the containment of Communism. With nuclear backing from the United States, strong Indian forces would have presented a formidable deterrent to Chinese incursions.

With respect to Chinese MRBMs, U.S. officials on "United States", "Indian", and "Red Chinese" teams seemed equally skeptical concerning the likelihood or credibility of Red Chinese nuclear blackmail in this situation considering the relative power of U.S. and Chinese nuclear capabilities. In fact, many players felt that the Red Chinese MRBMs constituted a provocative and dramatic potential target for enemy attack, e.g., in NU-II, the USSR "insulted" Red China by conventionally bombing the Chinese MRBM site and airfield. (This opinion was not universally held, however and was, in fact, questioned by a senior participant at the Senior Review.)

In NU-66, Chinese objectives were more limited than they might be in other imaginable confrontations such as renewed Korean hostilities, Peiping vs Taiwan or a Chinese attack in Southeast Asia. The possibility that Red China might use a modest nuclear capability to hold the Indian population hostage as a deterrent to western nuclear response or as a means of neutralizing Indian counter moves, was considered plausible by "Red Chinese" players.

In both NU-I and NU-II, "United States" teams reacted to the private "Chinese" nuclear threat (to attack Indian cities if India tried to regain Sikkim),

[REDACTED]

by deployment of nuclear capable task forces into the Bay of Bengal and quiet warnings through Warsaw and Moscow that nuclear retaliation would be swift and sure. Both "United States" teams provided defensive nuclear assurance requested by India without deep concern that the Red Chinese would employ such weapons. A senior participant commented during the final review that U.S. efforts to dissuade India from the production of its own nuclear weapons carried an inherent commitment for defense which might involve more than nuclear guarantees.

In both games, the U.S. teams rapidly expanded economic and military aid which, if provided earlier, might have helped prevent the crisis.

In the initial scenario, India had not yet made a final decision regarding development of nuclear weapons and the question of U.S. opposition to such a project was not addressed in the game. It would have been illuminating to contemplate an American response to an initial situation in which India possessed a nuclear capability. Would this substantially alter the situation? Perhaps not very much since in NU-66 it was noted that Indian population centers were more vulnerable to attack by Chinese MRBMs or conventional aircraft than were Chinese population targets to Indian weapons.

In NU-I, brief consideration was given to providing India with U.S. atomic demolition munitions for defensive use in the Himalayan passes, but that question was overtaken by rapid Chinese moves. Tactical nuclear weapons were not otherwise discussed in the game.

The fact that the United States was not itself vulnerable to attack by major Chinese weapons systems in NU-66 did not go unnoticed by the U.S. team. What consideration would apply if China were an inter-continental nuclear power? A game set in a later time frame, when Red China has ICBMs might see greater sensitivity to the subject on the part of U.S. players.

Both "United States" teams and their "Indian" counterparts correctly appraised "Chinese" military goals as limited to border gains rather than a massive military assault against Assam. They believed, again

correctly, in this game that Peiping was attempting to restore its power image, humiliate India and further erode Indian viability. Both "United States" teams felt that India could cope with this situation if assisted and they proceeded to provide the economic, military materiel and other aid which had been cut back during recent years.

In NU-I, the "United States" provided air force, air defense and naval units for immediate combat employment against the Red Chinese. In NU-II, no U.S. forces were committed, but the "United States" was ready to provide airlift in shifting Indian Army reserves if this became absolutely necessary.

Both "United States" teams hoped to obtain some cooperation from the USSR and to deter Pakistan from intervening. It was evident that an attack by fourteen Red Chinese divisions would have been far less of a problem if a large part of the Indian Army hadn't been tied down in the Kashmir. Peace with Pakistan would have changed the entire power ratio.

As a consequence of Indian intransigence on the Kashmir issue in NU-I, the "United States" found itself aligned against both Red China and Pakistan. In that game, Indian violations of East Pakistan territory (forced by the Siliguri bottleneck), led to a major Pakistani offensive toward New Delhi and into Kashmir.

The United States had the choice of:

- a. Continuing the war on the side of India against China with the Indians concentrating their energies in defense against Pakistan.
- b. Withdrawing entirely from the subcontinent and risking the complete fragmentation of India with consequent extension of Chinese influence.
- c. Taking action against Pakistan itself, an alternative that didn't look particularly appealing.

In this situation, joint US/Russian intervention to halt the struggle between India and Pakistan might have been a possibility if the game had gone on.

[REDACTED]

The "United States" elected to assist the Indians in defense against Red China while somehow remaining aloof from the Indian-Pakistan conflict. This seemed a fairly untenable solution which might profitably have been explored in another move.

Like internal Indian instability, war between Pakistan and India loomed more ominously as a complicating factor than did the limited Chinese nuclear capability. The Indo/Pak conflict in NU turned on the Kashmir question. Without a Kashmir settlement, any Pakistani Government would have been vulnerable to internal as well as external influences seeking to make trouble. Any Indian Government making major concessions with respect to the Kashmir, particularly in a crisis, faced loss of critical domestic support. The question of whether the United States should support settlement of the Kashmir question on a strictly legal and moralistic basis was implicitly answered in the actions of both "United States" teams in NU. In the game, United States national interests precluded more than the most moderate forms of pressure along this line if Indo/American relations were not to be compromised. The alternative, of applying pressure by holding back aid to India did not look promising and neither "United States" team even considered this course. To many players an overall settlement of the Kashmir issue which mollified moderate majorities in both India and Pakistan would have served long-range interests of those countries as well as the United States and would probably have been a mutually fruitful area of interest to the United States and USSR.

It was apparent that the "United States" had virtually no leverage for heading off Pakistani action in Kashmir without military aid ties. A number of players felt, therefore, that in addition to military aid for India before the crisis, it would have been useful to have provided commensurate military support to the Pakistanis in order to head off Pakistani "fishing expeditions" into the Communist world. It looked as if U.S. military support for both countries would have had to be part of an overall political package aimed at precluding renewal of Indian/Pakistani hostilities.

[REDACTED]

Both "United States" teams were wary and reluctant about too great a U.S. military commitment to India in so unstable a situation, but in NU-I, U.S. planes were being shot down by Chinese fighters in the Siliguri Corridor when Pakistan attacked. It looked as though the U.S. would have a difficult time extricating itself. In NU-II, it was decided early by the "United States" to allow the Russians to provide the lion's share of military aid, depending upon long-range U.S. economic capabilities to offset short-term extension of Russian influence. (It was noted by one critic who thought this was a risky policy that in 1948-50 U.S. economic power had provided very little political leverage in China once the Reds had taken over.)

Neither U.S. team was interested in participating in Indian efforts to secure the border states (which raises questions regarding the real impact loss of these states might have on Indian viability), but both "United States" teams were anxious to see India continue as a non-Communist national entity. In fact, during play, the "United States" team in NU-I changed its goal from "Contain Communist China," to "Maintenance of a viable India as a prerequisite to Chinese containment."

The game highlighted the vital military significance of the Siliguri Corridor. This narrow neck between Sikkim and East Pakistan constitutes the only access route through which Indian reserves and support can move to bolster defensive efforts in the NEFA or Assam. If use of this corridor is impeded as occurred in the two games, either by a Chinese thrust through Sikkim, or by air attacks, India might have to force passage through East Pakistan as they did in NU-I. That violation caused hostilities with Pakistan, underlining the importance of U.S. contingency planning to prevent or to help end such a confrontation. Use of a UN or other peace force, including U.S. and perhaps Soviet military units to halt fighting between Indians and Pakistanis, was discussed slightly in the NU-II "United States" team.

In NU-II, instead of Pakistani intervention, Control had the USSR provide amazingly prompt and massive military aid to India. In effect, Control had the Russians preempt the "United States" team, which then had to decide whether or not to compete.

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In NU-II, the "United States" speculated on advantages to the United States of a Sino-Soviet military confrontation, but after considering how such an event could be fostered, that team decided to sit back and "await further developments." Control had the Soviets attack an MRBM site and airfield in west China (in retaliation for Soviet transports lost to the ChiComs near their common border). At that point there was considerable doubt in the U.S. team as to the magnitude of the Soviet strike against "nuclear activities." The "United States" hoped the Russians would knock out Red China's nuclear production. It tried to tamp down third nation peace efforts on the one hand while heading off precipitate Nationalist Chinese action on the other.

There were a number of participants, who felt that this was a rather cavalier attitude toward the possibility of nuclear war between Red China and the Soviet Union. One thought expressed at the Final Review was that such a war could lead to extension of Soviet influence over Red China and a return to the monolithic structure of communism which existed during the 1950s. It was suggested that the present bi-polar arrangement within the communist camp may be preferable in the U.S. interest.

While NU-I and NU-II were being prepared by the Joint War Games Agency, it was believed that questions of bases and Indian Ocean deployments would have major game significance. NU did not dwell on these points however, and the fact that there was no U.S. Indian Ocean Naval Force at the outset made introduction of a U.S. carrier task force into the Bay of Bengal a fairly significant warning "signal" to Peiping. Had the task force been there at the outset, however air assistance could have been provided to the Indians (in NU-I) on a more expeditious basis. This raises some questions: (1) Would this have made any substantial tactical difference? and (2) Would normal intelligence indications provide a basis for advance positioning of naval forces if not already on station? In these games, U.S. forces were still actively based in Thailand and South Vietnam. A facility had been established at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, U.S. bases were still located in Thailand and Vietnam, and no great difficulties were encountered in rapidly deploying air and naval units, including C-5 transports. This is a highly complex subject however, deserving of considerable more attention than was provided in NU-66.

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The fact that the British defense presence had been drastically reduced in the Indian Ocean area had little game significance.

The foregoing comments are not a definitive analysis of NU-I or NU-II 66, nor are they so intended. It is hoped that they will serve the reader as a gauge with which to compare his own impressions.

In comparing material examined during the two games with the "Issues, Problems and Questions" identified during preparation of the game Fact Book and Scenario, it appears that coverage was quite good. Most of the things that were bothering planners before the game were at least considered in one of the games or in the Final Review.

NV I & II - 66

SENICR DISCUSSION
8 February 1966

[] Gentlemen, I think that we best kick-off and call this a quorum. If there's anything that we in the War Games Agency have learned, it is not to try to have a Politico-Military Game with the high level people of Washington concurrently with the beginning of a new session of Congress, a war and peace movement and a snow storm. If any one of these had fallen out, I think we would have had some more people. We had regrets as you know from a large group. The picture in the paper this morning of the Honolulu Conference, we had hoped, would be about what our table would look like this afternoon. However, we of the War Games Agency are very happy to have been of service and hope that all of you have gotten something out of this game.

We will try to document the game so that a good report will be available to those who were not able to be here. That's one of the reasons we are here in the Air Force Television Facility, where we will tape and record video so that we can identify by teams, the people that are speaking.

None of this will go outside for any type of distribution attributed to anyone as is normal in these games. This is for internal consumption of our group only in turning out a game report. I should like to turn the meeting over to [

GAME DIRECTOR: Thank you [] This is []'s valedictory game, and in case you don't know it there's an extraordinary amount of imaginative devoted hard work that goes into these things. I'm not taking credit for it. I enjoy it just as you do. But I think the [] and his Staff really deserve congratulations. The only possible hitch in these things is the one that he has already confessed to. Actually, the truth is we had an initial problem of too big a

conference. First the ^I tried a snow storm, that reduced the size and he got a bigger storm than he meant. Finally, he arranged the Honolulu Conference and we shortened the table by about eight feet.

This is the first double header game I've participated in and it is going to be hard for all of us to keep the two games separate in our minds, while yet having both of them somewhat in mind. Let me just remind you that Game NU-I essentially took a direction that became an India-Pakistani confrontation, raising one particular set of problems for the U.S., and I guess reducing certain such problems for Red China. Game NU-II became a rather heightened version of a Sino-Soviet dispute because the Soviet Union jumped into the act. It found itself substantially at odds with China, had a border scrape and (with Control making decisions for Russia) took what was meant to be at least a slightly provocative action, namely attacking an airfield and a missile site, at both of which nuclear weapons were thought by the Russians to be present.

Now, I should confess that this difference between the two games was really the decision of the Control Team. This is not the same thing flopping one way in one set of rooms and another way in another set of rooms. The Control Team has a serious problem of making a game go. If any generalization comes out of these games -- and it may not apply to the world, I think it does -- is that it is very, very hard to get a war started. It was hoped in this game that we might push things to the point where at least some kind of nuclear intervention by one side would be seriously considered.

One of Control's problems is to introduce plausibly the behavior of the countries. Plausibility usually comes up for a little criticism at these sessions. Let me say two things about it. First, most of life seems to be a sequence of implausible events. (The problem is to choose among implausible events.) The problem is to choose among implausible alternatives and even if one can interpret these games as true history, rather than synthetic history, one would still, as the historian does, have to say, that's just one way things could have gone. Don't generalize too much about it. The other point about plausibility is the Control Team often finds itself groping for something that is fairly plausible, chooses something, works it over for a while and it becomes very, very plausible through a

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process of getting familiar with it. I think, frequently, what these games can accomplish is to demonstrate that what often appears on the surface to be implausibility or improbability is merely unfamiliarity. It's hard to work with any sequence of events in a game for several hours without it's beginning to seem either real or as one that could be real.

Now, I've provided for you the following series of ten observations in the form of questions. I thought we needed some kind of an agenda to focus on this afternoon. These are not questions to be answered here. They are questions to promote discussion. We don't need to cover them all. We don't need to take them up in any particular order.

1. One purpose of the exercise was to see what difference some Chinese nuclear weapons would make. Is the answer that they did not make any difference? In what circumstance would they have made a difference? What alternative Chinese nuclear capability would have made a difference in this game?
2. Pakistan did make a difference. Is the Kashmir dispute more trouble than Chinese weapons in this period of time? Would Pakistan have been harder to deal with (in Game I) had it been fully allied with Communist China and a declared enemy of Blue?
3. Blue's aid to India, in both games, was limited to direct support of local defense, with neither actions nor threats against economic or other assets on Chinese territory. Was this because coercive bombing was considered unnecessary, ineffective, unpopular, or dangerous?
4. Ragged, ambiguous areas invited faits accomplis -- Sikkim, Bhutan, NEFA, etc. Should Blue want to support a military effort to restore such areas; would Blue have to support a military effort to restore such areas? Would Blue and Green interests eventually have diverged embarrassingly?

5. The danger of Indian "collapse" was of concern to both Blue Teams, quite explicitly to one of them. How much should this danger deter Blue's involvement? Can China destroy India internally by a war that stays safely within the "ragged areas"?

6. Was East Pakistan any kind of "hostage" in India's hands, to deter Pakistan in the west? If not, why not, and could it have been?

7. Would any kind of Indian nuclear capability have mattered? Was there a mode of utilization (ADM's for example) that might have appealed to Green? Would Yellow's nuclear diplomacy have been different if some real or token Indian nuclear capability had existed?

8. If the Sino-Soviet dispute reaches the action stage, is there some point at which Blue should become (a) concerned about the dangers of war, (b) concerned that the Soviets will dominate China, or (c) concerned that American influence is put too much in the back seat?

9. Can the United States be "pre-empted" out of India by a too forthcoming a Soviet Union in India's hour of need? Would the tactic appeal to the Soviet Union; could it be resisted by India; can it be countered by American economic influence (food and other aid)?

10. Does the exercise have any implications for American aid and Indian economic planning -- e.g., internal transport, pre-stocked emergency food, greater priority to development of particular areas of India?

Just to provide us a starting place, I would propose that question one is as good a place as any. This to me is a particularly important question in the game because a purpose of the game was to see what difference it made to sketch a game at a period of time when the Chinese might have nuclear capabilities that would either lie like a shadow over the situation or bring about some kind of nuclear action. As far as I can tell things never came close in either game to involving serious nuclear decisions. Therefore, I propose as question one, the

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observation: "Is the answer that nuclears don't make any difference? If not, why not? Would they have if the scenario had been different? Would they have if the weapons imputed to the Chinese had been different? Or did they make a difference in some fashion that isn't what we anticipated and therefore it needs to be discovered out of different material?"

CPR II (OSD): Well, I was on one of the Chinese teams, and my impression was that the nuclear question did make -- I'd have to check with my colleagues -- but it was certainly very much on my mind at the beginning that our nuclear capability made a substantial difference to the way that we thought. One of the main issues of concern to us was to be sure that we could secure our capability to retaliate against the Indians, using the Indians as a hostage to keep the United States from threatening us. In effect, this set some upper limit on the provocation that we felt we could make in that the key problem or key issue about our nuclear capability was its survivability. We did indicate that we wanted to take measures to protect our nuclear capability by dispersing our missiles or doing other things so that the United States wouldn't be able to knock them out. And having done that, instead of having India as a hostage, we sort of assumed that we did have a secure retaliatory capability and went on.

GAME DIRECTOR: Your interest was in deterring the US from something?

CPR II (OSD): That's right in deterring the US from making a nuclear attack on us on behalf of the Indians and we didn't think that we could threaten the US very well. We wanted to use the Indians as hostages and threaten to retaliate against India as a way of deterring the US from attacking us. Is that the way my colleagues thought about it?

CPR II (OSD): Yes, now that I think back on it, the possible exclusion that I'd allow myself to make was by 1970 it didn't occur to me to credit us, the Chinese, with a tactical capability. I thought and played exclusively with the strategic nuclear exchange. That may have colored the system although we didn't get into a tactical confrontation where I think tactical

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nuclears would have been appropriate. It just didn't occur to me to think about them.

CPR II (OSD): Nor me. I wonder, were we given just the intermediate range missiles and aircraft? Did we have short-range tactical nuclears? I mean the Army type nuclears?

GAME DIRECTOR: We did not have it in the scenarios. Were you thinking you could deter any tactical use of nuclears by the United States or only a major attack on your homeland?

CPR II (OSD): I think we were just thinking of a major attack on our homeland.

GAME DIRECTOR: And were you in fact, prepared to retaliate or did you just want the Indian Team to think you would so that they would keep them (the US) from doing it?

CPR II (OSD): I think if there had been a major attack we would have retaliated.

CPR II (OSD): We moved the MRBMs so that we could.

CPR II (OSD): I think we would have retaliated against the Indian cities, if there had been a major attack against our nuclear facilities.

GAME DIRECTOR: Suppose there had been US tactical use of nuclears, would you have fired at the Indian cities?

CPR II (OSD): Well, I was the nuclear hawk on our team and I did in fact try and get our team interested in a small nuclear explosion, ambiguous as to its nature, so that we might even get the Russians and the US confronting one another over who may have been responsible. But I got no enthusiasm out of the Chinese for that gamble.

CPR II (CIA): I might say Mr. Chairman, I was the dove on the Chinese Team, and all the way through my thinking was, let us not shake those nuclear weapons because we have far, far too much to lose. I won't say that I triumphed in my views.

CPR II (OSD): I don't think what we're saying conflicts with that. Certainly our policy wasn't to threaten, and we talked a little bit about our nuclear capability, but we really weren't threatening a nuclear war. We just wanted to prevent one from happening.

GAME DIRECTOR: May I ask someone on the Indian Team of Game II whether they were much worried, either about a Chinese attack or about the US provoking an attack by being too wayward with nuclear weapons?

INDIA II (OSD): I don't think that we were terribly worried about either of these. I think we felt that the threat by the US to attack China was a very fine deterrent indeed. We thought it was rather splendid and we felt comfortable under the nuclear umbrella. Isn't this so?

Game II was the one where the Russians and the Chinese got into each other's hair very quickly. We debated the issue about whether we should get the US and the Chinese fighting as well, and in Game II that really wasn't the real option because the US just didn't play at all. As far as we Indians could see the US stayed very carefully out of that one except meeting minimum commitments, and it was easy to play a line of getting rather angry at the US. We Indians were very self-righteous. I would say that the problem of the US attacking the Chinese with nuclear weapons wasn't very serious.

CPR I (DIA): I was on the Yellow I Team and from our point of view in thinking in as Chinese a manner as possible, we felt we were trying to recoup face from the Indo-Chinese campaign in the eyes of the Africans and Asians as well. Our objectives, then, were to secure the frontier countries without arousing a major war. Any consideration of the use of tactical weapons or any use of them by our side would have thoroughly damaged and strained such friendly Africans and the other people who hadn't any such capabilities. In addition to that, it appeared to me that any minor power having atomic weapons would be unlikely to seriously consider their use in a conflict in which one of the major atomic powers was taking a keen interest. It was obvious that it might redound in serious damage in a very short time.

GAME DIRECTOR: I might report that at the Critique last week, with the action teams present, I believe both Chinese Team captains used language suggesting that the

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nuclear weapons had affected their thinking. The weapons had to them represented liabilities rather than assets in that they doubted whether they would ever use them. They doubted that the US Team thought they would initiate them. They thought nuclear weapons provided nice symbolic targets for demonstration attacks, if the US was looking around for something bold like this to do. But they also felt quite confident that they could achieve both their immediate and their longer range objectives without getting close enough to nuclear war for these things to make much difference for the immediate objectives. I think that both teams had this feeling about political conquest of these border areas and the implication for the potential future collapse of India and other parts of Asia, due to the demonstrated Chinese ability to enjoy a success of that sort.

INDIA II (STATE): I think we diagnosed the Chinese purpose in the beginning as probably being like you stated. We are now learning that our original decision was correct. We assumed that although this had neo-dramatic quality, the way it started, the probability was that this would be a serious and limited action. Now if you take this assumption as a premise, and as a kind of a conclusion, this line was all through the first discussion of the scenario, as far as we were concerned. To me this was an all out path and a lot of times from the attitude of Pakistan to all these various things were interpreted in that light. So essentially what we did was to diagnose your plan as you put it to us as it was and act accordingly. Is that correct?

INDIA II (OSD): Several times this deterred us from being nastier than we might have been. We felt we were risking being wrong in a big way for a relatively little output when we might just as well "wait another move" and see how it would really go. For example, whether or not a large Chinese attack would develop in Assam or something of that sort, which as it happened, didn't. That solved that for us.

INDIA II (STATE): That's why the nuclear thing didn't loom so large and Pakistan didn't loom a little larger, because Pakistan loomed large relatively in a political sense.

GAME DIRECTOR: Let's look at question two. "Pakistan did make a difference. Is the Kashmir dispute more trouble than Chinese weapons in this period of time? Would Pakistan have been harder to deal with (in Game I) had it been fully allied with Communist China and a declared enemy of Blue?" I think in both the games the Kashmir dispute was far more important than the Chinese nuclear capability in terms of the pre-occupation with India-Pakistan relations. While it's true that the war with Pakistan was invented by Control and has no particular authenticity to it, my Control team colleagues, who pushed me into that war, found it exceedingly plausible and it almost looked as though the US team was delighted to go and fight China, while the Indian team would fight Pakistan for a change. Could one conclude that the more troublesome adversary may have been Pakistan, rather than China, and that if one had a choice just from a point of view from this game, of cleaning up the Kashmir dispute or cleaning up Chinese nuclear weapons, the former might have been far more worthwhile?

INDIA II (OSD): There's something that troubles me here about what I may say quite frankly appears to be the present policy and its relevance in light of your question. The kind of dispute which is going on in Pakistan has been going on in the Indian subcontinent for a thousand years -- 1200 or something of that sort. And it has taken many shapes and forms but has had very much the same roots in many ways throughout this long time period. I wonder how realistic it is to try to clean that up in the '60s. Aren't the chances very good that this will go on for another 300 years and that perhaps we'll have to try to live with it rather than shoving it down everybody's throat?

None of this is supposed to be an argument against trying to dampen whatever trouble breaks out, but it is a question about how much sense there is in trying to force a solution onto people. Perhaps they're really most comfortable having a low level conflict going on for a long time, because it's always been that way and they don't really have to settle anything that way. For example, speaking as India in Game II for a minute, we felt that loss of Jammu and Kashmir was absolutely unacceptable to the Indian Government and would as a minimum produce a collapse of the government in India -- a real collapse of the government structure. Therefore, it seemed much more important to prevent a Pakistani take over in Kashmir than it was to worry about the Chinese MRBMs. Is this not right?

[REDACTED]

INDIA II (STATE): Also you had a very heavy Soviet intervention here from the very outset. They had a hold of Pakistan from the very beginning and it seemed very dubious that the Pakistanis were going to do anything at all. They didn't do much fighting at all. We weren't going to give in on that.

INDIA II (NAVY): I think a thought too was that we really didn't need very much to hold Pakistan out of this fight. We didn't have to worry too much about that.

GAME DIRECTOR: Let's pass this to the US team of Game I. How much leverage did you feel you had in keeping Pakistan quiet? I visited one of the sessions and heard some, I'm afraid inconclusive, information of just what could be done to Pakistan to make it stay quieted down. In the end, how much did you decide you could influence Pakistan?

US I (AID): Not at all.

GAME DIRECTOR: Did you consider military action against Pakistan or military threats?

US I (AID): In terms of the US?

GAME DIRECTOR: Yes.

US I (AID): No, not seriously.

US I (WHITE HOUSE): One member did.

GAME DIRECTOR: Was this.....(Laughter) Are you the one?

US I (WHITE HOUSE): I'm the one. The next part is well taken in question two here. Would Pakistan have been harder to deal with (in Game I) had it been fully allied with Communist China and a declared enemy of Blue? It would have been easier to deal with as in a longer time with China than just to overstate it that way.

GAME DIRECTOR: In other words, this was partly the improvisation against military action against a country that was supposed to be or recently had been friendly allies and all that fuss.

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US I (WHITE HOUSE): I think the question is wrong. We'll argue that we were deterred from taking action absolutely essential if you are going to deal with the situation at all by past experience.

US I (AID): I think there is another consideration here which certainly could influence some of us and that's the geography of the situation. If Pakistan was in the war and we went after Pakistan, for example, wouldn't this increase the chances of the Chinese entering East Pakistan? And wouldn't this raise the very serious threat of escalating the whole situation beyond our estimate that the Chinese had limited objectives. As soon as you got Pakistan in the situation there was East Pakistan, next to Siliguri and the Chinese would likely be down there in a short time.

US I (AID): It seemed to us that the Pakistani had the US in a painful position.

US I (CIA): Well, I was on the US Team also. It seemed to us at the outset, that perhaps if we did nothing, maybe the Control Team wouldn't notice (laughter). Then when we did come in, it seemed to us that we were so busy trying to shore up a very flabby unsubstantial India. When Pakistan, even with its limited sources, came in, it seems to us to make the problem of doing anything through India -- our efforts were through India -- ever so much more difficult. It was obvious the Indians would focus what they had on Pakistan. They had no choice.

GAME DIRECTOR: Again, you had a kind of prospective division of labor in which the Indians were set to take on the Pakistani, you were more responsible for the Chinese. If you project this a little further forward and suppose that the Indians were not successful -- or were not immediately successful -- in repulsing Pakistan, would you have been willing then to engage Pakistan alongside India or would you have found a way to withdraw gracefully, or simply tried to help win in the east even though India was losing in the west? Was this necessarily a viable division or were the contingencies that you had to face either backing out completely or joining India in a two-front war without the privilege of picking out whom your enemy would be?

[REDACTED]

US I (CIA): I think that throughout, our whole approach was "Let's do this with as little commitment as possible." In the first place, it was very difficult for us to see that this was a situation where U.S. prestige and interest ought to be committed in any important way. The problem was not one that's susceptible to being treated in military terms, but to be treated only by direct application at the point of pressure in China or pressure from the Russians on the Chinese. It never seemed worth the candle to our team to try to hit the Chinese directly. I think you come at this in question three. Blue's aid to India, in both games, was limited to direct support of local defense, with neither actions nor threats against economic or other assets on Chinese territory. Was this because coercive bombing was considered unnecessary, ineffective, unpopular, or dangerous? That was the heart of the problem. In other words, if the assumption by the Indian planners was that the U.S. would feel a requirement to make this a matter of principle and say to the Chinese, "You may not move in this area because we will prevent you from doing so." This was never accepted by the U.S. team as a matter of policy.

GAME DIRECTOR: Let's then skip to question five of the original agenda. "The danger of Indian 'collapse' was of concern to both Blue teams, quite explicitly to one of them. How much should this danger deter Blue's involvement? Can China destroy India internally by a war that stays safely within the 'ragged areas'?" How much was considered to be at stake when you say you wanted to act on the cheap, was this because it didn't seem to matter if India was or was not lost anyway? At least one of the teams seriously talked about the possibility of an Indian collapse. It wasn't altogether clear what collapse meant. I forget which team that was, but the implication was that if it looked as though India would collapse the U.S. would rather be out than in.

US I (AID): They would rather stay out in this one.

GAME DIRECTOR: They were planning to sit out?

[REDACTED]

US I (AID): I think that if India collapsed, we would have gotten out, as we saw it. They painted a rather dim picture certainly in the facts that were given us at the outset of India's capabilities. It was kind of standard talk around our team that if India hadn't got those fertilizer factories built by 1970, she was in pretty poor shape. Certainly her transport capabilities would be so poor, her port facilities would be so poor, her whole internal distribution system would be so poor that she couldn't maintain any kind of a strong military operation in India. Quite apart from the question of whether you want to confront China rather directly in India, where the Chinese were coming across, it seemed to us that it was a question of whether India could make the grade or whether she couldn't. And if she could, great! It's damned important that she should, but there didn't seem to be an awful lot that we could do to change the situation in terms of large scale support. Our hope had to be that if the Chinese effort did have limited objectives, we could somehow handle the Pakistan situation with no leverage as we saw it. Presumably the Indians if helped by us in the east, with air support and the like, could handle the Pakistanis and wouldn't fall apart and you just sort of had to cross your fingers and say, "I hope to Christ the Indians don't fall apart."

INDIA I (OSD): I was on the India I team. Let me answer very quickly a number of these points from our team's viewpoint that haven't been expressed here. Either out of good sense or naivete, I'm not sure of which, we weren't at all concerned about nuclear attacks. Secondly, we certainly did feel that the Kashmir dispute was the more serious and I think that China did have limited objectives. In fact, at a later stage of the game we transferred troops from the eastern front to meet the Pakistanis. In connection with U.S. support, our major problem was transportation plus logistics. We were almost desperate as far as trying to obtain additional transport from the United States. At one stage we debated and decided not to attack covertly the United States and try to blame it on the Pakistanis or the Chinese or someone in order to obtain greater U.S.

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involvement. However, I think that from the viewpoint of the Indians, additional logistics support -- additional air transport -- could have made a considerable difference and might have been exactly the difference that enabled us to hold together and handle the situation or not to.

INDIA I (JCS): That's a very good team summary. I thank you. One thing that got kicked around at the last meeting, just about as we were to close up was rather interesting. It related to question seven. "Would any kind of Indian nuclear capability have mattered? Was there a mode of utilization (ADM's for example) that might have appealed to Green? Would Yellow's nuclear diplomacy have been different if some real or token Indian nuclear capability had existed?" There was a proposal that we Indians start making nuclear weapons. There wasn't much clarity about what we were going to do with them once we got them made. It was mentioned and that's the only thing I can add to your comments at this point.

GAME DIRECTOR: Let me summarize the three points that I think arose by the Indian collapse. First, Indian collapse was considered likely enough to require serious concern and contingency plans. Second, US intervention would not decisively have affected the odds on Indian collapse. They were either going to collapse or not. And third, Indian internal transport, in particular, in this crisis might have made a difference to the problem of collapse or no collapse. Now does this also imply that the Chinese team by playing it cool, confining itself to Sikkim, Bhutan, a little trouble in Nagaland, a bit of a threat from Burma, a little encouragement from Pakistan, might have had it in its power to cause the collapse of India with little risk to itself?

CPR I (DIA): Our team did consider that possibility of course. This was certainly a major factor in our considerations. The danger of India collapsing under just the pressure that was apparent was great enough so that we felt that it would be less than useful to make any invasion of Assam. In the first place, we didn't really want Assam. It contained more troubles

[REDACTED]

than we needed. In the second place, we felt that the threats against India and internal pressures from Kerala and other soft communist areas would divert their attention to the point where they probably could not drive us out of the Indian frontier states. If we would not stir up the situation any more than was necessary to secure those areas, these pressures on India would either bring about a collapse or an environment in which we could negotiate and keep substantially all of our gains.

INDIA II (CSD): We worried about this naturally. Our first reaction, if I may summarize, was to be rather panicky. We saw the threat very strongly -- the Chinese threat, in particular, and the limitations of our own ability to move troops and so on. The game itself was really not detailed enough to be able to address the question of whether we had enough transportation to do all the things that needed doing. In one sense your question can really not be answered in context of the game. We, I think unconsciously came around to the following kind of a solution to your question though. About Move II, or so, we realized that the Chinese had very similar logistic problems to the ones we had. They probably would not be able to mount a very large attack against India because of the very long land lines of communication, the very bad roads, weather, etc. Therefore, we felt an all out military threat really was not the big problem and that we could deal with this in terms of the manipulation of the border states and worrying about Pakistan trying to play off the Soviet Union against the U.S., and so on.

We deliberately did not address the unrest in India. There's always going to be the unrest in India. Let's just wait and see what happens. We gambled a fair amount in moving our strategic reserve closer to Nepal than was wise if the country was about to collapse and we certainly left the road from Pakistan to New Delhi open. I think the thing that sold us on being able to do a number of these things was the realization that the Chinese supply problem was at least as bad as ours. That is the Chinese communication system was at least as bad as ours in Tibet, which is the place that mattered.

[REDACTED]

INDIA II (ACDA): I think that in regards to morale, we gave ourselves a little bit more credit than Control gave us in the picture. We let patriotism play its role. It didn't worry us too much about the possibility of a political breakdown.

INDIA II (OSD): We became concerned a number of times to produce spectacular successes of one sort or another for morale reasons. A fair amount of our discussions centered on what could we do that looked good.

INDIA II (USN): May I answer the same thing? We had enough confidence that we could do something in this area and at the same time take a chance on Pakistan (because of our Soviet friends) that we moved large numbers of forces from the Pakistan frontier to the east where we could have some kind of military success. I think we had some confidence that we could give the Chinese a bloody nose. So this would help the country and remove a large concern about the collapse.

DIRECTOR: If collapse were considered to be a danger, what would have been the cause of it? Would it have been the shock to morale and confidence of a military defeat, or would it have been internal difficulties arising out of the need to prosecute war? Was collapse something that if it occurred was going to occur quickly, and if not quickly then the storm would be weathered? What would have contributed to it?

INDIA II (USN): While we didn't discuss this in our team, I could give a personal observation. I would have felt that a military defeat in the northeast would have snowballed, in a sense that we would have probably subjected ourselves to a Pakistani attack and these two things together could probably result in a collapse. I think this is the way I would have viewed it and I think this is in the back of the other people's minds. So it was important not to be defeated in the Chinese area and also to be able to show some military gains.

DIRECTOR: What was your definition of defeat?

INDIA II (USN): I think if we had to retreat from that whole area and get a bloody military nose. Perhaps having a pitched battle without American aid.

[REDACTED]

DIRECTOR: Suppose you had lost the Northeast Frontier Agency, Sikkim, nothing else, but couldn't recapture it. Would this constitute a shocking defeat or could this have been rationalized as a border scrape?

INDIA II (USN): I think it would have been much more dangerous to have suffered an actual defeat on the battlefield, in which you had a route in the army, even if no territory was seriously involved.

INDIA II (OSD): As I recall in our discussions, we put a loss of Kashmir and Jammu, a loss of Assam, Northeast Frontier Agency, as things that were to be avoided at all costs. This was clearly objective number one. Then we wanted to either retrieve the border states or save as many of them as we could. We wanted to prevent a military disaster in the Siliguri area and were willing to go to fair risks to do this. And, finally, we thought that clear alliance with either the Soviet Union or the U.S., or both, would be enough to prevent complete collapse. This is sort of how we solved it. And we came out alright on that score in the sense that the major provinces were saved, the border states were mixed. We lost Sikkim, Bhutan was on the half and half, and the border was quite uncertain, but not by any means hopeless. The military situation in Siliguri was OK. The Soviets were clearly our strong allies at that point.

INDIA II (STATE): Would you have expected to get U.S. help if say the NEFA were the only area that you were losing?

INDIA II (OSD): Well, we asked for this several times and got no answers except generalized ones. I recall that major Chinese attacks would bring U.S. help to us.

DIRECTOR: One of the members said earlier that China didn't want to try to take Assam because they didn't see what great value Assam was. You're suggesting, aside from the value of Assam to the Chinese, if they had attempted to dislodge you there and had been successful, whatever they got out of it, you were facing the kind of collapse of morale that you were talking about?

[REDACTED]

INDIA II (OSD): In addition to this, it would have been a very strong indication for Pakistan to get into the fray and get its share somewhere. We put considerable weight on keeping the Chinese and the Paks apart -- physically separated.

DIRECTOR: This then implies to the US team that they should have been about as interested in keeping Pakistan quiet as helping to fight the Chinese.

INDIA II (OSD): This was considered very helpful and it happened in Game II.

US I (WHITE HOUSE): Our team may have read the problem wrong but certainly as we looked at it from the point of view of United States interests, we got the impression that India was in a very bad way -- famine in one area, total civilian unrest in one large state, a fear of conventional bombings of cities reminiscent of World War II. The picture we got of the country was one of very shaky control. Therefore, we even talked about the possibility of whether forces could be kept in the field because many of them were assigned to preserve order within the states.

Now maybe we got the wrong impression of the condition of this country. But it wasn't the esoteric thought of losing a little bit of real estate. It was the weakness that was basic to the local control of the individual towns, rural areas and states. And I think that's where our first orientation came from. Given this kind of situation some of the pleasantries of sovereignty and so forth would have been given rather secondary consideration.

It also left the U.S. objective of containing Communist China as a rather weird hangover, and I notice that in the discussion we've had here that we had gotten down to these border areas pretty fast without much counter-reaction. Is it in the U.S. national interest to permit this to take place? What is necessary? Maybe the way to put it is we can't contain Communist China cheaply.

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One observation I do want to make about nuclear weapons before we forget this entirely. I think there are some of those who would urge that the United States make offers to India of protection in return for their not developing nuclear weapons. This was an element in our consideration. How far could we go with this kind of a guarantee. I think that if one were drawing lessons, one might say that there's a pretty sizable argument in terms of persuading the Indians not to go for a nuclear capability. We concluded they didn't mean much to the Chinese. We could get ourselves in a position where we would be obliged to do certain things in return for the Indians not developing a nuclear capability. I don't mean to labor the point, but this was an element in adding up U.S. national interests in dealing with this particular situation.

DIRECTOR: Now I take it that neither Chinese team had contemplated initiating the use of nuclear weapons, and while that doesn't prove that the Chinese wouldn't, it proves that the Americans on the Chinese teams didn't find this a plausible situation.

US I (WHITE HOUSE): Well, the Chinese had backup. It wasn't that they couldn't create the kind of chaos we feared in the Indian towns. There was no occasion for it. The points that the Indians had asked in the first scenario that Control gave us were hard to deal with because we were indebted to India in a sense on the nuclear commitment which was really academic. This is exactly the point I'm trying to make that the trouble could have been caused by the conventional weapons in major cities and the air defense requests to the U.S. were against conventional weapons, not nuclear. The commitment to come to India's aid and help them no matter what our deadline was lies on a different foundation. I don't want to labor this but...

DIRECTOR: The question you're raising is "What kind of guarantee proves in the event to matter to India, and how does that compare with the kind of guarantee that the U.S. teams were thinking about making?" It seems to me one thing that shows up in the game is that to the members of the Chinese team, it

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does not look as though a threat to retaliate against the Chinese first use of nuclears in 1970 with these weapons makes any real difference, because it isn't plausible for the Chinese Team that they should initiate nuclears. It isn't plausible to the Indian team that the Chinese would initiate, and my impression was that while, at least one U.S. team spent quite a little discussing the wording of the guarantee, they spent no time thinking about what they would actually do with the developing Chinese nuclear use. I took that to mean that they considered that contingency so remote that it wouldn't deserve to be mentioned in the diplomacy. It did not deserve two minutes of their planning time.

US I (CIA): Well, that's it exactly. It seemed to me the operative judgement here was the judgement that the Chinese objectives were very limited. All of us seemed to come to exactly the same conclusion and the talk about using nuclear weapons in a situation, where they were moving down inches at a time in a remote area where we could do very little against them directly seemed to us just part of the background knowledge, and not to be taken seriously.

GAME DIRECTOR: Suppose the Chinese team had decided having heard the previous discussions that the inflicting of significant military defeat, say on Assam, would bring about the collapse of Asia, which would be a major catastrophe for the United States. While the Chinese objective territorially may look only like an incursion halfway into Assam, the real object would be to cause a country of a half million people to collapse. Now, at this point the stakes might be a good deal higher. One could say the Chinese objective is very far reaching, even though their action doesn't have to reach far to accomplish it. Now, one could reach the conclusion that this is a danger that is worth the use of nuclear weapons. Would you have thought that if that was the Chinese objective, the Chinese would have been willing to initiate the use of nuclear weapons, and that a deterrent threat to stop them would have been badly needed by the Indians?

US I (CIA): It would not occur to us that the Chinese would have fancied they could achieve this objective, merely by the use of nuclear weapons in one or two engagements. This would certainly open up the whole situation into much broader terms of reference and oblige the United States to consider meeting the Chinese directly.

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GAME DIRECTOR: Doesn't this come back to the previous point that what these Chinese teams thought they might get out of their nuclear weapons, if they got anything was (to turn the language around), to minimize the possibility of American nuclear blackmail. That is to say, to deter the American use of or threat of nuclear weapons, not to threaten or to initiate the use on their own. This would have become operative in the game only if the United States got to the point where it were considering some use of nuclear weapons in a still non-nuclear contingency, knowing that the Chinese wouldn't initiate -- or strongly believed they wouldn't -- nevertheless, feeling it necessary to introduce nuclear weapons either to inflict defeat on the Chinese or to protect India or for any other objective. At this point I think one might have tested how much of a deterrent does it look to these teams that the Chinese "get" out of the modest capabilities which were given them. This, I think, we didn't test ourselves in the game because we didn't come close to the point where the Americans were considering actions that might be deterred by this rather puny Chinese nuclear capability.

US I (CIA): You would have to build a lot more into the scenario to make the whole Chinese movement much larger with less limited Chinese objectives and being very successful in terms of these objectives.

US I (AID): I don't know whether I speak for the whole team or not, but I know the team well enough that they'll say so if I don't. Insofar as I'm concerned, I went on the assumption that the U.S. would never use the nuclear bomb first. It's a paper bomb from that standpoint. I would guess that the Chinese would come to the same conclusion. They'd be foolish to use the bomb first themselves, when they've only got a few of them and we have an incredible capability. It seems to me that nuclear bombs for this kind of an exercise might just as well be shut up in the cupboard somewhere. They don't really enter into the picture at all.

The real issue in this case, it seems to me, the real lesson that comes out of this situation is, what can be done about the Kashmir dispute? That's the thing that really made the big difference here. It's not the nuclear bombs or anything else. It's the problem about the Kashmir dispute, that's the real thing here, and it made a real difference. Because if by 1970 the "Spirit of Tashkent" had gone on, you'd have these fellows in

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the realm of realism and plausibility to make them realistic. But still, wouldn't some valuable insights be derived if people were willing to try things where the risks are clearly not as great as they are in the real world? If you can assure them that trying these things does not brand them with the name of "hawk" or "dove" outside of the game and you also urge them in a preliminary briefing and discussion, to be willing to gamble -- to play the game with the purpose of deriving the insight rather than to see whether or not to keep the United States from losing or whatever -- wouldn't this be important?

GAME DIRECTOR: This is a war in which if you lose it's not for keeps. We usually try to solve this by designing what we think is an absolutely fool-proof starting scenario which requires hard decision on both sides.

(Mixed conversation)

INDIA II (OSD): [] I'd like to add to your comments about the way these games seem to go not only that the aggressor can take a small bite and get away with it because the "defender" is willing to settle for a small loss, a very small loss, a loss which he considers negligible. I wonder whether that's not a part of the technique in the following sense. If I were playing a thousand games in succession and each time I would only lose a very, very small bit, maybe after about 300 games, I'd start worrying. Perhaps the fact that there are only a very few games that one gets involved in of a few moves, each of which makes the defender more relaxed about rocking on his heels. I guess this carries over into the real world in the sense that one does have to look at the question, where does one stop giving in? That's a point which Mr. Rusk makes very often nowadays about South Vietnam, I personally think quite accurately. If you don't stop aggression there, then you have the other choice of either in Laos or Thailand or Malaysia, or somewhere else. I wonder if one could design games which run fast enough in time of the moves where lots of small losses by one side become noticable, aggravating and a cause for a rather strong countermove even if its somewhat riskier than one feels like doing.

GAME DIRECTOR: We've only got a minute left. -- Let me suggest that if any of you have thoughts arising out of the game, reactions to these questions, reactions to the discussion or anything else, would you be willing to quickly dictate and send them to the Joint War Games Agency. They can go into the record just as this discussion does. And if you've said anything here today

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that you'd like to reflect on and say again in a more organized form, that would be welcome. That goes for everybody in the room. I thank you all for your participation and I'd like to ask [] to say the final benediction.

[] I have to stand in for the Chairman. [] He normally takes this opportunity to thank all of the agencies for participation, not only in the play, but in the preparation. You said we had done the job, actually this is a community job and we do thank you for the time and efforts of your people who helped make a scenario which we hoped was going to get somebody a bit closer to war than we did. It's been a great pleasure for all of us and on behalf of the Chairman and the Director of the Joint Staff, I thank you and your agencies for participating and hope that you'll be ready for the next one which will be in a couple of months if everything goes all right. The meeting is adjourned. Thank you, [] for a wonderful job.

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EXTRACTS OF ACTION LEVEL DISCUSSIONS

The following comments are extracts from the transcript of the Action Level Review of NU-66 which took place at the Pentagon from 1400-1600 hours on 2 February 1966:

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GAME DIRECTOR: If you're curious as to what these games are for, what they're good for, my impression is that most people get something out of them, but not everybody gets the same thing. Some games are particularly good at focusing on the process of decision-making, of planning or of estimating an adversary. Some games stir up substantive problems and policy issues. Some games are especially rich in by-products. Most games are a splendid cram-course in local geography and politics.

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GAME DIRECTOR: I don't want to confine the discussion today, but I thought that in a group this large we had to have some point of departure, so I've jotted down ten observations, which are in front of you now. (These are the same ten points listed on page D-3). We don't necessarily have to look at all of them, or to take them up in any particular order, I think possibly the one that surely deserves attention is the first one since even the time in which these games were pitched was determined by an interest in some kind of Chinese nuclear capability, and it is worth-while asking what difference that made?

"1. One purpose of the exercise was to see what difference some Chinese nuclear weapons would make. Is the answer that they did not make any difference? In what circumstance would they have made a difference? What alternative Chinese nuclear capability would have made a difference in this game?"

[REDACTED]

US-II: Let me get at this first question by saying that on the US-II Team, we pretty much had one objective right from the outset with which Control played precisely the way we wanted it played. The team really wanted to get into a situation that was positive to us -- Sino-Soviet confrontation. We recognized that there were dangers, and one of the things that concerned us most (it particularly concerned one member of the team) was the fear that bringing the Soviets and the Chinese into a confrontation might open the door to greater Soviet influence in the subcontinent. This bothered us, but our conclusion on this point was that the risk was worth taking. We thought that over the long run the Indians would of necessity require our economic assistance. Therefore, while we recognized that we were opening the door to the Soviets getting into India, we didn't think that this was an irrevocable action or at least one that was not manageable.

US-II: The first thing that struck us was the very minimum attention which Control gave to our US-II nuclear guarantee to India. As a matter of fact, it wasn't even mentioned in the subsequent response from Control and we weren't really quite sure how to interpret this because we felt this was a rather significant commitment on the part of the United States. As the game developed, and this continued to get closer to your question of Chinese nuclear weaponry, we really didn't feel that we were very much threatened by this as a problem. We didn't really see that it had very much direct pertinence in terms of the Indian confrontation on the border states. But it did seem to us to have some significance in terms of the possibility of a Chinese-Soviet confrontation. From our point of view this was borne out by the eventual move which had the Soviets respond to the Chinese shooting down of Soviet aircraft by not only retaliating against the base from which these aircraft flew, but in addition, taking action against Chinese nuclear facilities. From my point of view, we were not at all reluctant to see the Chinese and the Soviets move in this direction. We recognized that this might even raise the question of a

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nuclear engagement. We weren't much concerned about the Chinese nuclear capability, except that we were interested in seeing it disappear and preferably disappear by Soviet action rather than our own.

GAME DIRECTOR: Would somebody from India-II comment on US-II's remarks that its nuclear guarantee didn't seem to get much of a reaction?

INDIA-II: I was on India-II and I think it came through rather ambiguously. That didn't bother us too much because we, too, discounted the significance of the Chinese nuclear capability related to the situation that we faced.

US-II: The US-II Team was very unresponsive on the non-nuclear element. While there was a movement of forces, there was no indication of a willingness to provide India with military assistance or other forms of military aid.

CHINA-II: Might I comment for China-II, with respect to the first question? We felt that in terms of obtaining our objectives against India, and our initial objectives to the Himalayan area, that the nuclear weapons were a liability. One of our first moves was to quietly remove them from our bases in West China, so that when the Soviets hit us, they hit the base and didn't get any of our MRBMs. I would add that we felt that nuclear weapons might serve as an implicit deterrent against U.S. or, possibly even Soviet, actions in behalf of India because these nuclear weapons were targeted on Indian cities. They might prove a deterrent if the conflict escalated. I might add that we felt a little uncomfortable with the first scenario, having us make this private demarche to the Indians through Liu Shao-Chi, because we felt that this was probably going much further than the Chinese would want to do at that stage in the action.

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CONTROL: I would like to address myself to this first question. It seems to me that the situation was so limited that it was difficult in any event to make the nuclear threat creditable in this situation. I wonder whether or not the same nuclear capabilities in the hands of the Chinese would have been used differently if the initial situation had been different. If there had been a clear cut escalation to the point where the sides weren't speaking to each other with firmly developed threats to national interest of all sides, then there's a question in my mind what role the Chinese nuclear capability would play.

CHINA-I: Speaking for China-I, I think one of the things we faced right at the start was that we had two concepts of this war. One concept was that it was to be a military operation in which we would move in and take over Assam, and hope to crush India. Presumably, under those circumstances, we would attempt to use our nuclear capability, limited as it was. The other possibility was to develop this thing as a political-military experiment. We wanted to take advantage of the existing situation, which I thought gave us great gains, and use it politically to weaken India. We in China had plenty of time to let the situation develop.

GAME DIRECTOR: It is interesting that both Chinese teams played what you might call the same move, which was to deplore the nuclear threat that had been depicted in the scenario.

US-I: I want to speak from the standpoint of US-I. There was a little difference here with respect to what impact the Chinese nuclear capability had on us. We had quite a lengthy discussion on at least two occasions as to whether we shouldn't consider taking out the Chinese nuclear facilities and striking at the Chinese bases and so on. We concluded that they were probably more of a liability to the Chinese than they were a real concern to us.

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CHINA-II: On the other side of this nuclear coin, we on China-II found our own capability to be an embarrassment. It seemed to emerge that nuclear weapons weren't a very good weapon and, as a consequence, we felt if the conflict were kept within reasonable balance we didn't have anything to fear, at least from the US.

US-II: The character of the Chinese nuclear capability has some relationship to its utility in a specific situation. An MRBM, in a positive situation would be a pretty good weapon for deterrence. That is, you strike us and we could take out Indian cities. In an offensive sense, it doesn't seem to have very much practical application. I wonder how tactical nuclear weapons might have affected the equation?

US-I: According to the scenario, the objectives of China appeared to be just the border states. Both teams estimated these objectives correctly and this was the principle factor that made nuclear weapons rather irrelevant. The thing that bothered us most about the threat of nuclear weapons was whether the Chinese objective might be to crush India. If not, there wasn't any sense in talking about nuclear weapons.

CONTROL: If the Chinese had even a very limited second strike capability against the United States, they might have been able to make a demonstration that amounted to the use of nuclear weapons even if they had burst one at an extremely high altitude over India, after we had given the guarantee or asked the United States to give the guarantee and United States had made no response. I can imagine panic in the Indian Government and they might not have had to use nuclear weapons at all against Indian targets to get the Indians to concede to the objectives that the Chinese were really seeking. I think you have a question here about what would have happened if the character of the weapons had been different.

GAME DIRECTOR: Is it generally agreed that in neither game did we come close to a contingency in which any of the sort of plausible alternative Chinese nuclear capabilities would yet have made a

real difference? Would it follow that this was a potential deterrent that would become significant if things escalated considerably and only then would the Chinese nuclear capability have been greatly appreciated by the U.S., India or China itself?

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"2. Pakistan did make a difference. Is the Kashmir dispute more trouble than Chinese weapons in this period of time? Would Pakistan have been harder to deal with (in Game I) had it been fully allied with Communist China and a declared enemy of Blue?"

US-II: May I speak from the point of view of US-II? In our first move, we started out discussing our estimate of long term objectives. For example: Chinese communists on the subcontinent. We then turned to the consideration of where our long term interests were most seriously affected. We did discuss in some length both in terms of strategy, and even in more limited tactical sense, whether we should not try to make a limited offer of assistance in general to the Indians, and at the same time put the pressure on the Indians to at least lay the ground work to start toward some hopeful and eventual solution in Kashmir which we recognize would probably be in terms of more concessions on the part of the Indians than the Pakistanis.

US-II: I'd like to mention one other aspect which we were thinking about on the US team. We had an initial judgement that the Russians might share to a considerable degree, at least in short terms, our general interest in seeing if we could establish some sort of settlement -- or lay the basis for a later settlement -- between Pakistan and India. We debated during the second move as to whether we had, at least for the purposes of this game, misread the Russian intention since they came back so strong, and relatively single handedly without our receiving any echo back very specifically from the Russians about our interest in the settlement.

GAME DIRECTOR: Well, that can illustrate the fact that when there happens to be a common interest it doesn't mean the Russians will choose to go about

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meeting it by common action. They may let interest overlap and go ahead on their own, if they think that by going on their own would give them an advantage over the United States.

GAME DIRECTOR: In a way, Pakistan was a much more serious enemy than China at the moment. Not only for military geographical reasons, but because Pakistan was the one enemy of the two that the United States was constrained about getting engaged with directly. It even occurred to me that the situation would have been much easier if Pakistan had been a full-fledged member of the Chinese Communist Bloc. Then the United States would have no embarrassment about lending all necessary support to India if it wanted to. However, under the circumstances it looked as though Pakistan in a way did China more good and India more harm by not being an enemy of the United States. So essentially we had one game that was very much oriented towards this question of whether the U.S. might get accidentally up-staged by the Soviet Union and one in which we explored the question whether continuing Indian-Pakistan rivalry with Kashmir was an obvious note of contention. Pakistan was more of a military liability to India and more of a political liability to the United States than the Chinese armies and the Chinese nuclear weapons.

US-I: This I think was really one of the greatest problems which US-I was faced with -- the determination of a handle on Pakistan. We actually couldn't find any. It was too slippery to get a hold of. We were faced with a situation where it would have embarrassed us if we would have gotten in with both feet and kicked her, and yet we couldn't watch India go down the drain without doing something. I think that's one of the real problems, one of the real situations to be looked at that comes out of this game is: "How do you approach a Pakistan problem of this type?" What can you do to handle this situation ahead of time? How do you find some handle to put on it now rather than when it happens?

GAME DIRECTOR: How seriously did you consider military threats and sanctions against Pakistan?

US-I: We went into it quite fully. Our Seniors really kept us against China and moved India against Pakistan. Actually, we were disturbed by the possibility of the Chinese, and the Pakistanis invading India at the same time. You recall, India wasn't in very good internal shape at that time. We were so disturbed by this we thought that perhaps we should stand aside completely. This was also a time when the Soviets were standing aside. We felt it was a bad situation to have the Chinese attacking, but with the Pakistanis in, too, it was a hopeless case for the United States to try to handle. We did everything we could with the Indians to try to pacify the Pakistanis and keep them out of it. In the end, we did try to look for a position to relieve her. We would have liked to handle the Chinese, and let the Soviets handle the Pakistanis.

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"5. The danger of Indian 'collapse' was of concern to both Blue teams, quite explicitly to one of them. How much should this danger deter Blue's involvement? Can China destroy India internally by a war that stays safely within the 'ragged areas'?"

GAME DIRECTOR: This relates to the Chinese team's objectives and the question as to the threat to India. At least one of the teams was very explicit about the danger of an Indian collapse. I think it was US-II, as they said in their first message: "If we estimate that India is going to collapse, we want to be out of it". Maybe I sat in on the discussion and carried away more of an impression of that than was in the message. The question that I'm raising is really not just what was the danger of Indian collapse, but to what extent could the Chinese Teams have said, "Our objective is not merely the Himalayas, but Indian collapse. We will seek to achieve it by staying in this comparatively safe geographical mode of operation. We'll pretend all we're trying to do is straighten out our borders and help the liberation movements in Sikkim and Bhutan, but the object is to shock, stun, discourage and demoralize India. Possibly with the help of Pakistan. A lot more fruit may fall off the tree after we've shaken the branches a little. Is this,

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the serious danger to all of India even though militarily the Chinese might confine it to the NEPA? To a couple of Himalayan states? With noises from the direction of Burma? And maybe with some help from Pakistan along the way?"

US-II: I think that we would have been in a much more difficult problem in terms of U.S. resolution of it, had we faced the situation where the scenario really described the danger of India coming apart at the seams, which I can easily imagine in the kind of situation you were just predicating.

GAME DIRECTOR: Tell me what you mean by coming apart at the seams?

US-II: The unrest within the Indian Government and the population which the scenario described worsened, demanding that the Indian Government take effective action. The Indian Government would have been faced with a major invasion on the outskirts of India. Under these circumstances with perhaps the Chinese in a position to capitalize upon their position and move further either in a direct way or maybe indirectly by exerting political influence within the Indian society. In this situation, we might have been posed with a more difficult problem than we were because from my point of view, the stakes just weren't high enough.

GAME DIRECTOR: I think that there are two different points here. One that I consider quite important is the notion that even if the Soviets gain undue influence in the near term because of the security that they give India, in the long run the United States has an economic capacity to buy its way back into the influence of India. The other has to do with this question of immediate collapse. Would it be fair to postulate that until the collapse of India was really threatened, the stakes were not high enough to warrant a great US involvement; but if the collapse had been more imminent, the United States didn't want to be involved.

US-II: Actually, we considered this perhaps in a more limited sense than the kind of thing that you're talking about. We had some discussion about the Assam and the NAGA areas. If there were a serious incipient Communist movement which the Chinese could nurture, say by limited military success in those areas temporarily from which they could later withdraw their military forces perhaps back to the border countries, and perhaps later would have amounted to a local people's regime in the Assam area, which is still part of India and used them in terms of internal Communist efforts in New Delhi, for example, to expand the internal degree of representation in the Chinese image in India. This would certainly have served in the Chinese interest in the long run.

US-II: It's entirely conceivable that the situation could have become so bad in India that no matter what the United States tried to do would have been of little help. I think actually that's what the Chinese government was banking on.

GAME DIRECTOR: Was your Chinese Team ambitious enough to look forward to that?

CHINA-I: Yes, indeed. This was only the first step. After all, it's still 1970 and one has to see beyond that. Hoping that through the example of achieving Sikkim we could carry on with this process of disintegration. We could reach the point where there wouldn't be any recognizable India left.

GAME DIRECTOR: Would it be fair to say that your main interest in Sikkim, Bhutan or the Nagaland was the corrosive effect on the whole subcontinent rather than on these territories alone?

CHINA-I: That was certainly a very large part of it, but also around the world. We couldn't close our eyes to the situation elsewhere in the world -- in the United Arab Republic and in Africa. A success at this time in India would have tremendous effect on our image everywhere.

GAME DIRECTOR: I have an impression that when it is said that the stakes were not very high, you're

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saying that to the Chinese Team the stakes were very large. They were not just a few hundred thousand people in Sikkim. They were all of India and your interests spread to other continents.

CHINA-I: That's very true. You remember from the scenario how we (Chinese) had taken a beating in Vietnam. Now our program was to restore prestige within the communist movement and around the world. This was sort of a heaven-sent opportunity.

GAME DIRECTOR: Does this imply that if the US team had achieved the objective of momentarily holding the fort -- perhaps not reconquering Sikkim, perhaps not reconquering the NEFA, perhaps with the NAGA rebellion still a little bit uncertain as to how we'd come out -- the U.S. might have been able to say we achieved most of our objectives? Had the U.S. preferred not to go up with the Sikkimese to help India would your Chinese team have said, "Splendid, we achieved most of our objectives. They're very important objectives. It's a great success for China, not only here, but all over the world."

CHINA-I: That's what we were trying to do when we offered to negotiate. We were trying to signal that this was all we wanted at this point.

US-II: I don't think your description of the US team is accurate. We would have been unhappy about it for a variety of reasons. However, we were relieved of that particular anxiety by virtue of the Soviets rushing into the gap.

US-I: The US I team was more concerned about this possibility than had been mentioned in US-II. We were actually concerned that if the Chinese were able to take Assam and perhaps Kashmir and India couldn't do anything about it, India might very well have crumbled. We felt that the Chinese could gain some rather large advantages out of just taking pieces along the periphery of India and hope that the chaotic internal situation in India would remove any kind of support of the Chavan government.

US-I: That's why we considered more seriously than the US-II did, the possibility of using nuclear weapons against China. We felt that this was probably the only way in which we could really use our assets against this kind of a problem. At the end of the first day we decided to see what India could do. Then we would see what events transpired rather than rush in too quickly.

GAME DIRECTOR: If you had realized that you were getting very involved and India looked as though it were going to crumble and you couldn't prevent it by some sudden act on China or anything of this sort, would this have led you to assume even greater responsibilities toward the containment of China?

US-I: The US-I team on the first move had some soul-searching about whether they would have maintenance of a viable India as one of their goals. They gave it up -- they would not have it as a goal on the first move -- and in that move they gave as a contingency that if India collapsed they'd withdraw. On the third move they were willing to put more aid into India and finally in the third move decided they should add to their goal that they wanted a viable India.

GAME DIRECTOR: (To U.S. teams). Suppose the game had gone on two more moves and Control had retroactively improved the Pakistani march and had fixed things up so that it looked as though even if you could eventually have stopped the Pakistani, you couldn't have easily driven them out -- you couldn't have achieved a quick morale building military victory against the Pakistanis. Suppose the food situation got worse in Kerala, the police couldn't take care of it and you had to consider a little truce down there. Perhaps more Chinese action was thrown in and all of a sudden it looked as though this nice little war -- where America gets to fight with China, whom we would like to fight and India gets to fight Pakistan, who they like to fight -- isn't going to be handled quite that way. Would you naturally have been willing to fight against Pakistan if it proved necessary or might this have been a real stumbling block in the whole plan to save India?

[REDACTED]

US-I: I think we would have not committed any more resources. We would not have attacked Pakistan. We would have probably considered withdrawal. The settlement was to really get behind India and if India could not handle the Pakistani situation, then we didn't want to be underneath India when it fell.

GAME DIRECTOR: Suppose you could have saved India? Well, let's say that either for military or diplomatic reasons, you estimate that you were willing to engage Pakistan. You could stop them. Either they would be obliged to withdraw or you could throw them back. Let's suppose that you received an estimate that if American forces engaged Pakistan you could contain this western problem and pursue the southeast Asian problem and India would probably gain cohesion. If you didn't, Pakistan might lean to one side, and with your withdrawal the Chinese would be more lively from the other side. Now the question is: Would you have favorably considered military action against Pakistan and, if not, would it have been that you just didn't want to fight that war? Would it have been that there's something wrong about fighting your friends and getting along with your enemies? Would it have been that you were afraid this would have brought Pakistan into the Chinese Communist orbit? What would have been the reason that you were willing to fight the Chinese in eastern India and not Pakistan in western India?

CONTROL: There's one thing interesting here. On the US-I team an original plan was to withdraw if they saw India crumbling. As they really became involved in the third move, and after Pakistan entered into this conflict, they offered India additional assistance in the form of tactical air and air transport. Towards the end of the game they were becoming quite heavily engaged in eastern India. How could they at this time consider withdrawing or disengaging themselves?

US-II: One thing that did not come into the play that I would like to mention here in regard to Pakistan is that in the first move we did not anticipate a major Russian jump into the game. We were at first looking wide and rather hard at the Chinese threat. We tried to gently put the pressure on the Indians in regard to

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Kashmir. We were considering as a second move, if the Paks threatened seriously the possibility that we might try somehow to place internationally sponsored forces in Kashmir. We would try to arrange this with the Russians or, in the extreme case, unilaterally. We would inform the Indians and Pakistanis that we were going to place forces into the Kashmir area before anything really started between the Paks and the Indians. We would then tell the Indians, "Your western flank is relatively secure, you can now cope with the threat from the Chinese in the east." We would tell the Paks, "Look, at least you've got a hope that you might eventually some day get something out of a plebiscite."

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GAME DIRECTOR: Let's go to question eight, since this was so much on the minds of the teams.

"8. If the Sino-Soviet dispute reaches the action stage, is there some point at which Blue should become (a) concerned about the dangers of war, (b) concerned that the Soviets will dominate China, or (c) concerned that American influence is put too much in the back seat?"

US-II: When we talked about the dangers of war, we were mystified in the specifics of the scenario of just what was panicking our British cousins. Perhaps the Japanese might be concerned about some fallout in their direction from a short exchange. What caused the Japanese and British concern? We did not see the dangers of all-out Sino-Soviet war were very great at that point. We thought we would like to see the Sino-Soviet conflict continue.

GAME DIRECTOR: Would you have liked to see the Soviet Union use at least one nuclear weapon on China?

US-II: We would have liked to have seen a Soviet interference with a significant portion of the Chinese Communist capability in the nuclear field. Not necessarily by the use of nuclear weapons.

[REDACTED]

US-II: At one point we discussed the question of how far for example the President of the United States could put himself in the position of egging on two major powers, which was really what we were doing if by no other action than by removing any restraining influence that we might have otherwise observed in normal circumstances. The extent to which he could satisfactorily do this -- up to and including a point short of a major war -- was discussed. But the question of whether the eventuality of a very major war wouldn't inevitably draw us into it at some point in time was not discussed.

GAME DIRECTOR: I remember from one of the meetings a US team was discussing this in terms of "Let's hold their coats and see how far they'll go." Somebody brought up the idea that this might be a rather cheap way for both the US and the USSR to achieve a common objective and that's the elimination of this needling Chinese nuclear threat.

INDIA-II: Our Indian team wanted to see the Sino-Soviet confrontation continue. Both the action team and the seniors would like to have seen this continue long enough to have the Soviets eliminate the Chinese Communist nuclear capability.

* * * * *

US-II: I don't think that any of us seriously considered that this was going to result in a pro-Soviet faction coming into power in Peking or of solidifying relations resulting in some team work between Moscow and Peking in which Peking was clearly the junior assistant partner and Soviet Russia was purely in control.

US-II: We thought about the possibility of the Soviet Union dominating China. We would have said, "Let them try." How the hell do you dominate six hundred million people? It would have been -- I'm projecting now, in my own thoughts, but I think this is it -- just how do you handle a problem of this magnitude. Therefore, in terms of how you put your question, I would ask you, what do you mean by this? Do you mean exercise of military control? Do you mean a political equation, or just what? How do you dominate a land mass and a population mass of this sort?

US-II: We pursued this about twenty minutes and that's about all. It was one of the assumptions, momentarily, that the real conflict between the USSR and China was the good old national problem that has existed for centuries. The USSR did indeed have a long-range concern about the Chinese and they might well want to use this opportunity to at least eliminate the Chinese nuclear capability. Once that is done, they don't really have to worry about the Chinese threat against them, because they hold the trump cards as far as still having nuclear power. Therefore, it wasn't quite the question of the Soviets dominating China, but really holding the trump cards over Communist China.

CHINA-II: Could I throw in the reaction of China II into this whole development? We didn't understand why Control might wish to raise this spectre of confrontation to test the reaction of the other teams or to move the game ahead to a crisis situation? It is very hard to believe that the Soviet Union would in real life have taken such steps because we felt they would feel that on this issue they were risking so much in long term consequences in their leadership of the International Communist movement. They were becoming so vulnerable by their actions. We really didn't think that they were going to push it any further.

GAME DIRECTOR: If the Soviets took out the Chinese nuclear capability, both would be weakened. And the United States would gain relative to both. The Chinese would be weakened by having lost their nuclear weapons and lost a share of influence and power. They had been a nuclear power since 1964 and were unable to deal satisfactorily with this Russian threat. Also, among many communist and other leftists and perhaps others in the world, the Chinese would fear all the more now to have been engaged in something from the standpoint of their national interest. At the same time, the Russians would certainly lose a good deal in terms of any long run expectations of being able to re-establish some degree of influence in China by this move.

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CHINA-I: We have filled almost two hours with the primary thrust of the conversation being on the "nucs". I would ask the question, "Why is it that Control obviously figured the nuclear question was the most important?" Throughout the game this was played as being most important. Yet, immediately both Chinese teams, both US teams and to a certain extent, I gather, even the Indian teams, ruled the Chinese nuclear capability out as being the most important. Yet, throughout the action all teams ignored to a various degree a collapse of India and what impact this would have on a world-wide basis. We ignored the impact of these large Chinese ground forces that were in position and able to move in practically any direction. We ignored the impact of the loss of Sikkim, Bhutan and the Nagaland -- again always coming back to the nuclear question. Actually the thing I have trouble with here is what is this terrific emphasis on something that even today's world will not face?

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GAME DIRECTOR: Things like the collapse of India may be properly judged in terms of the knowledge available at the time. Now that the game is over, and now that we have several years until 1970 to think about the problem, maybe we should look very seriously not only at the question of how serious it would be if India collapsed, but what difference it would make if it collapsed:

- a. With China taking the credit.
- b. In spite of American efforts to help.
- c. Because the Americans were unwilling to fight Pakistanis, and therefore let it go.
- d. For internal reasons that had they been anticipated, might have been somewhat remedied.
- e. For things that were so wholly beyond our control that all we could do was get ready for it.

NU I & NU II - 66

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ACTION LEVEL PARTICIPANTS

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